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Line Item Veto Act of 1996
Line Item Veto Act of 1996
Line Item Veto Act of 1996
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Line Item Veto Act
Great Seal of the United States
Long titleAn Act To give the President line item veto authority with respect to appropriations, new direct spending, and limited tax benefits.
Enacted bythe 104th United States Congress
Citations
Public lawPub. L. 104–130 (text) (PDF)
Statutes at Large110 Stat. 1200
Legislative history
United States Supreme Court cases
Clinton v. City of New York

The Line Item Veto Act Pub. L. 104–130 (text) (PDF) was a federal law of the United States that granted the president the power to line-item veto budget bills passed by Congress. It was signed into law on April 9, 1996, but its effect was brief since it was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court just over two years later, in Clinton v. City of New York.[1]

Legislative history

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The bill was introduced by Senator Bob Dole on January 4, 1995, cosponsored by Senator John McCain and 29 other senators. Related House Bills included H.R. 147, H.R. 391, H.R. 2,H.R. 27 and H.R. 3136. The bill was signed into law by President Bill Clinton on April 9, 1996.

Judicial review

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Raines v. Byrd

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It was immediately challenged in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia by a group of six senators, first among whom was Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV), where it was declared unconstitutional by District Judge Harry Jackson, a Reagan appointee, on April 10, 1997. The case was subsequently remanded by the Supreme Court of the United States with instructions to dismiss on the grounds that the senators had not suffered sufficient, particularized injury to maintain suit under Article III of the United States Constitution (i.e., the senators lacked standing). The case, Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), was handed down on June 26, 1997, and did not include a judgment on the constitutional grounds of the law.

Clinton v. City of New York

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Clinton subsequently used the veto on a provision of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and two provisions of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, each of which was challenged in a separate case: one by the City of New York, two hospital associations, one hospital, and two health care unions; the other by a farmers' cooperative from Idaho and an individual member of the cooperative. Senators Byrd, Moynihan, Levin, and Hatfield again opposed the law, this time through Amicus curiae briefs.

Judge Thomas Hogan of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia combined the cases and declared the law unconstitutional on February 12, 1998.[2] This ruling was subsequently affirmed on June 25, 1998, by a 6–3 decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case Clinton v. City of New York. Justices Breyer, Scalia, and O'Connor dissented. The ruling has been criticized by some legal scholars.[3]

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Line Item Veto Act of 1996

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from Grokipedia
The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-130) was a federal statute that amended the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 to grant the President authority to unilaterally cancel specific discretionary budget authority, items of new direct spending, and limited tax benefits within duly enacted appropriation or revenue bills, thereby allowing partial vetoes without rejecting the entire . Signed into law by President on April 9, 1996, after passage by a Republican-controlled amid bipartisan support for curbing earmarks and federal deficits, the Act took effect on January 1, 1997, and empowered the executive to issue cancellation notices within five calendar days of signing a bill, with such actions having the force of law unless enacted expedited disapproval . Proponents viewed the measure as a tool to eliminate wasteful "pork-barrel" spending and special-interest provisions often inserted late in the legislative process, with President exercising the power 82 times during its brief tenure, targeting over $1 billion in projected savings from agriculture subsidies, military projects, and tax breaks. However, the Act sparked immediate constitutional challenges, culminating in the Supreme Court's 6-3 ruling in Clinton v. City of New York (524 U.S. 417), which invalidated it as violating the of Article I, Section 7, on grounds that it permitted the President to amend rather than laws passed by , thereby disrupting the and presentment requirements essential to the legislative process. The decision underscored tensions over separation of powers, with dissenters arguing the Act represented a permissible delegation of legislative authority akin to historical rescission practices, but the majority emphasized its novelty in altering enacted statutes post-passage without bicameral approval or presentment to the President for the modified version. Efforts to revive line-item veto mechanisms via constitutional amendment or alternative statutes have since faltered, leaving the power unrealized at the federal level despite its routine use by 43 state governors.

