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Single-wing formation
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A classic single-wing alignment, with the center (50) shotgun-snapping the ball either to the left halfback/"tailback" (40) or to the fullback (30). Quarterback (20) is called "blocking back" in this formation, right halfback (10) is the "wingback," frequently a pass receiver.

In American and Canadian football, a single-wing formation was a precursor to the modern shotgun formation.[1] The term usually connotes formations in which the snap is tossed rather than handed. Formations with one wingback and a handed snap are commonly called "wing T" or "winged T".

Created by Glenn "Pop" Warner, the single wing was deemed superior to the T formation in its ability to get an extra eligible receiver downfield.[2]

History

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There is no way to improve on football beyond the unbalanced line single-wing.

— Carl Snavely[3][4]

Pop Warner at the University of Pittsburgh in 1917

Among coaches, single-wing football denotes a formation using a long snap from center as well as a deceptive scheme that evolved from Glenn "Pop" Warner's offensive style. Traditionally, the single-wing was an offensive formation that featured a core of four backs including a tailback, a fullback, a quarterback (blocking back), and a wingback. Linemen were set "unbalanced", with two on one side of the center and four on the other. This was done by moving the off-side guard or tackle to the strong side. The single-wing was one of the first formations attempting to trick the defense instead of overpowering it.[5]

Pop Warner referred to his new offensive scheme as the Carlisle formation because he formulated most of the offense while coaching the Carlisle Indians. The term single-wing came into widespread use after spectators noticed that the formation gave the appearance of a wing-shape. In 1907, Warner coached at Carlisle, a school for Native Americans, where his legacy consisted of at least three significant events. The first was the discovery of Jim Thorpe's raw athletic ability. The second was the use of an extensive passing game that relied on the spiraled ball. Finally, faking backs who started one way, but abruptly headed the opposite way, kept defenses guessing.[6] Since Jim Thorpe had so much raw talent, Coach Warner more than likely designed much of his single-wing offense around this gifted athlete. Thorpe, the proverbial triple threat, was a good runner, passer, and punter.[7]

Single-wing formation similar to Pop Warner's playbook

For much of the history of the single-wing formation, players were expected to play on both sides of the ball. Consequently, offensive players often turned around to play a corresponding location on defense. The offensive backs played defensive backs, just as the offensive linemen played defensive linemen. Unlike teams of today, single-wing teams had few specialists who only played on certain downs.

College football playbooks before the 1950s were dominated with permutations of the traditional single-wing envisioned by Warner. Two-time All-American Jack Crain's handwritten playbook clearly denotes how the University of Texas ran their version of the single-wing circa 1939–1940. University of Texas Coach Dana X. Bible ran a balanced line, which meant that each side of the center had the same number of linemen. The ends were also slightly split.[8]

Slightly splitting offensive ends, called flexing, was in widespread use by Notre Dame's Box variation of the single-wing. Knute Rockne's Notre Dame Box offense employed a balanced line, which had 3 linemen on each side of the center. Another Rockne innovation was a shifting backfield that attempted to confuse the defense by moving backs to alternate positions right before the snap.[9] Another variation of the single-wing saw the quarterback move out as a wingback on the weak side. Besides adding different blocking angles for the quarterback, the double-wing formation facilitated the passing game. Stanford had a variation on the double-wing in which the quarterback stayed right behind the strong side guard, while the tailback became the wingback to the weak side. The fullback, being the only deep back left, took all the snaps and directed the plays.[9]

The advent of the T formation in the 1940s led to a decline in the use of single-wing formations. For example, the single-wing coach Dana X. Bible, upon his retirement in 1946, saw his replacement, Blair Cherry, quickly install the T formation like many other college coaches of the day.[10] Wallace Wade said he was "not convinced that the single wing is not a more potent formation than the T. The single wing we used caused the defense to spread. It called for more intensive coaching on individual assignments."[11][12]

However, from 1949 to 1957, Henry "Red" Sanders elevated a rarely distinguished UCLA football program to an elite level with his precision single-wing system, winning a National Championship at UCLA in 1954.

The single-wing style of football is still practiced by a small group of teams across the country, almost exclusively at the high school and youth level.[13] The Pittsburgh Steelers were the last NFL team to use the single-wing as their standard formation, finally switching to the T formation in 1952.[14] In 2008, the Miami Dolphins utilized a version of the single-wing offense (calling it the "wildcat") against the New England Patriots on six plays, which produced four touchdowns in a 38–13 upset victory, and again two weeks later, defeating the San Diego Chargers.[15] In college football, by the early 1960s, the only major teams still relying on the single wing were Tennessee, UCLA, University of Pennsylvania and Princeton. Following 1964, only Princeton, which had been particularly known for the single wing under its longtime coach Charlie Caldwell, still used the formation, finally giving it up in 1969 after the retirement of Caldwell's successor Dick Colman.[4][16]

Sutherland single wing

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The Sutherland single-wing was a variation used with great success by Coach Jock Sutherland of the 1930s and 1940s. Note that coach Sutherland mastered many forms of the single-wing, but the formation described here is the one he invented and was named after him.

