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Sudan People's Liberation Movement
Sudan People's Liberation Movement
Sudan People's Liberation Movement
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The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM; Arabic: الحركة الشعبية لتحرير السودان, Al-Ḥarakat ash-Shaʿbiyyat liTaḥrīr as-Sūdān) is a political party in South Sudan. It was initially founded as the political wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA; a key belligerent of the Second Sudanese Civil War) in 1983. On January 9, 2005 the SPLA, the SPLM and the Government of Sudan signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, ending the civil war. SPLM then obtained representation in the Government of Sudan, and was the main constituent of the Government of the then semi-autonomous Southern Sudan. When South Sudan became a sovereign state on 9 July 2011, SPLM became the ruling party of the new republic. SPLM branches in Sudan separated themselves from SPLM, forming the Sudan People's Liberation Movement–North. Further factionalism appeared as a result of the 2013–2014 South Sudanese Civil War, with President Salva Kiir leading the SPLM-Juba and former Vice President Riek Machar leading the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition.

Key Information

Although the party has not adhered to one consistent ideology since the independence of South Sudan and many factions exist, it has been described as "being on the left of centre ideological[ly] speaking,"[11] and section IV.2 of the party manifesto states support for a regulated market economy[12] with similar elements to social democracy.

History

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The SPLM was formed as a Marxist-Leninist,[13] socialist[14] rebel movement on 16 May 1983, after the Government of Sudan's abandonment of the Addis Ababa Agreement signed between the government of Gaafar Nimeiry and the Anyanya leader Joseph Lagu, who had first introduced the southern Sudanese to the effective political, economic, social, educational, and religious situations they would face after Sudan's independence. The movement published a manifesto setting out its positions and attracted a group of rebellious southern Sudanese soldiers of the Sudanese Army based in Bor, Pochalla, and Ayod (first called the Bor Mutiny).[15] These joined remnants of the Anyanya rebels of the First Sudanese Civil War based in Ethiopia. Founders of the SPLA (the military wing of the movement) included Captain Salva Kiir Mayardit, Samuel AbuJohn Khabas, Major William Nyuon Bany, Major Kerubino Kuanyin Bol and many other southern Sudanese officers of the Sudanese Armed Forces. Joseph Oduho was made chairman of the SPLM and Colonel John Garang, a Dinka army officer, was made commander of the SPLA. Oduho was later deposed by Garang, who made himself overall leader of the combined movement (SPLA/M).[16]

The Government of Sudan has been associated with Islam and Arab descent and culture since then, in deep contrast with the SPLA, associated instead with Africanism, indigenous beliefs, African culture and, to a degree Christianity.[17]

It fought against the governments of Gaafar Nimeiry, Sadiq al-Mahdi and Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir in what is now called the Second Sudanese Civil War. SPLA/M's declared aim was to establish a democratic Sudan with it as the leading party in control of the southern areas. The war has been largely described in religious and ethnic terms, and also as a struggle for control of the water and oil resources located in southern and western Sudan.

In the late 1980s, Marxism-Leninism was abandoned in favor of a broadly Socialist platform.[13]

In 1991, the SPLA-Nasir faction led by Dr Riek Machar and Dr Lam Akol attempted to overthrow chairman Garang. The attempt failed but led to widespread fighting in the south and the formation of other rebel groups, such as Kerubino Kuanyin Bol's SPLA Bahr-al-Ghazal faction. These internal divisions hampered negotiations with the government. SPLA-Nasir renamed itself SPLA-United and then transformed itself, with substantial personnel changes, into the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army. Several smaller factions signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement with the government in April 1997 and formed the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF).

In July 1992, a government offensive seized southern Sudan, and captured the SPLA headquarters in Torit.[18] The Sudanese government accused Uganda and Eritrea of supporting the SPLA/M, who were alleged to have operated on the Ugandan side of the Sudanese border with Uganda at the southern limit of Sudan.

In 2005, a treaty between the SPLA/M and the Sudanese government led to the formal recognition of Southern Sudanese autonomy. SPLM joined the government as part of the 2005 peace agreement, gaining about one-third of government positions. On 11 October 2007, the SPLM withdrew from the government, alleging violations of the peace agreement; this raised concerns about the future of the agreement.[19]

In 2012, as a consequence of South Sudanese independence, SPLM became the new country's governing political party and the SPLA the country's army. The Sudan branch separated from the movement and formed SPLM-N to carry out anti-government activities in Sudan.

Factionalism

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  • SPLM-DC (Democratic Change, 2009–present)
  • SPLM–N (North, 2011–present)
  • SPLM-IG (In Government, 2013–present)
  • SPLM-IO (In-Opposition, 2013–present)
  • SPLM-FD (Freed Detainees, 2015–present)
  • R-SPLM

As a result of the South Sudanese Civil War in 2013–2014, the SPLM factionalised into the SPLM-Juba, led by President Salva Kiir,[20] and SPLM-IO (in opposition), led by former Vice President Riek Machar.[21]

Notable people

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Electoral history

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Presidential elections

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Election Candidate Votes % Result
2010 Yasir Arman 2,193,826 21.69% Lost Red XN

Presidential (Southern Sudan) elections

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Election Candidate Votes % Result
2010 Salva Kiir Mayardit 2,616,613 92.99% Elected Green tickY

National Assembly elections

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Election Leader Votes % Seats +/– Position Result
2010 Yasir Arman
99 / 450
 New 2nd Opposition

