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Radio and Television of Montenegro
Radio and Television of Montenegro
Radio and Television of Montenegro
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Radio and Television of Montenegro (Montenegrin: Радио и Телевизија Црне Горе, Radio i Televizija Crne Gore; abbr. РТЦГ/RTCG) is the public service broadcaster of Montenegro. A state-owned company with its headquarters in Podgorica, it is made up of the Radio of Montenegro (Montenegrin: Радио Црне Горе, Radio Crne Gore; RCG) and the Television of Montenegro (Montenegrin: Телевизија Црне Горе, Televizija Crne Gore; TVCG).

Key Information

In July 2001, RTCG became a joint member of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU). It became a full member of the EBU upon the declaration of Montenegrin independence in 2006.

History

[edit]

The first radio station in the Balkans and South-East Europe was established in Montenegro with the opening of a transmitter situated on the hill of Volujica near Bar by Knjaz Nikola I Petrović-Njegoš (1841–1921) on 3 August 1904. Radio Cetinje commenced broadcasts on 27 November 1944 and in 1949, Radio Titograd was formed. In 1990 it changed its name to Radio Crna Gora.

In 1957, the first TV antenna was placed on Mount Lovćen. It was able to receive pictures from Italy. RTV Titograd was established in 1963 to produce original television programmes. RTV Titograd later became RTCG. The first broadcast by TVCG in Belgrade was a news program in 1964.

Since October 2002, RTCG has been a member of the EGTA, European Group of Television Advertising.

RTCG announced a competition for a new logo in late 2023, which received 43 entries.[1] The winner was supposed to be revealed on 27 November, but was postponed as the winning design was similar to the logo used by Google's OR-Tools.[2] The new identity was officially unveiled on 2 April 2024, coinciding with the 60th anniversary of television in Montenegro.[3]

Management

[edit]
Former RTCG logo (2006–2012)
Former RTCG logo (2012–2024)

RTCG is regulated by the Law on Public Radio-Diffusion Services, requiring it to serve the interests of all Montenegro citizen, regardless of their political, religious, culture, racial or gender affiliation.[4]: 20 

RTCG is managed by a Council of nine members, who are experts proposed by civil society organisations and appointed by the Parliament by simple majority. The RTCG Council appoints the Director General of the RTCG and advocates in the public interest. Although its nomination procedure should ensure the independence of the Council, the fact that some of the nominating organisations receive state funding has led the OSCE and the Council of Europe to express concern about their lack of independence from the government coalition.[5]

RTCG is widely seen as dependent from the Government,[6] particularly after allegedly politically motivated dismissals of journalists in 2011. RTCG does not pay a broadcasting licence fee and is financed directly from the State budget (1,2% of the budget) as well as from advertising revenues (for a limited airtime) and sales revenues. Its finances have been in trouble lately, and it edged bankruptcy in 2012, further endangering its independence credentials.[4]: 20  RTCG's financial viability is often at risk and relies heavily on the government as its primary source of funding. RTCG's debt stock (€2.4 million) was covered by the state budget in 2014.[7]

Services

[edit]

RTCG has four television channels: three terrestrial, one international; it also has two radio stations. RTCG also now provides four online radio channels (YUG, Millennium, Classic, Shqip) through the broadcaster's app and via the internet.

Television channels
  • TVCG 1 – News and domestic production.
  • TVCG 2 – Sport, entertainment.
  • TVCG 3 – Live broadcasts from the Parliament of Montenegro and other government institutions.
  • TVCG MNE, formerly known as TVCG Sat – RTCG's international channel via satellite.
  • Channel logos since 2024
  • TVCG 1
    TVCG 1
  • TVCG 2
    TVCG 2
  • TVCG 3
    TVCG 3
  • TVCG MNE
    TVCG MNE
Radio stations

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Radio and Television of Montenegro

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from Grokipedia

Radio Televizija Crne Gore (RTCG) is the national public service broadcaster of , delivering radio and television programming to inform, educate, and entertain the public. Radio services began operations on November 27, 1944, while television transmissions started in 1964 under the name Radio Televizija Titograd. Headquartered in and owned by the , RTCG operates three primary television channels—TVCG 1, TVCG 2, and TVCG 3—alongside the international TVCG MNE channel and multiple radio networks. Primarily funded through a state budget allocation equivalent to 0.3% of Montenegro's , supplemented by advertising, the broadcaster maintains a mandate for . However, RTCG has endured persistent political interference via council appointments and editorial influence from successive governments, compromising its autonomy and drawing international scrutiny over media freedom deficits.

