Hubbry Logo
IraqIraqMain
Open search
Iraq
Community hub
Iraq
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Contribute something
Iraq
Iraq
from Wikipedia

Iraq,[b] officially the Republic of Iraq,[c] is a country in West Asia. It is bordered by Saudi Arabia to the south, Turkey to the north, Iran to the east, the Persian Gulf and Kuwait to the southeast, Jordan to the southwest, and Syria to the west. The country covers an area of 438,317 square kilometres (169,235 sq mi) and has a population of over 46 million, making it the 58th largest country by area and the 31st most populous in the world. Baghdad, home to over 8 million people, is the capital city and the largest in the country.

Key Information

Starting in the 6th millennium BC, the fertile plains between Iraq's Tigris and Euphrates rivers, referred to as Mesopotamia, fostered the rise of early cities, civilisations, and empires including Sumer, Akkad, Babylonia, and Assyria. Known as the cradle of civilisation, Mesopotamia saw the invention of writing systems, mathematics, navigation, timekeeping, a calendar, astrology, the wheel, the sailboat, and a law code. After the Muslim conquest of Mesopotamia, Baghdad became the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate and a global cultural and intellectual hub during the Islamic Golden Age, home to institutions such as the House of Wisdom. Following Baghdad's destruction by the Mongols in 1258, Iraq came under successive empires and, from the 16th century until the 20th century, was governed within the Ottoman system as a defined region known administratively as ‘the Iraq Region’. Additionally, Iraq holds religious significance in Christianity, Judaism, Yazidism, and Mandaeism.

Since independence in 1932, Iraq has experienced spells of significant economic and military growth alongside periods of instability and conflict. It was part of the Ottoman Empire until the end of World War I. Mandatory Iraq was then established by the British in 1921. It transitioned into an independent kingdom in 1932. Following a coup in 1958, Iraq became a republic, first led by Abdul Karim Qasim, followed by Abdul Salam Arif and Abdul Rahman Arif. The Ba'ath Party took power in 1968, establishing a one-party state under Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and later Saddam Hussein, who presided over war against Iran from 1980 to 1988 and then invaded Kuwait in 1990. In 2003, a U.S.-led coalition forces invaded and occupied Iraq, overthrowing Saddam and triggering an insurgency and sectarian violence. The conflict, known as the Iraq War, ended in 2011. From 2013 to 2017, Iraq faced another war with the rise and defeat of the Islamic State. Today post-war conflict continues at a lower scale, hampering stability alongside the rising influence of Iran.

A federal parliamentary republic, Iraq is considered an emerging middle power. It is home to a diverse population, geography and wildlife. Most Iraqis are Muslim, while significant minorities include Christians, Mandaeans, Yazidis, Yarsanis and Jews. Iraqis are ethnically diverse; mostly Arabs, as well as Kurds, Turkmen, Yazidis, Assyrians, Armenians, Domcs, and Shabakis. Arabic and Kurdish are the official languages of Iraq, while Suret, Turkish and Mandaic are spoken regionally. Iraq, home to one of the largest oil reserves in the world, has a significant oil and gas industry. It is also popular for its agriculture and tourism. At present, Iraq is rebuilding with foreign support.

Name

[edit]

There are several suggested origins for the name. One dates to the Sumerian city of Uruk and is thus ultimately of Sumerian origin.[16][17] Another possible etymology for the name is from the Middle Persian word erāg, meaning "lowlands".[18] An Arabic folk etymology for the name is "deeply rooted, well-watered; fertile".[19]

The name al-ʿIrāq is attested as a common toponym in pre-Islamic Arabic poetry. The sixth-century poet Adi ibn Zayd, from the Lakhmid court at al-Ḥirah, used the name in a demographic context, speaking of the "people of Iraq" (ahl al-ʿIrāq),[20] and in a geographical sense, referring to the "central area of Iraq" (ṣaḥn al-ʿIrāq).[21][22] His contemporary, Imruʾ al-Qais, used the name in social contexts, mentioning "the abundant food of Iraq" (ṭaʿām al-ʿIrāq al-mustafīḍ) and "the patterned fabric of Iraq" (ḥawkk al-ʿIrāq al-munammaq), and in a political context, stating "his kingdom stretches from Iraq to Oman" (lahu mulk al-ʿIrāq ilā ʿUmān).[23] This usage continued into the early Islamic period. The tenth-century geographer al-Maqdisi, defending his use of "Iraq" instead of the ancient name "Babylonia", noted that it was the only name used in his time. He cited the precedent Abu Bakr, who reportedly said, "For Allah to grant a victory, even a handspan, of the Holy Land by my hand is more beloved to me than a district from the districts of Iraq" (rustāq min rasātīq al-ʿIrāq), and al-Maqdisi specifically pointed out that Abu Bakr did not say "Babylonia".[24]

During the medieval period, there was a region called ʿIrāq ʿArabī ("Arabian Iraq") for Mesopotamia and ʿIrāq ʿAjamī ("Persian Iraq"),[25] for the region now situated in Central and Western Iran.[25] According to some historians, the term historically included the plain south of the Hamrin Mountains and did not include the northernmost and westernmost parts of the modern territory of Iraq.[26] However, contemporary medieval definitions of Iraq's extent varied. The 13th-century geographer Yaqut al-Hamawi, for example, defined Iraq as stretching "from Mosul to Abadan in length, and from Al-Qadisiyyah to Halwan in width".[27] Prior to the middle of the 19th century, the term Eyraca Arabica was commonly used to describe Iraq.[28][29] The term Sawad was also used in early Islamic times for the region of the alluvial plain of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.

As an Arabic word, عراق ʿirāq means "hem", "shore", "bank", or "edge", so that the name by folk etymology came to be interpreted as "the escarpment", such as at the south and east of the Jazira Plateau, which forms the northern and western edge of the "al-Iraq arabi" area.[30] The Arabic pronunciation is [ʕiˈrɑːq]. In English, it is either /ɪˈrɑːk/ (the only pronunciation listed in the Oxford English Dictionary and the first one in Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary[31]) or /ɪˈræk/ (listed first by MQD, the American Heritage Dictionary,[32] and the Random House Dictionary.[33])

When the British established the Hashemite king on 23 August 1921, Faisal I of Iraq, the official English name of the country changed from Mesopotamia to the endonymic Iraq.[34] Since January 1992, the official name of the state is "Republic of Iraq" (Jumhūriyyat al-ʿIrāq), reaffirmed in the 2005 Constitution.[35][36][37]

History

[edit]

Iraq largely coincides with the ancient region of Mesopotamia, often referred to as the cradle of civilisation.[38] The history of Mesopotamia extends back to the Lower Paleolithic period, with significant developments continuing through the establishment of the Caliphate in the late 7th century AD, after which the region became known as Iraq.

Bronze and Iron Age

[edit]
The Shanidar Cave, where the remains of eight adults and two infant Neanderthals, dating from around 65,000–35,000 years ago were found[39][40]
The Neo-Babylonian Empire under Nabonidus (r. 556 BC – 539 BC) at its greatest territorial extent

Within its borders lies the ancient land of Sumer, which emerged between 6000 and 5000 BC during the Neolithic Ubaid period.[38] Sumer is recognised as the world's earliest civilisation, marking the beginning of urban development, written language, and monumental architecture.[38] Iraq's territory also includes the heartlands of the Akkadian, Neo-Sumerian, Babylonian, Neo-Assyrian, and Neo-Babylonian empires, which dominated Mesopotamia and much of the Ancient Near East during the Bronze and Iron Ages.[38]

The Iraq of antiquity was an innovation stronghold, producing early written languages, literary works, and significant advancements in astronomy, mathematics, law, and philosophy. This era of indigenous rule ended in 539 BC when the Neo-Babylonian Empire was conquered by the Achaemenid Empire under Cyrus the Great, who declared himself the "King of Babylon". The city of Babylon, the ancient seat of Babylonian power, became one of the key capitals of the Achaemenid Empire. Ancient Iraq, known as the Mesopotamia, is home to world's first Jewish diaspora community, which emerged during the Babylonian exile.

The Babylonians were defeated by the Persian Empire, under the leadership of Cyrus the Great. Following the fall of Babylon, the Achaemenid Empire took control of the Mesopotamian region. Enslaved Jews were freed from the Babylonian captivity, though many remained in the land and thus the Jewish community grew in the region. Iraq is the location of numerous Jewish sites, which are also revered by the Muslims and Christians.

In the following centuries, the regions constituting modern Iraq came under the control of several empires, including the Greeks, Parthians, and Romans, establishing new centres like Seleucia and Ctesiphon. By the 3rd century AD, the region fell under Persian control through the Sasanian Empire, during which time Arab tribes from South Arabia migrated into Lower Mesopotamia, leading to the formation of the Sassanid-aligned Lakhmid kingdom.

Middle Ages

[edit]
Abbasid Caliphate with capitals in Baghdad and Samarra c. 850

The Arabic name al-ʿIrāq likely originated during this period. The Sasanian Empire was eventually conquered by the Rashidun Caliphate in the 7th century, bringing Iraq under Islamic rule after the Battle of al-Qadisiyyah in 636. The city of Kufa, founded shortly thereafter, became a central hub for the Rashidun dynasty until their overthrow by the Umayyads in 661. Karbala is considered as one of the holiest cities in Shia Islam, following the Battle of Karbala, which took place in 680.

With the rise of the Abbasid Caliphate in the mid-8th century, Iraq became the centre of Islamic rule, with Baghdad, founded in 762, serving as the capital. Baghdad flourished during the Islamic Golden Age, becoming a global hub for culture, science, and intellectualism. However, the city's prosperity declined following the Buwayhid and Seljuq invasions in the 10th century and suffered further with the Mongol invasion of 1258.

Early Modern Period: Ottoman Iraq (1534-1920)

[edit]

Iraq was conquered by Sultan Suleiman I in 1534 and became part of the Ottoman Empire. During the 16th and 17th centuries, Iraq was a major frontier of the Ottoman–Safavid wars, with Baghdad changing hands several times until the Treaty of Zuhab in 1639 confirmed Ottoman control.[41] Administratively, Iraq was organised into the provinces of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, and Shahrizor, which the Ottomans collectively referred to as Hıtta-i Irakiyye (“the Iraq region”).[42][43][44]

From 1749 to 1831, Iraq was ruled by a Mamluk dynasty of Georgian origin with considerable autonomy while maintaining nominal allegiance to the Ottoman sultan. After the dynasty was overthrown in 1831, the centralisation of Iraq under Baghdad began.[45] Under the two-time Ottoman Viceroy, Namık Pasha, Baghdad's authority was expanded through military and administrative reforms.[46] Midhat Pasha introduced further reforms in taxation, land registration, infrastructure, education, and communications, reforms often seen as laying the groundwork for the modern Iraq.[47]

Iraq remained under Ottoman control until the First World War, when the British launched the Mesopotamian campaign. The campaign led to the occupation of Baghdad in 1917, and in 1920 Ottoman Iraq was formally dissolved with the establishment of the British Mandate of Mesopotamia.[48]

Modern Iraq

[edit]
Nuri Pasha al-Said (1888–1958) served eight terms as prime minister during Mandatory Iraq and the Hashemite Kingdom

Iraq's modern history began in the wake of World War I, as the region emerged from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.[49] Arab forces, inspired by the promise of independence, had helped dismantle the Ottoman hold on the Middle East, but the dream of a united, sovereign Arab state was soon dashed.[49] Despite agreements made with Hussein bin Ali, the Sharif of Makkah, the European powers had different plans for the region. Following the British withdrawal of support for a unified Arab state, Hussein's son, Faisal, briefly declared the Kingdom of Syria in 1920, encompassing parts of what are now Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, and Syria.[49] However, the kingdom was short-lived, crushed by local opposition and the military might of France, which had been granted a mandate over Syria.[49]

In Iraq, under British mandate, tensions were rising as local forces increasingly resisted foreign control.[49] A rebellion erupted, challenging British authority, and the need for a new strategy became clear.[49] In 1921, the Cairo Conference, led by British officials including Winston Churchill and T. E. Lawrence, decided that Faisal, now exiled in London, would become the king of Iraq.[49] This decision was seen as a way to maintain British influence in the region while placating local demands for leadership.[49] Upon his coronation, he focused on unifying a land formerly divided into three Ottoman provincesMosul, Baghdad, and Basra.[49] He worked hard to gain the support of Iraq's diverse population, including both Sunnis and Shiites, and paid special attention to the country's Shiite communities, symbolically choosing the date of his coronation to coincide with Eid al-Ghadeer, a key day for Shiite Muslims.[49]

His reign laid the foundations of modern Iraq.[49] Faisal worked to establish key state institutions and fostered a sense of national identity.[49] His education reforms included the founding of Ahl al-Bayt University in Baghdad, and he encouraged the migration of Syrian exiles to Iraq to serve as doctors and educators.[49] Faisal also envisioned infrastructural links between Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, including plans for a railway and an oil pipeline to the Mediterranean.[49] Although Faisal succeeded in securing greater autonomy for Iraq, British influence remained strong, particularly in the country's oil industry.[49] In 1930, Iraq signed a treaty with Britain that gave the country a measure of political independence while maintaining British control over key aspects, including military presence and oil rights.[49] By 1932, Iraq gained formal independence, becoming a member of the League of Nations.[49] Faisal's reign was marked by his efforts to balance the pressures of external influence and internal demands for sovereignty.[49] He was admired for his diplomatic skill and his commitment to steering Iraq towards self-determination.[49] Untimely, he died from a heart attack on 8 September 1933, leaving his son Ghazi to inherit the throne.[49] King Ghazi's reign was brief and turbulent, as Iraq was impacted by numerous coup attempts.[49] He died in a motor accident in 1939, passing the throne to his young son, Faisal II, who ascended to the throne at just 3 years old.[49] Faisal II's uncle, Crown Prince Abdullah, assumed regency until the young king came of age.[49]

On 1 April 1941, Rashid Ali al-Gaylani and members of the Golden Square staged a coup d'état and installed a pro-German and pro-Italian government.[49] During the subsequent Anglo-Iraqi War, the United Kingdom invaded Iraq for fear that the government might cut oil supplies to Western nations because of its links to the Axis powers.[49] The war started on 2 May, and the British, together with loyal Assyrian Levies, defeated the forces of Al-Gaylani, forcing an armistice on 31 May.[49] Regency of King Faisal II began in 1953.[49] The hopes for Iraq's future under Faisal II were high, but the nation remained divided.[49] Iraq's Sunni-dominated monarchy struggled to reconcile the diverse ethnic and religious groups, particularly the Shiite, Assyrian, Jewish and Kurdish populations, who felt marginalised.[49] In 1958, these tensions culminated in a military coup, inspired by the revolutionary wave sweeping across the Arab world, particularly the 1952 Egyptian revolution.[50]

Republic and Ba'athist Iraq

[edit]
Saddam Hussein in 1980

Brigadier General and nationalist Abd al-Karim Qasim led a coup d'état known as the 14 July Revolution in 1958.[50] This revolt was strongly anti-imperial and anti-monarchical in nature and had strong socialist elements.[50] King Faisal II, Prince Abd al-Ilah, and Nuri al-Sa'id, along with the royal family were killed brutally.[50] Qasim controlled Iraq through military rule and in 1958 he began a process of forcibly reducing surplus land owned by a few citizens and having the state redistribute the land.[50] In 1959, Abd al-Wahab al-Shawaf led an uprising in Mosul against Qasim. The uprising was crushed by the government forces.[50] He claimed Kuwait as part of Iraq, when the former was granted independence in 1961.[50] The United Kingdom deployed its army on the Iraq–Kuwait border, which forced Qasim to back down.[50] He was overthrown by the Ba'ath Party in February 1963 coup.[51] However internal division within Ba'athist factions caused another coup in November, which brought Colonel Abdul Salam Arif to power.[51] The new regime recognised Kuwait's independence.[51] After the latter's death in 1966, he was succeeded by his brother, Abdul Rahman Arif.[51] Under his rule, Iraq participated in the Six-Day War in 1967.[51] The 17 July Revolution overthrew Arif and brought the Iraqi Ba'ath Party to power in 1968, with Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr as the president of Iraq.[52] However, the government gradually came under the control of Saddam Hussein, Iraq's then vice-president.[53] Saddam sought to achieve stability between Iraq's ethnic and religious groups.[53] The first Iraqi–Kurdish war ended in 1970, after which a peace treaty was signed between Saddam and Barzani, granting autonomy to Kurds.[54] In the 1970s, the leadership offered peace initiatives to Assyrians in Iraq and invited exiled Iraqi Jews back to Iraq.[55][56][57] The government introduced free healthcare and education, nationalised oil, promoted women's rights and developed infrastructure.[58]

In 1974, the second Iraqi–Kurdish war began and border clashes with Iran took place on Shatt al-Arab. Iran supported Kurdish militants.[53] The Algiers Agreement signed in 1975 by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and Saddam resolved the dispute and Iran withdrew support for the Kurds, resulting in their defeat in the war.[59] In 1973, Iraq participated in the Yom Kippur War against Israel, alongside Syria and Egypt.[53] An attempt to ban an annual pilgrimage to Karbala in 1977 caused an uprising by Shia Muslims across Iraq.[53] Another Shia uprising took place from 1979 to 1980, as a followup to the Islamic Revolution in Iran.[53] On 16 July 1979, Saddam acceded to the presidency and chairmanship of the Revolutionary Command Council, Iraq's then supreme executive body.[53]

Following months of cross-border raids with Iran, Saddam declared war on Iran in September 1980, initiating the Iran–Iraq War.[53] Taking advantage of the post-Iranian Revolution chaos in Iran, Iraq captured some territories in southwest Iran, but Iran recaptured all of the lost territories within two years, and for the next six years Iran was on the offensive.[page needed] Sunni-led Arab countries and the United States supported Iraq throughout the war.[53] In 1981, Israel destroyed a nuclear reactor of Iraq.[53] In midst of the war, between 1983 and 1986, Kurds led rebellion against the regime.[53] In retaliation, the government-coordinated Anfal campaign led to the killing of 50,000–100,000 civilians.[53] During the war, Saddam extensively used chemical weapons against Iranians.[53] The war, which ended in stalemate in 1988, killed between half a million and 1.5 million people.[53]

Kuwait's refusal to waive Iraq's debt and reducing oil prices pushed Saddam to take military action against it.[60] On 2 August 1990, the Iraqi forces invaded and annexed Kuwait as its 19th governorate, starting the Gulf War.[60] This led to military intervention by the US-led alliance.[60] The coalition forces proceeded with a bombing campaign targeting military targets and then launched a 100-hour-long ground assault against Iraqi forces in southern Iraq and Kuwait.[60] Iraq also attempted to invade Saudi Arabia and attacked Israel.[60] Iraq's armed forces were devastated during the war.[60] Sanctions were imposed on Iraq, following the invasion of Kuwait, which resulted in economic decline.[60] After the end of the war in 1991, Iraqi Kurds and Shi'ite Muslims in northern and southern Iraq led several uprisings against Saddam's regime, but these were repressed.[60] It is estimated that as many as 100,000 people, including many civilians, were killed.[60] During the uprisings, the US, UK, Turkey and France, claiming authority under UNSC Resolution 688, established the Iraqi no-fly zones to protect Kurdish population from attacks and autonomy was given to Kurds.[60] Iraq was also affected by the Iraqi Kurdish Civil War from 1994 to 1997.[60] Around 40,000 fighters and civilians were killed.[60] Between 2001 and 2003, the Kurdistan Regional Government and Ansar al-Islam engaged in conflict, which would merge with the upcoming war.[60]

Post-invasion Iraq

[edit]

After the 11 September 2001 attacks, George W. Bush began planning the overthrow of Saddam in what is now widely regarded as a false pretense.[61] Saddam's Iraq was included in Bush's "axis of evil". The US Congress passed joint resolution, which authorised the use of armed force against Iraq.[61] In November 2002 the UN Security Council passed resolution 1441.[61] On 20 March 2003, the US-led coalition invaded Iraq, as part of global war on terror.[61] Within weeks, coalition forces occupied much of Iraq, with the Iraqi Army adopting guerrilla tactics to confront coalition forces.[61] Following the fall of Baghdad in the first week of April, Saddam's regime had completely lost control of Iraq.[61] A statue of Saddam was toppled in Baghdad, symbolising the end of his rule.[61]

Insurgency and Civil war

[edit]

The Coalition Provisional Authority began disbanding the Ba'ath Army and expelling Ba'athists from the new government.[61] The insurgents fought against the coalition forces and the newly installed government.[61] Saddam was captured and executed.[61] The Shia–Sunni civil war took place from 2006 to 2008.[61] The coalition forces were accused of war crimes such as the Abu Ghraib torture, the Fallujah massacre, the Mahmudiyah rape and killings and the Mukaradeeb wedding party massacre.[61] Following the withdrawal of US troops in 2011, the occupation ceased and war ended. The war in Iraq has resulted in between 151,000 and 1.2 million Iraqis being killed.[61]

The subsequent efforts to rebuild the country amidst sectarian violence was galvanised by continuing discontent over Nouri al-Maliki's government, which led to protests. In 2013, taking advantage of the ensuing chaos and popular discontent against the Iraqi government, Ba'athist and other Sunni militants (Al Qaida and ISIS) launched a number of attacks against the government during what is known as the Anbar campaign. What followed, was a large scale offensive by ISIS in Mosul, which marked the beginning of the rapid territorial expansion of the group, initiating full-scale war in Iraq. Sunni insurgents belonging to the Islamic State group seized control of large swathes of land including several major cities, like Tikrit, Fallujah and Mosul, creating hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons amid reports of atrocities by ISIS fighters. An estimated 500,000 civilians fled from Mosul. Around 5,000 Yazidis were killed in the genocide by ISIS, as a part of the war. In June 2014, Iraq's leading Shii Grand Ayatollah, Ali al-Sistani issued a Fatwa calling on able-bodied men to join the Armed Forces to fight against ISIS. Even though the Fatwa specifically instructed Iraqis to join the official Armed Forces of the country (such as the Army or the Police), it nevertheless resulted in the creation of the Popular Mobilisation Forces.[62] During that time, the government of Iraq, headed by Haider al-Abadi requested the international community to assist Iraq against ISIS, resulting in the creation of the American-led Coalition against ISIS. Meanwhile, in an attempt to counter US influence, Khomeinist anti-US militias prompted Iranian intervention, which resulted in the latter expanding its influence. The Iraqi armed forces, supported by the US-led coalition, as well as the Popular Mobilisation Forces, Peshmerga and other allied anti-ISIS militias then initiated a counter-offensive to retake and liberate ISIS-held territory. In December 2017, when ISIS had lost all its territory in Iraq, the government declared victory.

2019-2021 protests

[edit]

One of the main causes for popular discontent in Iraq is the lack of reliable electricity infrastructure and clean water. The electrical grid faces systemic pressures due to climate change, fuel shortages, and an increase in demand.[63][64][65] Corruption remains endemic throughout Iraqi governance while the United States-endorsed sectarian political system has driven increased levels of violent terrorism and sectarian conflicts.[66][67][65] Climate change is driving wide-scale droughts while water reserves are rapidly depleting.[68] Nationwide protests erupted in Iraq in October 2019, demanding systemic reform, and the end of the party-based quota system as well as the disarmament of non-state militias and end to foreign interference. Despite heavy repression, hundreds of deaths, and widespread injuries, the movement remained united around calls for institutional reform and increased accountability. In 2020, the sitting prime minister Adil Abdul Mahdi resigned in the face of popular demand. Succeeding him was prime minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, during whose tenure the COVID-19 pandemic erupted, causing a macroeconomic shock that plummeted oil prices, devastating the Iraqi economy which is dominated by the oil sector. The country has been in a prolonged drought since 2020 and experienced its second-driest season in the past four decades in 2021. Water flows in the Tigris and Euphrates were down 30-40% in 2023. Half the country's farmland is at risk of desertification.[65] Nearly 40% of Iraq "has been overtaken by blowing desert sands that claim tens of thousands of acres of arable land every year".[69] In 2024, Iraq experienced unprecedented rainfall that —according to the Ministry of Water Resources— boosted Iraq's strategic water reserves by 10%, significantly easing the drought crisis.[70]

Period of stability (2022-present)

[edit]

In October 2022, the Council of Representatives elected Abdul Latif Rashid as president,[71] and Mohammed Shia al-Sudani became Prime Minister.[72] Since assuming office in October 2022, Prime Minister al-Sudani has overseen a period of relative political, security, and economic stabilisation.[73] Government officials have cited increased regional diplomacy, improved international relations, and economic diversification initiatives such as the Iraq–Europe Development Road project as key indicators of recovery.[74][75] In August 2023, al-Sudani established the Iraq Development Fund whose purpose is to strengthen the private sector and finance projects of crucial social and environmental value. In February 2025, the fund had gained $7bn in foreign direct investments, and signed Memoranda of Understanding with a number of countries including United Kingdom and Japan. In May 2025, Iraqi Ministry of Planning announced that the unemployment rate in Iraq had dropped from 17% in 2022 to 13% in 2025.[76] A report published on 24 July 2025 and submitted to the United Nations Security Council, assessed that ISIS "is at its weakest" in Iraq since its emergence.[77]

Geography

[edit]
Cheekha Dar is the highest point in Iraq (around 3,611 meters).
Views from the Amedi gate.

Iraq lies between latitudes 29° and 38° N, and longitudes 39° and 49° E (a small area lies west of 39°). Spanning 437,072 km2 (168,754 sq mi), it is the 58th-largest country in the world.