Historical Context

Origins in State Governments

The concept of the line-item veto emerged in governments during the mid-19th century as a mechanism to grant governors authority to reject specific appropriations or provisions within a bill without vetoing the entire legislation, thereby curbing legislative tendencies toward excessive or targeted spending. Georgia adopted the first state-level line-item veto provision in its in 1861, amid post-secession constitutional revisions that aimed to strengthen executive fiscal oversight. This innovation paralleled the line-item veto granted to the president under the Confederate Constitution that same year, though state adoptions were independent responses to local budgetary challenges rather than direct emulation. Adoption spread rapidly in the following decades, often as part of broader state constitutional reforms emphasizing gubernatorial power over fragmented legislatures. incorporated the authority in 1866, followed by in 1872 and in 1873. By the and , additional states including , New York, , , , , and enacted similar provisions, typically limiting the veto to appropriation items to prevent executive overreach into matters. These early implementations reflected a practical of the general power, enabling governors to excise "pork" or unrelated riders from omnibus spending bills without derailing essential funding. By the early , the had become a standard feature in most state constitutions, with states like adopting it in 1930 amid progressive-era demands for fiscal discipline. As of the late 1990s, 44 states provided governors with some form of this authority, excluding , , , , , and ; the power's prevalence underscored its perceived utility in balancing legislative and executive branches at the state level. This state-level experimentation informed later federal proposals, demonstrating the veto's role in promoting targeted budgetary restraint.

Early Federal Proposals

The first federal proposal for presidential line-item veto authority was introduced in the in 1876, amid post-Civil War expansions in federal spending that prompted concerns over congressional and pork-barrel appropriations. President publicly endorsed the measure, recommending it in his annual message to as a tool to excise specific wasteful items from appropriations bills without vetoing entire legislation, thereby promoting fiscal discipline in an era of growing deficits. Despite this support, the proposal failed to advance, reflecting early congressional reluctance to dilute its budgetary control. Over the subsequent decades, similar bills surfaced periodically, often tied to presidential appeals during economic pressures or reform movements. Presidents such as , , and advocated for the power, with specifically urging it in his 1887 annual message to counter "indiscriminate" spending embedded in omnibus bills. In total, more than 150 line-item veto proposals were introduced in Congress from 1876 through the 1980s, frequently as statutory measures or constitutional amendments, yet none passed due to persistent debates over and fears of executive overreach. Renewed momentum appeared in the , particularly under Presidents and , who requested the authority amid efforts to balance budgets post-World War I and during the onset; Coolidge proposed it in 1927 as part of broader executive reform. These efforts highlighted a recurring causal tension: while presidents viewed the as a check on legislative extravagance, lawmakers resisted, prioritizing their role in originating appropriations under Article I of the . By the mid-20th century, proposals had evolved to include impoundment alternatives, but direct bills remained stalled until the fiscal debates.

Provisions and Mechanisms

Scope of Presidential Authority

The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 empowered the President to cancel, in whole, three categories of provisions within enacted appropriations bills or related measures: dollar amounts of discretionary budget authority, items of new direct spending, and limited tax benefits. Discretionary budget authority referred to levels allocated through annual appropriations processes, allowing the President to eliminate specific spending items without affecting the remainder of the . These cancellations applied only to provisions in bills signed into law after April 1, 1997, and targeted fiscal years beginning on or after October 1, 1997. New direct spending encompassed any item of new entitlement authority that increased mandatory outlays, such as expansions of programs like or new credit authority leading to federal liabilities. Limited benefits were defined as provisions reducing federal by less than 25% of potential collections and benefiting 100 or fewer taxpayers or entities, enabling targeted elimination of narrow exemptions or credits. The Act explicitly prohibited partial cancellations, requiring entire items to be struck, and mandated that actions serve deficit reduction without altering non-cancellable elements like emergency funding or provisions essential to the President's al obligations. Presidential cancellations required submission of a special message to within five calendar days of signing the bill, detailing the items affected, estimated budgetary savings, and policy rationales tied to fiscal restraint. retained authority to disapprove cancellations via expedited legislative procedures, though successful overrides were rare in practice. This framework aimed to enhance executive control over earmarks and pork-barrel spending while preserving congressional primacy in appropriations.

