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Fernando Chui
Fernando Chui
Fernando Chui
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Fernando Chui Sai On GCM GML (Chinese: 崔世安; Jyutping: Ceoi1 Sai3 On1; born 13 January 1957) is a Macau politician who served as the 2nd chief executive of Macau from 2009 to 2019. He served as secretary for social and cultural affairs from 1999 to 2009.

Key Information

Chui was born in 1957 to local construction tycoon Chui Tak Seng and Chan Keng Fan, the second son after Chui Sai Cheong. His wife is a niece of the late Hong Kong tycoon Henry Fok Ying-tung.

Education

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In Macau, Chui attended Lingnan High School and then finished high school at Hawaiian Mission Academy in Honolulu before pursuing his post-secondary education. Chui obtained his university training in the United States where he obtained his various degrees:

He was guest professor at the Huanan Teachers Training University.[clarification needed]

Due to studying in the United States at a younger age, Chui did not have the opportunity to study Mandarin (Putonghua), and thus does not speak it well. This was evident when he made his oath of acceptance as Chief Executive of Macao in front of Chinese leader Hu Jintao.

Chief Executive of Macau

[edit]

Prior to becoming Chief Executive, Chui served as a member of the 5th Legislative Assembly of Macau.

In June 2009 Chui was declared to be the sole candidate for the position of Macau's chief executive. He was nominated by 286 members of the 300-member election committee. On election day, 26 July 282 committee members voted for Chui (14 blank, 4 abstention), and was subsequently appointed by Wen Jiabao, Premier of China. He assumed his new role as Chief Executive of Macau in December 2009.[2][3][4][5]

On 31 August 2014, Chui was re-elected as Macau's Chief Executive with 380 votes from the 400-member election committee.[6] Meanwhile, 7,762 Macau residents voted having no confidence in Chui becoming the Chief Executive in an unofficial "referendum".[7]

List of policy addresses

[edit]
Year English title Portuguese title Chinese title
2017 Development Plan in Progress for Building a Perfect Home "Implementação Progressiva do Planeamento, Construção Conjunta de um Bom Lar" 逐步落實規劃 共建美好家園[permanent dead link]
2016 Boosting the economy, focusing on livelihoods, and ensuring stable development[permanent dead link] "Impulsionar a economia, promover o bem-estar da população, consolidar o desenvolvimento" 促經濟 重民生 穩發展[permanent dead link]
2015 Coordinate planning to ensure stable development Converge collective wisdom to open new chapters[permanent dead link] "Coordenar o planeamento, promover o desenvolvimento estável Reunir sabedorias da sociedade, alcançar conjuntamente novos progressos" 統籌規劃 穩健發展 匯聚民智 同創新篇 Archived 23 November 2015 at the Wayback Machine
2014 Enhance Underlying Strength and Promote Sustainable Development[permanent dead link] "Aumentar a capacidade global e promover o desenvolvimento sustentável" 增強綜合實力 促進持續發展 Archived 4 June 2015 at the Wayback Machine
2013 Enhance the Well-being of Society and Prepare for Long-term Development Archived 4 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine "Melhorar o bem-estar da população e planear o desenvolvimento a longo prazo" 增進民生福祉 立足長遠發展 Archived 3 August 2016 at the Wayback Machine
2012 Promoting Adequate Diversification of the Economy and Raising Overall Standard of Living Archived 4 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine Promover a diversificação adequada da economia e elevar a qualidade de vida da população[permanent dead link] 推動經濟適度多元 提高民生綜合水平 Archived 3 August 2016 at the Wayback Machine
2011 Adopting a Scientific Approach to Public Administration; Drawing a Blueprint for Future Development Archived 4 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine "Desenvolvimento concertado e progresso harmonioso" 落實科學施政 規劃發展藍圖[permanent dead link]
2010 Coordinated Development in Harmony Archived 4 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine "Desenvolvimento concertado e progresso harmonioso" 協調發展 和諧共進 Archived 3 August 2016 at the Wayback Machine

Election results

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Legislative Assembly

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Year Candidate Hare quota Mandate List Votes List Pct
1992 Fernando Chui (UPD) 3,271 No.5/8 6,543 23.75%

Chief Executive

[edit]
Year Candidate Votes Pct
2009 Fernando Chui 282 95.27%
2014 Fernando Chui 380 96.95%

Charities

[edit]
  • Executive manager and director of Medical and Health Department of the Tung Sin Tong Charitable Institution
  • President of Macau Jaycees
  • Executive Director of Macau Kiang Wu Hospital Charitable Association
  • board member of the Macau Eye-Bank Foundation
  • Vice President of the Association of the Management Professionals
  • Honorary President of the Association of Nursing Staff of Macau

Chui is also involved in youth and education causes including:

