Hubbry Logo
Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-OppositionSudan People's Liberation Movement-in-OppositionMain
Open search
Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition
Community hub
Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition
Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition
Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (abbreviated SPLM-IO), also known as the anti-governmental forces (AGF), is a mainly South Sudanese political party and rebel group that split from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in 2013, due to political tensions between President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar over leadership of the SPLM. Tensions grew between forces loyal to Kiir and Machar and South Sudan plunged into the South Sudanese Civil War.[5]

Key Information

The party and militia are led by Riek Machar.[6][7] Machar appointed General Simon Gatwech Dual as Army Chief of General Staff, deputized by the Deputy Chief of General Staffs for operations, training, political and moral orientation, logistics, administration and finance.[8] In June 2021, Machar removed General Gatwech Dual from the position and appointed him into the Presidency as an adviser.[9] Gatwech however, rejected the new role, rejected Machar's leadership of the SPLM/A-IO, and declared himself interim leader, which led to fighting between Machar allies and those loyal to Gen. Gatwech formerly known as the Kit-Gwang faction throughout 2021.[10]

Etymology

[edit]

During the Nasir convention in April 2014, the rebels in the South Sudanese Civil War were split on whether to maintain an affiliation with the ruling SPLM party. While Maj. Gen. Garouth Gatkuoth and many generals spoke against a SPLM affiliation, Angelina Teny and much of the leadership were in favor, leading Riek Machar to defer a final decision. The group decided on the provisional name SPLM-SPLA.[11] Shortly after the meeting, however, the media began to call the group the SPLM-in-Opposition, due to its opposition to the governing SPLM party.

History

[edit]

The SPLM-IO was established in December 2013, following tensions within the ruling SPLM that escalated into a full-scale conflict. After President Salva Kiir dismissed Riek Machar as vice president, violence broke out in Juba, leading to a split in the SPLM. Machar and his supporters fled the capital and declared their opposition to Kiir’s government, leading to the creation of the SPLM-IO as an armed rebel movement.[12]

During the South Sudanese Civil War, the SPLM-IO engaged in intense fighting with government forces, controlling large territories in parts of Upper Nile, Jonglei, and Unity states. The conflict was marked by allegations of war crimes, ethnic violence, and humanitarian crises.[13]

A series of peace negotiations were held between the SPLM-IO and the government, mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and international partners. This culminated in the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), signed in September 2018, which called for a unity government.[14]

In February 2020, Riek Machar was reinstated as First Vice President under a power-sharing agreement. However, tensions and sporadic clashes have continued between the SPLM-IO and government forces.

According to the SPLM-IO, Machar was put under house arrest on 26 March 2025, along with his wife, interior minister Angelina Teny, after an armed convoy led by top government officials entered his residence in Juba.[15] Their guards were disarmed and taken to an unknown location.[16] The party stated that the 2018 peace agreement with the government was effectively void as a result.[15] On 28 March, the South Sudanese government announced that Machar was under house arrest.[17]

Politics

[edit]

By May 2018, the SPLM/A-IO had set up a "parallel bush government" in Upper Nile, rivaling the government in Juba. People in rebel-held areas no longer accepted South Sudanese currency which had lost its worth due to hyperinflation, and instead used United States dollars and Ethiopian birr.[18]

Ideology

[edit]

The SPLM-IO initially positioned itself as a reformist faction within the broader SPLM movement, advocating for:[19]

  • Federalism in South Sudan to address ethnic and regional grievances.
  • Democratic governance and transparency in government institutions.
  • Accountability for human rights violations committed during the civil war.
  • Greater autonomy for states and local communities.

Over time, the SPLM-IO’s ideological stance has been shaped by shifting alliances and political realities. While it still calls for democratic reforms, critics argue that its leadership has been driven more by power struggles than consistent policy goals.

In 2018, a South Sudanese critical writer and analyst Duop Chak Wuol questioned SPLM-IO's overall strategy, arguing that the movement's leadership pursued a political solution as part of its efforts to end the civil war without a good plan for its military wing.[20][21]

Governance

[edit]

Following the 2020 power-sharing agreement, the SPLM-IO has played a role in South Sudan’s transitional government, holding key ministerial positions. However, tensions remain over the distribution of power, security arrangements, and electoral preparations. The SPLM-IO has often accused Kiir’s government of obstructing agreed-upon reforms, further straining the fragile peace process. Despite being part of the unity government, the SPLM-IO continues to operate semi-independently, balancing its governance role with maintaining its political and military influence.[22]

Armed wing

[edit]
SPLA-IO soldiers in April 2016.

The military forces of the SPLM-IO are known as "Sudan People's Liberation Army-in-Opposition" (abbreviated "SPLA-IO") and consist of deserters from the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), alongside the private armies of rebel warlords and tribal militias. Those elements of the South Sudanese military that joined the SPLA-IO have done so to protect tribal interests or felt marginalized by the government due to their previous membership in the SSDF.[23] Despite attempts by Machar to attract other ethnic groups to his cause, the SPLA-IO is dominated by Nuer people.[24] Parts of the SPLA-IO are known to recruit child soldiers.[25]

For weapons to fight the South Sudanese civil war, the SPLA-IO used a "shadowy" network of arms dealers, of which little is known other than that most of the gunrunners appeared to be European.[26] A rare exception was the Franco-Polish arms dealer Pierre Dadak who was arrested on 14 July 2016 at his villa in Ibiza.[26] At his villa, the Spanish National Police Corps allege that they found documents showing he was negotiating to sell the SPLA-IO 40,000 AK-47 assault rifles, 30,000 PKM machine guns and 200,000 boxes of ammunition.[26][27][28]

In 2017 SPLA-IO lost the town of Pagak on the Ethiopian border during a government offensive.

