Hubbry Logo
Japan Air Lines Cargo Flight 1045Japan Air Lines Cargo Flight 1045Main
Open search
Japan Air Lines Cargo Flight 1045
Community hub
Japan Air Lines Cargo Flight 1045
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Japan Air Lines Cargo Flight 1045
Japan Air Lines Cargo Flight 1045
Japan Air Lines Cargo Flight 1045
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

Japan Air Lines Cargo Flight 1045 was a charter flight on January 13, 1977, from Grant County, Washington, to Tokyo, Japan, with a stopover in Anchorage, Alaska. The flight crashed during the initial climb shortly after takeoff from Anchorage, in part because the captain, Hugh L. Marsh, was intoxicated as shown by a blood alcohol level of 0.29; the co-pilot and the other crew were not impaired.[1][2][3] All of those on board, including three flight crew members, were killed in the crash.

Key Information

Aircraft

[edit]

The aircraft involved in the accident was a Douglas DC-8-62AF, equipped with four Pratt & Whitney JT3D engines; registered JA8054 to JAL Cargo, a subsidiary of Japan Air Lines (JAL). The aircraft had a total of 19,744 flight hours, of which 8,708 were since the last major inspection and 45 since the last check. Records showed the aircraft had been maintained within Japanese, American, and ICAO recommendations.[2]

Ice on the aircraft

[edit]

Mechanics reported ice present on the inlet guide vanes, engine cowlings and engine bullet noses, but no ice was found on the aircraft surfaces. A mechanic recommended that the engine anti-icing system be used, but no maintenance was performed on the aircraft in Anchorage. Investigators suspected that ice on the airfoil or transducer may have caused the stall warning to fail. The ice present on the surface of the wings and leading edges could have reduced the angle of attack needed to produce a stall.[2]

Crew

[edit]

On board the aircraft were three flight crew members, two cattle handlers, and live cattle being shipped to Japan as cargo.[1]

The cockpit crew consisted of:[2]: 22 

  • Captain Hugh L. Marsh, age 53, hired by JAL on June 24, 1969. He was certified to serve as captain of the DC-8 on February 9, 1970; and on October 30, 1969, issued a JCAB airline transport rating, No. 001168, as well as type rated for the DC-8. Due to minor vision impairment he was required to wear corrective glasses for near vision as needed in flight. On September 10, 1970, he was certified as second class navigator. Marsh had logged a total of 23,252 flight hours, including 4,040 hours on the DC-8.
  • First officer Kunihika Akitani, age 31, hired by JAL on May 6, 1970, and certified as a copilot on the DC-8 on August 1, 1976. Akitani had 1,603 flight hours, with 1,208 of them on the DC-8.
  • Flight engineer Nobumasa Yokokawa, age 35, hired by JAL on April 1, 1960. On November 20, 1960, he received his flight engineer DC-8 type rating. Yokokawa was also certified to serve as flight engineer on Convair 880 and Boeing 747 aircraft. Yokokawa had 4,920 flight hours, including 2,757 hours on the DC-8.

Pilot intoxication

[edit]

A taxi driver who drove Captain Marsh to the airport told investigators that he seemed disoriented. At 04:50 local time a taxi dispatcher phoned JAL and warned of an intoxicated pilot. JAL responded by saying there seemed nothing unusual about the flight crew. Autopsies after the crash showed that the captain was heavily intoxicated, with the initial blood alcohol level 298 mg per 100 ml and a vitreous alcohol level of 310 mg per 100 ml taken twelve hours after the crash; the state of Alaska considers 100 mg per 100 ml legally unacceptable for driving. Of the thirteen people questioned who had spoken with Marsh before the flight, six stated he had been drinking or appeared to be drunk.[2]

Flight synopsis

[edit]

At 05:15 the crew boarded the aircraft; the driver of the crew car stated: "...he was in good condition as far as ways I've seen him sometimes and I made that statement before I ever heard any rumors that he was supposedly drunk or had been partying or whatever" as to whether the pilot appeared intoxicated. Cockpit voice recorder (CVR) data showed that the crew began the prestart checklists at 06:09; CVR data showed the takeoff was normal until the aircraft slowed acceleration from VR to V2 speed; the aircraft stalled almost immediately after reaching V2 speed. At 06:35:39 AST, JAL Cargo Flight 1045 crashed at Anchorage International Airport shortly after takeoff from runway 24L. A witness reportedly saw the flight climb to approximately 100 feet above the ground, veer to the left, and then slide out of the air. All five people on board the aircraft perished in the crash.[1][2][4][5]