  • tutor in the Chamber of Commerce for International Youth
  • member of the Youth Committee of the Macau Government
  • headmaster of the Kiang Ping School
  • President of the Youth Association of the Kiang Wu Hospital
  • member and Standing Committee member of All-China Youth Federation

Scandals

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Chui has been linked to several scandals during his time as a minister of Edmund Ho's administration.[8]

Most notably, the East Asian Games in 2005 were run under Chui's portfolio and put him in the midst of the Ao Man Long scandal. The games ran over budget by 70%. Ao allegedly received a MOP50 million (US$6.2 million) bribe in connection with the construction contract for the games' centerpiece, the Macau Dome indoor arena. Overall, that project wound up costing MOP640 million, MOP285 million over budget. As a result, he was extremely unpopular amongst the pro-democracy camp even before he was elected as the chief executive.[9][10] In 2016, Chui was caught up in allegations of transferring Macau's reserves to the mainland. He was accused of favouritism after the Macau Foundation – a quasi-official foundation of which he is chairman and of which his brother heads the supervisory board – donated 100 million yuan ($15.4 million) of public money to Jinan University in Guangzhou, of which he is deputy head of the board. The Macanese government said that the donation was made in return for China's long-standing support to the SAR.[11]

Honours

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Fernando Chui

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Fernando Chui Sai On (born 13 January 1957) is a Macanese politician who served as the second Chief Executive of the Macau Special Administrative Region from 20 December 2009 to 20 December 2019. He was elected unopposed in both terms, succeeding Edmund Ho and prioritizing continuity in governance under the "one country, two systems" framework. Prior to his chief executive role, Chui held the position of Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture from 2002 to 2009, during which he managed cultural heritage initiatives and public health policies. Educated in the United States with a bachelor's degree in community health from California State University, Sacramento, and later earning a master's and PhD in public administration from the University of Hong Kong, Chui brought expertise in health and administration to his leadership. Under his administration, Macau sustained robust economic growth fueled primarily by the gaming and tourism sectors, maintaining low unemployment rates below 2% and accumulating substantial fiscal reserves exceeding MOP 500 billion by the end of his tenure. Chui's government advanced moderate economic diversification into areas such as finance, conventions, and Chinese medicine, while enhancing infrastructure like the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge to bolster regional integration. His term also saw expansions in social welfare, including increased education funding—deemed one of his proudest achievements—and public housing initiatives to address livelihood concerns. Despite these developments, Chui's leadership encountered criticism over limited political reforms and handling of public discontent, including 2014 protests against perceived elite capture, though stability was preserved without major concessions. Family connections to business interests drew scrutiny regarding potential conflicts, yet no direct corruption charges materialized against him personally. Post-tenure, Chui has maintained a low profile, praised for integrity amid Macau's evolving challenges.

Early Life and Education

Family Background and Upbringing

Fernando Chui Sai On was born in 1957 in to Chui Tak Seng, a prominent tycoon, and grew up in a well-off with extensive business interests in , pharmaceuticals, and trading. His father died in 1984, leaving a substantial portfolio to Chui and his older brother Chui Sai Cheong, born in 1954. The Chui clan, originating from Xinhui in province with six generations established in , belonged to one of the territory's influential elite families alongside the Ma and Ho clans, maintaining close ties between , business, and politics. Chui's upbringing occurred amid Macau's pre-handover era under administration, in a traditional and patriotic household linked to mainland Chinese associations such as the All-China Federation. He completed at Ling Nam School in , reflecting the family's emphasis on local roots before his departure for studies in the United States. From early on, family networks positioned him for , though specific childhood influences beyond the clan's commercial and political prominence remain undocumented in available records.

Academic Qualifications and Early Influences

Fernando Chui Sai On was born on 13 January 1957 in , into a family with deep roots in the territory spanning six generations and origins in Xinhui, province. His , Chui Tak Seng, built a successful business that contributed to local development, while the family's longstanding involvement in shaped Macau's social landscape and political networks since the . This environment of entrepreneurial and community-oriented activities likely oriented Chui toward and from an early age, reflecting broader patterns in Macau's elite families where business success intertwined with civic contributions under Portuguese colonial rule. Chui pursued higher education in , graduating with a in from , earning honors for his academic performance. He continued at the , where he obtained both a and a PhD in from the School of . These qualifications positioned him among Macau's most formally educated officials, emphasizing preventive health and urban sanitation—fields resonant with his family's legacy in community-building projects.

Early Professional Career

Roles in Education and Administration

Chui Sai On returned to Macau in 1984 following the completion of his doctoral studies in at the in the United States. He entered the education sector, serving as principal of Kiang Peng School during the 1990s, where he oversaw administrative operations and school management. This position provided him with direct experience in educational administration amid Macau's transition toward the 1999 handover to Chinese sovereignty.

