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Fa Zheng
Fa Zheng
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Key Information

Fa Zheng (176–220),[a] courtesy name Xiaozhi, was a key adviser to the warlord Liu Bei in the late Eastern Han dynasty. Born in a family of high social status and of noble descent, Fa Zheng travelled to Yi Province (covering present-day Sichuan and Chongqing) in the late 190s and became a subordinate of Liu Zhang, the provincial governor. However, his feelings of alienation and perception of Liu Zhang as an incompetent governor eventually led him to betray Liu Zhang and defect to Liu Bei in 211. Between 211 and 214, Fa Zheng assisted Liu Bei in overcoming Liu Zhang and seizing control of Yi Province, and became one of Liu Bei's most trusted advisers. In 217, he urged Liu Bei to launch the Hanzhong Campaign to capture the strategic Hanzhong Commandery from a rival warlord, Cao Cao, but died a year after Liu emerged victorious in the campaign.

Fa Zheng's keen foresight and brilliance in formulating strategies earned him praise from his contemporaries such as Zhuge Liang and Chen Shou. In less than a decade serving under Liu, Fa showed a near unmatched sense of timing where military geniuses like Cao Cao and his best advisers fell victim to his schemes. However, he was also notorious for his vindictive personality. When he held office, he abused his power by taking revenge against those who had offended him before, and by killing them without reason. Nevertheless, he was still highly regarded and trusted by Liu Bei – to the point where Zhuge Liang once said that Fa Zheng might have been the only person capable of preventing Liu Bei's defeat at the Battle of Xiaoting in 221 if he were still alive.

Family background

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Fa Zheng's ancestral home was in Mei County (郿縣), Youfufeng Commandery (右扶風郡), which is in present-day Mei County, Shaanxi. His ancestor was Tian Fazhang, who is historically known as King Xiang of the Qi state in the Warring States period. Tian Fazhang's descendants changed their family name from "Tian" to "Fa" after the fall of Qi in 221 BCE.[1]

Fa Zheng's great-grandfather, Fa Xiong, served as the Administrator (太守) of Nan Commandery (南郡; around present-day Jingzhou, Hubei) during the reign of Emperor An in the Eastern Han dynasty. Fa Zheng's grandfather, Fa Zhen, was a reclusive scholar known for his lofty character; despite being a learned scholar, he led a humble life and repeatedly rejected offers to serve in the government.[Sanguozhi 2] Fa Zheng's father, Fa Yan (法衍), whose courtesy name was Jimou (季謀), also served as a government official and held the positions of an assistant to the Excellency over the Masses (司徒) and the Minister of Justice (廷尉).[Sanguozhi zhu 1]

Service under Liu Zhang

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In the early Jian'an era (196–220) of the reign of Emperor Xian, when famines broke out, Fa Zheng and his friend Meng Da travelled to Yi Province (covering present-day Sichuan and Chongqing) to join the provincial governor, Liu Zhang. Although Fa Zheng served as the Prefect () of Xindu County (新都縣) and later as a Colonel Who Advises the Army (軍議校尉) under Liu Zhang. Since he didn't have any connection to local clans and was defamed by other refugees from Youfufeng, who had also moved to Yi Province. He couldn't realize his ambitions. He maintained a close friendship with his colleague Zhang Song, who shared the same views as him about Liu Zhang being an incompetent and incapable governor.[Sanguozhi 3]

In 208,[2] Zhang Song travelled to Jing Province (covering present-day Hubei and Hunan) to meet the warlord Cao Cao, who controlled the Han central government and the figurehead Emperor Xian. After returning to Yi Province, Zhang Song advised Liu Zhang to break ties with Cao Cao and build friendly relations with another warlord, Liu Bei. When Zhang Song recommended Fa Zheng to be Liu Zhang's representative to meet Liu Bei, Fa initially refused to accept the task but eventually relented. When Fa Zheng returned from his mission, he told Zhang Song that Liu Bei had grand ambitions and persuaded Zhang to follow him to serve Liu Bei. They wanted to help him secure Yi province but did not have the occasion to do so.[Sanguozhi 4]

Their opportunity came in 211,[3] when Liu Zhang became fearful upon receiving news that Cao Cao was planning to attack the warlord Zhang Lu in Hanzhong Commandery. As Hanzhong Commandery was located strategically at the northern route leading into Yi Province, Liu Zhang would be in great peril if Hanzhong fell into Cao Cao's hands. Zhang Song proposed to Liu Zhang to invite Liu Bei to Yi Province to assist them in countering the threat posed by Cao Cao. Liu Zhang agreed and sent Fa Zheng as his envoy to contact Liu Bei. When Fa Zheng met Liu Bei, he secretly told him, "General, with your brilliance, you can overcome our incompetent and weak Governor Liu. Zhang Song, as a trusted adviser (of Liu Zhang), will serve as your spy. Upon acquiring Yi Province's wealth and resources, and having its natural barriers as protection, you can easily realise your grand ambitions."[Sanguozhi 5] Fa Zheng also saw Liu Bei's marital problems and advised him to have Lady Sun sent back to Wu.[4] Liu Bei accepted Fa Zheng's former advice and led his forces into Yi Province, where he met Liu Zhang at Fu County (涪縣; present-day Fucheng District, Mianyang, Sichuan). Liu Bei then led his troops north to Jiameng (葭萌; located about 20 km northeast of present-day Jiange County, Sichuan) before turning south to attack Liu Zhang later.[Sanguozhi 6]