It has a coastline measuring 58 km (36 miles) on the northern Persian Gulf.[78] Further north, but below the main headwaters only, the country easily encompasses the Mesopotamian Alluvial Plain. Two major rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, run south through Iraq and into the Shatt al-Arab, thence the Persian Gulf. Broadly flanking this estuary (known as arvandrūd: اروندرود among Iranians) are marshlands, semi-agricultural. Flanking and between the two major rivers are fertile alluvial plains, as the rivers carry about 60,000,000 m3 (78,477,037 cu yd) of silt annually to the delta.

The central part of the south, which slightly tapers in favour of other countries, is natural vegetation marsh mixed with rice paddies and is humid, relative to the rest of the plains.[citation needed] Iraq has the northwestern end of the Zagros mountain range and the eastern part of the Syrian Desert.

Rocky deserts cover about 40 percent of Iraq. Another 30 percent is mountainous with bitterly cold winters. The north of the country is mostly composed of mountains; the highest point being at 3,611 m (11,847 ft). Iraq is home to seven terrestrial ecoregions: Zagros Mountains forest steppe, Middle East steppe, Mesopotamian Marshes, Eastern Mediterranean conifer-sclerophyllous-broadleaf forests, Arabian Desert, Mesopotamian shrub desert, and South Iran Nubo-Sindian desert and semi-desert.[79]

Climate

[edit]
Köppen–Geiger climate classification

Much of Iraq has a hot arid climate with subtropical influence. Summer temperatures average above 40 °C (104 °F) for most of the country and frequently exceed 48 °C (118.4 °F). Winter temperatures infrequently exceed 15 °C (59.0 °F) with maxima roughly 5 to 10 °C (41.0 to 50.0 °F) and night-time lows 1 to 5 °C (33.8 to 41.0 °F). Typically, precipitation is low; most places receive less than 250 mm (9.8 in) annually, with maximum rainfall occurring during the winter months. Rainfall during the summer is rare, except in northern parts of the country.

The northern mountainous regions have cold winters with occasional heavy snows, sometimes causing extensive flooding.[80] Iraq is highly vulnerable to climate change.[81] The country is subject to rising temperatures and reduced rainfall, and suffers from increasing water scarcity for a human population that rose tenfold between 1890 and 2010 and continues to rise.[82][83]

The country's electrical grid faces systemic pressures due to climate change, fuel shortages, and an increase in demand.[63][64] Corruption remains endemic throughout all levels of Iraqi governance while the political system has exacerbated sectarian conflict.[66][67] Climate change is driving wide-scale droughts across the country while water reserves are rapidly depleting.[68] The country has been in a prolonged drought since 2020 and experienced its second-driest season in the past four decades in 2021. Water flows in the Tigris and Euphrates are down between 30 and 40%. Half of the country's farmland is at risk of desertification.[65] Nearly 40% of Iraq "has been overtaken by blowing desert sands that claim tens of thousands of acres of arable land every year".[69]

However, in 2023, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani announced that government was working on a wider "Iraqi vision for climate action". The plan would include promoting clean and renewable energy, new irrigation and water treatment projects and reduced industrial gas flaring, he said. Sudani said Iraq was "moving forward to conclude contracts for constructing renewable energy power plants to provide one-third of our electricity demand by 2030". In addition, Iraq will plant 5 million trees across the country and will create green belts around cities to act as windbreaks against dust storms.[84][85]

In the same year, Iraq and TotalEnergies signed a $27 billion energy deal that aims to increase oil production and boost the country's capacity to produce energy with four oil, gas and renewables projects. According to experts, the project will "accelerate Iraq's path to energy self-sufficiency and advance Iraq's collective climate change objectives".[86][87]

Biodiversity

[edit]
A valley in the north of the region, through which the Great Zab flows
The Asiatic lion has remained a prominent symbol since ancient times

The wildlife of Iraq includes its flora and fauna and their natural habitats.[88] Iraq has multiple and diverse biomes which include the mountainous region in the north to the wet marshlands along the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, while western part of the country comprises mainly desert and some semi-arid regions. Many of Iraq's bird species were endangered, including seven of Iraq's mammal species and 12 of its bird species. The Mesopotamian marches in the middle and south are home to approximately 50 species of birds, and rare species of fish.[89] At risk are some 50% of the world's marbled teal population that live in the marshes, along with 60% of the world's population of Basra reed-warbler.[89]

The Asiatic lion, in the present-day extinct in the region, has remained a prominent symbol of the country throughout history.[90] Draining of the Mesopotamian Marshes, during the time of Saddam's government, caused there a significant drop in biological life.[91] Since the 2003–2011, flow is restored and the ecosystem has begun to recover.[91] Iraqi corals are some of the most extreme heat-tolerant as the seawater in this area ranges between 14 and 34 °C.[92] Aquatic or semi-aquatic wildlife occurs in and around these, the major lakes are Lake Habbaniyah, Lake Milh, Lake Qadisiyah and Lake Tharthar.[93]

Government and politics

[edit]

The Republic of Iraq is defined under the current Constitution as a democratic, federal parliamentary republic. The federal government is composed of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, as well as numerous independent commissions. Aside from the federal government, there are subnational federal regions, governorates, and districts with jurisdiction over various matters as defined by law.[35][94] The president is the ceremonial head of state, while the prime minister is the head of government and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces with direct executive authority over general state policy. The constitution provides for two deliberative bodies, the Council of Representatives and the Council of Union. The judiciary is free and independent of the executive and the legislature.[94]

Council of Representatives of Iraq meeting at Baghdad

Baghdad is the capital, home to the seat of government;[95][94][96] the Green Zone, which contains governmental headquarters and the army, in addition to containing the headquarters of the American embassy and the headquarters of foreign organisations and agencies for other countries.

According to International IDEA’s Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Indices and Democracy Tracker, Iraq performs in the low to mid-range on overall democratic measures, with particular weaknesses in political equality, including economic equality and social group equality.[97][98][99] Additionally, according to the 2023 V-Dem Democracy indices Iraq was the third most electoral democratic country in the Middle East.[96] Under Saddam, the government employed 1 million employees, but this increased to around 7 million in 2016. In combination with decreased oil prices, the government budget deficit is near 25% of GDP as of 2016.[100]

Law

[edit]

In October 2005, the new Constitution of Iraq was approved in a referendum with a 78% overall majority, although the percentage of support varied widely between the country's territories.[101] The new constitution was backed by the Shia and Kurdish communities, but was rejected by Arab Sunnis. Under the terms of the constitution, the country conducted fresh nationwide parliamentary elections on 15 December 2005. All three major ethnic groups in Iraq voted along ethnic lines, as did Assyrian and Turcoman minorities. Law no. 188 of the year 1959 (Personal Status Law)[102] made polygamy extremely difficult, granted child custody to the mother in case of divorce, prohibited repudiation and marriage under the age of 16.[103] Article 1 of Civil Code also identifies Islamic law as a formal source of law.[104] Iraq had no Sharia courts but civil courts used Sharia for issues of personal status including marriage and divorce. In 1995 Iraq introduced Sharia punishment for certain types of criminal offences.[105] The code is based on French civil law as well as Sunni and Jafari (Shi'ite) interpretations of Sharia.[106]

In 2004, the CPA chief executive L. Paul Bremer said he would veto any constitutional draft stating that sharia is the principal basis of law.[107] The declaration enraged many local Shia clerics,[108] and by 2005 the US had relented, allowing a role for sharia in the constitution to help end a stalemate on the draft constitution.[109] The Iraqi Penal Code is the statutory law of Iraq.

Military

[edit]
An F-16 Fighting Falcon, the main combat aircraft of the Iraqi Air Force, during a take-off
ISOF during training in Babylon, 2021

Iraqi security forces are composed of forces serving under the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Ministry of Defense (MOD), as well as the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Bureau, reporting directly to the Prime Minister of Iraq, which oversees the Iraqi Special Operations Forces. MOD forces include the Iraqi Army (including the Iraqi Army Aviation Command), the Iraqi Air Force, the Iraqi Air Defence Command and the Iraqi Navy.[110] The MOD also runs a Joint Staff College, training army, navy, and air force officers, with support from the NATO Training Mission - Iraq. The college was established at Ar Rustamiyah on 27 September 2005.[111] The center runs Junior Staff and Senior Staff Officer Courses designed for first lieutenants to majors.

The current Iraqi armed forces were rebuilt after the US invasion of Iraq, with large amounts of American military aid at all levels. The army consists of 14 divisions, all of them infantry, except for the ninth division, which is motorised infantry. Each division consists of four brigades and comprises 14,000 soldiers. Before 2003, Iraq was mostly equipped with Soviet-made military equipment, the country has since turned to Western suppliers.[112]

The Iraqi air force is designed to support ground forces with surveillance, reconnaissance and troop lift. Two reconnaissance squadrons use light aircraft, three helicopter squadrons are used to move troops and one air transportation squadron uses C-130 transport aircraft to move troops, equipment, and supplies. The air force currently has 5,000 personnel.[113] It was planned to increase to 18,000 personnel, with 550 aircraft by 2018, but that did not happen as planned.[114]

As of February 2011, the navy had approximately 5,000 sailors, including 800 marines. The navy consists of an operational headquarters, five afloat squadrons, and two marine battalions, designed to protect shorelines and inland waterways from insurgent infiltration.

On 4 November 2019, more than 100 Australian Defence Force personnel left Darwin for the 10th rotation of Task Group Taji, based north of Baghdad. The Australian contingent mentors the Iraqi School of Infantry, where the Iraqi Security Forces are trained. However, Australia's contribution was reduced from 250 to 120 ADF personnel, which along with New Zealand had trained over 45,000 ISF members before that.[115]

Foreign relations

[edit]
Al Sudani meets with Secretary Blinken in Munich, Germany, 2023.

After the end of the Iraq War, Iraq sought and strengthened regional economic cooperation and improved relations with neighbouring countries.[116] On 12 February 2009, Iraq officially became the 186th State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Under the provisions of this treaty, Iraq is considered a party with declared stockpiles of chemical weapons. Because of their late accession, Iraq is the only State Party exempt from the existing timeline for destruction of their chemical weapons.[117]

Since the situation eased, Iraq reengaged with its Arab neighbours while maintaining relations with Iran in an attempt to position Iraq as a country that would not exacerbate the security concerns of its neighbours and seeking a pragmatic balance in foreign relations.[116] Iran–Iraq relations have flourished since 2005 by the exchange of high-level visits.[116] A conflict occurred in December 2009, when Iraq accused Iran of seizing an oil well on the border.[118] Relations with Turkey are tense, largely because of the Kurdistan Regional Government, as clashes between Turkey and the PKK continue.[119] In October 2011, the Turkish parliament renewed a law that gives Turkish forces the ability to pursue rebels over the border in Iraq.[120] Turkey's "Great Anatolia Project" reduced Iraq's water supply and affected agriculture.[121][83] Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has sought to normalise relations with Syria in order to expand cooperation.[122] Iraq is also seeking to deepen its ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.[123] Foreign ministers of Iraq and Kuwait have announced that they were working on a definitive agreement on border demarcation.[124][125]

States with which Iraq has diplomatic relations.

On 17 November 2008, the US and Iraq agreed to a Status of Forces Agreement,[126] as part of the broader Strategic Framework Agreement.[127] On 5 January 2020, the Iraqi parliament voted for a resolution that urges the government to work on expelling US troops from Iraq. The resolution was passed two days after a US drone strike that killed Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, commander of the Quds Force. The resolution specifically calls for ending of a 2014 agreement allowing Washington to help Iraq against Islamic State groups by sending troops.[128] This resolution will also signify ending an agreement with Washington to station troops in Iraq as Iran vows to retaliate after the killing.[129] On 28 September 2020, Washington made preparations to withdraw diplomats from Iraq, as a result of Iranian-backed militias firing rockets at the American Embassy in Baghdad. The officials said that the move was seen as an escalation of American confrontation with Iran.[130] The United States significantly reduced its military presence in Iraq after the defeat of ISIS.[131]

Human rights

[edit]

Relations between Iraq and its Kurdish population have been sour in recent history, especially with Saddam Hussein's genocidal campaign against them in the 1980s. After uprisings during the early 90s, many Kurds fled their homeland and no-fly zones were established in northern Iraq to prevent more conflicts. Despite historically poor relations, some progress has been made, and Iraq elected its first Kurdish president, Jalal Talabani, in 2005. Furthermore, Kurdish is now an official language of Iraq alongside Arabic according to Article 4 of the Constitution.[35]

LGBT rights in Iraq remain limited. Although decriminalised, homosexuality remains stigmatised in Iraqi society.[132] Human rights in Islamic State-controlled territory have been recorded as highly violated. It included mass executions in Islamic State-occupied part of Mosul and genocide of the Yazidis in Yazidi populated Sinjar, which is in northern Iraq.[133]

Administrative divisions

[edit]

Iraq is composed of nineteen governorates (or provinces) (Arabic: muhafadhat, singular muhafadhah). The governorates are subdivided into districts (or qadhas), which are further divided into sub-districts (or nawāḥī).

Clickable map of Iraq exhibiting its eighteen governorates, and partially recognized Halabja.
A clickable map of Iraq exhibiting its governorates.Halabja GovernorateNinawa GovernorateDohuk GovernorateArbil GovernorateSulaymaniyah GovernorateKirkuk GovernorateDiyala GovernorateSalah ad Din GovernorateAl Anbar GovernorateBaghdad GovernorateBabil GovernorateKarbala GovernorateWasit GovernorateAl Najaf GovernorateAl-Qādisiyyah GovernorateMaysan GovernorateDhi Qar GovernorateAl Muthanna GovernorateBasra Governorate
A clickable map of Iraq exhibiting its governorates.

Economy

[edit]
Historical economic growth of Iraq

According to the International Fund for Agricultural Development, Iraq is an oil-rich upper-middle-income country.[134] Iraq's economy is dominated by the oil sector, which has traditionally provided about 95% of foreign exchange earnings.[134] The lack of development in other sectors has resulted in 18%–30% unemployed and a per capita GDP of $4,812.[3][134] Public sector employment accounted for nearly 60% of full-time employment in 2011.[135] The oil export industry, which dominates the Iraqi economy, generates little employment.[135] Currently only a modest percentage of women (the highest estimate for 2011 was 22%) participate in the labour force.[135] The official currency in Iraq is the Iraqi dinar. The Central Provisional Authority issued new dinar coins and notes, with the notes printed by De La Rue using modern anti-forgery techniques.[136] Jim Cramer's 20 October 2009 endorsement of the Iraqi dinar on CNBC has further piqued interest in the investment.[137]

Erbil skyline at night

Prior to the 2003 invasion, Iraq's centrally planned economy prohibited the foreign ownership of businesses, ran most large industries as state-owned enterprises, and imposed large tariffs to keep the foreign goods out .[138][139] Oil was nationalised in 1972 and its revenue was spent on government development projects. Iraq was one of the most advanced countries in the Middle East. But it faced economic decline as a result of sanctions. After 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority quickly began issuing many binding orders privatising the Iraqi economy and opening it up to foreign investment.[139] On 20 November 2004, the Paris Club of creditor countries agreed to write off 80% ($33 billion) of Iraq's $42 billion debt to Club members. Iraq's total external debt was around $120 billion at the time of the invasion, and had grown another $5 billion by 2004. The debt relief was to be implemented in three stages: two of 30% each and one of 20%.[140]

Five years after the invasion, an estimated 2.4 million people were internally displaced (with a further two million refugees outside Iraq), four million Iraqis were considered food-insecure (a quarter of children were chronically malnourished) and only a third of Iraqi children had access to safe drinking water.[141] In 2022, and after more than 30 years after the UN Compensation Commission was created to ensure restitution for Kuwait following the invasion of 1990, the reparations body announced that Iraq has paid a total of $52.4 billion in war reparations to Kuwait.[142] According to the Overseas Development Institute, international NGOs face challenges in carrying out their mission, leaving their assistance "piecemeal and largely conducted undercover, hindered by insecurity, a lack of coordinated funding, limited operational capacity and patchy information".[141] International NGOs have been targeted and during the first 5 years, 94 aid workers were killed, 248 injured, 24 arrested or detained and 89 kidnapped or abducted.[141]

The Amwaj Residential Towers in Baghdad, a modern high-rise complex that represents part of the city's recent urban development projects.

The war have left heavy impact on the economy.[143][144] According to a report by the Arab News, Iraq has shown positive signs of recovery.[145][146] The Kurdish and Shia populated regions of Iraq experienced an economic boom after the end of the war,[147][148][149] and until 2023,[150][151] Kurdistan Region was considered economically more stable —mostly driven by hitherto independent oil exports.[152] Recent developments in the internal political dynamics of the country has seen Baghdad reassert full control over the oil industry of the country[153] and has been since considered more stable and prosperous,[154] while Kurdistan Region has experienced an economic downfall.[150][151] In recent years, Sunni-populated provinces in Iraq have also made economic progress, as evidenced by numerous new construction projects.[155][156][157] In 2025, parliament speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani stressed that Iraq is stable in terms of security and economy and has taken a non-aligned approach.[158] According to a new report from the Arab Investment & Export Credit Guarantee Corporation ("Dhaman"), the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, and Algeria, the leading contributors to the Arab economy and 72% of the region's GDP.[159][160] In addition, Iraq is an agricultural country.[161] Tourism in Iraq stands to be a major growth sector, including archaeological tourism and religious tourism while the country is also considered to be a potential location for ecotourism.[162][163][164]

Tourism

[edit]
A reconstructed portion of the ruins of Babylon

Iraq was an important tourist destination for many years but that changed dramatically during the war with Iran and after the invasion by the US and allies.[165] As Iraq continues to develop and stabilises, tourism in Iraq is still facing many challenges, and little has been made by the government to meet its tremendous potential as a global tourist destination, and gain the associated economic benefits, mainly due to conflicts.[166] Sites from Iraq's ancient past are numerous and many that are close to large cities have been excavated. Babylon has seen major recent restoration; known for its famous Ziggurat (the inspiration for the Biblical Tower of Babel), the Hanging Gardens (one of the Seven Wonders of the World), and the Ishtar Gate, making it a prime destination.

Nineveh, a rival to Babylon, has also seen significant restoration and reconstruction.[167] Ur, one of the first Sumerian cities, which is near Nasiriyya, has been partially restored.[167] This is a list of examples of some significant sites in a country with a tremendous archaeological and historic wealth.[167] Iraq is considered to be a potential location for ecotourism.[168] The tourism in Iraq includes also making pilgrimages to holy Shia Islamic sites near Karbala and Najaf.[149] Since 2003, Najaf and Karbala have experienced economic boom, due to religious tourism.[149] Mosul Museum is the second largest museum in Iraq after the Iraq Museum in Baghdad. It contains ancient Mesopotamian artefacts.

Saddam Hussein built hundreds of palaces and monuments across the country. Some of them include Al-Faw Palace, As-Salam Palace and Radwaniyah Palace.[169] Al-Faw Palace is currently occupied by the American University of Iraq. Since Saddam's overthrow, the palaces are open to tourists, though they are not officially functioning, and the government of Iraq is considering to sell them for useful purposes. A majority of these structures were built after the 1991 Gulf War, when Iraq was put under sanctions by the United Nations.[169] Saddam reconstructed part of Babylon, one of the world's earliest cities, using bricks inscribed with his name to associate himself with the region's past glories.[170] One of his palaces in Basra was turned into a museum, despite it was time when Iraq allied with the US was engaged in war with the ISIS.[171][clarification needed]

Transport

[edit]
The 150 Meter Motorway is Erbil’s largest ring road, built to improve traffic flow and connect expanding areas of the city.

Iraq has a modern network of motorways. Roadways extended 45,550 km (28,300 mi).[172] The roadway also connect Iraq to neighbouring countries of Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.[172] There are more than seven million passenger cars, over million commercial taxis, buses, and trucks in use. On major motorways the maximum speed is 110 km/h (68 mph).[173] Many of the roads were constructed in the late 1970s and early 1980s and were designed with a 20-year lifespan.[174] Most of these facilities were damaged in enduring wars, that Iraq experienced.[174] Since then traffic has been a serious issue, specially in Baghdad.

Iraqi Republic Railways is the responsible body for railway transportation in Iraq.[175] The railway infrastructure consists of 2,405 km (1,494 mi) of track, 109 stations, 31 locomotives and 1,685 units of rolling stock.[175] The government is attempting to establish railway links with Turkey, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia to complete a continuous Euro-Gulf rail route.[175] Currently, a large project is underway to connect Karbala and Najaf.

Most of Iraq's oil exports are done through its ports.[174] Basra is the only coastal governorate of Iraq.[174] It is home to all of Iraq's six ports — Abu Flous Port, Al Başrah Oil Terminal, Grand Faw Port, Khor Al Amaya Oil Terminal, Khor Al Zubair Port, Port of Basra and Umm Qasr Port.[174] Iraq has about 104 airports as of 2012.[175] Major airports at Baghdad, Basra, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk and Najaf.[175] The government is constructing international airports for Karbala and Nasiriyah. Nasiriyah Airport is in partnership with China and reoping of Mosul Airport, which was closed during the 2013–2017 civil war.[175][176][177][178]

Oil and energy

[edit]
Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminal

With its 143.1 billion barrels (2.275×1010 m3) of proved oil reserves, Iraq ranks third in the world behind Venezuela and Saudi Arabia in the amount of oil reserves.[179][180] Oil production levels reached 3.4 million barrels per day by December 2012.[181] Only about 2,000 oil wells have been drilled in Iraq, compared with about 1 million wells in Texas alone.[182] Iraq was one of the founding members of OPEC.[183][184]

During the 1970s Iraq produced up to 3.5 million barrels per day, but sanctions imposed against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990 crippled the country's oil sector. The sanctions prohibited Iraq from exporting oil until 1996 and Iraq's output declined by 85% in the years following the First Gulf War. The sanctions were lifted in 2003 after the US-led invasion removed Saddam Hussein from power, but development of Iraq's oil resources has been hampered by the ongoing conflict.[185] As of 2010, despite improved security and billions of dollars in oil revenue, Iraq still generates about half the electricity that customers demand, leading to protests during the hot summer months.[186] The Iraq oil law, a proposed piece of legislation submitted to the Council of Representatives of Iraq in 2007, has failed to gain approval due to disagreements among Iraq's various political blocs.[187][188] Al Başrah Oil Terminal is a trans-shipment facility from the pipelines to the tankers and uses supertankers.

According to a US Study from May 2007, between 100,000 barrels per day (16,000 m3/d) and 300,000 barrels per day (48,000 m3/d) of Iraq's declared oil production over the past four years could have been siphoned off through corruption or smuggling.[189] In 2008, Al Jazeera reported $13 billion of Iraqi oil revenues in American care was improperly accounted for, of which $2.6 billion is totally unaccounted for.[190] Some reports that the government has reduced corruption in public procurement of oil; however, reliable reports of bribery and kickbacks to government officials persist.[191]

On 30 June and 11 December 2009, the Ministry of Oil awarded service contracts to international oil companies for some of Iraq's many oil fields.[192][193] Oil fields contracted include the "super-giant" Majnoon oil field, Halfaya Field, West Qurna Field and Rumaila Field.[193] BP and China National Petroleum Corporation won a deal to develop Rumaila, the largest oil field in Iraq.[194][195] On 14 March 2014, the International Energy Agency said Iraq's oil output jumped by half a million barrels a day in February to average 3.6 million barrels a day. The country had not pumped that much oil since 1979, when Saddam Hussein rose to power.[196] However, on 14 July 2014, as sectarian strife had taken hold, Kurdistan Regional Government forces seized control of the Bai Hassan and Kirkuk oilfields in the north of the country, taking them from Iraq's control. Baghdad condemned the seizure and threatened "dire consequences" if the fields were not returned.[197] On 2018, the UN estimated that oil accounts for 99% of Iraq's revenue.[185] As of 2021, the oil sector provided about 92% of foreign exchange earnings.[198]

Water supply and sanitation

[edit]
Lake Dukan

Three decades of war greatly cut the existing water resources management system for several major cities. This prompted widespread water supply and sanitation shortfalls thus poor water and service quality.[83] This is combined with few businesses and households who are fully environmentally aware and legally compliant however the large lakes, as pictured, alleviate supply relative to many comparators in Western Asia beset by more regular drought. Access to potable water diverges among governorates and between urban and rural areas. 91% of the population has access to potable water. Forming this figure: in rural areas, 77% of people have access to improved (treated or fully naturally filtered) drinking water sources; and 98% in urban areas.[199] Much water is discarded during treatment, due to much outmoded equipment, raising energy burden and reducing supply.[199]

Infrastructure

[edit]

Although many infrastructure projects had already begun, at the end of 2013 Iraq had a housing crisis. The then war-ravaged country was set to complete 5 percent of the 2.5 million homes it needs to build by 2016 to keep up with demand, confirmed the Minister for Construction and Housing.[200] In 2009, the Iraq Britain Business Council formed. Its key impetus was House of Lords member and trade expert Lady Nicholson. In 2013, South Korean firm Daewoo reached a deal to build Bismayah New City of about 600,000 residents in 100,000 homes.[201]

In December 2020, Al-Sudani launched the second phase of the Grand Faw Port via winning bid of project head contractor Daewoo at $2.7 billion.[202] In late 2023, the government announced that it will build a total of 15 new cities across Iraq, in an attempt to tackle a persistent housing problem, according to officials.[203] This project falls under the government's plan and strategy to establish new residential cities outside city centres, aiming to alleviate the urban housing crisis.[204] The first 5 new cities will be located in Baghdad, Babylon, Nineveh, Anbar and Karbala, while another 10 new residential cities will be launched in other governorates.[204] The initial phase of the [housing] plan began in late 2023, when Al-Sudani laid the foundation stone of Al-Jawahiri city.[204] Located west of the capital, the new city will host 30,000 housing units which will cost $2 billion.[204] It is expected to be completed in four to five years. According to officials, none of it is financed by the government.[205][206][204]

In 2024, and during a visit to Baghdad by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a quadrilateral memorandum of understanding regarding cooperation in the Iraq–Europe Development Road project was signed between Iraq, Turkey, Qatar, UAE. The deal was inked by the transportation ministers from each country. The 1,200-km project with railway and motorways which will connect the Grand Faw Port, aimed to be the largest port in the Middle East. According to officials, it is a strategic international project which will strengthen Iraq's geopolitical position.[207][208][209]

Demographics

[edit]

The 2021 estimate of the total Iraqi population is 43,533,592.[210][211] Iraq's population was estimated to be 2 million in 1878.[212] In 2013 Iraq's population reached 35 million amid a post-war population boom.[213] It is the most populous country in the Arabian Plate.[214] Iraq is made up of three former administrative divisions (vilayets) of the Ottoman Empire — Mosul, Basra and Baghdad — which were designated as concentration of different ethnic groups.