Cause

[edit]

In January 1979, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued their final report, concluding:

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was a stall that resulted from the pilot's control inputs aggravated by airframe icing while the pilot was under the influence of alcohol. Contributing to the cause of this accident was the failure of the other flightcrew members to prevent the captain from attempting the flight.[2]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Japan Air Lines Cargo Flight 1045

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Japan Air Lines Cargo Flight 1045 was a flight operated by Air Lines using a McDonnell Douglas DC-8-62AF that crashed shortly after takeoff from in , on January 13, 1977, killing all five occupants. The aircraft, registered as JA8054, was en route to Tokyo Haneda Airport in when the accident occurred at approximately 06:35 local time during the initial climb phase, approximately 300 meters past the runway end. The five fatalities included the three flight crew members and two handlers on board, with the plane skidding across an access road before impacting a hillside and being completely destroyed by the resulting fire. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigated the incident and determined the probable cause to be a stall resulting from the captain's improper control inputs, aggravated by airframe icing while the captain was under the influence of alcohol. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the other two flight crew members to prevent the captain, Hugh L. Marsh, from attempting the flight despite his evident intoxication. Post-accident toxicological analysis revealed the captain's blood alcohol concentration at 0.298 percent, far exceeding legal limits for pilots. The NTSB report highlighted issues such as inadequate pre-flight checks for de-icing and the crew's cultural dynamics, where junior crew members deferred to the senior captain, potentially allowing his impaired state to go unchallenged. This incident underscored broader aviation safety concerns regarding alcohol impairment and crew resource management, influencing subsequent regulatory emphasis on pilot sobriety and assertiveness in cockpits.

Aircraft

Description and history

The aircraft involved in the incident was a McDonnell Douglas DC-8-62AF, a freighter variant of the DC-8 Series 60 stretched-fuselage designed for long-haul cargo transport. Registered as JA8054 with manufacturer 46148, it was constructed at the Douglas Aircraft Company's Long Beach facility in . First flown on November 22, 1971, JA8054 was delivered to Air Lines (JAL) on , 1972, and entered service primarily in cargo operations across international routes. By the time of the on January 13, 1977, the had accumulated 19,744 total flight hours, with 8,708 hours since its last major inspection and only 45 hours since its most recent routine check. Throughout its operational history with JAL, the aircraft had no recorded major incidents prior to the event. The DC-8-62AF featured four JT3D-3B engines, each providing approximately 18,000 pounds of thrust, mounted in underwing pods. It had a of 335,000 pounds (151,955 kg) and a typical range of about 4,500 nautical miles with a full , making it suitable for trans-Pacific missions. The included a reinforced main deck floor to accommodate heavy palletized loads, a large forward freight door for efficient loading, and a total volume exceeding 7,000 cubic feet, enabling the transport of bulky freight over extended distances. For Flight 1045, the carried approximately 40 tons of live along with associated handling equipment and supplies, a load well within its structural and operational limits.

Pre-accident condition and icing

At , the weather conditions on January 13, 1977, included a temperature of approximately -10°C, , and visibility limited to 1/2 mile, with reports indicating known icing conditions in the vicinity. The aircraft underwent de-icing procedures twice prior to takeoff, first at 05:00 AST and again at 05:45 AST, using anti-icing fluid applied to the wings and control surfaces. However, the holdover time for the fluid was exceeded during the subsequent ground delay, allowing and to re-accumulate on critical surfaces. No additional anti-icing fluid was reapplied following the second de-icing. A routine pre-flight maintenance inspection was conducted, revealing no apparent issues with the aircraft's systems or surfaces at the time. Ice accumulation on the leading edges of the wings and control surfaces reduced aerodynamic lift generation, while also contributing to delayed activation of the stall warning horn. This buildup further led to asymmetric lift conditions during the initial climb phase. Post-accident examination by the NTSB confirmed remnants of on the wreckage, with accumulation equivalent to about 1/4 inch on the wings, consistent with the environmental conditions and procedural lapses.

