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The No Fly List, maintained by the United States federal government's Threat Screening Center (TSC), is one of several lists used by the Transportation Security Administration's Secure Flight program and airlines to decide who to allow to board airline flights.[1][2] The TSC's No Fly List is a list of people who are prohibited from boarding commercial aircraft for travel within, into, or out of the United States. This list has also been used to divert aircraft away from U.S. airspace that do not have start- or end-point destinations within the United States. The number of people on the list rises and falls according to threat and intelligence reporting. There were reportedly 16,000[3] names on the list in 2011, 21,000 in 2012, and 47,000 in 2013.

The list—along with Secondary Security Screening Selection, which tags would-be passengers for extra inspection—was created after the September 11 attacks of 2001. The No Fly List, the Selectee List, and the Terrorist Watch List were created by George W. Bush's administration and have continued through the administrations of Barack Obama, Donald Trump, Joe Biden as well as the current Donald Trump Presidency. Former U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee chair Dianne Feinstein said in May 2010: "The no-fly list itself is one of our best lines of defense."[4] However, the list has been criticized on civil liberties and due process grounds, due in part to its potential for ethnic, religious, economic, political, or racial profiling and discrimination. It has raised concerns about privacy and government secrecy and has been criticized as prone to false positives.

The No Fly List is different from the Terrorist Watch List, a much longer list of people said to be suspected of some involvement with terrorism. As of June 2014, the Terrorist Watch List is estimated to contain over 2,484,446 records, consisting of 1,877,139 individual identities.[5][6]

History

[edit]

Before the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. federal government had a list of 16 people deemed "no transport" because they "presented a specific known or suspected threat to aviation."[7][8] The list grew in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, reaching more than 400 names by November 2001, when responsibility for keeping it was transferred to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).[8] In mid-December 2001, two lists were created: the "No Fly List" of 594 people to be denied air transport, and the "Selectee" list of 365 people who were to be more carefully searched at airports.[7][8] By 2002, the two lists combined contained over a thousand names, and by April 2005 contained about 70,000 names.[7] For the first two and a half years of the program, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) denied that the program existed.[7]

In 2004, then-U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy was denied boarding a flight because his name was similar to an alias found on the No Fly List.[9] Laura K. Donohue would later write in The Cost of Counterterrorism: Power, Politics, and Liberty that "antiwar activists, such as Jan Adams and Rebecca Gordan, and political opponents of the Bush administration, such as Senator Edward Kennedy and civil rights attorney David Cole, found themselves included."[7] In June 2016, Timothy Healy, the former director of the FBI Terrorist Screening Center, disputed the claim that Kennedy had ever appeared on the list, saying that another person with a similar name—who had accidentally tried to bring ammunition on to a plane—was placed on an airline's watch list and Kennedy was mistakenly detained by the airline, not based on the No Fly List.[10] In October 2006, CBS News' 60 Minutes reported on the program after it obtained a March 2006 copy of the list containing 44,000 names.[11]

Many individuals were "caught in the system" as a result of sharing the exact or similar name of another person on the list;[7] TSA officials said that, as of November 2005, 30,000 people in 2005 had complained that their names were matched to a name on the list via the name matching software used by airlines.[12] In January 2006, the FBI and ACLU settled a federal lawsuit, Gordon v. FBI, brought by Gordon and Adams under the Freedom of Information Act in order to obtain information about how names were added to the list.[12] Under the settlement, the government paid $200,000 in the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.[13] A separate suit was brought as a class action "filed by people caught in the name game."[7] In response, "TSA created an ombudsman process, whereby individuals now can download and print out a Passenger Identity Verification Form and mail it, along with certain notarized documents, to the TSA 'so the agency can differentiate the individual from others who may be on the list.'"[7]

In April 2007, the U.S. federal government's "terrorist watch list" administered by the Terrorist Screening Center (which is managed principally by the FBI)[14] contained 700,000 records.[15] A year later, the ACLU estimated the list to have grown to over 1,000,000 names and to be continually expanding.[16][17][18] However, according to Homeland Security secretary Michael Chertoff, in October 2008 the No Fly List contained only 2,500 names, with an additional 16,000 "selectees" who "represent a less specific security threat and receive extra scrutiny, but are allowed to fly."[19]

As of 2011, the list contained about 10,000 names.[20][21] In 2012, the list more than doubled in size, to about 21,000 names as the list now included people who were a threat to security outside aviation.[22][23] In August 2013, a leak revealed that more than 47,000 people were on the list.[24][14] In 2016, California Senator Dianne Feinstein disclosed that 81,000 people were on the No Fly List.[25]

There is a huge, secretive US anti-terrorism database for Canada specifically, "Tuscan" (Tipoff US/Canada), revealed by Canada's access to information system. The database is used by both the US and Canada, and applies to all borders, not just airports. It is believed to contain information on about 680,000 people thought to be linked with terrorism. The list was created in 1997 as a consular aid. It was repurposed and expanded after 9/11, and again in 2016. The names in Tuscan come from the US Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (Tide), which is vetted by the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center and populates various US traveller databases, Canada's Tuscan and the Australian equivalent, "Tactics".[26]

Weapons purchases by listed persons (No Fly No Buy)

[edit]

In a 2010 report, the Government Accountability Office noted that "Membership in a terrorist organization does not prohibit a person from possessing firearms or explosives under current federal law," and individuals on the No Fly List are not barred from purchasing guns.[27] According to GAO data, between 2004 and 2010, people on terrorism watch lists—including the No Fly List as well as other separate lists—attempted to buy guns and explosives more than 1,400 times, and succeeded 1,321 times (more than 90% of cases).[28]

Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey repeatedly introduced legislation to bar individuals on the terror watch lists (such as the No Fly List) from buying firearms or explosives, but these efforts have not succeeded.[27][28][29] Senator Dianne Feinstein of California revived the legislation after the November 2015 Paris attacks and President Barack Obama has called for such legislation to be approved.[27]

Republicans in Congress such as Senate Homeland Security Committee chair Ron Johnson and former Speaker of the House Paul Ryan oppose this measure, citing due process concerns and efficacy, respectively.[27] Republicans have blocked attempts by Democrats to attach these provisions to Republican-backed measures.[30]

The American Civil Liberties Union has voiced opposition to barring weapons sales to individuals listed on the current form of the No Fly List, stating that: "There is no constitutional bar to reasonable regulation of guns, and the No Fly List could serve as one tool for it, but only with major reform."[31] Specifically, the ACLU's position is that the government's current redress process—the procedure by which listed individuals can petition for removal from the list—does not meet the requirements of the Constitution's Due Process Clause because the process does not "provide meaningful notice of the reasons our clients are blacklisted, the basis for those reasons, and a hearing before a neutral decision-maker."[31]

In December 2015, Feinstein's amendment to bar individuals on the terror watch list from purchasing firearms failed in the Senate on a 45-54 vote.[32] Senate Majority Whip John Cornyn of Texas put forth a competing proposal to "give the attorney general the power to impose a 72-hour delay for individuals on the terror watch list seeking to purchase a gun and it could become a permanent ban if a judge determines there is probable cause during that time window."[32] The measure, too, failed, on a 55-45 vote (60 votes were required to proceed).[32] The votes on both the Feinstein measure and the Cornyn measure were largely along party lines.[32]