Helping Liu Bei seize Yi Province from Liu Zhang

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Upon receiving news of Liu Bei's attack, Zheng Du (鄭度), an assistant officer from Guanghan Commandery (廣漢郡; around present-day Guanghan, Sichuan)[Sanguozhi zhu 2] serving under Liu Zhang, pointed out to his lord that Liu Bei's army lacked supplies and was composed of newly recruited soldiers who might not be loyal to him. He suggested that Liu Zhang adopt a scorched earth policy against Liu Bei by forcing the residents of Baxi (巴西) and Zitong (梓潼) commanderies to relocate elsewhere and destroy all the granaries and supply depots in the commanderies, and then fortify their defences while avoiding direct conflict with Liu Bei. He claimed that if this strategy was implemented, Liu Bei would run out of supplies within 100 days and retreat, and then Liu Zhang could attack him while he was retreating. Liu Bei felt frustrated when he heard about Zheng Du's plan and consulted Fa Zheng about it. Fa Zheng predicted that Liu Zhang would not heed Zheng Du's suggestion and was proven right: In response to Zheng Du's plan, Liu Zhang not only rejected it on the grounds that it would cause disturbance to the people, but also dismissed Zheng from office.[Sanguozhi 7]

In 214,[5] when Liu Bei's army surrounded Luocheng (雒城), one of Liu Zhang's strongholds, Fa Zheng wrote a long letter to his former lord, pointing out that Liu Zhang was already in a highly disadvantageous position and urging him to give up resistance and surrender to Liu Bei.[Sanguozhi 8]

Fa Zheng's letter was written as such:

"I am of the sort that lack talent yet I completed the alliance objective and later came to disobey you. Now I am afraid that your subjects would not comprehend my true reasons hence putting all the blame on myself however I can be mocked by others yet even with their contempt I would still strive to accomplish the mission I was given faithful to my path. I feared that your lordship would trust those baseless rumors therefore I didn't dare to send letter but now when I look back to how I was treated and thinking of the future, I believe It's not too late. Therefore I will admit everything of my heart, from the beginning to the end, from the earliest to the latest moment. I never hide my feelings and even if I would sometimes not do my utmost, I never hide secret plans but my devotion wasn't acknowledged and now we are in this situation.[Sanguozhi 9]

At this moment, the affairs of the state are of utmost importance and danger is near yet even if I serve another and my words can easily be hated however may what is left of my loyalty to you be used to share my sentiment on the situation. Wise General, I know well the sentiment of your heart and It is to not lose your good relation with the General of the Left[b] but if we are in this situation is because of your subjects do not understand the way to follow and serve heroes, advocating that one can violate trust and turn his on his vows and instead change his views such as the sun and moon shift looking to only please your ears and eyes with their flattery and fawn therefore cannot plan with thoughtful calculation for the future of the state. The incident already happened therefore they do not judge strength and weakness thinking that the General of the Left's army is isolated far from home with no provisions or grain stored and want to avoid confrontation and just wait for days behind their walls locked together. However when we marched from the pass to here, all of them have been defeated, each of the stronghold and division garrisons have fallen and have been conquered. Even if there are ten thousand troops below Luo castle, they are all weak soldiers and generals of defeated armies. If you thought of fighting a decisive battle then the strength of your troops and generals would be no match. What your strategists wanted to do was to outlast our provisions however now those strongholds have fallen and grain and rice is gathered in great numbers while your own territory Wise General is daily lost and the common people suffer. In that situation, your enemy forces increase and your own supporters grow distant and few. Therefore I have considered those conditions and can say with certainty that you will be defeated first and should not think that you can outlast us. You can try in vain to defend against us but cannot last against us.[Sanguozhi 10]

While I'm writing this letter, Zhang Yide's army of tens of thousands has already conquered Badong, entered Qianwei’s borders, with his divisions pacifying Zizhōng and Deyang as they invade by three different roads then how would you resist this? Wise General, surely your strategists believe that this army is far from home with no provisions, their food supply lines being difficult to keep and their troops few with no followers. However the roads of Jing province are connected and their armies increase by tenfolds also General of Chariots and Cavalry[c] sends his younger brother with Li Yi, Gan Ning and others to follow after. Now if you want to compare with our lord's strength then looking at the one with the most territory. Now our side has Badong, Guanghan, Qianwei so over half has already been conquered while the important commandery of Baxi will also soon fall Wise General. At the moment, It can be seen that the whole of Yi province relies only on Shu (commandery), but this province is already defeated and ruined; thow thirds of the province are already lost, officials and common people are impoverished and those with rebellious intent against you are eight out of ten households; If the enemy is distant then the common people cannot endure your conscription while if the enemy is near then they would soon change their allegiance. Just for example, what happened during the conquest of Guanghan’s various counties. Moreover Yufu and Guantou are the gateway who can determine the success or ruin of Yi province and now those gates are open, your strongest cities have fallen and your various armies have been defeated, your soldiers and Generals are weakened while your enemy is several steps in advance and already the province’s heart and guts while you await and defend in Chengdu and Luo and whether you would succeed or fail can already clearly be seen.[Sanguozhi 11]