Involvement in Local Legislature

Fernando Chui Sai On served as a member of the 5th from to 1996. This term occurred under administration prior to the 1999 handover to the , during which the assembly handled legislative matters including oversight of colonial governance. Chui was elected to the assembly in , marking his initial entry into formal legislative roles. Specific contributions from his tenure, such as committee assignments or sponsored legislation, are not prominently documented in available records, though his participation aligned with his broader background in education and administration.

Rise to Secretary for Social and Cultural Affairs

Appointment and Initial Responsibilities (1999–2004)

In August 1999, Fernando Chui Sai On was appointed by the Central People's Government of the as the Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture for the incoming Special Administrative Region (SAR) government, as part of the principal officials-designate announced ahead of the sovereignty handover from scheduled for December 20, 1999. At age 42, Chui brought expertise from his degree earned in the United States and prior administrative roles in Macau's education and health sectors. Chui formally assumed office on December 20, 1999, coinciding with the handover ceremony, under the first Chief Executive, Edmund Ho Hau-wah. His portfolio encompassed the Secretariat for Social Affairs and Culture, overseeing policies and administration in education, public health, social welfare, youth affairs, sports, tourism, and cultural preservation—areas critical for social stability during Macau's transition to SAR status. In the initial years (1999–2004), Chui's responsibilities centered on integrating these sectors into the framework, including adapting Portuguese-era institutions to requirements while addressing post-Asian recovery needs, such as bolstering social services amid economic contraction and peaking at around 7% in 2000. The secretariat under his leadership managed transitional challenges like harmonizing health and welfare systems with linkages, without major disruptions reported in official assessments, and laid groundwork for later expansions in and efforts. This period emphasized continuity and administrative efficiency to foster public confidence in the new SAR governance.

Key Policies and Reforms (2004–2009)

During his tenure as Secretary for Social and Cultural Affairs from 2004 to 2009, Fernando Chui Sai On prioritized the preservation and promotion of Macau's , culminating in the inscription of the on the World Heritage List on July 15, 2005, as China's 31st such site. This achievement, built on preparatory efforts dating back to at least 2001, recognized the area's unique blend of Chinese and architectural influences spanning over 400 years. In response, Chui emphasized the establishment of a coordinated management system for heritage sites, including conservation measures, public-private partnerships, and community involvement to ensure and protection against urban pressures. These initiatives aimed to integrate heritage preservation with tourism growth, fostering cultural pride among residents while stimulating related economic activities without compromising authenticity. In the realm of education, Chui chaired key meetings of the Education Council, such as the June 8, 2005, session focused on advancing non-tertiary education reforms, including curriculum enhancements and infrastructure improvements to align with Macau's post-handover development needs. He introduced administrative policies emphasizing quality education access, teacher training, and alignment with broader social goals, as outlined in policy addresses during this period. These efforts contributed to increased government investment in schooling amid the gaming industry's revenue surge, laying groundwork for expanded enrollment and facilities, though full implementation of measures like extended free education occurred later. Social welfare policies under Chui's oversight benefited from Macau's economic boom, with expanded budgets supporting community services, , and youth programs, though specific reforms emphasized regulatory frameworks over structural overhauls. Initiatives included enhanced coordination between government and NGOs for welfare delivery, reflecting a flexible, needs-based approach amid rising prosperity from casino liberalization in 2002. Overall, these policies maintained continuity with the administration's focus on stability, prioritizing incremental improvements in social security and cultural identity to support Macau's integration into the framework.

Path to Chief Executive

2009 Election Process and Unopposed Victory

The for Macau's third Chief Executive since the 1999 handover to took place on July 26, 2009, organized by a 300-member comprising representatives from key societal sectors including , , , , and national bodies. The committee's composition favored pro-Beijing interests, ensuring alignment with central government priorities under the "" framework. Fernando Chui Sai On, serving as Secretary for Social and Cultural Affairs since 1999, formally declared his candidacy on May 13, 2009, positioning himself as the successor to outgoing Chief Executive Hau-wah. The nomination period ran from June 12 to 23, 2009, requiring at least 30 endorsements (10% of the committee) for eligibility; Chui secured 286 nominations, far exceeding the threshold and signaling strong establishment backing. No other individuals registered as candidates by the deadline, rendering Chui unopposed and underscoring the controlled nature of the selection process, where potential challengers faced significant barriers including the need for substantial support and implicit approval. On , all 300 committee members participated, with Chui receiving 282 votes—94% of the total—while 14 ballots were blank and 4 invalid. The Court of Final Appeal validated the results on August 3, 2009. Chui's appointment was endorsed by China's State Council, leading to his on December 20, 2009, for a five-year term. This unopposed victory reflected continuity in Macau's amid driven by the gaming sector, though it drew criticism from pro-democracy groups for lacking competitive elements.