Procedural Requirements

The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 authorized the President to cancel in whole specific provisions of enacted laws, including discretionary authority, new direct spending items, or limited benefits, provided such cancellations would reduce the Federal deficit and not impair any essential Government functions or harm the national interest. To exercise this authority, the President was required to act within five calendar days (excluding Sundays) after signing the relevant bill into law, transmitting a special message to specifying the canceled items by reference number, dollar amount, and estimated fiscal impact. This message also had to include a detailed justification for each cancellation, identifying affected legal references and any geographic or programmatic impacts, with the full text subsequently published in the . Cancellations took effect immediately upon Congress's receipt of the special message, effectively rescinding the targeted budget authority or nullifying the provision's legal force without altering the remainder of the law. The Act established a "lockbox" mechanism to prevent rescinded funds from being reappropriated, reducing overall limits by the amount of unoverturned cancellations in budget authority and outlays. Congress retained the ability to disapprove cancellations through an expedited legislative process. A disapproval bill, listing specific cancellation numbers, could be introduced in either chamber within five calendar days of session following receipt of the special message, with committees required to report within seven session days. Floor consideration was limited: in the House, to one hour of debate without amendments except to strike listings; in the Senate, to ten hours with germaneness restrictions on amendments and a three-fifths vote to waive points of order. The entire disapproval process was confined to 30 calendar days of session, after which unoverturned cancellations became permanent, and any enacted disapproval bill was subject to presidential , requiring a two-thirds in both houses for override. In practice, this framework allowed for rapid but constrained congressional response, as observed in 1997 when President issued 82 cancellations, with only one disapproval bill (restoring construction funds) passing both houses before being vetoed.

Enactment and Early Use

Legislative Passage

The Line Item Veto Act originated as S. 4, introduced in the on January 4, 1995, by Senator (R-FL) and cosponsored by Senators (D-WV) and (R-MS), among others, with referral to the Committees on Governmental Affairs and the Budget. A companion bill, H.R. 2, was introduced in the House on January 4, 1995, by Representative Bill Clinger (R-PA) and passed the House in amended form on February 6, 1995. The passed its version of S. 4, with amendments, on March 23, 1995, by a yea-nay vote of 69-29. Differences between the House and versions necessitated a committee, which filed its report on March 21, 1996. The approved the conference report on March 27, 1996, by a vote of 69-31, with nineteen Democrats joining Republicans in support and three Republicans opposing. The House agreed to the conference report on March 28, 1996, pursuant to H. Res. 391, which provided for its consideration under . President signed S. 4 into law as 104-130 on April 9, 1996, stating that it would provide a "scalpel" for targeting wasteful spending and contribute to deficit reduction without infringing on congressional prerogatives. The act amended the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 to grant the president cancellation authority over certain appropriations, new direct spending items, and limited tax benefits, effective January 1, 1997, or upon enactment of specified deficit reduction legislation, with a on January 1, 2005.

Implementation Under Clinton

President signed the Line Item Veto Act into on April 9, 1996, with the authority becoming effective on January 1, 1997. The act permitted the president to cancel specific dollar amounts of discretionary budget authority, new entitlement authority, or limited benefits within five days of signing an appropriations or bill into , provided the cancellations did not exceed the relevant spending limits and were justified on grounds of reducing the deficit or avoiding . Clinton first exercised the line-item veto authority on August 11, 1997, targeting three provisions in the recently enacted and : one spending item providing $289 million in funds to for private attorneys handling welfare cases, and two tax benefits—one exempting a from taxes on imported and another allowing agricultural cooperatives to avoid certain taxes. These initial cancellations were projected to save approximately $550 million over five years, primarily by eliminating targeted tax breaks and reallocating funds deemed inefficient. Over the course of 1997, issued 11 sets of cancellations affecting 82 provisions across multiple appropriations bills, focusing predominantly on earmarked spending projects such as military base construction and research grants, as well as select tax benefits. The targeted items included $287 million in 1998 spending for 38 projects, alongside tax provisions estimated to reduce revenues by smaller amounts. Congressional procedures allowed lawmakers to enact disapproval bills to reinstate canceled items, which could then veto; in response, the approved overrides for 36 canceled projects in November 1997, though most required further action that did not materialize before judicial challenges halted implementation. The fiscal effects of these cancellations were estimated at $1.9 billion in savings over five years, a modest fraction of the federal budget exceeding $1.6 trillion annually at the time. One cancellation was later deemed impermissible under the act's terms for targeting an item outside the specified categories, highlighting procedural constraints. Implementation revealed practical challenges, including rapid congressional pushback and lawsuits from affected parties, such as challenging a benefit cancellation projected to cost it $250 million in refunds. Overall, the tool's use under demonstrated selective application to "pork-barrel" spending but yielded limited budgetary restraint amid ongoing deficit reduction efforts.