This is only the big picture of what is happening at the moment, the rest is more complex and would be difficult to explain everything. If someone as lowly as me can however comprehend that this situation is doomed and cannot succeed then all the more obvious to the talented ministers in your court Wise General, how they would not understand that that this situation is doomed? From dawn they use flattery and cheat your favour, wishing to keep good appearance's while not thinking of the future, none can devote all of their energy to a long term plan. If danger is near then all of them would first and foremost save their own skins, would strive to help their own families, switch their allegiances back and forth and would be very different of their current composure, not sacrifice themselves for you Wise General however It would be your honored household that would be victim of the disaster they fear. Even if I am already branded as a disloyal man, my heart keep me from turning back against your holiness’s virtue. Only when I look back at my separate mission, I am truly sad that I had to leave you behind. It is the same for the General of the Left and truly he has no unkind intentions. Sincerely, I truly believe that you can still change your plans and then would be able to save your honored household from misfortune."[Sanguozhi 12]

Later that year, when Liu Bei's forces was besieging Yi Province's capital Chengdu, Xu Jing, a commandery Administrator serving under Liu Zhang, planned to surrender and defect to Liu Bei, but his plan was leaked out and hence aborted. Liu Zhang felt that he was already at the brink of destruction so he did not punish Xu Jing. He eventually surrendered and relinquished his control of Yi Province to Liu Bei. After taking over Yi Province, Liu Bei treated Xu Jing coldly because he felt that Xu was a disloyal person. Fa Zheng advised him, "Xu Jing is someone with an exaggerated reputation. However, my lord, you've recently built your foundation and you can't possibly explain the facts to everyone. Xu Jing's name is already well known throughout the Empire. If you don't treat him respectfully, others might think that you're belittling talented and virtuous people. You should honour and respect him, and make this known to everyone, just like how the King of Yan treated Guo Wei (郭隗)." Liu Bei followed Fa Zheng's advice and treated Xu Jing generously.[Sanguozhi 13]

Sun Sheng criticizes Fa Zheng for his advice and the comparison between Guo Wei and Xu Jing :

"One of the most important path of statecraft is to respect the worthies while rewarding virtue and visiting the tombs and gates of past rulers following this example. Hence one must seek after those exceptional and profound of high righteousness reigning over their time, only then can one overlook the land and mixed with the multitude. If this is not such a man then this way shouldn't be followed. Xu Jing while in the household of his kinsman[d] was not devoted, was put in charge where he didn't belong and when in face of danger was quick to change his heart, his safety was what matters most. How could after that he should be given favor to encourage others? In that case, the favor given to the superficial and false is taken from the worthies unfairly taking their merits then how with what courtesy would they be treated with? Fa Zheng's method just confuse people and detach from the noble and esteemed even give the example of Guo Wei wronging natural human relations."[Sanguozhi zhu 3]

Pei Songzhi completely disagrees with Sun Sheng's opinion:

"Your servant believes that though Guo Wei was not worthy, he received favor for his ability in planning. Moreover, Wenxiu[e] already had a reputation through the whole empire as an outstanding and great individual even if he made mistakes in the latter years, yet the matter was not as simple. If such a man wasn't treated with respect, how could it not be confused by the people near and far? Fa Zheng's comparison between Xu Jing and Guo Wei wasn't bad, but Sun Sheng made matters complicated by citing honoring tombs and visiting gates; how pedantic! If he was right, then even King Zhao of Yan would be in the wrong; how could the blame be solely on Old Liu (Liu Bei)? As for non-devotion to his kinsman, the fault was with Zijiang.[f] Just looking at the discussion of Jiang Ji, one can understand that it wasn't Wenxiu's fault. Also, Sun Sheng mocked him for being appointed where he didn't belong; this refers to his service to Dong Zhuo. When Zhuo first gained control of the government, he recruited all the worthies and talented, among those who received rank and office all were awe-inspiring like this. Wenxiu was already an official before Zhuo arrived. Later, he was promoted as Palace Deputy and accepted it. If this should be considered as disparaged, then Xun Shuang and Chen Ji should also be rejected in their times."[Sanguozhi zhu 4]

Service under Liu Bei

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Becoming Liu Bei's Chief Adviser

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Liu Bei appointed Fa Zheng as the Administrator (太守) of Shu Commandery (蜀郡) and General Who Spreads Martial Might (揚武將軍). Fa Zheng oversaw administrative affairs in the vicinity of Yi Province's capital Chengdu. While Zhuge Liang was promoted to administer internal affairs, Fa Zheng served as Liu Bei's chief adviser.[Sanguozhi 14][Sanguozhi 15]

Following Liu Bei's victory over Liu Zhang, his subordinates urged him to take for wife Liu Mao's widow. However Liu Bei refused on the basics that he and Liu Mao were of the same family. Fa Zheng then to convince him said: "In the ancient times, lady Huai Ying first married the Duke Huai of Jin and later married his own brother, the Duke Wen of Jin. If the marriage of a widow between brothers happened by the past then why not for you and Liu Mao who are not close kinsman?" Liu Bei agreed with him and married Lady Wu.[6]

