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Siege of Izmail
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Siege of Izmail
The siege of Izmail (Turkish: İzmail Kuşatması), also called the storming of Izmail (Russian: Штурм Измаила), was a military action fought in 1790 on the Danube near the Black Sea during the Russo-Turkish War (1787–1792) and simultaneously the Austro-Turkish War (1788–1791). The Russians were led by Alexander Suvorov, who had defeated the Ottoman Turkish forces at Kinburn, Focsani, and Rymnik, as well as participating in the siege of Ochakov. The Black Sea rowing flotilla was commanded by the Spanish admiral José de Ribas (Iosif Deribas) who was in the service of the Russian Empire. In preparation for the storming, Suvorov personally trained his soldiers and, approaching Izmail Fortress at a distance of a gunshot, explained to senior officers how and where to act during the assault. It is regarded as one of Suvorov's finest victories and one of the greatest deeds in world military history.
The fortress was considered to be impregnable and was referred to as "a fortress without weak points", and was commanded by one of the best and most experienced Ottoman generals, Aydoslu Mehmed Pasha, who did not allow the Russian commanders Ivan Gudovich, Alexander Samoylov, Pavel Potemkin, and Deribas (November, 1790) to capture Izmail in the previous beleaguering. The Ottoman commander Hassan Pasha, after his defeat by Nikolai Repnin at Salcia, repelled Repnin's attempt to take Izmail in 1789; however, in this case, the blame lies largely with Repnin's own indecision.
Suvorov gave Commander-in-Chief Potemkin advice regarding subsequent military operations; "rowing fleet should seize the Danube Delta, take Tulcha and Isaktcha, together with ground troops to conquer Izmail and Brailov and put a tremor on Sistovo". Two detachments were intended for action on the Lower Danube; with the help of a rowing fleet they were to take possession of all local Turkish fortifications, destroy Ottoman river vessels and generally clear the Lower Danube with its coasts. Most of this task was accomplished without special effort; by the end of November, the small fortresses of Kilia, Tulcea, and Isaktcha were in Russian hands, and the Ottoman rowing flotillas had been annihilated. There remained the formidable stronghold of Izmail, "the key to the Danube", built under the direction of German and French engineers, in the region of Budjak (now in Ukraine).
The siege of Izmail in December 1790 was undertaken due to order of the supreme commander of the Russian Southern Army, General-Feldmarshal Grigory Potyomkin, – commonly known as Potemkin, – appointing a new leader of the Izmailian forces. Neither Nikolay Repnin (1789), nor Ivan Gudovich, replaced by Samoylov, nor Pavel Potyomkin, nor Deribas (November, 1790) were able to meet the challenge, failing the siege either through lack of overall command, or the sluggishness, or the indecisiveness on the part of their troops or themselves; after which Grigory Potyomkin assigned the task of supervising the troops assembled at Izmail to General-in-Chief Count Suvorov-Rymniksky, who was then watching Galatz and Brailov with his corps. During the entire last November siege, Deribas managed, however, to eliminate most of the Turkish small vessels (77 captured and 210 sunk). The news of Suvorov's appointment spread throughout the flotilla and the siege corps instantly. Every soldier understood what the denouement of the inaction would be, and one of the top officials in his private letter expressed himself: "as soon as Suvorov arrives, the fortress will be stormed".
More recently in 1790, Coburg's Austrians took Orșova. Afterwards, they tried to besiege Giurgiu stronghold: at first things went well for the Austrians there, but the Ottomans, in Prince of Coburg's absence, made a very successful sortie that spoilt the whole affair. They drove the Austrians away, took their artillery, and inflicted a loss of 1,000 men. The Austrians were 6 times stronger than the garrison of Giurgiu, but despite this, they lost all their siege artillery and were forced to retreat from Giurgiu. Potemkin gloatingly described this affair to his sovereign, mentioning Coburg in every negative way, but Coburg had no part in this rout. The affair at Giurgiu was a mere private failure, which, at the end of the same month of June, General Clerfayt partly made up for by a victory over the Turks at the Battle of Calafat. But with these three deeds of the Austrians their active operations ended.
