Hubbry Logo
Ma SuMa SuMain
Open search
Ma Su
Community hub
Ma Su
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Ma Su
Ma Su
Ma Su
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

Ma Su (190–228),[1][2] courtesy name Youchang, was a Chinese military general and politician of the state of Shu Han in the Three Kingdoms period of China. Ma Su had conspicuous talent in military theories and was admired by the Shu chancellor Zhuge Liang. However, a tactical blunder by Ma Su at the Battle of Jieting resulted in Shu being dealt a huge defeat by Zhang He, a general of the rival state of Wei. He was a younger brother of Ma Liang.

Key Information

Much dramatisation shrouds the death of Ma Su. According to the biography of Ma Su's close friend Xiang Lang, Ma Su was said to have attempted to flee with no further information if it was after or during his defeat at Jieting, but was captured. Following this, he was executed on Zhuge Liang's order and seemed to have faced death with dignity. Most cultural depictions concentrate on the latter part, such as the historical novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms as well as the Peking opera Loss of Jieting.

Early life

[edit]

Ma Su was born in Yicheng, Xiangyang Commandery, which is present-day Yicheng, Hubei. He was one of the five brothers in the Ma family, all of whom were renowned for their intellects and commonly known as the "Five Changs" (五常) as their style names all contained "Chang" (常). Although, Ma Su's elder brother Ma Liang was deemed to be the most talented among them all.[3] Aside from his personal talent and military knowledge, Ma Su was described as a man about eight chi tall (approximately 1.84 metres), sociable and good at making friends. With a bright mind and deep expertise.[4]

Together with Ma Liang, Ma Su began his service as an Assistant Officer (從事) under Liu Bei around 209, when Liu Bei succeeded Liu Qi as Governor of Jing Province (covering present-day Hubei and Hunan). In 211, he accompanied Liu Bei into Yi Province. Later, when conflict broke out between Liu Bei and Liu Zhang, Ma Su followed him with the army and served as a military advisor alongside Pang Tong and Fa Zheng. He was appointed as Prefect (令) of Mianzhu (綿竹) and Chengdu (成都). Thereafter, Ma Su was transferred to serve as Administrator of Yuexi (越嶲太守), a troubled commandery in the south. Yuexi was home to numerous indigenous tribes, many of whom refused to accept Liu Bei’s authority. It was the site of a significant tribal revolt led by Gao Ding (高定), the chief of the Sou tribe (叟族) in 218 that was successfully quelled with help from Li Yan.[5][6]

As Ma Su had talent and ability that surpassed others and enjoyed discussing planning and strategy. Liu Bei's chief advisor, Zhuge Liang had been impressed by him and praised him as an exceptional individual.[7] However, before Liu Bei died in 223, he warned Zhuge Liang that Ma Su's knowledge and speech exceed his real abilities and should not be given important appointments.[8] Still, Zhuge Liang did not heed the warning, and Ma Su was made a personal military Advisor (參軍) soon after Liu Bei's death. The two were very close and would often hold discussions from dawn to dusk.[9]

Southern Campaign

[edit]
Main article: Zhuge Liang's Southern Campaign

During the campaign against Meng Huo, Ma Su went several tens of li to see Zhuge Liang off. Zhuge Liang told Ma Su: "It's been years since we strategized together, now I ask for your help with your wise and skilled planning."[10]

Ma Su answered to Zhuge Liang as such: "Nanzhong relies on the distance from the capital and its difficult access, and it never submits for long. If we defeat them and leave, tomorrow they would rebel again. Now that you lord are about to engage the whole state and army for a Northern Expedition against the powerful rebels. When the south learn that the authority of the government is weak then they will immediately rebel again. However, if all the tribes with their kinds are exterminated to end future worries then that would be inhumane as this is not the way of the benevolent man. Moreover, it would be a long affair. I learned that, in the way of using troops "attacking the heart is the wisest, attacking the city is worst. Psychological warfare is best, armed warfare is the worst." Therefore, I hope that you my lord will focus on subduing their hearts.”[11]