History

Founding and Yugoslav Period (1944–1991)

Radio broadcasting in Montenegro originated amid World War II partisan operations, with the establishment of Radio Cetinje on November 27, 1944, following the liberation of Cetinje from Axis occupation. The station initially aired brief programs, including battlefield reports and news aligned with the communist-led National Liberation Movement's objectives, reflecting the partisans' use of media to consolidate control and mobilize support in contested territories. In May 1949, operations relocated to Titograd (present-day ), renaming the entity Radio Titograd to serve as the primary radio outlet for the nascent within the Federal People's Republic of . Television services emerged later under the umbrella of Radio Televizija Titograd (RTV Titograd), formed in 1963 to develop local programming capabilities. Regular broadcasts commenced in May 1964, initially featuring news relays from before expanding to original Montenegrin content, integrated into the federal (JRT) framework that coordinated output across republics. Coverage relied on limited transmitters, prompting investments in repeater stations by the 1970s and 1980s to overcome geographical barriers and reach remote areas, though signal quality remained uneven due to resource constraints in the socialist economy. As a state-controlled entity under the League of Communists of , RTV Titograd prioritized ideological conformity over journalistic independence, functioning as an apparatus for disseminating communist doctrine, extolling Josip Broz Tito's leadership, and fostering "" among Yugoslavia's nationalities. Programming schedules emphasized —depicting collective farm successes, industrial self-management, and anti-fascist narratives—with minimal foreign imports restricted to ideologically vetted Soviet or material, ensuring alignment with party directives rather than diverse viewpoints. This structure mirrored the Soviet-influenced press model prevalent in Yugoslavia until the , where media served regime stability over public discourse, substantiated by the absence of oppositional content amid one-party rule.

State Broadcaster Era (1992–2006)

In 1991, Radio Televizija Titograd was renamed Radio Televizija Crne Gore (RTCG), reflecting Montenegro's assertion of distinct identity amid the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's dissolution, and it operated under full state ownership and control as the republic's primary broadcaster. Following Montenegro's entry into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) with Serbia in April 1992, RTCG functioned as a state entity, disseminating official narratives during international sanctions imposed on the FRY from 1992 to 1995 for involvement in the Bosnian War and other regional conflicts. Its programming emphasized loyalty to the ruling League of Communists of Montenegro (rebranded Democratic Party of Socialists, or DPS, in 1991 under Milo Đukanović), with content aligned to Belgrade's positions initially, including support for Serb interests in the Croatian and Bosnian wars. During the 1999 NATO bombing campaign against the FRY—triggered by the conflict—RTCG covered the strikes on Montenegrin targets, such as bridges and military sites, while framing the intervention as aggression against Yugoslav sovereignty, consistent with the Đukanović government's initial protests despite growing tensions with Slobodan Milošević in . By the late 1990s, as Đukanović distanced Montenegro from Milošević following the 1997 Montenegrin protests and economic isolation, RTCG's output began reflecting this pivot, portraying the regime as a moderate force seeking Western engagement amid FRY sanctions and that reached 313,000% annually in 1993. The broadcaster engaged in limited commercialization, introducing advertising revenue streams by the mid-1990s to offset state funding shortfalls, but remained negligible, with appointments and content shaped by DPS dominance. As the State Union of formed in 2003—replacing the FRY—RTCG advocated for Montenegrin sovereignty, aligning with Đukanović's push culminating in the 2006 on May 21, where 55.5% voted for separation, narrowly meeting the EU-mandated threshold. Throughout this era, RTCG disseminated content obedient to the ruling DPS, including instances of during the 1990s wars, underscoring its role as a tool of state propaganda rather than impartial media, with no substantive mechanisms for until post-referendum reforms.

