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Senate hold
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In the United States Senate, a hold is a parliamentary procedure permitted by the Standing Rules of the United States Senate which allows one or more Senators to prevent a motion to proceed with consideration of a certain manner from reaching a vote on the Senate floor, as no motion may be brought for consideration on the Senate floor without unanimous consent (unless cloture is invoked on the said motion).

If the Senator provides notice privately to their party leadership of their intent (and the party leadership agrees), then the hold is known as a secret or anonymous hold. If the Senator objects on the Senate floor or the hold is publicly revealed, then the hold is more generally known as a Senatorial hold.

Origin and intent

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Sections 2 and 3 of Rule VII (Morning Business) of the Standing Rules of the Senate outline the procedure for bringing motions to the floor of the Senate. Under these rules, "no motion to proceed to the consideration of any bill...shall be entertained...unless by unanimous consent." In practice, this means that a senator may privately provide notice to their party leadership of intent to object to a motion. The leadership can more easily schedule business if they know in advance which unanimous consent requests are likely to receive objection.[1]

The original intent of these sections was to protect a senator's right to be consulted on legislation that affected the senator's state or in which a senator had a great interest. The ability to place a hold would allow that senator an opportunity to study the legislation and to reflect on its implications before moving forward with further debate and voting.[2]

According to Congressional Research Service research, holds were not common until the 1970s, when they became more common due to a less collegial atmosphere and an increasing use of unanimous consent to move business to the floor.[3]

Holds, like filibusters, can be defeated through a successful cloture motion. However, the time required to bring around a cloture vote often allows fewer than 40 senators to block unimportant legislation when the majority is not willing to force the vote. The countermeasure to excessive holds may be increased determination on the part of the leadership to bring up measures despite holds, but the delay involved in cloture votes constrains the leader's ability to do this.[4]

In 2023 the Congressional Research service estimated that even with cloture motions, approvals would average 2.6 hours each if there is not unanimous consent (720 hours for 273 nominations).[5]

In 2025 the Senate changed its rules to allow votes without unanimous consent, except for judges and the cabinet.[6][7]

Controversy

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In August 2006, the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 was put on secret hold. This bill, intended to encourage transparency within government, was considered by political pundits to be an especially ironic target of a secret hold and much attention was drawn to the bill and to the procedure itself.[8] Bloggers and political activists sought to identify the senator or senators responsible by process of elimination, by having constituents contact each senator and requesting a specific on-the-record denial of placing the secret hold. Within 24 hours, 96 senators had explicitly denied that they had placed the secret hold, leaving only 4 senators still suspected and under growing public scrutiny as a result.[citation needed] On August 30, a spokesperson for Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska announced that Stevens had placed a hold on the bill.[9] On August 31, 2006, Senator Robert Byrd also admitted placing a hold on the bill.[10] Ultimately, the bill passed the Senate unanimously.

During the 110th Congress, Senator Tom Coburn put holds on a significant number of bills, raising the ire of the leadership and forcing them to package many of the bills with holds into one Omnibus Act (the so-called "Tomnibus") at the beginning of the 111th Congress.[11] Some senators—such as Senators Ron Wyden and Jeff Merkley, both Democrats representing Oregon—have complained that the hold system makes it too easy to block legislation and that the leadership should not honor holds on the floor unless the senator is personally there to object.

During the 118th Congress, Senator Tommy Tuberville put holds on all military promotions and nominees because he opposed the Department of Defense policy to reimburse travel expenses for military personnel who have to leave their states to get abortions or other reproductive care.[12] Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has criticized him for the risks posed to national security by leaving hundreds of military posts vacant.[13] On December 19, Tuberville lifted the hold on all remaining officers, ending the matter.[14]

Attempts to amend or abolish the rule

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Throughout the history of the Senate, multiple unsuccessful attempts have been made to abolish this practice.[15][16] Common reforms which have been discussed include time limits on holds, requirements that a hold not cover a wide variety of business, publication of holds, or needing more than one senator to place a hold.[17]