Organization

[edit]

The SPLA-IO did not have a formal military structure until the Pagak I conference in December 2014, after a year of war. Riek Machar created the following structure:[29]

Simon Gatwich as chief of general staff with the following deputies:

  • Maj. Gen. Peter Gadet Yak, operations
  • Maj. Gen. Garouth Gatkouth, logistics
  • Maj. Gen. Dau Atujong, training
  • Maj. Gen. Martin Kenyi, moral orientation
  • Maj. Gen. Elias Juda Kulang, administration
  • Maj. Gen. Moses Chot Riek, military production
  • Maj. Gen. John Both Teny, general headquarters command
  • Maj. Gen. Gabriel Tang Gatwich Chan, inspector general.

Along with the following commands:

International Relations

[edit]

The SPLM-IO has engaged with international actors, including:[30]

  • IGAD and the African Union (AU): Mediating peace talks and monitoring the ceasefire.
  • United Nations (UN): The UN has called for the full implementation of the peace agreement and an end to human rights abuses by all parties.
  • Western governments (USA, UK, EU): These countries have supported peace efforts through diplomatic pressure and humanitarian aid.
  • Sudan and Ethiopia: Neighboring countries have played roles in both supporting and pressuring SPLM-IO, given their own strategic interests in South Sudan.

Criticism & Controversy

[edit]

The SPLM-IO has been accused of committing human rights violations, including:[31]

  • Ethnic killings and recruitment of child soldiers.
  • Attacks on civilians during the war.
  • Internal suppression of dissent within the movement.

Some critics argue that Machar and other SPLM-IO leaders have prioritized personal political ambitions over genuine democratic reforms. The SPLM-IO's reliance on ethnic-based mobilization has also contributed to inter-communal violence, complicating South Sudan’s path to stability.

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) is a South Sudanese political and military organization formed in December 2013 by in the aftermath of his dismissal as vice president by President Salva Kiir and the ensuing violence in that ignited the country's . Led primarily by Nuer ethnic leaders and fighters, the SPLM-IO mobilized defectors from the national army and irregular forces to challenge Kiir's Dinka-dominated government, framing its struggle as a push against authoritarian centralization and for federal devolution of power. Its military wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Army-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO), rapidly coalesced through spontaneous uprisings in regions following the December 15, 2013, clashes in the capital. The movement's core objectives include establishing a federal governance structure to decentralize authority, fostering through and for past atrocities, and eradicating to enable democratic institutions that protect civilians regardless of ethnicity. During the 2013–2018 , SPLM-IO forces controlled significant territories and engaged in both conventional battles and guerrilla operations, contributing to an estimated 383,000 deaths from direct violence and , though the group has faced accusations of and recruitment of child soldiers alongside government forces. A pivotal achievement was Machar's role in negotiating the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of (R-ARCSS), which reinstated him as first in a power-sharing , yet has faltered amid stalled security unification, defections, and renewed tensions, including Machar's in March 2025 amid a treason trial. Internally fractious, with factions and historical splits tracing back to Machar's 1991 breakaway from the original SPLM, the SPLM-IO embodies 's ethnic and factional divisions, prioritizing for marginalized groups while critiquing Kiir's regime for perpetuating one-man rule.

Origins

Historical Context

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) originated in 1983 as the political counterpart to the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), formed amid southern Sudanese grievances over economic marginalization, cultural suppression, and the northern government's imposition of law following the 1983 revocation of the Addis Ababa Agreement's regional autonomy provisions. Led by , a Dinka military officer, the SPLM initially advocated for a united, secular "New Sudan" but shifted toward southern self-determination by the mid-1990s after internal splits, including Riek Machar's 1991 factional rebellion against Garang's leadership, which exacerbated ethnic divisions between Nuer and Dinka groups. The ensuing (1983–2005) caused an estimated 2 million deaths and displaced over 4 million people, primarily through famine, disease, and combat. The conflict concluded with the , signed on January 9, 2005, between the SPLM and the Sudanese government, mediated by the and international actors; it established a six-year interim period of power-sharing, demilitarization protocols, wealth-sharing from oil revenues, and a referendum on southern independence. Garang's death in a helicopter crash on July 30, 2005—mere weeks after his swearing-in as Sudan's First —triggered riots in killing at least 130 and led to Salva Kiir's succession as SPLM chairman and president of the semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan on August 1, 2005, maintaining the CPA's framework despite heightened factional risks. The January 9–15, 2011, referendum fulfilled the CPA's clause, with 3.95 million registered voters (98.83% turnout) delivering 98.83% approval for , confirmed by the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission and international observers. declared on July 9, 2011, as the world's newest state, with SPLM transitioning to the under President Kiir and Vice President Machar (reinstated in 2009 after prior alliances with ), inheriting vast oil resources but facing immediate border disputes with , institutional fragility, and unresolved ethnic patronage networks from the liberation era. These structural weaknesses—compounded by , military dominance over politics, and competition for SPLM leadership positions—intensified pre-existing Dinka-Nuer rivalries, as both groups vied for control in a patronage-based system lacking robust governance.

