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Regulation school
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The regulation school (French: l'école de la régulation) is a group of writers in political economy and economics whose origins can be traced to France in the early 1970s, where economic instability and stagflation were rampant in the French economy. The term régulation was coined by Frenchman Destanne de Bernis, who aimed to use the approach as a systems theory to bring Marxian economic analysis up to date.[1] These writers are influenced by structural Marxism, the Annales School, institutionalism, Karl Polanyi's substantivist approach, and theory of Charles Bettelheim, among others, and sought to present the emergence of new economic (and hence social) forms in terms of tensions within existing arrangements. Since they are interested in how historically specific systems of capital accumulation are "regularized" or stabilized, their approach is called the "regulation approach" or "regulation theory". Although this approach originated in Michel Aglietta's monograph A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience (Verso, 1976) and was popularized by other Parisians such as Robert Boyer,[1] its membership goes well beyond the so-called Parisian School, extending to the Grenoble School, the German School, the Amsterdam School, British radical geographers, the US Social Structure of Accumulation School, and the neo-Gramscian school, among others.
The regulation approach
[edit]Robert Boyer describes the broad theory as "The study of the transformation of social relations, which creates new forms- both economic and non-economic- organized in structures and reproducing a determinate structure, the mode of reproduction".[2] This theory or approach looks at capitalist economies as a function of social and institutional systems and not just as government's role in the regulation of the economy, although the latter is a major part of the approach.
Regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation
[edit]Regulation theory discusses historical change of the political economy through two central concepts, "regime of accumulation or accumulation regime" (AR) and "mode of regulation" (MR). The concept of regime of accumulation allows theorists to analyze the way production, circulation, consumption, and distribution organize and expand capital in a way that stabilizes the economy over time. Alain Lipietz, in Towards a New Economic Order, describes the regime of accumulation of Fordism as composed of mass-producing, a proportionate share-out of value added, and a consequent stability in firm’s profitability, with the plant used at full capacity and full employment (p. 6).
An MR is a set of institutional laws, norms, forms of state, policy paradigms, and other practices that provide the context for the AR's operation. Typically, it is said that it comprises a money form, a competition form, a wage form, a state form, and an international regime, but it can encompass many more elements than these. Generally speaking, MRs support ARs by providing a conducive and supportive environment, in which the ARs are given guidelines that they should follow. In cases of tension between the two, a crisis may occur. Thus this approach parallels Marx's characterisation of historical change as driven by contradictions between the forces and the relations of production (see historical materialism).
Translation and definition
[edit]Bob Jessop summarises the difficulties of the term in Governing Capitalist Economies as follows: "The RA seeks to integrate analysis of political economy with analysis of civil society and or State to show how they interact to normalize the capital relation and govern the conflictual and crisis-mediated course of capital accumulation. In this sense, régulation might have been better and less mechanically translated as regularization or normalization" {Jessop, 2006, p.4}. Therefore, the term régulation does not necessarily translate well as "regulation". Regulation in the sense of government action does have a part in regulation theory.
History of modes of regulation
[edit]Robert Boyer distinguished two main modes of regulation throughout the 19th and 20th centuries:
- The "mode of regulation of competition" (1850–1930). It consisted of a first mode of regulation, from 1850 to the beginning of the 20th century, that Boyer called "extensive mode of regulation", characterized by low productivity gains, important part of the output dedicated to equipments, and high competition. The second period is called "intensive mode of regulation without mass consumption", because it consists of high productivity gains (thanks to Taylorist methods) and the production of consumption commodities.
- The "monopolist mode of regulation" (after 1930), characterized by high productivity and mass consumption. The Fordist system made possible a regular growth of economic output and an increase in income at the same time.
Crisis
[edit]Regulationist economists distinguish between cyclical and structural crises. They study only structural crises, which are the crises of a mode of regulation. From this distinction, they have formulated a typology of crises that accounts for various disarrangements in institutional configurations. According to its initial objective, which was to understand the rupture of the Fordist mode of regulation:
- Exogenic crises are due to an external event; they can be very perturbing but cannot endanger the mode of regulation, and even less the mode of accumulation. Neoclassical economists (or economists of the school of rational anticipations) consider that all crises are exogenic.