Zhuge Liang followed Ma Su's advice, many times he forgave Meng Huo in order to gain the trust of the people of the South. Hence, until the end of Zhuge Liang’s life, the South did not rebel again.[12]

Performance in Jieting

[edit]
Main article: Battle of Jieting
Ma Su of Lost Street Pavilion (Lost Jieting), a famous program of Peking opera

In 228, Zhuge Liang launched his Northern Expeditions against Wei, at the time there were veteran leaders such as Wei Yan and Wu Yi. Among the army, many advisors suggested appointing either one of them as the vanguard commander however Zhuge Liang disagreed with the majority and chose Ma Su to command the army at the front instead.[13]

Ma Su's forces encountered Zhang He's forces at Jieting. It was here that Ma Su made a serious tactical blunder. He disobeyed Zhuge Liang's order to garrison his army inside the city of Jieting and had his troops camped on top of a hill, believing the vantage point would provide him with a more advantageous position in terms of observation and a place of attack. His subordinate Wang Ping advised against Ma Su's decision, arguing that their water supply might be cut off and their forces surrounded. While his good counsel was rejected, Ma Su allowed Wang Ping to take 1,000 men and camp nearby the Shu forces in support.[14][15]

As Wang Ping predicted, Zhang He took advantage of Ma Su's mistake by striking at the Shu camp's water supply. He succeeded in cutting off the enemy's water supply. The parched soldiers of Shu were easily defeated when Zhang He launched an offensive on the main camp itself. Wang Ping, with only a handful of soldiers, did his best to keep the retreat organized and ordered his soldiers to beat their drums loudly to create the impression that reinforcements had arrived. Zhang He believed this to be an ambush and did not pursue. When Zhuge Liang arrived, he could not force Zhang He from his position and retreated to Hanzhong.[16][17]

Records on Ma Su's death

[edit]
Kongming shedding tears as he subjects Ma Su to execution

According to a record from the biography of Xiang Lang in Sanguozhi, Xiang, as a close friend of Ma Su, didn't report him when he fled though the record makes no statement if it was during or after the battle.[18][a]

Although he survived the battle, Ma Su's army suffered a heavy defeat (Wang Ping was able to regroup the scattered forces), so he was soon arrested and sentenced to execution by a reluctant and tearful Zhuge Liang[19][b] as a way to soothe the troops.[c] Before his execution, Ma Su wrote a letter to Zhuge Liang: "You wise lord regarded me like a son and myself looked upon you as a father. I dearly hope that this is the righteousness of the execution of Gun leading to the rise of Yu the Great. May our whole life's relationship not be reduced by this. Though I shall die, I shall bear no resentments against the yellow earth."[20] At the time, many among the army wept for his death.[21]

When Jiang Wan later visited Hanzhong, he spoke with Zhuge Liang on this matter: "In the past, when the State of Chu killed Cheng Dechen then the joy of the Duke Wen of Jin was great. Today, the Empire has yet to be unified, however you put a man who is a knowledgeable strategist to death. Is it not regretful?" Zhuge Liang, in tears, answered: "The reason why Sun Tzu was able to dominate through the empire was that he was clear in his application of the laws. Thus, it was because Yang Gan (楊干) had brought confusion to laws that Wei Jiang (魏絳) put his charioteer to death. Now that the Empire is still divided and war has just begun. If we again abandon the laws, then by what means shall we quell the rebels?"[22]

Xi Zuochi harshly criticized Zhuge Liang for Ma Su's execution. Xi wrote: "Wasn't it appropriate that Zhuge Liang failed to unify the realm? When Xun Linfu (荀林父) was defeated by the army of Chu, the Duke of Jin refused to execute him, knowing his latter success would allow him to win the war. While, when the King Cheng of Chu executed Cheng Dechen ignorant of all he was doing for his country and therefore brought his own defeat. Now, Shu is situated in a remote location with less population and talent than the central plains. Yet, they executed their outstanding men and have to fall back and employed lesser men. To be so severe with the talented and not apply the "principle of three defeats" while wanting to realize great enterprises: isn't that difficult? Moreover, Liu Bei warned him that Ma Su shouldn't be employed in important matters. Why choose Ma Su rather than someone else? Zhuge Liang heard his warning but didn't follow it. Surely, he wasn't able to refuse Ma Su. However, Zhuge Liang was the chief minister of his empire and wanted to gather more resources. Yet, he didn't evaluate the ability of each to make the correct appointment and assigned people according to their talent. His judgement was wrong and he ignored his lord's brilliant advice. Hence, he failed and killed a man who had something to offer. After this, it seems hard to include him when speaking of the wise."[23]