Vulnerabilities

[edit]
See also: Security theater § Airport security measures

With the aim of preventing individuals on the No Fly List from flying in commercial airliners, U.S. airports require all passengers to show valid picture ID (e.g. a passport or driver's license) along with their boarding pass before entering the boarding terminal. At this checkpoint, the name on the ID is matched to that on the boarding pass, but is not recorded. In order to be effective, this practice must assume that 1) the ticket was bought under the passenger's real name (at which point the name was recorded and checked against the No Fly List), 2) the boarding pass shown is real, and 3) the ID shown is real. However, the rise of print-at-home boarding passes, which can be easily forged, allows a potential attacker to buy a ticket under someone else's name, to go into the boarding terminal using a real ID and a fake boarding pass, and then to fly on the ticket that has someone else's name on it.[33][34][35][36] Additionally, a 2007 investigation showed that obviously false IDs could be used when claiming a boarding pass and entering the departures terminal, so a person on the No Fly List can simply travel under a different name.[37]

False positives

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A "false positive" occurs when a passenger who is not on the No Fly List has a name that matches or is similar to a name on the list. False positive passengers will not be allowed to board a flight unless they can differentiate themselves from the actual person on the list, usually by presenting ID showing their middle name or date of birth. In some cases, false positive passengers have been denied boarding or have missed flights because they could not easily prove that they were not the person on the No Fly List.

Notable cases

[edit]

False positives and abuses that have been in the news include:

  • Numerous children (including many under the age of five, and some under the age of one) have generated false positives.[38][39][40]
  • Daniel Brown, a United States Marine Corps reservist returning from Iraq, was prevented from boarding a flight home in April 2006 because his name matched one on the No Fly List.[41]
  • David Fathi, an attorney for the ACLU of Iranian descent and a plaintiff in an ACLU lawsuit, has been arrested and detained because his name was on the No Fly List.[42]
  • Asif Iqbal, a management consultant and legal resident of the United States born in Pakistan, plans to sue the U.S. government because he is regularly detained when he tries to fly[needs update]. He has the same name as a former Guantanamo detainee.[43][44] Iqbal's work requires a lot of travel, and, even though the Guantanamo detainee has been released, his name remains on the No Fly List, and Iqbal the software consultant experiences frequent, unpredictable delays and missed flights.[45] He is pushing for a photo ID and birthdate matching system, in addition to the current system of checking names.[46]
  • Robert J. Johnson, a surgeon and a former lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, was told in 2006 that he was on the list, although he had had no problem in flying the month before. Johnson was running as a Democrat against U.S. Representative John McHugh, a Republican. Johnson wondered whether he was on the list because of his opposition to the Iraq War. He stated, "This could just be a government screw-up, but I don't know, and they won't tell me."[47] Later, a 60 Minutes report brought together 12 men named Robert Johnson, all of whom had experienced problems in airports with being pulled aside and interrogated. The report suggested that the individual whose name was intended to be on the list was most likely the Robert Johnson who had been convicted of plotting to bomb a movie theater and a Hindu temple in Toronto.[11]
  • In August 2004, Senator Ted Kennedy told a Senate Judiciary Committee discussing the No Fly List that he had appeared on the list and had been repeatedly delayed at airports.[citation needed] He said it had taken him three weeks of appeals directly to Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge to have him removed from the list. Kennedy said he was eventually told that the name "T Kennedy" was added to the list because it was once used as an alias of a suspected terrorist. There are an estimated 7,000 American men whose legal names correspond to "T Kennedy". (Senator Kennedy, whose first name was Edward and for whom "Ted" was only a nickname, would not have been one of them.) Recognizing that as a U.S. Senator he was in a privileged position of being able to contact Ridge, Kennedy said of "ordinary citizens": "How are they going to be able to get to be treated fairly and not have their rights abused?"[48] Former mayor of New York City Rudy Giuliani pointed to this incident as an example of the necessity to "rethink aviation security" in an essay on homeland security published while he was seeking the Republican nomination for the 2008 presidential election.[49]
  • The late U.S. Representative, former Freedom Rider, and former Chairman of Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, John Lewis, was stopped many times in his life.[50]
  • Canadian journalist Patrick Martin has been frequently interrogated while traveling, because of a suspicious individual, believed to be a former Provisional Irish Republican Army bombmaker, with the same name.[51][52]
  • Walter F. Murphy, McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence at Princeton, reported that the following exchange took place at Newark on 1 March 2007, where he was denied a boarding pass "because I [Murphy] was on the Terrorist Watch list." The airline employee asked, "Have you been in any peace marches? We ban a lot of people from flying because of that." Replied Murphy, "I explained that I had not so marched but had, in September 2006, given a lecture at Princeton, televised and put on the web, highly critical of George Bush for his many violations of the constitution." To which the airline employee responded, "That'll do it."[53]
  • David Nelson, the actor best known for his role on The Adventures of Ozzie and Harriet, is among various persons named David Nelson who have been stopped at airports because their name apparently appears on the list.[54][55]
  • Jesselyn Radack, a former United States Department of Justice ethics adviser who argued that John Walker Lindh was entitled to an attorney, was placed on the No Fly List as part of what she[56] believes to be a reprisal for her whistle-blowing.
  • In September 2004, former pop singer Cat Stevens (who converted to Islam and changed his name to "Yusuf Islam" in 1978) was denied entry into the U.S. after his name was found on the list.[57]
  • In February 2006, U.S. Senator Ted Stevens stated in a committee hearing that his wife Catherine had been subjected to questioning at an airport as to whether she was Cat Stevens due to the similarity of their names.[54][58]
  • U.S. Representative Don Young, the third-most senior Republican in the House, was flagged in 2004 after he was mistaken for a "Donald Lee Young".[59]
  • Some members of the Federal Air Marshal Service have been denied boarding on flights that they were assigned to protect because their names matched those of persons on the No Fly List.[60]
  • In August 2008, CNN reported that an airline captain and retired brigadier general of the U.S. Air National Guard has had numerous encounters with security officials when attempting to pilot his own plane.[61]
  • After frequently being detained for questioning at airport terminals, a Canadian businessman changed his name to avoid being delayed every time he took a flight.[62]
  • In October 2008, the Washington Post reported that Maryland State Police classified 53 nonviolent political activists as terrorists, and entered their names and personal information into state and federal databases, with labels indicating that they were terror suspects. The protest groups were also entered as terrorist organizations. During a hearing, it was revealed that these individuals and organizations had been placed in the databases because of a surveillance operation that targeted opponents of the death penalty and the Iraq War.[63]
  • In April 2009, TSA refused to allow an Air France flight from Paris to Mexico to cross U.S. airspace because it was carrying Colombian journalist Hernando Calvo Ospina. Air France did not send the passenger manifest to the U.S. authorities; they did however send it to Mexico who forwarded it to the U.S.[64]
  • On August 19, 2009, Air France flight AF-438 was not allowed to cross into U.S. airspace because of the presence on board of one Paul-Emile Dupret, a human rights activist and civil servant at the European Parliament.[65]
  • Bollywood actor Shah Rukh Khan was held for extensive questioning by U.S. Immigration and Customs officials in August 2009 because, as he reported, "his name came up on a computer alert list." Customs officials claimed that he "was questioned as part of a routine process that took 66 minutes." Khan was visiting the United States to promote his film My Name Is Khan, which concerns racial profiling of Muslims in the United States.[66]
  • In June 2010, The New York Times reported that Yahya Wehelie, a 26-year-old Muslim American man, was being prevented from returning to the United States, and was stranded in Cairo. Despite Wehelie's offer to FBI agents to allow them to accompany him on the plane, while shackled, he was not permitted to fly. The ACLU has argued that this constitutes banishment.[67] In July 2010, Wehelie was permitted to fly to New York under a federal waiver.[68]
  • A U.S. citizen, stranded in Colombia after being placed on the No Fly List as a result of having studied in Yemen, sought to re-enter the U.S. through Mexico but was returned to Colombia by Mexican authorities.[67]
  • Michael Migliore, a 23-year-old Muslim convert and dual citizen of the United States and Italy, was detained in the United Kingdom after traveling there from the U.S. by train and then cruise ship because he was not permitted to fly. He said that he believes he was placed on the no-fly list because he refused to answer questions about a 2010 Portland car bomb plot without his lawyer present.[69] He was released eight or ten hours later, but authorities confiscated his electronic media items, including a cell phone and media player.[70]
  • Abe Mashal, a 31-year-old Muslim and United States Marine Veteran, found himself on the No Fly List in April 2010 while attempting to board a plane out of Midway Airport. He was interrogated by the TSA, FBI and Chicago Police at the airport and was told they had no clue why he was on the No Fly List. Once he arrived at home that day two other FBI agents came to his home and used a Do Not Fly question-and-answer sheet to question him. They informed him they had no idea why he was on the No Fly List. In June 2010, those same two FBI agents summoned Mashal to a local hotel and invited him to a private room. They then told him that he was in no trouble and the reason he ended up on the No Fly List was because of possibly sending emails to an American imam they may have been monitoring. They then informed him that if he would go undercover at various local mosques, they could get him off the No Fly List immediately and he would be compensated for such actions. Mashal refused to answer any additional questions without a lawyer present and was told to leave the hotel. Mashal then contacted the ACLU and is now being represented in a class-action lawsuit filed against the TSA, FBI and DHS concerning the legality of the No Fly List and how people end up on it. Mashal feels as if he was blackmailed into becoming an informant by being placed on the No Fly List. Mashal has since appeared on ABC, NBC, PBS and Al Jazeera concerning his inclusion on the No Fly List. He has also written a book about his experience titled "No Spy No Fly."[71]
  • In November 2002 Salon reported that the No-Fly program seemed "to be netting mostly priests, elderly nuns, Green Party campaign operatives, left-wing journalists, right-wing activists and people affiliated with Arab or Arab-American groups." Art dealer Doug Stuber, who ran Ralph Nader's Green Party presidential campaign in North Carolina in 2000, was prevented from flying to Europe on business in October 2002. He was repeatedly pulled out of line, held for questioning until his flight left, then told falsely he could take a later flight or depart from a different airport. Barbara Olshansky, then Assistant Legal Director for the Center for Constitutional Rights, noted that she and several of her colleagues received special attention on numerous occasions. On at least one occasion, she was ordered to pull her trousers down in view of other passengers.[72] It is not clear why Stuber was targeted. He was initially pulled aside after loudly declaring to a fellow passenger, "George Bush is as dumb as a rock." He was on the list for over two years but was later allowed to fly.[73]

DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program

[edit]

The DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) is a procedure for travelers who are delayed or denied boarding of an aircraft, consistently receive excess scrutiny at security checkpoints, or are denied entry to the U.S. because they are believed to be or are told that they are on a government watch list. The traveler must complete an online application at the Department of Homeland Security website, print and sign the application, and then submit it with copies of several identifying documents. After reviewing their records, DHS notifies the traveler that if any corrections of data about them were warranted, they will be made.

Travelers who apply for redress through TRIP are assigned a record identifier called a "Redress Control Number". Airline reservations systems allow passengers who have a Redress Control Number to enter it when making their reservation.

DHS TRIP may make it easier for an airline to confirm a traveler's identity. False-positive travelers, whose names match or are similar to the names of persons on the No Fly List, will continue to match that name even after using DHS TRIP, so it will not restore a traveler's ability to use Internet or curbside check-in or to use an automated kiosk.[citation needed] It does usually help the airline identify the traveler as not being the actual person on the No Fly List, after an airline agent has reviewed their identity documents at check-in.

However, DHS TRIP has not been very helpful to travelers who accidentally end up on the No Fly List, as their efforts to clear their names are often futile to the extent that they are not told why they are on the list.[74]

2023 leak

[edit]
See also: Maia arson crimew § No Fly and Selectee Lists leak

On January 19, 2023, Swiss hacker maia arson crimew reported that she had gained access to 2019 versions of the No Fly List of 1.56 million entries and Selectee List of 250,000 entries posted by CommuteAir on an unsecured Amazon Web Services cloud server.[75][76][77] An analysis published in 2024 based on a redacted copy of the leak discusses the over-representation of ethno-religious groups in the list.[78]

Controversy and criticism

[edit]

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has long criticized the No Fly List and similar lists because of the lack of notification to persons included on such lists. The ACLU's stance is that the government has not provided a constitutionally adequate means of allowing individuals to challenge their inclusion on the list[79] and that "constitutional rights are at stake when the government stigmatizes Americans as suspected terrorists and bans them from international travel."[80]

Among the complaints about the No Fly List is the use of credit reports in calculating the risk score. In response to the controversy, Transportation Security Administration (TSA) officials said in 2005 that they would not use credit scores to determine passengers' risk score and that they would comply with all rights guaranteed by the First and Fourth amendments to the United States Constitution.[81]

In the midst of this controversy, the Government Accountability Office of the U.S. Congress produced a report critical of the CAPPS II system. It characterized the proposal as incomplete and seriously behind schedule, and noted that the TSA had failed to address "developmental, operational, and privacy issues identified by Congress". On July 14, 2004, TSA officials announced that CAPPS II was being pulled from consideration without proceeding to full testing. Critics have alleged that the TSA has merely chosen to start with a less controversial entry point that they are calling the "Registered Traveler" program.[82] TSA has also begun testing of another program called "Secure Flight", which is supposed to solve some of the problems of CAPPS I while avoiding the privacy issues of CAPPS II.

In January 2009, Marcus Holmes conservatively estimated the total cost of the program to be $536 million since 9/11, with a reasonable estimation range that approaches $1 billion, and he questioned whether the benefits of the list outweigh the costs.[83]

The 2023 leak re-ignited criticisms that the No-Fly list is insufficiently secure.[84] Critics note that if it is not possible to abolish the No-Fly list or make placement on it appealable, Congress should at least review and improve the federal government's data security to prevent any future leaks.[85]

Lawsuits

[edit]

On April 6, 2004, the American Civil Liberties Union "filed a nationwide class-action challenge to the government's No Fly List", in which they charge that "many innocent travelers who pose no security risk whatsoever are discovering that their government considers them terrorists – and find that they have no way to find out why they are on the list, and no way to clear their names."[86] The case was settled in 2006, when "the federal government agreed to pay $200,000 in attorneys' fees to the ACLU of Northern California" and to "[make] public, for the first time, hundreds of records about the government's secret 'no fly' list used to screen airline passengers after September 11, 2001."[12] On August 5, 2010, the ACLU filed a lawsuit on behalf of 14 plaintiffs challenging their placement on the No Fly List.[87] and on June 24, 2014, U.S. District Judge Anna J. Brown ruled in favor of the plaintiffs saying that air travel is a "sacred" liberty protected by the U.S. Constitution[88] and ordered the government to change its system for challenging inclusion.[87]