- Endogenous crises are cyclical crises that are necessary and inevitable, for they make it possible to cancel imbalances accumulated during the phase of expansion without major deterioration of institutional forms. These crises are inseparable from the operation of capitalism.
- The crisis of the mode of regulation: unable to avoid a downward spiral, institutional forms and the ways the state intervenes in the economy must be modified. The best example is the crisis of 1929, where the free play of market forces and competition did not lead to a renewed phase of expansion.
- The crisis of the mode of accumulation means that it is impossible to continue long-term growth without major upheaval of institutional forms. The crisis of 1929 is the best example: the interwar period marks the passage from a mode of accumulation characterised by mass production without mass consumption to a mode incorporating both mass production and mass consumption.
Current development
[edit]Since the 1980s, the Regulation school has developed research at other socio-economic levels: firms, markets and branches studies (food and agriculture, automotive, banking…); development and local regions ("regulation, sectors and territories" research workshop); developing countries or developed economies others than France and USA (South Korea, Chile, Belgium, Japan, Algeria, etc.): political economy of globalization (diversity of capitalisms, politics and firms...). By doing so, its methods now range from institutional macroeconomics to discourses analysis, with quantitative and qualitative methods.
Members of the Regulation School
[edit]See also
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ a b The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction (Columbia University Press, 1990)
- ^ The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction (Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 17
- ^ "Site du CEPREMAP".
- ^ "Jamie Peck - Canada Research Chair in Urban and Regional Political Economy". Archived from the original on 2010-01-07. Retrieved 2009-10-29.
- ^ "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2015-01-18. Retrieved 2023-01-07.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link) - ^ Edgell, Stephen; Gottfried, Heidi; Granter, Edward (2015). Fordism and the Golden Age of Atlantic Capitalism. doi:10.4135/9781473915206. ISBN 9781446280669. Retrieved 16 November 2020.
- ^ Vidal, Matt (June 2013). "Postfordism as a Dysfunctional Accumulation Regime". Work, Employment and Society. 27 (3): 451–471. doi:10.1177/0950017013481876. S2CID 55223929. Retrieved 16 November 2020.
- ^ "Incoherence and dysfunctionality in the institutional regulation of capitalism". Retrieved 16 November 2020.
References
[edit]- Bob Jessop, Ngai-Ling Sum, Beyond The Regulation Approach: Putting Capitalist Economies In Their Place, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006.
- Boyer, Robert, Saillard, Yves (Ed.), (2002), Régulation Theory. The State of the Art, Routledge, London & New-York.
External links
[edit]- Revue de la Régulation/ Régulation Review. Capitalism, Institutions, Power
- Association Recherche & Régulation. Among others resources (working papers, research workshops, researchers networks, news..., note the 2015 international colloquium Research&Regulation "The theory of regulation in times of crisis"
- An overview of the Regulation School
- A scholarly blog on the Regulation School in Economic Thought
- An interview in which Alain Lipietz gives a brief introduction to Regulation Theory
- Article on Lipietz's approach to Regulation Theory
- A page containing some notes on the Regulation School's approach to Fordism, as presented by Ash Amin
- A selection of key works by Regulation School writers
- fundamental recent working papers by regulationist scientists
- Chapter 2 of this monograph explores the theoretical approach of the Regulation School Archived 2006-07-12 at the Wayback Machine
- A Critique of the Fordism of the Regulation School - from Wildcat
Regulation school
View on GrokipediaOrigins and Development
Emergence in French Political Economy
The Regulation School arose in French political economy during the mid-1970s, as economists grappled with the stagflation crisis and the unraveling of post-World War II expansion, which exposed limitations in both neoclassical equilibrium models and deterministic interpretations of capitalist contradictions.[6] This heterodox approach sought to explain long-term economic stability and instability through the interplay of institutional structures and accumulation processes, diverging from mainstream French economic policy traditions like indicative planning while engaging critically with them.[7] It developed in Parisian academic and research circles, including affiliations with institutions such as CEPREMAP, amid an intellectual environment shaped by structuralist influences and dissatisfaction with orthodox tools for analyzing structural shifts.