Li Sheng (李盛) and Zhang Xiu (張休) were also put to death with Ma Su. Huang Xi (黃襲) along with others were relieved of the command of their soldiers. Wang Ping, on the other hand, was promoted to General Who Attacks Bandits (討寇將軍) for his efforts in minimizing casualties and for trying to prevent Ma Su's actions. Zhuge Liang sent a memorial to the Emperor Liu Shan requesting to be demoted for the defeat at Jieting which he was.[24]

Regardless, Ma Su was deemed by Zhuge Liang and later by Liu Shan in an imperial memorial following the Battle of Jianwei to hold major responsibility for the failure of the first Northern Expedition. However, Ma Su's wife and children were well taken care of by Zhuge Liang after Ma Su's death. Zhuge Liang also personally offered sacrifice at Ma Su's grave.[25][26]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Ma Su

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Ma Su (Chinese: 馬謖; Youchang; c. 190–228), younger brother of the Shu Han official Ma Liang, was a military strategist and government administrator who served the state of during the period of . Appointed to various civil posts including director of Mianzhong and as well as governor of , Ma Su gained the strong favor of chancellor due to his eloquence and professed knowledge of , despite emperor Bei's explicit warning that Ma Su excelled in words but lacked practical talent and required careful oversight. In 228 AD, during 's first against the rival state of Wei, Ma Su was controversially selected over more experienced generals to command the vanguard at Jieting, where his disregard for instructions to secure a water source by encamping atop a barren hill led to a rout by Wei general , scattering Shu troops and forcing 's retreat to . Following the defeat, Ma Su was imprisoned for violating military discipline, with reportedly weeping over the decision; historical indicate he died in custody at the age of thirty-nine, amid accounts varying on whether execution was carried out or preempted by illness.

Early Life and Background

Family and Origins

Ma Su was born in 190 in Nan Commandery, Jing Province (modern Yicheng, Hubei), originating from a family of scholars in . He was the younger brother of Ma Liang, a prominent advisor to , and one of five brothers collectively admired for their erudition and administrative talent during the late Eastern . The siblings' names all incorporated the character cháng (常)—such as Ma Liang's Jichang and Ma Su's Youchang—leading to their designation as the "Five Constant Mas" in contemporary accounts. Little is recorded about their parents or deeper ancestry, though the family's reputation for intellectual distinction facilitated their entry into service under regional warlords amid the dynasty's collapse. Ma Su, like his brothers, initially aligned with in Jing Province around 208, leveraging familial connections to Ma Liang, who had already proven loyal during 's campaigns. This background positioned Ma Su within Shu Han's scholarly , though historical records emphasize the brothers' shared aptitude over specific lineage claims.

Education and Relationship with Zhuge Liang

Ma Su, courtesy name Youchang, was born around 190 in Yicheng County, Commandery, to a family of five brothers noted for their intellectual prowess; his elder brother Ma Liang served as a key advisor under and later Shu Han. While primary records do not detail formal schooling, Ma Su exhibited a strong aptitude for , reflecting the scholarly environment of his upbringing amid the turbulent late Eastern Han era, where elites often studied classical texts on strategy such as those by . Zhuge Liang, Shu Han's chancellor, particularly valued Ma Su's expansive grasp of military doctrines, appointing him to the advisory role of Can Jun (Participating Army Supervisor) and confiding in him through extensive daily deliberations on tactics and state affairs, often spanning from morning to evening. This intimate advisory bond positioned Ma Su as one of Zhuge's closest strategic confidants, with Zhuge Liang demonstrating favoritism by elevating him despite evident risks. However, as Liu Bei lay dying in Baidicheng in 223, he explicitly cautioned Zhuge Liang against overreliance on Ma Su, observing that his talents appeared greater than they truly were and urging closer scrutiny before entrusting him with command. Zhuge Liang disregarded this admonition, continuing to groom Ma Su for higher military roles, which later contributed to pivotal events in Shu's northern expeditions.