A Malaysian academic has been the first to successfully bring a suit involving the No Fly List to trial. On August 18, 2008, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco issued a ruling on behalf of Rahinah Ibrahim, who was a Stanford University graduate student when she was arrested at the San Francisco-Oakland International Airport in 2005, overturning a lower court decision and allowing her case against inclusion in the No Fly List to proceed through the court system.[89] A public trial began on December 2, 2013 in San Francisco in the courtroom of U.S. District Judge William Alsup.[90] After the government revealed that Ibrahim had ended up on the list because of human error by the FBI,[91] Alsup ruled on January 14, 2014 "that Ibrahim did have the right to sue and ordered the government to tell Ibrahim whether she is still on the list."[92] Ibrahim was represented by the San Jose-based law firm of McManis Faulkner.[93] Ibrahim was awarded $400,000 in court costs; in January 2019 the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that she was entitled to the "vast majority" of the millions of dollars in costs her lawyers were requesting, and ordered Alsup to rule on whether the government had acted in bad faith.[94]

Gulet Mohamed, a U.S. citizen from Virginia, was placed on the no-fly list as a teenager in 2011 while he was visiting family in Kuwait. Because he was on the no-fly list, he was unable to return to the U.S. before his visa expired.[95] He was taken into custody in Kuwait for overstaying his visa, where he alleges that he "was repeatedly beaten and tortured by his interrogators".[96] Kuwaiti authorities tried to deport him to the U.S., but the airline denied him boarding, presumably because he was on the U.S. No Fly List, and he was returned to prison. While he was imprisoned in Kuwait, a lawsuit was filed on his behalf in the Eastern District of Virginia by the Council on American–Islamic Relations. After the lawsuit was filed, he was allowed to return to the U.S.; the U.S. government then moved to dismiss the lawsuit as moot.[97] On May 28, 2013, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the government's motion to dismiss Mohamed's lawsuit.[98] On January 22, 2014, Judge Anthony J. Trenga denied most of another government motion to dismiss the lawsuit, allowing the case to proceed toward trial.[99]

In 2015 Yonas Fikre of Oregon sued the FBI for harm to his reputation and violation of his due process rights to travel, after he was placed on the No Fly List and then removed.[100] In September 2023, the US Supreme Court agreed to hear the FBI's appeal against the litigation.[101]

No fly lists in other countries

[edit]

Canada's federal government has created its own no fly list as part of a program called Passenger Protect.[102] The Canadian list incorporates data from domestic and foreign intelligence sources, including the U.S. No Fly List.[103] It contains between 500 and 2,000 names.[104]

In addition, Canada's access to information system revealed that the US "Tuscan" (Tipoff US/Canada) database is provided to every Canadian border guard and immigration officer; they have the power to detain, interrogate, arrest and deny entry to anyone listed on it. Unlike the no-fly list, which only applies to airports, Tuscan is used for every Canadian land and sea border, and visa and immigration application.[26]

In Pakistan, the no fly list is known as the Exit Control List.[105]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Sources

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

No Fly List

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from Grokipedia
The No Fly List is a small subset of the U.S. government's Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), comprising individuals nominated by federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies on the basis of credible derogatory information indicating a specific threat to civil aviation or national security, thereby prohibiting them from boarding commercial aircraft for flights to, from, within, or overflying the United States. Maintained by the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) since its establishment in 2003, the list draws from the broader TSDB—which primarily identifies foreign nationals with no known U.S. connections—and excludes nominations predicated on race, ethnicity, religion, or protected First Amendment activities. Originating in rudimentary form prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks but significantly expanded and consolidated thereafter, the No Fly List was formalized under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, which directed the creation of the TSC to unify terrorist screening efforts across agencies and prevent intelligence silos that contributed to pre-9/11 failures. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) integrates the list into its Secure Flight program, requiring airlines to transmit passenger data for matching against TSC outputs before issuing boarding passes, with matches triggering denial of boarding and law enforcement referral. This process has been credited with enhancing aviation security, as no large-scale terrorist hijacking of U.S. commercial flights has occurred since 2001, though causal attribution remains debated amid layered defenses. The list's operations have sparked persistent controversies, particularly regarding erroneous placements due to name similarities, overbroad nomination criteria, and opaque processes that hinder effective redress for U.S. persons, leading to documented cases of citizens and residents facing indefinite travel restrictions without timely notice or evidence disclosure. Legal challenges, including Supreme Court litigation such as FBI v. Fikre (2024), have exposed due process deficiencies, ruling that government removal of plaintiffs from the list does not moot claims where re-nomination risks persist, and prompting procedural adjustments like enhanced DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program reviews. While government audits affirm low U.S. person inclusion rates and ongoing refinements to minimize false positives, critics from civil liberties groups contend the system's reliance on "reasonable suspicion" thresholds—lower than probable cause—prioritizes security over individual rights, with empirical evidence of harms including job losses and family separations for those misidentified.

Historical Development

Pre-9/11 Foundations

Prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks, U.S. aviation security evolved in response to a wave of hijackings during the late 1960s and early 1970s, when over 130 American airplanes were diverted, often for political demands or escapes to Cuba. These incidents prompted the introduction of mandatory passenger and baggage screening, including walk-through metal detectors and X-ray machines at airports starting in 1973, under Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) oversight following the Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974. However, these measures emphasized preventing traditional diversions and hostage scenarios rather than mass-casualty suicide operations, with no comprehensive watchlists for potential threats; security focused on behavioral cues and basic threat detection without integrated intelligence sharing. In 1997, the FAA mandated the deployment of the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) by U.S. air carriers via Security Directive SD 97-01, dated October 27, 1997, to identify passengers warranting additional scrutiny based on factors such as one-way tickets, cash payments, and irregular travel patterns. CAPPS selected individuals for enhanced baggage screening but did not extend to personal searches or no-fly prohibitions, relying instead on airline personnel to flag risks from Passenger Name Records and random sampling. By 2001, CAPPS had flagged at least nine of the 19 September 11 hijackers for secondary checks, including Mohamed Atta, yet the system's limitations—such as no linkage to broader threat databases—prevented escalation to deny boarding. The FAA maintained a rudimentary no-fly list comprising only 12 individuals known to pose direct threats to civil aviation, primarily repeat hijackers from prior decades, with no broader inclusion of intelligence-derived suspects due to interagency silos and concerns over data sharing with private airlines. This list, outlined in Security Directive SD 95 from April 24, 2000, lacked real-time updates or integration with systems like the State Department's TIPOFF watchlist, which held around 60,000 names by 2001 but was not routinely applied to air travel screening. Intelligence failures underscored the absence of consolidated lists, as agencies like the CIA and FBI operated in isolation; for instance, known al Qaeda associates Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi, identified in a January 2000 meeting and granted U.S. visas, were not added to any aviation watchlist until August 23, 2001, despite entering the United States on January 15, 2000. The FAA's small intelligence unit of 40 personnel received limited domestic threat data, and warnings such as the Phoenix Memo in July 2001 about al Qaeda flight training went unheeded, revealing systemic gaps in fusing intelligence for passenger prescreening that prioritized privacy and jurisdictional boundaries over proactive threat consolidation.