2014 Re-election and Mandate Renewal

Chui Sai On, the incumbent Chief Executive, announced his candidacy for re-election in July 2014, emphasizing administrative reforms and economic diversification amid Macau's gaming boom. The election occurred on , 2014, conducted by a 400-member dominated by pro-Beijing interests, as stipulated by Macau's for indirect selection of the Chief Executive. Running unopposed, Chui secured 380 votes, equivalent to 96.95 percent of the total, with the remaining 20 votes withheld, reflecting the controlled nature of the process lacking public suffrage. The unopposed outcome underscored the absence of competitive challengers, as potential candidates required nomination by a significant portion of the pro-establishment , limiting broader participation. Following endorsement by the central government in , Chui's second five-year mandate formally commenced on December 20, 2014, succeeding his first term that began in 2009. In his post-election address, he pledged to accelerate governance improvements and address public expectations without disappointing residents, amid criticisms from pro-democracy groups highlighting the election's lack of . This renewal aligned with the Basic Law's provision for a maximum of two consecutive terms, positioning Chui to oversee continued integration with while navigating economic dependencies on gaming revenue. Preparations for the term included a announced in early December 2014, introducing new principal officials to implement promised reforms.

Tenure as Chief Executive (2009–2019)

First Term: Economic Boom and Stability Initiatives (2009–2014)

Chui Sai On assumed office as on 20 December , inheriting an economy that had slowed to 1.27% GDP growth in amid the global financial crisis. The subsequent rebound marked a period of robust expansion, with real GDP surging 25.12% in 2010, 21.62% in 2011, and 9.24% in 2012, driven primarily by recovery in visitor arrivals and gross gaming revenue, which exceeded MOP 200 billion by 2012. This boom elevated Macau's per capita GDP to over US$50,000 by 2013, supported by tourism and concessionaire investments in new resorts. remained below 2%, reflecting labor demand in and sectors. To promote stability amid volatility risks, Chui prioritized fiscal prudence, achieving consistent budget surpluses that funded infrastructure and reserves; from gaming taxes alone reached 80% of total fiscal intake by 2013. Initiatives included the 2011 announcement to liberalize the fixed-line monopoly, aiming to foster and non-gaming sectors. Following his election, Chui pledged economic diversification to mitigate over-reliance on gaming, emphasizing talent development through expanded vocational and education programs to build for emerging industries like and conventions. Despite these efforts, diversification yielded limited results in the first term, as gaming continued to dominate, comprising over 50% of GDP and exposing the economy to external shocks like policy shifts in . Policies such as support for small and medium enterprises via financial aid measures were introduced by 2013, but structural dependence persisted, with non-gaming sectors growing slower than the overall economy. Chui's administration maintained political and social stability, avoiding major disruptions and aligning with Beijing's directives under "," which underpinned investor confidence during the expansion.

Second Term: Challenges and Long-Term Planning (2014–2019)

Chui's second term commenced amid an abrupt contraction in Macau's gaming sector, which accounted for over 80% of government revenue prior to 2014. Gross gaming revenue, which had surged to a peak of MOP 373 billion in 2013, recorded its first annual decline in 2014, falling by approximately 2.3% to MOP 365 billion, primarily due to Beijing's intensified anti-corruption campaign curbing high-stakes gambling by mainland officials and affluent visitors. This downturn intensified in 2015, with revenues plummeting 34% year-on-year amid broader Chinese economic pressures and restrictions on cross-border fund transfers, leading to Macau's first recession since its 1999 handover to China. The administration responded with fiscal stimulus, including a MOP 22 billion injection into social welfare and infrastructure, while maintaining low unemployment at around 1.8% through public sector hiring and subsidies. Social and political tensions escalated alongside economic strains, with pro-democracy activists protesting the lack of and demanding greater transparency in public spending amid perceptions of in the gaming-dependent . Chui's faced criticism for slow diversification efforts, as casino operators expanded non-gaming amenities but overall GDP growth contracted by 21.6% in 2016. To address these, Chui restructured his cabinet in late 2014, appointing figures focused on economic resilience, and emphasized structural reforms to reduce gaming reliance, though critics noted persistent over-dependence with gaming still comprising 50% of GDP by 2017. Long-term planning centered on economic diversification and , articulated in the 2016–2020 Five-Year Development Plan, which prioritized non-gaming sectors like , , and conventions. Chui advocated for Macau's role in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Greater Bay Area initiative, promoting infrastructure links such as the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge, completed in October 2018 to enhance connectivity and . The plan included projects for expanded commercial zones and investments in the Macau International Airport's third runway, aiming to boost capacity to 24 million passengers annually by 2020. These efforts sought to foster sustainable growth, with Chui stating in 2014 that diversification represented an "inevitable choice and long-term strategy" amid volatile external dependencies. By 2019, gaming recovery had begun, but the term underscored the challenges of transitioning from a boom-bust model, with fiscal reserves dipping to MOP 500 billion from prior highs.