[8] Michel Aglietta's 1976 book Régulation et crises du capitalisme: l'expérience des États-Unis (1945-1971) marked the foundational text, applying empirical analysis to the U.S. case to theorize how specific "modes of regulation"—institutional norms, wage relations, and state interventions—sustain phases of expanded reproduction despite underlying tensions in capital accumulation. Published by Calmann-Lévy, the work drew on macroeconomic data to demonstrate that the Fordist regime's viability depended on wage indexation to productivity gains and credit mechanisms, which began faltering by the early 1970s due to rising social costs and international competition.[9] Aglietta, then a researcher in French economic circles, positioned regulation not as mere state control but as emergent social forms resolving accumulation contradictions temporarily, influencing subsequent French debates on crisis management.[7] By the late 1970s, Robert Boyer extended these ideas, emphasizing wage-labor nexus as pivotal to regulatory viability, while Alain Lipietz contributed analyses of international dimensions, solidifying a collaborative "Parisian" network that formalized the school's emphasis on historical periodization over universal laws.[7] This phase reflected France's post-1968 intellectual milieu, blending Marxist insights on class conflict with Keynesian demand management and institutional economics, yet prioritizing verifiable macroeconomic patterns—such as U.S. GDP growth averaging 4% annually from 1945 to 1965 before declining—over prescriptive ideology.[8] The school's early traction stemmed from its capacity to model regime transitions empirically, contrasting with the era's dominant monetarist responses in policy circles.[6]Intellectual Influences and Early Works
The Regulation School emerged from a synthesis of Marxist political economy, which provided the foundational critique of capitalism's inherent contradictions and class struggles, with the long-term historical analysis of the Annales School, emphasizing structural transformations over conjunctural events.[10] Key influences included John Maynard Keynes's theories on macroeconomic demand management and the role of state intervention in stabilizing economies, as well as Michał Kalecki's extensions of these ideas to incorporate oligopolistic pricing and investment cycles in capitalist systems.[10] These elements were adapted to explain how temporary institutional arrangements could mitigate but not eliminate the crises endemic to accumulation, diverging from orthodox Marxism's emphasis on inevitable collapse by incorporating post-Keynesian insights into effective demand and wage-profit dynamics. Early theoretical development centered on the work of Michel Aglietta, whose 1976 monograph Régulation et crises du capitalisme: l'expérience des États-Unis introduced core concepts like the wage relation and monetary forms as regulatory mechanisms stabilizing Fordist accumulation in the post-World War II United States.[9] Published by Calmann-Lévy, the book drew empirical evidence from U.S. economic data spanning the 1920s to the 1970s, arguing that regulation—through norms, institutions, and social compromises—temporarily resolves mismatches between production and consumption without altering capitalism's structural imperatives.[11] Aglietta's analysis, rooted in his doctoral research at the University of Paris-Dauphine, marked the school's shift from abstract Marxist crisis theory to concrete historical-periodization, influencing subsequent researchers at institutions like CEPREMAP. Robert Boyer's contemporaneous contributions, including his 1976 publications on economic policy and growth regimes, further elaborated regulation as a meso-level process bridging macro accumulation and micro institutional forms.[6] Collaborations among Aglietta, Boyer, and Alain Lipietz in the late 1970s, often through seminars at the Centre d'études prospectives d'économie mathématique appliquées à la planification (CEPES), formalized the approach, with early papers addressing the 1973-1975 oil crisis as a signal of Fordist regulation's breakdown.[1] These works prioritized empirical validation over doctrinal purity, critiquing both neoclassical equilibrium models and rigid structuralist determinism for underestimating capitalism's adaptive capacity via state and wage regulations.Core Concepts
Regimes of Accumulation
