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The Jenin refugee camp (Arabic: مخيم جنين للاجئين), also known as the Jenin camp (Arabic: مخيم جنين), is a town originally founded in 1953 as a Palestinian refugee camp located within the city of Jenin in the northern West Bank. It was established in 1953 to house Palestinians who fled or were expelled from their homes by Israeli forces during and in the aftermath of the 1948 Palestine War. The town has since become a stronghold of Palestinian militants and has become known as "The Martyr's Capital" by Palestinians, and "The Hornets' Nest" by Israelis. It is assumed that much of its population is descended from those 1948 refugees. The town is currently under full Israeli military control as part of Israel's "Operation Iron Wall".[1][2]

Key Information

The town was the location of several incidents relating to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, most notably the 2002 Battle of Jenin between Israel and Palestinian militants, the 2022 killing of Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, and the 2025 Israeli operations in the West Bank. Jenin remains the site of frequent clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinians.

The town has a high population density, estimated at 33,000/km2 (85,000/sq mi) by the UNRWA. The town's residents face difficult living conditions, which are caused in part by Israeli restrictions. The town has a high unemployment rate compared to the rest of the West Bank, and many residents live in substandard shelters, with poor sewage networks and common shortages in water and electricity.

History

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Establishment and Israeli occupation

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The Jenin refugee camp was formally established in 1953 after a snowstorm had destroyed a previous refugee camp in the region.[3] The camp was established over 372 dunams of land that was leased to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) for an extended period of time,[4] and was later expanded to 473 dunams (0.42 km2).[5]

The camp is located in the city of Jenin. To its north is the Jezreel Valley or Marj Ibn Amir (Arabic: مرج ابن عامر), and to its east is Jordan Valley. The camp and the entirety of the West Bank was under Jordanian control at the time of its establishment, following the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank that took place in 1950.[6]

Following the defeat of the Arab Armies in the Six-Day War of 1967, the West Bank, including the Jenin camp, came under Israeli occupation.[7] Following the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was forced out of the country, settling in Tunisia.[8] However, many PLO militants chose to return to the occupied Palestinian territories, leading to the emergence of a number of militant groups, a number of which were centered in the vicinity of Jenin. These groups included the 'Black Panthers' of Fatah and the 'Red Eagles' of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).[4]

The residents of the Jenin camp participated in the First Intifada, a major Palestinian uprising against Israel that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s.[9] During that intifada, the camp was the target of several Israeli raids conducted in search of militants.[4] The Oslo Accords, signed at the end of the First Intifada, transferred the control and administration of the camp to the then-newly established Palestinian National Authority (PA).[10]

Second Intifada and Battle of Jenin

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Main article: Battle of Jenin (2002)
Israeli forces in the Jenin Camp during the Battle of Jenin; 2002

The Jenin camp was heavily involved the Second Intifada, another major Palestinian uprising against Israel that took place in the early 2000s. In April 2002, after a string of Palestinian suicide attacks, Israeli forces entered the camp as part of Operation Defensive Shield, commencing the Battle of Jenin. Israel stated that the camp was a hotbed of Palestinian militancy, and prevented relief workers and reporters from entering the camp, saying that the booby traps set up by the Palestinians were a serious concern. Palestinians later acknowledged that explosives were placed throughout the camp.[11][12]

Israeli tanks in the streets of the camp April 2002.

The battle lasted for ten days between 1 April and 11 April, and Israel began withdrawing its troops on 18 April. Over the course of the battle, over 400 homes were destroyed, and hundreds more were severely damaged.[13] A UN envoy likened the camp to an earthquake zone,[14] as did a reporter for the Associated Press who later visited the camp.[15] The BBC reported that ten percent of the camp was "virtually rubbed out by a dozen armored Israeli bulldozers".[16]

Aerial view of camp, two days after the Israeli attack in April 2002

A report by the United Nations stated that 52 Palestinians and 23 Israeli soldiers were killed in the battle, although the Palestinians claim that the Israeli military killed 500 people during the battle.[17] 4,000 people, a quarter of the camp's pre-battle population, were left homeless because of the destruction.[18] After the battle, the Israeli housing minister offered to rebuild the camp at a nearby location with enlarged roads. However, the camp's residents rejected the proposal, which they saw as an attempt to erase the political symbolism of Palestinian refugee camps, whose existence they see as a living testament to the Nakba.[19] By 2005, the UNRWA had completed the reconstruction of the camp, in an operation that was described as "the largest humanitarian intervention during the Second Intifada". However, this rebuild has been criticized by the camp's residents, who said that the new network of roads exposed them to greater violence and insecurity as it made it easier for Israeli jeeps and tanks to enter the camp.[20]

Subsequent violence

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Israeli Armed forces conducted a large scale operation in Jenin camp, tearing up roads, sewages pipes and water network and damaging individual property, July 2023

The Jenin camp is located in Area A of the West Bank, which is under de jure civil and security control by the Palestinian National Authority.[10] However, Israeli forces frequently carry out incursions into the camp with the declared objective of conducting counter-terrorism operations. However, Palestinians say that the Israeli forces target not only militants but also noncombatant civilians, with a paramedic telling CNN that he did not feel safe "even in uniform".[21] These near-daily Israeli raids mostly occur during the night, and lead to clashes with militants.[22][23]

In September 2021, Ayham Kamamji and Monadel Nafe'at, the final two prisoners at large after the Gilboa Prison break, were rearrested in the Jenin camp, along with two residents who allegedly helped the escapees. The captures took place during a raid by Israeli forces.[24] In May 2022, Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh was killed in the Jenin camp while trying to cover an Israeli raid. Al Jazeera has accused the Israeli forces of deliberately shooting her,[25] although an IDF report has said that the shooting was accidental.[26] The CNN have published evidence which suggests that Abu Akleh was "shot dead in a targeted attack by Israeli forces".[27]

The year 2023 saw an increase in the number and size of Israeli incursions to the camp. In January, the Israeli military raided Jenin city and the refugee camp, killing ten Palestinians, including three civilians.[28][29][30][21] At least one ambulance was hit with live ammunition.[31] The Israeli raid was described as the "deadliest in two decades."[32] In July, Israel launched a largescale incursion involving drones, Apache Helicopters and ground troops targeting militants. This attack was even deadlier, with at least twelve Palestinians killed, eighty injured and fifty arrested.[33][34] This attack left more than 3500 people internally displaced and 23,600 people without access to water for several weeks, with an estimated $5.2 million of humanitarian aid required to fix the damage.[35] During the Gaza war that began in October, Israeli forces launched multiple ground incursions into the camp.[36][37]