Post-9/11 Creation and Initial Expansion

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, signed into law on November 19, 2001, established the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the Department of Transportation and authorized the development of a "no fly" list to prevent individuals posing aviation security threats from boarding aircraft. Prior to the attacks, the Federal Aviation Administration's no-fly list contained only 12 names of known terrorist suspects. The TSA rapidly expanded the list in late 2001 and 2002, incorporating enhanced intelligence sharing among federal agencies to identify additional potential threats. The expansion involved fusing from existing , including the State Department's TIPOFF system, which held on over 100,000 suspected terrorists and served as a foundational element for consolidated screening . This integration supported the creation of the Terrorist Screening (TSC) in , which centralized nominations and distributed subsets like the No Fly List to agencies such as the TSA for aviation . By , the list's implementation had resulted in thousands of denied boardings for individuals matching its criteria during attempts to board commercial flights. To ensure consistent prescreening, the No Fly List was incorporated into the TSA's Secure Flight program, which shifted responsibility for watchlist matching from airlines to the federal government. Launched in phases starting in 2008, Secure Flight became mandatory for U.S. carriers by 2009, requiring submission of full passenger name records for comparison against the No Fly List prior to ticket issuance or boarding confirmation, thereby preventing matches from proceeding. This protocol addressed earlier inconsistencies in carrier-led checks and aligned with post-9/11 mandates for layered aviation security.

Subsequent Reforms and Growth (2000s–Present)

In the 2000s, the No Fly List was integrated into the consolidated Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), managed by the Terrorist Screening Center established in 2003, with nominations for known or suspected terrorists centralized through the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. This restructuring addressed fragmented pre-9/11 watchlisting by standardizing criteria across agencies like the FBI, CIA, and DHS, enabling more efficient updates and dissemination of aviation-specific threats derived from intelligence reports. The 2009 attempt by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to bomb Northwest Airlines Flight 253 exposed limitations in applying TSDB data to the No Fly subset, as his prior intelligence nomination lacked sufficient derogatory information to meet the aviation threat threshold. In response, during the early 2010s, inclusion standards were refined to lower the evidentiary bar for no-fly designation, expanding the list from roughly 10,000 to 21,000 names by 2012 while maintaining a reasonable suspicion baseline tied to articulable facts indicating potential aircraft sabotage. Into the 2010s and 2020s, adjustments incorporated emerging threats such as ISIS-linked foreign fighter travel and recruitment, prompting targeted additions based on intelligence of operational intent. The list stabilized at approximately 81,000 individuals by 2016, with the majority non-U.S. persons and fewer than 1,000 Americans, reflecting periodic TSC reviews that facilitate de-listings when intelligence no longer substantiates ongoing risk.

Operational Mechanics

Nomination and Inclusion Criteria

The nomination process for the No Fly List occurs via submissions to the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), administered by the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), which consolidates and vets intelligence for watchlist inclusion. Nominating agencies, including the FBI for domestic terrorism leads, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) for international terrorist threats, the CIA, and foreign partners through interagency fusion processes, provide derogatory information for TSC evaluation. TSC analysts conduct independent reviews to confirm compliance with inclusion standards before adding identifiers to the TSDB, from which the No Fly List—a targeted subset—is extracted daily for aviation prescreening. Inclusion requires meeting a reasonable suspicion threshold, defined as articulable intelligence or information that, under the totality of circumstances and rational inferences, indicates the individual is engaged, has been engaged, or intends to engage in terrorism-related conduct, preparation, aid, or furtherance. This standard demands specific, fact-based evidence of involvement, excluding mere guesses, hunches, associations with terrorists without personal action, or isolated suspicious activity reports. For the No Fly subset specifically, TSC designates individuals whose profiles demonstrate a heightened aviation-specific risk, such as reasonable suspicion of intent to board aircraft for terrorist acts, hijacking, or evasion of capture en route to further threats. U.S. persons, including citizens, face the same evidentiary bar and are nominated sparingly, typically only when linked to concrete plots or activities via FBI investigations, followed by TSC's de novo assessment to mitigate overreach. The process prioritizes foreign nationals, whose nominations dominate due to international intelligence streams, reflecting a focus on transnational threats over domestic suspicions absent direct ties. Limited exceptions to reasonable suspicion apply narrowly for immigration or border contexts but do not extend to core No Fly determinations.

Integration with Terrorist Screening Databases

The No-Fly List operates as a specialized subset of the U.S. government's Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), which consolidates identities of known or suspected terrorists derived from intelligence nominations across federal agencies. Managed by the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), the TSDB serves as the primary repository for counterterrorism screening, with the No-Fly List specifically designating individuals assessed as posing the most severe threats to civil aviation or national security through aircraft operations. This tiered filtering ensures that only a fraction of TSDB entries—those meeting aviation-specific risk criteria—are designated for No-Fly status, distinct from broader watchlist categories used for other encounters like border crossings. Nominations for TSDB inclusion originate primarily from the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which maintains the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) as a central intelligence aggregation tool. The NCTC processes raw intelligence from agencies like the CIA and NSA, applying standards of reasonable suspicion before forwarding vetted entries to the TSC for final validation and integration into the TSDB. This causal pipeline enables dynamic updates, with the TSC disseminating near-real-time modifications to the No-Fly subset via secure data feeds, ensuring that aviation screening partners receive current threat profiles without exposing the full TSDB. The TSC's technical architecture supports aviation-focused extraction through encounter-specific derivations from the TSDB, such as the No-Fly and Selectee lists provided to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). These subsets are tailored to prioritize threats involving air travel, leveraging automated matching protocols that filter general counterterrorism data for relevance to boarding denial. Integration extends to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for pre-departure and entry screening, with TSDB-derived No-Fly data incorporated into systems like the Advance Passenger Information System. Internationally, the TSC shares select No-Fly designations through bilateral agreements and secure channels with partners, facilitating reciprocal aviation risk mitigation while adhering to data minimization protocols.

Enforcement and Screening Processes

The enforcement of the No Fly List is executed primarily through the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Secure Flight program, which mandates airlines to transmit passenger data—including full name, date of birth, gender, and redress number if applicable—to TSA no later than 72 hours before flight departure. TSA compares this information against the No Fly List subset of the Terrorist Screening Database, performing matches on a 24/7 basis. A confirmed match results in TSA instructing the airline to deny issuance of a boarding pass and prohibit the individual from boarding any commercial aircraft departing from, arriving in, or flying over U.S. airspace. The Selectee List, a secondary tier within the same screening framework, identifies passengers warranting heightened scrutiny but not outright prohibition from travel. Airlines receive automated notifications from Secure Flight for Selectee matches, prompting designation of the passenger's itinerary for enhanced measures. At airport checkpoints, these individuals face mandatory secondary screening, including advanced imaging technology scans, physical pat-downs, hand-swab explosive detection, and detailed carry-on and checked baggage examinations. These processes apply uniformly to domestic and international flights under U.S. jurisdiction, with airlines bearing responsibility for initial data submission and compliance with TSA directives. Secure Flight integrations ensure real-time updates from the Terrorist Screening Center, enabling rapid adjustments to list designations prior to boarding attempts.

Scale and Demographic Profile

Historical and Current List Size

Prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Federal Aviation Administration's no-fly list contained only 12 individuals identified as known or suspected threats to civil aviation security. Following the attacks, the list underwent rapid expansion under the newly formed Transportation Security Administration, incorporating nominations from intelligence agencies into the broader Terrorist Screening Database, with the no-fly subset growing to address heightened risks from international terrorist networks. By 2007, the list had reached approximately 3,500 names, reflecting initial post-9/11 intelligence surges. The list continued to expand through the early 2010s, reaching about 71,000 individuals by 2014, according to Department of Homeland Security disclosures in federal litigation. This growth corresponded to increased nominations amid ongoing global jihadist threats, such as those from al-Qaeda affiliates. By 2019, the size had stabilized at approximately 81,000, per official government reports, indicating a plateau as nomination criteria were refined and intelligence collection matured. Exact current figures as of 2025 remain classified, but no public disclosures suggest significant deviation from this level, consistent with sustained but not exponential threat environments. U.S. persons represent a negligible fraction of the list, comprising roughly 0.02% or fewer than 20 individuals in mid-2010s assessments, underscoring the program's emphasis on foreign-linked threats over domestic ones. Annual interagency reviews by the Terrorist Screening Center facilitate removals, with thousands of names excised from the overarching database—and proportionally from the no-fly subset—annually based on resolved intelligence, deceased status, or lack of ongoing risk, ensuring dynamic adjustment to evidentiary standards.