Legislative Assembly (Southern Sudan) elections

[edit]
Election Leader Votes % Seats +/– Position Result
2010 Salva Kiir Mayardit
161 / 170
 New 1st Supermajority government

See also

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References

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Further reading

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Sudan People's Liberation Movement

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The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) is a South Sudanese that originated as the political wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), a rebel group founded on 16 May 1983 by de Mabior through a mutiny of southern Sudanese troops in Bor against the government's imposition of Sharia law. Initially advocating for a united, secular "New Sudan" to address marginalization of non-Arab southern populations, the SPLM/A led the Second (1983–2005), which resulted in over two million deaths and displaced millions, primarily due to famine, disease, and combat. The movement's protracted insurgency, supported by , , and , forced negotiations culminating in the 2005 , which granted southern autonomy and a on ; Garang's brief tenure as Sudan's ended with his death in a helicopter crash shortly after, paving the way for Salva Kiir's leadership. In 2011, achieved independence following a 98.83% vote in favor, with the SPLM emerging as the dominant , controlling the presidency under Kiir and most legislative seats. However, post-independence governance has been defined by factional strife, including the 2013 split when Vice President formed the SPLM-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) amid power struggles, triggering a civil war marked by ethnic targeting—particularly Dinka versus Nuer—widespread atrocities, and institutional weaknesses that hindered state-building. Despite its foundational role in liberation, the SPLM's record includes criticisms of authoritarian tendencies, , and failure to unify diverse ethnic groups, as evidenced by recurrent violence in (e.g., 2016 clashes killing hundreds) and ongoing reliance on a 2018 peace deal to share power uneasily with opposition factions. The party's evolution from revolutionary force to single-party rule underscores causal tensions between wartime cohesion and peacetime pluralism in a resource-cursed, ethnically fragmented .

Origins and Early Development

Formation and Initial Mutiny (1983)

The mutiny in Bor on May 16, 1983, marked the immediate spark for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), triggered by President Jaafar Nimeiri's policies that eroded the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement's provisions for southern autonomy. These included the imposition of Sharia law through the September Laws, the abolition of the southern region's administrative structure, and the declaration of Arabic as the official language in the south, replacing English. Compounding these were orders to redeploy southern Sudanese battalions from their home regions to northern garrisons, perceived as a deliberate effort to dismantle southern military presence and enforce Islamization on non-Muslim populations. Soldiers from Battalion 105, stationed in Bor, initiated the uprising under Major Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, seizing the town and armory in against marginalization and cultural imposition; Battalion 104 in nearby Pibor and Ayod soon followed suit, expanding the revolt. Approximately 500 mutineers defected initially, drawing from predominantly Nuer-recruited units that had been formed post-1972 to integrate southerners into the national army. The government response involved airstrikes and reinforcements, but the mutineers evaded capture by withdrawing southward toward . Colonel de Mabior, a Dinka officer and U.S.-educated military strategist dispatched by to assess and suppress the Bor unrest, defected alongside the mutineers, assuming command and establishing the SPLA as the SPLM's armed wing. Garang consolidated leadership by July 1983, issuing the SPLM manifesto from bases in Ethiopia's Bilpam and Itang refugee camps, where defectors regrouped and began recruiting from southern ethnic groups including Dinka, Nuer, and Equatorians. This rapid expansion leveraged cross-border sanctuary provided by Ethiopia's Mengistu regime, enabling the nascent movement to arm itself with captured Sudanese weapons and Ethiopian support.

Influences from Anya-Nya and Broader Context

The Anya-Nya I insurgency, active from 1955 to 1972, embodied southern Sudanese grievances against northern political dominance, economic neglect, and cultural imposition, including forced and Islamization policies that marginalized non-Muslim southern populations comprising about one-third of Sudan's territory but only 20-30% of its population. This guerrilla campaign, involving an estimated 10,000-15,000 fighters by its end, sought greater regional autonomy amid resource inequities, as southern agricultural lands and potential minerals were underdeveloped while northern elites controlled national revenues. The movement's decentralized structure and reliance on ethnic militias foreshadowed later southern resistance patterns, though its fragmentation limited strategic gains. Following the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which granted southern autonomy under a regional assembly and integrated some Anya-Nya fighters into the national army, dissatisfaction persisted among ex-rebels excluded from power-sharing, leading to the emergence of Anya-Nya II in the mid-1970s as a splinter separatist force numbering around 1,000-2,000 militants. This group continued low-intensity operations against , protesting unfulfilled integration promises and southern underrepresentation in federal institutions, where northern held over 80% of senior posts despite demographic imbalances. Anya-Nya II's persistence highlighted causal failures in the agreement's implementation, including inadequate funding for southern development—regional budgets received only about 25% of promised allocations—and disputes over administrative boundaries excluding oil-rich areas like from southern control after seismic surveys in 1974-1978 revealed vast reserves estimated at billions of barrels. These inequities, rooted in northern prioritization of resource extraction via pipelines to , eroded trust without direct military confrontation until later escalations. Broader geopolitical dynamics amplified southern insurgencies through pragmatic cross-border alliances, as Anya-Nya fighters utilized Ethiopia's western border regions for training camps and logistics from the early , receiving arms and sanctuary from to counter shared threats from Khartoum's irredentist claims. During the , Ethiopia's alignment with the after 1974 facilitated indirect proxy support, including Israeli-supplied weapons routed through to southern rebels, exploiting Sudan's pro-Western tilt under President Nimeiri to weaken a rival without ideological commitment to southern . Such external enablers underscored the insurgencies' dependence on regional rather than unified ideology, with Ethiopian aid peaking at small arms shipments and intelligence sharing by the late , sustaining Anya-Nya II amid internal Sudanese peace efforts. This context of opportunistic refuge and material backing provided a logistical template later adapted by emerging southern movements, though prior groups' ethnic divisions and limited coordination often undermined long-term efficacy.