Transition to Independence and Public Service Model (2006–Present)

Following and declaration on 21 May 2006, Radio Television of Montenegro (RTCG) accelerated its shift from a state-controlled entity to a broadcaster, building on foundational legislation from 2002–2005 that had initiated the transformation. Between 2006 and 2010, amendments to the on established a multi-stakeholder oversight council comprising representatives from , academia, and media professionals to guide editorial policies and ensure accountability, though RTCG's operational autonomy remained constrained by structural reliance on allocations. The 2015 completion of the digital terrestrial television switchover, with analogue signals terminated on 17 June, enabled RTCG to enhance transmission efficiency and introduce high-definition (HD) broadcasting capabilities across its channels, improving signal quality and coverage reach without additional spectrum constraints. This transition aligned with broader infrastructural upgrades, including HD-SDI production workflows and hybrid IP networking for studios. As pursued accession—achieving candidate status in 2010 and opening negotiations in 2012—RTCG faced imperatives to bolster through internal reforms, such as diversified programming mandates and safeguards against political interference in content decisions, as stipulated in EU progress reports emphasizing independent governance. In recent developments, RTCG marked the 80th anniversary of its radio service origins in 1944 with celebrations on 27 November 2024, coinciding with the launch of the MNE PLAY over-the-top (OTT) platform to expand digital accessibility. The broadcaster has pursued regional expansions, including a new studio in and planned facilities in Boka and , to strengthen local content production and nationwide representation. Further technological advancements target full ultra-high-definition (UHD) production by 2026, reflecting ongoing modernization amid public service obligations.

Governance and Management

Organizational Structure and Oversight Bodies

RTCG maintains its headquarters in , , and is structured into operational divisions responsible for , television channels, news production, and content creation, enabling coordinated delivery of public service programming across platforms. The RTCG serves as the principal supervisory body, comprising nine members who must possess expertise in media, law, or related fields. Nominations originate from specified institutions, including two from the University of , two from the Media Union or Association of Journalists, two from the Montenegrin , one each from the Academy of Sciences and Arts and the Consumer Protection Association, and one from other civil society organizations; Parliament appoints them by simple majority vote to represent the founder's interests on behalf of the state. The appoints the following public tender, approves strategic plans, and monitors fulfillment of public broadcasting obligations under the on National Broadcaster. External regulation falls to the Agency for Audiovisual Media Services (AVMU), an independent body tasked with licensing public and commercial broadcasters, including RTCG, enforcing audiovisual media laws, and addressing violations through monitoring and sanctions. RTCG employs 746 staff across these functions. Although designed to promote autonomy via diverse nominations and statutory independence, the governance framework reveals structural weaknesses to political interference, primarily through Parliament's decisive appointment role, which aligns Council composition with ruling majorities. This has manifested in crony-driven decisions, such as the Council's appointment of Boris Raonić as Director General in August 2021 via tender and his reappointment in June 2023 despite lacking the required five years of managerial experience and amid ongoing litigation; courts annulled both selections, citing procedural flaws and conflicts of interest tied to prior affiliations with the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists. Such patterns indicate that empirical political capture overrides formal depoliticization efforts, as parliamentary majorities leverage appointments to steer leadership and priorities.

Leadership Appointments and Director General Role

The of Radio Television of Montenegro (RTCG) is elected by the RTCG Council, the broadcaster's governing body composed of nine members appointed by the , for a four-year mandate. The position requires candidates to demonstrate relevant professional experience, though amendments to the Law on the Public Broadcaster adopted by in August 2024 reduced the mandatory years of experience from five to facilitate broader eligibility for appointments. Once elected, the exercises executive authority over RTCG's operations, including editorial programming decisions and resource allocation within the organization, which can shape content priorities and internal dynamics. Boris Raonić, a lawyer and former NGO activist from Podgorica, was first appointed Director General in August 2021 by a Council vote of 7-2, succeeding prior leadership amid the post-2020 governmental transition following the end of the long-ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) dominance. His re-election in late August 2023 for a second term, again by Council majority despite a Higher Court ruling earlier that year deeming his initial appointment unlawful due to procedural irregularities, drew criticism from civil society groups and media watchdogs for undermining legal standards. Further legal challenges persisted, with the Basic Court in Podgorica annulling Raonić's re-appointment decision in October 2025 on grounds of invalid Council proceedings, though he maintained the role pending appeals. These episodes highlight recurring disputes over the Council's adherence to statutory requirements, including candidate qualifications and voting quorums, often exacerbated by the politically affiliated composition of Council members selected through parliamentary majorities. Appointments to the role have frequently reflected alignments with prevailing ruling coalitions, as evidenced by shifts following the 2020 parliamentary elections, which installed a broad anti-DPS alliance that influenced RTCG governance changes. assessments in non-papers and rule-of-law reports have flagged such politicization, urging resolution of RTCG leadership disputes through judicial means to mitigate risks of executive capture over . Prior examples, such as the 2017 election of Andrijana Kadija—a seasoned who served briefly before dismissal in 2018 amid internal conflicts—further illustrate how Council decisions can prioritize political compatibility over insulated expertise, perpetuating cycles of contestation that affect operational stability.