Formation and 2013 Split

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) originated from deepening internal divisions within the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) following South Sudan's independence in 2011. Tensions escalated due to power struggles between President Salva Kiir, a Dinka, and Vice President Riek Machar, a Nuer, amid accusations of authoritarianism, corruption, and inadequate preparations for democratic elections. On July 23, 2013, Kiir dismissed Machar as vice president and dissolved the entire cabinet, suspending the SPLM's secretary general and detaining several senior leaders, which intensified factional rivalries. These political frictions culminated in armed clashes on December 15, 2013, when fighting broke out in between Dinka and Nuer elements of the Presidential Guard (Tiger Battalion), rapidly expanding into widespread ethnic violence targeting Nuer civilians. Kiir declared the incident an attempted coup orchestrated by Machar and his supporters, while Machar denied involvement in any coup plot, framing the events as a spontaneous against Kiir's regime. The Juba violence, involving indiscriminate firing and targeted killings along ethnic lines, prompted mass defections from the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), particularly Nuer officers such as Peter Gadet, who aligned with Machar. In response to the crisis, Machar established the SPLM-IO as a formal opposition faction to Kiir's SPLM-in-Government (SPLM-IG), demanding accountability for the killings, federal reforms, and power-sharing. The group's military wing, the SPLA-IO, coalesced spontaneously from SPLA defectors and Nuer militias known as "white armies" in regions, without initial centralized command. The SPLM-IO's structure was formalized at its inaugural convention in from April 15 to 18, 2014, where Machar was confirmed as chairperson and , solidifying its role as the primary rebel movement in the ensuing . Investigations found no concrete evidence supporting claims of a premeditated coup by Machar, attributing the split more to ethnic grievances and revenge for the December massacres than orchestrated .

Leadership and Internal Dynamics

Key Figures

Riek Machar, a Nuer politician and former guerrilla commander, founded and chairs the SPLM-IO following his dismissal as South Sudan's vice president on July 23, 2013, which precipitated the group's formation as an opposition to President Salva Kiir's SPLM faction. Machar, who previously split from the original SPLM in 1991 over ideological differences with John Garang, advocates federalism and resource-sharing reforms amid ongoing ethnic tensions exacerbated by the 2013-2018 civil war, during which SPLM-IO forces controlled significant northern territories. As of September 2025, Machar faces indictment on treason charges related to a militia attack in Nasir, leading to his suspension and house arrest, though he retains de jure leadership amid factional challenges. Angelina Teny, Machar's wife and a prominent negotiator, holds senior roles within SPLM-IO, including participation in peace talks under the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in (R-ARCSS), where she represented opposition interests on power-sharing and security arrangements. Her influence stems from familial ties and advocacy for inclusive governance, though internal dynamics have limited her formal military command positions. Simon Gatwech Dual, a senior Nuer military commander, served as SPLM-IO chief of general staff until his dismissal by Machar in June 2021, sparking a major factional split that weakened the group's cohesion ahead of delayed elections. Gatwech's ouster, tied to loyalty disputes, led to the formation of rival Kitgwang forces, resulting in defections of thousands of fighters and highlighting ethnic divisions within the opposition. Stephen Par Kuol, appointed interim chairman by a splinter in April 2025 while Machar was detained, represents a faction pushing for leadership transition amid claims of Machar's inability to lead from custody. As former minister of , Par Kuol's elevation underscores ongoing power struggles, with supporters arguing it enables operational continuity despite Machar loyalists denouncing it as a coup. Nathaniel Oyet, acting SPLA-IO commander-in-chief as of September 2025, has issued decrees appointing figures like Lt. Gen. Alfred Futuyo Karaba as deputy chief of staff for operations, signaling efforts to consolidate military command amid defections and rejections from regional leaders. Oyet's role emerged from the 2021 Gatwech split, positioning him as a key stabilizer in Unity State operations.

Factions and Splits

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) experienced a major schism in July 2016 following renewed clashes in that forced leader to flee the capital. , Machar's former chief negotiator and deputy, was selected by a group of SPLM-IO members to replace him as First , a move endorsed by President Salva Kiir but rejected by Machar. Taban's faction, which included key politicians such as Ezekiel Gatkuoth and Alfred Ladu, aligned with the government, bringing significant military and political assets with it and contributing to the integration of some opposition elements into the ruling structure. This division fragmented SPLM-IO's cohesion, with Taban's group effectively defecting toward government control by 2018. A subsequent internal split occurred in August 2021 when senior commanders, led by Simon Gatwech Dual, issued the Kitgwang Declaration on August 3, ousting Machar as SPLM-IO chairman and appointing Dual as interim leader. The faction, known as SPLM/A-IO Kitgwang, cited Machar's reluctance to enforce full implementation of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), particularly security sector reforms and cantonment of forces. Clashes erupted immediately afterward in Megenis, Upper Nile State, resulting in dozens of deaths, and continued into 2022 with fighting in Leer County, Unity State, on April 8 that killed at least 35 people and displaced over 14,000. The Kitgwang faction itself faced further fragmentation, including infighting in 2022 that split its ranks and a 2024 schism where Major General Gatkuoth Biel Nyany accused Dual of obstructing peace efforts, leading to Dual's ouster by a group of generals. SPLM-IO has been plagued by recurrent defections, exacerbating its divisions. In mid-2015, several commanders and troops abandoned the group amid ongoing conflict. More recently, over 400 members defected to the ruling SPLM in July 2025 citing leadership concerns, followed by a mass defection of more than 11,000 SPLA-IO forces to the South Sudan People's Defense Forces (SSPDF) announced on October 25, 2025. These outflows, often linked to frustrations over Machar's house arrest since March 2025 and stalled peace implementation, have prompted internal investigations and further splintering, including the dismissal of nine senior members by a Western Equatoria faction.