During this period of time, Fa Zheng repaid all of his previous debts, good or bad. He would not forget those who showed him even a little kindness but also abused his power by taking revenge against those who offended him before. And by killing those who harmed him without the legal authority. Someone approached Zhuge Liang, another of Liu Bei's key advisers, and urged him to restrict Fa Zheng's influence by advising their lord to take action against him. However, Zhuge Liang replied, "When our lord was in Gong'an, he was wary of Cao Cao's influence in the north and fearful of Sun Quan's presence in the east. Even in home territory he was afraid that Lady Sun might stir up trouble. He was in such a difficult situation at the time that he could neither advance nor retreat. Fa Xiaozhi supported and helped him so much that he became his own wings (翼),[g] such that he is now able to fly high and no longer remain under others' influence. How can we stop Fa Zheng from behaving as he wishes?" Zhuge Liang was aware that Liu Bei greatly favoured and trusted Fa Zheng, which was why he refused to intervene in this matter.[Sanguozhi 16]

The historian Sun Sheng criticised Zhuge Liang's attitude towards Fa Zheng's abuse of power and called it a "lapse in justice". He felt that no subject should be above the law, regardless of how great his past contributions were.[Sanguozhi zhu 5] While Tang Geng (唐庚), a scholar from the Song dynasty, in his work called the Three Kingdoms Miscellaneous Cases (三國雜事; Sanguo Zashi) compared Fa Zheng to Fan Ju (范雎), Li Guang and Guo Jin (郭進). The three of them were allowed to settle their personal grudges and rendered great achievements for their States. Tang Geng commented that this is how rulers of the past made use of their outstanding and heroic individuals. That they had their own conceptions of righteousness. Tang Geng called Sun Sheng shortsighted for not seeing this.[7]

Role in the Hanzhong Campaign

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In 217, Fa Zheng urged Liu Bei to attack Hanzhong Commandery, which was originally under Zhang Lu's control but was conquered by Cao Cao in 215. He pointed out Hanzhong's strategic importance and said that it was an opportune moment for Liu Bei to seize Hanzhong from Cao Cao's generals Xiahou Yuan and Zhang He. He told Liu Bei: "Cao Cao with a single strike was able to submit Zhang Lu into surrender and acquire Hanzhong, however he did not press his advantage to conquer Ba and Shu. Instead he returned North and left Xiahou Yuan and Zhang He. This cannot be an error of his part or because of a lack of strength, but rather because he met some internal problems and must solve them. Now Xiahou Yuan and Zhang He can't compare against our army. If we advance, we will surely capture them. Then we can collect grains, fill our storehouse readying ourselves for any opportunities. If we are successful we can vanquish the enemy and restore the ruling House, otherwise we can expand our borders into the Liang province and in any case we would have gain a most important position to defend and prepare ourselves. Heaven is on our side, you must not lose this chance." Liu Bei accepted his plan and started the Hanzhong Campaign with Fa Zheng following him.[Sanguozhi 17]

In 219, during the Battle of Mount Dingjun, when Xiahou Yuan led troops to attack Liu Bei's camps at Dingjun and Xingshi mountains, Fa Zheng suggested Liu Bei to strike the enemy. Liu Bei ordered his general Huang Zhong to lead his men on a charge down the mountain towards Xiahou Yuan's forces, with war drums beating in the background. Huang Zhong defeated and killed Xiahou Yuan in the midst of battle.[Sanguozhi 18]

Later, when Cao Cao was leading his forces from Chang'an to reinforce Hanzhong, he received news about the strategy proposed by Fa Zheng to Liu Bei to attack Hanzhong. He remarked, "I know Xuande (Liu Bei) is not capable of doing this. He must be following somebody's advice."[Sanguozhi 19][8] According to the Chronicles of Huayang, Cao Cao also said: "How could it be that among my army of bold heroes, none could find a strategy that would overcome this Fa Zheng?"[9] The historian Pei Songzhi commented that Cao Cao made that former remark – which suggests that Liu Bei was not wise enough to notice Hanzhong's strategic importance – because of his personal disdain for Liu, and that it should not be taken seriously. He felt that a lord acting on his adviser's suggestion should not be interpreted as a sign that the lord was not wise enough to make his own judgment. He pointed out that Cao Cao himself also followed the advice of his adviser Guo Jia.[Sanguozhi zhu 6]

Death and postmortem events

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In 219, after Liu Bei emerged victorious in the Hanzhong Campaign, he declared himself "King of Hanzhong" (漢中王) and appointed Fa Zheng as the Prefect of the Masters of Writing (尚書令) and General Who Protects the Army (護軍將軍). Fa Zheng died in the following year at the age of 45 (by East Asian age reckoning). Liu Bei cried for days when Fa Zheng died and awarded Fa the posthumous title "Marquis Yi" (翼侯), which literally means "marquis of the flank". Alone, the Yi (翼) word/title is more commonly translated as "wing". Therefore, Fa's posthumous title can also be translated as "marquis of the wing".[Sanguozhi 20]

During Liu Bei's short reign, many of his long term companions and famous generals had died. Among them were Guan Yu, Zhang Fei, Ma Chao, Pang Tong and Huang Zhong; yet Fa Zheng was the only one to receive a posthumous title,[h] such was the extent to which Liu Bei valued Fa Zheng. Fa Zheng's son, Fa Miao (法邈), received the title of a Secondary Marquis (關內侯) and served as a Commandant of Equipage (奉車都尉) and the Administrator of Hanyang Commandery (漢陽郡) in the state of Shu Han, which Liu Bei established in 221.[Sanguozhi 21]