Judicial Review

Raines v. Byrd

In Raines v. Byrd, six members of the 104th —four Representatives and two Senators, all Democrats who had voted against the [Line Item Veto Act](/page/Line-item_veto Act)—filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on April 10, 1996, challenging the Act's on grounds that it violated the (Art. I, § 7, cl. 2) and the requirement by delegating excessive legislative power to the President. The plaintiffs argued that the Act diminished 's lawmaking authority by allowing the President to selectively cancel provisions after signing bills into , thereby nullifying their votes without presentment for reconsideration. Defendants, including Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin (as representative of the executive) and congressional leaders, moved to dismiss for lack of standing and , but the District Court denied the motion, granted to the plaintiffs, and declared the Act unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted direct appeal under the Act's expedited review provision and, in a 7-2 decision issued on June 27, 1997, vacated the District Court's judgment and dismissed the complaint for lack of Article III standing. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority (joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, with Souter and Ginsburg also joining the dissent in part), held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a "personal injury fairly traceable to the unlawful conduct" that was particularized and concrete, as required under Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (504 U.S. 555, 1992). The Court emphasized that the alleged injury—institutional dilution of legislative voting power—was generalized and abstract, shared by the entire Congress rather than individualized to the plaintiffs; their votes against the Act had been counted, and the law had passed through normal bicameral procedures, distinguishing the case from Coleman v. Miller (307 U.S. 433, 1939), where legislators' votes on ratification were effectively overridden by executive action. Rehnquist noted that allowing standing here would invite frequent judicial intervention in interbranch disputes, undermining separation of powers, and that individual legislators cannot sue merely to protest laws they opposed. Justice Souter dissented (joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer), arguing that the plaintiffs faced a sufficiently concrete injury akin to vote nullification, as the Act enabled the President to amend duly enacted statutes unilaterally, altering the content of laws the legislators had voted on and potentially frustrating their policy objectives in future appropriations. Souter contended that the majority's institutional injury rationale overlooked precedents like (395 U.S. 486, ), where a member's exclusion from conferred standing, and warned that dismissing such suits could leave constitutional violations unremediable absent unlikely congressional action to repeal the law. Justice Breyer filed a separate dissent, joined by Stevens and Ginsburg, critiquing the majority's narrow view of standing as risking unchecked executive overreach in legislative matters. The decision did not reach the merits of the Line Item Veto Act's , preserving the law's operation until challenged successfully in v. City of New York (524 U.S. 417, 1998) by parties with more direct economic injuries from specific vetoes. It established a stringent barrier for congressional standing in separation-of-powers disputes, requiring allegations of personal, particularized harm beyond generalized institutional grievances, a precedent reaffirmed in later cases like (570 U.S. 744, 2013).