The practice was successfully banned in 1997, but only temporarily. Majority leader Trent Lott and minority leader Tom Daschle altered the rule so that anyone intending to hold a bill had to notify the bill's sponsor and the chair of the appropriate committee. That year, the result was that opponents of a bill would wait until the bill was before the entire Senate before announcing their opposition, wasting time and ultimately delaying other popularly supported legislation in the process. The practice was soon re-instituted.[18]

Enacted on September 14, 2007, the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 amended the Senate rules to require public notice of holds within 6 session days.[19]

On April 22, 2010, 69 senators signed a letter to Senate Leaders Reid and McConnell pledging that they would not place secret holds on legislation or nominations, and requesting changes in Senate rules to end the practice.[20]

On January 27, 2011, the Senate voted 92–4 to pass a resolution that would require any hold to be entered into the Congressional Record two days after it is placed, unless the hold is lifted within the two-day period.[21] If the senator that placed the hold does not come forward or remove the hold within the two-day period, the hold will be attributed to the party leader, or the senator that placed the hold on behalf of the secret Senator.[22]

Attempts to evade loss of anonymity

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Since U.S. Senate rules require the entering of the senator's name into the public record after two days, senators commonly circumvent the limit by using what is called a 'tag-team' on a hold. 'Tag-Teaming' a hold requires at least two senators that want to hold the legislation indefinitely. The first senator (anonymously) places a hold on the legislation, and then, before their name is entered into the record, releases the hold. The second senator then places an (anonymous/secret) hold on the legislation and repeats the action, releasing their hold before the 2-day window is up. The first senator then takes over the hold, and the process repeats itself indefinitely.[23]

Although a hold is placed anonymously, the identity of the senator placing the hold can quickly become common knowledge. Under traditional dictates of Senate courtesy, the identity of the holder is not made public.[24] However, senators have become increasingly willing to identify colleagues who place holds, in all but name.[25]

See also

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References

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Senate hold

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from Grokipedia
A is an informal practice in the whereby a senator notifies party leaders of an intent to object to a request, thereby delaying or preventing floor consideration of specific or executive nominations. This procedure, unrecognized by formal rules, leverages the chamber's reliance on for efficient scheduling to grant individual senators significant leverage over the legislative agenda. Originating from longstanding Senate customs emphasizing courtesy and deliberation, holds enable senators to express policy concerns, seek amendments, or extract concessions without invoking more visible tactics like the . Leaders typically respect holds by refraining from advancing measures via , though the practice can force reliance on time-consuming alternatives such as motions to proceed, which require votes amid potential extended debate. Historically, holds have evolved from private communications to more structured notices, with periodic bipartisan efforts to impose transparency requirements, such as public disclosure mandates enacted in 2011 and subsequent standing orders. While holds preserve the Senate's tradition of and minority party checks, they have drawn for enabling obstruction, particularly on nominations, where prolonged delays can hinder government operations and military readiness, as evidenced by impacts on confirmations. Reforms have aimed to curb anonymous or "secret" holds and limit duration, yet the practice persists due to its utility in a body designed for extended , underscoring tensions between individual prerogatives and collective efficiency.

Definition and Mechanics

The conducts much of its business through (UC) agreements, which allow the chamber to waive procedural requirements such as calls, limitations, and votes on amendments, thereby expediting legislative and executive actions. UC requests are typically proposed by the and require no objection from any senator to proceed; a single objection halts the agreement, reverting the to its more deliberative default rules that often demand time-consuming processes like motions needing 60 votes to invoke. This reliance on UC stems from the 's constitutional design emphasizing extended and minority protections, making holds—a senator's informal signal of intent to object—a powerful tool for influencing scheduling without formal votes. A Senate hold operates entirely outside codified rules, functioning as a convention where a senator privately notifies their party's leader (or sometimes the bipartisan ) of opposition to UC on a specific bill, , or matter. Upon notification, the leader may object preemptively on the senator's behalf or delay seeking UC altogether to avoid public confrontation, effectively stalling the item until negotiations resolve the concerns or the majority expends time on a formal motion to proceed. This procedure leverages the Senate's norm against filibustering minor matters routinely, as constant UC objections would grind business to a halt; instead, holds allow discreet leverage, with the objecting senator often remaining anonymous initially unless the hold becomes public. Historically, holds have evolved without written protocol, but party conferences adopted informal guidelines in the and to curb abuses, such as requiring holds to be disclosed to within a short timeframe and limiting "secret holds" that evade notification. In 2011, Senate rules were amended via a standing order to mandate that holds on or nominations be publicly announced by the leader after two days, aiming to enhance transparency while preserving the right to object; however, relies on voluntary compliance, and holds persist as a bilateral signaling mechanism between senators and leaders. Critics from procedural analyses note that this informality can enable obstruction without accountability, as the UC framework incentivizes private bargaining over open debate, though proponents argue it facilitates minority input in a chamber where formal rules otherwise favor the majority. Empirical reviews of Senate practices confirm that over 90% of floor actions in recent es occur via UC, underscoring holds' outsized role in shaping priorities.