Ideology and Strategic Objectives

The New Sudan Vision

The New Sudan Vision, articulated by in the SPLM's founding of July 31, 1983, proposed a unified, socialist transformation of the entire country rather than southern . It envisioned replacing the Khartoum-centered regime—characterized by Arab-Islamic dominance and economic exploitation—with a secular, democratic state structured around to accommodate Sudan's ethnic, cultural, and . The emphasized a national democratic revolution to achieve justice, equality, freedom, and prosperity for all Sudanese, explicitly stating that while the movement began in the south out of necessity, it aimed to "engulf the whole country in socialist transformation." Central to this ideology was the rejection of Arab hegemony and the extension of liberation to marginalized non-Arab groups across , including northern peripheries. Garang positioned the SPLM as a multi-ethnic front against oppression, issuing appeals in 1984 to peoples like the Beja, , Fung, and Nuba to join in overthrowing the "oppressive Jellaba regime" and building a pluralistic that recognized diversity without racial or sectarian primacy. This approach sought to transcend north-south binaries by framing the conflict as systemic injustice affecting all peripheral regions, not merely southern grievances. From a causal standpoint, the vision's feasibility was undermined by Sudan's entrenched ethnic fractures, where the north's predominant Arab-Muslim identity—reinforced by historical Islamization and policies—clashed irreconcilably with the south's diverse African ethnicities and Christian-animist traditions. of limited uptake included minimal defections or from northern groups, with SPLM ranks remaining overwhelmingly southern despite outreach efforts, as cultural and identity mismatches precluded broad buy-in for . This reality, rooted in over 500 ethnic groups and prior failures of unity under imposed (e.g., the 1983 laws sparking the war), highlighted the impracticality of overriding deep-seated divisions through ideological appeals alone.

Shift Toward Secession and Self-Determination

The 1991 Nasir Declaration, issued on August 28 by , Lam Akol, and Gordon Kong Chol from in Upper , marked a pivotal fracture within the SPLM/A, as the dissenting faction explicitly rejected John Garang's "New Sudan" vision of a united, secular country in favor of outright independence for southern through . This split arose from accumulated grievances, including Garang's perceived authoritarian control, ethnic imbalances favoring Dinka commanders over Nuer and other groups, and battlefield exhaustion after eight years of grueling conflict against Khartoum's forces, which had stalled progress toward any form of national transformation. The declaration's call for a on separation reflected a pragmatic recognition that southern fighters prioritized ending the war over abstract unity ideals, amid reports of internal purges and resource disputes that eroded morale. Factional pressures intensified the shift, as the Nasir group's control over key oil-producing areas in Unity and Upper Nile states—where fields like those in generated revenues critical to sustaining the insurgency—highlighted southern economic grievances against northern exploitation and internal SPLM inequities in wealth distribution. Nuer-dominated units, feeling marginalized by Dinka-led command structures, leveraged these resources to challenge Garang's authority, fostering a causal dynamic where local control over petroleum infrastructure overrode pan-Sudanese ambitions, as evidenced by the splinter's alliances with to secure oil concessions while demanding separation. This internal weakened the SPLM/A militarily, with the split contributing to territorial losses and an estimated one million southern deaths from famine and combat by the mid-1990s, compelling a reevaluation of objectives toward viable exit strategies rather than indefinite national overhaul. By early 2002, amid mounting external mediation, the factions pragmatically reunified under SPLM auspices on , when Machar and Garang signed an agreement resolving disputes and aligning on a as the core demand, effectively institutionalizing as the de facto goal to consolidate southern support for impending talks with . This evolution, formalized in the July 2002 Machakos Protocol during Naivasha negotiations, subordinated unity rhetoric to empirical southern consensus on separation, driven by the recognition that prolonged division risked total against government offensives. The pivot underscored how factional realignments, rather than ideological purity, dictated strategy, with oil revenue-sharing formulas emerging as a binding incentive for cohesion.

Military Engagements and Structure

Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005)

The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the military wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), launched its insurgency in 1983 following mutinies by southern Sudanese soldiers in Bor and Ayod against the imposition of Sharia law by President Jaafar Nimeiri. Initial operations relied on guerrilla tactics, including ambushes and sabotage of government garrisons, supported by training camps and logistical aid from Ethiopia under Mengistu Haile Mariam until the regime's fall in 1991. The SPLA's structure emphasized mobile battalions over conventional formations, with recruitment drawing disproportionately from Dinka ethnic groups, particularly from Bahr el Ghazal, fostering perceptions of ethnic favoritism despite efforts to incorporate other southern tribes. This phase saw limited territorial gains but significant disruption to government supply lines, though the SPLA avoided decisive battles due to logistical constraints and dependence on external patrons. The overthrow of Ethiopia's in 1991 disrupted SPLA supply routes, coinciding with internal factionalism triggered by a split in August 1991, when and allies formed the SPLA-Nasir faction, accusing SPLM leader of authoritarianism. This led to prolonged infighting from 1991 to 2002, marked by ethnic clashes between Dinka-dominated SPLA-Torit forces and Nuer-aligned Nasir groups, culminating in the Bor Massacre on November 15, 1991, where Nasir forces and Nuer militias killed approximately 2,000 Dinka civilians. The violence exacerbated famine in SPLA-controlled areas, displacing hundreds of thousands and weakening overall rebel cohesion, as government forces exploited divisions to recapture territories. Factional reconciliation accelerated in the late , with Machar's reintegration into the SPLA mainstream in January , bolstered by shifting Sudanese alliances with Islamist groups and indirect U.S. diplomatic pressure favoring southern amid priorities. This resurgence enabled renewed offensives, capturing key oil fields and towns like by –2004, pressuring toward negotiations. The war resulted in an estimated 2 million deaths, primarily from , , and combat, alongside 4 million displaced persons, with SPLA dependencies on cross-border highlighting vulnerabilities in sustainment. These dynamics culminated in the signed on January 9, 2005, establishing a and power-sharing framework.