Arriving at Izmail on 13 December, Suvorov immediately began preparations for an assault. His troops were positioned in a semicircle 2.1 kilometres (1.3 mi) from the fortress; their flanks rested on the river, where Deribas' flotilla and the detachment on Çatal Island[ru] (5 battalions of infantry with 8 artillery batteries) started the blockade. Reconnaissance was underway for several days in a row, with the participation of both Suvorov himself and his superiors; ladders and fascines were being prepared at the same time; Suvorov went among the soldiers, egging them on, joking with them. He would point towards Izmail and say, "There is the fortress. Its walls are high, its ditches deep, but we must take it. Our Mother, the Empress, has ordered it, and we must obey her". Suvorov, who was accompanied by Ober-Quartermaster Lehn and many generals and staff officers (so that everyone could become more familiar with the approaches to the fortress), rode up to Izmail within gun range, indicating the points to which the columns should be directed, where to attack, and how to support each other. At first, the Turks fired at Suvorov's retinue, but later, [it seems] they no longer considered it worthy of attention. Suvorov carefully thought out and drew up plans to respond to a major sortie, based on his bitter experience at Ochakov. In order to inspire the Turks with the idea that the Russian meant to conduct a proper siege, on the night of 18 December, on both flanks were laid batteries, each with 10 guns: two — on the west side, 300 m. from the fortification, and two — on the east side, not more than 370 m. from the hedge. To train troops for making an assault, a large moat was dug in the distance and filleed ramparts in design like Izmail; secretly on the night of 19 and 20 December Suvorov personally showed the troops escalade techniques and taught them to act with a bayonet, with the Turks represented by the fascines. On 18 December, 2 o'clock in the afternoon, Suvorov sent a note to the commandant of Izmail:
To Serasker, elders and all your society: I arrived here with the troops. Twenty-four hours to think about surrender and twenty-four hours of liberty; my first shots mean that liberty is gone; the assault is death. This is what I leave you for consideration.
The next day came a reply from the serasker, who asked permission to send two men to the Grand Vizier for a command and offered to conclude an armistice for 10 days. By 20 December Suvorov replied that he could not agree to the serasker's request and gave a deadline until the morning of the 21st day. In the appointed time there was no reply and the fate of Izmail was decided.
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Siege of Izmail
The siege of Izmail (Turkish: İzmail Kuşatması), also called the storming of Izmail (Russian: Штурм Измаила), was a military action fought in 1790 on the Danube near the Black Sea during the Russo-Turkish War (1787–1792) and simultaneously the Austro-Turkish War (1788–1791). The Russians were led by Alexander Suvorov, who had defeated the Ottoman Turkish forces at Kinburn, Focsani, and Rymnik, as well as participating in the siege of Ochakov. The Black Sea rowing flotilla was commanded by the Spanish admiral José de Ribas (Iosif Deribas) who was in the service of the Russian Empire. In preparation for the storming, Suvorov personally trained his soldiers and, approaching Izmail Fortress at a distance of a gunshot, explained to senior officers how and where to act during the assault. It is regarded as one of Suvorov's finest victories and one of the greatest deeds in world military history.
The fortress was considered to be impregnable and was referred to as "a fortress without weak points", and was commanded by one of the best and most experienced Ottoman generals, Aydoslu Mehmed Pasha, who did not allow the Russian commanders Ivan Gudovich, Alexander Samoylov, Pavel Potemkin, and Deribas (November, 1790) to capture Izmail in the previous beleaguering. The Ottoman commander Hassan Pasha, after his defeat by Nikolai Repnin at Salcia, repelled Repnin's attempt to take Izmail in 1789; however, in this case, the blame lies largely with Repnin's own indecision.
Suvorov gave Commander-in-Chief Potemkin advice regarding subsequent military operations; "rowing fleet should seize the Danube Delta, take Tulcha and Isaktcha, together with ground troops to conquer Izmail and Brailov and put a tremor on Sistovo". Two detachments were intended for action on the Lower Danube; with the help of a rowing fleet they were to take possession of all local Turkish fortifications, destroy Ottoman river vessels and generally clear the Lower Danube with its coasts. Most of this task was accomplished without special effort; by the end of November, the small fortresses of Kilia, Tulcea, and Isaktcha were in Russian hands, and the Ottoman rowing flotillas had been annihilated. There remained the formidable stronghold of Izmail, "the key to the Danube", built under the direction of German and French engineers, in the region of Budjak (now in Ukraine).
