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List of Superfund sites
List of Superfund sites
from Wikipedia

A map of Superfund sites as of October 2013. Red indicates currently on final National Priority List, yellow is proposed, green is deleted (usually meaning having been cleaned up).

Superfund sites are polluted locations in the United States requiring a long-term response to clean up hazardous material contaminations. Sites include landfills, mines, manufacturing facilities, processing plants where toxic waste has either been improperly managed or dumped. They were designated under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980. CERCLA authorized the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to create a list of such locations, which are placed on the National Priorities List (NPL).[1]

The NPL guides the EPA in "determining which sites warrant further investigation" for environmental remediation.[2] As of June 6, 2024, there were 1,340 Superfund sites in the National Priorities List in the United States.[2] Thirty-nine additional sites have been proposed for entry on the list, and 457 sites have been cleaned up and removed from the list.[2] New Jersey, California, and Pennsylvania have the most sites.[3]

Lists of Superfund sites

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U.S. states and federal district

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Insular areas

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See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The List of Superfund sites catalogs the (NPL), a registry maintained by the (EPA) that identifies uncontrolled or abandoned releases of hazardous substances posing the greatest threats to and the environment, warranting prioritized federal intervention for assessment and remediation. Established under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), signed into law on December 11, 1980, the program created a dedicated trust fund—initially financed by excise taxes on petroleum and chemical industries—to address such sites when responsible parties could not be identified or held liable. The NPL, first published in 1983, scores sites using the Hazard Ranking System to determine eligibility, focusing on factors like , migration potential, and population exposure. As of March 2025, the NPL comprised 1,340 active sites distributed across all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories. Remediation efforts typically involve potentially responsible parties (PRPs) conducting or funding cleanups under EPA oversight, with techniques ranging from source removal and treatment to monitored natural attenuation and land use restrictions. While the program has achieved construction completion at numerous sites, enabling economic redevelopment and risk mitigation, it has confronted persistent challenges, including protracted timelines—often spanning decades—escalating costs exceeding initial estimates, and funding volatility following the 1995 expiration of the original tax authorizations, which shifted reliance to annual congressional appropriations and PRP settlements.

Program Background

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) was enacted by the U.S. Congress on December 11, 1980, establishing the federal program to address uncontrolled hazardous substance releases into the environment that posed risks to public health or welfare. Signed into law by President , CERCLA provided the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with broad authority to identify, investigate, and remediate contaminated sites, including provisions for short-term removal actions to abate immediate threats and long-term remedial actions for permanent cleanup. The Act created the Hazardous Substance , initially financed through a tax on the chemical and industries, to cover costs when responsible parties could not be identified or were unwilling to act. CERCLA's legal framework imposes strict, on potentially responsible parties (PRPs), including current and past owners or operators of sites, generators of , and transporters, without requiring proof of fault or . This liability extends to natural resource damages and response costs, enabling the federal government to compel PRPs to perform cleanups or reimburse the for government-led efforts. The Act mandates the development of a National Contingency Plan (NCP) to outline response procedures, including the Hazard Ranking System (HRS) for prioritizing sites on the (NPL), which as of its inception focused on the most serious uncontrolled releases. Implementation falls under the President's delegated authority to the EPA, which coordinates with states, tribes, and other agencies, though the program's trust fund faced chronic shortfalls after the initial excise taxes expired in , leading to reliance on general appropriations and recoveries from PRPs. CERCLA does not preempt state laws but allows in cases of inconsistency, emphasizing a approach while prioritizing federal intervention for sites warranting national attention. Subsequent amendments, such as the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, refined mechanisms and community involvement requirements but did not alter the core establishment framework from 1980.