Ideology and Objectives

Political Platform

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) advocates for a federal democratic system of governance in , emphasizing of power to address ethnic and regional grievances stemming from centralized authority under the ruling (SPLM). This stance, articulated by leader since the 2013 split, positions —initially proposed as a division into 21 states—as a core mechanism to empower local communities economically and politically, contrasting with the unitary tendencies of the SPLM government. Central to the platform is the promotion of inclusive , , and equality for all citizens, with demands for transparent and accountable institutions free from corruption and , which the group attributes to President Salva Kiir's administration. The SPLM-IO Charter outlines broader political, social, and economic objectives, including protection of ancestral lands, , and to foster national cohesion beyond ethnic divisions. In peace negotiations, such as those leading to the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in (R-ARCSS), the movement insisted on constitutional entrenchment of as a prerequisite for power-sharing, viewing it as essential to resolving root causes like resource mismanagement and exclusionary politics. Despite these reformist aims, analysts note that ideological depth has been secondary to immediate political and military objectives, with the platform often framed reactively against perceived and Dinka dominance in , though the group claims inclusivity across ethnic lines. Economic policies implicitly prioritize accountable resource management, particularly oil revenues, to fund equitable development, while social goals stress justice and integrity to prevent relapse into conflict.

Military and Governance Aims

The (SPLM-IO) pursues military objectives aimed at confronting and potentially displacing the government of President Salva Kiir, whom it accuses of and ethnic favoritism, through operations conducted by its armed wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Army-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO). These efforts, rooted in the schism within the (SPLM), seek to secure territorial control in opposition-held areas, particularly in regions with significant Nuer populations, and to weaken government forces via guerrilla tactics and alliances with other armed groups. The group's conflict goals explicitly include the removal of Kiir to enable a restructuring of power dynamics, as articulated in analyses of the dynamics. In parallel, SPLM-IO's governance aims emphasize as a mechanism to mitigate ethnic tensions and centralize power abuses, proposing a division of into 21 states based on colonial-era districts to devolve authority and promote equitable resource distribution. Chairperson presented a 10-point political program in Pagak, Upper Nile, advocating security reforms to diversify the armed forces along ethnic lines, an independent judiciary for accessible justice, integration of customary and state institutions, meritocratic , and economic policies focused on , development, , and involvement to foster and modernization. These objectives align with the group's broader vision of democratic , transparency, and against marginalization, as stated on its official platform.

Military Structure

Armed Wing Organization

The Sudan People's Liberation Army-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO) constitutes the primary military component of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), functioning as its armed wing since the group's formation amid the 2013 South Sudanese civil war. It emerged from defectors and dissident elements of the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF), formerly the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), maintaining a hierarchical command structure that enables coordinated operations despite internal challenges. SPLA-IO's command is headed by a Chief of General Staff reporting to SPLM-IO chairman , who holds ultimate authority as . As of October 2025, Acting Chief of Staff Thok Chuol Luak oversees operations, with Peter Ruot Chuol appointed as Deputy Chief of General Staff and other senior roles filled by figures such as Alfred Futuyo in acting capacities. Earlier appointments, including Simon Gatwech Dual as Chief of General Staff, reflect efforts to consolidate leadership amid factional tensions, such as the 2021 split under the Kitgwang Declaration. The structure facilitates deployment to divisions, with commanders assigned to units like Division 5 under Major General James Khor Chuol. Organizationally, SPLA-IO mirrors conventional army models with divisions, brigades, and battalions, though formalization advanced post-2015 Pagak agreements amid peace processes. It operates primarily as , relying on including airdropped Type 56 assault rifles and ammunition in 7.62mm calibers, with limited heavy weaponry compared to government forces. Under the 2018 Revitalized Agreement, SPLA-IO secured allocations in unified command structures, including 106 senior positions across organized forces as of 2023, representing a 40% share in joint mechanisms. However, implementation lags, with forces often cantonment-bound and awaiting integration into the SSPDF. Troop strength estimates for core SPLA-IO forces hover around 35,000 former soldiers supplemented by approximately 10,000 defected police, though these figures predate significant attrition. The group draws additional irregular support from Nuer-affiliated militias, numbering 10,000 to 50,000 when mobilized, which operate semi-autonomously for defensive or raiding roles but lack full integration into the formal hierarchy. Recent developments include over 11,000 defections to SSPDF in October 2025, primarily in , underscoring vulnerabilities in retention and cohesion. Strongholds span Unity, Jonglei, Upper Nile, and parts of states, where divisions maintain operational flexibility through decentralized command.

Operations and Engagements

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) initiated its military operations amid the outbreak of the South Sudanese Civil War on December 15, 2013, when Nuer-aligned elements within the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) mutinied in Juba against forces loyal to President Salva Kiir, prompting defections that formed the core of the SPLA-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO). These initial clashes escalated into broader offensives, with SPLA-IO forces advancing into Jonglei State and briefly capturing Bor on December 25, 2013, before government counteroffensives, supported by Ugandan troops, retook the town in January 2014. In Upper Nile State, SPLA-IO units coordinated with local Nuer militias to seize key positions, reflecting a strategy reliant on ethnic mobilization for rapid territorial gains. In Unity State, SPLA-IO forces launched a significant offensive, capturing and Rubkona on April 15, 2014, following intense fighting that displaced thousands and involved reprisal killings against Dinka and other non-Nuer civilians. Government forces retook on May 8, 2014, after five days of clashes, highlighting the fluid control over oil-rich areas central to the conflict's economic stakes. SPLA-IO attempted further assaults on , including from October 27 to 29, 2014, but failed to dislodge SPLA defenders, underscoring logistical challenges and dependence on irregular militias like the for manpower. Subsequent engagements shifted to defensive postures and guerrilla tactics as government offensives, bolstered by external support, recaptured most urban centers by 2015–2016, confining SPLA-IO to rural strongholds in northern . In region from 2016 onward, SPLA-IO expanded operations through alliances with local rebels, conducting ambushes and raids against SPLA supply lines, though these yielded limited strategic gains amid internal factionalism. Post-2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in (R-ARCSS), large-scale offensives subsided, but sporadic clashes persisted, often involving auxiliaries affiliated with SPLM-IO. Recent escalations in 2025 have seen SPLA-IO and allied White Army militias overrun a South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF) base in Nasir, Upper Nile State, on March 4, 2025, killing dozens and prompting UNMISS alerts. Further fighting in Burebiey, Upper Nile, on September 21, 2025, resulted in at least 48 deaths when SPLM-IO forces and White Army attacked an SSPDF position, signaling renewed threats to the fragile peace amid Machar's political marginalization. These actions demonstrate SPLM-IO's persistent reliance on asymmetric warfare and ethnic militias, prioritizing survival over sustained conventional engagements.