Types of Holds and Notification Process

In the United States , holds are categorized by their intent and scope, though these distinctions are informal and not codified in rules. Informational holds request that the relevant notify or consult the holding senator prior to scheduling consideration of a measure or , allowing time for or debate preparation. Choke holds explicitly signal an intent to or otherwise obstruct action, aiming to prevent or significantly delay agreements. Blanket holds apply to an entire class of business, such as all nominations to a specific agency or department; for instance, in 2003, Senator placed a blanket hold on over 800 promotions to protest perceived mistreatment of a base closure decision. holds, named after the entertainer's quip "come up and see me sometime," are placed to initiate negotiations with bill sponsors, nominees, or the administration, often resolving through . Retaliatory holds serve as political leverage against a colleague or executive official for prior actions, functioning as a form of payback. Rolling holds involve coordination among multiple senators, who rotate objections to prolong delay beyond what a single hold might achieve. The notification process for placing a hold relies on informal communication, typically a written letter or verbal to the senator's or their staff, expressing concerns and requesting delay of action via objection to . Prior to 2007, holds were often conducted secretly, with no requirement for public disclosure, enabling anonymous obstruction. The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-81, Section 512) introduced partial transparency: if a senator objects to based on a hold, they must submit a "Notice of Intent to Object" within six session days, which is printed in the and listed on the Senate calendar, identifying the objector and the affected matter. This provision yielded limited notices initially, with five in the 110th (2007-2008) and 12 in the 111th (2009-2010). Senate Resolution 28, adopted unanimously on January 25, 2011, further refined the process by requiring a written notice to the within two session days of any initial hold communication, followed by public disclosure in the . Implementation data shows 24 such notices in the 112th (2011-2012), nine in the 113th (2013-2014), and 34 in the 114th (2015-2016), with the latter largely from one senator targeting Foreign Service promotions. To lift a hold, the senator submits a statement of non-objection, such as "I do not object to proceeding to [measure]," which is also published in the Record, though leaders may still delay action at their discretion. These mechanisms do not eliminate holds but aim to curb secrecy, as holds retain potency through the threat of extended debate under rules.

Historical Origins

Early Senate Customs and Precedents

The United States Senate, established in 1789, operated from its inception under customs that afforded individual senators substantial influence over legislative proceedings, reflecting the framers' intent for a deliberative body where minority views could delay or shape outcomes. Unlike the House of Representatives, the Senate lacked formal mechanisms to limit debate or amendments until the 20th century, relying instead on mutual accommodations among members to advance business efficiently. Senators frequently deferred to colleagues' requests to postpone consideration of measures or nominations, a practice rooted in collegiality and the chamber's small initial size of 26 members, which allowed personal negotiations to govern the agenda. A key early custom enabling such delays was the use of requests to expedite routine matters, a procedure employed as early as the First to waive reading of bills or dispense with calls. By the mid-19th century, had evolved to structure debate and limit amendments, with the first recorded instance of such a request to restrict debate occurring in during consideration of a tariff bill. Objection by even a single senator could halt these agreements, effectively allowing one member to block floor action without formal rules enforcement, a dynamic that foreshadowed later scheduling obstructions. This reliance on consent, rather than vote alone, underscored the Senate's of requiring broad agreement to override individual prerogatives. For nominations, the precedent of emerged prominently in the late , permitting a senator to oppose or delay appointees from their home state, often prompting the president to withdraw nominations absent that senator's support. This custom gained traction following President George Washington's 1789 nomination of Benjamin Fishbourn as a naval officer, which Georgia's senators successfully opposed due to local grievances, leading to its rejection by the . By the early , this deference extended to federal judgeships and other posts, with senators signaling objections to the president or chamber leadership to avert embarrassing votes, thereby institutionalizing informal holds on executive selections. These customs collectively established precedents for modern holds by embedding the principle that a single senator's notification of concerns—whether to party leaders or on the floor—could compel delays, consultations, or revisions, prioritizing extended deliberation over expeditious action. In an era without party leaders' formal control over the calendar, the presiding officer typically yielded to such courtesies, as evidenced in 19th-century practices where senators routinely requested postponements to bills or rally support. This informal framework persisted because it aligned with the Senate's constitutional design to check hasty , though it occasionally enabled strategic stalling without accountability.