Clinton v. City of New York

Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), was a landmark U.S. decision that invalidated the Line Item Veto Act of 1996. The case consolidated two challenges to President 's exercise of the Act's cancellation authority: one by the City of New York and affected health care entities, and another by potato growers from . On August 11, 1997, Clinton canceled a provision in the that would have provided tax benefits to New York City for payments to the , arguing it violated a tax code restriction on benefits to organizations with related-party transactions. He also canceled a Medicaid-related limitation on federal reimbursements to states for health care services provided by non-governmental organizations, impacting the plaintiffs' expected funding. The plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, claiming the cancellations violated the of Article I, Section 7, Clause 2, which requires bills passed by both houses of to be presented to the President for approval or in their entirety. The district court granted , finding the Act unconstitutional and enjoining further cancellations, a ruling upheld on appeal to the D.C. Circuit. The granted to resolve the constitutionality of the Act, distinguishing it from Raines v. Byrd (1997), where individual members of lacked standing to challenge the Act prospectively. Here, the Court unanimously found standing for the institutional plaintiffs due to concrete financial injuries traceable to the cancellations and redressable by invalidating them. In a 6-3 authored by on June 25, 1998, the Court held the Act unconstitutional under the . The ruling emphasized that the Act authorized the President to "cancel" specific provisions after signing bills into law, effectively amending or repealing parts of statutes unilaterally without bicameral congressional approval or presentment of the altered text. This process produced legal effects different from the laws as enacted, circumventing the constitutional requirement that repeal or amendment follow the same procedures as original enactment. The Court rejected the government's defense that cancellations were mere "non-enforcement" or conditional delegations, noting the Act's directive language compelled excision with immediate legal consequences, akin to historical precedents like the invalidation of the legislative veto in INS v. Chadha (1983). No provision in the Constitution or early practice supported such executive revision of duly passed laws. Justice concurred in the judgment but argued the Act violated the non-delegation doctrine by impermissibly transferring legislative power to the executive without an intelligible principle. Justices , , and dissented in part, with Scalia contending the Act was a permissible delegation of Congress's spending , not a violation of presentment since it occurred post-enactment; he viewed the majority's formalistic approach as ignoring practical budgetary realities. O'Connor and Ginsburg joined Breyer's non-delegation analysis, while Breyer filed a separate partial dissent critiquing the majority for not addressing delegation issues directly. The decision rendered all prior cancellations void, restoring the canceled provisions.

Evaluations and Debates

Fiscal and Budgetary Impacts

The Line Item Veto Act of 1996, effective from January 1, 1997, enabled President Bill Clinton to cancel specific provisions in enacted legislation, targeting discretionary budget authority, new direct spending items, and limited tax benefits to achieve budgetary savings. During its 18 months of operation, Clinton exercised this authority 82 times across 11 laws, including 9 appropriations acts and 2 reconciliation measures. Of these, 79 cancellations affected discretionary spending, totaling $477 million in fiscal year 1998 budget authority; one addressed new direct spending under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, with a $200 million budgetary authority reduction; and two involved limited tax benefits in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, projecting $29 million in revenue gains. Initial White House estimates projected approximately $1.9 billion in five-year savings from these actions, primarily through elimination of targeted pork-barrel projects and inefficient tax provisions. However, congressional overrides and judicial interventions substantially diminished these figures: on February 25, 1998, Congress overrode 38 military construction cancellations worth $287 million via expedited procedures, restoring the funds; a federal court also nullified one cancellation related to Federal Employees Retirement System open-season eligibility on January 6, 1998. After accounting for such reversals, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated net five-year savings at less than $600 million, with tax benefit cancellations contributing under $300 million. These adjustments reflected the Act's "lockbox" mechanism, which redirected some savings to reduce discretionary spending caps by $192 million in budget authority and $100 million in outlays for fiscal year 1998. The Act's fiscal effects were marginal relative to the federal budget, comprising less than 0.04 percent of annual spending and exerting negligible influence on deficits amid the era's agreement, which already constrained discretionary outlays through caps and . Proponents anticipated broader reductions in wasteful earmarks via presidential scrutiny, but empirical outcomes showed limited uptake, as most targets were minor items rather than systemic drivers of expenditure growth; moreover, the threat of vetoes prompted preemptive congressional adjustments in some bills, though quantifiable preemptive savings remain unverified. The Supreme Court's invalidation in Clinton v. City of New York on June 25, 1998, nullified all prior cancellations prospectively, reinstating the affected provisions without retroactive fiscal clawbacks, thereby erasing any enduring budgetary restraint. Analyses from the CBO underscored uncertainties in long-term efficacy, noting that one year of data precluded robust projections and that definitional ambiguities in "limited tax benefits" constrained application to larger revenue losses.