On January 6, 2024, the Israeli army killed seven Palestinians in an airstrike.[38]

In late August 2024 the Israeli military began an operation in Jenin resulting in significant displacement of the civilian population, as well as both Palestinian and Israeli casualties.[39]

In December 2024, the Palestinian Authority launched its largest operation in three decades, 'Protect the Homeland,' aimed at regaining control of the Jenin refugee camp. The operation saw Palestinian security forces clash with local Islamist militants as part of an effort to dismantle insurgency and curb instability.[40][41][42]

Palestinian militancy

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See also: Palestinian political violence
Graffiti in the Jenin Camp in 2011: "Not to forget.."

The Jenin camp has become a center of Palestinian militancy. The al-Quds Brigades of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades of Fatah are the two most prominent armed groups in the camp, while the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades of Hamas have recently begun to maintain a more viable presence.[43] These armed groups act as the sole form of resistance and protection for the population from the Israeli army, which regularly comes in and conducts raids, killing civilians, and taking many prisoners.[citation needed]

Armed militants enjoy high levels of support amongst the residents of the camp, who condemn the Palestinian Authority as "collaborators with the occupation".[15][44] The camp is sometimes referred to by Palestinians as "The Martyr's Capital"[45] and by the Israeli military as "The Hornets' Nest.".[43] In January 2023, thirty five Palestinians were killed in the West Bank in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, twenty of whom were from the Jenin camp.[46]

In contrast, the Palestinian Authority's control over the camp has been relatively weak due to its location far away from Ramallah, the de facto capital of the PA.[47] In fact, PA forces seldom enter the camp. Israel has blamed the PA for its "incompetence," which has led to the "deterioration of security conditions". However, the PA has rejected these claims, criticizing Israel for "deliberately acting to weaken it",[48] and saying that Israeli actions are to blame for Palestinian violence.[49]

The Jenin Battalion, also known as the Jenin Brigades (Arabic: كتيبة جنين), is a Palestinian armed group that has recently appeared in the Jenin camp. Initially founded by the PIJ in 2021 to serve as a local branch for the al-Quds Brigades,[50][51] it has developed into an affiliation of armed militants from several factions, similar to the Lion's Den group in Nablus.[52] According to Al-Monitor, the two groups maintain high coordination with each other.[53] The group has a Telegram account with around 66,600 subscribers as of August 15, 2023.[54] According to Moein Odeh, an expert on Palestinian affairs, the Jenin Brigades consist of teenagers and men in their early twenties and do not have a clear hierarchical structure of command, making it difficult to track down members. Observers say that the Jenin Brigades and other similar groups formed amidst "a complete loss of confidence in the Palestinian political leadership".[49]

Organisation

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UNRWA Health Center in the Jenin Camp; 2011

The Jenin camp houses mainly the descendants of Palestinian refugees who were displaced form their homes in the regions of Haifa and the Carmel mountains, areas relatively close to the camp's location, allowing the town's population to maintain close ties to their relatives across the Green Line.[4][55] The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) estimates that the population of the Jenin camp will reach 11,674 people by June 2023,[56] while Al Jazeera reports that the camp has a population of more than 22,000 refugees.[57] However, many other sources report a figure between 13,000 and 15,000 refugees,[58][59] which gives a population density closer to the UNRWA estimate of 33,000/km2.[3] These differences in population counts stem from the fact that many refugees left the camp in the aftermath of the Second Intifada but are still registered refugees,[60] and the fact that a number of registered households live outside formal camp boundaries.[59]

During the first years of the Jenin camp, refugees lived at former barracks that were evacuated by the British Army, then at an abandoned train station from the Ottoman period, then at tents provided by the UNRWA. It wasn't until a few years later that the camp's residents began building mud houses to replace their tents, while concrete houses did not appear until the 1970s.[61][better source needed] Even today, the camp's residents face problems due to poor sewage networks,[62] and many live in shelters that lack appropriate lighting and ventilation. Moreover, water and electricity shortages have become increasingly common in recent years, particularly in the summer.[60]

The Jezreel Valley to the north of the Jenin camp

In the camp, there is one health center, administered by the UNRWA, and there are five schools, built with local support from a charitable organization in Nablus.[63] However, difficult economic conditions have raised the pressure on young boys to leave school for work, and on young girls to leave school for marriage. A survey by the IWS found that 14% of married females between 15 and 65 years of age have married under the age of fifteen, and 28% under the age of sixteen.[59] The Jenin camp has an unemployment rate of 22%, compared to the West Bank average of 16%.[43] Many residents previously relied upon work in Israel, but that has become more difficult since the construction of the West Bank Wall and the implementation of the permit regime, which mandates Palestinians to obtain a number of separate permits, issued by the Israeli administration in the West Bank, for a wide range of activities.[64]

Due to its proximity to the Jezreel Valley, the camp has one of the largest fertile plains in Palestine, and is sometimes called the "breadbasket of the West Bank". However, Israeli restrictions have blocked agricultural sales inside Israel, which has led to the devaluation of crops.[65]

See also

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References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Jenin refugee camp

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from Grokipedia
Jenin refugee camp is a densely populated Palestinian Arab encampment situated adjacent to the city of in the northern , established in 1953 by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees () to house individuals displaced during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Covering approximately 0.25 square kilometers, it accommodates around 14,000 registered refugees, yielding a exceeding 57,000 inhabitants per square kilometer—one of the highest globally—and features rudimentary marked by , , and limited access to basic services. Originally intended as a temporary , the camp has evolved into a permanent urban slum, with multi-story buildings replacing initial tents, yet retaining official refugee status under , which perpetuates generational dependency rather than facilitating permanent resettlement or citizenship in host territories. Over decades, Jenin camp has become notorious as a stronghold for Palestinian militant factions, including elements of , , and local armed groups, from which numerous terrorist attacks—such as shootings and bombings targeting Israeli civilians—have been launched, prompting repeated Israeli Defense Forces operations to dismantle explosive manufacturing sites and neutralize combatants embedded within the civilian population. Key events defining the camp include the 2002 Battle of during the Second Intifada, where Israeli forces engaged heavily armed militants in urban combat, resulting in the deaths of 52 Palestinians (including about half combatants) and 23 Israeli soldiers, contrary to initial unsubstantiated claims of a large-scale propagated by some media outlets. More recently, in 2023 and 2024, the area has seen escalated violence, with over 50 shooting attacks on Israelis originating from and ongoing IDF raids targeting militants responsible for a surge in , amid a broader rise in attacks that have claimed dozens of Israeli lives. These dynamics underscore the camp's role not merely as a humanitarian concern but as a persistent security challenge rooted in the glorification of violence and rejection of peaceful resolutions.