Iraq's native population is predominantly Arab, but also includes other ethnic groups such as Kurds, Turkmens, Assyrians, Yazidis, Shabaks, Armenians, Mandaeans, Circassians, and Kawliya. A report by the European Parliamentary Research Service suggests that, in 2015, there were 24 million Arabs (14 million Shia and 9 million Sunni); 4.7 million Sunni Kurds (plus 500,000 Faili Kurds and 200,000 Kaka'i); 3 million (mostly Sunni) Iraqi Turkmens; 1 million Black Iraqis; 500,000 Christians (including Assyrians and Armenians); 500,000 Yazidis; 250,000 Shabaks; 50,000 Roma; 3,000 Mandaeans; 2,000 Circassians; 1,000 of the Baháʼí Faith; and a few hundred Jews.[215]

Cities and towns

[edit]
 
 
Largest cities or towns in Iraq
Rank Name Governorate Pop. Rank Name Governorate Pop.
1 Baghdad Baghdad 6,719,477 11 Hillah Babylon 455,741
2 Mosul Nineveh 1,361,819 12 Diwaniyah Al-Qādisiyyah 403,796
3 Basra Basra 1,340,827 13 Kut Wasit 389,376
4 Erbil Erbil 1,550,071 14 Dohuk Dohuk 340,871
5 Kirkuk Kirkuk 972,272 15 Az Zubayr Basra 300,751
6 Najaf Najaf as-Sharif 747,261 16 Baqubah Diyala 279,133
7 Karbala Karbala 711,530 17 Fallujah Anbar 250,884
8 Sulaymaniyah Sulaymaniyah 676,492 18 Ramadi Anbar 223,525
9 Nasiriyah Dhi Qar 558,446 19 Samawah Muthanna 221,743
10 Amarah Maysan 527,472 20 Zakho Dohuk 211,964

Ethnic groups

[edit]
  Sunni Arabs
  Shiite Arabs
  Sunni Kurds
  Assyrians
  Yazidis
  Turkmen
Map of all majority-group clusters of the country's ethnic groups in large, deliberately grouped, census output areas as at the 2006 to 2008 study

Iraq's native population is predominantly Arab, but also includes other ethnic groups such as Kurds, Turkmens, Assyrians, Yazidis, Shabaks, Armenians, Mandaeans, Circassians, and Kawliya.

A report by the European Parliamentary Research Service suggests that, in 2015, there were 24 million Arabs (14 million Shia and 9 million Sunni); 4.7 million Sunni Kurds (plus 500,000 Faili Kurds and 200,000 Kaka'i); 3 million (mostly Sunni) Iraqi Turkmens; 1 million Black Iraqis; 500,000 Christians (including Assyrians and Armenians); 500,000 Yazidis; 250,000 Shabaks; 50,000 Roma; 3,000 Mandaeans; 2,000 Circassians; 1,000 of the Baháʼí Faith; and a few dozens Jews.[215]

According to the CIA World Factbook, citing a 1987 Iraqi government estimate,[3] the population of Iraq is 75–80% Arab followed by 15–20% Kurds.[3] In addition, the estimate claims that other minorities form 5% of the country's population, including the Turkmen/Turcoman, Assyrians, Yezidis, Shabak, Kaka'i, Bedouins, Roma, Circassians, Mandaeans, and Persians.[3] However, the International Crisis Group points out that figures from the 1987 census, as well as the 1967, 1977, and 1997 censuses, "are all considered highly problematic, due to suspicions of regime manipulation" because Iraqi citizens were only allowed to indicate belonging to either the Arab or Kurdish ethnic groups;[217] consequently, this skewed the number of other ethnic minorities, such as Iraq's third largest ethnic group – the Turkmens.[217]

The historic Assyrian Quarter in Baghdad housed 150,000 Armenians in 2003. Most of them fled, following the escalation of war, and today only 1,500 Armenians are found in the city. Around 20,000 Marsh Arabs live in southern Iraq.[218] Iraq has a community of 2,500 Chechens,[219] and some 20,000 Armenians.[220] In southern Iraq, there is a community of Iraqis of African descent, a legacy of the slavery practised in the Islamic Caliphate beginning before the Zanj Rebellion of the 9th century, and Basra's role as a key port.[221] It is the most populous country in the Arabian Plate.[222]

Languages

[edit]
Children in a village near the city of Sulaymaniyah

The main languages spoken in Iraq are Mesopotamian Arabic and Kurdish, followed by the Iraqi Turkmen/Turkoman dialect of Turkish, and the Neo-Aramaic languages (specifically Chaldean and Assyrian dialects).[223] Arabic and Kurdish are written with versions of the Arabic script. Since 2005, the Turkmen/Turkoman have switched from the Arabic script to the Turkish alphabet.[224] In addition, the Neo-Aramaic languages use the Syriac script. Other smaller minority languages include Mandaic, Shabaki, Armenian, Circassian and Persian.

Prior to the invasion in 2003, Arabic was the sole official language. Since the new Constitution of Iraq was approved in 2005, both Arabic and Kurdish are recognised (Article 4) as official languages of Iraq, while three other languages, Turkmen, Syriac and Armenian, are also recognised as minority languages. In addition, any region or province may declare other languages official if a majority of the population approves in a general referendum.[35]

According to the Constitution of Iraq (Article 4): The Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the two official languages of Iraq. The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue, such as Turkmen, Syriac, and Armenian shall be guaranteed in government educational institutions in accordance with educational guidelines, or in any other language in private educational institutions.[35]

Religion

[edit]
Shrine in Karbala, showing use of Arabesque

Religions in Iraq are dominantly Abrahamic religions.[225] In 2020, the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) estimated that 97% Iraqis followed Islam, with 61% being Shia and 35% Sunni.[226] An older estimate in 2015 by the CIA World Factbook that reported between 90 and 95% of Iraqis followed Islam, with 61–64% being Shia and 29–34% being Sunni. Christianity accounted for 1%, and the rest (1-4%) practiced Yazidism, Mandaeism, and other religions.[225] In 2011, Pew Research estimated that 51% of Muslims in Iraq see themselves as Shia, 42% as Sunni, while 5% as "just a Muslim".[227] Iraq is also home to two of the holiest places among the Shias – Najaf and Karbala.[228] Shia Muslims are mostly concentrated in southern Iraq and in parts of north region and Baghdad. Sunni Muslims are found in the Sunni Triangle region, in cities such as Ramadi, Tikrit and Fallujah, where Sunnis make majority.

Christianity in Iraq has its roots from the conception of the Church of the East in the 5th century AD, predating the existence of Islam in the region of Iraq.[229] Iraqi Christians are predominantly native Assyrians belonging to the Ancient Church of the East, Assyrian Church of the East, Chaldean Catholic Church, Syriac Catholic Church and Syriac Orthodox Church.[229][230] There is also a significant population of Armenian Christians in Iraq who had fled Turkey during the Armenian genocide.[229][230] Christians numbered over 1.4 million in 1987 or 8% of the estimated population of 16.3 million and 550,000 in 1947 or 12% of the population of 4.6 millions.[231] After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, violence against Christians rose, with reports of abduction, torture, bombings, and killings.[232][233][230] The post-2003 war has displaced much of the remaining Christian community from their homeland as a result of ethnic and religious persecution at the hands of Islamic extremists.[234][235][236][237][238]

Iraq is home to one of the oldest Jewish communities in the Middle East and the first Jewish diaspora.[239] In 1948, the Jewish population was estimated at 200,000, although some sources suggest the population may have been even higher.[239] After the establishment of Israel in 1948, Jews emigrated, fleeing persecution in Iraq, while 100,000 of them remained.[240] By the time Saddam Hussein came to power, their population had reached 15,000.[241][242] Under his rule, the population dwindled—not due to persecution, but because the government lifted travel restrictions, allowing many Jews to emigrate abroad and visiting Iraq occasionally.[243] At this point, around 1,500 Jews remained.[244] After 2003, fear among the Jewish community increased, leading to their further decline.[245] Today, it is estimated that only around 400 Jews remain in Iraq.[246] Iraq is home to over 250 Jewish sites.

There are also small ethno-religious minority populations of Mandaeans, Shabaks, Yarsan and Yezidis remaining.[233] Prior to 2003 their numbers together may have been 2 million, the majority Yarsan, a non-Islamic religion with roots in pre-Islamic and pre-Christian religion.[233] Yazidis are mostly concentrated around the Sinjar Mountains.[247][233] Mandaeans live primarily around Baghdad, Fallujah, Basra and Hillah.[248][233]

Diaspora and refugees

[edit]

The dispersion of native Iraqis to other countries is known as the Iraqi diaspora. The UN High Commission for Refugees has estimated that nearly two million Iraqis fled the country after the multinational invasion of Iraq in 2003.[249] The UN Refugee agency estimated in 2021 that 1.1 million were displaced within the country.[250] In 2007, the UN said that about 40% of Iraq's middle class was believed to have fled and that most had fled systematic persecution and had no desire to return.[251] Subsequently, the diaspora seemed to be returning, as security improved; the Iraqi government claimed that 46,000 refugees returned to their homes in October 2007 alone.[252]

In 2011, nearly 3 million Iraqis had been displaced, with 1.3 million within Iraq and 1.6 million in neighbouring countries, mainly Jordan and Syria.[253][254][255] More than half of Iraqi Christians had fled the country since the US-led invasion.[254][255] According to official US Citizenship and Immigration Services statistics, 58,811 Iraqis had been granted refugee-status citizenship as of 25 May 2011.[256] After the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, numerous Iraqis in Syria returned to their native country.[257] To escape the Syrian civil war, over 252,000 Syrian refugees of varying ethnicities have fled to Iraq since 2012.[258]

Health

[edit]
Al-Shaab General Hospital inauguration in Baghdad

In 2010, spending on healthcare accounted for 6.84% of the country's GDP. In 2008, there were 6.96 physicians and 13.92 nurses per 10,000 inhabitants.[259] The life expectancy at birth was 68.49 years in 2010, or 65.13 years for males and 72.01 years for females.[260] This is down from a peak life expectancy of 71.31 years in 1996.[261] Officially, healthcare is free in Iraq.[262] However, years of wars, conflicts, and instability have left a deep impact of healthcare, just like other sectors of Iraq.

Iraq had developed a centralised free health care system in the 1970s using a hospital based, capital-intensive model of curative care.[263] The country depended on large-scale imports of medicines, medical equipment and even nurses, paid for with oil export income, according to a "Watching Brief" report issued jointly by the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization in July 2003.[264] Unlike other poorer countries, which focused on mass health care using primary care practitioners, Iraq developed a Westernised system of sophisticated hospitals with advanced medical procedures, provided by specialist physicians.[264] The UNICEF/WHO report noted that prior to 1990, 97% of urban dwellers and 71% of the rural population had access to free primary health care; just 2% of hospital beds were privately managed.[264]

In 2024, Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani officially inaugurated Shaab General Hospital, Baghdad's first new general hospital in nearly 40 years.[265] The 246-bed facility, which was a long-delayed project was completed under a collaborative management model, which boasts state-of-the-art infrastructure, with advanced medical equipment, and a full range of healthcare services according to Sudani.[265] Minister of Health Salih Hasnawi highlighted the ministry's accomplishments over the past two years, including the construction of 13 new hospitals, three specialised centres, two burn units, and 25 kidney treatment centres in different governorates, while plans are in place to build 16 new hospitals, each with 100 beds, to be managed by qualified companies.[266][267] In the same year, the government launched the implementation of a joint operation and management programme for modern hospitals at the newly opened Najaf Teaching Hospital.[268]

Education

[edit]
University students in Iraq, 2016

Before 1990 and later 2003, Iraq already had an advanced and successful education system.[269] However, it has now been "de-developing" in its educational success.[269] During his rule, Saddam turned Iraq into a leading centre of higher education.[269] Since the implementation of the MDGs, education has shown improvement in Iraq.[269] Enrollment numbers nearly doubled from 2000 to 2012, reaching six million students.[270] By 2015–2016, around 9.2 million children were attending school, with a steady annual increase of 4.1% in enrollment rates.[270]

However, the rapid increase in primary education students has strained the system.[270] Education receives only 5.7% of government spending, leading to a lack of investment in schools and poor educational rankings in the region.[270] UNICEF found that funding has been wasted, resulting in increasing dropout and repetition rates.[270] Dropout rates range from 1.5% to 2.5%, with girls being affected more due to economic or family reasons. Repetition rates have reached almost 17%, causing a loss of approximately 20% of education funding in 2014–2015.[270]

Regional disparities greatly impact enrollment rates for children in primary education in Iraq.[270] Conflict-ridden areas like Saladin Governorate have seen over 90% of school-age children out of school due to the conversion of schools into shelters or military bases.[270] Limited resources strain the education system, hindering access to education.[270] However, efforts have been made to reopen closed schools, with success seen in Mosul, where over 380,000 children are back in school.[270] Access to education varies depending on location, and there are disparities between boys and girls.[270]

In 2024, the government inaugurated 790 new schools across the country, as part of a framework agreement with China to build 1,000 schools. This initiative aims to address overcrowding and the issue of triple shifts in schools, which have been exacerbated by the destruction caused by years of conflict.[271] Many schools have had to operate multiple shifts, sometimes giving students as little as four hours of learning per day, which negatively affects educational outcomes.[271][272] The school construction project stems from a 2021 agreement between the Iraqi and Chinese governments to build 1,000 schools. Additionally, the Iraqi Prime Minister announced that the Iraq Development Fund will soon collaborate with the private sector to build 400 more schools, addressing the current shortage of over 8,000 schools in the country.[271][272]

Culture

[edit]

Iraq's culture has a deep heritage that extends back in time to ancient Mesopotamian culture. Iraq has one of the longest written traditions in the world including architecture, literature, music, dance, painting, weaving, pottery, calligraphy, stonemasonry and metalworking. The culture of Iraq or Mesopotamia is one of the world's oldest cultural histories and is considered one of the most influential cultures in the world.

Mesopotamian legacy went on to influence and shape the civilisations of the Old World in different ways such as inventing writing system, mathematics, time, calendar, astrology and the law code.[273][274] Iraq is home to diverse ethnic groups that have each contributed in different ways to the country's long and rich heritage. The country is known for its poets, architects, painters and sculptors, who are among the best in the region, some of them being world-class. Iraq is known for producing fine handicrafts, including rugs and carpets.

Art

[edit]
Wasiti's illustrations served as an inspiration for the modern Baghdad art movement in the 20th-century.[275]

There were several interconnected traditions of art in ancient Iraq. The Abbasid Dynasty developed in the Abbasid Caliphate between 750 and 945, primarily in its heartland of Mesopotamia. The Abbasids were influenced mainly by Mesopotamian art traditions and later influenced Persian as well as Central Asian styles. Between the 8th and 13th centuries during the Abbasid period, pottery achieved a high level of sophistication, calligraphy began to be used to decorate the surface of decorative objects and illuminated manuscripts, particularly Q'ranic texts became more complex and stylised. Iraq's first art school was established during this period, allowing artisans and crafts to flourish.[276]

At the height of the Abbasid period, in the late 12th century, a stylistic movement of manuscript illustration and calligraphy emerged. Now known as the Baghdad School, this movement of Islamic art was characterised by representations of everyday life and the use of highly expressive faces rather than the stereotypical characters that had been used in the past.[277]

Architecture

[edit]
Zaha Hadid (1950–2016), an acclaimed architect

The architecture of Iraq has a long history, encompassing several distinct cultures and spanning a period from the 10th millennium BC and features both the Mesopotamian and Abbasid architecture.[278] Baghdad and Mosul have plethora of cultural and heritage buildings. There are numerous historic mosques in Baghdad and Basra, old churches in Mosul and synagogues in Baghdad.[278] Modern prominent architects include Zaha Hadid, Basil Bayati, Rifat Chadirji and Hisham N. Ashkouri among others.[278]

The capital, Ninus or Nineveh, was taken by the Medes under Cyaxares, and some 200 years after Xenophon passed over its site, then mere mounds of earth. It remained buried until 1845, when Botta and Layard discovered the ruins of the Assyrian cities. The principal remains are those of Khorsabad, 16 km (10 mi) northeast of Mosul; of Nimroud, supposed to be the ancient Calah; and of Kouyunjik, in all probability the ancient Nineveh. In these cities are found fragments of several great buildings which seem to have been palace-temples. They were constructed chiefly of sun-dried bricks, and all that remains of them is the lower part of the walls, decorated with sculpture and paintings, portions of the pavements, a few indications of the elevation, and some works connected with the drainage.

In recent years, modern buildings include shopping malls and high-rise towers.[279] Iraq was of the first countries along with Egypt, to adopt mall culture in the Arab world and the Middle East.[279] Al-Adil Shopping Center (formerly Ozdi Pak) in Baghdad was the second mall in the region after Egypt.[279]

Important cultural institutions in the capital include the Iraqi National Symphony Orchestra – rehearsals and performances were briefly interrupted during the occupation of Iraq but have since returned to normal.[280] The National Theatre of Iraq was looted during the 2003 invasion, but efforts are underway to restore it. The live theatre scene received a boost during the 1990s when UN sanctions limited the import of foreign films. As many as 30 cinemas were reported to have been converted to live stages, producing a wide range of comedies and dramatic productions.

Facade of Temple at Hatra near Mosul was declared World Heritage Site by UNESCO in 1985[281]

Institutions offering cultural education in Baghdad include the Academy of Music, Institute of Fine Arts and the Music and Ballet School Baghdad. Baghdad also features a number of museums including the National Museum of Iraq – which houses the world's largest and finest collection of artefacts and relics of Ancient Iraqi civilisations; some of which were stolen during the occupation of Iraq. On 2021, it was announced that Iraq had reclaimed about 17,000 looted artefacts, which was considered to be the biggest repatriation.[282]

Literature

[edit]
An Akkadian inscription

The literature in Iraq is often referred to as "Mesopotamian literature" due to the flourishing of various civilisations as a result of the mixture of these cultures and has been called Mesopotamian or Babylonian literature in allusion to the geographical territory that such cultures occupied in the Middle East between the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.[283] The Sumerian literature was unique because it does not belong to any known linguistic root. Its appearance began with symbols of the things denoting it, then it turned with time to the cuneiform line on tablets. The literature during this time were mainly about mythical and epic texts dealing with creation issues, the emergence of the world, the gods, descriptions of the heavens, and the lives of heroes in the wars that broke out between the nomads and the urbanites. They also deal with religious teachings, moral advice, astrology, legislation, and history. One of which was the Epic of Gilgamesh, which is regarded as the earliest surviving notable literature.[284]

During the Abbasid Caliphate, the House of Wisdom in Baghdad, which was a public academy and intellectual fulcrum, hosted numerous scholars and writers. A number of stories in One Thousand and One Nights feature famous Abbasid figures.[285] Iraq has various medieval poets, most remarkably Hariri of Basra, Mutanabbi, Abu Nuwas, and Al-Jahiz. In modern times, various languages are used in Iraqi literature including Arabic, Neo-Aramaic, Kurdish and Turkish, although the Arabic literature remains the most influential literature. Notably poets include Jawahiri, Safa Khulusi and Dunya Mikhail.

Music

[edit]
Kadim Al Sahir known as "The Caesar" of Arabic songs. Considered as one of the most successful singers in the history of the Arab World.

Iraq is known primarily for its rich maqam heritage which has been passed down orally by the masters of the maqam in an unbroken chain of transmission leading up to the present. The Iraqi maqam is considered to be the most noble and perfect form of maqam. Al-maqam al-Iraqi is the collection of sung poems written either in one of the 16 meters of classical Arabic or in Iraqi dialect (Zuhayri).[286] This form of art is recognised by UNESCO as "an intangible heritage of humanity".[287]

Early in the 20th century, many of the most prominent musicians in Iraq were Jewish.[288] In 1936, Iraq Radio was established with an ensemble made up entirely of Jews, with the exception of the percussion player.[288] At the nightclubs of Baghdad, ensembles consisted of oud, qanun and two percussionists, while the same format with a ney and cello were used on the radio.[288]

The most famous singer of the 1930s–1940s was perhaps Salima Pasha (later Salima Murad).[288][289] The respect and adoration for Pasha were unusual at the time since public performance by women was considered shameful.[288] The most famous early composer from Iraq was Ezra Aharon, an oud player, while the most prominent instrumentalist was Yusuf Za'arur.[citation needed] Za'arus formed the official ensemble for the Iraqi radio station and were responsible for introducing the cello and ney into the traditional ensemble.[288]

Media

[edit]
An image showing a page from Iraq newspaper, 5 June 1920

Iraq was home to the second television station in the Middle East, which began during the 1950s. As part of a plan to help Iraq modernise, English telecommunications company Pye Limited built and commissioned a television broadcast station in the capital city of Baghdad.[290]

After the end of the full state control in 2003, there was a period of significant growth in the broadcast media in Iraq.[291] By 2003, according to a BBC report, there were 20 radio stations from 0.15 to 17 television stations owned by Iraqis, and 200 Iraqi newspapers owned and operated.

Iraqi media expert and author of a number of reports on this subject, Ibrahim Al Marashi, identifies four stages of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 where they had been taking the steps that have significant effects on the way for the later of the Iraqi media since then. Stages are: pre-invasion preparation, and the war and the actual choice of targets, the first post-war period, and a growing insurgency and hand over power to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) and Prime Minister Iyad Allawi.[292][page needed]

Cuisine

[edit]
Dolma, a popular Iraqi dish

Iraqi cuisine can be traced back some 10,000 years – to the Sumerians, Akkadians, Babylonians, Assyrians and Ancient Persians.[293] Tablets found in ancient ruins in Iraq show recipes prepared in the temples during religious festivals – the first cookbooks in the world.[293] Ancient Iraq, or Mesopotamia, was home to many sophisticated and highly advanced civilisations, in all fields of knowledge – including the culinary arts.[293] However, it was in the medieval era when Baghdad was the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate that the Iraqi kitchen reached its zenith.[293] Today the cuisine of Iraq reflects this rich inheritance as well as strong influences from the culinary traditions of neighbouring Turkey, Iran and the Greater Syria area.[293]

Some characteristic ingredients of Iraqi cuisine include – vegetables such as aubergine, tomato, okra, onion, potato, courgette, garlic, peppers and chilli, cereals such as rice, bulgur wheat and barley, pulses and legumes such as lentils, chickpeas and cannellini, fruits such as dates, raisins, apricots, figs, grapes, melon, pomegranate and citrus fruits, especially lemon and lime.[293]

Similarly with other countries of Western Asia, chicken and especially lamb are the favourite meats. Most dishes are served with rice – usually Basmati, grown in the marshes of southern Iraq.[293] Bulgur wheat is used in many dishes, having been a staple in the country since the days of the Ancient Assyrians.[293]

Sport

[edit]
Basra International Stadium

Football is the most popular sport in Iraq. Basketball, swimming, weightlifting, bodybuilding, boxing, kick boxing and tennis are also popular sports.

The Iraq Football Association is the governing body of football in Iraq, controlling the Iraq national football team and the Iraq Stars League. It was founded in 1948, and has been a member of FIFA since 1950 and the Asian Football Confederation since 1971. Iraq were champions of the 2007 AFC Asian Cup, and they participated in the 1986 FIFA World Cup and the 2009 FIFA Confederations Cup.

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Bibliography

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Iraq, officially the Republic of Iraq, is a federal parliamentary republic in Western Asia encompassing the Mesopotamian alluvial plain between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the eastern Zagros Mountains, and portions of the Arabian Desert, with a narrow coastline along the Persian Gulf. Bordered by Turkey to the north, Iran to the east, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to the south, Jordan to the southwest, and Syria to the west, the country covers 438,317 square kilometers. Its capital and largest city is Baghdad, home to over 8 million residents, while the total population stands at approximately 46 million as of early 2025. Predominantly Muslim, Iraq's population is ethnically diverse, with Arabs forming 75–80 percent, Kurds 15–20 percent, and smaller Turkmen, Assyrian, and other groups. Historically Mesopotamia, Iraq is recognized as the cradle of civilization, where Sumerian innovations including the earliest cities, cuneiform writing, wheel, and codified laws emerged around 3500 BCE, laying foundations for subsequent empires like Akkad, Babylon, and Assyria. Under Islamic caliphates, particularly the Abbasids, Baghdad became a global center of science, philosophy, and trade from the 8th to 13th centuries. Modern Iraq emerged from Ottoman Empire rule via British mandate after World War I, achieving formal independence in 1932 under a Hashemite monarchy that fostered oil-driven modernization but ended in the 1958 military coup establishing the Republic. Ba'athist seizures in 1968 led to Saddam Hussein's dictatorship from 1979, characterized by nationalization of oil, aggressive expansionism triggering the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) with heavy casualties and chemical weapon use, and the 1990 invasion of Kuwait prompting the 1991 Gulf War coalition expulsion and subsequent sanctions. Hussein's regime also perpetrated the Anfal genocide against Kurds, killing tens of thousands via chemical attacks. The 2003 United States-led invasion, justified by intelligence on weapons of mass destruction later unverified, toppled Hussein but unleashed sectarian strife, insurgency, and a civil war exacerbated by de-Ba'athification and premature dissolution of security forces, creating a vacuum exploited by al-Qaeda affiliates evolving into ISIS, which seized significant territory by 2014 before military defeat in 2017. Post-2003 Iraq adopted a federal constitution emphasizing Shia Arab majority rule, Kurdish autonomy in the north, but grapples with corruption, militia dominance, Iranian influence, and fragile institutions amid demographic youth bulge and unemployment. Economically, Iraq remains heavily dependent on petroleum, with oil exports funding over 90 percent of federal revenues in 2024 despite diversification efforts hampered by infrastructure decay and governance failures. Achievements include ancient scholarly legacies and modern literacy rates exceeding 80 percent under Hussein-era investments, though controversies persist over authoritarian legacies, war crimes, flawed foreign interventions destabilizing the region, and stalled reforms perpetuating poverty for many despite oil wealth.