Policy Priorities and Implementation

Economic Diversification and Gaming Industry Management

During his tenure as Chief Executive, Fernando Chui Sai On prioritized regulatory oversight of Macau's gaming sector, which accounted for over 80% of in peak years like 2013 when gross gaming reached MOP 369 billion. In March 2015, his administration initiated a mid-term of the three gaming concessions held by operators including SJM Holdings, Galaxy Entertainment, and Sands China, evaluating eight key aspects such as compliance with non-gaming investment commitments, operational integrity, and contributions to . This aimed to enforce legal requirements for operators to invest in non-gaming facilities at a ratio of at least three to one relative to gaming capital, though enforcement faced challenges amid a post-2014 triggered by China's campaign, with gross gaming dropping 34% to MOP 244 billion in 2015. Chui's government extended sub-concessions for SJM Holdings and MGM by two years and three months in March 2019, pushing expiration to June 2022 to allow time for legislative amendments and public tender processes, amid debates over maintaining the cap at six operators or expanding to promote . By late 2018, Chui indicated ongoing studies for full concession renewals, emphasizing conditions for sustainable industry growth while strengthening regulations on corporate social responsibilities, including anti-money laundering measures and labor standards. These actions sought to balance revenue preservation—critical as gaming taxes funded public handouts like the 2016 MOP 9,000 distribution—with curbing excesses, though critics noted insufficient penalties for non-compliance with diversification mandates within integrated resorts. Parallel to gaming management, Chui advocated economic diversification to mitigate over-reliance on casinos, describing it in December 2014 as "the inevitable choice and long-term strategy" for Macau's development amid slowing visitor growth from mainland China. Initiatives included promoting non-gaming tourism through incentives for retail, conventions, and exhibitions, alongside fostering sectors like traditional Chinese medicine and finance, with policies outlined in his 2016 policy address to consolidate innovative development bases. In his January 2017 New Year's message, Chui reiterated commitments to regional cooperation and diversified growth, integrating Macau into the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Greater Bay Area framework by 2019 to leverage synergies in trade and logistics. Despite these efforts, gaming's dominance persisted, with non-gaming sectors contributing less than 10% to GDP by 2019, reflecting structural barriers like limited land and skilled labor rather than policy shortcomings alone.

Social Welfare, Housing, and Urban Renewal

During his tenure, Fernando Chui expanded social welfare programs leveraging Macau's gaming revenue surplus, including the Wealth Partaking Scheme, which provided annual cash payments to residents; by 2019, permanent residents received MOP10,000 (approximately USD 1,250), up from MOP6,000 in 2010, while non-permanent residents got MOP6,000. The government allocated MOP12.89 billion (about USD 1.6 billion) for social benefits in 2018, focusing on , poverty alleviation, and amid economic fluctuations. Chui emphasized maintaining social policies despite proposed spending cuts in 2015, prioritizing quality-of-life enhancements for vulnerable groups. In housing policy, Chui prioritized public rental units to address affordability amid rapid and ; his 2017 policy address outlined of 12,600 public housing units in the short to medium term, including 8,000 rental apartments, with sites like the former Scala plot designated for development. Social rental housing was given precedence over subsidized ownership schemes to target low-income families, though earlier commitments to complete 19,000 units by 2012 faced delays due to land constraints and planning issues. Critics noted insufficient in accelerating , contributing to waitlists exceeding 20,000 applicants by mid-decade. For , Chui pledged a comprehensive policy in March 2015 to revitalize aging districts beyond mere residential redevelopment, aiming to integrate upgrades and community relocation support. To overcome resident opposition, the administration proposed building temporary housing for displaced owners and drafting requiring majority (rather than unanimous) approval for reconstruction projects in old neighborhoods, as announced in July 2016. These efforts built on prior failed bills, seeking to modernize substandard buildings while preserving historical elements, though implementation lagged due to legislative hurdles and public consultations.

Cultural Preservation and Education Advancements

During Fernando Chui Sai On's tenure as Chief Executive, the Macau government prioritized the preservation of the region's distinctive Sino-Portuguese cultural heritage, particularly the UNESCO-listed Historic Centre inscribed in 2005, through policy commitments to revitalization and protection amid rapid urban development. In his September 2015 address, Chui pledged that the administration would exert maximum efforts to safeguard cultural assets for future generations, emphasizing their role in maintaining Macau's unique identity. Conservation was integrated into broader urban planning, with Chui stating in July 2015 that protecting heritage sites ranked as a primary governmental consideration alongside enhancing residents' quality of life. He further advocated for public engagement, urging Macau residents in September 2015 to actively value and maintain heritage buildings and sites, underscoring that community stewardship was essential to effective long-term protection. In June 2017, Chui reaffirmed the government's commitment to defending these sites against development pressures, expressing confidence that ongoing measures would prevent any risk to their UNESCO status. In education, Chui's administration oversaw substantial financial expansions, with public investment surging 103 percent from 2010 to 2018, reaching MOP 11.6 billion, and overall government education expenditures increasing 166 percent between 2009 and 2018. These funds supported targeted subsidies, including aid for higher education enrollment, purchases of school materials, and specialized scholarships to broaden access. In September 2015, Chui committed additional resources specifically to upgrading teacher training programs and school infrastructure, aiming to elevate instructional quality and facilities. Reflecting on his decade in office in November 2019, Chui identified these education policies as among his most significant accomplishments, crediting them with fostering development in a gaming-dependent economy.