Geography and Demographics

Location and Physical Layout

The Jenin refugee camp is situated in the northern , bordering the municipality of city and recognized as the northernmost such camp in the region. Established in 1953 following the destruction of an earlier tent encampment by a snowstorm, it occupies an area of approximately 0.42 square kilometers on the eastern outskirts of Jenin. The camp's physical layout features a dense urban fabric characterized by narrow, winding streets and multi-story concrete buildings that have evolved from initial temporary shelters. This organic development, with vertical expansion to accommodate , has resulted in a labyrinthine structure prone to and limited access. Post-2002 reconstruction efforts preserved elements of the pre-existing street patterns rather than imposing a rigid grid, prioritizing continuity amid the camp's constrained footprint.

Population and Socioeconomic Conditions

The Jenin refugee camp is home to 24,239 registered Palestinian refugees as of 2023, though the actual resident population, including non-registered individuals, is estimated to be similar in scale given the camp's confines. The camp spans approximately 0.42 square kilometers, resulting in an extreme population density of about 57,712 persons per square kilometer, one of the highest in the West Bank. This overcrowding stems from its origins as a temporary settlement for 1948 war refugees and subsequent natural population growth, with multi-generational families housed in densely packed, often substandard structures. Military operations in 2025, including Israeli incursions, displaced over 12,785 residents from the camp by mid-year, exacerbating demographic instability and straining return efforts. Socioeconomic conditions in the camp are markedly dire, with unemployment and poverty rates ranking among the highest of the 19 West Bank refugee camps. In the broader Jenin Governorate, unemployment stood at 16.9% in 2022, but camp-specific figures are elevated due to restricted access to labor markets, particularly after barriers to employment in Israel reduced opportunities for manual laborers who once comprised a significant portion of the workforce. Poverty is pervasive, with historical surveys indicating nearly half of households in poverty as of 2002—far exceeding rates in nearby Jenin city—and recent assessments confirming the camp's position as having the highest such incidence among West Bank camps amid ongoing financial strains on aid providers like UNRWA and the Palestinian Authority. Living conditions reflect these challenges, characterized by inadequate including poor systems, limited access to clean , and vulnerability to damage from recurrent conflicts. operates four schools serving thousands of students and basic health clinics, but overcrowding hampers service delivery, contributing to elevated risks of and educational disruptions. Economic reliance on international aid is heavy, with militancy-related restrictions and Israeli measures further curtailing , , and mobility, perpetuating a cycle of dependency and underdevelopment.

Historical Development

Establishment and Early Refugee Settlement

The Jenin refugee camp was established in 1953 by the in the northern , then administered by following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. It served to shelter displaced during that war, with many residents originating from and adjacent villages in what became Israeli territory. The camp occupied 0.42 square kilometers of land adjacent to the town of , replacing an earlier tent-based settlement in the area that had been obliterated by a heavy snowstorm. UNRWA's founding in 1949 by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 302 enabled the agency's operations in Jordanian-controlled territories, including the provision of emergency rations, shelter materials, and basic services to refugees registered after the 1948 conflict. Early settlement involved temporary tented accommodations, reflecting the agency's initial mandate for short-term relief amid the displacement of approximately 700,000 amid wartime fighting and territorial changes. Over the subsequent years, shifted toward semi-permanent structures, including basic housing units, though the camp remained marked by poverty and reliance on agency support for health clinics and schools. The camp's location near the facilitated agricultural labor opportunities for some residents, but early conditions were characterized by overcrowding and inadequate sanitation, consistent with the makeshift nature of post-1948 sites under administration. By the mid-1950s, as integrated the , the camp's population stabilized as a registered community, though exact initial figures from 1953 remain undocumented in primary records, with growth tied to family reunifications and natural increase.

Periods of Jordanian Control and Initial Conflicts

The Jenin refugee camp was established in 1953 by the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East () on land leased from the Jordanian government, following the destruction of an initial tent encampment by a severe snowstorm. It housed displaced during and after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, primarily from villages in what became northern . Under Jordanian administration, which controlled the —including the Jenin district—after annexing it in April 1950, camp residents were granted Jordanian citizenship as early as 1949, facilitating access to employment, education, and social services within the kingdom while UNRWA provided essential aid such as food rations, , and basic . Living conditions in the camp during this era reflected broader challenges for , with initial tent dwellings gradually replaced by semi-permanent shelters amid ongoing overcrowding and poverty. registered thousands of residents, supporting schools and clinics, though socioeconomic integration varied; many worked in or labor in Jordanian cities, yet the camp retained its status as a symbol of displacement. Jordanian authorities maintained security over the , suppressing overt Palestinian nationalist organizing to prioritize stability and avoid provoking Israeli reprisals, which limited large-scale militant activity from the camps. Early tensions manifested in sporadic cross-border infiltrations and raids from Jordanian-controlled territories into during the 1950s, often driven by refugees seeking revenge or property reclamation, though documented involvement specific to Jenin camp residents remains sparse compared to operations. These actions, peaking around 1951–1956, prompted Israeli retaliatory strikes against Jordanian border villages and military positions, escalating regional instability without direct camp engagements. Jordanian forces occasionally clashed with infiltrators to enforce agreements, reflecting the kingdom's balancing act between hosting refugees and border security. The period culminated in the 1967 , when Israeli forces captured Jenin and the on June 5 after Jordanian artillery exchanges, ending Jordanian rule over the camp and displacing additional residents.