Name

Etymology

The name "Iraq" derives from the term al-ʿIrāq, which by the medieval period denoted territory between the and rivers, encompassing the fertile central to early Islamic administration under the . This usage distinguished it from the upland region of al-Jazīra to the north, reflecting a geographic focus on the riverine lowlands rather than the broader Mesopotamian expanse. Philological analysis traces al-ʿIrāq to the erāk or ērāk, signifying "lowlands" or "perspiration" in reference to the region's humid, irrigated terrain, a term employed during Sassanid rule (224–651 CE) to describe the Persian province of Ārāg. An alternative hypothesis connects it to the Sumerian Uruk (Sumerian Unug, circa 4000–3100 BCE), proposing an evolution through Akkadian Urūku into later or forms, though this remains speculative and lacks direct phonetic continuity beyond . Medieval Arabic geographers, such as al-Yaʿqūbī in his 9th-century Kitāb al-Buldān, applied ʿIrāq specifically to the Abbasid heartland around , underscoring its administrative and cultural connotation as the core of Arab Islamic civilization, separate from Persian ʿAjam territories. This nomenclature persisted into Ottoman times, where ʿIrāq ʿArabī denoted the southern provinces, evolving into the modern state's designation post-World War I without implying ethnic exclusivity.

Official Designations

The official name of Iraq is the Republic of Iraq (Arabic: الجمهورية العراقية, al-Jumhūriyyah al-ʿIrāqiyyah), as affirmed in Article 1 of the Constitution, which specifies it as "a single federal, independent, and fully " with a republican, representative, parliamentary, and democratic system of government. This federal designation marked a shift from the pre-2003 Ba'athist era, when Iraq operated as the Republic of Iraq under a unitary framework outlined in the 1970 interim constitution and earlier republican documents following the overthrow of the . The framework replaced the interim Law of Administration for the State of Iraq (effective 2004 during the transitional period post-invasion), reestablishing the republic with explicit federal provisions ratified by referendum on October 15, . In the Kurdistan Region, official designations employ bilingual usage of Arabic and Kurdish (primarily Sorani dialect), as mandated by the 2005 Constitution's recognition of Kurdish as an alongside Arabic, with applications in passports, currency, traffic signs, and regional documents. Internationally, Iraq is designated as the of Iraq in documentation and holds codes of alpha-2 "IQ", alpha-3 "IRQ", and numeric "368", reflecting its status as a fully since its UN admission on October 21, 1945 (initially as the Kingdom of Iraq, transitioning post-republic).

History

Ancient Civilizations and Mesopotamia

The region between the and rivers, known as , hosted some of the earliest known prehistoric settlements dating back to the period around 10,000 BCE, with evidence of farming communities emerging along river tributaries by the 7th millennium BCE, as indicated by pottery and tool finds at sites like Tell Hassuna. These early groups transitioned into the (c. 6500–3800 BCE), marked by the development of irrigation canals that harnessed seasonal floods to cultivate barley, wheat, and dates, generating agricultural surpluses that supported population densities exceeding those of contemporaneous hunter-gatherer societies elsewhere. This surplus, causally linked to organized labor for canal maintenance and flood control, enabled sedentism and the rise of proto-urban centers, as surplus calories freed individuals from full-time foraging, allowing specialization in crafts, administration, and trade—evidenced by increased settlement sizes and storage facilities at Ubaid sites. By the (c. 4000–3100 BCE), Sumerian city-states such as and emerged as complex polities with populations up to 50,000, featuring monumental architecture including the earliest ziggurats—stepped temple platforms built from mud-brick, symbolizing religious and administrative centrality. Sumerians innovated cuneiform writing around 3200 BCE on clay tablets for record-keeping of grain allocations and transactions, facilitating bureaucratic control over labor and resources. The , adapted into wheeled vehicles by c. 3500 BCE, enhanced pottery production and transport efficiency, while arithmetical systems based on base-60 notation laid foundations for later . These advancements, rooted in empirical responses to alluvial soils and unpredictable floods, sustained independent city-states like and , which competed through warfare and alliances until unified under external conquest. The , founded by (r. c. 2334–2279 BCE), marked the first known multi-ethnic empire, encompassing Sumerian territories through military campaigns that integrated diverse regions via standardized administration and Akkadian as a . Sargon's forces, estimated at tens of thousands, subdued city-states from the to the Mediterranean, promoting trade in and tin, as attested by victory stelae depicting his triumphs. This centralization, however, collapsed around 2150 BCE amid climate-induced droughts and internal revolts, fragmenting into neo-Sumerian revivals like the Third Dynasty of Ur (c. 2112–2004 BCE), which rebuilt networks to restore prosperity before Gutian incursions. In southern Mesopotamia, the Old Babylonian period under Hammurabi (r. c. 1792–1750 BCE) produced the , inscribed on a 7.5-foot around 1750 BCE, comprising 282 laws addressing commerce, family, and retribution—such as "" principles scaled by social class—to enforce royal justice and economic stability. Northern Assyrian expansions from (c. 2000 BCE onward) established trade colonies in , evidenced by tablets from detailing merchant activities, while military innovations like iron weapons and chariots facilitated territorial growth by the Middle Assyrian period (c. 1365–1050 BCE). Artifacts such as bronze palace reliefs from illustrate these conquests, underscoring how and coercive governance sustained urban hierarchies amid environmental volatility.

Islamic Era and Medieval Dynasties

The Arab conquest of Mesopotamia began under the in 633 CE, with initial invasions targeting Sasanian territories weakened by internal strife and prolonged wars against . The decisive in 636 or 637 CE near al-Hirah saw a Rashidun force of approximately 30,000 under defeat a larger Sasanian army led by Rustam Farrukh Hormuzd, resulting in the collapse of Sasanian control over Iraq and paving the way for the fall of by 637 CE. This conquest integrated into the caliphate by 638 CE, with Arab armies exploiting Sassanid disarray rather than overwhelming numerical superiority, as local populations often submitted to avoid prolonged conflict. Under the (661–750 CE), Iraq served as a key administrative province, governed from and later , with figures like centralizing fiscal and military control under Caliph Abd al-Malik (r. 685–705 CE). Umayyad rule emphasized Arab tribal hierarchies and tax extraction from non-Arab converts (mawali), fostering resentment that contributed to Abbasid agitation in eastern provinces. Governance relied on Byzantine-inspired bureaucracy, but favoritism toward Arab elites strained resources and unity. The Abbasid Revolution in 750 CE overthrew the Umayyads at the River, establishing a dynasty that shifted power eastward and founded in 762 CE under Caliph as a circular fortified city on the , designed for defensibility and trade centrality. flourished as an intellectual hub during the 8th–9th centuries, exemplified by the , patronized by caliphs like (r. 786–809 CE) and (r. 813–833 CE), where scholars translated Greek, Persian, and Indian texts into Arabic, advancing fields like , astronomy, and —e.g., al-Khwarizmi's derived from such efforts. This era's prosperity stemmed from institutional support for inquiry, not inherent cultural superiority, though empirical outputs included refined astrolabes and hospitals treating thousands annually. Economically, Abbasid Iraq thrived on irrigated yielding grains, dates, and newly widespread via expanded qanats and waterwheels, supporting urban populations exceeding 1 million in by the 9th century. Trade routes linked the to the Mediterranean via and , handling silk, spices, and paper, with annual tax revenues reaching millions of dinars from land and commerce. However, reliance on slave labor in marshlands and unequal land grants sowed seeds of revolt, as seen in the Zanj uprising (869–883 CE), which disrupted southern production. The Seljuk Turks assumed de facto control over Iraq by 1055 CE, installing Tughril Beg as sultan while preserving the Abbasid caliph as a figurehead, fragmenting authority into atabegates around and . Seljuk governance stabilized Sunni orthodoxy against Shi'a challenges but prioritized military fiefs over innovation, marking a transition from caliphal centralization to feudal decentralization. The Mongol invasion culminated in Hulagu Khan's in January 1258 CE, where 150,000–200,000 troops breached defenses after 13 days, executing Caliph and massacring up to 1 million civilians, destroying canals and libraries. This sacked the Abbasid capital, ending its role as caliphal seat, though the event exacerbated rather than solely caused prior stagnation. The (1256–1335 CE), established by Hulagu, ruled Iraq as a Persianate Mongol , initially destructive but later promoting reconstruction and under (r. 1295–1304 CE), yet failing to restore pre-1258 agricultural output due to depopulation. Decline from the 10th century onward reflected internal causal factors over external shocks: sectarian divisions (Sunni-Shi'a), dynastic infighting, and rising religious conservatism—e.g., Al-Ghazali's 11th-century emphasis on over —stifled empirical inquiry, reducing original scientific contributions by the despite Mongol attributions in popular narratives. Empirical evidence shows agricultural yields and trade volumes stagnating pre-1258 due to mismanaged systems and revolts, with invasions accelerating but not originating the shift from to orthodoxy-driven . Prioritizing unity and institutional incentives for verification, rather than blame on nomads, better explains the failure to sustain earlier advances.

Ottoman Period and Early Modernization

Following the Ottoman conquest of in 1534 by I, the territories comprising modern Iraq were integrated into the empire as frontier provinces, divided into the pashaliks of , , and . These administrative units operated under governors (pashas) appointed from , but effective control often devolved to local elites due to the region's distance from the imperial center and persistent threats from Safavid Persia, including the temporary loss of in 1623 before its reconquest in 1638. Tribal confederations, such as the and Aniza in the north and various groups in the south, retained significant autonomy, collecting taxes and maintaining militias that limited Ottoman revenue extraction and administrative penetration. From the early 18th century until 1831, Baghdad's governance fell under a semi-autonomous Mamluk dynasty of Georgian slave-soldiers, who amassed power through military patronage and alliances with local tribes while nominally pledging loyalty to the sultan. This period exemplified chronic center-periphery frictions, as Mamluk pashas like Ali Pasha (r. 1750s) prioritized personal enrichment and defense against Persian incursions over imperial directives, fostering corruption and irregular tax farming (iltizam) that stifled agricultural productivity and urban development. External pressures compounded internal weaknesses; Wahhabi forces from Najd raided southern Iraq repeatedly in the early 1800s, sacking Karbala in 1802 and killing thousands while plundering Shia shrines, exposing Ottoman vulnerabilities in desert fringes where tribal pacts with raiders undermined centralized authority. The reforms, initiated empire-wide in 1839, sought to address these dysfunctions through centralization, but implementation in Iraq lagged due to entrenched local resistances. The 1858 Ottoman Land Code aimed to formalize private ownership ( land) and boost state revenues by registering tribal-held lands, yet tribal sheikhs often evaded surveys, preserving communal grazing rights and perpetuating nomadic patterns that hindered sedentary farming. laws from 1844 onward expanded the military to counter European encroachments, but in Iraq, exemptions for bedouins and bribes allowed widespread evasion, yielding only sporadic levies from urban areas like . Governor Midhat Pasha's tenure in (1869–1872) intensified these efforts, building like canals and a modern station while suppressing remnants and tribal revolts, yet his heavy-handed tactics alienated peripheries, revealing how geographic isolation and cultural divides—exacerbated by Sunni-Shia tensions—impeded uniform reform. These dynamics contributed to , as central demands for fiscal extraction clashed with peripheral incentives for , resulting in underinvestment in systems critical to Mesopotamia's fertility and recurrent famines, such as those in the from neglected maintenance. Rather than precursors to colonial exploitation, this inertia stemmed from the empire's failure to reconcile absolutist governance with Iraq's tribal federalism and sectarian pluralism, yielding a of in cities and indirect in rural expanses that persisted into the late . British commercial interests, evident in trading posts at from the 1790s, further strained Ottoman sovereignty without immediate territorial gains, highlighting the periphery’s role in amplifying imperial overextension.

British Mandate, Monarchy, and Independence

Following the Ottoman Empire's defeat in , the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 16, 1916, secretly divided its Arab territories into British and French spheres of influence, with Britain gaining primary control over the region encompassing modern Iraq to secure oil interests and strategic routes to . At the San Remo Conference on April 25, 1920, the Allied powers formalized Britain's (Iraq), tasking it with provisional administration under the League of Nations while preparing the territory for self-governance, though local populations largely rejected the arrangement as colonial imposition. The mandate faced immediate resistance in the 1920 Iraqi Revolt, erupting in May with demonstrations in and spreading to Shia tribes in the mid-Euphrates region, including clashes at Razzaza, where insurgents targeted British forces; Sunni urban elites and also participated, driven by opposition to foreign rule and fears of taxation without representation, resulting in thousands of Arab casualties and over 2,000 British and Indian troops killed before suppression by October. This uprising highlighted deep ethnic and sectarian fractures—Shia Arabs in the south, Sunni Arabs in central areas, and in the north—undermining claims of unified national consent for the mandate, as tribal loyalties and pan-Arab aspirations clashed with imposed borders that amalgamated disparate Ottoman vilayets without regard for local demographics or autonomy demands. To stabilize the mandate, Britain orchestrated the installation of Faisal I, son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, as king; following the Cairo Conference in March 1921 and a plebiscite claiming 96% approval (widely viewed as manipulated amid suppressed dissent), Faisal entered Basra in June and was proclaimed king on August 23, 1921, establishing the Hashemite monarchy as a veneer of Arab legitimacy over British oversight. Faisal's rule navigated ongoing Kurdish revolts, such as those led by Sheikh Mahmud in 1922-1923, and Shia unrest, relying on British air power and subsidies to maintain order while fostering a nascent Iraqi , though pan-Arab unity proved illusory amid tribal divisions and elite rivalries. Independence came via the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty signed on June 30, 1930, which granted formal sovereignty in exchange for British bases, transit rights, and consultation on foreign policy, culminating in Iraq's admission to of Nations on October 3, 1932, ending the mandate but preserving de facto British influence. Under the , Iraq declared neutrality in , but pro-Axis nationalists staged the Rashid Ali coup on April 1, 1941, ousting the pro-British regent and aligning with ; British forces invaded in May, defeating the regime by June after battles at and , restoring the but exposing vulnerabilities to external ideologies amid internal pan-Arabist fractures. The Hashemite era persisted until the 1958 military coup, which overthrew King Faisal II, reflecting accumulated grievances over elite corruption, economic inequality, and persistent foreign entanglements that exacerbated ethnic and tribal disunity rather than forging cohesive statehood.

Republican Era and Ba'athist Consolidation

The 14 July Revolution of 1958 overthrew Iraq's Hashemite monarchy in a bloodless coup led by Brigadier General Abd al-Karim Qasim and Colonel , establishing the Iraqi Republic and ending British-influenced royal rule. Qasim, appointed prime minister and defense minister, pursued a policy of over , withdrawing from the Baghdad Pact on 24 August 1958 and fostering ties with the while suppressing communist and Ba'athist rivals. This era saw initial reforms, including land redistribution and infrastructure projects, but also growing factionalism amid weak civilian institutions, which empowered officers and enabled recurrent power struggles. The resulting instability, rooted in the monarchy's abrupt collapse and absence of robust democratic mechanisms, facilitated a cycle of coups rather than ideological fervor alone as the primary driver. On 8 February 1963, the Ba'ath Party, influenced by Michel Aflaq's doctrine of secular Arab socialism emphasizing unity, freedom, and socialism without religious governance, orchestrated the Ramadan Revolution against Qasim, who was captured and executed. The Ba'athists, allied with nationalists, installed Abdul Salam Arif as president and initiated purges targeting communists, killing thousands in Baghdad and other cities during a brief reign marked by authoritarian consolidation. Internal divisions led to Arif's ouster of the Ba'ath in a November 1963 counter-coup, shifting power to a Nasserist military regime that lasted until 1968, perpetuating the pattern of fragile governance vulnerable to factional takeovers. On 17 July 1968, Ba'athists under Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr executed another coup against President Abdul Rahman Arif, securing enduring control through a bloodless operation that sidelined rivals and entrenched party dominance via security apparatuses. Under al-Bakr's presidency from 1968, the Ba'ath regime nationalized the on 1 June 1972, seizing foreign-owned assets and redirecting revenues—previously limited by concession terms—to state coffers, which surged from $559 million in 1972 to over $21 billion by 1979, funding expansionist policies and repression. Efforts to address Kurdish demands included the 11 March 1970 autonomy agreement, granting self-rule in northern provinces with Kurdish representation in , but faltered by 1974 amid disputes over fields and , reigniting and exposing the regime's centralizing . State repression intensified empirically, with party militias and intelligence networks suppressing dissent, as evidenced by expanded executions and detentions, prioritizing Ba'athist ideological control over pluralistic institutions.

Saddam Hussein's Rule: Internal Repression and External Wars

seized full control of Iraq in July 1979 by compelling President to resign on July 16, assuming the presidency himself six days later, and orchestrating a purge on July 22 that accused 68 members of treason, resulting in the execution of at least 21 high-ranking officials to eliminate rivals. This established a personalist reliant on fear, secret police surveillance, and familial loyalty, where internal threats—real or perceived—were met with torture, disappearances, and purges that claimed thousands of lives across Ba'athist institutions and society. Externally, Saddam launched the Iran-Iraq War on September 22, 1980, with a full-scale invasion aimed at territorial gains and containing Iran's Islamic Revolution, escalating into an eight-year stalemate that killed an estimated 500,000 Iraqis and involved Iraq's repeated use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces starting in 1983, including and agents documented in battlefield casualties sent to European hospitals. The regime's defiance extended to the August 2, 1990, invasion of , motivated by Iraq's war debts, disputes over oil production, and claims to historical territory, which rapidly overwhelmed Kuwaiti defenses and prompted unanimous UN Security Council condemnation for violating international sovereignty. Domestically, repression peaked in the from February 1986 to September 1989, a systematic effort to eradicate rural Kurdish resistance in northern Iraq through village razings, forced deportations, and chemical attacks, culminating in the March 16, 1988, gassing that killed 5,000 civilians; overall, the operation resulted in 50,000 to 100,000 Kurdish deaths, evidenced by mass graves containing nearly exclusively Kurdish remains and internal regime documents inciting extermination. Following the 1991 defeat, Saddam's suppressed Shia uprisings in 14 southern cities starting March 1991, employing artillery, tank assaults, and summary executions that killed 30,000 to 100,000 civilians, draining marshes to expose rebels and consolidating Sunni Arab dominance. These policies stemmed from Saddam's Tikriti Sunni tribal base, which institutionalized sectarian favoritism and preemptive violence against Shia majorities and Kurdish autonomists perceived as threats to Ba'athist secular control, prioritizing regime perpetuation through total deterrence over economic or social development. Iraq's pre-1991 weapons of mass destruction programs, including chemical stockpiles of thousands of tons and nascent biological agents, enabled such aggressions but were largely dismantled by 1991 under coercion, though Saddam retained dual-use infrastructure and reconstitution ambitions to deter future invasions.

Gulf Wars, Sanctions, and Containment (1990-2002)

Iraq's invasion of on August 2, 1990, prompted immediate international condemnation, with United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 demanding the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces. Following failed diplomacy and Operation Desert Shield's buildup of forces, Operation Desert Storm commenced on January 17, 1991, with a five-week air campaign targeting Iraqi military infrastructure, followed by a 100-hour ground offensive from February 24 to 28 that liberated and routed Iraqi divisions. The , led by the and comprising 34 nations, inflicted approximately 20,000 to 35,000 Iraqi military fatalities while suffering fewer than 400 deaths, demonstrating decisive technological and strategic superiority. The ceasefire formalized by UN Security Council Resolution 687 on April 3, 1991, required Iraq to destroy its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) stockpiles, end development beyond specified ranges, and accept ongoing inspections by the (UNSCOM) and the (IAEA). Iraq initially complied partially, allowing UNSCOM to uncover and eliminate chemical agents, biological weapons programs, and nuclear research facilities, but repeatedly obstructed inspectors, concealing documents and sites, which led to escalating tensions and UNSCOM's withdrawal in December 1998. Comprehensive UN sanctions under Resolution 661, imposed in August 1990, prohibited most Iraqi exports and imports to compel compliance, resulting in a sharp economic contraction: Iraq's GDP fell by over 50% in the early 1990s, with dropping from around $3,000 pre-invasion to under $1,000 by 1995. To mitigate civilian hardship, the , authorized by Resolution 986 in April 1995 and operational from December 1996, permitted Iraq to export $2 billion in oil every six months (later expanded) in exchange for humanitarian goods, distributing over $30 billion in aid by 2003 but marred by regime diversion of funds—estimated at 10-20% skimmed for palaces and military procurement—while undercutting contract prices to extract kickbacks. Northern and southern no-fly zones, established post-ceasefire under Operations Provide Comfort (April 1991) and Southern Watch (August 1992), enforced by U.S., U.K., and French air patrols, prohibited Iraqi fixed-wing and attack helicopters south of the 32nd parallel and north of the 36th parallel to shield Shiite Arabs and from reprisals after failed 1991 uprisings. These zones, patrolled until 2003, involved over 100,000 sorties and neutralized Iraqi air defenses through intermittent strikes, effectively containing regime forces and preventing incursions into Kurdish safe havens or . The sanctions' humanitarian toll, particularly on child mortality, remains contested: regime-provided data, amplified in outlets like a 1995 UNICEF survey, claimed over 500,000 excess child deaths attributable to sanctions, but subsequent analyses revealed systematic manipulation, including falsified surveys inflating pre-sanctions baselines and regime hoarding of aid—diverting 40-60% of Oil-for-Food supplies to loyalists and military—while gross domestic product losses stemmed partly from smuggling networks enriching Saddam Hussein's inner circle with billions in illicit oil revenues. Independent estimates, adjusting for underreporting of regime violence and misdistribution, indicate child mortality rates stabilized or declined post-1996 with Oil-for-Food, underscoring sanctions' pressure on the regime without alternatives that could have compelled WMD disarmament or deterred aggression. Overall, containment via sanctions, inspections, and no-fly zones succeeded in neutralizing Iraq's offensive capabilities and averting regional threats through 2002, as evidenced by the regime's inability to rebuild its military to pre-1991 levels or project power beyond borders.

2003 Invasion, Regime Overthrow, and Initial Occupation

The invasion of Iraq commenced on March 20, 2003, when U.S.-led coalition forces, primarily from the and , initiated ground operations from alongside air and missile strikes targeting Iraqi military and sites. Coalition troops, numbering around 160,000 in the initial phase, advanced northward rapidly, encountering sporadic resistance from Iraqi units and militias, with major cities like falling within days. By early April, forces reached Baghdad's outskirts, conducting "Thunder Runs" to probe defenses and secure key infrastructure such as the on April 4. Baghdad fell to coalition control on April 9, 2003, after Iraqi forces largely disintegrated, allowing U.S. Marines and units to enter the city center with minimal opposition; symbolic acts included the toppling of a large statue in amid crowds of Iraqis. President declared the end of major combat operations on May 1 from the USS Abraham Lincoln, though and remnants of his regime evaded capture initially. U.S. forces located and arrested Saddam on December 13, 2003, in an underground hideout near , where he surrendered without resistance; he was handed over to Iraqi authorities, tried for , and executed by hanging on December 30, 2006. The regime's collapse led to the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) on May 11, 2003, under U.S. diplomat L. Paul Bremer, who replaced the short-lived Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance to govern Iraq temporarily and facilitate transition to Iraqi-led institutions. The CPA issued Order No. 1 on de-Ba'athification on May 16, 2003, mandating the removal of senior Ba'ath Party members—estimated at over 20,000—from government, military, and security roles to dismantle the party's repressive apparatus, though implementation extended to mid-level officials, affecting public sector employment. Order No. 2, signed May 23, 2003, dissolved the Iraqi army, intelligence services, and other Ba'athist entities, demobilizing approximately 400,000 troops without immediate pay or reintegration plans, intending to eliminate regime enforcers but contributing to economic dislocation. Initial occupation challenges emerged from the abrupt regime vacuum, including widespread looting starting April 10, 2003, in and other cities, where unprotected government buildings, ministries, and the National Museum lost thousands of artifacts and equipment to opportunistic theft, exacerbating infrastructure decay from years of sanctions and war damage. Coalition forces prioritized military objectives over securing civil sites, leading to verifiable destruction of administrative records and facilities essential for governance continuity. Casualty data from the invasion phase (March-May 2003) reflect its swift nature: U.S. forces suffered 139 deaths (hostile and non-hostile), with total coalition fatalities under 200, while Iraqi military losses exceeded killed or captured, per operational reports, though civilian deaths numbered in the low thousands from and strikes, with precise figures contested due to incomplete reporting. Early reconstruction under CPA focused on stabilizing essentials, with $20 billion in U.S. appropriations by mid-2003 directed toward sector repairs (restoring production to 2 million barrels per day by late 2003) and electricity grid fixes, though output remained below pre-war levels at 80% capacity due to sabotage risks and deferred maintenance. These efforts, funded partly from Iraqi revenues and frozen assets, enabled basic service resumption in urban areas but highlighted shortfalls, as ad hoc contracts favored speed over oversight, per government audits. The tyrant Saddam's removal dismantled a system responsible for mass atrocities, creating conditions for eventual democratic processes despite operational frictions in the occupation's opening months.