Fa Zheng and Zhuge Liang did not share the same moral beliefs but they had a good working relationship because of their common goal, which was to serve Liu Bei well. Zhuge Liang was very impressed with Fa Zheng's brilliance. In 221, before the Battle of Xiaoting, many of Liu Bei's subjects advised their lord against going to war with his former ally, Sun Quan, who seized Jing Province from Liu in 219 and executed Liu's general Guan Yu. Liu Bei ignored them and proceeded with his campaign against Sun Quan. In the following year, he lost to Sun Quan's forces at the Battle of Xiaoting and had to retreat to Baidicheng, where he died in 223. Zhuge Liang sighed, "If Fa Xiaozhi was still alive, he could have prevented our lord from going on this eastern campaign; even if our lord did go on this campaign, he wouldn't have ended up in this disastrous situation (if Fa Xiaozhi was with him)."[Sanguozhi 22]

Zhuge Liang might be right about Fa Zheng, as inferred from an incident during the Hanzhong Campaign. During one battle, when the odds turned against Liu Bei, Liu's subjects urged their lord to retreat but he stubbornly refused. They did not dare to advise him again for fear of incurring his wrath. Fa Zheng rushed forth and stood in front of Liu Bei when Cao Cao's forces rained arrows on their camp. Liu Bei told Fa Zheng to stay under cover to avoid the arrows, but Fa insisted on braving the arrows with his lord. Liu Bei then decided to retreat together with Fa Zheng.[Sanguozhi zhu 7]

Appraisal

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Chen Shou, who wrote Fa Zheng's biography in the Sanguozhi, appraised Fa as follows: "Fa Zheng clearly foresaw success and failure. Therefore, he had talent for all sort of unusual tactics and strategies. However, he was not known to be of good moral character. In comparison with officials from (Cao) Wei, Pang Tong would be similar to Xun Yu like a brother while Fa Zheng would be of the same nefarious kind as Cheng and Guo."[Sanguozhi 23]

Yang Xi, who wrote the Ji Han Fuchen Zan (季漢輔臣贊; pub. 241), a collection of praises of notable persons who served in the Shu Han state, appraised him as follows: "Marquis Yi (翼侯; Fa Zheng) was talented for stratagem, could anticipate both rise and decline of the world. Entrusted with the foundation by his Lord, he answered with correct instruction and counsel. With a swift thought he managed his calculation, would observe the situation and perceive the opportunity."[Sanguozhi 24]

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Fa Zheng became a playable character in Koei's Dynasty Warriors 8: Xtreme Legends.

See also

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Notes

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Fa Zheng (法正; 176–220), Xiaozhi (孝直), was a Chinese and high-ranking official who served as a primary advisor to the during the collapse of the and the establishment of the regime in the era. Originating from Meixian in Fufeng commandery (modern ), he initially served under Liu Zhang, the inspector of Yi Province, but defected to in 211 after his abilities were overlooked. Fa Zheng's most notable achievements include masterminding the conquest of Yi Province in 214, which secured as a strategic stronghold and economic base for , earning him appointments as Governor of Shujun and General Arousing Martiality. He later orchestrated key tactics in the 219 , defeating Cao Cao's forces and enabling to claim the title of King of , with subsequent promotions to Director of the Imperial Secretariat and Protector-General. Fa Zheng died in 220, mere months after 's accession as emperor, prompting Liu Bei to lament that without him, neither nor would have been obtained; posthumously, he was honored, though later figures like Zhuge Liang referenced his counsel against aggressive expansions such as the Yiling campaign. assessments, drawn from Chen Shou's Records of the , praise his prescient strategic planning and brilliance in foreseeing outcomes, yet note his narrow-mindedness and propensity for long-held grudges, repaying minor slights with vengeance while rewarding small favors generously.

Origins and Early Career

Family Background

Fa Zheng was born in 176 CE in Mei County, Fufeng Commandery (present-day Mei County, Province). He hailed from a prominent scholarly lineage in the region, which provided him with early access to classical education and elite networks. His grandfather, Fa Zhen (styled Gaoqing), exemplified Confucian integrity as a reclusive scholar proficient in the Five Classics and techniques; despite repeated invitations to office, he maintained a life of principled withdrawal, dying in 188 CE at age 89 and earning the moniker "Mysterious Virtue" for his unyielding moral stature. Fa Zheng's father, Fa Yan (styled Jimou), held mid-level administrative posts, including aide to the Excellency over the Masses and Left to the Minister of Justice, ensuring the family's sustained prestige and facilitating Fa Zheng's entrée into officialdom. This heritage of scholarly repute and bureaucratic experience positioned Fa Zheng among the educated , enabling his swift initial advancements irrespective of individual shortcomings noted in historical accounts.