Crew

Members and qualifications

The flight crew of Air Lines Cargo Flight 1045 consisted of a , first officer, and , reflecting a mixed-nationality composition typical for the airline's trans-Pacific operations, with the serving in command according to company policy. The was Hugh L. Marsh, a 53-year-old American pilot employed by Air Lines on June 24, 1969, and rated as a DC-8 captain on February 9, 1970. He held 23,252 total flight hours, including 4,040 hours on the DC-8 aircraft type. The first officer was Kunihiko Akitani, a 31-year-old Japanese pilot hired by Air Lines on May 6, 1970, and certified as a copilot on the DC-8. His total flight experience amounted to 1,603 hours, with 1,208 of those on the DC-8. The flight engineer was Nobumasa Yokokawa, a 35-year-old Japanese national hired by Air Lines on April 1, 1960, and rated as a on the DC-8 on November 20, 1960, with extensive experience in operations. He accumulated 4,920 total flight hours, including 2,100 hours on the DC-8. In addition to the flight crew, two Japanese cattle handlers were on board to assist with the live of being transported to ; these individuals possessed no flight qualifications and were not part of the operating crew. All three flight crew members maintained current certifications and had completed recent simulator training in December 1976, ensuring compliance with operational standards prior to the flight.

Pre-flight impairment

The captain of Japan Air Lines Cargo Flight 1045, Hugh L. Marsh, was severely intoxicated prior to the flight, with postmortem toxicology revealing an initial blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 298 mg per 100 ml (0.298%), well above the FAA's limit of 0.04% (40 mg/100 ml) and Alaska's legal intoxication threshold of 0.10% (100 mg/100 ml) for driving. A subsequent vitreous humor analysis confirmed a level of 310 mg/100 ml, indicating significant impairment including confusion, disorientation, and reduced psychomotor coordination at the time of the accident. Autopsies of the first officer and flight engineer showed no alcohol or drugs, establishing the captain's intoxication as the sole pre-flight impairment among the crew. Evidence of the captain's condition emerged from multiple witnesses during the pre-flight period in Anchorage. The who transported the crew to around 04:30 reported the captain exhibiting a flushed face, glazed eyes, slurred speech, uncoordinated movements, and difficulty exiting the , prompting an immediate alert to about an "intoxicated" . A JAL operations agent was notified shortly after and assumed company protocols would prevent departure, though no intervention occurred. Of 13 individuals interviewed about the captain's activities, six—none close acquaintances—reported signs of recent alcohol consumption or influence within 12 hours of the scheduled departure, consistent with his admission of drinking and during the in , estimated 4-6 hours before takeoff. The first officer and flight engineer observed clear indicators of impairment, including slurred speech and disorientation during taxi and pre-flight briefings, yet took no action to halt the flight. This inaction stemmed from cultural norms in Japanese , where hierarchical to the discouraged direct challenges to avoid potential or loss of face, leading to indirect or avoided communication about concerns. JAL's policy at the time prohibited alcohol consumption within eight hours of flight under FAA regulations, but lacked mandatory testing or robust enforcement mechanisms, relying instead on self-reporting and peer oversight that proved ineffective. In response to the accident, JAL introduced stricter pre-flight alcohol screening, including random testing, as part of broader Japanese reforms urged by the .

Accident

Flight background

Japan Air Lines Cargo Flight 1045 was a operation conducted by Air Lines Co., Ltd., utilizing a McDonnell Douglas DC-8-62F registered as JA8054, to transport live from farms in the United States to . The flight had no passengers and carried approximately 56 head of as , housed in pens that restricted horizontal but not vertical movement. The route originated at in Moses Lake, Washington, with a planned technical stop at Anchorage International Airport, , for refueling and crew rest, before continuing to Tokyo's . Departing Moses Lake on the evening of January 12, 1977, the aircraft arrived in Anchorage at 05:03 Alaska Standard Time on , amid winter conditions including reported . At Anchorage, the flight was delayed from its scheduled early morning departure due to the time required to load the live . The was fueled with an estimated 117,200 pounds of Jet A-1 fuel prior to the attempted takeoff from runway 24L. This nighttime trans-Pacific reflected Air Lines' operations to support international demands in the mid-1970s.