Development into Modern Practice

The practice of Senate holds evolved from early informal customs rooted in and the Senate's reliance on agreements, transitioning into a more structured yet still unregulated tool by the mid-20th century. Under in the late 1950s, holds originated as courteous notifications to party leaders requesting delays in scheduling floor consideration of bills or nominations, allowing senators time for review or debate without immediate objection. This reflected the chamber's norms of reciprocity, where leaders accommodated individual members' needs to maintain amid growing legislative demands. As the Senate's workload expanded post-World War II, with increased use of to expedite routine business—avoiding time-consuming roll-call votes—holds provided an efficient mechanism for senators to signal potential objections, effectively delaying action without invoking a formal . By the and , holds had proliferated into a staple of modern operations, often functioning as a "silent " that leveraged the chamber's requirements for to prolong deliberations. Senators began placing holds on executive nominations and appropriations bills en masse, with reports indicating hundreds of active holds at peak periods; for instance, in 1997, two senators described the practice as having shifted from a debate-facilitating to a routine instrument of leverage. became a hallmark, as holds were communicated privately via letters to leaders without public disclosure, enabling minority influence disproportionate to formal rules. This development coincided with broader reforms, such as the 1975 reduction of the threshold from two-thirds to three-fifths, which inadvertently amplified holds' obstructive potential by making threats more credible without requiring extended speeches. Efforts to formalize and curb holds' excesses marked the late 20th and early 21st centuries, shaping contemporary practice around partial transparency. Secret holds drew bipartisan criticism for enabling anonymous obstruction, prompting in 1997 to institute a voluntary 72-hour disclosure policy, though compliance was inconsistent. More substantively, the 2007 Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (P.L. 110-81, Section 512) mandated public notification of holds within six session days if a senator objected to proceeding, with the first such disclosures occurring on October 3, 2007. This was refined in 2011 via S.Res. 28, which shortened the disclosure window to two session days and applied upon initial hold transmission to leaders, extending oversight to a broader range of holds while preserving their informal status. Despite these measures, holds remain unregulated by standing rules, persisting as a flexible tool for policy signaling and delay, with over 100 reported in some Congresses, underscoring the Senate's enduring preference for precedent over codification.

Usage and Empirical Patterns

The practice of Senate holds originated in the late 1950s as an informal courtesy under Majority Leader , primarily for signaling scheduling preferences rather than obstruction, with limited documented usage in early decades. By the 1980s and 1990s, holds proliferated amid rising partisanship, averaging approximately 220 per year during Robert Dole's tenure as majority or minority leader from 1985 to 1996, totaling around 2,655 across the 99th through 104th ; outright holds—direct requests to delay or block—comprised a significant portion, peaking at 56.8% of holds (208 total) in the Democratic-controlled 103rd (1993-1994) when Republicans were in the minority.
CongressTotal HoldsOutright Holds (% of Total)
99th (1985-1986)43482 (18.9%)
100th (1987-1988)608284 (46.7%)
101st (1989-1990)414134 (32.4%)
102nd (1991-1992)443150 (33.9%)
103rd (1993-1994)366208 (56.8%)
104th (1995-1996, partial)387111 (28.7%)
Disclosure requirements introduced by the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-81, Section 512) and Senate Resolution 28 (2011) provided partial visibility into holds, revealing fluctuations: 5 public notices in the 110th Congress (2007-2008), 12 in the 111th (2009-2010), 24 in the 112th (2011-2012), 9 in the 113th (2013-2014), and 34 in the 114th (2015-2016), often targeting nominations like Foreign Service promotions. However, these figures understate actual frequency, as many holds—such as rotating or secret ones—evade reporting, and usage has intensified in the nomination process amid procedural changes like the 2013 and 2017 "nuclear options" reducing filibuster thresholds, shifting obstruction tactics toward holds as a lower-effort alternative to extended debate. Overall, holds transitioned from reciprocal courtesies to strategic tools for leverage and delay, with empirical patterns showing spikes during unified or minority obstruction periods; their persistence reflects the Senate's reliance on , enabling individual senators to amplify influence despite informal status.