Governance in Controlled Areas

Administrative Practices

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) has maintained a rudimentary administrative framework in areas under its influence, primarily rural territories in , characterized by provisional committees and appointed local officials rather than robust bureaucratic systems. Following the Nasir convention on 15–18 April 2014, the group formalized eight national provisional committees—covering sectors such as political affairs, finance, and foreign relations—each comprising 15 members and a secretariat to oversee civil functions, though these bodies have exhibited limited operational capacity due to resource shortages and internal divisions. In controlled areas, SPLM-IO governance emphasizes principles, with announcements of 21 states and appointments of governors, such as Tjwok Adher Aguet for Fashoda state, following the Pagak I in December 2014; however, these structures remained largely aspirational, hampered by logistical constraints, parochial ethnic loyalties among commanders, and incomplete civilian oversight of military elements. The Pagak II on 19–23 2015 resolved to enhance humanitarian access by cooperating with agencies through the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), including issuing licenses for non-governmental organizations, as a means of providing basic services in opposition-held zones, though disruptions from ongoing conflict have undermined consistent delivery. Administrative practices have been further complicated by factionalism, with weak institutional bases allowing senior figures to exert control over territories, often prioritizing combat operations over civil administration. United Nations reports indicate that tactics employed by government forces, such as blockades, have disrupted governance in SPLM-IO areas, exacerbating shortages of essentials like medicine and hindering any centralized policy implementation. In June 2025, amid the collapse of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in , SPLM-IO's self-exiled acting chairman Nathaniel Oyet issued No. 02/2025, establishing parallel authorities in opposition-controlled regions, including positions for commissioners, deputy commissioners, and sector heads to manage local affairs independently of Juba's government. This move, justified by the failure of peace implementation and the government's limited reach beyond headquarters, has been criticized for lacking mechanisms, as SPLM-IO holds few formal seats, and for signaling the erosion of national unity efforts.

Economic and Social Policies

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) outlines its economic and social policies primarily through its , which prioritizes a federal democratic system with strong, accountable institutions to address failures. Central to this is an agenda aimed at eradicating across government levels, though specific mechanisms for implementation, such as fiscal reforms or revenue-sharing protocols, remain aspirational rather than detailed. The lacks explicit blueprints for macroeconomic stabilization or industrial development, reflecting the group's origins as a opposition faction rather than a comprehensive economic planner. In social policy, the SPLM-IO advocates protecting ancestral lands, preserving , and upholding and equality for all citizens, positioning these as countermeasures to perceived ethnic favoritism and marginalization under the . Resolutions from internal conferences, such as Pagak II in April 2015, emphasize national reconciliation in conflict-affected regions and with humanitarian organizations to enhance citizen welfare, including facilitating internally displaced persons' returns and issuing operational licenses to non-governmental organizations in SPLM-IO-held territories. However, delivery of public services like healthcare or is minimal, constrained by ongoing hostilities and reliance on external rather than self-sustained systems. Governance in SPLM-IO-controlled areas, spanning parts of Upper Nile, Jonglei, and Unity states as of 2014–2016 assessments, features provisional administrative structures, including a National Leadership Council and sector-specific bodies, but these prioritize military command over civilian economic or social programming. Economic sustenance derives from informal mechanisms, such as operating checkpoints—controlling up to 80% along certain rivers like the Zeraf in data—to extract fees from and movement, funding operations amid disrupted production in targeted fields. This approach sustains rebel logistics but fosters dependency on war economies, with senior commanders wielding control over local resources, often leading to factional disputes rather than equitable distribution or long-term development. The absence of a coherent ideological economic framework underscores the SPLM-IO's focus on over reformist policy innovation.

International Engagement

Foreign Support and Alliances

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) has primarily received foreign support from , which provided the group with access to territory and materiel during the . This assistance included logistical bases in Sudanese border areas, enabling SPLM-IO forces to regroup and launch cross-border operations against South Sudanese government positions. Sudanese government officials have denied direct involvement, but South Sudanese authorities and independent analysts have cited intercepted supply lines and shared weaponry as evidence of Khartoum's backing, particularly in the early phases of the 2013-2018 conflict. Arms tracing reports indicate that SPLM-IO fighters received airdropped weapons and consistent with Sudanese military stockpiles, including and anti-tank systems used in operations in as early as . These supplies mirrored Sudan's provision to other regional insurgent groups, suggesting a of proxy support to undermine Juba's stability amid ongoing border disputes over oil fields and . Historical precedents, including Riek Machar's 1991 alliance with during his earlier split from the SPLM, have fueled perceptions of enduring tactical ties, though SPLM-IO frames such support as opportunistic rather than ideological. Beyond , SPLM-IO has formed limited operational alliances with Sudanese non-state actors, such as joint attacks with elements of the National Salvation Front against South Sudanese forces in 2025. These collaborations exploit Sudan's internal civil war, allowing SPLM-IO to access additional and safe havens, but they risk escalating regional entanglements without formal . The group lacks broad international alliances, facing isolation from Western donors and IGAD mediators who view it as a barrier to peace implementation under the 2018 Revitalized Agreement. No verified evidence exists of direct support from major powers like , which backs the Kiir government, or , despite occasional roles.