Site Designation Criteria

Sites qualify for designation as Superfund sites through placement on the (NPL), which identifies locations of known or threatened releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants that may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health, welfare, or the environment. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uses the Hazard Ranking System (HRS), a standardized scoring model, as the principal mechanism to assess and prioritize sites for NPL inclusion. Established under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980 and revised in 1990, the HRS evaluates sites based on three main components: the likelihood of release or migration of hazardous substances, the characteristics of the waste (including toxicity, persistence, and volume), and the potential targets affected (such as human populations, resources, or sensitive ecosystems). The HRS assigns scores ranging from 0 to 100 across four environmental migration pathways—groundwater, surface water, soil exposure, and air migration—with the overall site score determined by the highest pathway score. For each pathway, the score integrates factors like observed releases (e.g., contaminated monitoring wells or observed contamination), potential for migration based on hydrogeological data, waste quantity (measured in observed or potential volumes), and hazard potential (derived from toxicity benchmarks such as carcinogenic risk or ). Targets are scored by proximity to populated areas (e.g., residential or commercial zones with weighted population counts), sensitive environments (e.g., wetlands or national parks), and critical facilities (e.g., wells serving over 500 people daily). A site achieves eligibility for NPL proposal if its HRS score reaches or exceeds 28.5, serving as a to indicate relative priority among thousands of potential sites without implying a fixed risk level. Following HRS evaluation—typically after a preliminary assessment and site —the EPA proposes sites meeting the threshold for NPL listing via a notice, triggering a minimum 60-day public comment period and coordination with state agencies and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry for health consultations. Final designation occurs through , after which the site becomes eligible for long-term under authorities, including funding from the Superfund Trust Fund or responsible parties. Federal facilities follow a parallel process under CERCLA Section 120, often bypassing HRS if deferred to Department of Defense or programs. This criteria-driven approach ensures prioritization of sites with the greatest demonstrated threats, though scores can be updated with new data during remedial investigations.

Current Status and Metrics

Total Sites and Distribution

As of October 1, 2025, the Agency's (NPL) includes 1,343 sites requiring long-term , consisting of 1,186 non-federal sites and 157 federal facilities. An additional 38 sites await final listing after proposal and public comment periods. Cumulatively, 459 sites have been deleted from the NPL upon verification that cleanup remedies protect human health and the environment, though partial deletions have occurred at 118 of these, allowing reuse of uncontaminated portions. Superfund sites exhibit a non-uniform geographic distribution reflective of historical concentrations of , , and . Among the states, has the highest count at 113 NPL sites, followed by (97 sites) and (95 sites); these figures stem from dense clustering of chemical manufacturing, refineries, and landfills in urban-industrial corridors. Fewer than 10 sites exist in less industrialized states such as , , and , underscoring causal links between site prevalence and prior economic activities involving hazardous substances. Federal facilities, often military or energy-related, contribute disproportionately to tallies in states like and Washington. Sites in U.S. territories remain limited, with none currently on the NPL in areas such as or the U.S. Virgin Islands beyond occasional proposals.

Cleanup Completion Rates

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) considers a site's cleanup complete when it is deleted from the (NPL), signifying that all required response actions have been implemented, the remedy is protective of human health and the environment, and no further EPA is necessary. As of March 2025, 459 sites have been deleted from the NPL, including both full and partial deletions. With 1,340 sites remaining active on the NPL at that time, this equates to roughly 26% of all sites ever finalized on the list achieving deletion status. Deletion typically follows the completion of physical construction of the selected remedy and a subsequent period—often 10 years or more—of operation, maintenance, and five-year reviews to verify long-term effectiveness. However, progress toward deletion has varied, with annual full-site deletions averaging fewer than 20 in recent s, including just four sites reaching construction-complete status in 2024. Historical trends show a decline in completions at nonfederal NPL sites, dropping about 37% from s 1999 through 2013, attributed to reduced federal funding and increasing site complexities. EPA tracks intermediate environmental indicators to gauge partial progress, such as whether current human exposures and migration of contaminants are under control; these metrics indicate protectiveness at approximately 85-90% of sites but do not equate to full cleanup completion. Delays in achieving deletion often stem from ongoing monitoring needs, unresolved responsible party contributions, or litigation, leaving hundreds of sites in post-construction phases for extended periods. Overall, the program's deletion rate reflects incremental but slow advancement, with funding constraints exacerbating a 79% real decline in program appropriations since 1999 despite persistent site backlogs.