Insurgency, Sectarian Civil War, and Counterinsurgency Efforts

Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, an emerged primarily among , driven by former Ba'athist elements and tribal leaders who rejected the dissolution of the Iraqi army via Order No. 2 and the perceived empowerment of Shia political actors in the new order. This Sunni rejectionism stemmed from fears of marginalization after decades of dominance, compounded by policies that alienated mid-level officers and officials, fueling attacks on coalition forces and Iraqi security personnel starting in mid-2003. By 2004, the had evolved with the rise of (AQI), led by , whose group conducted high-profile bombings targeting Shia civilians and recruits to exacerbate sectarian divides and undermine the post-Saddam government. Zarqawi's strategy deliberately provoked Shia retaliation to ignite civil war, viewing it as a means to expel foreign forces and establish Sunni Islamist dominance; this included bombings of Shia religious sites and markets, such as the August 2004 attacks in and killing over 200. The tipping point came on February 22, 2006, when AQI operatives bombed the in , destroying its golden dome and sparking waves of retaliatory Shia killings of Sunnis, transforming the into full-scale sectarian . Violence peaked in 2006-2007, with Iraq Body Count documenting 29,625 to 31,852 civilian deaths from July 2006 to June 2007, predominantly from sectarian executions and bombings, while monthly nationwide fatalities reached approximately 3,000 by December 2006 before beginning to decline. Empirical data indicate that AQI's alienating tactics—such as imposing strict foreign jihadist rule on local Sunnis, including forced marriages and —combined with longstanding grudges from Hussein's repression of Shia uprisings, drove the escalation more than occupation alone, as Sunni communities initially tolerated insurgents but recoiled from AQI's . Counterinsurgency efforts gained traction with the Anbar Awakening, beginning in late 2006 when Sunni tribal sheikhs in Al-Anbar Province, alienated by AQI's brutality, allied with U.S. forces to expel the group, forming local militias that numbered over 20,000 fighters by 2007 and significantly reduced attacks in the region from 25 daily in to four. Zarqawi's death in a U.S. on June 7, 2006, further weakened AQI's cohesion, though sectarian reprisals continued. The U.S. "Surge" strategy, announced January 10, 2007, and implemented under General , deployed an additional 20,000-30,000 troops to secure and surrounding areas, emphasizing population protection, tribal partnerships, and clear-hold-build operations rather than solely kinetic raids. By mid-2008, these efforts yielded a 60% decline in overall attacks and a 90% reduction in sectarian deaths compared to peaks, with civilian fatalities dropping to around 600 per month, enabling provincial Iraqi control transitions and stabilizing key urban centers. The turning points reflected causal dynamics where AQI's overreach fractured Sunni insurgent unity, allowing U.S.-backed local forces to reclaim territory, rather than exogenous factors like ceasefires alone; data from U.S. military metrics and independent tallies confirm the integrated approach's efficacy in reversing violence trajectories.

Rise of ISIS, Territorial Losses, and Global Coalition Response

In early 2014, the , evolving from , capitalized on Sunni Arab disenfranchisement fostered by Nouri al-Maliki's sectarian governance, including the reversal of de-Baathification for political gain, mass arrests of Sunni politicians and military officers, and empowerment of Shia militias, which eroded trust in the and created fertile ground for insurgency revival. On June 10, 2014, ISIS forces overran , Iraq's second-largest city, where approximately 30,000 ISF troops fled or surrendered, abandoning vast stockpiles of U.S.-supplied equipment including tanks, artillery, and that bolstered ISIS capabilities. Emboldened, ISIS declared a caliphate on June 30, 2014, under , claiming authority over territories in Iraq and and attracting an estimated 20,000-30,000 foreign fighters alongside local recruits. By mid-2015, ISIS had seized additional key areas, including the fall of on May 17, 2015, after ISF withdrawals amid tribal divisions and inadequate reinforcements, marking the group's deepest incursion into Anbar Province. At its zenith in 2015, ISIS controlled roughly 40% of Iraq's territory, encompassing urban centers and rural swaths, generating approximately $2 billion annually from illicit oil sales smuggled via and local rackets. ISIS atrocities peaked with the Sinjar genocide starting August 3, 2014, where fighters massacred thousands of — an ethno-religious minority deemed apostates—enslaved over 6,000 women and children, and displaced 400,000 into , prompting urgent humanitarian evacuations by Kurdish forces. The U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, announced September 10, 2014, initiated airstrikes in Iraq on August 8, 2014, targeting ISIS convoys and positions to relieve besieged and support ground operations by and reconstituted ISF units, delivering over 13,000 strikes by 2016 that degraded ISIS logistics and command structures without committing large-scale Western boots on the ground. Coalition efforts, coordinated via , combined precision bombing with intelligence sharing and training, enabling incremental territorial reversals such as the recapture of in April 2015, though initial gains exposed ISF morale issues rooted in prior sectarian purges. Mainstream analyses often underemphasize Maliki-era exclusions as a causal vector for Sunni acquiescence to ISIS, prioritizing jihadist over governance failures that left Sunni regions ungoverned and resentful.

ISIS Defeat, Political Deadlock, and Stabilization Attempts (2017-2021)

The battle to liberate from control, launched in October 2016, reached its climax in mid-2017, with Iraqi forces, supported by the U.S.-led , declaring the city retaken on July 10 after intense urban that resulted in over 9,000 deaths, including civilians, security personnel, and militants. This marked the effective end of 's territorial in Iraq, as the group lost its last major urban stronghold, though its fighters employed attrition tactics, improvised explosives, and fire to prolong resistance. Despite the victory, transitioned to a persistent , conducting guerrilla attacks, bombings, and ambushes in rural areas like the Anbar and Diyala , exploiting governance vacuums and sectarian grievances to maintain a latent threat. Parliamentary elections on May 12, 2018, reflected public frustration with entrenched corruption and elite capture, with the Sairoon alliance—led by Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and emphasizing anti-corruption and nationalism—securing the most seats at 54 out of 329, followed by alliances tied to former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and incumbent Haider al-Abadi. No bloc achieved a majority, triggering prolonged coalition negotiations marked by gridlock, as rival Shiite factions vied for influence amid Kurdish and Sunni marginalization. Adil Abdul-Mahdi, a Shiite independent with ties to both Islamist and secular groups, was nominated as prime minister on October 2, 2018, and confirmed shortly thereafter, forming a unity government that prioritized reconstruction but struggled with factional vetoes. Stabilization efforts post-ISIS focused on reintegrating liberated areas and bolstering state institutions, yielding modest economic recovery as oil production rebounded to pre-war levels, contributing to GDP growth of approximately 1.1% in and accelerating thereafter amid higher global prices, though non-oil sectors lagged due to damage estimated at $88 billion. The (PMF), Shiite-dominated militias formalized in 2016, played a pivotal role in the anti-ISIS campaign but entrenched as semi-autonomous entities post-victory, securing parliamentary seats, a $2.5 billion annual budget, and operational independence that undermined the state's monopoly on legitimate violence, particularly through Iran-aligned factions like exerting local control and political leverage. This duality—territorial gains versus fragmented authority—highlighted causal tensions between military success and institutional fragility, as PMF integration laws in 2016 and 2021 formalized their hybrid status without fully subordinating them to civilian oversight.

2019-2021 Protests, Government Formation, and Reforms

The Tishreen protests erupted on October 1, , primarily in and southern provinces, as predominantly young demonstrators decried systemic corruption, inadequate public services, and the muhasasa ta'ifiya sectarian quota system entrenched since 2003, which allocates government positions by ethno-sectarian affiliation and fosters patronage networks. High , estimated at 36 percent compared to the national rate of 16 percent, exacerbated grievances among participants, many of whom were students or underemployed individuals lacking viable economic prospects. The movement's leaderless nature and cross-sectarian composition distinguished it from prior partisan mobilizations, emphasizing domestic failures over external influences. Security forces responded with lethal force, including live ammunition, snipers, and canisters fired at close range, resulting in over 600 protester deaths and thousands injured by late 2019, with a attributing at least 149 initial fatalities directly to state actors in alone. Pro-Iranian militias affiliated with the also participated in attacks on encampments, though official probes rarely held perpetrators accountable. Sustained demonstrations, peaking in November amid clashes that killed dozens more, compelled Adil Abdul-Mahdi to resign on November 29, 2019, marking a rare concession to public pressure. Following two failed prime ministerial nominations, , former intelligence chief, secured parliamentary approval as interim prime minister on May 7, 2020, pledging anti-corruption drives, economic stabilization, and early elections to address Tishreen demands. His government enacted electoral reforms in November 2020, reducing district sizes to favor independents over party machines and curbing vote-buying practices, though implementation faced resistance from entrenched elites. Sporadic protests persisted through 2020 and into 2021, with activists facing assassinations and harassment, underscoring limited progress on accountability for repression. In response to ongoing unrest, snap parliamentary elections occurred on , 2021, yielding a fragmented Council of Representatives where Muqtada al-Sadr's Sadrist Movement secured 73 of 329 seats as the largest bloc, capitalizing on its anti-corruption rhetoric aligned with Tishreen sentiments. Al-Sadr advocated excluding rival Shiite factions like the Iran-backed Coordination Framework from government formation, nominating allies for key posts, but opposition stalled presidential and premiership selections, initiating a protracted deadlock that paralyzed governance into late 2021. This impasse highlighted persistent muhasasa dynamics, as coalitions maneuvered via veto powers rather than reform mandates, despite dropping to 41 percent amid disillusionment.

Developments from 2022 to 2025: Elections, US Drawdown, and Fragile Stability

assumed the role of prime minister on October 27, 2022, following his designation by President on October 13, 2022, amid efforts to resolve a year-long political deadlock after the 2021 elections. His government launched the National Development Plan (NDP) 2024-2028 in August 2024, emphasizing improvements in public services, infrastructure development, oil and gas sector expansion, and sustainable resource management to diversify the economy beyond oil dependency. In the , parliamentary elections occurred on October 20, 2024, after multiple delays from the original 2022 date due to disputes over the between the (KDP) and (PUK). The KDP secured the most seats, but ongoing rifts between the parties have complicated government formation, highlighting persistent divisions despite voter turnout around 70%. Iraq's national parliamentary elections are scheduled for November 11, 2025, to elect 329 members amid low expected turnout and scrutiny over militia influence. Shiite cleric , who withdrew his bloc from politics in 2022, has conditioned any return on the dismantlement of armed militias and restoration of state authority, though he reaffirmed a in July 2025; his potential participation could reshape power dynamics. Fiscal vulnerabilities loom large, with oil prices around $67 per barrel exacerbating budget shortfalls in an oil-reliant , potentially delaying reforms and heightening pre-election spending pressures without measures. The initiated a drawdown of its military mission in Iraq on October 1, 2025, per a bilateral agreement to conclude the anti-ISIS coalition presence by September 2025, involving departures from bases like Ain al-Asad while retaining a small advisory force at select sites due to ongoing ISIS threats; this transition shifts focus to bilateral cooperation and regional operations from and . Security remains fragile, with overall violence levels low since 2022 but punctuated by incidents like the October 15, 2025, car bombing of parliamentary Safaa al-Mashhadani in , the first such political killing ahead of the vote, prompting arrests of five suspects in a case deemed criminal rather than terrorist. Tribal clashes in southern Iraq and militia autonomy persist as concerns, fueling calls for disarmament to consolidate state control, though entrenched patronage resists integration.

Geography

Physical Features and Borders

Iraq encompasses a total area of 438,317 square kilometers, predominantly featuring broad, flat, or rolling plains in the central and southern regions known as the , with low desert expanses in the west and rugged mountains in the north and northeast forming part of the . The elevation varies from at the to 3,611 meters at Cheekha Dar peak in the , with a mean elevation of 312 meters. Approximately 21.6% of the land is agricultural, including 11.6% arable, while desert covers significant portions, particularly in the western extension. Iraq's land boundaries total approximately 3,800 kilometers, shared with six neighboring countries: Turkey (367 km to the north), Syria (599 km to the northwest), Jordan (179 km to the west), Saudi Arabia (814 km to the southwest), Kuwait (242 km to the south), and Iran (1,599 km to the east). These borders, largely defined by post-World War I treaties and subsequent agreements, traverse diverse terrains from mountainous frontiers in the northeast to arid expanses in the west and south. The southeastern boundary with follows the waterway, formed by the confluence of the and rivers, providing Iraq's primary outlet to the but marked by longstanding territorial disputes. Key conflicts include the 1975 Algiers Agreement, which delimited the as the border but was abrogated by Iraq in 1980, precipitating the Iran-Iraq War. Water scarcity in Iraq's river systems stems substantially from upstream dams constructed by and , which impound flows of the and , diminishing downstream volumes beyond climatic variability alone.

Hydrography and Water Resources

The and rivers constitute the primary hydrographic features of Iraq, forming a transboundary system that supplies over 90% of the country's renewable . The originates primarily in and receives significant contributions from Iranian tributaries, with upstream countries ( and ) accounting for approximately 49% of its total flow, while internal Iraqi sources provide the remaining 51%. The , also rising in and passing through , derives nearly all its water from these upstream riparian states, with and contributing 90% and 10% respectively before entering Iraq. These rivers converge near to form the waterway, which discharges into the . Major dams upstream and within Iraq have profoundly altered natural flow regimes. Turkey's Atatürk Dam, completed in 1992 as part of the Southeast Project, impounds waters for and , contributing to reduced downstream discharges during filling phases and operational storage. In Iraq, the on the , constructed in the 1980s, serves as a critical but has faced structural due to karstic foundation issues, requiring ongoing grouting and risking catastrophic failure without maintenance. Additional dams in on tributaries, such as the Daryan Dam operational since 2015, further regulate flows entering Iraq. These structures, combined with evaporation losses and upstream abstractions, have led to verifiable flow declines: inflows to Iraq have decreased by 40-45% since the early 1970s, primarily attributable to the construction of over 30 dams and barrages in the basin. Water resource challenges in Iraq stem from both transboundary controls and domestic factors, including inefficient practices inherited from mid-20th-century expansions that diverted rivers for , exacerbating intrusion. Total dissolved solids in the Euphrates have more than doubled since 1973 at the Iraqi border, reaching levels that impair downstream usability due to reduced dilution from lower volumes and return flows laden with salts from evaporated water. Tigris flows have experienced lesser but notable reductions, estimated at around 30% in recent decades, compounded by trapping behind that diminishes natural replenishment of alluvial soils. solutions, such as improved dam operations for equitable releases and domestic water recycling, offer pathways to mitigate shortages beyond diplomatic disputes, as historical data indicate that internal overuse and poor infrastructure maintenance amplify upstream impacts.

Climate Patterns and Environmental Degradation

Iraq experiences a predominantly hot (Köppen BWh) across much of its territory, transitioning to semi-arid (BSh) conditions in the northern mountainous regions. Summers are intensely hot, with average highs in reaching 45°C (113°F) in and occasional peaks exceeding 50°C (122°F) in southern areas during heatwaves. Winters are mild, with January averages around 10.5°C (51°F) in central Iraq, though northern highlands can drop to 8°C (46°F). Annual averages 200-400 mm, concentrated between and April, with northern regions receiving up to 400-600 mm while southern deserts see less than 100 mm, contributing to stark regional variability. Dust storms, driven by shamal winds from the northwest, are a defining feature, occurring throughout the year but peaking in spring and summer, accounting for 72-93% of events. These storms, intensified by arid soils and low vegetation cover, reduce visibility to near zero, deposit fine particulates, and exacerbate respiratory issues, with satellite observations showing plumes extending across the country and into neighboring regions. Meteorological data indicate increased frequency linked to land surface degradation, as bare expanses facilitate wind erosion. Environmental degradation manifests primarily through desertification, affecting approximately 39-40% of Iraq's land area, equivalent to a region the size of Florida, via soil erosion, salinization, and loss of arable land at rates claiming tens of thousands of acres annually. Primary causal factors include overgrazing by livestock, deforestation, and unsustainable agricultural practices, which predate modern conflicts and stem from population pressures and inadequate land management, rather than episodic wartime damage. Natural amplifiers like recurrent droughts and rising temperatures (projected 1.9-3.2°C increase) compound these, but empirical assessments prioritize anthropogenic mismanagement over war-related incidents as the dominant drivers. Wartime pollution, such as the Kuwait oil well fires ignited by retreating Iraqi forces—numbering over 600 wells burning until November—produced plumes reaching 250 km into Iraq, causing temporary atmospheric cooling of 5-8°C, deposition, and regional air quality degradation with toxic aerosols and gases. However, long-term and impacts in Iraq remain localized and secondary to chronic overuse. munitions, used in and conflicts totaling around 1,200-2,000 tons, contaminated over 350 sites, but evidence for widespread environmental persistence is limited, with external radiation negligible and ecological effects confined to hotspots rather than broad drivers.

Biodiversity, Natural Resources, and Geological Significance

Iraq's biodiversity encompasses diverse ecosystems, including the Mesopotamian Marshes in the south, arid deserts in the west, and mountainous regions in the north associated with the Zagros range. The country hosts over 4,500 vascular plant species, 417 bird species, and 106 fish species, with the marshes historically serving as a critical wetland supporting unique aquatic and avian life. However, anthropogenic factors such as the systematic drainage of the marshes—reducing their extent by approximately 90% between 1991 and 2003—have driven significant habitat loss and species declines, primarily through desiccation and conversion to agriculture rather than climatic shifts alone. Partial reflooding post-2003 has enabled some recovery, with about 58% of the original marsh area restored by 2006, though recent upstream damming and reduced river flows have caused renewed drying, affecting 22 globally endangered species and 66 at-risk bird populations. Natural resources in Iraq are dominated by hydrocarbons, with proven crude oil reserves estimated at 145 billion barrels as of , ranking fifth globally and comprising 17% of Middle Eastern proved reserves. These reserves, concentrated in the southern and northern basins, underpin extractable wealth but face challenges from under-explored potential and political instability. Iraq also possesses substantial non-hydrocarbon minerals, including some of the world's largest deposits, extensive reserves exceeding 10 billion tons, and , though exploitation of the latter remains limited. Geologically, Iraq lies within the Zagros Fold and Thrust Belt, a Neogene-era orogenic system formed by the collision of the Arabian Plate with the Eurasian Plate, creating folded anticlines that trap hydrocarbons and host 49% of global reserves in such fold-thrust structures. This tectonic regime, extending from southeastern through to the Iranian border, features thick sedimentary sequences from to eras, with the belt's deformation providing structural traps for oil accumulation in reservoirs like the Burgan and Asmari formations. The Zagros' significance extends to seismic hazards and mineral deposition, but its primary value derives from enabling Iraq's oil endowment through fault-related folds and stratigraphic traps.

Government and Politics

Constitutional Structure and Federalism

The Constitution of Iraq, ratified by referendum on October 15, 2005, establishes the country as a federal parliamentary democracy with Islam as a foundational source of legislation. The preamble affirms Iraq's Islamic identity while guaranteeing religious freedoms, and declares the state as independent, sovereign, democratic, and federal, emphasizing unity amid diversity. Article 1 specifies the Republic of Iraq as a single federal state with a republican, representative, parliamentary, and democratic system of government. This framework divides powers between federal authorities and regions, with the federal government retaining exclusive competencies in areas such as national defense, foreign policy, and monetary standards, while regions hold authority over local matters not reserved federally. Central to federal resource management, Article 111 declares oil and gas as owned by all Iraqi people across regions and governorates, with Article 112 mandating federal oversight of exports and development of fields in cooperation with regions and producer governorates, prioritizing undeveloped regions. Article 109 vests the federal government with formulating oil and gas policy, reflecting centralized control over national economic levers despite regional claims. Article 117 recognizes the as a federal entity, preserving its pre-existing authorities until altered by federal legislation approved by the regional legislature, which has entrenched de facto autonomy but fueled disputes over power delineation. Article 140 outlines a process for resolving disputed territories, including , through normalization of demographics, a , and a by June 30, 2007—a deadline unmet due to political impasse, leaving the province's status contested between federal, Kurdish, and Arab claims. This unresolved ambiguity exemplifies broader tensions between unitary impulses in and federal aspirations, particularly in , where centralist rulings by the Federal Supreme Court have overridden regional prerogatives, such as in oil revenue disputes. Debates over amendments persist, driven by the constitution's vague allocation of powers, which critics argue enables institutional and veto-heavy in federal-regional relations. Proposals for revision, including clearer formulas, have gained traction amid post-election deadlocks, with calls for a constitutional to address flaws like that hinder unified governance without dissolving the state. Such critiques highlight how interpretive ambiguities, rather than explicit consociational mechanisms, exacerbate factional standoffs, as evidenced by repeated failures to legislate shared competencies.

Executive Branch and Prime Ministerial Role

The 2005 Iraqi Constitution designates the as the and the primary executive authority, responsible for directing the , implementing state policies, and serving as of the armed forces. The nominates ministers for parliamentary approval, supervises federal ministries, and represents Iraq in key diplomatic and military decisions. In practice, this role has centralized power in the 's office, enabling figures like during 2006-2014 to expand influence through control over security apparatuses despite constitutional limits. The President, elected by , functions in a ceremonial capacity with restricted powers, including ratifying laws, appointing judges on the 's recommendation, and formally nominating the after parliamentary selection. By post-2003 convention, the is reserved for a Kurdish candidate to ensure ethnic balance, as seen in appointments of in 2005 and in 2022. This arrangement limits presidential intervention in daily governance, subordinating the office to the 's agenda. Post-2003 coalition dynamics have complicated Prime Ministerial selection, requiring the nominee from the largest parliamentary bloc to secure cross-factional support amid fragmented Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish alliances. Delays in this process—such as the 13-month deadlock after the October 2021 elections—have empirically fostered instability, creating power vacuums that strain security and economic management. Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, appointed on October 27, 2022, exemplifies the role's demands, leading a Coordination Framework coalition to prioritize infrastructure reconstruction, poverty alleviation through job programs, and balanced foreign engagements, including U.S. partnership talks in 2024. Despite formal checks, personal networks and patronage have sustained Prime Ministerial dominance, overriding institutional constraints as causal drivers of executive continuity.

Legislative Process and Sectarian Quota System (Muhasasa)

The Council of Representatives serves as Iraq's unicameral legislature, comprising 329 members elected every four years through proportional representation across 18 multi-member constituencies corresponding to the country's governorates. Of these seats, 320 are allocated via party-list voting, with 9 reserved for ethnic and religious minorities, including 5 for Christians, 1 each for Yazidis, Shabaks, and Sabeans-Mandaeans; additionally, at least one-quarter of seats (83) must be held by women to promote gender balance. The body convenes in Baghdad's Green Zone, holds sessions to debate and pass legislation, ratify budgets, and oversee the executive, but requires a quorum of two-thirds for key actions like electing the president or approving international treaties. Voter turnout in the October 2021 elections, held early amid protests, reached only 41-43%, reflecting widespread disillusionment with the system's efficacy. The muhasasa (quota) system structures top executive positions along ethno-sectarian lines, with the prime ministership reserved for Shiites, the parliamentary speakership for Sunnis, and the presidency for , extending to ministerial portfolios and state appointments divided proportionally among major groups. This informal power-sharing arrangement originated in the early 1990s among exiled Iraqi opposition figures but was formalized post-2003 following the U.S.-led invasion, initially through the and subsequent coalitions to stabilize a fractured by ensuring communal representation. Proponents frame it as inclusive preventing dominance by any single sect, yet it inherently prioritizes group affiliation over competence, creating multiple veto points that demand cross-sectarian consensus for decisions, often paralyzing governance absent meritocratic checks. Muhasasa contributes to legislative gridlock, as evidenced by the fifth parliamentary term (2021-2025), where only 51% of scheduled sessions (132 out of 256) occurred by mid-2025, stalling bills due to sectarian bargaining and absenteeism. This low productivity manifests in protracted delays for even routine legislation, with political rifts frequently blocking quorum and forcing deferrals of over 200 pending bills to the next assembly, underscoring how quota-driven alliances incentivize obstruction over policy advancement. Empirical patterns reveal that without alternatives emphasizing individual qualifications or electoral reforms, the system sustains elite pacts that undermine legislative output, as intra-sect competition for shares diverts focus from national priorities.