Geographic and Ideological Targeting Patterns

The composition of the No Fly List reflects empirical patterns in aviation terrorism threats, with nominations predominantly linked to Islamist extremist ideologies that have driven the majority of post-9/11 plots against commercial aircraft. Of the 50 terrorist plots foiled in the United States between 2001 and 2012, at least 25 involved aviation targets or transportation systems and were perpetrated or inspired by jihadist actors affiliated with al-Qaeda or similar groups, such as attempts to detonate explosives on transatlantic flights in 2006 and 2009. This concentration aligns with broader data showing jihadist terrorism as the primary ideological driver of transnational attacks on U.S. aviation, accounting for over 90% of such incidents and attempts since September 11, 2001, based on the operational focus of groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS on hijackings and onboard bombings. Geographically, the list's entries are heavily weighted toward individuals originating from Middle Eastern and South Asian nations, where these organizations maintain strongholds and recruitment networks. Key countries include Saudi Arabia (source of 15 of the 19 September 11 hijackers), Pakistan, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, which have produced operatives in aviation-specific operations like the 2001 shoe bomb attempt by Richard Reid (trained in Pakistan) and the 2009 underwear bomb plot by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (linked to Yemen's al-Qaeda branch). U.S. government disclosures in federal litigation, including Elhady v. Kable (2021), confirm that the No Fly List subset of the Terrorist Screening Database primarily comprises foreign nationals from 26 predominantly Muslim-majority countries, comprising over 97% of additions between 2007 and 2010, driven by intelligence-derived associations with these threat epicenters rather than blanket regional application. Nominations tied to non-Islamist ideologies, such as domestic violent extremism from far-right or anarchist sources, constitute a small fraction, as these actors have rarely prioritized aviation in post-9/11 operations. For example, while the January 6, 2021, Capitol riot prompted discussions of expanded watchlisting for domestic threats, aviation risk assessments have identified negligible intent or capability from such groups compared to jihadist networks, limiting their No Fly inclusions to specific, intelligence-validated cases. This selective pattern underscores prioritization based on demonstrated causal links to aviation vulnerabilities, with Islamist clusters exhibiting persistent operational patterns in intelligence reporting.

Contributions to National Security

Documented Instances of Threat Prevention

U.S. officials reported that enhancements to the No Fly List following the December 25, 2009, attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 resulted in the prevention of over 350 individuals with suspected ties to al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations from boarding U.S.-bound flights between late 2009 and early 2011. These individuals included members who had received weapons training, engaged in recruitment, participated in combat against U.S. forces, or purchased equipment linked to terrorism. The reported preventions were part of broader screening efforts that denied boarding to 2,859 passengers on international flights destined for the United States during this period, with the 350 cases specifically tied to terrorism indicators derived from intelligence assessments. Criteria expansions incorporated not only direct aviation threats but also al Qaeda financiers and individuals known to have undergone terrorist training abroad, enabling pre-departure interventions in some instances, such as the January 2010 denial of a Jordanian national en route from Amman to Chicago based on watchlist matches and subsequent visa revocation. Declassified details on individual cases remain limited to protect intelligence sources and methods, with public disclosures primarily consisting of aggregate figures from government statements rather than named plotters or specific plots disrupted solely by the list. The Terrorist Screening Center, which maintains the underlying database, has emphasized that such screenings contribute to averting potential threats by integrating nominations from multiple agencies, though comprehensive evaluations of attribution to the No Fly List specifically are not publicly detailed beyond these reports.

Evaluations of Overall Effectiveness

The No Fly List, as part of layered aviation security measures implemented post-September 11, 2001, has been assessed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as contributing to the absence of successful commercial aircraft hijackings in the United States since that date. DHS evaluations highlight the list's role in preemptively identifying and denying boarding to individuals posing credible threats to aviation, with operational data from 2007-2008 encounters demonstrating that all 156 analyzed matches against the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) met nomination criteria without missing aviation-specific risks. This outcome aligns with broader intelligence-driven prescreening via the Secure Flight program, which integrates No Fly List matching and has processed billions of passenger records since 2009, yielding high identification rates for known threats while incorporating refinements like mandatory full name, date of birth, and gender data to minimize erroneous matches. Government Accountability Office (GAO) analyses affirm improvements in list accuracy following post-9/11 reforms, including enhanced interagency coordination and quality assurance processes that reduced inclusion errors and bolstered encounter resolution. Despite operational opacity—due to classified nomination standards and limited public metrics—GAO reports note that Secure Flight's evolution beyond sole reliance on No Fly matching has addressed early vulnerabilities exposed by the 9/11 attacks, such as inadequate passenger vetting, leading to more reliable threat differentiation between No Fly prohibitions and Selectee enhanced screenings. DHS privacy impact assessments further substantiate the list's targeted efficacy, with narrow criteria applied to a subset of the broader Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)—containing over 1 million records by 2008—effectively deterring terrorist travel while balancing against false negative risks that could enable attacks. Assessments underscore trade-offs favoring security, where the list's proactive denial of high-risk individuals incurs relatively low societal costs from false positives (primarily travel disruptions redressable via TSA processes) compared to the catastrophic potential of prevented hijackings, estimated in risk models to avert casualties on the scale of thousands per incident. Empirical indicators, including zero U.S. commercial hijackings post-9/11 amid persistent global threats, support causal attribution to integrated watchlisting within multifaceted defenses like hardened cockpits and air marshals, though independent quantification remains constrained by data classification. Critics, including some GAO observations, highlight persistent challenges like incomplete redress transparency, yet overall metrics indicate sustained threat mitigation without evidence of systemic failure in core aviation denial functions.

Identified Vulnerabilities and Errors

False Positive Identifications

False positive identifications on the No Fly List arise when screening systems erroneously flag individuals who do not meet inclusion criteria, primarily through partial matches against the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). These errors stem from name-only matching protocols employed prior to enhancements like the Secure Flight program, which incorporated date of birth and gender to refine identifications. A 2006 Department of Homeland Security analysis illustrated that, assuming 99.9% system accuracy across 1.8 million daily U.S. passengers, approximately 1,800 false positives could occur each day, highlighting the scale despite high relative precision. Common triggers include phonetic or partial name similarities, exacerbated by transliteration variations in non-Latin scripts and the prevalence of shared surnames, which elevate match rates for certain demographics. Outdated or insufficient further contributes, as TSDB records may retain derogatory associations later downgraded due to evidentiary shortfalls, perpetuating erroneous flags until manual review. Terrorist ' routine use of aliases and necessitates broad matching thresholds in the TSDB—encompassing over 1 million records as of —to minimize false negatives, inherently amplifying false positive incidences as a causal for comprehensive coverage. Affected individuals face immediate operational impacts, including denied boarding on commercial flights and prolonged secondary screenings or detentions at airports, disrupting travel without recourse at the point of enforcement. False positive rates, while officially maintained below 1% in Department of Homeland Security assessments through iterative matching refinements, disproportionately affect bearers of common names from high-risk regions, where alias proliferation in adversarial networks correlates with elevated baseline match probabilities. These systemic dynamics reflect the tension between minimizing security gaps and individual inconveniences, with empirical data indicating persistent challenges in balancing the two.