Geographic Listings

Sites by U.S. State and Federal District

The (NPL) comprises hazardous waste sites designated for priority cleanup under the program, with distribution reflecting historical concentrations of , , and waste disposal activities. States in the Northeast and Midwest, regions with extensive early-20th-century industrialization, host disproportionately high numbers relative to population or land area. As of January 2016, 1,303 NPL sites existed across the 50 states, excluding the District of Columbia. led with 113 sites, attributed to dense chemical and pharmaceutical industries in areas like the Meadowlands and corridor. followed with 95, many linked to steel production and coal-related contamination. had 97, driven by , , and agricultural legacies in the Central and urban bays. By March 2025, the national total reached 1,340 active sites, indicating modest additions amid ongoing designations and deletions upon cleanup completion. The District of Columbia maintains one NPL site, primarily associated with institutional and urban contamination sources. No sites were recorded in as of , though peripheral assessments occur in neighboring states; all other states had at least one. The table below details state-level counts from 2016 EPA data, which remain indicative of broader patterns despite incremental changes.
StateNumber of Sites
Alabama13
Alaska6
Arizona9
Arkansas9
California97
Colorado19
Connecticut14
Delaware13
Florida53
Georgia16
Hawaii3
Idaho6
Illinois44
Indiana38
Iowa11
Kansas12
Kentucky13
Louisiana11
Maine13
Maryland20
Massachusetts32
Michigan65
Minnesota25
Mississippi8
Missouri33
Montana16
Nebraska15
Nevada1
New Hampshire20
New Jersey113
New Mexico15
New York85
North Carolina39
North Dakota0
Ohio37
Oklahoma7
Oregon13
Pennsylvania95
Rhode Island12
South Carolina25
South Dakota2
Tennessee17
Texas51
Utah15
Vermont12
Virginia31
Washington51
West Virginia9
Wisconsin37
Wyoming2
Federal facilities, such as bases and Department of Energy sites, account for a subset across states (e.g., 81 federal sites nationally as of 2025), often complicating responsible party identification and funding. Site-specific details, including contaminants like polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), volatile organic compounds, and , are tracked via EPA regional offices, with public dockets available for each.

Sites in U.S. Insular Areas and Territories

U.S. insular areas and territories host a limited number of (NPL) sites relative to the mainland , often linked to military installations, industrial operations, and improper waste storage, with cleanups challenged by geographic isolation and resource constraints. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) oversees these under the standard framework, prioritizing sites based on hazard rankings and potential risks to human health and ecosystems. Puerto Rico maintains the largest concentration of such sites among the territories, stemming from , , and waste disposal activities. Construction completion—indicating has addressed principal threats—has been achieved at 14 NPL sites as of the latest EPA reporting. Notable examples include the Fibers Public Supply Wells in Guayama, a 540-acre area contaminated by synthetic fibers production and adjacent sugar cane processing, now in reuse following groundwater treatment. The Ochoa Fertilizer Co. site in Guánica, spanning 125 acres near Guánica Bay, was added to the NPL on October 1, 2021, due to elevated levels of , , and other chemicals from fertilizer operations threatening marine habitats. Guam features NPL sites predominantly tied to former military use, including , a federal facility listed since involving extensive soil and remediation for fuels, solvents, and explosives under a Defense-State Memorandum of Agreement. The Ordot Landfill (also known as Ordot Dump), added to the NPL in , encompasses leachate-contaminated and soils from decades of open dumping, with ongoing litigation attributing much liability to U.S. Navy operations from onward, culminating in a Supreme Court revival of Guam's cost-recovery claims against the federal government. U.S. Virgin Islands includes the Tutu Wellfield site on St. Thomas, listed on the NPL and comprising a 108-acre groundwater plume polluted with volatile organic compounds from former industrial solvent use and dry cleaning operations; remedial actions have enabled partial reuse, though monitoring continues for residual tetrachloroethylene. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands has the PCB Warehouse in Saipan on the NPL, proposed December 30, 1982, where government-stored drums of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB)-contaminated transformer oils and liquids posed risks of releases into soil and water; cleanup involved drum removal and disposal. American Samoa currently has no sites on the NPL, but EPA has executed time-critical removal actions at non-NPL locations, such as the Taputimu Farm site, where outdated agricultural pesticides and chemicals stored in a warehouse and trailer were excavated and disposed of to prevent leaching. Similarly, the Chlorine Cylinder site in Pago Pago addressed abandoned compressed chlorine gas cylinders through secure storage and off-island transport.