Corruption, Patronage, and Institutional Weakness

Iraq ranks among the most corrupt countries globally, scoring 26 out of 100 on Transparency International's 2024 , placing it 140th out of 180 nations, an improvement of three points from the previous year but still indicative of entrenched graft. This perception stems from systemic , where political leaders and sectarian parties exploit state resources for personal gain, undermining institutional integrity. Audits and official estimates attribute over $150 billion in losses to since 2003, primarily through smuggling and illicit deals in the oil sector, with former President stating that this figure represents funds siphoned from nearly $1 trillion in oil revenues during that period. Higher estimates, such as $300 billion cited by Iraqi officials, highlight the scale of , where elites control revenue streams without accountability. The muhasasa sectarian quota system, embedded in Iraq's post-2003 political order, facilitates by allocating ministerial posts and budgets along ethnic and confessional lines, enabling parties to distribute public funds to loyalists rather than merit-based allocation. This mechanism perpetuates , as political blocs appropriate bureaucracy and resources, using expanded payrolls for "ghost employees"—fictitious names drawing salaries without rendering service—to build clientelist networks across civilian ministries. Oil smuggling exemplifies this persistence, with militias and corrupt officials diverting refined products and crude, often blending Iranian oil with Iraqi exports to evade sanctions, generating billions in untaxed revenue that bolsters rather than public coffers. Institutional weakness arises from the resource curse inherent in Iraq's oil-dependent economy, where rents incentivize over institutional development, compounded by absent checks like independent audits or judicial enforcement. Elites repress mechanisms, capturing oversight bodies and using legal structures to shield flows, as seen in the failure to prosecute high-level actors despite Commission of Integrity referrals. Causal factors prioritize weak internal —lacking and rule enforcement—over external aid narratives, necessitating domestic reforms to dismantle muhasasa and prioritize fiscal transparency to mitigate elite entrenchment. Iraq's legal framework operates as a hybrid system blending civil law traditions inherited from Ottoman and post-independence codes with Sharia principles, particularly in personal status matters. The 2005 Constitution's Article 41 permits Iraqis to adhere to personal status laws aligned with their religious sects or beliefs, effectively allowing Sharia-based rules for marriage, divorce, inheritance, and custody, drawn from an amalgam of Sunni and Shia Islamic schools. This contrasts with secular civil and criminal codes, which derive from French-influenced models but incorporate Islamic oversight, as no legislation may contradict "the established provisions of Islam." The Federal Supreme Court (FSC), established under Article 92, serves as the apex judicial body, with nine justices appointed for life by a two-thirds parliamentary majority after nomination by the Supreme Judicial Council; it adjudicates constitutional disputes, federal-regional conflicts, and election challenges. The FSC has issued rulings reinforcing federal authority in disputed territories, such as its 2019 decision upholding constitutional provisions on Kirkuk's status pending full implementation of normalization measures from earlier agreements. In November 2024, it dismissed five complaints against Kirkuk's provincial council, citing procedural grounds, which critics viewed as sidestepping deeper ethnic quota disputes. However, the court's perceived politicization undermines its independence, with appointments influenced by sectarian quotas and parliamentary blocs, leading to accusations of bias in cases. Rule of law faces severe enforcement gaps, exacerbated by a chronic judicial backlog that delays trials and contributes to prolonged pretrial detentions. Nongovernmental organizations report that insufficient judges, slow investigations, and resource shortages result in hearings postponed for months or years, with thousands of cases pending across courts. Politicization manifests in militia impunity, particularly for Popular Mobilization Units (PMF), where Iran-aligned groups and federal forces often evade prosecution for abuses due to political protection and parallel command structures outside judicial reach. The U.S. State Department notes PMF and militia operations with de facto impunity, as investigations rarely lead to convictions amid patronage networks. Human Rights Watch has documented state-sanctioned unlawful executions surging in 2024, with at least 150 prisoners at risk without due process safeguards, highlighting systemic failures in judicial oversight. These issues perpetuate a cycle where powerful actors bypass courts, eroding public trust and effective legal enforcement. The (ISF) encompass the , , , and federal police, with the army forming the core at approximately 193,000 active personnel as of recent assessments. Post-ISIS territorial defeat in 2017, the ISF has focused on internal stabilization, counter-terrorism, and border security, though challenges persist in cohesion and operational readiness due to sectarian divisions and equipment maintenance issues. The forces operate a mix of Western and Eastern hardware, including 36 U.S.-supplied F-16IQ fighter jets delivered between 2014 and 2018, which have become central to air capabilities amid shortages in legacy Russian aircraft parts exacerbated by global conflicts. The Popular Mobilization Units (PMF), formalized under a parliamentary , integrate over 230,000 fighters into the state while retaining significant , operating parallel to the regular under nominal oversight of the prime minister as . Comprising dozens of predominantly Shia militias, many formed in 2014 to combat , the PMF played a decisive role in liberating territories like but has since expanded rapidly, with personnel numbers surging 95% in recent , raising concerns over unchecked growth and resource allocation. This structure allows PMF brigades to maintain independent command chains, procurement, and deployments, often prioritizing local or factional interests over unified national strategy. In 2025, Iraqi authorities have pursued PMF integration to centralize control, including draft legislation debated in to regulate its authority, yet proposals risk entrenching its independence by designating it a permanent entity outside full military subordination. U.S. officials have criticized such moves, arguing they hinder disarmament or absorption into the ISF and preserve Iran-aligned factions—estimated at over 60 groups pledging loyalty to Iran's Supreme Leader— that have conducted attacks on American targets and undermine state sovereignty. Critics from think tanks like the Washington Institute describe the PMF as a "state within a state," with Iranian influence manifesting in operational decisions, such as withholding participation in national operations unless aligned with Tehran's regional agenda, complicating Iraq's post-ISIS architecture. Despite these tensions, PMF units contribute to counter-ISIS remnants and border patrols, equipped with captured, donated, or procured arms including Iranian-supplied drones and artillery, though lacking the ISF's air assets.

Human Rights Record: Abuses and International Scrutiny

Under the Ba'athist regime of , Iraq experienced systematic abuses, including the of an estimated 250,000 to 300,000 individuals, primarily , Shi'a Muslims, and political opponents, through arbitrary arrests, mass executions, and operations. These violations encompassed widespread in facilities like , involving beatings, acid burns, and suspension from limbs, as documented in survivor testimonies and international reports prior to 2003. The regime's centralized repression resulted in higher per capita state-inflicted killings compared to post-invasion periods, with empirical data indicating annual death tolls from political violence exceeding those seen in subsequent decentralized conflicts, though total post-2003 civilian casualties from and actions cumulatively rivaled earlier figures. Following the 2003 invasion, abuses shifted from state-orchestrated mass disappearances to fragmented violence by security forces, militias, and armed groups, including routine in detention centers through beatings with cables, electric shocks, and . During the 2019-2020 protests against and failures, and Iran-backed militias killed at least 500 demonstrators in the initial weeks, with a total death toll exceeding 600 and over 19,000 wounded, often via sniper fire, munitions to the head, and abductions. investigations highlighted for these acts, with few prosecutions despite orders for restraint, contrasting the Saddam era's top-down terror but revealing persistent failures in under the post-2003 constitutional framework. LGBTQ individuals face severe extrajudicial violence rather than formal state executions, with armed groups conducting at least four documented killings, eight abductions, and 27 instances of sexual violence between 2015 and 2021, often under pretext of moral offenses. Honor killings remain endemic, perpetrated by families against perceived violators of sexual norms, including LGBTQ persons and women in extramarital relations, with cultural and tribal enforcement bypassing legal protections despite the penal code's nominal equality provisions. In 2024, parliament passed legislation criminalizing same-sex relations with up to 15 years' imprisonment, intensifying scrutiny from organizations like Human Rights Watch, which report such measures enable militia-led vigilantism. Women's rights have regressed post-2003 amid sectarian power-sharing and conservative backlash, with increased vulnerability to , forced marriages, and honor killings, as and displacement eroded pre-invasion urban gains in and . The 1959 Personal Status Law's secular protections were partially supplanted by Article 41 of the 2005 Constitution, allowing sectarian courts to apply Sharia-based rules favoring male guardianship and limiting rights, contributing to higher reported gender-based rates than under Ba'athist . International scrutiny from UN and emphasizes slow reparations for these abuses, though empirical stability post-ISIS defeat in 2017 has reduced mass atrocities, enabling some activism despite ongoing impunity for perpetrators across regimes.

Administrative Divisions, Local Governance, and Kurdish Autonomy

Iraq is divided into 19 governorates (muhafazat), each governed by an elected provincial council and a governor appointed by the prime minister, with Baghdad functioning as both a governorate and the national capital under direct federal oversight. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) exercises autonomy over four governorates—Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Duhuk, and Halabja—managing internal affairs such as security, education, health, and economic policy within its territory, though revenue-sharing and territorial disputes with the federal government in Baghdad persist. Halabja was elevated to full governorate status on April 14, 2025, expanding the KRG's administrative scope amid ongoing integration debates. Local governance outside the KRG operates through decentralized structures established post-2003, including and sub-district levels, but implementation has been hampered by weak institutional capacity and networks. Governors derive from provincial councils elected every four years, yet federal intervention often overrides local decisions, particularly in budget allocation and security matters. In the KRG, the allows greater legislative independence, with the regional president and sharing executive powers, enabling more cohesive policy execution compared to the fragmented Arab-majority governorates. The KRG's , formalized in 2005, includes control over natural resources, but export rights remain contested, exemplified by a shutdown from 2023 to September 2025 due to Baghdad's demands for centralized revenue control. A tripartite agreement in September 2025 restarted exports via , with the KRG committing to hand over 50% of proceeds, though enforcement relies on fragile compliance amid historical KRG independent sales generating billions without federal approval. The 2017 , where 92.73% of voters in the approved secession on September 25, underscored autonomy aspirations but was rejected by Baghdad and non-recognized internationally, triggering federal forces' recapture of disputed areas like and reinforcing centralist pushback. Decentralization has differentially empowered the KRG, fostering relative stability and service delivery through 's asymmetric application, while in governorates, it exacerbates fragmentation via entrenched and sectarian quotas undermining merit-based governance. Iraq's 2024 score of 26 out of 100 reflects systemic graft, with local officials implicated in 8.3% of cases investigated across 15 federal governorates, eroding and efficacy. Empirical outcomes indicate mitigates Kurdish marginalization by preserving regional institutions against Baghdad's recentralization efforts, but causal dynamics in areas reveal devolution's failure to curb , as politicized councils prioritize over development, perpetuating institutional weakness without unified national oversight.

Foreign Relations

Post-2003 Realignments and Regional Dynamics

Following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011, as stipulated in the U.S.-Iraq (SOFA) signed in November 2008 and effective from January 1, 2009, Iraq's foreign alignments shifted toward greater accommodation of Iranian interests while attempting to maintain broader regional ties. The SOFA had governed U.S. military operations, including immunity for forces and restrictions on third-country attacks from Iraqi soil, but its expiration left a vacuum that enabled expanded Iranian political and economic penetration, particularly under (2006–2014), who aligned more closely with amid shared Shia governance structures. This pivot reflected causal dynamics of reduced U.S. leverage post-withdrawal, allowing to leverage sectarian affinities and proxy networks to counter Sunni Arab and Western influences. Bilateral trade between Iraq and Iran expanded significantly after 2011, reaching approximately $10–13 billion annually by the early 2020s, dominated by Iraqi imports of Iranian electricity, natural gas, and consumer goods essential for stabilizing Iraq's grid and economy. Iran's exports to Iraq, including energy supplies critical during summer peaks, created dependencies that bolstered Tehran's sway, with volumes growing from under $1 billion pre-2003 to over $8 billion by 2010 and sustaining double-digit figures thereafter despite U.S. sanctions waivers for Iraq. This economic interdependence, coupled with Iranian support for Shia militias integrated into Iraq's security apparatus, facilitated a de facto alliance, though Iraqi leaders publicly framed it as pragmatic necessity rather than ideological alignment. Iraq pursued reintegration with Sunni Arab states to offset Iranian dominance, hosting the Summit in in 2012 as a marker of normalization after years of isolation under , though formal membership had never lapsed. Relations with , however, strained over upstream dam projects like the (GAP), which have reduced and inflows by up to 50% since the , exacerbating Iraq's and enabling to wield hydrological leverage in negotiations over security, trade, and Kurdish issues. Turkish dams, including Ilisu on the , have triggered downstream salinization and agricultural losses, prompting Iraqi accusations of non-compliance with 1980s water-sharing protocols. Iraqi governments have asserted a policy of "balanced neutrality" in great-power competitions, as articulated by Prime Minister in 2023–2025 statements emphasizing sovereignty and non-alignment. Yet this stance is undermined by recurrent attacks on U.S. bases by Iran-aligned militias within Iraq's Popular Mobilization Units (PMF), with over 150 documented strikes since October 2023, including drone and assaults on facilities like . Baghdad's failure to disband or decisively curb these groups—despite constitutional authority over the PMF—signals tacit tolerance, as the militias provide deniability while advancing Iranian objectives against U.S. presence, highlighting the limits of Iraq's claimed in regional dynamics.

Iranian Influence, Proxy Militias, and Border Security

Iranian influence in Iraq has been exerted primarily through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF), which has cultivated a network of Shiite proxy militias integrated into the (PMF). These groups, including , receive funding, training, and weaponry from , enabling them to operate with significant autonomy from the Iraqi central government. The killing of IRGC-QF commander and PMF deputy leader in a U.S. drone strike on , 2020, near underscored these deep ties, as Soleimani had directed proxy operations in Iraq. In retaliation, launched over a dozen ballistic missiles at U.S. bases in Iraq on January 8, 2020, injuring over 100 U.S. personnel and highlighting the militias' alignment with Tehran's strategic objectives over Iraqi sovereignty. These Iran-backed militias have conducted hundreds of attacks against U.S. and forces, demonstrating their role as destabilizing actors rather than mere defenders against external threats. Since , 2023, groups under the "Islamic Resistance in Iraq" banner—largely PMF factions—have launched more than 180 attacks on U.S. positions in Iraq, , and using rockets, drones, and missiles. In Iraq alone, at least 78 such incidents occurred by mid-2025, often in coordination with broader Iranian proxy efforts amid regional escalations. This pattern erodes Iraqi sovereignty, as militias prioritize Iranian directives, including threats to expel U.S. forces, over national stability. Border security between Iraq and remains highly porous, facilitating militia operations and illicit activities that further entrench Tehran's influence. Unofficial crossings, controlled by pro-ian militias and criminal networks, serve as primary routes for weapons, drugs, and contraband from Iran into Iraq. In eastern provinces like Diyala, IRGC-aligned groups exploit remote valleys for trafficking, complicating Iraqi efforts to curb cross-border flows that fund militia activities. These porosities not only bolster proxy capabilities but also undermine , with militias reportedly involved in oil via routes like the Shalamcheh crossing. Economic dependencies have historically amplified Iranian leverage, particularly through imports, though recent U.S. policy shifts have curtailed this. Iraq relied on Iranian for about one-third of its power generation and imported covering up to 3% of demand as of early 2025. However, the U.S. terminated sanctions waivers on March 9, 2025, halting imports and prompting Iraq to seek alternatives amid worsening shortages. In response to ongoing militia threats, U.S. urged Iraqi in October 2025 to prioritize disarming Iran-backed groups to restore and regional stability. This call reflects empirical evidence of militias' role in perpetuating violence and external control.

United States Partnership: From Invasion to 2025 Drawdown

Following the 2003 invasion, the provided Iraq with extensive reconstruction and security assistance, appropriating over $49 billion by the mid-2000s for efforts including rebuilding and stabilization. This aid encompassed $20.9 billion authorized by for civilian reconstruction in the years immediately after the invasion, focusing on like , , and oil . Subsequent assistance shifted toward military , with the U.S. Department of State delivering $1.25 billion in Foreign Military Financing since 2015 to enhance Iraq's defense capabilities against ongoing threats. In response to the Islamic State (ISIS) offensive in 2014, the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS re-engaged, providing critical airpower, intelligence, and training that enabled Iraqi forces to reclaim territory, culminating in the territorial defeat of ISIS by 2019. U.S. forces trained tens of thousands of Iraqi security personnel and supplied equipment, fostering operational independence without committing large-scale ground troops, though critics note persistent reliance on external support has limited full self-sufficiency. By early 2025, approximately 2,500 U.S. troops remained in advisory roles at bases including Al-Asad, supporting counter-ISIS operations and bilateral security cooperation. A September 2024 U.S.-Iraq agreement outlined the transition of the coalition's military mission, set to conclude no later than September 2025, with U.S. forces departing key sites like Baghdad headquarters and Al-Asad Air Base. Drawdown commenced in October 2025, reducing troop numbers below 2,000 while retaining limited advisory presence at select locations to continue defeat-ISIS efforts. Analysts have critiqued the withdrawal as potentially creating a security vacuum exploitable by Iran-backed militias, which could expand influence amid weakened U.S. deterrence, though proponents emphasize Iraq's improved capacities as evidence of successful partnership outcomes.

Relations with Arab States, Gulf Monarchies, and Turkey

Iraq's relations with fellow Arab states have seen gradual normalization since , driven by and shared concerns over regional instability, though historical animosities and sectarian divides have constrained deeper integration. and , among the earliest to engage the post-invasion Iraqi government, have fostered ties through trade agreements and infrastructure projects; for instance, supplies Iraq with electricity and hosts millions of Iraqi refugees, while a 2021 tripartite economic framework with aims to enhance connectivity via pipelines and rail links. Relations with remain tense due to longstanding rivalry and accusations of Damascus harboring insurgents during Iraq's , with border closures and diplomatic freezes persisting into the before partial reopenings amid Syria's . With Gulf monarchies, Iraq has pursued pragmatic economic outreach amid lingering distrust from Saddam Hussein's era, particularly the 1990 invasion of , which imposed $52.4 billion in UN-mandated reparations fully settled by Iraq in 2022. Saudi Arabia reopened its embassy in in April 2019 after a 25-year hiatus, following initial steps in 2015, and launched the Arar border crossing for trade in November 2020, facilitating $1 billion in pledged loans for Iraqi development projects. , after protracted negotiations, reached a 2012 settlement on pre-1990 debts from the Iran-Iraq War, including $500 million for aviation liabilities, signaling a thaw despite initial resistance to full forgiveness. The has emerged as Iraq's largest Gulf trading partner, with bilateral non-oil trade exceeding $28 billion in 2023, fueled by UAE investments in Iraqi , , and energy sectors. Turkey's engagement with Iraq balances robust economic ties against persistent security frictions, primarily Ankara's cross-border operations targeting the (PKK). Turkey maintains over 80 military bases and outposts in northern Iraq as of 2025, conducting airstrikes and ground incursions that intensified post-2019, eliminating hundreds of PKK militants annually while prompting Iraqi protests over sovereignty violations. Economically, has grown, bolstered by the September 2025 reopening of the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline, which restores Iraq's export capacity to 3.6 million barrels per day and addresses Turkey's energy needs, though disputes over water sharing from the and rivers complicate negotiations. These dynamics reflect Iraq's constrained sectarian thaw with Sunni-majority neighbors, where Iranian influence over Baghdad's Shia-led institutions limits alignment against shared threats like .

Kurdish Regional Government Interactions and Independence Referendum Aftermath

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) held an on September 25, 2017, in which voters in the region and disputed territories overwhelmingly supported secession from Iraq, with turnout at 72% and over 92% favoring independence. In response, the Iraqi central government in rejected the vote as unconstitutional and launched a military offensive on October 16, 2017, reclaiming control of key oil-rich disputed areas including from retreating forces, who offered minimal resistance amid internal divisions and lack of external backing. This resulted in the KRG losing approximately 40% of the territory it had controlled since 2014, severing access to Kirkuk's oil fields that had previously generated up to 350,000 barrels per day in independent exports via a to . Baghdad intensified economic pressures by halting federal budget transfers to Erbil, which had constituted the KRG's primary revenue source; in the national budget, Iraq's reduced the KRG's share from the prior 17% of total expenditures—based on —to 12.6%, effectively slashing funding by about 25% and exacerbating the region's fiscal amid unpaid salaries. Oil disputes escalated as Baghdad halted KRG exports through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan , dropping flows to under 250,000 barrels per day by late 2017 and accusing Erbil of unauthorized sales that bypassed national revenue-sharing laws established under the 2014 federal oil law. These measures, compounded by the loss of Kirkuk revenues, forced the KRG to impose , including salary cuts and borrowing, while negotiations over contract legitimacy and export rights stalled for years, with intermittent shutdowns persisting into the early . The opposed the referendum, urging postponement to prioritize Iraqi unity against ISIS remnants, and provided no military aid to Peshmerga forces during the Iraqi advance on , signaling prioritization of Baghdad's over Kurdish ambitions. This stance strained U.S.-KRG relations, as American mediation efforts focused on dialogue rather than endorsing Erbil's claims, though Washington continued advisory support to units within recognized KRG borders. Despite these setbacks, the KRG's semi-autonomous governance yielded economic resilience, with GDP per capita reaching approximately $7,000 in 2022 compared to Iraq's national average of $5,565 in 2023, driven by diversified foreign investment and oil production within core territories, though dependent on resolving federal disputes for sustained growth. By 2025, partial oil export agreements had eased some tensions, but core issues like revenue allocation and territorial control remained unresolved, underscoring Baghdad's leverage in enforcing constitutional primacy.

Controversies and Debates

2003 Invasion Justifications: WMD Programs, UN Resolutions, and Saddam's Threats

The Bush administration justified the 2003 invasion of Iraq primarily on the grounds that Saddam Hussein's regime retained weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in violation of United Nations mandates, posed a threat through support for international terrorism, and represented an ongoing danger due to its history of aggression and internal repression. Pre-1991, Iraq had developed and deployed chemical weapons, including mustard gas and tabun, against Iranian forces and Kurdish civilians during the Anfal campaign, killing thousands; it also pursued a nuclear weapons program focused on implosion-type devices using highly enriched uranium, though halted by the Gulf War. Biological weapons research, including anthrax and botulinum toxin, was confirmed by UN inspectors post-1991, with undeclared stockpiles destroyed under duress. UN Security Council Resolution 1441, adopted unanimously on November 8, 2002, declared Iraq in "material breach" of prior obligations and offered a "final opportunity" for full compliance, including unfettered access for . Saddam's regime obstructed inspections, concealed documents, and failed to account for prohibited materials, continuing a pattern of defiance against at least 16 UN resolutions since 1991, including UNSCR 687 requiring destruction of WMD capabilities. U.S. intelligence, including claims of mobile biological labs and aluminum tubes for uranium enrichment, suggested active reconstitution efforts, though key sources like the defector "" provided unverified and later discredited information relayed through German intelligence without direct U.S. access. The 2004 Duelfer Report by the found no operational WMD stockpiles post-1991 due to sanctions and inspections, but confirmed Saddam's intent to resume programs once constraints eased, maintenance of dual-use infrastructure, and deliberate ambiguity to deter regional rivals like . This empirical reality—historical capabilities degraded but not verifiably eliminated, coupled with non-cooperation—causally escalated suspicions, as partial compliance might have averted force under UN frameworks. Links to terrorism were cited as amplifying the threat, with Iraq harboring operatives like , involved in the , and providing safe haven to Palestinian militants; Saddam authorized payments of $25,000 to families of suicide bombers targeting , sustaining attacks that killed over 1,000 civilians from 2000-2003. Ties to al-Qaeda's core were limited and opportunistic, lacking operational alliance, per declassified assessments, though shared anti-U.S. interests and meetings (e.g., with in 2002) raised concerns in a post-9/11 context. Humanitarian rationales emphasized Saddam's threats to stability, including invasion of in 1990 and gassing of in 1988, alongside mass graves containing remains of 300,000 victims from purges of Shiites, , and dissidents, documented by post-invasion excavations. Critics, often from left-leaning outlets and academia, argue the WMD claims were exaggerated or fabricated to justify for or neoconservative aims, pointing to politicization and absence of stockpiles as evidence of deceit; however, Saddam's own bluffing —feigning WMD retention to project strength—invited miscalculation, and his removal empirically ended a that had twice invaded neighbors and sponsored proxy violence. Independent probes like Duelfer's, untainted by pre-war advocacy, affirm dual-use violations and reconstitution plans, underscoring that defiance, not fabrication, drove the causal path to confrontation. Mainstream media's retrospective emphasis on "lies" often overlooks Saddam's documented obstructions, reflecting institutional biases toward anti-intervention narratives over pre-invasion empirical threats.