Internal Factionalism and Reforms

The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the military wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), experienced profound internal divisions beginning in 1991, primarily driven by ethnic tensions between the dominant Dinka leadership under and Nuer commanders who perceived marginalization. On August 28, 1991, Teny Dhurgon, a Nuer, alongside Lam Akol Ajawin and Gordon Kong Chuol, announced the Nasir Declaration from the town of , splitting from the main SPLA to form the SPLA-Nasir faction; this breakaway group advocated for southern over Garang's broader "New Sudan" vision and accused Garang of authoritarian control and exclusion from key decisions. The Nasir faction drew support largely from Nuer communities, exacerbating tribal cleavages that prioritized ethnic loyalties over unified strategic objectives, while Equatoria-based groups, such as elements aligned with the Equatoria Defense Force, emerged in parallel opposition, further fragmenting southern rebel cohesion. These divisions precipitated a brutal intra-SPLA civil war from 1991 to 1997, marked by inter-ethnic violence that killed thousands and devastated communities; for instance, factional clashes in 1993 alone contributed to an estimated 220,000 excess deaths in southern Sudan from displacement, disease, and starvation, as reported by Operation Lifeline Sudan observers amid intensified infighting. Nuer-on-Nuer segmentation within the Nasir faction compounded the chaos, with leaders like Machar and Lam Akol turning on each other, while Dinka SPLA forces retaliated against perceived Nuer betrayals, leading to massacres such as the July 1995 attack on Ganyliel villages that claimed over 210 lives. This internal strife eroded SPLA territorial control, allowing Sudanese government forces to exploit divisions and recapture areas previously held by rebels, while diverting humanitarian aid intended for civilians toward sustaining factional militias and prolonging suffering. Leadership failures, including Garang's reluctance to decentralize power and Machar's opportunistic alliances with Khartoum in 1997, amplified these ethnic fractures without mitigating underlying tribal patronage networks that incentivized defection over collective discipline. Efforts at gained traction after , when Garang brokered a reconciliation with Machar in on January 6, reintegrating Nasir remnants into a unified SPLA command structure to streamline operations ahead of peace talks. This unification emphasized centralized military discipline under Garang's authority, incorporating former factional militias through absorption protocols that prioritized loyalty oaths and logistical integration, though implementation revealed persistent ethnic enclaves as commanders retained control over tribal levies. Despite these measures, ethnic militias endured, with Nuer and Equatorian units operating semi-autonomously, undermining long-term cohesion and foreshadowing post-independence fractures; empirical outcomes included stabilized frontlines by 2005 but ongoing aid inefficiencies, as factional remnants continued to siphon resources amid unresolved grievances.

Path to Independence

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005)

The (CPA) was signed on 9 January 2005 in , , between the and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), formally ending the after over two decades of conflict. The accord established a six-year interim period leading to national elections and a referendum on for Southern , with key provisions for power-sharing in a , including the allocation of ministerial positions proportionally between northern and southern parties. Wealth-sharing arrangements mandated a 50/50 split of net revenues after production costs, managed through a National Petroleum Commission, while security protocols required the demilitarization of southern garrisons, redeployment of Sudan Armed Forces northward, and integration of SPLA units into a unified . These compromises reflected SPLM concessions on Garang's "New Sudan" vision of national transformation in favor of de facto southern , but embedded tensions over resource control and federal authority that later fueled disputes. John Garang, as SPLM chairman, assumed the role of First under President , symbolizing the power-sharing framework's intent to foster unity during the interim phase. However, Garang's death on 30 July 2005 in a helicopter crash in —while returning from talks with Ugandan President —disrupted this fragile equilibrium, triggering widespread riots in that killed over 100 people, mostly southerners, and exposing underlying ethnic and regional animosities. His successor, Salva Kiir, prioritized southern interests over national integration, accelerating a shift toward and weakening the CPA's unity incentives, as Garang's personal stature had been pivotal in bridging northern-southern divides. Critics have highlighted the CPA's vague federal provisions and enforcement mechanisms, which permitted the northern National Congress Party (NCP) government to delay demarcation of the north-south border, obstruct arbitration, and retain influence over oil-producing border regions, undermining southern economic autonomy. Power-sharing formulas, while allocating vice presidencies and legislative seats, lacked robust dispute-resolution protocols, enabling selective implementation that sowed seeds of instability by incentivizing non-compliance and eroding trust, as evidenced by persistent NCP intransigence on transparency and redeployments. These structural ambiguities, compounded by Garang's untimely , compromised the accord's capacity to sustain long-term national cohesion, foreshadowing post-2011 border conflicts and resource disputes.