Initial Positions and Discontent under Liu Zhang

Fa Zheng initially served Liu Zhang, the Inspector of Yi Province, as the of Xindu County in Guanghan Commandery, a position he held after relocating southward from during the widespread chaos of the 190s CE. His administrative competence in this role earned recognition, leading to his promotion and to Liu Zhang's court, where he was appointed as a serving in a military advisory capacity (junshi zhonglang). These appointments occurred amid Liu Zhang's efforts to consolidate control over Yi Province's fertile but geographically isolated territories, yet Fa Zheng's strategic acumen remained largely sidelined in favor of routine duties. By approximately 211 CE, escalating border tensions with Zhang Lu, who controlled the strategic region to the north, prompted Liu Zhang to prioritize defensive fortifications at key passes such as Baimen and Luocheng rather than launching preemptive strikes. Fa Zheng viewed this passive strategy as a critical weakness, causally exposing Yi Province to potential due to its abundant resources and limited natural defenses beyond the mountainous barriers. Historical records note his intelligence was acknowledged but not harnessed for bold initiatives, contributing to personal frustration as influences, including slander from entrenched refugees and guests from eastern provinces, marginalized his counsel and stifled his ambitions. Fa Zheng's discontent deepened through private discussions with like-minded officials, including Zhang Song, who handled guest receptions in Chengdu, and Meng Da, another underutilized talent. They concurred that Liu Zhang's governance failed to capitalize on Yi Province's advantages—such as its agricultural surplus and defensible terrain—for expansion or robust defense, rendering the region precariously dependent on tactics. This shared assessment emphasized Liu Zhang's perceived lack of resolve and vision, fostering a conviction that his leadership imperiled long-term stability, though these exchanges remained confined to critique without advancing concrete alternatives at the time.

Defection and Conquest of Yi Province

Conspiracy and Invitation to Liu Bei

In 211 CE, Fa Zheng, serving as an advisor to the warlord Liu Zhang in Yi Province (modern ), grew disillusioned with Liu Zhang's indecisiveness and perceived incompetence in governance and defense. Alongside associates Zhang Song, a mid-level official and brother of Liu Zhang's trusted aide Zhang Su, and Meng Da, a military officer, Fa Zheng initiated a secret conspiracy to invite , then based in Jing Province, to enter Yi Province under the pretext of providing aid against the northern threat of Zhang Lu, the leader of a religious sect in . This plot capitalized on Liu Zhang's strategic miscalculation in seeking external reinforcements amid escalating border pressures, as Zhang Song had previously assessed 's ambition and capability during an embassy visit and advocated for his invitation over alternatives like . Fa Zheng leveraged his position to provide with critical intelligence upon his arrival, including detailed maps, assessments of Yi Province's terrain, internal factional divisions among Liu Zhang's retainers, and the ruler's reluctance to commit to aggressive defenses, which exposed vulnerabilities in key commanderies like Ba and Guanghan. These disclosures, drawn from Fa Zheng's firsthand knowledge of court dynamics, emphasized Liu Zhang's pattern of conciliatory policies that prioritized short-term stability over consolidating power, enabling opportunistic shifts in allegiance by disaffected elites. Zhang Song remained in to act as an internal informant, relaying developments to facilitate the plot, while Meng Da positioned forces to defect at opportune moments. Liu Zhang dispatched Fa Zheng with a contingent of troops to escort westward through the strategic passes into Yi Province, formally framing the entry as a defensive . Upon meeting near the border, Fa Zheng openly defected, urging an immediate advance on rather than a nominal deployment against Zhang Lu, thereby marking the conspiracy's shift from invitation to conquest. This precipitated 's rapid mobilization of 30,000–40,000 troops from Jing Province, crossing into Yi Province by late 211 CE and initiating tensions that unraveled Liu Zhang's authority without initial large-scale combat. The premeditated betrayal, as annotated in Pei Songzhi's commentary on Chen Shou's Sanguozhi, highlighted how personal ambition and realistic appraisals of power imbalances overrode nominal loyalties in the fragmented late Han context.

Tactical Contributions to the Campaign

Fa Zheng urged to press the offensive aggressively following initial victories in Yi Province, advising against hesitation despite setbacks such as the ambush at Luofang Pass in 213 CE, where 's forces under Zhang Ren inflicted heavy losses. This counsel capitalized on Liu Zhang's indecisiveness and divided loyalties among his subordinates, preventing the consolidation of defenses around key cities like . Leveraging his intimate knowledge of Yi Province's terrain and internal politics, Fa Zheng recommended swift maneuvers through vulnerable routes, bypassing fortified positions to target administrative centers directly and disrupt supply lines. His strategies emphasized exploiting Liu Zhang's reluctance to adopt scorched-earth tactics, which preserved resources for the invaders while demoralizing defenders. Fa Zheng facilitated coordinated defections of local commanders, including Meng Da at Zitong in early 214 CE, using personal networks to sow discord and induce surrenders that fragmented Liu Zhang's armies without extended battles. These internal disruptions minimized Liu Bei's need for prolonged sieges, as defecting garrisons opened flanks and reduced overall resistance across the province. During the siege of from mid-214 CE, Fa Zheng oversaw logistical consolidations and advisory roles that pressured Liu Zhang into surrender by December 214 CE after three months, averting widespread devastation and enabling rapid administrative takeover. The expedition's success, achieved with fewer than 40,000 troops against a larger host, secured Yi Province's wealth and population base for Shu Han's foundation, though the prominence of betrayals engendered distrust among remaining Liu Zhang loyalists, complicating long-term integration.