Integration with Mainland China and Regional Cooperation

Chui Sai On prioritized Macau's alignment with national strategies, viewing integration with as essential for long-term stability and growth. In February 2019, he affirmed Macau's readiness to deepen participation in China's national development framework, emphasizing the special administrative region's responsibility to contribute to broader objectives under the "" principle. This approach included expanding physical infrastructure for cross-border collaboration; in April 2014, Chui requested allocation of five square kilometers on Island for joint industrial projects, aiming to alleviate Macau's land constraints while fostering economic ties with Guangdong Province. A cornerstone of regional cooperation under Chui was the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Greater Bay Area (GBA) initiative, launched to integrate the nine cities of the with and into a cohesive economic cluster. In July 2017, Chui joined Chief Executive in signing the GBA development framework agreement, witnessed by President , which outlined coordinated planning for , , and . He positioned the GBA as a mechanism for economic diversification beyond gaming, stating in March 2019 that it would create opportunities in finance, technology, and logistics while prioritizing national interests. Chui advocated for youth involvement, encouraging Macau residents to engage in GBA opportunities for skills development and employment, as highlighted in his December 2019 remarks on the need for talent mobility across the region. Chui implemented a "two-pronged" combining internal capacity-building with external partnerships, as articulated in February 2019 policy addresses. This involved bilateral agreements with neighboring cities; for instance, in March 2018, he outlined enhanced cooperation with and on transport links, , and to support GBA goals. Such efforts extended to positioning Macau as a platform for -Portugal relations, leveraging its historical ties to facilitate trade and cultural exchanges within the broader framework, though primary focus remained on mainland integration. By his tenure's end, these policies had reinforced Macau's role as a connector between and international markets, with Chui crediting central government support for bolstering regional confidence.

Economic and Social Impacts

Growth Metrics and Prosperity Under Stable Governance

Under Fernando Chui's administration from 2009 to 2019, Macau's real GDP growth averaged approximately 8-10% annually in the early years, driven primarily by the expansion of the gaming sector and tourism inflows from mainland China, before contracting sharply from 2015 onward due to external factors including China's anti-corruption campaigns and economic slowdown. In 2009, the year Chui assumed office, GDP growth was 1.3%, recovering to highs such as 27.1% in the third quarter of 2010 amid post-global financial crisis rebound. By 2014, cumulative growth had elevated nominal GDP per capita from $38,891 in 2009 to peaks exceeding $80,000, reflecting the territory's status as one of the world's highest per capita income economies during the boom phase. Key prosperity indicators underscored sustained affluence, with rates remaining structurally low at 1.9-2.5% throughout the decade, indicative of robust labor absorption in services and sectors. fiscal reserves expanded significantly, reaching 627 billion patacas by the end of 2019, supported by gaming taxes that constituted over 70% of revenue and funded infrastructure and welfare programs without broad tax increases. GDP (PPP terms) climbed to around $114,400 by 2017, positioning Macau ahead of most global peers despite later volatility. These metrics aligned with a period of elevated living standards, including rising household incomes and public spending on housing subsidies. Stable governance under Chui, characterized by adherence to the framework and minimal political disruption, facilitated this prosperity by ensuring policy continuity, investor confidence, and seamless integration with mainland economic opportunities, such as increased visitor visas. Chui emphasized that national stability provided a "strong backing" for Macau's development, enabling diversification initiatives like non-gaming investments while maintaining a business-friendly environment with low intervention. This administrative predictability, free from the electoral volatility or protests seen elsewhere, correlated with sustained capital inflows and economic resilience, though prosperity remained heavily tied to external demand rather than broad structural reforms.