Involvement in the First Intifada

The Jenin refugee camp emerged as a focal point of resistance during the , a Palestinian uprising that began on December 9, 1987, in the in Gaza and rapidly spread to locations, including Jenin. Residents of the camp, many of whom were descendants of 1948 refugees with longstanding grievances over displacement and living conditions, engaged in coordinated protests, commercial strikes, and boycotts of Israeli goods as part of the civil disobedience campaign orchestrated by the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, dominated by and other factions. These activities disrupted daily life in the region and challenged Israeli administrative control, with the camp's dense, impoverished layout facilitating organized defiance against occupation forces. The camp's involvement extended to more confrontational tactics, including stone-throwing, barricade-building, and the use of Molotov cocktails against Israeli patrols, reflecting the escalation from nonviolent demonstrations to sporadic armed clashes by late 1988. served as a hub for Fatah-affiliated groups, such as the Black Panthers, which mobilized youth for these actions and early organization, making the surrounding district one of the most active areas for such underground networks during the uprising's initial phases. Israeli Defense Forces responded with curfews, demolitions of homes belonging to suspected activists, and arrests, conducting regular raids into the camp to dismantle these cells and seize improvised weapons, often resulting in violent confrontations. These dynamics contributed to the broader pattern of the , where refugee camps like functioned as centers of subaltern resistance, prioritizing mobilization over formal PLO leadership. While exact casualty figures for Jenin-specific incidents remain sparsely documented in aggregate reports, the camp's role underscored the uprising's decentralized, community-driven nature, with local committees enforcing compliance through intimidation of perceived collaborators. By the 's end in 1993, following the , Jenin's experience had solidified its reputation as a bastion of persistent militancy, though the period saw hundreds of Palestinian deaths across camps from clashes and targeted operations.

The Second Intifada and Battle of Jenin

During the Second Intifada, which erupted on September 28, 2000, following Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount, the Jenin refugee camp evolved into a major hub for Palestinian militant operations in the northern West Bank. Armed factions, primarily the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades affiliated with Fatah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad's al-Quds Brigades, established strongholds within the densely packed camp, using it to manufacture explosives, store weapons, and coordinate attacks. Between October 2000 and April 2002, militants operating from Jenin planned and launched 28 suicide bombings targeting Israeli civilians, contributing to a broader wave of violence that claimed over 1,000 Israeli lives by early 2002. The camp's militants also rejected oversight from Palestinian Authority security forces, asserting independent control and fostering an environment where armed resistance overshadowed civilian governance. The escalation culminated in Israel's , launched on March 29, 2002, as a direct response to intensified Palestinian , including the March 27 Netanya that killed 30 Israeli civilians. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) units entered city and camp on April 3, initiating the Battle of Jenin, a ten-day urban engagement characterized by close-quarters combat amid booby-trapped buildings, improvised explosive devices, and sniper fire from fortified positions. Palestinian fighters, numbering around 200-300, employed guerrilla tactics including and human shields, while IDF infantry and engineering units advanced methodically to dismantle terror infrastructure, uncovering extensive networks of tunnels and explosive caches. On , a reserve unit suffered its heaviest single-day loss since 1973, with 13 soldiers killed in a minefield . Casualties reflected the intensity of the fighting: 23 IDF soldiers were killed, and over 100 wounded, primarily in against armed s. Palestinian losses totaled approximately 52 confirmed deaths by late May 2002, as verified by hospital records and corroborated by IDF estimates, with the majority identified as combatants based on forensic evidence and witness accounts; a UN fact-finding team dispatched in May concluded there was no evidence of a , debunking early media claims of 500 civilian deaths propagated by Palestinian sources. The operation destroyed or damaged around 130 of the camp's 1,800 structures, often to expose hidden explosives or clear zones, displacing thousands temporarily but disrupting militant command structures and reducing immediate attack capabilities from the area. Subsequent investigations highlighted how initial unverified reports from biased outlets amplified narratives of disproportionate force, while empirical data underscored the battle's status as a symmetric clash between regular troops and irregular fighters embedded in civilian terrain.

Post-2002 Reconstruction and Ongoing Instability

Following the April 2002 Battle of Jenin, Israeli forces destroyed over 400 homes in the camp and severely damaged hundreds more, displacing more than a quarter of the population. coordinated the reconstruction, implementing a redesign that included modern shelters for approximately 450 homeless families and the addition of adjacent land equivalent to about 3% of the original camp's surface area to accommodate expanded needs. The effort, the largest during the Second , was funded primarily by a $27 million from the UAE Red Crescent and completed by , restoring essential amid continued hostilities. Despite these rebuilding initiatives, Jenin camp has endured persistent instability driven by entrenched poverty, overcrowding, and militant entrenchment. The identifies it as having among the highest rates of unemployment and poverty in the , with a exceeding 50,000 per square kilometer in a 0.42 square kilometer area housing around 14,000 residents. Recurrent Israeli military operations, aimed at neutralizing armed groups like and local factions such as the , have punctuated the period, including a major incursion in July 2023—the largest since 2002—that resulted in the deaths of 12 , mostly militants, and infrastructure damage. Violence escalated further from 2022 onward, with serving as a launchpad for terrorist attacks on , prompting intensified raids that killed over 120 in the Jenin area by mid-2023, according to Palestinian sources, alongside the neutralization of numerous militants. By early 2025, reported nearly two months of unceasing clashes, raids, and demolitions, exacerbating displacement and humanitarian strain, with families fleeing amid intra-communal violence, drug trade influences, and security force confrontations. This cycle of militant activity, Israeli countermeasures, and limited Palestinian Authority control has perpetuated the camp's status as a hotspot for unrest, hindering socioeconomic recovery despite initial post-2002 gains.