Services and Programming

Radio Operations

Radio Crne Gore (RCG) and Radio 98 constitute the primary radio channels operated by RTCG, functioning as national outlets with FM transmission across . RCG delivers a general-interest format emphasizing , cultural programming, and , while Radio 98 targets youth audiences with contemporary content. Both channels operate 24 hours daily, prioritizing content relevant to , including information and entertainment. Coverage relies predominantly on analog FM networks, enabling reception in major cities such as , , and through regional transmitters that ensure nationwide reach. RTCG provides limited broadcasts in minority languages, including Albanian and Bosnian, typically as bi-weekly programs rather than dedicated channels, reflecting constraints in production capacity for ethnic communities. Efforts to introduce digital radio via DAB+ trials occurred from March 2021 to January 2022, targeting areas around and , but analog FM remains the dominant mode due to lack of sustained implementation. In terms of audience, Radio Crne Gore holds fifth place in national listenership rankings, with higher engagement in rural areas compared to urban centers, and appeals more to older listeners and men. Approximately 40% of its audience tunes in weekly or more frequently, underscoring radio's enduring utility in less urbanized regions where television penetration is lower.

Television Channels and Content

RTCG operates several television channels as part of its mandate, focusing on informing, educating, and entertaining Montenegrin audiences while prioritizing domestic production and cultural representation. TVCG 1 serves as the primary generalist channel, emphasizing news bulletins such as "Vijesti" aired multiple times daily, alongside domestic entertainment programs including morning shows like "Dobro Jutro Crna Goro" and independent productions such as "Perspektiva." This channel features a mix of informational content, cultural segments, and original series, aligning with RTCG's role in providing balanced coverage of national events and fostering public discourse. TVCG 2 specializes in sports coverage, documentaries, and programming targeted at ethnic minorities, including children's shows and educational content that constitutes around 5% of its schedule each for sports and youth-oriented formats. It broadcasts live sports events, analytical discussions, and minority-language productions to promote inclusivity, reflecting RTCG's statutory obligations to represent Montenegro's diverse population. Complementing these, TVCG 3 provides live parliamentary sessions and government proceedings, ensuring transparency in democratic processes. For the Montenegrin , TVCG MNE (formerly TVCG SAT) transmits via , offering rebroadcasts and tailored content that highlights multicultural and multireligious aspects of Montenegrin society to maintain cultural ties abroad. RTCG's content emphasizes original domestic programming, including news, documentaries, and , with a legal framework under the Law on the National Public Broadcaster mandating priority for local productions to preserve and support independent creators. This includes quotas and incentives for in-house and commissioned works, such as cultural documentaries and EU-supported collaborative projects on regional topics. In 2019, RTCG transitioned its signals to high-definition (HD) digital broadcasting, enhancing production quality across channels. Programming also incorporates for accessibility, particularly in news and educational segments, to broaden reach within Montenegro's linguistic diversity.

Digital and Online Platforms

The RTCG operates the rtcg.me portal, launched in , which serves as a central hub for news articles, streams of channels including TVCG 1, TVCG 2, TVCG 3, and TVCG MNE, as well as radio broadcasts and video archives. The portal features a responsive , noted as the first in the to implement such functionality for improved mobile accessibility, enabling users to access content, share via social networks, and view on-demand materials. Complementing the portal, RTCG provides a dedicated mobile application available on Android and iOS platforms, offering news feeds, photo galleries, videos, user comments, and social sharing capabilities, with updates continuing into 2025. RTCG maintains an active social media presence, including an Instagram account (@rtcg_me) with over 70,000 followers for sharing clips and engaging audiences, and a YouTube channel (@rtcgYT) for video content distribution. In late 2024, coinciding with its 80th anniversary, RTCG introduced MNE Play, a free over-the-top (OTT) streaming service providing live and on-demand access to television and across web browsers, mobile devices, and platforms such as and . Developed in partnership with More Screens, the platform aims to expand reach amid a decade-long trend of audiences shifting from traditional broadcasts to online media alternatives. However, RTCG's digital efforts remain constrained by slower adoption compared to private outlets, with surveys indicating higher engagement on platforms like , , and competitor portals over sites.