Causes of Post-Invasion Sectarian Violence: Invasion Fault vs. Endemic Divisions

Under Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist , which ruled Iraq from 1979 to 2003, Sunni Arabs—comprising about 20-30% of the population—dominated key institutions, including the military and security apparatus, while systematically repressing the Shia Arab majority (60-65%) and Kurdish minority (15-20%). This favoritism manifested in policies like the (1986-1989), where Iraqi forces used chemical weapons and mass executions against , resulting in 50,000 to 182,000 deaths, and ongoing purges of Shia religious leaders and communities suspected of disloyalty. Such repression suppressed overt sectarian conflict but entrenched grievances, as evidenced by the 1991 uprisings following the ceasefire on February 28, 1991, when Shia in southern provinces and in the north rebelled against the , leading to reprisals that killed 30,000 to 100,000 civilians, many in Shia-dominated areas like and . These events demonstrated pre-existing cleavages along sectarian lines, with rebels targeting Ba'athist symbols and the regime framing the unrest as foreign-inspired (Shia as Iranian proxies, as separatists) to rally Sunni loyalty. The 2003 U.S.-led invasion debate pits "invasion fault" arguments—attributing violence to Coalition Provisional Authority decisions like de-Ba'athification and army dissolution, which alienated Sunnis and created a power vacuum—against evidence of endemic divisions predating and driving post-invasion escalation. Initial insurgency violence from April 2003 onward involved former regime elements targeting U.S. forces, but sectarian dimensions intensified through deliberate provocation by Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who from 2004 pursued a strategy of attacking Shia civilians and holy sites to incite retaliatory cycles. The February 22, 2006, bombing of the Al-Askari Shrine (Golden Mosque) in Samarra—widely attributed to AQI—destroyed the shrine's dome and triggered over 1,000 deaths in subsequent weeks, marking the peak of ethno-sectarian killings, with monthly civilian fatalities exceeding 3,000 by mid-2006 per Iraq Body Count data cross-verified with U.S. military reports. This event exploited latent animosities rather than inventing them, as AQI's tactics aligned with Zarqawi's pre-invasion calls for Shia-Sunni war, and violence patterns mirrored 1991 reprisal dynamics where regime collapse briefly unleashed suppressed rivalries. Empirical assessments challenge claims that U.S. "neocon hubris" or policy errors alone caused the sectarian surge, emphasizing instead local agency and pre-existing fault lines. The Sunni Awakening movement, beginning in Anbar Province in September 2006 when tribal leaders like allied with U.S. forces against AQI overreach, spread to other Sunni areas by early 2007, correlating with a 60-80% drop in violence in participating regions before the full U.S. troop surge (peaking at 170,000 in June 2007). Quantitative analyses of and U.S. military data indicate this decline required synergy between Awakening realignments—driven by Sunni rejection of AQI's extremist ideology amid intra-Sunni competition—and reinforced U.S. presence, but Awakening-initiated shifts predated surge reinforcements, underscoring that endemic tribal and sectarian self-interest, not external imposition, curbed violence without relying on Shia-dominated central government integration. Causal analysis supports endemic divisions as the primary driver, with the invasion acting as an accelerator by dismantling repressive structures that had contained them since the 1920s colonial-era Sunni-Shia imbalances. Pre-2003 data, including suppressed Shia marsh Arab drainage (1991-2003, displacing 100,000+) and Kurdish autonomy demands, reveal structural inequities that fueled post-invasion mobilization, independent of U.S. actions. While critics like some Brookings analysts attribute partial blame to occupation mismanagement for empowering militias, the rapidity of AQI-fueled escalation and Awakening reversals point to internal dynamics: Saddam's vacuum removed a lid on divisions rooted in demographic majorities' historical exclusion, not exogenous creation. This view aligns with patterns in other post-authoritarian transitions where latent identities surface amid power shifts, rather than invasion uniquely inventing conflict.

De-Ba'athification Policy: Necessity vs. Destabilization

The (CPA) issued Order Number 1 on May 16, 2003, mandating the removal of senior members—defined as those holding ranks 4 through 10 in the party's hierarchy—from positions in Iraq's , including ministries, universities, and , with an initial estimate affecting approximately 20,000 individuals. This policy, driven by CPA administrator L. Paul Bremer, sought to eradicate the institutional remnants of Saddam Hussein's regime, which had permeated state structures through mandatory party membership for career advancement. Complementing this, CPA Order Number 2 on May 23, 2003, dissolved the Iraqi army, intelligence services, and other Ba'ath-linked entities, demobilizing an estimated 400,000 troops without immediate reemployment plans. Proponents argued was essential to preclude coups or sabotage by regime loyalists, given the Ba'ath Party's role in systemic atrocities, including the Anfal campaign's against (resulting in up to 180,000 deaths) and brutal suppressions of Shi'a uprisings in 1991, which embedded complicity across mid- and upper-level ranks. Retaining such personnel risked undermining the post-invasion transition, as Ba'athists had historically monopolized power through coercion and purges, making selective vetting unreliable without broader removal to signal a clean break. The policy aligned with principles by targeting those with proven ties to , prioritizing causal prevention of over immediate administrative continuity. However, implementation flaws exacerbated destabilization: the process expanded beyond initial senior ranks to affect 30,000–50,000 civil servants and military officers, disproportionately Sunnis due to the party's ethnic dominance, creating widespread and expertise vacuums in and . Disbanding the army without pensions or absorption into new forces left demobilized soldiers—many non-ideological conscripts—economically desperate, channeling grievances into recruitment, as evidenced by former officers' documented roles in early networks. The blanket approach ignored variances in loyalty—nominal low-level members versus active perpetrators—leading to overreach that alienated capable technocrats and fueled perceptions of sectarian targeting, though data shows purges hit administrative functions hardest rather than purely ideological enforcement. Partial reversals emerged with the January 2008 Law on and Justice, which replaced the Commission and permitted vetted reintegration of lower-ranking (pre-1980s) Ba'athists into and security roles, aiming to address benchmarks amid U.S. pressure. Implementation remained limited, with appeals processes bogged down and few high-profile returns, as the law preserved bans on senior ranks; by 2011, ongoing exclusions contributed to Sunni marginalization, correlating with disenfranchisement metrics like minimal parliamentary representation (Sunnis secured only 17 of 275 seats in the boycotted elections, with alienation peaking amid 2006–2007 violence surges). While necessary for against Ba'ath-era crimes, the policy's rigid execution—lacking granular assessments—amplified instability by prioritizing ideological purity over pragmatic stability, a causal misstep evident in the insurgency's momentum before the 2007 troop surge.

Iran's Role in Iraq: Liberation Ally or Destabilizing Hegemon

Iran provided refuge and material support to Iraqi Shia dissidents during the regime, particularly after the 1980-1988 -Iraq War, which unified many Iraqi Shia against Ba'athist repression due to shared victimization under Saddam's chemical attacks on Shia populations and his execution of Shia leaders. Groups like the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (), later renamed the , operated from , where its Badr Brigade received training from 's (), positioning as a ally in efforts to undermine Saddam's Sunni-dominated rule. This pre-2003 opposition aid fostered perceptions among some Iraqi Shia of as a liberator from tyranny, especially as Saddam's of had killed an estimated 200,000-600,000 Iranians while also devastating Iraqi Shia communities through purges and the 1991 uprising suppression. Following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion and Saddam's ouster, Iran's influence shifted toward political and paramilitary dominance, with Shia parties aligned to —such as those led by —gaining power through elections, enabling IRGC-Quds Force coordination with militias like and . These groups, integrated into the (PMF) after their 2014 formation to combat , include over 67 primarily Shia factions, many of which receive Iranian funding, weapons, and ideological direction, pledging loyalty to Iran's Supreme Leader rather than solely to . The PMF's state budget exceeds $3.6 billion annually as of 2025, but pro-Iran elements like maintain parallel IRGC ties, using Iraqi territory for operations that prioritize Tehran's "Axis of Resistance" against U.S. and Israeli interests. Critics, including Iraqi nationalists and U.S. officials, portray Iran as a destabilizing hegemon that rigs elections and sovereignty through proxies; for instance, pro-Iran factions rejected 2021 parliamentary results after electoral losses, fueling gridlock, while 2025 reports detail Iranian infiltration of Iraq's electoral commission to favor aligned parties ahead of November voting. In January 2020, Iran fired 11 ballistic missiles at U.S. bases in Iraq—killing no Americans but injuring over 100 via traumatic brain injuries—retaliating for the killing of IRGC commander Qasem Soleimani, demonstrating Tehran's willingness to exploit Iraqi instability for regional leverage without regard for Baghdad's protests. By 2025, the U.S. designated four Iran-aligned PMF militias—Harakat al-Nujaba, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, and Kata'ib al-Imam Ali—as foreign terrorist organizations for attacks on U.S. forces and infrastructure, amid Iraq thwarting 29 militia drone and missile attempts tied to Iran-Israel tensions. Empirically, Iran's strategy sustains controlled chaos to prevent a sovereign, integrated Iraq that could align with Sunni Arab states or reduce Tehran's power over Baghdad's decisions, as evidenced by dominance hindering national reforms and economic diversification; pro-Iran PMF factions' 2020-2025 attacks on U.S. , totaling over 200 incidents, preserved Iranian influence by deterring full Western re-engagement while Shia protests in 2019-2021 decried Tehran-backed and meddling. Pro-Iran voices, such as PMF leaders, counter that Tehran provides essential security against Sunni extremism, crediting IRGC aid for ISIS's 2017 defeat, yet data shows militias' post-ISIS expansion—now 238,000 strong—often targets domestic rivals or U.S. assets, eroding on force. This duality frames Iran as a Shia protector to allies but a sovereignty-eroding force to detractors, with causal evidence tilting toward : Tehran's proxies veto anti-Iran policies, as in blocking PMF subordination to prime ministerial command, ensuring Iraq remains a client buffer rather than a peer.

Oil Resource Management: National Sovereignty vs. Corruption and Foreign Claims

The (IPC), established in the 1920s as a dominated by British, French, Dutch, and American interests, controlled exploration and production across much of Iraq's territory under concessions granted by the and later the British mandate, limiting national revenue to royalties until partial renegotiations in the and . In June 1972, the Ba'athist government under nationalized the IPC, transferring operations to the state-owned and asserting full sovereignty over resources, though this move triggered legal disputes and compensation claims from foreign stakeholders that lingered into the 1980s. Following the 2003 U.S.-led and the dissolution of prior structures, Iraq's interim and subsequent governments pursued technical service contracts (TSCs)—often framed as production-sharing arrangements—with international oil companies to rehabilitate war-damaged fields and increase output capacity. BP secured a 20-year TSC for the Rumaila field in 2009, committing to raise production from 1.4 million to over 2.8 million barrels per day by investing billions, while joined the West Qurna 1 project in 2010 under similar terms, targeting phased expansions amid debates over whether such deals diluted by granting foreign firms profit-based fees tied to performance benchmarks. In October 2025, Iraq signed a preliminary agreement with to develop the Majnoon field, including infrastructure upgrades for exports, reflecting ongoing reliance on foreign technical expertise despite nominal of reserves. Iraq fulfilled United Nations-mandated reparations to for damages from the 1990 invasion and annexation, disbursing a total of $52.4 billion by early through deductions from its oil export revenues under UN Security Council Resolution 687, with the final payment closing a 30-year that strained national finances but resolved foreign claims without ceding control. These payments, administered via the UN Compensation Commission, prioritized Kuwaiti losses from environmental damage, infrastructure destruction, and lost oil production, underscoring how interstate conflicts imposed external drains on greater than routine foreign investment contracts. Corruption within Iraq's oil sector has eroded sovereign control more profoundly than foreign partnerships, with estimates indicating over $150 billion in revenues siphoned by political elites, officials, and militias since 2003 through , inflated contracts, and kickbacks, often facilitated by opaque state-owned enterprises like . Independent audits and whistleblower accounts reveal systemic graft, including ghost employees and rigged tenders, where up to 20-30% of sector budgets vanish annually according to forensic reviews, far outpacing the 10-20% remuneration shares in TSCs that deliver verifiable production gains. Disputes between and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over oil sales highlight intra-sovereign tensions, as the KRG pursued independent export deals via pipelines to from 2014 onward, bypassing federal oversight and prompting to deem them unconstitutional, leading to a 2023 halt in KRG exports following an ruling against for unauthorized flows. By September 2025, a federal-KRG accord resumed exports through at minimum volumes of 230,000 barrels per day, with the KRG retaining a portion after revenue sharing, yet cumulative losses exceeded $28 billion since the shutdown, illustrating how decentralized claims fragment national control while in both entities perpetuates over unified . Ultimately, while and post-2003 frameworks advanced formal by retaining reserve ownership, domestic —rooted in networks and weak institutions—has extracted greater value than foreign operators or resolved claims like Kuwait's, as evidenced by persistent revenue leakages absent in audited IOC projects.

Economy

Macroeconomic Overview and Oil Dependency

Iraq's nominal GDP stood at approximately $265 billion in 2024, reflecting a modest increase from $251 billion in 2023 amid fluctuating global prices. The economy's overall growth has been volatile, contracting by 11.9% in due to a collapse in prices and restrictions that curtailed demand and activity. Recovery has been uneven, with real GDP growth projected at 1.4% for 2024, driven primarily by sector output rather than broad-based expansion. Oil dominates the macroeconomic structure, comprising over 90% of government revenues and nearly all exports, rendering fiscal stability highly sensitive to fluctuations and + quotas. In 2024, export revenues formed 91% of the $107 billion federal , underscoring persistent vulnerability despite production averaging 4.2 million barrels per day. This reliance perpetuates boom-bust cycles, as evidenced by the 2020 downturn when revenues plummeted alongside global lockdowns. Non-oil GDP growth has averaged below 1% annually since 2018, with projections stabilizing at 3-4% medium-term only if reforms address structural bottlenecks. The economy exhibits symptoms of , where abundant oil rents appreciate the real , eroding competitiveness in tradable non-oil sectors like and through higher input costs and labor shifts to . This dynamic, rooted in rentier effects rather than solely legacy sanctions or conflict, sustains low diversification, with non-oil contributions to GDP hovering around 40% but failing to generate sustainable or exports without currency adjustment and investment incentives.

Energy Sector: Production, Exports, and Revenue Management

Iraq's crude oil production reached approximately 4.4 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2025, following overproduction relative to its OPEC+ quota of around 4 million bpd in 2024, for which compensation cuts were agreed. Southern fields, particularly in Basra province including Rumaila, West Qurna, and Zubair, account for over 80% of national output, with exports primarily shipped from Persian Gulf terminals handling Basra medium and heavy grades. The government aims to expand capacity to 6 million bpd by the end of the 2024-2028 National Development Plan through new contracts with international firms like ExxonMobil and BP for fields such as Majnoon and Kirkuk. Exports averaged about 3.3 million bpd from southern ports in early 2025, with receiving 72% of shipments, led by , , and . Iraq has faced + pressure for exceeding quotas, prompting voluntary cuts and compensation plans, though it continues advocating for higher allocations to match infrastructure capacity. Kurdish regional exports, halted since 2023, resumed in September 2025 at up to 230,000 bpd via , potentially adding to federal totals pending revenue-sharing agreements. Oil revenues, comprising over 90% of government income, have been hampered by , including and , with estimates of annual losses in the billions from illicit diversions and mismanaged contracts. Past windfalls from high prices, such as a projected $79 billion surplus in 2008, largely failed to fund reconstruction or diversification, instead fueling expansions and amid weak oversight. The 2024-2028 plan targets zero routine gas flaring by 2028 via capture projects like the Gas Growth Integrated Project, aiming to monetize flared volumes worth $4-5 billion annually and reduce reliance on Iranian imports. Proposals for a to stabilize revenues by saving windfalls have circulated since the but remain unimplemented, with advocates arguing it could counter volatility and by ring-fencing funds for future generations rather than immediate spending. Iraq's holds reserves financed by , but without a dedicated fund, remains exposed to price swings, as evidenced by non-oil revenue stagnation despite booms.

Non-Oil Sectors: Agriculture, Industry, and Services

Iraq's sector contributes approximately 3.4% to GDP as of , employing a significant portion of the rural workforce despite its diminished role relative to pre-1970s levels when systems supported broader cultivation along the and rivers. The sector's output includes grains like and , but dates remain a standout, with Iraq ranking fourth globally in production at 800,000 tons in and leading in harvested palm area at nearly 276,000 hectares. However, potential for expansion is constrained by chronic , exacerbated by upstream damming in and , reduced and flows, and inefficient practices that lead to salinization and affecting 92% of . Droughts in slashed seasonal harvests, forcing half of farming households to reduce cultivated land or water use, underscoring the need for modernized water management to restore productivity. The industrial sector outside oil, encompassing cement, textiles, petrochemicals, and light manufacturing, has struggled to regain pre-war capacity, with output hampered by outdated infrastructure, security disruptions, and reliance on imported inputs. Iraq produces substantial cement volumes annually, supporting local construction, but textiles and other non-hydrocarbon industries remain stalled due to competition from cheap imports and insufficient investment, contributing minimally to non-oil GDP growth which slowed to 2.5% in 2024. Barriers include persistent power shortages, with state grids supplying only 8-12 hours daily on average, compelling industries to depend on costly private generators and limiting operational efficiency. Services account for about 45.8% of GDP in 2024, driven by retail, , and emerging digital activities, though growth is tempered by bureaucratic hurdles and informal employment patterns. Regulatory advances, such as the of Iraq's No. 2 of 2024 and 2024 guidelines for licensing digital banks, aim to foster adoption, enabling electronic and potentially integrating small enterprises into formal finance amid a cash-heavy . Youth engagement in services faces headwinds from skill mismatches, with unemployment rates exceeding 30% in this demographic, highlighting untapped potential in tech and if and training improve. Cross-sector challenges like unreliable and access perpetuate low productivity, necessitating targeted reforms to elevate non-oil contributions beyond current stagnation.

Fiscal Challenges: Deficits, Subsidies, and 2024-2028 National Development Plan

Iraq's 2025 budget totals 198.9 trillion Iraqi dinars (approximately $153 billion), continuing the triennial framework approved in 2023, with expenditures heavily skewed toward recurrent costs that sustain fiscal imbalances. Public sector salaries and pensions consume a dominant share of outlays, with employee compensation and related benefits exceeding 40% in recent years, fueled by ongoing expansions in civil service hiring to accommodate patronage demands from political factions. Budget deficits persist due to oil revenues falling short of requirements, as Iraq's fiscal breakeven oil price stands at approximately $90 per barrel—among the highest for OPEC producers—while global prices have hovered below this threshold, limiting non-oil revenue growth and amplifying vulnerabilities to market fluctuations. The International Monetary Fund projects elevated deficits through the medium term, driven by rigid current spending that crowds out capital investments and heightens debt risks absent structural adjustments. Subsidies for and represent another core fiscal strain, accounting for tens of billions of dollars annually in implicit costs through underpriced energy that encourages inefficiency and , yet political resistance to rationalization remains fierce due to networks linking subsidies to voter loyalty and factional influence. Efforts to phase out these distortions, such as metering reforms or price adjustments, provoke backlash risks that deter implementation, perpetuating deficits as short-term populist spending overrides long-term fiscal discipline ahead of electoral cycles. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani's National Development Plan (NDP) for 2024-2028 outlines priorities to mitigate these pressures, emphasizing upgrades in , , and services alongside non-oil revenue mobilization to reach 79 dinars by 2028 through enhancements and incentives. The plan envisions substantial capital outlays—aligned with budgeted increases to over 200 dinars in annual spending—to drive diversification, but reforms and restructuring are de-emphasized amid constraints, limiting potential deficit reductions and exposing implementation to factional vetoes. Empirical patterns indicate that without curbing patronage-driven allocations, such plans risk repeating past cycles of ambitious targets undermined by unreformed expenditures.

Unemployment, Inequality, and Labor Market Issues

Iraq's unemployment rate stood at 15.5% of the total labor force in 2024, according to modeled (ILO) estimates, reflecting persistent challenges in absorbing the workforce despite oil revenues. , affecting ages 15-24, reached 32.1% in the same year, exacerbating pressures from a demographic bulge where over 60% of the population is under 25. These figures exceed official Iraqi government reports, which often cite lower rates around 12-16%, potentially due to undercounting informal or discouraged workers. Income inequality in Iraq remains moderate, with a of 29.8 in 2023, indicating a relatively even distribution compared to regional peers but masking disparities in access to high-paying jobs. The accounts for approximately 38% of total , employing an estimated 4.5-5 million workers out of a labor force of about 12 million, sustained by hiring and generous benefits that crowd out private investment. This bloat contributes to fiscal strain, as salaries consume over 30% of the budget, while growth lags due to bureaucratic regulations, inconsistent enforcement, and in licensing and contracts. Key causal factors include a mismatch between education outputs and market needs, where curricula emphasize theoretical knowledge over vocational skills, leaving graduates unprepared for private industry roles amid declining education quality since the . Systemic , including nepotistic and in public hiring, further distorts labor allocation, prioritizing political loyalty over merit and stifling more than residual war-related disruptions. Reforms to limit public hiring to essential needs and streamline private regulations could address these issues, though entrenched interests have hindered progress.

Infrastructure Gaps: Transport, Water, Sanitation, and Digital Growth

Iraq's infrastructure remains hampered by extensive deterioration from conflicts spanning decades, including the 2003 invasion and ISIS occupation, compounded by chronic underinvestment and maintenance neglect. The national road network totals approximately 47,877 km, encompassing primary arterial roads linking provinces (11,000 km) and secondary routes to districts (15,200 km), but a substantial portion suffers from potholes, , and overload due to inadequate upkeep, limiting freight efficiency and safety. Railways extend 2,375 km across nine lines, predominantly freight-oriented but operating at low capacity owing to obsolete tracks and signaling; in June 2025, the World Bank approved a $930 million project to rehabilitate and modernize 1,047 km of key lines connecting to via , aiming to elevate annual freight to 6.3 million tons through upgraded rolling stock and digital systems. Ports, vital for oil and import exports, center on in , which handled one million containers annually as of 2024 but faces congestion; government plans seek to quadruple capacity to four million containers per year via equipment acquisitions and yard expansions, supported by $120 million IFC-Aloreen investment, though delays from bureaucratic hurdles persist. Water and sanitation access reveal stark disparities, exacerbated by upstream damming by neighbors like and , domestic infrastructure decay from war, and mismanagement. While 87% of households reported home access to in the 2024 census, only about 60% of the population benefits from safely managed services per World Bank assessments, with urban areas achieving higher coverage (around 92%) compared to rural zones at 47.6% for improved sources, leading to reliance on contaminated and seasonal shortages affecting and . Sanitation coverage stands at 53% for safely managed facilities, with untreated wastewater discharge polluting rivers like the and , contributing to outbreaks; rural neglect amplifies risks, as cycles of have stalled treatment plant upgrades despite available funds. Digital infrastructure lags amid growing penetration, with roughly 30 million users in 2024, driven by but constrained by unreliable and limited fiber optics, fostering uneven adoption. The issued Electronic Payment Services Regulation No. 2 in 2024 to license firms, promote card-based transactions, and reduce cash dependency, alongside guidelines for digital banks, yet enforcement challenges and low (under 20% adult account ownership) hinder scalability. These gaps stem primarily from war-induced destruction—estimated at billions in damages to roads, rails, and utilities—followed by postwar neglect, siphoning reconstruction funds, and political prioritization of over maintenance, as evidenced by stalled projects despite oil revenues exceeding $100 billion annually. The National Development Plan 2024-2028 outlines ambitious targets, including diversification tied to economic sectors and enhanced public services connectivity, aligned with Iraq Vision 2030, but historical execution shortfalls—such as incomplete initiatives amid graft—cast doubt on realization without reforms, given institutional biases toward short-term allocations over long-term resilience.

Demographics

Population Dynamics and Projections

Iraq's population reached 46,118,793 according to the final results of the 2024 national , conducted from November 20-30, 2024, marking the first comprehensive enumeration since 1987. Preliminary figures released in November 2024 had estimated 45.4 million, including foreigners and refugees, with the upward revision reflecting refined data collection amid logistical challenges in conflict-affected areas. The census highlighted a near-even distribution, with 101 males per 100 females. Annual population growth stood at approximately 2.1% in 2024, driven primarily by a high of around 27 births per 1,000 people, offset by a rate of about 3.9 per 1,000. This rate aligns with projections from the World Bank, though historical disruptions from conflicts have introduced variability, including undercounting in prior estimates due to displacement and insecurity. Iraq's of 3.2 children per woman sustains youthful demographics, slowing population aging compared to global trends, with over half the population under 25 years old. Urbanization has accelerated, with 70.17% of the residing in urban areas as of the 2024 census, up from earlier estimates of 71.6% in 2023 per World Bank data. This shift reflects post-conflict rural-to-urban migration for and economic opportunities, straining urban . pyramids remain skewed due to wars and displacement: the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, 1991 , 2003 invasion, and ISIS conflict (2014-2017) caused excess mortality—estimated at hundreds of thousands—disproportionately affecting males of military age and young families, while displacement of over 6 million internally since 2003 distorted age-sex structures through selective survival and return patterns. Projections indicate continued expansion, with the population potentially reaching 48.9 million by 2028 and up to 75 million by mid-century under medium- scenarios, exacerbating resource pressures unless fertility declines further. UN estimates suggest a 2025 figure of around 47 million, assuming sustained growth amid improving stability.

Ethnic Composition: Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and Minorities

Iraq's ethnic composition is dominated by , who constitute 75-80% of the population and are primarily settled in the central riverine areas, southern marshlands, and western deserts. represent the second-largest group at 15-20%, concentrated in the northern governorates of Dohuk, , and , where they form autonomous regional administrations. Turkmen, numbering around 5%, are mainly located in northern cities like and , often in mixed communities amid oil-rich territories. Smaller minorities include Assyrians (1-2%), , , and , totaling under 5% and dispersed in northern pockets, with many having faced displacement from ancestral villages. Genetic analyses reveal underlying continuity across these groups with ancient Mesopotamian substrates, marked by admixtures from Levantine, , and Central Asian sources. Paternal Y-chromosome studies of northern Iraqis—encompassing , , and Assyrians—demonstrate overlapping distributions (e.g., high frequencies of J1 and J2), indicating shared patrilineal ancestries rather than stark genetic divides. Autosomal further supports this, showing Iraqi and clustering closely with Levantine and Anatolian populations, with Turkmen exhibiting additional Turkic influences but minimal differentiation from neighbors. These findings underscore that ethnic identities in Iraq reflect cultural and linguistic divergences atop a genetically homogeneous base, challenging narratives of primordial racial separation. Ethnic tensions have manifested in territorial disputes, particularly in Nineveh Province around Mosul, where Arab, Kurdish, and Turkmen claims overlap due to hydrocarbon resources and historical settlement patterns. Post-2003 instability saw targeted violence against minorities, including Assyrian and Turkmen communities in Mosul, involving kidnappings, bombings, and forced expulsions by militias seeking demographic shifts. Kurdish expansions into disputed areas exacerbated frictions with Arab and Turkmen populations, leading to retaliatory displacements documented in Human Rights Watch reports from 2004 onward. Since the 2003 invasion, minority populations have declined sharply due to and internal flight, with estimates indicating losses of 50% or more for groups like Assyrians—from over 1 million pre-2003 to around 300,000 by 2014—driven by targeted insecurity rather than broad Arab-Kurdish binaries. Turkmen numbers in similarly contracted amid reversals and Kurdish influxes, reducing their local share from 20-25% to under 15% in some districts. Empirical data from displacement tracking highlights that these outflows stem from localized power vacuums enabling ethnic score-settling, not inherent incompatibilities, as intergroup genetic affinities suggest viability for coexistence absent political exploitation.