Militant Activity and Terrorism

Emergence of Armed Factions

The Jenin refugee camp, established in 1953, became a center for Palestinian militant activity during the and , serving as an incubator for resistance networks affiliated with the (PLO), including and other secular factions that conducted cross-border operations and local confrontations with Israeli forces. These early groups, often composed of camp residents radicalized by socioeconomic hardship and repeated military raids, focused on stone-throwing, Molotov cocktails, and occasional armed skirmishes, laying the groundwork for organized armed cells amid the broader context of Jordanian control until and subsequent Israeli occupation. During the (1987–1993), the camp saw the formal emergence of structured armed factions, with local Fatah-linked units like forming to coordinate uprisings, ambushes, and knife attacks against Israeli patrols, drawing on a population of around 10,000 residents where exceeded 50% and youth disenfranchisement fueled recruitment. Islamist groups also took root in the early 1990s, as (PIJ), founded in 1981 but expanding into the camps, established cells in Jenin emphasizing ideological commitment to armed jihad against Israel, while , originating in Gaza in 1987, built a parallel network there by the mid-1990s through da'wa (propagation) and social services that masked military training. The Second Intifada, erupting in September 2000, accelerated the rise of the (AMB), Fatah's nominally official armed wing, which coalesced in from ad-hoc clusters of former PLO militants and unemployed youth responding to Ariel Sharon's visit and ensuing clashes, conducting drive-by shootings, bombings, and suicide operations that claimed over 100 Israeli lives from the camp by 2002. PIJ and factions in similarly intensified activities, with PIJ pioneering rocket and mortar attacks from the camp and exporting suicide bombers to Israeli cities, forming a militant ecosystem sustained by external funding from (for PIJ) and smuggling networks. This period marked the camp's transformation into a de facto militant stronghold, where inter-factional alliances overshadowed Oslo-era truce commitments, driven by causal factors including perceived PA weakness and expansion.

Key Terrorist Attacks and Operations

The Jenin refugee camp has functioned as a primary operational base for (PIJ) militants, particularly its Jenin Battalion, which has orchestrated numerous attacks against Israeli targets since the late 1990s. During the (2000–2005), the camp's PIJ infrastructure facilitated suicide bombings, shootings, and deployments, with Israeli intelligence identifying as the origin for over 50 shooting attacks on Israeli civilians and soldiers. One notable operation involved a PIJ cell from planning a detonation on October 25, 2002, in Ariel, killing 14 Israelis and wounding approximately 50 others. PIJ operatives from the northern , including , executed high-casualty suicide bombings, such as the June 5, 2002, Megiddo Junction attack, where a detonated explosives in a , killing 17 and injuring 38. The camp's militants also coordinated cross-border shootings and ambushes, leveraging its dense urban layout for weapon storage and recruitment; PIJ leaders in , like those neutralized in subsequent operations, directed cells that dispatched to Israeli cities. In the post-2010 period, emerged as a renewed hub for PIJ and unaffiliated "lone wolf" attacks amid weakened Palestinian Authority control, with militants using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and drive-by shootings. Between early 2022 and mid-2023, terrorists from were responsible for more than half of the 19 Israeli fatalities in shooting attacks, including multiple ambushes on highways and checkpoints targeting civilians and security personnel. These operations often involved PIJ-claimed IEDs planted along access roads to Israeli communities, as documented in Israeli military reports of thwarted and executed plots. By 2023–2025, 's networks continued low-level attacks, such as sporadic shootings and attempted stabbings, contributing to over 30 Israeli deaths attributed to militants, many linked to the camp's factions.

Internal Control and Clan Dynamics

In the Jenin refugee camp, internal control has been predominantly exercised by local armed militant groups rather than the Palestinian Authority (PA), which maintains only nominal influence amid chronic security vacuums. Groups such as the —an umbrella coalition including , affiliates, and independent local fighters—have assumed authority, enforcing rules, resolving disputes through informal mechanisms like sulh (traditional adapted by factions), and even imposing taxes or rackets on residents and businesses. This structure emerged prominently after the , with militants filling governance gaps exacerbated by repeated Israeli incursions and PA reluctance or inability to project power, leading to a parallel authority system that prioritizes armed resistance over civil administration. Clan (hamula) dynamics, rooted in networks often reconstituted around pre-1948 village origins in camps, provide underlying social cohesion but play a subordinate role to factions in . Unlike in areas such as or Gaza, where clans wield direct political or economic leverage and engage in territorial rivalries, Jenin's compact, densely populated environment (housing around 14,000 residents in 0.42 square kilometers as of recent estimates) fosters relative unity in resistance, with family loyalties channeling recruitment into ideological groups rather than fueling inter-clan feuds. Notable families may align with specific brigades—for instance, supporting or sheltering fighters—but documented clan-based violence remains rare, overshadowed by external threats and intra-factional coordination against PA or Israeli forces. Tensions between militant control and clan networks surfaced in PA security operations, such as the December 2024 incursion, where forces clashed with Brigades fighters, killing at least 15 and displacing families while highlighting the camp's autonomy; external clans, like those in , publicly condemned the PA actions, illustrating broader hamula solidarity transcending local dynamics. This interplay underscores causal factors like socioeconomic deprivation—Jenin camp records the West Bank's highest and rates among camps—and generational militancy, where youth from fragmented families gravitate toward armed groups for status and protection, perpetuating a cycle of informal rule over traditional clan mediation.

Israeli Counter-Terrorism Operations

Major Military Incursions and Tactics

The most significant military incursion into Jenin refugee camp occurred during on April 3, 2002, as part of Israel's response to a wave of Palestinian suicide bombings that killed over 120 Israelis in March 2002 alone. The IDF deployed infantry, engineering units, and armored bulldozers to dismantle militant infrastructure in the densely built camp, where and other groups had fortified positions with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and booby-trapped buildings. Tactics emphasized a cautious, methodical advance to minimize Israeli casualties, including the use of D9 bulldozers to raze structures suspected of hiding fighters or explosives, exposing ambushes in narrow alleys. The operation lasted ten days in the camp, resulting in 23 IDF soldiers killed in close-quarters combat and approximately 52 Palestinian deaths, with at least 22 identified as non-combatants by , though IDF assessments attributed most to militants. Subsequent incursions adopted refined tactics informed by experiences, focusing on intelligence-driven raids rather than large-scale assaults, though major operations recurred amid rising militancy. In July 2023, the IDF launched its largest raid since , beginning July 3 and involving hundreds of troops, drones for , and precision strikes to target Islamic Jihad commanders and weapon caches in response to multiple attacks originating from the camp. Engineering units again employed bulldozers to clear paths and destroy tunnels used for smuggling and ambushes, while ground forces conducted house-to-house searches, arresting over 200 suspects and neutralizing explosive devices. The two-day operation killed 12 , including militants, and wounded over 100, with IDF reporting the elimination of key terror cells. From late 2023 through 2025, IDF operations intensified into sustained campaigns, particularly following the October 7, 2023, attack, with serving as a launchpad for PIJ and local brigades' and attacks. A December 2023 raid from December 12-14 killed 12 militants in three days of fighting. By 2024-2025, operations evolved to include aerial drone strikes for targeted eliminations, combined with ground incursions to seize control of the camp, destroy underground networks, and demolish homes of attackers, displacing thousands amid reports of widespread structural damage visible in . Tactics prioritized rapid entry with for arrests or neutralizations, supported by barriers and checkpoints to isolate militants, reflecting a to degrade operational capacity without prolonged occupation, though critics from UN sources claim excessive force despite embedded militant tactics like using civilian areas for cover. Over 70% of militant activity in occurred during these raids, underscoring the camp's role as a persistent threat hub.