Criticisms of Inequality and Over-Reliance on Gaming

Critics have pointed to persistent income inequality during Chui's tenure, with Macau's rising slightly from 0.35 in 2012/13 to 0.36 in 2017/18, signaling a modest widening of income disparities despite overall driven by gaming revenues. This measure, derived from government surveys, reflects how casino-driven prosperity disproportionately benefited elites and concessionaires, while low-skilled workers, including many migrants in service roles, faced stagnant wages and escalating living costs. Academic analyses attribute this gap to "casino ," where of gaming licenses in amplified wealth concentration, exacerbating divides that Chui's welfare distributions—such as handouts—failed to fully mitigate, as they provided short-term without structural reforms. The over-reliance on gaming, which accounted for approximately 88% of by the mid-2010s, drew scrutiny for rendering vulnerable to external shocks, as evidenced by the sharp revenue decline from MOP 276 billion in 2013 to MOP 183 billion in 2015 amid China's anti-corruption campaign curtailing high-roller . Chui's administration promoted diversification through initiatives like the Guangdong-Macau Intensive Cooperation Zone and non-gaming investments in resorts, yet critics argued these measures yielded limited results, with gaming still comprising over 50% of GDP by 2019 and non-gaming sectors showing negligible growth. This dependency, inherited from prior liberalization but unaddressed aggressively under Chui, left the economy exposed; subsequent leaders explicitly cited failed past efforts, including during his term, as contributing to structural fragility revealed by events like the 2020 pandemic downturn. Such critiques highlight causal links between gaming monopoly and inequality: windfall taxes funded social programs, but without broader industrialization or skill-based sectors, remained low-wage and precarious, fostering resentment over unaffordable —where prices surged 300% from 2009 to 2019—and prompting some residents to relocate to for affordability. Reports from outlets like The China Project underscore that Chui's policies prioritized stability over bold diversification, perpetuating a model where a few conglomerates dominated, limiting upward mobility and long-term resilience. While government data emphasized via subsidies, independent analyses question the , noting that inequality metrics understated hidden costs like migrant exploitation and suppressed non-gaming .

Controversies and Criticisms

Administrative Scandals and Corruption Allegations

During Fernando Chui Sai-on's second term as (2014–2019), the administration faced several high-profile corruption investigations, though Chui himself was not directly implicated in wrongdoing. The most significant case involved former Prosecutor General Ho Chio Meng, who was charged in April 2016 with fraud, unlawful economic advantage, , and for allegedly accepting 44 million patacas (approximately $5.5 million) in kickbacks from 2004 to 2014. These kickbacks stemmed from awarding contracts worth 167 million patacas for over 2,000 construction and renovation projects related to the public prosecution office, often to companies linked to relatives of prosecution leaders. Ho, who served until December 2014 and was viewed as a potential rival to Chui for the chief executive position that year, was detained following a Court of Final Appeal ruling, marking the largest graft scandal in Macau since the 2006 conviction of former Transport Secretary Ao Man-long. Chui was notified of the probe by Public Prosecutor André Cheong as statutorily required but provided no instructions on its handling, and the case was reported to authorities. In response to broader anti-corruption directives from , particularly following President Xi Jinping's 2014 emphasis on regulatory tightening, Chui oversaw cabinet reshuffles and empowered the Commission Against Corruption (CCAC) to pursue investigations. Notable actions included initiating disciplinary proceedings in November against former Meteorological and Geophysical Bureau director Fong Soi Kun and his deputy over graft allegations unrelated to their retirement status. The CCAC's probes extended to other civil servants, uncovering multiple criminal cases by 2019, including employment irregularities and . Chui reviewed CCAC reports on such matters, such as a March 2019 submission on alleged in the justice sector, and stressed non-interference in judicial processes while committing to transparency. Critics, including local observers, highlighted persistent challenges in administrative , arguing that indefinite contracts and evidentiary hurdles often shielded officials from severe consequences despite detected misconduct. U.S. State Department assessments during this period noted few reported instances of official but acknowledged Macau's legal framework provided penalties, with enforcement varying by case. Chui's administration positioned these efforts as aligning with public demands for fairness over unchecked prosperity, building on his 2009 pledge to prioritize anti-graft measures.

Handling of Protests and Democratic Demands

During Fernando Chui's tenure as Chief Executive from 2009 to 2019, Macau experienced sporadic protests, primarily driven by economic grievances such as housing costs, inflation, and perceived official perks, rather than widespread demands for democratic . Unlike contemporaneous unrest in , Macau's demonstrations remained contained, with participation rarely exceeding tens of thousands, attributable to high per capita GDP from the gaming sector—reaching approximately MOP 500,000 (around USD 62,500) by 2014—which dampened appetite for political disruption. Chui's administration emphasized stability and economic growth, aligning with Beijing's "" framework, which prioritizes prosperity over expanded electoral participation. A pivotal event occurred on , 2014, when over 20,000 residents rallied against a proposed bill granting post-retirement allowances and benefits to high-ranking officials, criticized as entitling elites amid rising public discontent over wealth inequality and housing affordability. The demonstration, organized by civil groups and labor unions, marked Macau's largest since the 1999 handover, prompting Chui to announce the bill's withdrawal two days later on May 27, 2014, as a concession to public pressure. This response highlighted a pragmatic approach to socioeconomic complaints, averting escalation, though critics argued it exposed governance opacity rather than addressing root causes like over-reliance on gaming revenue. Democratic demands, including calls for universal suffrage in selecting the Chief Executive and , gained limited momentum under Chui. In August 2014, pro-democracy activists from groups like Macau Conscience organized an unofficial advocating "genuine" elections, mirroring Hong Kong's efforts, but authorities restricted venues and participation, with only around 1,500 votes cast amid police oversight. Chui, the sole candidate endorsed by , secured re-election on August 29, 2014, by the 400-member Election Committee with 96.2% approval, underscoring the system's pro-establishment design that favors elite consensus over popular input. -backed media dismissed such initiatives as external interference, and Chui's government maintained that 's did not mandate immediate reforms, prioritizing "patriots administering " to ensure loyalty to central authority. Subsequent protests, such as a rally of about 1,000 against Chui's allocation of MOP 1 billion in public funds to a mainland university, focused on fiscal accountability but yielded no policy reversal, reflecting firmer handling of issues perceived as challenging sovereignty ties. During Chinese President Xi Jinping's December 20, 2014, visit for Macau's 15th anniversary, security measures suppressed potential demonstrations, with Xi praising the territory's "stability" as a model contrasting Hong Kong's Occupy Central movement. Chui's tenure thus sustained low protest intensity through economic incentives and , though isolated concessions like the 2014 bill scrap demonstrated tactical responsiveness to avert broader alienation.