Diplomatic Positions and Peace Processes

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) has consistently advocated for as a core diplomatic position, arguing it would promote , equality, , and by decentralizing power and addressing ethnic grievances in . This stance emerged prominently during the 2013-2018 , positioning SPLM-IO against the centralizing tendencies of the ruling (SPLM) under President Salva Kiir, whom they accuse of enforcing "one tribe rule" favoring Dinka dominance. SPLM-IO leaders, including , have framed as essential for preventing conflict relapse, emphasizing for states to manage resources and security arrangements independently. In peace processes, SPLM-IO engaged in Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-mediated talks, signing the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCISS), which allocated 33% power-sharing to the opposition in government and security forces, though disagreements over security unification and federal provisions led to its collapse by mid-2016. The group participated in subsequent revitalization efforts, culminating in the 2018 Revitalized Agreement (R-ARCSS), under which Machar returned as First Vice President in a unity government, with SPLM-IO securing key portfolios and a commitment to graduated security unification by 2021—deadlines repeatedly extended amid mutual accusations of violations. Implementation stalled on issues like force integration, with SPLM-IO criticizing the government for non-compliance, including failure to demilitarize Juba and equitable resource allocation. By 2023-2025, SPLM-IO's diplomatic engagement shifted amid escalating tensions, withdrawing from the Kenyan-led Tumaini Initiative in July 2025 over concerns it sidelined core R-ARCSS issues like constitutional and elections, opting instead for mobilization against perceived regime entrenchment. Machar's arrest on March 26, 2025, following clashes in , prompted SPLM-IO to declare the R-ARCSS effectively dead, denouncing it as a government ploy to consolidate power without inclusive reforms. In September 2025, the group called for popular mobilization to achieve , rejecting one-sided extensions of the transitional period beyond December 2026 and insisting on as non-negotiable for any viable accord. Despite these positions, SPLM-IO has faced criticism for internal divisions and conditional commitments to ceasefires, contributing to the peace process's fragility as inter-communal violence persists.

Criticisms and Controversies

Alleged Atrocities and Human Rights Violations

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) and its armed wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Army-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO), have faced allegations of committing atrocities and violations during the , particularly from 2013 to 2018, as documented by investigations and the of . These include targeted ethnic killings, , and recruitment of soldiers, often in retaliation or during offensives in Unity and Upper states. The found evidence of widespread abuses by opposition forces, including extrajudicial killings and rape used as a weapon of , contributing to ethnic polarization between Nuer-aligned SPLM-IO fighters and Dinka civilians. reports similarly cataloged systematic attacks on civilians by SPLA-IO elements, with perpetrators enjoying impunity due to command failures and lack of internal accountability. A prominent incident occurred in Bentiu, Unity State, on April 17, 2014, following SPLA-IO capture of the town from government forces. SPLA-IO fighters, broadcasting hate speech on local radio inciting violence against non-Nuer civilians, killed between 200 and 400 people, primarily Dinka and other ethnic groups sheltering in mosques, a hospital, and a Catholic cathedral. Victims were targeted based on ethnicity, with reports of mutilations, rapes, and looting; for instance, attackers entered a mosque compound and executed dozens hiding there. Riek Machar later acknowledged that SPLM-IO had not investigated the massacre. A subsequent attack on October 29, 2014, saw SPLA-IO forces kill at least 70 civilians, including women and children, at a church in Bentiu, with survivors describing gunfire and grenades targeting displaced persons. SPLA-IO forces have also been implicated in widespread against civilians. data from 2015-2016 recorded over 100 cases of rape and by opposition-aligned militias in and surrounding areas, often as reprisals during clashes. In controlled territories like parts of Upper Nile, SPLA-IO commanders failed to prevent or punish such acts, exacerbating displacement and trauma among affected communities. In 2019, SPLM-IO leadership signed a UN committing to end conflict-related sexual violence and hold perpetrators accountable, implicitly recognizing prior lapses. Recruitment and use of child soldiers persisted under SPLM-IO command structures. documented cases from 2013-2015 where SPLA-IO officers forcibly conscripted over 1,000 children, some as young as 10, in Unity and Jonglei states, training them in combat roles and deploying them to frontlines. Specific commanders, including senior SPLM-IO figures, were named for ordering abductions and forced enlistment, violating international prohibitions. monitoring verified ongoing violations into 2018, with SPLM-IO listed for six grave violations against children, despite partial releases. Impunity remains, as no SPLM-IO leaders have faced prosecution for these acts. More recent allegations tie SPLM-IO to inter-communal violence via affiliated militias like the . In 2024 attacks in Upper Nile, forces linked to SPLM-IO dissent factions killed dozens of government troops and civilians, prompting charges against in September 2025 for murder, treason, and related to coordinated assaults. SPLM-IO denies direct command responsibility, attributing actions to autonomous ethnic militias, though UN experts note indirect control and failure to restrain such groups. These incidents underscore persistent patterns of civilian targeting amid political rivalries.