Casualties, Neutralizations, and Security Outcomes

During the April 2002 Battle of Jenin, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) operations resulted in the deaths of 52 , the majority of whom were armed militants involved in prior terrorist attacks, alongside 23 IDF soldiers killed in combat, including 13 in a single ambush by Palestinian fighters. The IDF dismantled extensive militant infrastructure, including explosive devices and weapon caches, significantly degrading the operational capacity of groups like Islamic Jihad and in the camp. In subsequent counter-terrorism raids from 2002 to 2022, the IDF conducted targeted operations yielding dozens of militant neutralizations annually, with arrests often exceeding kills; for instance, operations in the area frequently uncovered IED labs and neutralized explosives, contributing to a temporary reduction in suicide bombings originating from the camp post-Second Intifada. Post-October 7, 2023, intensified IDF operations in Jenin camp have neutralized over 700 terrorists across the northern by mid-2025, including 36 senior operatives, with Jenin-specific actions eliminating at least 100 militants through airstrikes, ground engagements, and arrests. In a January 2025 operation, the IDF eliminated 15 terrorists and arrested 40 suspects while destroying terror infrastructure and neutralizing numerous roadside explosives. A September 2024 raid alone killed 14 terrorists and apprehended 25 others, targeting Islamic cells. Israeli casualties in these recent operations remain low relative to neutralizations, with isolated deaths, such as one in a July 2023 incursion, underscoring the shift to precision tactics over large-scale battles. outcomes include the disruption of attack networks, with Jenin-sourced terrorist incidents declining amid ongoing raids; by early 2025, operations like "Iron Wall" had dismantled multiple bomb-making facilities, preventing potential assaults amid a surge in militancy. Palestinian civilian casualties, while reported in media, often involve verified militant affiliations per IDF assessments, though independent verification remains contested due to militant embedding in civilian areas.

Coordination with Palestinian Authorities

Israeli security coordination with the Palestinian Authority (PA) in has primarily involved intelligence sharing and joint efforts to prevent attacks, as stipulated under the framework, though practical implementation in the refugee camp remains limited due to the PA's weak governance and the entrenched presence of militant groups like (PIJ) and affiliates. The PA's National Security Forces (NSF) and other units are responsible for maintaining order in Area A, including , but have historically struggled against armed factions, leading to prioritize unilateral actions when PA efforts prove insufficient. Israeli officials have noted that while broader coordination persists—encompassing arrests of terror suspects and disruption of planned attacks—the Jenin camp's status as a militant stronghold often necessitates independent Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) incursions to neutralize immediate threats. In late 2024, the PA initiated a rare large-scale operation in Jenin refugee camp starting December 5, deploying elite units to dismantle militant networks, arrest dozens of fighters, and restore authority amid clashes that killed at least six PA personnel, four militants, and three civilians by early January 2025. This campaign, targeting the —a coalition of PIJ, , and local fighters—was welcomed by the IDF as a potential means to curb without Israeli intervention, with military sources expressing hope that bolstered PA capabilities could reduce the camp's role as a launchpad for attacks. However, the operation highlighted coordination challenges, as PA forces faced armed resistance from militants who viewed the crackdown as collaboration with , and a January 17, 2025, reconciliation deal between the PA and Jenin Brigades collapsed shortly after, underscoring the fragility of PA control. Tensions have periodically disrupted coordination, such as in July 2023 when PA President suspended security ties following an IDF raid in that killed 12 , including militants, prompting a broader freeze on relations until reassessment. During 's 2025 "Operation Iron Wall" in —which involved drone strikes, arrests, and the elimination of over a dozen militants—reports emerged of indirect PA support, including PA forces targeting fighters concurrently, though official Israeli-PA operational alignment remained opaque and criticized by militants as complicity. Overall, while advocates for enhanced PA effectiveness to handle security, the camp's dynamics—marked by clan loyalties, Iranian-backed militancy, and PA infighting—have constrained meaningful joint operations, with IDF assessments emphasizing that PA failures necessitate proactive Israeli measures to prevent attacks emanating from the area.

Recent Developments (2010–2025)

Escalations During the Knife Intifada

The Knife Intifada, a wave of predominantly individual Palestinian , , and vehicular attacks against beginning in 2015, saw notable escalations in Jenin refugee camp through intensified clashes and militant incitement. Local youth engaged in frequent stone-throwing and assaults on Israeli forces patrolling the area, prompting raids aimed at neutralizing potential attackers amid broader regional unrest. On October 4, 2015, Israeli forces entered the camp for search operations, sparking one of the period's most violent confrontations, which injured 55 Palestinians, including 11 from live ammunition fired in response to thrown projectiles. Similar clashes persisted, with reports of deployments causing suffocation incidents among residents by late October. Armed factions in the camp, particularly Palestinian Islamic Jihad's , amplified the violence by glorifying attackers via and funerals, framing s as heroic acts against perceived Israeli encroachments at holy sites. While the intifada's core featured "lone wolf" operations, produced several perpetrators or attempted assailants, reflecting its status as a militant hub. For instance, on January 11, 2016, Zaid Maher Muhammad Ashqar, a resident of the camp, carried out an attempted near , neutralized by . Israeli assessments attributed over 200 or attempted incidents nationwide by early 2016 to this incitement dynamic, with Jenin's networks providing ideological and logistical support despite the decentralized nature of many attacks. These escalations strained local infrastructure, with repeated IDF incursions leading to home searches and arrests of suspected plotters, though Palestinian sources claimed excessive force exacerbated tensions. By mid-2016, the wave subsided somewhat, but Jenin's role underscored its persistent function as a for anti-Israel militancy, where clan-based loyalties intertwined with factional agendas to sustain volatility. Independent analyses noted that while Israeli countermeasures prevented numerous plots, underlying grievances and unchecked glorification of violence perpetuated the cycle, independent of formal organizational command.