Military Career

Southern Campaigns against Nanzhong

In 225 AD, during the third year of the Jianxing era, Ma Su served as chief of staff (zhubu) to , who led forces on a campaign to suppress rebellions in the Nanzhong region of present-day and southern . The uprisings had erupted after Liu Bei's death in 223 AD, fueled by local leaders such as Yong Kai, the Administrator of Yizhou's Jianning Commandery, who sought independence and alliances with ; Yong Kai's forces killed the Shu-appointed of Yizhou, Zheng Tai, and rallied support from tribal chieftains including Gao Ding and . Zhuge Liang mobilized an army estimated at around 100,000 troops, advancing through difficult terrain to confront the rebels militarily while incorporating elements of persuasion and co-optation of local elites. Ma Su's advisory role supported Zhuge Liang's operational planning amid the campaign's logistical challenges, including supply lines strained by mountainous passes and reliance on local . Key engagements saw Shu forces defeat Gao Ding's coalition near the , where ambushes and superior coordination overwhelmed the rebels; Yong Kai was subsequently killed by his own subordinate, Li Hu, who defected to Shu. Meng Huo, a prominent chieftain, submitted after initial resistance, allowing Zhuge Liang to secure pledges of loyalty from various Yi and other non-Han groups. Historical accounts from regional chronicles emphasize that the strategy avoided total annihilation, instead leveraging surrenders to install compliant local governors like Li Hu in Yongchang Commandery. By autumn 225 AD, the revolts were pacified, restoring Shu control over Nanzhong's resources—such as salt wells and metals vital for Shu's economy—and enabling administrative reforms, including the appointment of native leaders to official posts and the establishment of schools teaching Han laws and script to foster integration. These measures aimed at long-term stability, contrasting prior approaches that had provoked recurrent unrest through heavy taxation and cultural imposition; the region's relative quiescence until later decades underscores the campaign's effectiveness in blending coercion with accommodation. Ma Su's staff duties during this success highlighted his early reputation for strategic insight, though primary records focus more on Liang's execution than individual subordinates' tactics.

Preparations for Northern Expeditions

Following the conquest of Nanzhong in 225, Zhuge Liang shifted focus to logistical and military buildup for offensives against Wei, relocating his base to by 227 to facilitate supply lines, construct mountain roads, and amass grain stores estimated at sufficient for prolonged campaigns. Ma Su, elevated to the role of Can Jun () in 223 upon 's assumption of regency, participated in these strategic deliberations, drawing on his acknowledged proficiency in theoretical military planning despite lacking field command experience. Zhuge Liang's confidence in Ma Su stemmed from their long collaboration, overriding earlier cautions from , who had noted Ma Su's strengths lay in counsel rather than execution and advised restraint in his deployment. By early 228 (Jian Xing 6th year), as the army mobilized toward Qishan, Ma Su received appointment as vanguard commander with 30,000 troops, tasked with securing the strategic chokepoint at Jieting to support the main force's advance into Wei territories like Longxi and . This assignment reflected Liang's preparatory emphasis on dividing forces for rapid strikes, though it exposed Ma Su to operational demands beyond prior advisory duties.