Effectiveness and Impacts

Successful Cleanups and Health Benefits

The Superfund program has achieved construction completion of remedial actions at 1,246 National Priorities List (NPL) sites since its inception, marking the point at which physical cleanup measures are implemented to address principal threats to human health and the environment. As of March 2025, 459 sites have been fully deleted from the NPL, signifying that remedial objectives have been met and residual risks are below levels warranting continued federal oversight. These milestones reflect empirical progress in containing or removing contaminants such as heavy metals, volatile organic compounds, and polychlorinated biphenyls, thereby curtailing pathways of exposure through soil, groundwater, and air. Peer-reviewed analyses provide causal of improvements post-cleanup. A study of over 621,000 births from 1989 to 2003 in , , , , and used difference-in-differences methods—comparing outcomes before and after remediation within 2 km versus 2–5 km of sites—to estimate a 20–25% reduction in congenital anomalies attributable to actions, with no significant effects on or in the broader sample. This effect size, derived from vital statistics natality data matched to EPA records, isolates remediation from factors like maternal demographics, though it lacks direct exposure metrics and focuses on short-term outcomes. For lead exposure, a separate investigation of children near contaminated NPL sites reported 13–26% lower risks of elevated blood lead levels (≥5 μg/dL) within 2 km post-cleanup, equating to 4–8 percentage point absolute declines, as confirmed via difference-in-differences and triple-difference models on CDC surveillance data from 1997–2010. These neurotoxicant reductions, statistically significant at p<0.01 in clustered regressions, align with causal mechanisms where excavation and capping diminish and , mitigating developmental risks without relying on behavioral changes. Integrated assessments further link these interventions to broader protections, such as decreased lifetime cancer risks and enhanced for future sites, though challenges like cleanup duration and pre-remediation exposures persist. Overall, such outcomes validate the program's focus on high-risk contaminants, yielding targeted gains amid variable site complexities.

Economic Costs and Litigation Burdens

The program has generated significant economic costs, encompassing federal appropriations, state contributions, and private expenditures by potentially responsible parties (PRPs). Federal taxpayers funded over $21 billion in cleanup and oversight costs through 2017, with annual appropriations typically ranging from $500 million to $1.2 billion in recent years, augmented by $3.5 billion from the for (NPL) sites. While the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pursues cost recovery from PRPs under CERCLA, recoveries cover a variable portion—often over 60% for remedial actions starting after 1991—but leave unrecovered "orphan shares" for insolvent parties, shifting burdens back to the trust fund. Average remedial costs per NPL site have reached approximately $27 million, with total projected costs for nonfederal sites estimated in the tens of billions when including private and state payments. Litigation imposes heavy burdens due to CERCLA's strict, retroactive, joint-and-several framework, which incentivizes PRPs to litigate rather than cooperate on cleanups, inflating transaction costs that include legal fees, negotiations, and administrative overhead. Economic studies highlight these inefficiencies, with transaction costs averaging up to 88% of total remediation expenses in early program analyses, though site-specific figures range from 17% for insurers at certain locations to a substantial share in complex multi-party cases. A analysis of private-sector spending at 18 sites from to 1991 estimated average total expenditures of $32 million per site, with transaction costs comprising a notable proportion that often exceeds direct remediation outlays. Major U.S. corporations, surveyed by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), reported widespread involvement, with 55% of respondents incurring -related costs and over two-thirds of those spending at least $50,000 in legal fees per high-cost site. Efforts to mitigate litigation, such as EPA settlement policies, reduced annual cases filed in U.S. district by nearly 50% from 1994 to 2007, yet persistent legal disputes continue to delay cleanups and divert resources from remediation. These burdens exacerbate overall program costs, as prolonged negotiations and battles—driven by uncertainty in liability allocation—have been identified in and economic reviews as key factors hindering timely and cost-effective management.