Partisan Usage and Notable Examples

Holds in the U.S. Senate are utilized by members of both major parties, primarily to signal objections to legislation, nominations, or scheduling, often leveraging the threat of extended debate to influence outcomes. While comprehensive partisan statistics are unavailable due to the informal and frequently confidential nature of the practice, congressional records of hold notices indicate usage by senators across party lines, with minority party members more commonly employing them aggressively to obstruct the majority's priorities or negotiate concessions. For instance, in the 114th Congress (2015–2017), when Republicans held the Senate majority, a single Democratic senator placed 29 holds, including 21 on a consolidated list of Foreign Service promotions. This reflects a strategic dynamic where holds serve as a low-cost tool for the minority to amplify leverage without invoking formal filibusters, though majority senators also use them internally for agenda management. Notable examples underscore the tactic's role in partisan contention over executive nominations. In May 2023, during the Democratic majority under President Biden, Republican Senator (R-AL) initiated a blanket hold on more than 450 senior military promotions and nominations, objecting to the Department of Defense's policy reimbursing service members for travel related to abortions following the Supreme Court's Dobbs decision. The hold persisted until December 2023, when Tuberville lifted most restrictions amid bipartisan pressure and reports of readiness impacts, such as delayed leadership transitions at U.S. commands; over 300 promotions were confirmed shortly thereafter via individual votes or . During the Obama administration, Republicans, particularly in their minority phase, routinely placed holds on executive branch and judicial nominees, exacerbating vacancy rates; by October 2015, the Republican-led had confirmed only 107 of Obama's picks amid such delays, compared to higher paces in prior years. Democrats have similarly wielded holds against Republican presidents' nominees. In February 2025, following Donald Trump's inauguration, Democratic Senator (D-HI) imposed a blanket hold on State Department nominations, citing concerns over Elon Musk's advisory role in decisions. Earlier, during Trump's first term, Democrats delayed confirmations through holds and extended debates, prompting Republican rule changes in 2019 to limit post-cloture time on nominees. These cases illustrate holds' utility in partisan battles over personnel, often tied to broader policy disputes, without evidence of one party abstaining from the practice.

Strategic Purposes and Impacts

Advantages for Deliberation and Checks

Senate holds enhance deliberation by enabling individual senators to signal potential objections to unanimous consent requests, thereby prompting leadership to provide advance notice or consultation, which facilitates preparation for debate, amendments, or further committee review. This mechanism counters the Senate's reliance on expedited procedures, allowing time to identify overlooked issues in bills or nominations that could lead to suboptimal outcomes if rushed to the floor. By necessitating negotiation over contested measures, holds encourage broader consensus and revisions, aligning with the chamber's procedural emphasis on extended consideration rather than speed. As a check on and executive power, holds grant disproportionate leverage to minority senators, protecting state-specific interests and preventing precipitant actions by larger coalitions, such as unvetted presidential nominees advancing without . This individual mirrors the Senate's broader rules, which prioritize and minority influence to balance raw , often yielding policy concessions through pre-floor bargaining that majority votes alone could not secure. Senate leaders have noted the informational value of holds in gauging colleagues' preferences, informing scheduling and strategy to avoid unnecessary confrontations or filibusters.