In regulation theory, a regime of accumulation refers to a historically specific and relatively stable pattern of economic evolution that coordinates the production and realization of surplus value, ensuring the expanded reproduction of capitalist relations over a prolonged period.[2] This concept, first systematically developed by Michel Aglietta in his 1976 analysis of the United States economy, describes the macro-level regularities that temporarily resolve or postpone inherent contradictions in capital accumulation, such as mismatches between productive capacity and effective demand.[2] Aglietta defined it as achieving "a certain match between the transformation of the conditions of production... and transformation in the conditions of final consumption," thereby stabilizing the valorization of capital at the scale of the total social product.[2] Key components of a regime of accumulation include the organization of production within firms, the temporal horizons guiding investment and capital formation decisions, the distribution of income among wages, profits, and other shares, the volume and structure of effective demand, and the integration with non-capitalist sectors or activities.[2] For instance, these elements form a coherent system where rising productivity in production aligns with expanding consumption outlets, preventing chronic overaccumulation or underconsumption crises. Robert Boyer, building on Aglietta, emphasized that such regimes depend on "the set of regularities that ensure the general and relatively coherent progress of capital accumulation, allowing resolution or postponement of distortions and disequilibria."[12] Unlike abstract models of equilibrium, regimes are empirically grounded in observable historical phases, such as the shift from extensive accumulation—reliant on labor extensification and simple commodity circulation in the 19th century—to intensive accumulation, which incorporates technological intensification and mass consumption patterns.[12][2] Regimes of accumulation do not operate in isolation but articulate with a complementary mode of regulation, comprising institutionalized norms, laws, and social compromises that govern wage-labor relations, competition, and monetary flows to sustain the regime's viability.[12] Together, they constitute a "mode of development," a temporary configuration that institutionalizes class conflict in ways compatible with ongoing accumulation, as theorized by Aglietta and extended by Boyer and Alain Lipietz in the 1980s.[2] This interplay highlights the regime's fragility: while providing structural stability—evident in phases like the post-1945 boom, where U.S. GDP growth averaged 3.8% annually from 1948 to 1973—regimes eventually exhaust due to internal rigidities, such as wage rigidities outpacing productivity or international imbalances, precipitating structural crises.[12] Empirical validation draws from quantitative data on productivity, profit rates, and consumption shares, underscoring the theory's focus on causal mechanisms over ideological narratives.[2]Modes of Regulation
In regulation theory, the mode of regulation denotes the historically specific ensemble of norms, institutions, organizational forms, and behavioral patterns that stabilize a given regime of accumulation by aligning individual actions with systemic requirements for capitalist reproduction.[1] This configuration mediates inherent contradictions, such as those between production and realization of value, through "situated rationalities" embedded in institutional networks, rather than through abstract market mechanisms alone.[7] Unlike purely competitive equilibria, modes of regulation incorporate extra-economic factors, including state interventions and social compromises, to defer crises and sustain growth phases.[1] The mode of regulation is analytically decomposed into five key institutional forms, each governing specific spheres of economic and social coordination:- Wage-labor nexus: Structures the relation between capital and labor, determining income distribution, work organization, and productivity norms to ensure effective demand matches supply, as seen in collective bargaining systems stabilizing mass consumption under Fordism.[1][6]
- Forms of competition: Defines inter-firm rivalry, ranging from price-based competition in fragmented markets to oligopolistic coordination via pricing strategies or technological standards, influencing investment and innovation patterns.[1][7]
- Monetary and financial regime: Regulates credit allocation, payment systems, and financial intermediation to synchronize monetary flows with real accumulation, such as through central bank policies linking savings to investment.[1][6]
- State and governance forms: Encompasses fiscal, regulatory, and welfare policies that internalize externalities and enforce compromises, adapting to accumulation needs via infrastructure provision or macroeconomic stabilization.[1]
- International regime: Manages cross-border trade, capital flows, and exchange rates to embed national accumulation within global constraints, exemplified by fixed exchange systems supporting export-led growth.[1][13]