Funding and Financial Model

Revenue Sources and Public Funding

RTCG derives the bulk of its revenues from annual allocations in the Montenegrin state budget, which accounted for approximately 75% of public broadcaster revenues in 2023, totaling €21.1 million for RTCG specifically out of €28.1 million across entities. These allocations, equivalent to roughly 0.3% of Montenegro's GDP (based on a €6.1 billion GDP and €19.5–21.1 million funding in recent years), reflect a model heavily reliant on funds rather than diversified streams. Commercial revenues, primarily from , remain marginal, supplementing but not offsetting the state dependency; in 2022, RTCG's total stood at €20.1 million, with advertising forming only a limited portion amid restrictions on public broadcasters' market activities. Direct subscription fees, once a key pillar, were eliminated by in 2009, further entrenching reliance on budgetary appropriations that critics argue facilitate governmental leverage over editorial decisions. European Union grants occasionally bolster RTCG's finances for targeted reforms, such as digital transitions or compliance enhancements, though these are project-specific and non-recurring, not altering the core state-centric structure. In June 2024, enacted a new on RTCG alongside broader media legislation, which expanded state allocations to promote ; however, analysts have faulted the reforms for embedding mechanisms—like adjustable budgetary strings—that perpetuate political influence, as funding levels can be tied to compliance with ruling priorities rather than insulating the broadcaster from interference. This approach contrasts with diversified models in EU peers, where license fees or hybrid reduce vulnerability to annual political negotiations.

Budgetary Challenges and Reforms

RTCG has faced persistent budgetary shortfalls, particularly in the , driven by overspending on personnel and production expenses that exceeded revenue projections. In 2010, the broadcaster recorded a loss of €1.2 million, contributing to operational strains that necessitated internal discussions. By 2014, deficits escalated to €2.4 million, prompting direct intervention to cover the shortfall through state allocations, highlighting RTCG's heavy dependence on public funds amid inefficient . High salaries have compounded these issues; in June 2025, the confirmed that some of RTCG's top executive compensations violated legal caps, underscoring systemic payroll inefficiencies. Average gross salaries stood at €735 in 2018, reflecting elevated labor costs relative to output in a small market. Reform efforts have focused on cost rationalization and revenue diversification, though implementation has lagged. Proposals under EU-supported initiatives, such as the 2022 Technical Assistance to Public Service Media in the Western project, advocated for enhanced commercial concessions, sponsorships, and subscription-based models to reduce state reliance, which exceeded 90% of RTCG's €20.1 million in 2022. Despite legal frameworks allocating subscription fees (75% to RTCG), actual diversification remains minimal, with revenues in 2023 reaching €21.1 million but still predominantly state-sourced, perpetuating vulnerability to fiscal cycles. Comparatively, RTCG's funding levels indicate lower efficiency than regional peers. With an annual budget approximating €20-21 million for Montenegro's population of roughly 620,000, per-capita expenditure reaches about €32-34, surpassing Serbia's RTS (around €18 per capita for 6.6 million residents) and aligning with or exceeding Croatia's HRT despite smaller scale and audience metrics. This disparity correlates with RTCG's challenges in achieving sustainable operations, as higher taxpayer burdens have not translated into proportional improvements in programming efficiency or financial autonomy.

Editorial Independence and Political Influence

The autonomy of Radio Television of Montenegro (RTCG) is enshrined in the Law on , originally adopted in 2002 as part of broader media reforms to transition from state-controlled to a model independent of editorial control. This law explicitly requires RTCG to maintain impartiality in its programming, free from direct state interference in content decisions, while obligating the broadcaster to adhere to principles of pluralism and balance. Subsequent amendments, including those in 2012, reinforced these provisions by clarifying RTCG's status as a public enterprise performing services without subordination to state authorities. A key element of the framework is the composition of RTCG's governing , mandated to reflect societal diversity through appointments from non-governmental organizations, media professionals, cultural institutions, and other independent sectors, with the explicit aim of insulating from political partisanship. The prohibits political on RTCG outside designated periods and imposes duties for equitable airtime allocation and balanced reporting during campaigns, with rules specifying that informative programs must present electoral platforms without favoritism. Enforcement relies on oversight by the , which can adjudicate violations of independence guarantees, and an internal tasked with investigating complaints related to impartiality breaches. However, international assessments have highlighted the framework's limited empirical effectiveness, as structural safeguards have frequently failed to prevent non-compliance, evidenced by recurring challenges in council appointments and content neutrality despite legal prohibitions. The 2020 revisions to the Law on the National Public Broadcaster RTCG aimed to bolster these mechanisms by emphasizing institutional separation from political entities, yet gaps in practical persist, underscoring causal weaknesses in binding over nominal rules.