Ethnic Mobilization and Tribalism

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) has relied extensively on ethnic mobilization within the Nuer community to sustain its operations during the . Led by , a member of the Nuer ethnic group, the movement's forces in the initial phases of the conflict from December 2013 onward predominantly comprised irregular fighters from Nuer sub-clans such as the and Gawaar, organized through traditional youth militias known as the . These groups, rooted in Nuer sectional identities, were rapidly mobilized for defense against perceived threats from Dinka-dominated government forces, providing the bulk of SPLM-IO's combat strength despite lacking formal integration into its command structure. This mobilization exploited longstanding networks, enabling quick assembly of thousands of armed civilians but often resulting in uncoordinated actions that blurred lines between political and communal defense. Critics have highlighted how this Nuer-centric approach fostered , exacerbating ethnic divisions rather than fostering a broad-based opposition. Although Machar has sought to reframe the SPLM-IO as a national movement by recruiting non-Nuer figures into roles, the organization's institutional base remains weak outside Nuer core areas, with political control over military commanders incomplete and dependent on ethnic loyalties. Internal fractures, including defections along sub-clan lines—such as tensions between Lou Nuer and other sections—have undermined cohesion, while perceptions of exclusion have alienated potential allies from groups like the Shilluk and Equatorians, limiting the movement's appeal beyond tribal confines. Such dynamics have contributed to cycles of retaliatory violence, including targeted attacks on non-Nuer civilians, as documented in conflict zones like Unity and Upper Nile states, where elements operated with limited accountability to SPLM-IO .

Leadership Failures and Personal Ambitions

The leadership of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), primarily under , has been marked by recurrent internal fractures exacerbated by competing personal ambitions among senior figures, undermining the group's cohesion and strategic effectiveness. These divisions intensified following the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of (R-ARCSS), where Machar's prioritization of his vice-presidential role and presidential aspirations clashed with demands for broader organizational reforms, leading to accusations of autocratic control and failure to adapt politically. Critics within the movement, such as former spokesperson Duer Tut, argued in December 2020 that Machar had "failed to lead the SPLM-IO as a political organization," particularly evident in the post-R-ARCSS period when the group struggled to transition from to without clear objectives beyond power retention. A pivotal manifestation of these failures occurred in August 2021, when the SPLM-IO's wing attempted to depose Machar as chairman, citing his "complete failure" in demonstrating and the resultant weakening of the party's position within the unity government. This coup bid, led by figures like General Johnson Olony (though later reconciled), highlighted how Machar's ethnic Nuer-centric mobilization—often prioritizing loyalty to his personal network over inclusive recruitment—alienated potential allies from and Bahr el Ghazal regions, fostering splinter factions and defections estimated at over 10,000 fighters by mid-2016. Internal analyses describe the SPLM-IO as inherently fractious, with disputes spreading even within Machar's Nuer base, as personal rivalries stalled decisions on compromises like the R-ARCSS arrangements, contributing to setbacks such as the loss of key territories in Upper by 2017. Machar's longstanding presidential ambitions, dating to his 1991 split from the SPLM and reiterated through civil war phases, have been identified as a causal driver of these dysfunctions, with observers noting his reluctance to devolve power or articulate non-ethnic visions for , reducing the movement to a vehicle for individual ascent rather than systemic opposition. This pattern persisted into 2025, as Machar's March withdrawal from the power-sharing —framed as a response to electoral delays blocking his candidacy—prompted further suspensions and prosecutions within the SPLM-IO, reflecting eroded discipline and a shift toward factional survival over unified resistance. Such ambitions, per independent assessments, perpetuated a cycle where short-term elite gains trumped long-term viability, leaving the SPLM-IO unable to capitalize on government weaknesses despite holding sway in opposition-held areas covering approximately 20% of South Sudan's territory as of 2021.