Service as Liu Bei's Primary Strategist

Ascension to Chief Advisory Role

Following the successful of Yi Province in 214 CE, Fa Zheng was appointed as General Arousing Martiality (Yangwu Jiangjun) and Governor (Taishou) of Shu Commandery, positions that elevated him to oversight of the capital region and integration into Bei's core advisory circle. These honors recognized his pivotal role in orchestrating the rapid subjugation of and the pacification of local elites, demonstrating empirical efficacy in territorial expansion. Liu Bei increasingly favored Fa Zheng as his primary strategist, consulting him preferentially on high-stakes decisions ahead of more conservative advisors like , whose internal administrative focus contrasted with Fa Zheng's proven aptitude for decisive military counsel. This causal preference stemmed from Fa Zheng's track record of advocating and executing aggressive maneuvers that yielded tangible conquests, fostering a dynamic where Liu Bei granted him direct access to private strategy sessions and deferred to his insights on Yi Province and external threats. By mid-214 CE, Fa Zheng's influence solidified Shu Han's nascent power structure, positioning him as the de facto chief advisor whose bold realism shaped Liu Bei's confidence in sustaining control amid regional rivalries. Following the conquest of Yi Province in 214 CE, Fa Zheng collaborated with Zhuge Liang, Liu Ba, Li Yan, and Yi Ji to compile the Shu Ke (蜀科), an early legal code for the nascent Shu Han regime that adapted Eastern Han dynasty frameworks to the diverse ethnic and administrative conditions of Yi Province, including its Qiang and Yi populations. This code emphasized codified rules for governance, taxation, and dispute resolution, prioritizing enforcement of loyalty oaths among former Liu Zhang officials and local elites to suppress residual resistance. As Administrator of Shu Commandery (蜀郡太守), Fa Zheng implemented these provisions on the ground, focusing on rapid pacification through selective appointments of defectors and pragmatic concessions to tribal leaders, which facilitated the integration of Yi's agrarian resources into Shu Han's fiscal system. Fa Zheng's policies underscored stability over ideological purity, advocating measured punishments for disloyalty while rewarding proven adherents, which enabled to extract grain levies and manpower from Yi Province without immediate revolts—evidenced by the regime's ability to field armies for the 217–219 CE . These reforms, grounded in Fa Zheng's intimate knowledge of Yi's factional dynamics from his prior service under Zhang, contrasted with stricter Confucian emphases elsewhere but proved causally effective in consolidating control amid post-conquest turbulence. However, Sanguozhi records critique Fa Zheng for personal inconsistencies, such as urging harsh measures against enemies while benefiting from 's leniency toward his own improprieties, including violations of propriety norms that undermined uniform enforcement. This favoritism toward allies like Meng Da raised concerns among contemporaries like , who sought to restrain such excesses, though prioritized Fa Zheng's utility in stabilizing the core commandery.

Command in the Hanzhong Campaign

In 217 CE, Fa Zheng analyzed the vulnerabilities in Cao Cao's hold on Commandery, noting the region's recent conquest left it unstable and that commanders and lacked the prowess to defend against Bei's forces, thereby urging an immediate offensive to seize the strategic area. This advice prompted Bei's advance toward Yangping Pass by December 217 CE, initiating the campaign through encirclement tactics that pressured Wei defenses without direct assault on fortified positions. As fighting intensified in 219 CE, Fa Zheng directed key tactical shifts, including advising Huang Zhong to reposition troops from Dingjun Mountain to the adjacent, higher Mount Tiandang to exploit elevation advantages. When Xiahou Yuan overextended to contest the heights, Fa Zheng identified the opportunity and urged an immediate downhill assault, resulting in Huang Zhong's forces killing Xiahou Yuan and shattering Wei morale at the Battle of Dingjun Mountain. He then pressed Liu Bei to pursue the routed enemy aggressively, preventing reorganization and capitalizing on the command vacuum to secure surrounding passes and terrain for defensive consolidation. Anticipating Cao Cao's personal intervention with reinforcements, Fa Zheng forecasted a limited Wei commitment, attributing potential withdrawal to Cao Cao's divided attentions and logistical strains from distant fronts rather than any deficiency in strength, and counseled against partial measures in favor of total territorial control. These recommendations guided maneuvers to block escape routes and prepare ambushes along withdrawal paths, forcing 's retreat by summer 219 CE after inconclusive engagements and enabling Bei's unchallenged occupation of . The victory, secured through Fa Zheng's emphasis on momentum and predictive assessment, directly facilitated Bei's proclamation as King of on 23 May 219 CE. Primary accounts credit this outcome to Fa Zheng's decisive counsel, though its success hinged on precise timing that risked catastrophic reversal had Wei forces rallied or reinforced more aggressively.

Death and Immediate Consequences

Final Illness and Passing

Fa Zheng died in in 220 CE, the year following his appointment as shangshu ling (Director of the Secretariat) after the victory at . At the time, he was 45 sui (44 years old by Western reckoning), amid the Shu regime's phase of territorial stabilization in Yi Province following the . Historical accounts indicate his death resulted from illness, occurring suddenly during preparations for broader administrative and potential military expansions. This event promptly generated a void in primary strategic advisory functions within Bei's inner circle.

Liu Bei's Response and Posthumous Recognition

Upon Fa Zheng's death in 220 AD, Liu Bei expressed profound grief, weeping continuously for several days as a direct testament to the strategist's critical influence on Shu Han's expansion and defense. This mourning underscored Fa Zheng's role as a primary of aggressive policies that secured key victories, such as the conquest of Commandery from in 219 AD. In immediate posthumous recognition, awarded Fa Zheng the title of General of the Chariots and Cavalry, a high honor reflecting his tactical contributions to recent campaigns. further honored Fa Zheng's kin by promoting his younger brother, Fa Zhen, to the rank of colonel, thereby elevating the family's status within Shu's administrative and hierarchy. Fa Zheng's son, Fa Miao, received enfeoffment as Marquis Within the Passes, accompanied by grants of estates, which served as empirical compensation for the family's loyalty and the deceased's foundational merits in establishing Shu's hold on Yi Province and . Zhuge Liang, upon reflecting on the Hanzhong victory shortly after Fa Zheng's passing, affirmed in recorded commentary that Fa Zheng's strategic merits were indispensable to the campaign's success, positioning them as the bedrock upon which subsequent Shu operations depended. These endorsements and honors by and his chief ministers empirically linked Fa Zheng's counsel to Shu Han's causal advancements, prioritizing merit-based acknowledgment over personal flaws noted elsewhere.