Evidence of Interference and Bias Claims

In surveys assessing public broadcaster independence, perceptions of political influence on RTCG have persisted at levels around 20%, despite some decline. An OSCE Mission to Montenegro poll conducted in 2022 found that 19.5% of respondents viewed RTCG as under strong political influence, a decrease from 25% in the preceding survey, with objectivity perceptions rising modestly to 17.4%. This indicates ongoing skepticism, particularly in a state-funded model vulnerable to ruling party capture, where editorial decisions align with governmental priorities over neutral reporting. Pre-2020, under prolonged Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) governance, RTCG exhibited favoritism toward the ruling coalition through board manipulations and biased coverage. In 2018, NGOs documented the replacement of independent council members with party-aligned figures, subverting institutional autonomy and enabling disproportionate airtime for DPS narratives. The U.S. State Department's 2021 report highlighted political interference in RTCG operations, including editorial pressures that favored incumbents and marginalized opposition voices. assessments from 2019 similarly flagged undue interference, with parliamentary appointments reinforcing DPS control over programming. Post-2020 brought initial diversification but subsequent claims of bias under the new coalition, evidencing bipartisan capture risks. While 2021 European Commission reports noted expanded political content diversity following management shifts, by 2025 convictions for abuse of office involving RTCG's president and board members underscored tied to the incoming government's influence. , such as OSCE observations in 2023, revealed persistent imbalances in airtime allocation, with opposition parties often receiving coverage below equitable thresholds mandated , perpetuating perceptions of selective neutrality. These patterns reflect structural incentives in models, where successive administrations leverage oversight mechanisms for partisan advantage.

Controversies and Criticisms

In September 2021, a crew from TVCG, RTCG's television channel, was attacked while covering events in , including assaults on journalists amid protests related to the of a bishop, highlighting vulnerabilities in field reporting for public broadcasters. Multiple court rulings have invalidated appointments of RTCG's general director Boris Raonić, exposing procedural irregularities in leadership selection. The High Court of confirmed in October 2024 that Raonić's June 2023 re-appointment was unlawful, following prior Basic Court decisions overturning it for non-compliance with legal requirements. In 2025, the Basic Court annulled his September 2024 appointment, ruling it violated tender procedures and eligibility criteria. In September 2025, the Basic Court in Podgorica issued a first-instance verdict convicting RTCG Council President Muhamed Raonić and three members—Amina Murić, among others—of abuse of office related to irregular worker elections, imposing suspended seven-month prison sentences and underscoring cronyism in governance. The case stemmed from decisions favoring unqualified candidates, prompting calls for resignations to restore institutional integrity. RTCG's organized protests in June 2025 against a proposed , criticizing it for perpetuating wage stagnation at minimum levels for most staff while enabling significant raises for executives, which pressured employees and exacerbated internal inequities.

Recent Developments (2020–2025)