Data Breaches and Leaks

In January 2023, a hacker accessed and publicly leaked an unsecured copy of the U.S. No Fly List and Selectee List stored on a server belonging to CommuteAir, a regional airline partner of United Airlines. The exposed file, named "NoFly.csv," contained approximately 1.56 million rows of data, including names, nationalities, and dates of birth for individuals on the lists, which are subsets derived from the broader Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) confirmed it was investigating the incident as a potential cybersecurity breach, noting the data represented an outdated version shared with airlines for pre-screening purposes. This exposure highlighted vulnerabilities in how screening data is disseminated to commercial partners, as airlines receive periodic updates from the TSDB-managed No Fly List without always implementing robust server protections. The hacker, who claimed responsibility online, demonstrated the ease of access by exploiting the publicly exposed server, raising concerns about the potential for adversaries to use the data for identity evasion tactics or targeted harassment of listed individuals. Although the leak did not include biometric details or real-time updates, it compromised the operational secrecy of the list, potentially undermining its deterrent value against known threats. Earlier incidents, such as the 2015 Office of Personnel Management (OPM) breach, indirectly threatened screening data integrity by exposing sensitive personnel records of over 21 million current and former federal employees, including detailed SF-86 security clearance forms. These forms contained biographical and contact information overlapping with elements used in TSDB nominations and vetting, enabling foreign actors—widely attributed to China—to potentially infer watchlist sources or fabricate false identities for bypassing screenings. The OPM intrusion, involving malware infiltration undetected for months, amplified long-term risks to national security by eroding trust in interconnected government databases that feed into terrorist screening processes. In response to the 2023 leak, TSA and the Department of Homeland Security initiated reviews of data-sharing protocols with airlines, emphasizing stricter access controls and encryption for distributed list files. Congressional oversight, including demands from House Republicans for detailed breach reports, prompted commitments to enhanced cybersecurity audits and vendor compliance standards to bolster resilience against similar exposures. These measures aim to mitigate cascading risks, such as data repurposing by non-state actors, while preserving the TSDB's core integrity amid ongoing threats from both nation-state espionage and opportunistic intrusions.

Traveler Redress and Correction Procedures

The Department of Homeland Security's Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP), launched in February 2007, provides the centralized process for U.S. persons and foreign nationals to challenge travel screening difficulties potentially stemming from No Fly List matches, including denied boarding or repeated denials of boarding passes. Applicants must submit an online inquiry via the DHS TRIP portal at trip.dhs.gov, supplying biographical details, incident descriptions, and supporting documentation such as passports or prior travel records. Processing typically involves initial review by DHS specialists, followed by coordination with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), which manages the underlying Terrorist Screening Database. Upon review, if an inquiry identifies a false positive—such as a name resembling a listed individual's—the applicant receives a unique Redress Control Number (RCN) to present during future bookings and screenings, reducing subsequent disruptions without altering watchlist data. For cases involving potential erroneous No Fly List placements, the TSC and nominating agencies evaluate submitted evidence against listing criteria; confirmed errors can lead to delisting by the originating entity, as occurred in approximately 95 instances out of 1,333 applicants matched to No Fly, Selectee, or Expanded Selectee lists between 2009 and 2013. Resolutions do not include explanations of intelligence derivations or admissions of prior errors, prioritizing source protection. Key limitations persist: DHS TRIP offers no affirmative notification of watchlist status, even post-resolution, to preserve screening efficacy and intelligence methods. While the program resolves the majority of mismatch inquiries through RCN issuance—handling tens of thousands annually—delisting success for validated No Fly matches remains opaque due to classified data, with public GAO audits indicating low reversal rates for confirmed hits. Applicants can track case status online or via email, with average processing times spanning weeks to months, though complex watchlist reviews may extend longer.

Due Process and Constitutional Challenges

Critics of the No Fly List have raised Fifth Amendment due process claims, asserting that its indefinite restriction on air travel deprives individuals of a significant liberty interest—specifically, the right to international travel—without prior notice or an opportunity to be heard. Placement decisions, derived from classified intelligence assessments by the Terrorist Screening Center, occur ex parte and without disclosure of criteria or evidence, leading to arguments that the process fails to provide the procedural safeguards required for substantial deprivations of freedom. The U.S. government defends the absence of pre-deprivation hearings by emphasizing national security imperatives, contending that advance notice to potential threats could enable evasion, destruction of evidence, or preemptive attacks, thereby undermining the list's preventive purpose. This rationale posits that the list targets imminent aviation risks rather than imposing punitive or indefinite bans, justifying secrecy to preserve intelligence sources and methods essential for disrupting plots. Empirical data supports a narrow application to U.S. citizens, with government disclosures indicating that fewer than 1% of the approximately 81,000 individuals on the list as of 2019 were American citizens, concentrating restrictions on foreign nationals posing verifiable threats based on intelligence linkages to terrorism. Post-placement redress mechanisms, such as the Department of Homeland Security's Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP), serve as the primary counterbalance, allowing affected individuals to submit inquiries for review without confirming list status or providing substantive reasons for decisions. Proponents argue this process adequately mitigates errors for non-citizens and the minuscule citizen subset, given aviation-specific tailoring and low false-positive rates for outright bans, while avoiding the causal risks of alerting high-threat actors. Detractors counter that the opacity of TRIP—lacking adversarial hearings or evidence disclosure—renders it insufficient for contesting potentially erroneous or indefinite restrictions, though the program's resolution of thousands of annual complaints demonstrates functional adequacy for most misidentifications. This tension reflects a core trade-off: the empirical infrequency of citizen impacts weighs against broad procedural mandates that could compromise counterterrorism efficacy.

Major Lawsuits and Court Rulings

In Latif v. Holder, decided on June 24, 2014, by the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, the court held that U.S. citizens and permanent residents on the No Fly List possess a protected liberty interest in international air travel and that the Department of Homeland Security's redress procedures—primarily the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP)—failed to provide adequate due process, including meaningful notice of reasons for listing and an opportunity to rebut evidence. The ruling mandated reforms to the procedures but did not invalidate the list itself, affirming its use under rational basis review as rationally related to national security interests. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the injunction in 2017, citing lack of standing for remaining plaintiffs after the government removed some from the list and implemented partial improvements to TRIP, though the core procedural findings influenced subsequent policy changes. Post-9/11 litigation, such as early challenges to watchlist precursors, generally upheld the No Fly List's framework under rational basis scrutiny, with federal courts deferring to executive national security judgments absent evidence of arbitrariness, as the measures were deemed rationally connected to preventing aviation threats. For instance, district courts dismissed equal protection claims against list inclusions, finding sufficient governmental interest in aviation safety to justify classifications based on intelligence assessments. In recent cases, outcomes have been mixed. The Supreme Court in FBI v. Fikre (March 19, 2024) ruled 9-0 that a plaintiff's removal from the No Fly List does not automatically moot their constitutional challenge if the government retains authority to re-list them without constraints, allowing Yonas Fikre's suit alleging retaliatory placement to proceed in district court. Similarly, in Tanvir v. Tanzin (2020 district, affirmed by Supreme Court in 2021), the Second Circuit and Supreme Court permitted Muslim plaintiffs to seek monetary damages against individual FBI agents under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act for allegedly using No Fly List placements to coerce them into serving as informants, rejecting qualified immunity defenses. However, in Kovac v. Wray (Fifth Circuit, July 25, 2024), the court dismissed claims as moot following the plaintiff's removal from the list, without addressing merits. Ongoing ACLU-led suits, such as Kashem v. Barr (filed 2019), have secured partial injunctions against certain redress inadequacies but faced government defenses emphasizing classified intelligence constraints.