Post-Tenure Activities

Charitable Engagements and

Following his retirement as Chief Executive in December 2019, Fernando Chui Sai On has maintained ties to Macau's charitable sector, particularly in health-related initiatives, building on his prior leadership in community organizations. Prior to entering higher political office, Chui served as of the Macao Kiang Wu Hospital Charitable Association, a key institution providing medical services and community support in . This role underscored his early commitment to public welfare, including youth development and healthcare accessibility, though specific post-tenure leadership positions or personal donations within the association remain undocumented in public records. Chui's philanthropic efforts have historically emphasized local community building, with involvement in entities focused on rather than high-profile international foundations. Post-tenure, he has received recognition for cumulative contributions to Macau's social fabric, including the Grand Lotus Medal in , awarded for distinguished service that encompassed charitable and public welfare dimensions. However, detailed accounts of new initiatives, funding commitments, or board memberships initiated after are limited, reflecting a shift to lower-profile engagements consistent with former officials' typical trajectories in Macau.

Advisory and Legacy Roles

Following his tenure as Chief Executive, which concluded on December 20, 2019, Fernando Chui Sai On maintained involvement in Macau's governance structures through committee leadership and electoral participation. He assumed a prominent role in talent development efforts, including chairing the Comissão de Desenvolvimento de Talentos (Talent Development Committee), an entity focused on fostering professional expertise amid Macau's economic diversification. In July 2024, Chui ran as a candidate for the educational sector seats on the 400-member Chief Executive Election Committee, positioning him to influence the selection of Macau's next leader in the 2026 election cycle. This participation highlights his advisory capacity in sustaining political continuity and alignment with national priorities. Chui's legacy roles extend to high-level engagements, such as his December 19, 2024, meeting with President alongside former Chief Executive Hau Wah, where discussions centered on Macau's integration into national development strategies like the Greater Bay Area. Such interactions underscore his enduring advisory influence on policy stability and socio-economic progress, as evidenced by his prior emphasis on integrity-driven governance.

Personal Life and Recognition

Family and Private Interests

Chui Sai On was born in 1957 in to Chui Tak Seng, a prominent local tycoon, and his wife Chan Keng Fan. His father died in 1984, leaving behind a with established interests in the . He is the of Chui Sai Cheong, a longtime lawmaker who has held positions including Vice-President of the . Chui is married to Winnie Fok Wai-fun, with whom he shares to Macau's business elite. The couple's personal assets, as publicly declared in 2013 amid requirements for senior officials, include two properties in and a 50 percent ownership stake in one property on the Chinese mainland. The broader Chui holds diversified commercial interests spanning construction, property development, , and commodities, which have occasionally raised questions about potential conflicts during his . Chui has maintained a low public profile regarding personal hobbies or leisure pursuits, with available records emphasizing his commitment to public duties over private engagements. In a 2015 message, he highlighted family harmony as foundational to broader social stability in .

Honours and Awards Received

Fernando Chui Sai On received the Decoration of Honour – Grand Lotus, the highest distinction in the Macau Special Administrative Region's honours system, on 26 January 2021 for his lifelong contributions to and governance during his tenure as Chief Executive from 2009 to 2019. This award, conferred by Chief Executive , recognizes exceptional service to the SAR and was jointly presented to Chui alongside Chinese epidemiologist for distinct merits. On 17 May 2014, Portuguese President bestowed upon Chui the Grand Cross of the during a bilateral ceremony in , honouring his role in fostering Macau-Portugal relations post-handover and promoting cultural and economic ties between the SAR and . This decoration, Portugal's second-highest civil honour, underscores Chui's diplomatic efforts in maintaining historical connections amid Macau's integration into .

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