2011 Referendum and State Formation

The self-determination referendum for Southern took place from January 9 to 15, , allowing voters to choose between unity with or independence. Official results indicated that 98.83% of participants favored , with a turnout exceeding 97% across polling stations in Southern and select overseas locations. The voting process unfolded with relatively few disruptions, despite tensions with northern Sudanese authorities, as international observers noted minimal organized or widespread . South Sudan formally achieved independence on July 9, 2011, marking the culmination of the SPLM's long campaign against Khartoum's rule and establishing Africa's 54th . The SPLM, as the primary southern political and military force, seamlessly transitioned into the new republic's ruling party, assuming control of the transitional government under President Salva Kiir. This shift positioned the movement to govern a territory encompassing roughly 619,745 square kilometers and a estimated at over 8 million, though immediate revealed gaps in administrative capacity. From inception, the fledgling state inherited acute challenges, including border ambiguities and resource conflicts unresolved by the . The Abyei area, an oil-bearing enclave straddling the new border, remained under dispute, with both and claiming administrative rights amid sporadic clashes displacing residents. Oil disputes further complicated viability, as approximately 75% of Sudan's pre-separation oil production originated from South Sudanese fields, yet export infrastructure—pipelines and refineries—lay in Sudanese territory, prompting protracted negotiations over transit fees and revenue splits that halted southern exports by mid-2011. These frictions, alongside underdeveloped institutions ill-prepared for sovereign functions like issuance and fiscal management, underscored the risks of precipitous separation without prior groundwork.

Post-Independence Governance

Political Dominance in

Following independence on July 9, , the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) solidified its position as the dominant political force in , controlling the executive, legislature, and most governorships through a combination of incumbency advantages and limited opposition participation. The SPLM secured at least 228 seats in the National Legislative Assembly and held nine of ten state governorships as of 2015, establishing a single-party system despite the formal multiparty framework outlined in the Transitional Constitution. This consolidation relied on patronage networks distributing oil revenues and public resources to loyalists, which reinforced party loyalty but stifled competitive politics. Elections underscored the SPLM's unchallenged status. In the April 2010 polls for the Government of Southern —held under the framework—SPLM candidates, including Salva Kiir for presidency, prevailed amid boycotts by several northern and southern opposition parties, which cited irregularities and lack of confidence in the process. The subsequent 2015 general elections, conducted during rising inter-communal tensions, similarly featured Kiir's re-election with opposition abstentions, as groups like the opted out, enabling SPLM's continued monopoly without robust contestation. These outcomes, marked by low turnout and procedural disputes, highlighted the party's effective exclusion of rivals through institutional control rather than broad electoral mandates. The Transitional Constitution of 2011, promulgated shortly after , further entrenched SPLM influence by vesting extensive powers in the presidency and central government, including decree authority over states and . Drafting occurred under SPLM stewardship, with opposition parties such as the SPLM-Democratic Change (SPLM-DC) and others boycotting consultations over insufficient inclusivity and demands for power-sharing, resulting in a favoring the ruling party's structure. Rivals like the SPLM-DC, formed in 2009 by dissident Lam Akol, faced marginalization, including state accusations of ties that the party denied as fabricated to discredit opposition activities. This environment suppressed alternative voices, channeling dissent into factional splits rather than institutionalized competition. Empirical indicators reveal the costs of this dominance: derives approximately 90% of fiscal revenues from oil exports, yet governance failures have yielded persistently low development outcomes. The country's stood at 0.385 as of 2023, reflecting severe deficits in health, education, and income amid resource abundance, with rankings placing it among the world's lowest. Opaque and patronage allocation, rather than investment in public goods, have perpetuated , underscoring how SPLM's monopolization prioritized elite cohesion over accountable rule.

Civil War and Reconciliation Efforts (2013–Present)

The civil war in South Sudan erupted on December 15, 2013, when clashes broke out in Juba between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir, a Dinka, and those aligned with former Vice President Riek Machar, a Nuer, following Kiir's dismissal of Machar and accusation of a coup plot. The initial political rivalry rapidly mobilized ethnic militias, with government troops targeting Nuer civilians in Juba—killing hundreds in door-to-door searches—and Machar's forces retaliating against Dinka communities, escalating into widespread ethnic violence across the country. By 2018, the conflict had resulted in an estimated 383,000 deaths, including direct combat fatalities and indirect losses from famine and disease, underscoring how elite-level power contests devolved into communal warfare without effective institutional checks. Efforts to end the fighting culminated in the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS), mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which established a transitional government of national unity and outlined power-sharing, security reforms, and resource allocation between Kiir's and Machar's factions. However, repeated violations, including the 2016 Juba clashes that displaced thousands anew, led to the agreement's partial collapse, prompting the September 12, 2018, Revitalized ARCSS (R-ARCSS), which reaffirmed ceasefire terms, extended the transition period, and prioritized unification of rival armies under a single command. The R-ARCSS facilitated formation of a unity government on February 22, 2020, reinstating Machar as first vice president, but implementation stalled on critical security arrangements, such as cantonment and integration of non-state militias into the Sudan People's Liberation Army. Post-2018 has been hampered by persistent failures in integration, with holdout forces refusing amid distrust between Dinka-dominated national forces and Nuer-aligned groups, perpetuating localized skirmishes and undermining centralized control. These elite-driven pacts have not resolved underlying command rivalries, contributing to a that has displaced over 4 million people—approximately 2.2 million internally and 2.3 million as refugees in neighboring countries—exacerbated by food insecurity and limited aid access. Elections, originally slated for 2015 under ARCSS and repeatedly deferred, were postponed again in September 2024 to December 2026, citing unpreparedness in , constitutional drafting, and security unification, further entrenching the transitional framework without addressing governance vacuums.