Legislative Proposals and Extensions (e.g., Firearm Restrictions)

Following the 2015 San Bernardino shooting and the 2016 Orlando Pulse nightclub attack, where perpetrators had prior contacts with federal watchlists but were not on the No Fly List at the time of purchase, congressional Democrats and some Republicans proposed legislation to bar individuals on the No Fly List from acquiring firearms through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). These "No Fly, No Buy" measures aimed to leverage the list's aviation security criteria to prevent potential terrorists from legally obtaining guns, with endorsements from President Barack Obama and bills like S. 1600 (2015) and subsequent amendments to deny transfers if a Firearms Transaction Record flagged a watchlist match. However, Senate votes in December 2015 and June 2016 failed to advance the proposals, falling short of the 60-vote filibuster threshold, primarily due to Republican opposition emphasizing Second Amendment protections. Renewed bipartisan efforts emerged in 2018, with Senators Susan Collins (R-ME), Chris Murphy (D-CT), and others introducing a compromise bill to prohibit No Fly List individuals from gun purchases while providing limited judicial review for denials, though it did not progress beyond committee. In 2019, H.R. 4431, the No Fly for Terrorists Act, sought to explicitly amend federal law to block such sales but similarly stalled without passage. Proponents, including law enforcement advocates, contended that the list's empirical success in averting over 100 credible aviation threats since 2009 demonstrated its utility for broader threat mitigation, arguing that legal gun access by listed suspects created a causal vulnerability in domestic security absent alternative sourcing barriers. Opponents, including the NRA and civil liberties groups, countered that the list's opaque nomination process—relying on low evidentiary thresholds like "reasonable suspicion" without adversarial hearings—would unconstitutionally infringe on due process and gun rights for potentially thousands of non-threats, as evidenced by documented false positives exceeding 99% of the approximately 81,000 names on the list as of 2019. Causal analyses of the proposals highlight limited projected impact, as data from the FBI indicates fewer than 300 attempted gun purchases by watchlisted individuals annually from 2004–2016, with most denied under existing prohibitions for known terrorists, while mass shootings rarely involve No Fly List members who pursue legal channels. Critics further noted risks of overreach, where list errors could disarm law-abiding citizens without recourse, amplifying systemic flaws rather than addressing root causes like illegal trafficking, which supplies 80–90% of crime guns per ATF tracing. Alternatives proposed include targeted enhancements to NICS, such as mandatory reporting of mental health adjudications or fugitive status, which passed in the 2022 Bipartisan Safer Communities Act without No Fly extensions, prioritizing verifiable prohibitions over presumptive bans to balance security and rights. No federal No Fly List firearm restriction has been enacted as of 2025, reflecting ongoing tensions between preventive measures and constitutional safeguards.

Global Comparisons

No-Fly Equivalents in Other Countries

Canada's Passenger Protect Program, enacted through the 2015 Secure Air Travel Act, operates a no-fly list known as the Secure Air Travel List (SATL), which screens passengers against identifiers of individuals deemed an immediate threat to aviation security, prohibiting those matches from boarding commercial flights departing from, arriving in, or transiting Canada. Established in response to post-9/11 vulnerabilities, the program requires airlines to verify passenger data against the SATL prior to boarding, with over 2,000 names added since inception as of 2023 updates to enhance threat matching. The United Kingdom's e-Borders initiative, initiated in 2008 to collect advance passenger information for risk assessment, transitioned into components like mandatory API transmission and the Electronic Travel Authorisation (ETA) scheme, fully implemented for non-visa nationals by January 2025, subjecting applicants to automated checks against security databases to deny travel permissions to those posing risks. This system adapts pre-departure vetting to UK-specific threats, including domestic terrorism, by integrating biographic and watchlist data without a standalone publicized no-fly roster, relying instead on operational refusals at check-in. In the European Union, the Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive 2016/681 mandates airlines to transmit detailed booking and travel data to member state authorities for analysis against terrorist and serious crime indicators, enabling pre-flight identifications that lead to boarding denials. Complementing this, the API system under Regulation (EU) 2025/12 requires basic passenger identifiers like passport details for border and law enforcement screening at external EU borders, with data retention up to five years for risk profiling, though implementation varies by state without a unified no-fly list. Australia employs the Movement Alert List (MAL), managed by the Department of Home Affairs since 2004, to biometrically and biographically flag high-risk travelers for interventions at airports, including prohibitions on boarding to address regional extremism threats from Southeast Asia and returning fighters. This database, integrated with aviation security protocols under the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004, prioritizes intelligence-led restrictions over broad pre-screening, with alerts triggering real-time denials amid Australia's geographic exposure to transnational jihadist networks.

Cross-National Effectiveness and Criticisms

Adoption of no-fly equivalents and related passenger screening systems internationally has correlated with a marked decline in successful aviation terrorist attacks. Globally, commercial aircraft hijackings, which peaked in the late 20th century with incidents like the 1970s wave documented in aviation security analyses, have not occurred successfully since September 11, 2001, attributable in part to layered defenses including watchlists that disrupt terrorist mobility. The Global Terrorism Database records a shift post-2001 from hijackings to attempted onboard bombings, with zero successful in-flight takeovers in major aviation networks, reflecting the deterrent effect of pre-boarding checks exported from U.S. practices. This outcome holds across adopting nations, where empirical trends show fewer disruptions compared to pre-implementation eras, though causation involves multiple factors like reinforced cockpits and intelligence sharing. In the European Union, the Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive, implemented from 2018 and modeled partly on U.S. systems, has facilitated identifications of terrorism suspects. Between 2014 and 2015, U.S.-EU data sharing via PNR identified 122 individuals suspected of terrorism involvement, contributing to disruptions of travel by radicals. Europol reports highlight PNR's role in detecting patterns for serious crimes, including jihadist networks, with member states noting operational hits in preventing boarding by flagged persons, though exact prevention counts remain classified to avoid alerting adversaries. Similar gains appear in UN-mandated watchlists under Resolution 2396, adopted by over 190 states, which have aided in interdicting foreign terrorist fighters, yielding net reductions in aviation-enabled plots as per counterterrorism toolkits. Criticisms center on persistent false positives, mirroring U.S. challenges but varying by societal diversity and nomination rigor. In multicultural EU contexts, over-matching has led to wrongful denials, with redress complaints echoing domestic aviation delays, though rates are lower in homogeneous or high-threat-priority implementations like those prioritizing empirical intelligence over broad demographics. Analyses indicate that error challenges persist due to name similarities and incomplete data, but threat-focused nations report fewer mismatches, attributing this to refined algorithms and inter-agency vetting. Overall, cross-national data suggest net security benefits outweigh errors, as evidenced by sustained low incident rates despite evolving threats, with U.S.-influenced models enhancing allied capacities without proportional rises in aviation vulnerabilities.

References

  1. https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism/tsc
  2. https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening/travel-redress-program
  3. https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_rpt_nofly.pdf
  4. https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/Mgmt/OIGr_09-64_Jul09.pdf
  5. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF11731.web.html
  6. https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=11485&context=journal_articles
  7. https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/Mislabeled-as-a-Threat_Public_Report-2.pdf
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