The Sutherland single-wing differs from the traditional single-wing in that the wingback is brought into the backfield as a halfback, flanking the fullback on the other side from the tailback. This allows a more flexible running attack to the weak-side. Both the tailback and halfback are triple threats in this offense. The weakness of this formation is less power than the traditional single-wing and it requires very talented backs to play tailback and halfback effectively.

Sutherland created this formation from the original single-wing he learned from legendary coach Pop Warner at the University of Pittsburgh in the 1910s. Sutherland became the Pitt coach in 1924, where he remained through 1938. Sutherland's Pitt teams were named "National Champions" by various selectors in nine different seasons,[17] including five recognized by the university.[18] Sutherland was the avowed master of the single-wing offense while at Pitt.[19] Sutherland brought his coaching skills to the NFL in 1940 as the coach of the Brooklyn Dodgers. At Brooklyn, he took over a team that had never finished better than second and had only one winning season since 1930. He implemented his offensive ideas and the Dodgers finished with a record of 8–3 and finished only a game behind the Washington Redskins. Sutherland's star was Ace Parker, who played tailback and was NFL MVP. The Dodgers also finished second in 1941, with a 7–4 mark. Later, Sutherland coached the Pittsburgh Steelers in 1946 and 1947. In 1947, Sutherland and his single-wing pushed the Steelers to their first playoff appearance, for the East Conference crown. They were soundly defeated by Greasy Neale's Philadelphia Eagles, running the T-formation, 21–0. Sutherland died suddenly in 1948, but the Steelers continued to use his single-wing until 1953, when they were the last NFL team to switch to the T. Runningback Austin Horton also rushed for 1,245 yards during the Sutherland season.

Double wing

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The double-wing is an offensive formation which should not be confused with the Double Wing offense. The double-wing formation is used in many offenses from the youth level through college. The formation was first introduced by Pop Warner around 1912. Just a few offenses that use the formation are the double wing, flexbone and wing T offenses. It was the primary formation used by Ara Parseghian when he ran the wing T at Notre Dame, winning National Championships in 1966 and 1973.

Double Wing Formation

The formation is not necessarily the same in all offenses and is a broad term to describe any offense with two wingbacks. In the wing T, the double-wing formation is used to refer to Red, Blue and Loose Red formations.

The double-wing formation in American football usually includes one wide receiver, two wingbacks, one fullback, and one tight end.

Single-wing style of play

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The direct snap or toss from the center usually went to the tailback or fullback. However, the quarterback could also take the ball. The tailback was very important to the success of the offense because he had to run, pass, block, and even punt. Unlike today, the quarterback usually blocked at the point of attack. As with his modern-day counterpart, a single-wing quarterback might also act as a field general by calling plays. The fullback was chosen for his larger size so that he could "buck" the line. This meant that the fullback would block or carry the ball between the defensive tackles. The wingback could double-team block with an offensive lineman at scrimmage or even run a pass route.[20]

The single-wing formation was designed to place double-team blocks at the point of attack. Gaining this extra blocker was achieved in several ways. First, the unbalanced line placed an extra guard or tackle on one side of the center. Second, a wingback stationed outside end could quickly move to a crucial blocking position. Third, the fullback and especially the quarterback could lead the ball carrier producing interference. Finally, linemen, usually guards, would pull at the snap and block at the specified hole. Line splits were always close except for ends that might move out from the tackle.

The single-wing formation depended on a center who was skilled both at blocking and at tossing the ball from between his legs to the receiving back. The center had to direct the ball to any of several moving backs, with extreme accuracy, as the play started. Single-wing plays would not work well if the back had to wait for the snap because quick defensive penetration would overrun the play. The center was taught to direct the ball to give the tailback or fullback receiver a running start in the direction that the play was designed to go. [21] The single-wing formation was a deceptive formation with spectators, referees, and defensive players often losing sight of the ball. A backfield player, called a "spinner", might turn 360 degrees while faking the ball to the other backs, or even keeping the ball or passing it. Defensive players were often fooled as to which back was carrying the ball.[22]