2023 Incursion and Immediate Aftermath

On January 26, 2023, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a counter-terrorism raid in Jenin refugee camp targeting a (PIJ) cell planning an imminent attack on Israeli civilians, according to IDF statements. The operation involved undercover units initially attempting arrests, but escalated into a firefight after s opened fire on troops. The IDF reported killing nine Palestinian gunmen, including senior PIJ commander Bassem Abu al-Rab and members affiliated with PIJ, , and Fatah's , who were actively shooting from multiple locations. Palestinian health officials reported nine deaths and seven injuries, attributing all fatalities to Israeli fire without distinguishing status, while local accounts claimed two civilians, including a 61-year-old and a young man, were among the dead. The IDF demolished the home of a involved in prior attacks and arrested one suspect, with no Israeli casualties reported. The raid, the deadliest single IDF operation in Jenin since 2002, prompted the Palestinian Authority (PA) to suspend security coordination with Israel, citing excessive force. In the immediate aftermath, violence escalated regionally: the following day, a Palestinian gunman from Hebron killed seven Israeli civilians in a synagogue stabbing attack near Jerusalem, which Israeli officials linked to heightened incitement following the Jenin operation. Palestinian militant groups in Jenin claimed the raid as justification for continued resistance, vowing retaliation, while the IDF maintained the action disrupted specific terror plots originating from the camp, a known hub for armed factions responsible for multiple attacks on Israelis in 2022-2023. Later in 2023, the IDF launched Operation Home and Garden on July 3, a two-day large-scale incursion involving over 1,000 troops, aerial drones, and engineering units to dismantle explosive devices and militant infrastructure in Jenin camp. The operation marked the first use of airstrikes in the West Bank since 2000, targeting PIJ and Hamas command centers; the IDF reported killing at least 12 militants, arresting over 50 suspects, seizing dozens of weapons and IEDs, and destroying terror tunnels and manufacturing sites. Palestinian sources reported 12 deaths and over 100 injuries, asserting many were civilians caught in crossfire or protesting the raid, though the IDF identified at least nine as confirmed PIJ and Hamas operatives. Post-operation assessments indicated tactical successes for the IDF, including temporary disruption of militant networks in , with Defense Minister stating the goals were "fully achieved" through neutralization of key figures and infrastructure. However, local Palestinian factions, including PIJ, declared the incursion a "" for resistance, citing minimal long-term deterrence and renewed amid camp damage that displaced hundreds temporarily. A raid in killed another 14-18 during arrests and clashes, further straining humanitarian conditions with reported injuries from explosives and gunfire. Overall, 2023 operations in neutralized dozens of militants linked to attacks killing Israeli civilians and soldiers, but coincided with a spike in violence, including over 130 Palestinian deaths and heightened factional activity.

2024–2025 Operations, Displacements, and Humanitarian Crises

In 2024, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted multiple counter-terrorism raids in the Jenin refugee camp, targeting militants affiliated with (PIJ) and the , a local PIJ-linked group responsible for attacks on Israeli targets. These operations intensified following the October 7, 2023, attack, with the IDF reporting the elimination of at least 14 terrorists in Jenin during a operation, alongside the apprehension of over 30 suspects and seizure of explosive devices. In November, undercover units eliminated five additional terrorists during a raid, amid ongoing efforts to dismantle roadside networks that had injured Israeli soldiers. Palestinian health authorities reported higher overall Palestinian casualties in these encounters, including civilians caught in , though the IDF attributed most deaths to armed militants. On December 5, the Palestinian Authority (PA) launched its own operation in Jenin against the , resulting in clashes that killed at least one militant commander and strained local alliances. Operation Iron Wall, initiated by the IDF on January 21, 2025, marked a large-scale escalation in and adjacent northern areas, aimed at uprooting entrenched terrorist infrastructure in camps following a Gaza ceasefire. The IDF deployed thousands of troops to neutralize PIJ and networks, destroy weapon caches, and prevent the camps from serving as launchpads for attacks, reporting the elimination of over 102 militants by mid-2025, including key figures linked to prior Israeli deaths. Initial days saw at least 10-12 killed in Jenin raids, with the IDF emphasizing precision strikes on armed cells exploiting civilian areas. The operation, the longest in the camp's history, involved bulldozing structures used for terror activities, which Palestinian sources described as widespread destruction affecting non-combatants. Five Israeli soldiers were killed by improvised explosives during the campaign, highlighting the tactical challenges posed by militants embedding in dense urban environments. Displacements surged during Operation Iron Wall, with evacuation orders and infrastructure demolitions forcing tens of thousands from and nearby camps like Tulkarem and Nur Shams. UN assessments indicated approximately 40,000 Palestinians displaced across the northern by February 2025, including nearly 20,000 from Jenin camp alone, rendering it largely depopulated as residents fled to makeshift shelters or relatives' homes. The IDF issued demolition orders for about 1,400 structures, citing to clear terror hideouts, though humanitarian groups reported secondary effects like severed roads and restricted returns exacerbating the exodus. By April, over 119 days into the operation, aid agencies noted persistent barriers to repatriation, with families facing acute shelter shortages. Humanitarian conditions deteriorated amid the operations, with destroyed water, electricity, and sewage systems in Jenin camp leading to health risks and service disruptions for remaining residents. OCHA reported ongoing access constraints for aid convoys, compounded by clashes, resulting in injuries from gunfire and explosives; by October 2025, 65 Palestinians had been killed in that year. UNRWA highlighted the camp's isolation, with schools and clinics shuttered and malnutrition risks rising among displaced families reliant on limited food distributions. While the IDF facilitated some humanitarian corridors, reports from MSF and others underscored urgent needs for medical evacuations and rebuilding, attributing crises to the interplay of entrenchment and responses in a confined area.