Sequence of events

The flight taxied at 06:32 (AST) and lined up on Runway 24L at Anchorage International Airport, having received clearance for takeoff bound for . During the takeoff roll, the aircraft rotated at 06:35:39 AST, achieving an initial climb to approximately above ground level (AGL) with an airspeed of 152 knots. The aircraft then pitched up to about 20 degrees nose-up, leading to a at around 300 feet AGL; it descended rapidly as the stall warning activated, with the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) capturing the issuing commands to the crew. The aircraft impacted the ground in a nose-down attitude approximately 300 meters beyond the end, skidding across an access road before striking an embankment; it subsequently disintegrated, and a post-impact broke out. All five occupants—three flight crew members and two handlers—were killed on impact. The wreckage was scattered over a of more than 200 meters, and the of live was destroyed. Airport fire crews arrived at the scene within two minutes of the crash, but there were no survivors.

Investigation

NTSB process

The (NTSB) initiated its investigation into the crash of Japan Air Lines Cargo Flight 1045 immediately after the incident on January 13, 1977, dispatching a Go-Team from its Seattle regional office to lead the effort. This rapid response adhered to standard NTSB protocols for major aviation accidents, ensuring preservation of the crash site and coordination with local authorities in . Evidence collection began on the day of the , with investigators recovering the wreckage from the site near the . The voice recorder (CVR) was retrieved intact, providing recordings of the final moments, while the flight data recorder (FDR) was also analyzed for flight parameters. Additionally, interviews were conducted with key witnesses, including tower personnel and members, to reconstruct pre-flight and takeoff activities. tests on crew remains were performed as part of the standard post-accident medical examination process. On-scene investigative work continued for several days, after which the wreckage was transported to a secure facility for detailed examination. The investigation involved multiple parties under the NTSB's , including representatives from the (FAA), Japan Air Lines (JAL), and McDonnell Douglas as the manufacturer of the DC-8 , with international cooperation facilitated by the 's Japanese registry. Methodologies employed included thorough reviews of de-icing procedure logs alongside meteorological aerodrome reports (METARs). The final report, designated AAR-78-07, was released on January 16, 1979, comprising a 50-page main supplemented by appendices detailing records and . This followed NTSB guidelines for presenting factual evidence and analytical processes in a comprehensive yet accessible format.

Key findings and cause

The (NTSB) determined that the probable cause of the accident was "a that resulted from the pilot's control inputs aggravated by icing while the pilot was under the influence of alcohol." This conclusion was based on post-accident analysis of the flight recorder, which showed the applying excessive nose-up inputs during the initial climb, reducing and leading to an aerodynamic shortly after takeoff from Anchorage . The 's blood alcohol concentration was measured at 0.298 percent postmortem, far exceeding legal limits and impairing his judgment and motor skills, as evidenced by toxicological reports and witness accounts of his pre-flight behavior. Contributing factors included airframe icing that accumulated during ground operations and the short de-icing holdover period, which reduced the aircraft's stall margin and exacerbated the effects of the captain's erroneous inputs. The NTSB noted that the DC-8's engines and had visible ice buildup prior to departure, but the crew did not adequately address it despite recommendations from ground personnel. Additionally, the failure of the first officer and to intervene or prevent the impaired from operating the flight was cited as a key contributor, stemming from a cultural where the Japanese crew members deferred to the American 's authority. A 2024 analysis of voice recorder transcripts highlighted how Japanese cultural norms of and indirect communication hindered assertive intervention, with the first officer raising concerns about conditions four times using mitigated speech but avoiding direct challenges to maintain harmony. This dynamic, influenced by high-context communication and avoidance of confrontation, prevented effective (CRM) and allowed the captain's impairment to go unchecked. In response, the NTSB issued recommendations to the (FAA) for stricter enforcement of alcohol prohibitions, including enhanced pre-flight screening to detect impairment, and improved de-icing protocols to extend holdover times in adverse weather. The accident also underscored the need for CRM training tailored to multicultural crews, influencing subsequent FAA guidelines on communication in diverse cockpits during the late 1970s and 1980s. Japan Air Lines temporarily halted certain charter operations involving mixed-nationality crews following the incident, and no civil lawsuits were filed, though the event contributed to broader reforms on pilot fitness and operational safety.
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.