References

  1. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/195801/HSBA-WP39-SPLM-IO.pdf
  2. https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/fractious-rebellion-inside-splm-io
  3. https://splm-io.org/about
  4. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan
  5. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2025/05/tipping-points-south-sudan-on-the-brink-of-collapse/
  6. https://irp.fas.org/world/para/spla.htm
  7. https://enoughproject.org/conflicts/south-sudan
  8. https://merip.org/2012/03/the-sudan-split/
  9. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2011/01/the-comprehensive-peace-agreement?lang=en
  10. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/sudan-john-garangs-death
  11. https://sudantribune.com/article/11670
  12. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12317927
  13. https://www.usip.org/programs/independence-south-sudan
  14. https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/HSBA-WP39-SPLM-IO.pdf
  15. https://sudanspost.com/elected-machars-2013-sacking-start-of-kiirs-dictatorship-says-pcca/
  16. https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/19/south-sudan-soldiers-target-ethnic-group-juba-fighting
  17. https://www.csis.org/analysis/coup-south-sudan
  18. https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/south-sudans-december-2013-conflict/
  19. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/riek-machar-south-sudans-embattled-vice-president-2025-03-27/
  20. https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/splm-io-declares-government-illegitimate-after-machars-suspension
  21. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c7933p4xe7po
  22. https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/splm-io-faction-says-machar-could-be-replaced
  23. https://www.bbc.com/audio/play/p04nhfhx
  24. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/south-sudans-main-opposition-party-appoints-new-leadership-amid-machar-detention/3533406
  25. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/south-sudan-splinter-group-ousts-machar-as-splm-io-leader-4996254
  26. https://alhuriya.space/splm-io-leadership-crisis-coup-and-condemnation/
  27. https://www.sudanspost.com/former-governor-futuyo-appointed-to-key-spla-io-military-role/
  28. https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/spla-io-rift-grows-as-wau-commander-rejects-appointment
  29. https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/HSBA-IB25-Taban-Deng-Gai-Dec-2016.pdf
  30. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/7/23/taban-deng-gai-south-sudan-must-move-forward
  31. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-05/07/c_137162067.htm
  32. https://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/non-international-armed-conflict-in-south-sudan
  33. https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/splm-a-io-kit-gwang-announces-split-in-ranks-after-fresh-infighting
  34. https://www.sudanspost.com/spla-io-kitgwang-split-again-as-general-accuses-gatwech-of-stalling-peace-deal/
  35. https://ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo/4226/0
  36. https://szn.ss/hundreds-abandon-splm-io-over-leadership-concerns/
  37. https://www.sudanspost.com/over-11000-spla-io-forces-defect-to-sspdf-in-major-blow-for-machar/
  38. https://www.eyeradio.org/oyet-distances-splm-io-from-proposed-reinvigoration-of-r-arcss/
  39. https://www.sudanspost.com/spla-io-calls-latest-mass-defection-of-forces-to-sspdf-sensitive-vows-investigation/
  40. https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/splm-io-faction-in-western-equatoria-dismisses-9-members
  41. https://splm-io.org/
  42. https://sudantribune.com/article/52567/
  43. https://www.cmi.no/publications/6974-the-paradox-of-federalism-and-decentralisation-in-south-sudan
  44. https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/pro-federalism-governor-rejects-machar-s-plan-for-21-states
  45. https://splm-io.org/vision
  46. https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/02/South-Sudan-Peace-Agreement-September-2018.pdf
  47. https://www.on-federalism.eu/images/2021/PDF/PoF_2-3_2021_ZA_JDV_DRT1.pdf
  48. https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/document-splm-in-opposition-announces-its-political-platform
  49. https://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/index.php/country-profile-of-south-sudan-military/
  50. https://www.facebook.com/AkoboSmartTV/posts/opinion-on-behalf-of-spla-io-command-structuretort-hon-nathaniel-pierino-oyetact/1288335336643859/
  51. https://www.instagram.com/p/DQJE5wBDO3T/
  52. https://sudantribune.com/article/56597
  53. https://www.conflictarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Weapons_and_ammunition_airdropped_to_SPLA-iO_forces_in_South_Sudan.pdf
  54. https://www.eyeradio.org/splm-a-io-explains-40-ratio-in-command-structure-deal/
  55. https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unmiss_hrd_-_attack_on_civilians_in_bentiu_and_bor_-_january_2015.pdf
  56. https://smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/HSBA-Conflict-Unity-State-Sept-2014.pdf
  57. https://docs.un.org/en/S/2014/821
  58. https://amaniafrica-et.org/timeline-of-escalating-tensions-in-south-sudan/
  59. https://www.trtworld.com/article/29cc521e5c3f
  60. https://docs.un.org/en/s/2023/784
  61. https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/splm-ios-parallel-civil-authority-signals-dying-peace-deal-analyst
  62. https://szn.ss/splm-ios-parallel-governance-bid-stokes-fresh-tensions/
  63. https://ipisresearch.be/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/2021-South-Sudan-Checkpoint-Economy-Summary-Report.pdf
  64. https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/sudan-accused-of-supporting-splm-io-rebels
  65. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2025/3/29/sudans-war-risks-merging-with-conflict-in-south-sudan-say-analysts
  66. https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/isolation-and-endurance-riek-machar-and-splm-io-2016-17
  67. https://nyamile.co/2015/04/08/why-the-splma-io-calls-for-federalism-in-south-sudan/
  68. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-sudans-opposition-says-government-trying-enforce-one-tribe-rule-2025-09-12/
  69. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/april20320202220agreement20for20south20sudan20in20juba.pdf
  70. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/south-sudans-shaky-peace-risk-collapse-can-it-be-saved
  71. https://www.usip.org/south-sudan-peace-process-key-facts
  72. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/south-sudan
  73. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0q1jppzp4no
  74. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-south-sudan-s-peace-process-be-rescued
  75. https://afrinz.ru/en/2025/09/south-sudan-opposition-calls-for-mobilisation-to-change-regime/
  76. https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/south-sudan/
  77. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auciss.final.report.pdf
  78. https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/riek-machar-admits-splm-io-never-investigated-bentiu-massacres
  79. https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/full-details-of-october-spla-io-bentiu-church-massacre
  80. https://www.state.gov/reports/2016-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/south-sudan
  81. https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/press-release/south-sudan-united-nations-special-representative-welcomes-spla-io-action-plan-to-combat-rape-in-war-and-undertakings-by-commanders/
  82. https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/12/15/we-can-die-too/recruitment-and-use-child-soldiers-south-sudan
  83. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c07vkln2ezro
  84. https://www.ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/connecting-or-disconnecting-white-army-from-the-splm-a-io-and-the-relevance-of-r-arcss-in-maintaining-peace-in-south-sudan/
  85. https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/HSBA-WP41-White-Army.pdf
  86. https://www.prio.org/MonitoringSouthSudan/2014/11/demystifying-the-white-army-nuer-armed-civilians-involvement-in-the-south-sudanese-crisis/
  87. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/south-sudan/b179-south-sudans-splintered-opposition-preventing-more-conflict
  88. https://www.sudanspost.com/who-are-the-white-army-and-what-is-their-relationship-to-splm-io/
  89. https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/machar-has-failed-splm-io-should-be-removed-duer-tut
  90. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/4/south-sudans-vp-machar-deposed-by-party-military-wing
  91. https://masharikirpc.org/what-will-it-take-to-bring-lasting-peace-to-south-sudan/
  92. https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resource/isolation-and-endurance-riek-machar-and-splm-io-2016-17
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.