Criticisms of Obstruction and Anonymity

Critics argue that Senate holds facilitate obstruction by enabling a single senator—or a small group—to indefinitely delay or derail and nominations, undermining the chamber's capacity for majority-rule . For instance, holds have been used to stall executive and judicial nominees, with one 2023 hold lasting 10 months and affecting 447 promotions and nominations. This practice exacerbates , as leaders must negotiate bilaterally or risk prolonged postponements, diverting floor time from other priorities and contributing to broader legislative stagnation. Empirical patterns show holds correlating with increased confirmation delays, particularly for agency heads and judges, where ideological opposition turns procedural tools into vetoes without requiring a filibuster's public effort. The anonymity inherent in traditional "secret holds"—communications between a senator and not formally disclosed—amplifies these issues by shielding obstructors from and public scrutiny. Although rules since a standing order require hold notifications to be published weekly, senators have continued to employ informal, undisclosed holds, flouting transparency mandates and allowing anonymous blockage of measures like enhanced whistleblower protections in 2010. This opacity enables leverage without electoral consequences, as constituents remain unaware of who is responsible for delays, fostering a culture of untraceable influence peddling. Critics, including bipartisan senators, contend this erodes democratic legitimacy, as it permits minority vetoes hidden from debate or voter judgment, contrasting with the framers' intent for open deliberation. Such practices have drawn condemnation for prioritizing individual or partisan gain over collective governance, with data indicating heightened use during to extract concessions on unrelated bills. advocates highlight that while holds originated as notifications, their evolution into obstructive tools—often without substantive debate—distorts the Senate's deliberative role, leading to policy inertia on critical issues like appropriations and confirmations. Despite attempts like the 2011 resolution to curb secrecy, persistence stems from mutual deterrence: senators retain holds to counter opponents, perpetuating a norm where protects against retaliation but at the cost of institutional trust.

Reform Efforts and Challenges

Attempts at Transparency and Regulation

Efforts to enhance transparency in holds date back to the , when senators informally agreed to publicize objections to end secret holds, though remained voluntary and inconsistent. In , an amendment to a D.C. appropriations bill proposed requiring hold disclosures in the within two session days, but it was dropped in conference committee. A 2006 amendment to S. 2349 sought a three-day disclosure rule to curb secret holds, yet it failed to advance as adjourned without action. The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-81), enacted on September 14, 2007, marked the first statutory attempt at through Section 512, mandating that senators disclose any "notice of intent to object" in the within six session days if a hold prompted an objection to . This provision aimed to deter anonymous obstruction by linking holds to public accountability, but its effectiveness was undermined by weak enforcement mechanisms and loopholes allowing leaders to object on behalf of unnamed senators. Disclosure notices remained low, with only five recorded in the 110th (2007-2008) and 12 in the 111th (2009-2010). Building on prior shortcomings, the adopted S. Res. 28 on January 27, 2011, by a 92-4 vote, establishing a standing order that shortened the disclosure window to two session days from the initial hold notification to party leaders and required written authorization for objections. Under this rule, party leaders must publish the hold details—including the senator's name, affected measure or , and date—in the and Senate calendars if the senator fails to do so; notices also appear in weekly Senate calendars. The reform increased reported holds, rising to 24 in the 112th (2011-2012), nine in the 113th (2013-2014), and 34 in the 114th (2015-2016), with the latter largely driven by one senator's holds on Foreign Service promotions. Proponents, including Senators and , argued it would facilitate negotiations by identifying objectors, though critics warned it might entrench holds as a formalized right without curbing their frequency. Subsequent proposals, such as S. Res. 502 (2010, Wyden-Grassley) for two-day disclosures and S. Res. 440 (2010, ) to cap holds at 30 days with bipartisan requirements, received no floor votes. Despite these measures, holds persist due to the Senate's reliance on for efficiency, the absence of binding penalties for non-disclosure, and the ability to use proxy objections or filibusters as alternatives. No major legislative reforms have advanced since 2011, as rule changes require a two-thirds majority to overcome potential filibusters, and informal practices adapt to evade strictures, perpetuating anonymity in practice even as nominal transparency has improved.