The formation of a new parliamentary majority and government in October 2023, following elections that ended prolonged political deadlock, heightened scrutiny of RTCG's editorial independence, with opposition groups and media NGOs alleging that the broadcaster shifted toward favoring the ruling coalition's narratives, amplifying prior bias claims from the previous administration. This transition coincided with the controversial re-election of Boris Raonić as Director General in June 2023, defying a Higher Court ruling that invalidated his initial 2021 appointment due to unmet professional experience requirements of five years in senior media roles. In August 2024, Montenegro's amended the on the Public Broadcaster RTCG, lowering the professional experience threshold for the position to three years and adjusting funding provisions to include increased state allocations for public interest content under the new 2024 Media , steps critics argued facilitated politically aligned appointments rather than structural reforms for . These changes followed affirmations of irregularities in Raonić's tenure, yet the RTCG Council upheld his position, prompting accusations of and institutional capture by pro-government factions. By 2025, media watchdogs such as the Center for Civic Education documented patterns of party influence under Raonić, including selective coverage that aligned with coalition priorities and marginalized dissenting voices, exemplified by unbalanced reporting on government policies. The RTCG portal faced specific rebukes from the Ombudsman for failing to publish required responses to criticized content, as in a June 2025 case involving the Trade Union of Media of Montenegro, violating self-regulatory codes on right-of-reply obligations, and for non-compliance with procedural rules under Article 10 of its own guidelines. In September 2025, the Basic Court convicted the RTCG Council president and three members of abuse of office in Raonić's re-election process, reinforcing claims of politicized governance despite legal safeguards. European Union progress assessments, including the 2024 Commission Report and a June 2025 non-paper, identified RTCG's leadership disputes and funding dependencies as persistent barriers to Chapter 23 ( and ) benchmarks, urging depoliticized appointment mechanisms and sustainable, non-partisan public financing to align with accession criteria, with stalled implementation risking delays in negotiations. These critiques underscored causal links between RTCG's vulnerabilities—rooted in council composition tied to parliamentary majorities—and broader deficits, as evidenced by repeated judicial interventions rather than proactive legislative depoliticization.

Reception and Societal Role

Audience Metrics and Public Trust

In 2022, RTCG's television channels, particularly TVCG 1, were watched most often by 25.4% of Montenegrin citizens, positioning it as the leading station in viewership frequency, though it ranked second overall in daily consumption with 24% of respondents tuning in regularly. A more recent 2024 survey indicated that 29.1% of citizens watched RTCG daily and 35.7% several times per week, while 25.2% viewed occasionally and 10% never followed its programming, reflecting a substantial non-engaged exceeding 35% and contributing to perceptions of eroding dominance amid from private outlets like TV Vijesti. Public trust in RTCG remains divided, with a 2022 poll showing 27% of respondents selecting it as the most trusted TV station, tying with TV Vijesti and marking an improvement in perceived objectivity to 17.4%. However, the same 2024 survey revealed only 27% fully trusting RTCG's news content, with 54.1% expressing partial trust and 10.9% none at all, alongside average ratings for independence at 2.81 out of 5, underscoring persistent skepticism linked to accusations of political influence that have hindered recovery from historical lows in credibility. This erosion is evident in the narrowing gap with private competitors, as Vijesti matched RTCG's trust levels in earlier polls but benefits from stronger perceptions of impartiality among subsets of viewers, further fragmenting RTCG's once-dominant position in Montenegro's polarized media environment.

Contributions and Limitations in Montenegrin Media Landscape

RTCG provides essential public goods in Montenegro's fragmented , which features over 180 outlets operating in a small with limited revenues of approximately €11 million annually, making niche services unsustainable for many private entities. As the national public broadcaster funded by at least €17 million from the state budget, it ensures broadcasting capabilities, supported by specialized training for journalists in live and reporting to deliver timely, reliable information nationwide during disasters or unrest. The broadcaster also advances cultural preservation through dedicated programming that documents and promotes Montenegrin heritage, traditions, and identity, fulfilling legal obligations to strengthen national cultural cohesion in a diverse society. Furthermore, RTCG addresses minority access gaps prevalent in the polarized by airing content in Albanian, Bosnian, and Romani languages, including weekly programs on minority cultures, histories, and literatures, thus enabling representation for ethnic groups comprising about 28% of the population. Despite these contributions, RTCG's reliance on government funding exposes it to , with political actors leveraging appointments and oversight to shape editorial priorities, which curtails broader by favoring aligned narratives over diverse viewpoints. This inherent vulnerability in state-controlled models contrasts with more insulated systems, such as Estonia's public broadcaster ERR, where robust mechanisms sustain high public trust ratings—recent surveys showing ERR among the most reliable institutions—while RTCG garners divided confidence, with public perceptions of hovering around 50% or lower due to perceived political sway. RTCG exerts considerable influence on public discourse as Montenegro's second-most-viewed , reaching a broad audience in a where television remains the primary source for over 75% of citizens. However, during crises such as the 2020 protests against corruption and electoral laws—which drew tens of thousands amid religious and civic tensions—its coverage, shaped by ties to the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists, prioritized official perspectives, exacerbating ethnic and political cleavages rather than mitigating them through balanced reporting. This dynamic underscores how state media's structural biases can intensify divisions in transitional societies prone to polarization.

References

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