Constitutional and Political Arguments

The Line Item Veto Act of 1996, enacted on April 9, 1996, empowered the President to cancel specific items, new entitlement spending, and limited benefits within five days after signing an appropriations or bill into law, without vetoing the entire measure. Constitutionally, opponents argued that this mechanism violated the of Article I, Section 7, Clause 2, which requires that every bill passed by be presented to the President for approval or in its entirety before becoming law. In Clinton v. City of New York (), the invalidated the Act by a 6-3 vote, holding that post-enactment cancellations effectively amended or repealed statutory provisions without bicameral congressional approval or renewed presentment, thereby disrupting the Constitution's "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure" for lawmaking. The majority distinguished this from the President's constitutional power, which operates pre-enactment on whole bills, and rejected analogies to historical discretionary authority, such as in Field v. Clark (1892), where executive suspension of tariffs occurred under conditions evaluated by before enactment rather than after the law's passage. The Act also raised separation of powers concerns, as it granted the executive branch unilateral authority to alter legislative text, encroaching on Congress's exclusive "power of the purse" under Article I, Section 9. Challengers contended that this bypassed , the requirement that revenue and spending bills originate in and be approved by both houses in identical form, allowing the President to select which portions of a duly passed would take effect. Defenders of the Act, including the , maintained that cancellations merely exercised delegated discretion over appropriations, akin to the President's longstanding ability to decline spending impounded funds, without amounting to repeal or amendment since Congress had pre-approved the cancellation mechanism in the itself. Dissenting opinions, such as Justice Scalia's, echoed this by viewing the power as non-legislative execution of congressional intent under intelligible principles like deficit reduction, arguing that the permits such delegations absent a violation of the , and that rigid adherence to formal presentment would hinder practical governance. Justice Breyer further dissented on pragmatic grounds, noting the Act's narrow scope—limited to specific fiscal items—and Congress's retention of override mechanisms, which preserved balance without necessitating a for similar reforms. Politically, supporters, including bipartisan majorities in the , promoted the Act as a tool for fiscal restraint, enabling the President to target earmarks and pork-barrel spending embedded in omnibus bills, which often bundled unpopular provisions to force overall passage and complicate vetoes. Proponents anticipated significant deficit savings—estimated by some at up to $10 billion annually—by curbing congressional and enhancing executive leverage in budget negotiations, drawing on state-level precedents where line-item vetoes had demonstrably reduced expenditures. Critics countered that it unduly concentrated budgetary authority in the , risking partisan misuse to dismantle targeted programs and eroding 's constitutional role in appropriations, potentially leading to executive overreach without corresponding accountability. Empirical analyses suggested limited real-world efficacy, as could circumvent cancellations through protective riders, emergency waivers, or supplemental appropriations, while presidents might prioritize political alliances over aggressive cuts, yielding negligible net reductions in deficits or shifts in power dynamics.

Legacy and Subsequent Efforts

Immediate Aftermath

President expressed disappointment with the Supreme Court's June 25, 1998, decision, stating from , , that the ruling undermined a tool for eliminating waste in the federal budget, though he acknowledged the Court's reasoning on constitutional grounds. The decision invalidated all 82 cancellations Clinton had issued under the Act, restoring funding for targeted appropriations and tax benefits, including a $5 billion tax exclusion for New York City-related bonds and $143 million in agricultural disaster relief, which immediately increased projected federal outlays by an estimated $1.9 billion in fiscal savings that were now moot. In , reactions were largely muted or favorable among many members, with few expressing grief over the loss of the presidential power, as it reaffirmed legislative control over appropriations amid concerns that the Act had shifted budgetary authority to the executive . Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman (R-Alaska), who had supported the original legislation, indicated reluctance to pursue revival efforts immediately, citing the need to focus on other fiscal priorities. Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.), a longtime opponent of executive encroachments on congressional prerogatives, welcomed the ruling as a vindication of the Constitution's , arguing it prevented the president from unilaterally amending duly enacted laws. The immediate legal effect nullified the Act's provisions retroactively, prompting the Treasury Department to reverse withholdings on canceled items and disburse funds accordingly, though no widespread administrative disruptions occurred due to the expedited nature of prior challenges. Bipartisan acknowledgment emerged that the ruling closed a brief experiment in enhanced presidential rescission authority, with short-term budgetary adjustments absorbed into ongoing appropriations processes without derailing the 1998 fiscal year.