Reasons for Persistence and Recent Context

The persistence of holds stems from their alignment with the chamber's institutional design, which relies heavily on to expedite business amid limited floor time. By signaling potential objections informally, holds allow individual senators to delay or negotiate on nominations and measures without invoking the more resource-intensive , thereby conserving legislative energy for both parties. Leaders often honor holds to filibusters, preserving and party cohesion, as overriding them could escalate partisan tensions or waste scarce debating hours. This practice endures because it empowers minority-party senators to extract concessions or highlight policy concerns at low personal cost, functioning as a check on majority overreach in a body constitutionally intended for deliberate review of executive and legislative actions. Reform efforts face structural barriers, including the need for a two-thirds to amend rules formally, which rarely materializes given that holds benefit whichever party holds the minority. Attempts to codify transparency, such as Section 512 of the 2007 Honest Leadership and Open Government Act and Resolution 28 in 2011, mandated public disclosure of holds within two to six session days, yet these measures have proven evadable through informal communications, "rolling" holds rotated among senators, or verbal notices that skirt written requirements. Without robust enforcement mechanisms—relying instead on leader discretion—such rules fail to deter abuse, and proposed overhauls risk unintended formalization of the practice, potentially entrenching it further by inviting more strategic invocations for public posturing. In recent contexts, holds have continued despite disclosure mandates, with formal notices fluctuating but informal variants persisting to influence nominations amid heightened partisanship. For instance, in the 114th (2015–2017), 34 public hold notices were filed, demonstrating ongoing utility even after transparency reforms. The practice gained prominence in the 118th (2023–2025), exemplified by Senator Tommy Tuberville's prolonged hold on military promotions in 2023 to protest abortion travel policies, which delayed over 300 confirmations until resolved through negotiations in September 2023, underscoring holds' leverage in policy disputes without triggering full battles. Entering the Republican-majority 119th in 2025, holds remain a tool for Democrats to scrutinize Trump administration nominees, though specific instances as of 2025 reflect the practice's adaptability rather than decline, as leaders balance expedition with .

References

  1. https://www.senate.gov/about/research-tools/glossary.htm
  2. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R43563
  3. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL31685.html
  4. https://www.gao.gov/assets/880/877873.pdf
  5. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/96-548
  6. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RS20668
  7. https://www.legislativeprocedure.com/blog/2023/6/30/explaining-senate-holds
  8. https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/long-sought-grassley-reform-end-secret-holds-passes-senate
  9. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43563
  10. https://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/09/us/senator-blocks-850-promotions-in-the-air-force.html
  11. https://www.senate.gov/about/origins-foundations/senate-and-constitution.htm
  12. https://www.senate.gov/history/1787.htm
  13. https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/rules-procedures/first-unanimous-consent-agreement.htm
  14. https://stevesnotes.substack.com/p/unanimous-consent-in-the-senate-part
  15. https://prologue.blogs.archives.gov/2014/08/03/the-origins-of-senatorial-courtesy/
  16. https://study.com/academy/lesson/what-is-senatorial-courtesy-definition-examples.html
  17. https://spia.uga.edu/faculty_pages/carson/Roberts%20paper.pdf
  18. https://www.npr.org/2023/12/19/1220492250/tuberville-drops-blockade-military-promotions
  19. https://federalnewsnetwork.com/federal-report/2024/03/impacts-of-tubervilles-military-holds-will-be-felt-for-years/
  20. https://www.politico.com/story/2015/10/gop-senate-barack-obama-cotton-214700
  21. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/democratic-sen-brian-schatz-puts-hold-trumps-state-department-nominees-rcna190470
  22. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/will-the-new-senate-rule-make-it-easier-for-presidents-to-confirm-their-teams/
  23. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN12200
  24. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-107679
  25. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-difficulty-of-reforming-senate-holds/
  26. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-negative-impact-of-the-use-of-filibusters-and-holds/
  27. https://journals.flvc.org/civic/article/view/130763
  28. https://www.propublica.org/article/with-four-lawmakers-objecting-senate-ends-practice-of-secret-holds-to-block
  29. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/09/senate-hold-procedure/675315/
  30. https://www.npr.org/2010/06/03/127368817/senators-fed-up-with-secret-blocks-on-nominees
  31. https://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/whats-the-hold-up-on-senate-nominees/
  32. https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/resolution-to-end-secret-holds-overwhelmingly-passes-the-senate
  33. https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-resolution/28/text
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