Religious Demographics: Shia Majority, Sunni Minority, and Sectarian Tensions

Iraq's population is predominantly Muslim, with Shia Muslims comprising 60-65% and Sunni Muslims 32-37%, including both and Kurdish adherents among the Sunnis. account for less than 1%, approximately 0.5%, and smaller groups such as Sabean-Mandaeans, , and Kaka'is make up the remainder. These figures reflect estimates adjusted for post-2003 displacement and violence, which disproportionately affected minorities; for instance, the population has declined to under 150,000 from around 1.5 million prior to 2003.
Religious GroupEstimated Percentage of Population
Shia Muslims60-65%
Sunni Muslims32-37%
Christians<1%
Yazidis~0.5%
Other<1%
Shia holy sites in Karbala and Najaf, housing shrines to Imam Hussein and Imam Ali respectively, draw millions of pilgrims annually, particularly during Arbaeen, generating substantial economic activity through tourism, hospitality, and local services. This influx has expanded urban infrastructure in these shrine cities, boosting GDP contributions from religious tourism while attracting foreign investment, though it has also reshaped local demographics and heightened resource competition. Post-2003, the shift from Sunni-dominated rule under to Shia-majority political control reversed longstanding power imbalances, exacerbating sectarian tensions driven more by competition for state resources and influence than doctrinal differences alone. peaked between 2006 and 2007, with monthly civilian deaths exceeding 2,000 amid bombings targeting Shia processions and Sunni neighborhoods, fueled by insurgent groups exploiting grievances over de-Baathification policies that marginalized Sunnis. From 2003 to 2021, over 7,900 conflict events were recorded, many sectarian in nature, contributing to an estimated 150,000-1 million total deaths. The rise of ISIS in 2014 intensified divisions, as the group—rooted in Sunni extremism—declared war on Shia Muslims, whom it labeled apostates, while committing genocide against Yazidis, enslaving thousands and destroying minority communities in Nineveh Plains and Sinjar. Shia militias, empowered post-invasion, responded with reprisals in Sunni areas, perpetuating cycles of displacement; by 2022, internally displaced persons included 40% Sunni Arabs and 30% Yazidis in the Kurdistan region. These dynamics underscore how institutional exclusions and militia proliferation, rather than inherent theological irreconcilability, have sustained tensions, with Sunni distrust of central Shia-led governance persisting amid uneven reconstruction in former ISIS-held territories.

Linguistic Diversity: Arabic, Kurdish, and Minority Languages

serves as the primary language of Iraq, spoken by approximately 75-80% of the population in its Mesopotamian dialect, which encompasses regional variants such as in central areas and South Mesopotamian Arabic in the south. This dialect differs from used in formal and media contexts, reflecting historical influences from ancient and Ottoman-era admixtures. As stipulated in Article 4 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, holds official status nationwide, facilitating government administration, education, and legal proceedings primarily in its standardized form. Kurdish, the second under the same constitutional provision, is spoken by 15-20% of , predominantly in the northern . Within Iraq, Central Kurdish (Sorani) predominates in central and southern Kurdish areas like , written in a modified , while Northern Kurdish (Kurmanji) prevails in northern districts near Dohuk and uses the Latin alphabet in some contexts, though Sorani serves as the administrative and educational standard in the (KRG). The KRG promotes both dialects in schooling and media to accommodate linguistic diversity, with Sorani's script alignment aiding integration with Arabic-medium instruction elsewhere. Minority languages include Turkmen, a spoken by communities in northern Iraq's region, and Neo-Aramaic varieties such as Assyrian and Chaldean , used by Christian groups in the and surrounding areas. The 2005 recognizes Turkmen and Neo-Aramaic alongside Turkish as languages with rights to education in mother tongues in relevant regions, though implementation remains limited. Script differences—Latin for Turkmen, Syriac for —pose literacy challenges, as often prioritizes or Kurdish scripts, contributing to lower proficiency rates among speakers. dialects face endangerment, with speaker numbers declining due to emigration, assimilation, and conflict-related disruptions since the , potentially losing a dialect every few years without documentation efforts. Ba'athist-era Arabicization policies from the to forcibly displaced Kurdish and minority speakers in northern oil-rich areas, imposing through settlement and suppression, which eroded non- linguistic use. Post-2003, reversal efforts enabled displaced and minorities to return, bolstering Kurdish and Turkmen usage in reclaimed territories via KRG and constitutional protections, though persistent insecurity hampers full revival.

Urbanization, Migration Patterns, and Refugee Crises

Iraq's rate stands at approximately 70% of its total as of the 2024 census, reflecting a long-term shift from rural areas to cities driven by conflict, economic opportunities, and infrastructure concentration. , the capital, hosts an estimated 8 million residents in its metropolitan area, accounting for nearly one-fifth of the national and exemplifying urban primacy amid ongoing strains from influxes. This has accelerated since the 2003 invasion and subsequent instability, with rural-to-urban migration intensifying as agricultural livelihoods deteriorated due to insecurity, , and lack of . Internal migration patterns post-Islamic State () territorial defeat in 2017-2019 have involved significant returns alongside persistent urbanward flows. An estimated 4.8 million Iraqis were internally displaced at peak ISIS control in 2014-2017, but over 4 million have since returned to areas of origin, often in northern and western governorates like Ninewa and Anbar, though many opt for urban peripheries due to destroyed rural and perceived safety in cities. Rural-urban migration continues, fueled by post-conflict reconstruction favoring urban centers and economic pull factors such as informal sector jobs in and , contributing to expansion and informal settlements housing hundreds of thousands. patterns include brain drain among skilled professionals, with an estimated 4 million Iraqis in the , primarily to Europe, , and Gulf states, though return migration remains limited amid ongoing instability. The and IDP crises impose acute urban pressures, with over 1 million IDPs remaining displaced as of late 2024, including about 109,000 in 21 camps mainly in the . Iraq also hosts around 340,000 and asylum-seekers, predominantly 300,000 concentrated in Dohuk and governorates, alongside smaller numbers of Iranians and others, many integrated into urban economies but vulnerable to pressures. Challenges include camp leading to service gaps and heightened risks, as remnants exploit grievances in protracted displacement settings through networks and ideological propagation, necessitating sustained efforts by authorities and international partners. Urban strains from these inflows exacerbate shortages, , and sectarian tensions in host communities.

Health Outcomes: Mortality Rates, Disease Prevalence, and Access Issues

Iraq's rate stood at 20.8 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2023, reflecting a gradual decline from 23.6 in 2019 but remaining elevated compared to regional peers with similar resources. Under-five mortality has followed a parallel trend, driven by factors including complications and infectious diseases, with non-communicable diseases (NCDs) emerging as leading causes of death overall, accounting for 66.9% of total mortality in 2019. Infectious disease outbreaks have persisted, notably the resurgence of wild type 1 in 2013–2014, with confirmed cases in Iraq linked to importation from amid conflict-disrupted campaigns; this prompted multiple immunization drives targeting millions of children, though coverage gaps allowed limited transmission. NCD has risen sharply post-2003, with age-standardized rates for conditions like ischaemic heart disease, , and increasing between 2003 and 2021; ischaemic heart disease alone caused 77 deaths per 100,000 in recent WHO estimates, exacerbated by shifts, poor diet, and inadequate screening in a population strained by decades of instability. COVID-19 coverage lagged, with only about 41% of surveyed adults receiving two doses by 2023, contributing to vulnerability in a system already overburdened. Access to care remains uneven, with approximately 40% of the population lacking reliable referral services due to facility distribution and staffing shortages, despite nominal coverage of primary points; medicine shortages intensified in 2023–2024, affecting essential drugs and fueling reliance on counterfeit imports estimated at 35% of the market. burdens from war trauma are acute, with (PTSD) prevalence exceeding 20% in conflict-exposed groups like adolescents and returnees, often untreated due to stigma and limited psychiatric capacity. Despite revenues enabling potential investment, expenditure hovered at 5.2% of GDP in 2021—below global averages for upper-middle-income nations—yielding low per-capita outlays and persistent gaps in service delivery, as evidenced by chronic underfunding of maintenance and procurement amid and fiscal mismanagement.

Education Attainment: Literacy, Enrollment, and Quality Concerns

Iraq's adult rate stood at 85.6% in 2017, with males at 91.2% and females at 79.9%, according to data. More recent estimates from the World Bank indicate a slight decline to 84.1% by 2021, reflecting persistent challenges in rural areas where illiteracy rates reach 18.5% compared to 8% in urban centers. Gender disparities contribute to these figures, with female lagging due to cultural barriers and uneven access, though youth literacy (ages 15-24) shows improvement at around 91%. Primary school gross enrollment rates hover near 90-92% as of recent years, with near indexed at approximately 1.0, per World Bank metrics. Secondary enrollment lags at about 60-70%, while tertiary gross enrollment remains around 35-40%, far below the outlined 50% target but indicative of expansion efforts amid capacity constraints. Female participation has risen post-2014, with increases of 8.7% in primary and up to 19.8% in lower secondary from 2013-2016, yet gaps persist in higher education where only 20% of women achieve post-secondary attainment compared to 28% of men. Educational quality remains low, as evidenced by Iraq's participation in international assessments like TIMSS, where scores in and for fourth and eighth graders fall well below global averages, signaling deficiencies in foundational skills. Curricula emphasize over , with pervasive Islamic religious content—often quoting the Qur'an—superseding secular subjects in some instances and fostering sectarian narratives. Madrasas exert influence, particularly in Shia-dominated areas, integrating religious instruction that prioritizes theological over scientific inquiry, though formal oversight varies. Post-2003 reconstruction efforts faced uneven progress due to insecurity, infrastructure destruction, and lagging capacity, with thousands of schools damaged and rebuilding stalled by regional disparities. Corruption exacerbates these issues, manifesting in bribery for grades, nepotism in hiring, and fund diversion—estimated to siphon billions—undermining teacher training and resource allocation across the sector. These factors causally link to quality declines, as diverted resources fail to address overcrowding and outdated materials, perpetuating a cycle of low outcomes despite nominal enrollment gains.

Diaspora, Brain Drain, and Return Migration

The Iraqi diaspora numbers in the millions, with nearly 2 million individuals having fled since the 2003 invasion, primarily to and initially, though substantial communities have formed in , the , , the , and . These expatriates include professionals, academics, and skilled workers who emigrated amid violence and instability, contributing to a dispersed network that sustains cultural and economic ties to Iraq. Remittances from this diaspora provide a vital economic lifeline, totaling $1.16 billion in 2023 and projected to reach $1.19 billion in 2025, representing a modest but steady share of GDP at around 0.35%. Post-2003 brain drain has severely depleted Iraq's human capital, with approximately 40% of the professional class emigrating by 2006, driven by targeted violence, economic collapse, and lack of security. In the medical sector alone, 20,000 of the 34,000 registered physicians had left by 2008, alongside thousands of engineers, academics, and bureaucrats purged or displaced under de-Baathification policies. This loss exacerbates skills shortages in critical areas like healthcare, infrastructure, and public administration, impeding reconstruction efforts and perpetuating dependency on foreign expertise, as evidenced by stalled institutional development and persistent governance weaknesses. Government responses to mitigate brain drain and encourage returns have evolved slowly, culminating in the launch of Iraq's first National Plan to Promote Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration in August 2025, covering 2025–2030. This five-year strategy prioritizes data-driven policies to facilitate voluntary repatriation, create job and education opportunities for returnees, and build institutional capacity for engagement, aiming to harness expatriate skills for national development while regulating outflows. Early implementation focuses on reintegration support, though challenges persist due to ongoing security concerns and economic incentives abroad.

Culture and Society

Ancient and Islamic Cultural Legacy

Ancient , encompassing the territory of modern Iraq, witnessed the emergence of urban civilization around 3500 BCE, marked by innovations in writing and monumental architecture. The , inscribed on clay tablets dating from approximately 2100 to 1200 BCE, constitutes the earliest known literary epic, originating from the Sumerian city of and exploring themes of heroism, friendship, and the human confrontation with death. Tablets from this epic, including a 3500-year-old fragment returned to Iraq in 2021, underscore the region's foundational role in world literature. Key artifacts from Babylonian and Assyrian periods, such as the ruins of —designated a in 2019—preserve evidence of advanced engineering, including the reconstructed and the ziggurat known as , built in the 6th century BCE under . These structures, excavated since the , reveal sophisticated and astronomical alignments that influenced subsequent architectural traditions. Under the from 750 CE, evolved into a preeminent center of Islamic scholarship during the 8th to 13th centuries, sustaining Mesopotamian legacies through systematic preservation and innovation. The , founded around 825 CE under Caliph , served as a , , and research institute where scholars rendered Greek, Persian, and Indian texts into Arabic, enabling syntheses in philosophy, medicine, and mathematics. Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi, a scholar at this institution circa 820 CE, authored Kitab al-Jabr wa'l-Muqabala, introducing algebraic methods for solving linear and quadratic equations through systematic completion and balancing techniques, which formed the basis for modern algebra. His works, disseminated via Latin translations by the 12th century, bridged ancient Hellenistic mathematics with medieval European developments. The Samarra Archaeological City, inscribed on the UNESCO list in 2007, exemplifies Abbasid-era monumental design with its 9th-century Great Mosque—once the world's largest—and the Malwiya minaret's helical structure, reflecting engineering prowess amid the caliphate's peak. These Islamic contributions, built upon Mesopotamian substrates, endured invasions like the Mongol sack of Baghdad in 1258 CE, with cuneiform tablets and Abbasid manuscripts continuing to inform global historiography.

Social Structures: Tribalism, Family Clans, and Honor Codes

Iraqi society retains strong tribal affiliations, with over 150 major Arab tribes and confederations shaping social organization, particularly in rural and peripheral areas. Prominent examples include the Sunni-dominated in Anbar province, known for its historical resistance to central authority, and the Shia Bani Malik tribe in southern Iraq. clans, or extended groups within tribes, function as primary units of loyalty and mutual support, often superseding state institutions in dispute resolution and resource allocation. The practice of wasta, or the use of interpersonal connections through family and tribal networks to secure favors, employment, or justice, permeates Iraqi social and political life, compensating for weak formal governance. Tribal honor codes enforce strict norms of conduct, including retaliatory feuds (tha'r) for offenses like murder or insult, which can escalate into multi-generational blood feuds between clans; recent examples include water disputes in southern Iraq exacerbated by drought since 2020. Honor killings, typically targeting women for perceived violations of family reputation such as extramarital relations, claim several hundred victims annually, often mitigated under legal provisions like Penal Code Article 409 that reduce sentences for "honor" motives. In contexts of state fragility, clans and tribes act as adaptive buffers against anarchy, providing parallel security and arbitration where central authority falters, as evidenced by tribal militias integrated into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) since 2014 to combat ISIS. These structures deliver functional order in ungoverned spaces but perpetuate resistance to modernization by prioritizing kinship loyalty over impartial rule of law, undermining efforts at national unification and institutional reform despite urbanization trends since the mid-20th century.

Religious Practices, Festivals, and Interfaith Relations

Shia Muslims in Iraq observe Ashura, the tenth day of Muharram, with mourning rituals commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Hussein at the Battle of Karbala in 680 CE, including public processions, recitations of elegies, and chest-beating known as latmiya. Some participants engage in tatbir, a controversial practice involving self-flagellation with blades or chains to symbolize shared suffering, though it draws criticism from Shia scholars for promoting extremism or health risks. Under Saddam Hussein's regime, such rituals were heavily restricted, with processions banned and participants arrested to suppress Shia expression amid Ba'athist secularism favoring Sunni Arabs. Annual festivals include Eid al-Fitr, marking the end of Ramadan with communal prayers, feasting, and charity distribution, and Eid al-Adha, involving animal sacrifice and meat sharing to recall Abraham's obedience. The Arba'een pilgrimage, 40 days after Ashura, draws millions to Karbala's Imam Hussein Shrine, featuring walking routes, communal meals, and vows of devotion, often exceeding Hajj attendance in scale. Kurds celebrate Nowruz on March 21, aligning with the spring equinox through fire-jumping, picnics, and symbolic renewals rooted in pre-Islamic Zoroastrian traditions, recognized as a public holiday since 2003. Iraqi participation in Hajj involves quotas approved by Saudi authorities, with over 30,000 pilgrims traveling annually under government coordination, though proxy Hajj (niyabah) is performed by relatives for the deceased or incapacitated per Shia jurisprudence. Interfaith relations in Iraq historically featured pragmatic coexistence among Muslims, Christians, Yazidis, and others under authoritarian controls that prioritized state loyalty over sectarianism, though Hussein's later Faith Campaign amplified Sunni Islam while repressing Shia practices. The 2003 U.S.-led invasion dismantled these controls, unleashing pent-up grievances and militia mobilizations that eroded tolerance, culminating in widespread sectarian violence. The February 22, 2006, bombing of Samarra's Al-Askari Shrine—destroying its golden dome and later minarets in 2007—served as a flashpoint, inciting revenge killings, mosque attacks, and displacement that killed tens of thousands and deepened Sunni-Shia divides. ISIS's 2014-2017 caliphate declaration intensified targeting, enforcing forced conversions or death on Yazidis, whom it deemed devil-worshippers, resulting in genocide recognized by the UN with mass killings, enslavement of over 6,800 women and children, and destruction of sacred sites. Post-ISIS recoveries remain fragile, with ongoing militia influence and kidnappings hindering Yazidi returns and intercommunal trust.

Arts, Literature, Architecture, and Intellectual Traditions

Iraq's intellectual traditions trace back to the Abbasid era, exemplified by the House of Wisdom (Bayt al-Hikmah) in Baghdad, established around 832 AD under Caliph al-Ma'mun as a major center for translation, research, and scholarship that synthesized Greek, Persian, and Indian knowledge in fields like mathematics, astronomy, and philosophy. Scholars there, including Hunayn ibn Ishaq, translated works such as Euclid's Elements and Ptolemy's Almagest, fostering advancements like al-Khwarizmi's algebra, which laid foundations for global scientific progress. Architectural legacies include the Great Mosque of Samarra, constructed between 848 and 852 AD during Caliph al-Mutawakkil's reign, featuring the iconic Malwiya spiral minaret rising 52 meters in a coiled brick ramp symbolizing ascent toward the divine and serving as a call-to-prayer platform. This UNESCO-listed site, part of Samarra's archaeological city, represents Abbasid innovation with its vast hypostyle hall covering 10 hectares, though much remains unexcavated. In Baghdad, structures like the Mustansiriyah Madrasa, built in 1234 AD, embodied intellectual hubs for Islamic learning, but many sites suffered ruination from conflicts, including post-2003 looting and damage to Abbasid palaces. Arabic poetry holds a central place in Iraqi literature, with al-Mutanabbi (915–965 AD), born in Kufa, producing over 326 influential poems that elevated the qasida form through intellectual depth and political satire, echoing in later works for their eloquence and critique of power. Modern poets draw from this tradition amid adversity; Sinan Antoon, born in Baghdad in 1967 and exiled to the U.S. after the 1991 Gulf War, explores themes of war, loss, and fragmented memory in novels like The Book of Collateral Damage (2019) and poetry reflecting Iraq's chaos. Under the Ba'ath regime from 1968 to 2003, rigorously suppressed dissenting and , with the monitoring publications, banning works critical of , and persecuting intellectuals through imprisonment or exile, prioritizing ideological conformity over creative freedom. Post-2003, efforts at revival faced persistent challenges from , ISIS destruction of sites, and instability, limiting institutional recovery despite literary outputs documenting trauma and , as in addressing aftermath.

Media Landscape: State Control, Censorship, and Independent Outlets

Iraq ranks 155th out of 180 countries in the 2025 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders (RSF), reflecting persistent challenges including political interference and violence against media workers, though marking a slight improvement from 169th in 2024. The country has recorded at least 285 journalist and media worker deaths since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, the highest toll globally for the profession during that period, with most attributed to targeted killings by insurgents, militias, and state actors rather than combat. This violence continues to deter investigative reporting, as evidenced by ongoing militia intimidation exceeding formal legal censorship in impact. State-controlled outlets, such as the Iraqi Media Network's television channels, maintain dominance in broadcast media, often aligning editorial content with government narratives under the oversight of the Communications and Media Commission (CMC). Independent outlets face partisan affiliations, with many television stations and newspapers funded or influenced by and blocs, limiting pluralistic coverage. mechanisms include content suspensions for alleged violations of media laws, particularly on corruption probes involving officials, though enforcement varies by region, with the Kurdistan Regional Government imposing additional restrictions on outlets critical of its leadership. Militia threats pose the primary causal risk to journalists over statutory laws, as armed groups affiliated with Iran-backed factions have issued death threats, conducted assaults, and driven relocations, especially in southern provinces like and during protest coverage. In contrast, legal frameworks like the 2004 Journalist Protection Law offer nominal safeguards but lack enforcement amid militia impunity, resulting in self-censorship on topics such as abuses. Digital shifts have amplified independent voices, notably during the 2019 Tishreen protests, where platforms like and facilitated mobilization, live-streaming, and cross-sectarian coordination against corruption and foreign influence, drawing millions despite government internet blackouts affecting 70% of users. However, 2024 regulations introduced mixed outcomes: the CMC imposed blocks on independent websites and long prison terms for online dissent under cybercrime laws, while a judicial shift transferred media cases to civil courts, potentially easing criminal prosecutions. Authorities also pressured platforms to restrict critical Iraqi accounts, underscoring state efforts to curb digital autonomy amid rising influencer licensing fees.

Cuisine, Customs, and Gender Roles in Daily Life

Iraqi cuisine centers on rice, grilled meats, and stuffed vegetables, with dolma—grape leaves or vegetables filled with spiced rice, lamb, and herbs—serving as a staple dish prepared for family gatherings and holidays. Kebabs, including ground meat skewers seasoned with sumac and onions, and masgouf, a whole grilled carp fish basted in tamarind and served over flameside rice, reflect Mesopotamian fishing traditions along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Bread such as samoon, a sesame-topped flatbread, accompanies most meals, while legumes like chickpeas feature in falafel patties fried with garlic and cumin. Tea, brewed strong in samovars and often sweetened with sugar or flavored with cardamom, forms a daily ritual consumed five to ten times per day, particularly among men in tea houses for social bonding. Social customs prioritize , where hosts offer elaborate meals to guests and insist on removing shoes before entering homes to maintain and respect. Weddings involve tribal negotiations, with the groom's formally requesting the bride's hand from her father, followed by multi-day festivities featuring feasts, folk dances, and ululations to celebrate alliances between clans. Daily interactions adhere to patrilineal structures, where elders mediate disputes and emphasize collective honor, reinforcing extended household living even in urban settings. Gender roles in Iraq uphold patriarchal norms rooted in tribal honor codes, which restrict women's public mobility and decision-making to preserve family reputation, resulting in female labor force participation at 13.88% in 2023. Veiling, typically the hijab, is widespread in conservative Shia and Sunni communities but varies in urban Baghdad versus rural areas, with enforcement often tied to familial rather than state mandates. Female genital mutilation remains low nationally, concentrated in parts of Iraqi Kurdistan where prevalence dropped from 38% in 2011 to under 10% by 2018 due to awareness campaigns and legal bans. Despite parliamentary quotas enabling 29% female representation in 2021 elections, economic reforms have yielded superficial gains, as social barriers like guardianship laws and sectarian pressures sustain women's primary roles in domestic spheres.

Sports, Recreation, and National Identity Expressions

The Iraqi national football team secured its sole AFC Asian Cup title on July 29, 2007, defeating Saudi Arabia 1-0 in the final held in Jakarta, Indonesia, with Younis Mahmoud scoring the decisive goal in the 73rd minute. This underdog victory, achieved amid Iraq's post-2003 instability and sectarian strife, generated widespread celebrations that transcended ethnic and religious divides, briefly unifying a fractured populace. The team's moniker, "Lions of Mesopotamia," underscores connections to Iraq's cradle-of-civilization legacy, amplifying sentiments of historical continuity. Wrestling constitutes a longstanding competitive pursuit in Iraq, with national teams contesting international events and domestic traditions persisting in regions like the southern marshlands, where informal variants such as reinforce communal bonds. Efforts to expand participation include the formation of Iraq's first women's wrestling team in , challenging entrenched norms in conservative areas. Falconry endures as a traditional recreational practice, entailing the breeding, training, and deployment of birds of prey like peregrine falcons for hunting quarry such as hares and bustards, a craft traceable to ancient Mesopotamian societies and still pursued by enthusiasts in Iraq's arid zones. This activity embodies skills in animal husbandry and environmental attunement, often shared across generations in rural and tribal settings. In sports, national identity manifests through invocations of Mesopotamian antiquity, as in football symbolism, juxtaposed against pan-Arab solidarity via Iraq's engagements in the Pan-Arab Games, inaugurated in 1953 to foster regional cohesion. Such events highlight hybrid affiliations, blending indigenous heritage with broader Arab frameworks, though internal divisions have periodically hampered consistent representation. Iraqi athletics grapples with doping infractions, exemplified by the July 2024 provisional suspension of judoka Sajjad Ghanim Sehen Sehen for and after testing positive during the Paris Olympics, alongside prior cases like sprinter Dana Hussein's 2021 exclusion from for a banned substance. These incidents, coupled with a lifetime ban in 2023 for trafficking prohibited methods, underscore enforcement gaps amid resource constraints.

References

Add your contribution
Related Hubs
Contribute something
User Avatar
No comments yet.