The siege of Izmail in December 1790 was undertaken due to order of the supreme commander of the Russian Southern Army, General-Feldmarshal Grigory Potyomkin, – commonly known as Potemkin, – appointing a new leader of the Izmailian forces. Neither Nikolay Repnin (1789), nor Ivan Gudovich, replaced by Samoylov, nor Pavel Potyomkin, nor Deribas (November, 1790) were able to meet the challenge, failing the siege either through lack of overall command, or the sluggishness, or the indecisiveness on the part of their troops or themselves; after which Grigory Potyomkin assigned the task of supervising the troops assembled at Izmail to General-in-Chief Count Suvorov-Rymniksky, who was then watching Galatz and Brailov with his corps. During the entire last November siege, Deribas managed, however, to eliminate most of the Turkish small vessels (77 captured and 210 sunk). The news of Suvorov's appointment spread throughout the flotilla and the siege corps instantly. Every soldier understood what the denouement of the inaction would be, and one of the top officials in his private letter expressed himself: "as soon as Suvorov arrives, the fortress will be stormed".
More recently in 1790, Coburg's Austrians took Orșova. Afterwards, they tried to besiege Giurgiu stronghold: at first things went well for the Austrians there, but the Ottomans, in Prince of Coburg's absence, made a very successful sortie that spoilt the whole affair. They drove the Austrians away, took their artillery, and inflicted a loss of 1,000 men. The Austrians were 6 times stronger than the garrison of Giurgiu, but despite this, they lost all their siege artillery and were forced to retreat from Giurgiu. Potemkin gloatingly described this affair to his sovereign, mentioning Coburg in every negative way, but Coburg had no part in this rout. The affair at Giurgiu was a mere private failure, which, at the end of the same month of June, General Clerfayt partly made up for by a victory over the Turks at the Battle of Calafat. But with these three deeds of the Austrians their active operations ended.
Arriving at Izmail on 13 December, Suvorov immediately began preparations for an assault. His troops were positioned in a semicircle 2.1 kilometres (1.3 mi) from the fortress; their flanks rested on the river, where Deribas' flotilla and the detachment on Çatal Island[ru] (5 battalions of infantry with 8 artillery batteries) started the blockade. Reconnaissance was underway for several days in a row, with the participation of both Suvorov himself and his superiors; ladders and fascines were being prepared at the same time; Suvorov went among the soldiers, egging them on, joking with them. He would point towards Izmail and say, "There is the fortress. Its walls are high, its ditches deep, but we must take it. Our Mother, the Empress, has ordered it, and we must obey her". Suvorov, who was accompanied by Ober-Quartermaster Lehn and many generals and staff officers (so that everyone could become more familiar with the approaches to the fortress), rode up to Izmail within gun range, indicating the points to which the columns should be directed, where to attack, and how to support each other. At first, the Turks fired at Suvorov's retinue, but later, [it seems] they no longer considered it worthy of attention. Suvorov carefully thought out and drew up plans to respond to a major sortie, based on his bitter experience at Ochakov. In order to inspire the Turks with the idea that the Russian meant to conduct a proper siege, on the night of 18 December, on both flanks were laid batteries, each with 10 guns: two — on the west side, 300 m. from the fortification, and two — on the east side, not more than 370 m. from the hedge. To train troops for making an assault, a large moat was dug in the distance and filleed ramparts in design like Izmail; secretly on the night of 19 and 20 December Suvorov personally showed the troops escalade techniques and taught them to act with a bayonet, with the Turks represented by the fascines. On 18 December, 2 o'clock in the afternoon, Suvorov sent a note to the commandant of Izmail:
To Serasker, elders and all your society: I arrived here with the troops. Twenty-four hours to think about surrender and twenty-four hours of liberty; my first shots mean that liberty is gone; the assault is death. This is what I leave you for consideration.
The next day came a reply from the serasker, who asked permission to send two men to the Grand Vizier for a command and offered to conclude an armistice for 10 days. By 20 December Suvorov replied that he could not agree to the serasker's request and gave a deadline until the morning of the 21st day. In the appointed time there was no reply and the fate of Izmail was decided.
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