Battle of Jieting

Appointment and Zhuge Liang's Orders

In the sixth year of the Jianxing era (228 AD), during 's first from toward Qishan, he appointed Ma Su as the vanguard commander responsible for securing , a vital strategic point controlling access to supply routes against the advancing Wei forces under . This decision came despite prior warnings from , who had advised Zhuge Liang that while Ma Su excelled in discoursing on military classics, he lacked substantive talent for command and required further observation before heavy reliance. Zhuge Liang valued Ma Su's theoretical grasp of strategy, having kept him as a close advisor since the southern campaigns, but faced internal dissent: subordinates advocated for more experienced generals like or Wu Yi to lead the vanguard instead. Nonetheless, Zhuge Liang proceeded with the appointment, dispatching Ma Su with an army estimated at several thousand troops, accompanied by the subordinate general Wang Ping to assist in defense. Zhuge Liang's explicit orders mandated strict adherence to a prearranged of strategic deployments, emphasizing fortified positions to counter Wei's numerical superiority and maintain logistical integrity for the broader offensive. These instructions implicitly required garrisoning defensible settlements like the nearby city rather than exposing forces on open terrain, as later contravention by demonstrated a to fortify adequately against encirclement. The appointment reflected Zhuge Liang's calculated risk, prioritizing Ma Su's advisory rapport amid limited options for the expedition's dispersed commands.

Tactical Decisions and Disobedience

Ma Su, appointed as vanguard general for the defense of Jieting during Shu Han's first in 228 AD, positioned his forces on elevated terrain rather than securing the town or proximate sources, a decision that exposed his to and deprivation. This choice contravened established military principles for holding contested passes, as mountain encampments without reliable supply lines invited isolation from essentials like , which Wei general promptly exploited by severing access routes. Subordinate commander Wang Ping, an experienced officer, repeatedly counseled Ma Su against abandoning the water sources and ascending the heights, advocating instead for a layered defense anchored in the town to maintain logistical security and flexibility. Ma Su disregarded this counsel, appearing agitated and overconfident in the topographic advantage of visibility and defensibility from above, which ultimately proved illusory as thirst and disarray undermined troop cohesion during Zhang He's assault. Such to on-site tactical advice compounded the inherent risks of Ma Su's formations, described in contemporary records as improperly arrayed, contributing to the rout where Shu forces suffered over 10,000 casualties and scattered. While primary accounts do not detail explicit contravention of Liang's directives—focusing instead on Ma Su's independent judgment—the strategist's prior reservations about his protégé's tendency to prioritize theoretical eloquence over practical execution underscored the peril of entrusting him with frontline command. This episode at Jieting exemplified how Ma Su's tactical hubris, unheeded warnings, and deviation from resource-secured positioning halted Shu's momentum, forcing a broader retreat.

Course of the Battle and Defeat

Ma Su advanced his approximately 10,000 troops to Jieting, where he elected to station them atop a barren hill known as Shudi rather than fortifying the nearby city or securing logistical bases below. This position offered defensive elevation but lacked natural water sources, a vulnerability exacerbated by the arid terrain and Ma Su's failure to dig wells or establish supply lines. Wei general , commanding around 30,000 men, exploited this error by dividing his forces to encircle the hill, first seizing control of the lower paths and streams to deny Shu access to water. Within days, gripped Ma Su's army; soldiers could not cook meals or sustain combat readiness, prompting widespread disorder, thirst-induced collapses, and desertions as morale crumbled. Wang Ping, Ma Su's subordinate, urged a withdrawal to more defensible ground, but Ma Su refused, insisting on holding the . Zhang He's and then pressed coordinated assaults on the weakened flanks, shattering the disorganized Shu formations in close-quarters fighting. Ma Su abandoned his command post amid the rout, leaving deputies to cover the retreat; thousands of Shu troops were killed or captured, with the remnants scattering into the hills. The fall of Jieting on this front severed Zhuge Liang's primary supply route during his first in 228 AD, exposing his main force at Qishan to and forcing a full withdrawal to . Zhang He's victory, achieved through superior adaptation to terrain and , demonstrated the perils of overreliance on theoretical advantages without practical sustainment, as later annotated in Pei Songzhi's expansions on Chen Shou's .