Criticisms and Reforms

Regulatory and Enforcement Shortcomings

The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Superfund enforcement mechanisms have been criticized for inconsistencies in application, particularly in oversight of federal agencies conducting remedial work at sites. An EPA Office of Inspector General evaluation found that enforcement options are not clearly documented in agency guidance or policy statements, resulting in inconsistent understanding and implementation by staff, which undermines effective cost recovery and compliance. This lack of standardized procedures contributes to delays in addressing violations and reimbursements, as regional offices vary in their approaches to penalties and settlements. Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessments have highlighted broader weaknesses that prolong site cleanups, including underutilization of administrative orders and insufficient aggressiveness in negotiations with potentially responsible parties (PRPs). For instance, the program's historical designation as high-risk stemmed from management deficiencies in , such as escalating legal costs and failures to prioritize actions efficiently, exacerbating fiscal uncertainties for long-term responses. Penalty policies have also drawn scrutiny, as they permit omission of economic benefits from assessments when deemed negligible, potentially allowing violators to retain gains from non-compliance without full deterrence. Data limitations further impair enforcement decisions, with GAO noting that decreased litigation—while reducing some burdens—coexists with inadequate information on site risks and PRP viability, hindering choices between settlements and judicial actions. Reliance on state-led enforcement, intended to supplement federal efforts, has instead raised costs to the Superfund trust fund in cases where states pursue less efficient remedies, diverting resources from national priorities. These structural issues have collectively slowed progress, with average cleanup timelines extending beyond initial projections due to protracted PRP negotiations and incomplete recovery of oversight expenses.

Policy Debates and Proposed Changes

Policy debates surrounding the program, established under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980, center on funding mechanisms, cleanup inefficiencies, and liability structures that hinder timely remediation of hazardous waste sites. Critics argue that the program's reliance on general revenues since the lapse of dedicated taxes in has led to inconsistent funding and political vulnerability, with annual appropriations fluctuating between $1.1 billion and $1.3 billion in recent fiscal years, insufficient to address a backlog of over 1,300 sites on the (NPL). Proponents of reinstating "polluter pays" taxes contend this would stabilize the trust fund and shift costs to responsible parties, as partially achieved by the (IIJA) of 2021, which revived taxes on crude oil, petroleum products, and certain chemicals effective January 1, 2022, projected to generate $14.4 billion over a decade but falling short of pre-1995 levels adjusted for inflation. Opponents, including chemical manufacturers, warn that full reinstatement could erode U.S. competitiveness by increasing production costs by up to 5-10% for affected sectors, potentially driving without proportionally accelerating cleanups. Cleanup delays, averaging 10-15 years per site from listing to completion, stem from bureaucratic requirements, protracted negotiations with potentially responsible parties (PRPs), and litigation over remedy selection, with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) identifying remedy negotiations and enforcement actions as primary bottlenecks in 40% of delayed cases as of 2025. Bipartisan hearings in April 2025 highlighted these issues, with members decrying the system's "broken" nature and calling for reforms to prioritize faster construction starts over exhaustive feasibility studies, potentially reducing timelines by streamlining EPA approvals under CERCLA Section 121. Proposed changes include procedural expediting for demolitions and initial responses, as implemented by EPA guidance in August 2025 to bypass certain reviews for imminent threats, and broader legislative efforts to limit of cleanup plans post-approval to curb delays from PRP challenges. Liability debates focus on CERCLA's strict, retroactive, and joint-and-several provisions, which some economists argue deter brownfield redevelopment by imposing uncertain costs on successors, with studies estimating 20-30% of potentially viable sites abandoned due to litigation fears. Reforms proposed in 2025 bipartisan discussions include expanded bona fide prospective purchaser (BFPP) protections to shield innocent buyers from legacy liabilities, mirroring federal expansions under the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002, and mechanisms for partial delistings to encourage phased cleanups. Complications from emerging contaminants like PFAS have intensified calls for targeted exemptions or cost-sharing, as the EPA's May 2024 designation of PFOA and PFOS as hazardous substances under CERCLA raised fears of massive new liabilities—estimated at $100 billion nationwide—without corresponding funding increases, prompting industry-led pushes for PRP contribution protections. Despite consensus on inefficiencies, divisions persist over funding offsets and enforcement rigor, with no comprehensive reauthorization bill advancing beyond committee by October 2025, though EPA principles emphasize maximizing PRP settlements (which funded 70% of cleanups in FY2024) and efficient resource allocation.

References

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