Leadership and Key Figures

John Garang and Foundational Era

de Mabior (June 23, 1945 – July 30, 2005) was a Dinka tribesman from southern who rose through the to the rank of colonel before defecting in 1983 amid mutinies protesting the central government's imposition of Islamic law on non-Muslim southern regions. Educated , Garang earned a in from in 1969 and later pursued advanced studies at , gaining expertise in and that informed his revolutionary approach. In May 1983, he co-founded the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its armed wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), positioning it as the primary southern insurgent force against Khartoum's rule. Garang's personal charisma and rhetorical emphasis on a "New Sudan"—a vision of a unified, secular, democratic state transcending north-south divides—helped consolidate disparate ethnic militias, including former Anya-Nya II fighters, under SPLM control despite initial fragmentation along tribal lines. During the , in SPLM-held "liberated zones" such as areas around Yambio, his leadership oversaw experimental civil administrations that provided basic services, enforced taxation, and developed rudimentary judicial systems to demonstrate viable , though these efforts were hampered by ongoing warfare and resource scarcity. However, Garang's tenure was marked by authoritarian practices, including purges of internal rivals; for instance, following the 1991 Nasir factional challenge led by , which accused him of dictatorial overreach, Garang consolidated power through executions and forced loyalties, exacerbating intra-southern violence that killed tens of thousands. Garang's sudden death in a Ugandan crash on July 30, 2005, mere weeks after his appointment as Sudan's First Vice President under the , triggered an immediate in the SPLM, as no clear succession mechanism existed amid his centralized command style. This gap fueled latent rivalries among commanders, risking fragmentation of the movement and undermining the fragile north-south accord, though interim stabilization occurred under his designated deputy.

Salva Kiir and Successive Leadership

assumed leadership of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Southern Sudan on August 1, 2005, immediately following the death of in a helicopter crash. As Garang's deputy and chief of staff of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), Kiir was swiftly confirmed as SPLM chairman and first , inheriting Garang's roles under the 2005 . His ascension marked a transition from Garang's vision of a broader "New Sudan" to a narrower focus on southern autonomy, with Kiir prioritizing consolidation of power through networks predominantly drawn from his Dinka ethnic group. This approach involved distributing state resources, including oil revenues, to loyalists via ethnic ties, fostering where Dinka-affiliated commanders and officials received disproportionate appointments and funding. Under Kiir's tenure from 2005 onward, policy continuity with Garang's era persisted in pursuing southern , but discontinuities emerged in style, emphasizing over ideological pluralism. In January 2012, Kiir ordered the shutdown of South Sudan's oil production—accounting for 98% of government revenue—to counter Sudan's seizure of oil transit fees, halting output of approximately 350,000 barrels per day and exacerbating economic strain until partial resumption in late 2012. A pivotal rupture occurred in July 2013, when Kiir dismissed his entire cabinet, including vice president and SPLM Secretary-General Pagan Amum, in a aimed at neutralizing perceived rivals and recentralizing authority amid growing factional dissent. This action, interpreted by some as preempting a power grab, intensified ethnic fault lines by sidelining non-Dinka leaders and reinforcing patronage-based control. Successive leadership under Kiir has involved repeated cabinet reshuffles to manage SPLM-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) tensions, reflecting ongoing and power consolidation. In March 2025, Kiir dismissed three ministers, including SPLM-IO affiliates, amid escalating frictions with Machar, signaling efforts to dilute opposition influence within the unity government formed under the 2018 peace accord. Further decrees in August 2025 removed additional SPLM-IO members from legislative roles, prompting accusations of and demands for reinstatement, which underscored Kiir's strategy of leveraging Dinka networks to maintain dominance. Defectors and analysts have contrasted this with Garang's emphasis on multi-ethnic inclusivity, noting Kiir's rule as introducing overt tribal favoritism, where promotions and resource allocation favored Dinka elites, per accounts from former SPLM insiders highlighting a departure from the movement's original cross-ethnic mobilization.

Achievements and Positive Impacts

Liberation from Northern Sudan

The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), as the armed wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), exhibited sustained military resilience during the Second Sudanese Civil War from 1983 to 2005, controlling vast rural territories in southern through guerrilla warfare despite facing a better-equipped northern government force. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, SPLA operations had secured influence over key oil-producing regions in Unity and Upper Nile states, which held the majority of Sudan's petroleum reserves and generated critical revenue for . This control disrupted government oil extraction and transport, exemplified by SPLA ambushes on convoys near in July 2001, compelling northern forces to withdraw from contested oil roads during the 2002 dry season. Economic pressure from southern oil fields, combined with SPLA's territorial gains, eroded the Sudanese government's war-making capacity, as southern areas produced over 75% of national oil output by the war's end. U.S. sanctions, imposed comprehensively in following Sudan's 1993 designation as a state sponsor of , exacerbated Khartoum's isolation by restricting oil exports and financial access, thereby bolstering SPLM leverage in international mediation efforts led by the (IGAD). These factors shifted the balance, pressuring the north to negotiate despite SPLA's internal factionalism and the conflict's toll of roughly 2 million deaths and 4 million displacements. The SPLA's persistence yielded the (CPA), signed on January 9, 2005, in , , which formally ended the 22-year war and established a framework for southern , power-sharing, and 50% oil revenue allocation to the south. This diplomatic triumph verified the SPLM's strategic success in compelling concessions from , enabling interim self-governance and paving the way for a 2011 , though at the high cost of prolonged .