Governance and Infrastructure

UNRWA Administration and Services

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) delivers core services including education, primary health care, and social welfare to the approximately 23,628 registered Palestinian refugees residing in Jenin camp, but maintains no administrative or policing authority over the camp, which falls under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority as the host entity. UNRWA's operational framework emphasizes human development through these services, with funding supporting infrastructure maintenance and emergency responses, though chronic underfunding and recurrent violence have periodically disrupted delivery. In education, UNRWA operates multiple schools serving a significant portion of the camp's roughly 7,150 children, focusing on basic and secondary curricula aligned with Palestinian standards, though access has been interrupted for thousands of students amid escalations, as seen in 2025 when over 4,000 pupils in Jenin-area UNRWA facilities faced closures due to ongoing conflict. services are centered at a single reconstructed facility opened in 2014, offering such as maternal and child health, dental treatment, and management of non-communicable diseases for around 300,000 patients agency-wide in 2023, with Jenin-specific provisions including vaccinations and chronic illness support until damages from the July 2023 Israeli operation forced temporary relocations. Social services include the Programme, providing annual cash assistance to about 947 impoverished households—equating to 4% of the registered population—to address extreme poverty amid high unemployment rates exceeding 17% in camps. In crises, 's interventions expand to emergency cash, , and repairs via units like the EU-funded Crisis Intervention Unit, though full service suspensions occurred repeatedly, such as in December 2024 amid clashes between Palestinian and armed groups, and persisted into early 2025 due to military operations displacing nearly all residents. These disruptions highlight operational vulnerabilities, with adapting through mobile health points and aid for over 3,500 displaced families from alone in 2025 responses.

Palestinian Authority Oversight and Challenges

The Palestinian Authority (PA) exercises nominal governance over Jenin refugee camp as part of Area A in the , where it holds responsibility for civil administration and internal security under the framework. However, effective oversight has been undermined by the entrenched presence of armed groups, including the —a coalition affiliated with , , and local militants—which have dominated camp operations, recruitment, and enforcement since the early 2000s. PA security forces, such as the National Security Forces and Preventive Security Service, have historically maintained a limited footprint in the camp, often prioritizing coordination with Israeli forces against mutual threats over direct confrontation with local factions, leading to accusations of complicity or weakness. In response to escalating militant activity, including over 500 terror attacks emanating from since October 2023, the PA launched a major security operation in the camp on December 5, 2024, aiming to dismantle armed networks and reassert authority. The campaign involved deploying hundreds of PA forces, imposing a that restricted movement, and cutting utilities like water and electricity to pressure residents and fighters, resulting in clashes that killed at least six PA personnel, four militants, and three civilians by early January 2025. Despite arresting dozens and targeting commanders, such as the killing of leader Yazid Ja'ayseh, the operation faced fierce local resistance, with residents viewing it as an infringement on and a concession to Israeli interests, exacerbating PA legitimacy deficits amid its aging leadership under President . Ongoing challenges include clan-based power structures that shield militants, chronic underfunding of PA security apparatus—exacerbated by Israeli withholding of tax revenues—and internal divisions, as some PA elements sympathize with resistance factions. A January 17, 2025, agreement with the to end the standoff collapsed shortly after, allowing PA forces limited deployment inside the camp but failing to prevent continued attacks on Israeli targets, such as a January 7 checkpoint assault. These dynamics highlight the PA's dilemma: aggressive enforcement risks "fratricidal" backlash and exploitation for propaganda, while inaction invites Israeli incursions that further erode PA relevance, as evidenced by concurrent IDF raids in nearby camps during the PA operation.

Local Social Structures and Economy

The social organization of Jenin refugee camp revolves around extended family networks known as hamulas, which serve as foundational units for mutual aid, kinship-based solidarity, and informal governance in a community of over 14,000 residents confined to 0.42 square kilometers. These clans enforce codes of honor, facilitate endogamous marriages, and mediate disputes to avert vigilantism, thereby maintaining internal stability amid external pressures. Palestinian society in the West Bank, including refugee camps like Jenin, exhibits this clan structure as a persistent feature of social resilience, where hamulas provide trusted networks for economic sharing and protection. Complementing these familial ties, community-based organizations (CBOs) form a vibrant civil society layer, offering supplementary services such as youth programs and welfare support that bolster social cohesion. The camp's is characterized by chronic underdevelopment, high dependency on external aid, and vulnerability to security disruptions. Unemployment rates in rank among the highest in West Bank refugee camps, with historical reliance on Israeli work permits severely curtailed by permit revocations and border closures, leaving many households without steady income. afflicts 29.4% of residents, driving informal economic activities like small-scale vending, home-based labor, and remittances from kin, though these are insufficient against the backdrop of restricted mobility and demolished . UNRWA's relief programs, including cash assistance, partially offset these challenges by injecting resources into the local and supporting , yet recurrent military incursions exacerbate job losses and displacement, as seen in operations from 2023 onward that uprooted thousands and intensified aid dependency. Overall unemployment hovered at 28.6% in the second quarter of 2025, with Jenin's conditions likely mirroring or exceeding this due to its militant profile and isolation.

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  93. https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/palestinians-west-bank-are-facing-urgent-needs-amid-mass-displacement
  94. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2025/07/israel-must-stop-killings-and-home-demolitions-occupied-west-bank
  95. https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/humanitarian-situation-update-333-west-bank
  96. https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/unrwa-commissioner-general-60-days-start-operation-iron-wall-jenin-camp
  97. https://www.ochaopt.org/content/israeli-forces-operation-jenin-40-cent-households-jenin-refugee-camp-still-lack-access-water-1700-jerusalem
  98. https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/jenin_camp_profile.pdf
  99. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/382561410_2023_UNRWA_health_annual_report_published_in_May_2024
  100. https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/unrwa-has-been-forced-suspend-services-jenin-camp
  101. https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/features/unrwa-lifeline-displaced-families-northern-west-bank
  102. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/unrwa-a-lifeline-for-the-displaced-families-in-the-northern-west-bank/
  103. https://www.newarab.com/analysis/whats-behind-palestinian-authoritys-crackdown-jenin
  104. https://apnews.com/article/palestinians-authority-jenin-raid-israel-d698557816e2b9b674c6221511a80ef6
  105. https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2025/01/07/palestinian-authority-fails-to-secure-jenin-camp-after-attacks-on-israeli-checkpoint/
  106. https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/security-agreement-reached-jenin
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