Revival Proposals and Alternatives

Following the Supreme Court's 1998 ruling in Clinton v. City of New York invalidating the Line Item Veto Act, congressional efforts to revive similar executive authority have primarily focused on constitutional amendments or modifications to the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (ICA), which governs presidential deferrals and rescissions of appropriated funds. Proponents argue these measures would curb earmarks and without directly altering enacted laws, though critics contend they risk executive overreach. In his January 31, 2006, address, President urged to grant authority to address growing deficits, emphasizing its potential to eliminate wasteful spending. This call aligned with earlier post-ruling proposals for expedited rescission statutes, under which the President could propose cancellations of specific appropriations, subject to fast-track congressional votes—typically requiring disapproval by both houses within 20-30 days to reinstate funds. Such bills, like those modeled on state-level practices, have been introduced sporadically but have not advanced beyond committee. Constitutional amendment remains a recurring revival strategy, explicitly authorizing the President to veto individual appropriation or benefit items in bills. For instance, H.J. Res. 8 in the 119th (introduced January 3, 2025) proposes amending Article I, Section 7, to permit such reductions, requiring by three-fourths of states. Similarly, in March 2025, Representative (R-TN) introduced the Legislative Act of 2025 (H.R. 0000, exact number pending), allowing the President to withhold or suspend targeted benefits for up to 30 days, after which must vote on permanent rescission under expedited procedures; failure to act would release the funds. These efforts reflect ongoing Republican-led pushes amid trillion-dollar deficits, though Democratic opposition has cited separation-of-powers concerns akin to the 1998 decision. As alternatives to direct veto revival, lawmakers have proposed procedural reforms like mandatory single-subject rules for appropriations bills, limiting of unrelated provisions and forcing to justify items individually—potentially reducing the need for executive intervention. Enhanced ICA mechanisms, including automatic across-the-board cuts triggered by deficit thresholds (as in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, or Gramm-Rudman-Hollings), offer another path, though they apply broadly rather than targeting specific items. Biennial budgeting cycles, debated in as recently as the 117th , aim to streamline oversight and limit annual earmark proliferation, providing indirect fiscal discipline without vesting unilateral power in the executive. None of these alternatives have achieved enactment at the federal level, reflecting persistent partisan divides over budgetary control.

References

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  32. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/12/04/line-item-veto-scorecard-19-billion-over-5-years/eca4b4dc-172f-4359-b3c5-ce46823e7bd3/
  33. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_students/resources/on-demand/quimbee-clinton-v-city-of-new-york/
  34. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/line-item-veto-little-beef-and-mostly-bun/
  35. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/96-1671.ZO.html
  36. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/521/811/
  37. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-1671
  38. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/96-1671.ZS.html
  39. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-1374
  40. https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1205&context=cjlpp
  41. https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal98-0000191043
  42. https://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/06/26/clinton.comments/index.html
  43. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/politics-and-government/us-supreme-court-strikes-down-line-item-veto
  44. https://congressionaldigest.com/issue/the-line-item-veto/response-to-the-ruling/
  45. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/98-690.html
  46. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33365.html
  47. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2803&context=facpubs
  48. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/after-the-line-item-veto-tools-for-controlling-spending/
  49. https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-joint-resolution/8
  50. http://burchett.house.gov/media/press-releases/rep-burchett-introduces-legislative-line-item-veto-act-2025
  51. https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1637&context=ndjlepp
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