Establishment of Sovereign South Sudan

The Republic of declared independence from on July 9, 2011, following a January 2011 referendum where 98.83% of southern voters opted for , marking the culmination of the SPLM's long campaign for . Under SPLM leadership, the new government prioritized institutional foundations, transitioning the SPLA—formed in 1983 as the SPLM's military arm—into the national army, which provided initial security amid the absence of rival forces. This force, numbering around 150,000 personnel at independence, focused on internal stabilization rather than external threats, though integration of former militias proved uneven. The Bank of was formally established in July 2011 via the Bank of South Sudan Act, 2011, assuming control of currency issuance (initially the , pegged to the U.S. dollar) and monetary oversight from the interim Bank of Southern Sudan, enabling rudimentary fiscal operations tied to oil transit fees from the north. Diplomatic recognition followed rapidly, with Sudan extending de facto acknowledgment on July 8, 2011, followed by the and over 50 nations on Independence Day, and admission to the on July 14, 2011, which unlocked access to international aid and observer status in bodies like the . These steps affirmed sovereignty, though border disputes over oil fields like persisted. By mid-2012, had established embassies in key capitals and joined regional economic communities, fostering initial foreign investment in infrastructure. From to , the period saw relative stability with no large-scale conflict, enabling production to average 350,000–400,000 barrels per day—accounting for 98% of exports and 60–80% of —and driving real GDP growth of approximately 24% annually in the early phase, per IMF estimates, from a low post-secession. However, this growth masked fragility, as revenues were heavily centralized under SPLM elites with limited transparency, funding patronage networks rather than broad development; non- sectors stagnated, and hovered above 20%, underscoring institutional weaknesses like inadequate taxation beyond . Independence effected a decisive break from Sudan's northern-imposed Sharia law, a core SPLM grievance since its 1983 nationwide enforcement reignited civil war by alienating non-Muslim southern populations; South Sudan's 2011 interim constitution enshrined religious freedom and customary law alongside civil codes, averting theocratic governance despite ethnic pluralism and inherited insurgent-era dysfunctions like command economies.

Controversies and Criticisms

Ethnic Divisions and Abuses

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its armed wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), experienced deepening ethnic fractures from the early , as internal power struggles aligned along Dinka and Nuer lines, undermining the movement's initial multi-ethnic ideology under . The 1991 split, when Nuer commander formed the SPLA-Nasir faction, triggered immediate violence, including the Bor massacre on November 15, 1991, where Nasir forces killed an estimated 2,000 to 5,000 Dinka civilians in and around Bor county, displacing tens of thousands and entrenching retaliatory cycles that persisted into the post-independence era. These divisions reflected not mere but competition for resources and within the SPLA, with Garang's mainstream faction (predominantly Dinka) viewing the split as a betrayal that invited northern exploitation, while Nasir leaders framed it as opposition to Garang's . The 2013 , erupting from a political dispute between SPLM leader Salva Kiir (Dinka) and vice president (Nuer), rapidly devolved into ethnic targeting by SPLA forces and opposition militias, with SPLA troops killing hundreds of Nuer civilians in in late December 2013, prompting revenge attacks by Nuer forces on Dinka in Bor and in early 2014, where thousands perished in door-to-door executions and mass drownings. documented these as widespread abuses violating , including deliberate civilian killings along ethnic lines, though SPLM officials defended operations as necessary to suppress an armed rebellion, attributing excesses to rogue elements rather than policy. Critics, including Genocide Watch, have characterized the SPLA's actions—such as systematic displacement and killings of non-Dinka groups—as genocidal intent, citing patterns of ethnic homogenization under Dinka dominance, while SPLM counters that opposition forces initiated and mirrored the violence for political gain. SPLA recruitment of child soldiers exacerbated these divisions, with the verifying over 19,000 children recruited by all parties since 2013, including thousands by government SPLA forces through forced in Dinka-majority areas and incentives in conflict zones. A 2015 Human Rights Watch investigation identified SPLA commanders directly responsible for enlisting boys as young as 10, often deploying them in frontline ethnic clashes without training, despite SPLM commitments under the 2015 peace accord to demobilize minors. In region, SPLA operations against perceived opposition sympathizers involved as a systematic tactic, with reporting hundreds of cases in 2016–2017 where soldiers gang-raped women and girls to terrorize non-Dinka communities, displacing over 200,000 Equatorians. UN reports detail these as conflict-related qualifying as war crimes, with SPLA denials emphasizing disciplinary measures against perpetrators, though accountability remains limited.

Corruption, Mismanagement, and State Failure

Since in , the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)-led government has faced extensive allegations of systemic , with revenues—constituting over 90% of the national —frequently diverted for personal gain by political elites rather than . Audits and investigations have documented billions in unaccounted funds, including a UN report highlighting a $2.2 billion scheme involving bogus payments totaling $1.7 billion from proceeds, underscoring a pattern where opaque financial controls enable without accountability. This misappropriation has persisted under SPLM leadership, with reports attributing it to a kleptocratic network centered on President Salva Kiir and associated figures who have accumulated vast business empires and luxury assets abroad. Elite enrichment contrasts sharply with public deprivation, as SPLM officials and their families have invested looted funds in foreign properties and enterprises, such as luxury homes in and linked to corruption probes. International watchdogs like The Sentry have exposed how Kiir's inner circle controls hidden corporate holdings, diverting state resources into private ventures while domestic infrastructure crumbles, exemplifying a causal link between and governance collapse. ranks as the world's most corrupt nation, with a 2023 score of 8/100, reflecting entrenched practices where , banking, and oil deals serve networks over merit. Mismanagement has exacerbated state failure, with oil wealth failing to translate into development amid recurrent fiscal opacity and elite-driven spending. Despite potential reserves supporting basic services, approximately 80% of the population lives below the absolute line, and infrastructure deficits—such as inadequate roads and power grids—heighten vulnerability to floods and crop failures, contributing to chronic food insecurity affecting over 7 million people annually. This neglect stems from SPLM prioritization of loyalist payouts over investment, fostering dependency on Western aid that covers up to 90% of humanitarian needs without incentivizing , as critiqued in reports on unsustainable assistance amid unchecked . Critics across international bodies and independent analyses, including UN commissions, attribute these failures to internal voids rather than external factors, with empirical on diverted funds directly correlating to stalled growth and humanitarian crises.