Historical Evaluations

Assessments in Primary Sources

Chen Shou, author of the Records of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguozhi), evaluated Fa Zheng's capabilities in his , noting that Fa "clearly recognized successes and failures" and demonstrated proficiency in devising unconventional plans and strategies, which proved instrumental in pivotal conquests like the seizure of in 214 CE. This foresight enabled Bei's forces to exploit opportunities decisively, validating Fa's recommendations through tangible outcomes such as the rapid consolidation of Yi Province. Shou balanced this praise with pointed criticism of Fa's character deficiencies, observing that he "was not praised for virtuous character," particularly due to his pettiness and vengeful tendencies that subordinated impartial justice to personal animosities, resulting in instances of law-breaking to pursue feuds. These flaws, Shou implied, reflected a prioritization of immediate strategic gains over enduring moral or legal principles, akin to the pragmatic yet controversial approaches of Wei advisors Cheng Yu and . In annotations to the Sanguozhi, Pei Songzhi countered some criticisms by underscoring 's indispensability to , defending his audacious counsel—such as pressing for offensive actions in the of 219 CE—against those who deemed it imprudent. Songzhi emphasized that Liu Bei's discernment in heeding Fa amplified these strategies' effectiveness, yielding victories that might otherwise have eluded Shu, thereby highlighting Fa's causal contributions over rigid adherence to Confucian orthodoxy.

Analysis of Strategic Acumen and Personal Flaws

Fa Zheng demonstrated exceptional strategic acumen through his capacity for opportunistic realism, accurately discerning momentary vulnerabilities in adversaries to advocate for decisive offensives rather than deferring to entrenched caution. This approach emphasized exploiting transient advantages, such as enemy overextensions or internal distractions, which empirically accelerated Shu's territorial consolidation in the late 210s by prioritizing causal momentum over risk-averse deliberation. His foresight in evaluating operational weaknesses enabled unorthodox maneuvers that outpaced rivals' responses, rendering overly conservative advisory norms—prevalent in era strategists who favored exhaustive preparation—inferior for achieving rapid dominance. However, Fa Zheng's personal flaws, particularly his vindictiveness, compromised the required for stable governance. Historical records note his tendency to pursue private enmities with excessive severity, executing individuals who had wronged him personally without formal authorization or regard for broader administrative needs, which deviated from principled justice toward retributive inconsistency. This character defect, described in primary sources as a lack of virtuous restraint, prioritized individual vendettas over collective cohesion, potentially eroding trust among subordinates and complicating post-conquest integration. The net impact of Fa Zheng's methods reveals a : his bold realism verifiably hastened Shu's expansion, establishing a stronger base amid competitive fragmentation, yet his flaws introduced risks of internal discord by modeling as an extension of personal scores rather than impartial rule. Traditional evaluations in sources like the Records of the acknowledge his tactical prowess while critiquing his moral shortcomings and initial disloyalty via , viewing these as causal contributors to post-mortem vulnerabilities in Shu's . Contemporary historical reassessments, particularly in specialized communities analyzing primary texts, reevaluate him as underrated, emphasizing strategic achievements over character lapses, though without dismissing the evidenced perils of unchecked vindictiveness to regime longevity.

Comparative Role Relative to Other Advisors

Fa Zheng held a position of unparalleled personal trust from prior to 220 CE, often eclipsing that of due to his advocacy for audacious, outcome-focused strategies that contrasted with Zhuge's preference for measured restraint. During the conquest of Yi Province (214 CE) and the (219 CE), deferred more readily to Fa Zheng's recommendations for opportunistic betrayals and rapid advances, enabling territorial gains that Zhuge's caution might have delayed. This disparity in influence stemmed from Fa Zheng's alignment with 's expansionist imperatives, positioning him as the regime's primary enabler of offensive momentum rather than 's role in logistical consolidation. Fa Zheng's aggressive orientation—likened in historical accounts to providing with "fangs" for decisive strikes—complemented 's strengths in civil administration and defensive fortifications, forming a balanced advisory duo until Fa's death disrupted this equilibrium. With Fa Zheng's passing in July 220 CE, Shu Han's strategic posture veered toward conservatism, as prioritized internal stability and incremental diplomacy over the bold incursions that had characterized earlier successes. Zhuge Liang's own reflections after Fa Zheng's death affirmed this offensive edge, as in 222 CE following Liu Bei's defeat at Yiling, when Zhuge remarked that Fa Zheng's counsel might have averted the rash eastern offensive against Wu, underscoring the causal risks of depending solely on harmonious, risk-mitigating advice. Later evaluations in primary records highlight Fa Zheng's realism—favoring pragmatic exploitation of weaknesses over scrupulous adherence to propriety—as a to the venerated caution of advisors like , with some analyses attributing Shu Han's post-220 stagnation to the uncompensated loss of such incisive, unidealized strategic input.
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