Execution and Legacy

Zhuge Liang's Response and Sentencing

Following the defeat at Jieting in summer 228 AD, ordered an immediate retreat of the forces, preserving the main army despite the loss of strategic position and several thousand troops. Upon returning to , petitioned Emperor to demote him by three grades and reduce his salary by three years, adhering to Shu military statutes that held commanders accountable for subordinates' failures. To enforce military discipline and address grievances among officers blaming Ma Su's disobedience for the campaign's setback, Zhuge Liang sentenced Ma Su to execution, as recorded in his biography in Chen Shou's Records of the Three Kingdoms. This act served as an apology to the troops, emphasizing that personal ties could not override explicit orders against occupying the exposed hilltop at Jieting. Despite their long friendship—Zhuge had long admired Ma Su's scholarly talents—Zhuge reportedly wept during the proceedings, reflecting reluctance amid necessity for impartiality. Ma Su's own biography in the Sanguozhi states he was imprisoned for the offense and subsequently died (wùgù, implying natural causes or illness) at age 39, without explicit mention of the execution being carried out. This discrepancy has led historians to infer Ma Su perished in custody awaiting death, underscoring Zhuge's resolve to prioritize causal accountability for the tactical blunder over favoritism.

Records of Death and Family Treatment

Following the defeat at Jieting in 228 CE, Ma Su was captured after attempting to flee and imprisoned by authorities. He died in custody that same year at the age of 39 (by ). is recorded as having wept upon learning of Ma Su's death, reflecting their close personal and professional relationship despite the military failure. A discrepancy exists in the primary historical records regarding the precise manner of Ma Su's death. While his biography in the Records of the Three Kingdoms describes imprisonment leading to death, Zhuge Liang's biography states that Ma Su was formally executed (dù lù) to appease the discontented troops and atone for the loss at Jieting, which compelled the withdrawal of the Shu army. This execution, whether literal or through custody, underscored the enforcement of amid the campaign's setback. Regarding Ma Su's family, historical commentaries indicate that personally ensured their welfare after his death. He provided ongoing support for Ma Su's wife and children, fulfilling an implied paternal responsibility given their prior mentor-protégé bond, and offered sacrifices at Ma Su's grave. Such treatment aligned with Confucian ideals of benevolence toward subordinates' dependents, even in cases of grave error, and was corroborated in annotations drawing from sources like Xi Zuochi's Xiangyang Ji. No records suggest punitive measures against the family, preserving their status within society.

Historical Evaluations and Debates

, in the Records of the , assessed Ma Su as intellectually talented and versed in , yet ultimately impractical in execution, noting his eloquence in counsel contrasted with failures in command. had cautioned against over-relying on Ma Su, observing that his apparent wisdom exceeded his substantive abilities, a warning borne out by the Jieting debacle where disobedience led to strategic collapse. This portrayal underscores a historical consensus on Ma Su's theoretical strengths undermined by overconfidence and poor adaptation to battlefield realities. The execution of Ma Su prompted sharp historiographical debate, particularly regarding Zhuge Liang's adherence to strict versus the preservation of scarce talent in Shu Han's resource-constrained regime. Eastern Jin historian Xi Zuochi, in his Annals of Han and Jin, lambasted the decision as emblematic of Zhuge's flawed personnel management, likening it to ancient rulers who unjustly slew advisors after minor setbacks, thereby forfeiting opportunities for unification; he argued that punishing Ma Su for a single loss—despite prior endorsements of his acumen—revealed systemic errors in talent evaluation. Defenders, drawing from Zhuge's own memorials, countered that the penalty was indispensable to restore army cohesion after the rout eroded soldier confidence, preventing broader indiscipline in future campaigns. Pei Songzhi's annotations to Chen Shou's text amplify these tensions by compiling variant accounts, including reports that Ma Su perished from illness in custody before formal , potentially softening perceptions of Zhuge's ruthlessness while highlighting evidentiary discrepancies in early sources. Later evaluations, such as those in Jin histories, often frame the incident as a microcosm of Shu's structural weaknesses: over-dependence on a few strategists amid talent shortages, where Ma Su's loss compounded logistical and manpower strains without yielding proportional disciplinary gains. These debates persist in analyses of military ethics, weighing causal links between individual accountability and state survival against the risks of favoritism in authoritarian hierarchies.
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.