Current Status and Recent Developments

Ongoing Internal Conflicts and Factionalism

The (SPLM-IO), led by , emerged from a 2013 split within the SPLM following President Salva Kiir's dismissal of Machar as vice president amid accusations of an attempted coup. This fracture rapidly escalated into , with manifesting along ethnic lines, particularly between Kiir's Dinka ethnic group, which dominates the SPLM leadership, and Machar's Nuer supporters, exacerbating pre-existing tribal rivalries over power and resources. The persistence of this factionalism stems from causal ethnic imbalances, where Dinka-centric networks have marginalized Nuer military and political figures, fostering repeated cycles of defection and insurgency rather than ideological disputes. SPLM-IO has continued to advocate for , rejecting integration into the government as superficial amid ongoing ethnic grievances. In March 2025, following clashes in , Upper Nile State, between government forces and Nuer-affiliated militias, South Sudanese authorities arrested several SPLM-IO leaders, including Petroleum Minister Puot Kang Chol and Lt. Gen. Gabriel Duop Lam, while placing Machar under . These events, which killed dozens and displaced thousands, highlight the failure of prior unification efforts, such as those under the 2018 peace agreement, where ethnic distrust undermined force integrations and power-sharing mechanisms. The SPLM-North (SPLM-N), under , represents another enduring schism, comprising non-Dinka ethnic groups from and left in after South Sudan's 2011 independence. Marginalized by both Khartoum's Arab-dominated regime and Juba's post-independence focus on southern core areas, SPLM-N forces have sustained low-intensity insurgencies in these regions since 2011, driven by ethnic exclusion from resource benefits and . Ethnic dynamics perpetuate this conflict, as Nuba and Ingessana fighters view SPLM-N as a for against Sudanese centralism, with sporadic clashes continuing into 2025 despite occasional ceasefires. Failed attempts to align SPLM-N with southern factions underscore how ethnic overrides broader liberation goals, sustaining parallel rebellions.

Peace Processes and 2023–2025 Challenges

The implementation of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in (R-ARCSS) has been marked by repeated extensions, with signatory parties, under mediation by the (IGAD), agreeing on September 12, 2024, to prolong the transitional period by 24 months, thereby deferring national elections from December 2024 to December 2026. This postponement, justified by incomplete security unification, constitutional drafting, and census preparation, reflects entrenched elite bargaining over power retention rather than accelerated reforms, as evidenced by stalled benchmarks like the disbandment of parallel forces. The envoy described the delay as a "regrettable" deviation from commitments, warning against normalizing such extensions amid a trust deficit that perpetuates fragility. The 2023–2025 period intensified challenges through spillovers from Sudan's civil war, which began in April 2023 between the and , propelling over one million refugees and returnees—many South Sudanese previously hosted in —across the border by January 2025, straining border regions like Upper Nile and with heightened insecurity and resource competition. Domestically, six consecutive years of severe flooding, compounded by erratic rainfall and conflict disruptions to , deepened food insecurity, affecting approximately 7.7 million people (57 percent of the population) with acute through the 2025 lean season, including (IPC Phase 5) conditions for around 83,000 individuals in flood-hit Upper Nile. SPLM leadership maneuvers further complicated peace efforts, as President Salva Kiir's appointment of ally Dr. Benjamin Bol Mel as First Chairman on May 20, 2025, sparked debates over succession and ethnic favoritism, particularly tensions between Aweil and Warrap factions, diverting focus from R-ARCSS deliverables like transitional security arrangements. These elite-centric adjustments, amid IGAD's calls for , highlight causal priorities of personal and factional consolidation over verifiable progress in reforms, sustaining a cycle of deferred and humanitarian vulnerability.

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  146. https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/sudans-spreading-conflict-i-war-in-south-kordofan.pdf
  147. https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/HSBA-Report-Sudan-Blue-Nile_0.pdf
  148. https://igad.int/igad-executive-secretarys-statement-on-the-extension-of-south-sudans-transitional-period-and-call-for-renewed-efforts-in-implementing-the-revitalised-peace-agreement/
  149. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-02/south-sudan-32.php
  150. https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/11/1156661
  151. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/22/over-a-million-people-flee-to-south-sudan-as-sudan-conflict-grinds-on-un
  152. https://www.unicef.org/southsudan/topics/food-crisis-and-famine
  153. https://www.savethechildren.net/news/south-sudan-sixth-year-flooding-deepens-one-worlds-worst-hunger-crises
  154. https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/kiir-appoints-ally-bol-mel-as-1st-deputy-in-ruling-party
  155. https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/opinion-leadership-debate-governance-and-the-future-of-the-splm
  156. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-south-sudan-s-peace-process-be-rescued
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