Single-wing punt formation similar to Pop Warner's playbook

The one play that was unique to the single-wing formation was the buck-lateral series. The terminology for this series of plays associates the word "buck" with the intent of the fullback to plunge into the line. In addition, the short toss, or lateral of the ball, can be made to the quarterback or wingback who may take the ball and do other maneuvers including passing the ball. Consequently, when the fullback takes the ball, he appears to be headed to buck the line. Typically, fullbacks were larger players that ran plays intended to smash the defensive front. The fullback's initial move pulls the defensive players toward the expected point of attack. Next, the fullback tosses the ball to another back causing the defense to change pursuit angles, thus losing a step in their catching the ball carrier. The strong side of the formation, where the extra lineman and wingback lined up, put pressure on the defensive end. Defenses might move extra players to that side or shift the whole defense to compensate. The cut-back play could succeed regardless of how the defense reacted. The cut-back play started like a strong side sweep with offensive guards and quarterback running interference for the tailback. The fullback would fake a smash over the guard hole to occupy the defensive tackles. The play was designed to make the defensive end overreact and try to stay outside to contain the runner. If the defensive end gave ground to the sideline, the tailback would cut-back inside to let his interference push the defensive end out of the play. If the defensive end came too far inside, then the ball carrier would run around him to the outside. After the cut-back play was used in a game, then the offense might run the wingback reverse since both plays started out the same way. At the outset, the defense tries to pursue the sweeping tailback. However, the tailback delivers the ball to the wingback running the opposite way to the weak side. Both the cut-back and the reverse would be set up with quick fullback bucks up the middle, which would cause the defensive line to over-protect their gaps, as opposed to pursuing quickly to the sideline.[9]

Single-wing teams used both a standard punting formation and a quick punt, often kicking on second or third downs. The quick punt, or quick kick, saw the tailback-punter swiftly backing up 5 yards as the ball was in the air from the center to distance himself from rushers. The strategy was to prevent defensive halfbacks, expecting a possession play, from dropping back to return the ball. The standard punt formation was often used for either punting as well as running or passing the ball. Most teams had a litany of plays that they might run from a punt formation.[23]

The single-wing melon-shaped ball measures from 28 to 22 in (710 to 560 mm) in circumference, while the modern ball measures approximately 21 in (530 mm)

Prior to 1930, the shape of the football was a prominent oval shape called a prolate spheroid. Due to the shape of the ball, single-wing backs handled the ball more like a basketball, with short tosses and underhand lobs. Gradually, balls were allowed to be elongated enough to produce streamlined passes with a spiral. The spiraled ball could be thrown further with more accuracy, thus increasing the potential for offenses to use the forward pass more frequently.[24]

The single-wing quarterback played a different role than modern-day quarterbacks. While the quarterback may have called the snap count due to his position close to the center of the formation, he may not have called the actual play in the huddle. For much of the history of football, coaches were not allowed to call plays from the sideline. This responsibility may have gone to the team captain. The quarterback was expected to be an excellent blocker at the point of attack. Some playbooks referred to this player as the blocking back. The quarterback also had to handle the ball by faking, handing off, or optioning to other backs.[25]

Modern use

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Although the single-wing has lost much of its popularity since the 1950s, its characteristic features are still prevalent in all levels of modern football. They include pulling guards, double teams, play action passes, laterals, wedge blocking, trap blocking, the sweep, the reverse and the quick kick. Many current offenses, such as the spread option, use single-wing tendencies for running plays, while using wide receivers instead of wingbacks.[26] Once a strong running formation, the single wing has been replaced by formations that facilitate passing, while minimizing the running aspect of the game. Today the single-wing has evolved into what coaches call the spread offense or shotgun, with the emphasis on passing. The most noticeable feature that remains of the powerful Carlisle formation is the long toss from center to the main ball-handler. The main talent and field general has become the quarterback instead of the tailback. The other single-wing backs have moved close to the line of scrimmage and are split further from the main line. Wide receivers are called split-ends, flex ends, slots, and flankers. Also, linemen spacing has increased in distance. Moving offensive players further apart serves the purpose of also spreading the defense. The goal is to make defenses cover the whole field on every play.[27]

The current incarnation of the Wildcat offense, which has been adopted by many college, NFL, and high school teams, uses many elements of the single-wing formation.

Successful teams

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The single-wing has had a successful revival in youth leagues, middle schools, high schools, and some colleges.[28] Here are some examples of single-wing high school teams that have had success all across the country. In 2005, Virginia saw three teams ride the single-wing to the state playoffs. Two of the three teams, Giles High School and Osbourn High School, actually won their division. Giles High School returned to the state championship game in 2006, and also won state championships using the single wing in both 1980 and 2013. In 1998 and 1999, Park View High School in Sterling, Virginia advanced to consecutive state championships using the single wing offense. When Park View coach Mickey Thompson moved to nearby Stone Bridge High School in 2000, he took the single wing with him. As a result, the Bulldogs have won 12 District titles, 9 Region titles and won the 2007, 2020, and 2021 AAA Division 5 State title games. On February 1, 2010, Stone Bridge Offensive Coordinator Matt "Hate-Dog" Griffis was named Head Coach of nearby Broad Run High School. Griffis announced he will be running the Single Wing as well as his hybrid Single Wing formation dubbed the "Griff-Bone". Tower Hill School in Wilmington, Delaware perfected this formation which led to numerous state championships. Warren County High School in Front Royal, Va. also used the single-wing to moderate success.[29] In Louisa County, Va., the local high school has had similar success by running the single-wing formation since 2003.[30]

Colton California has been a consistently successful single-wing team by reaching the state playoffs on six consecutive seasons.[31]

In 1998, The Menominee Maroons won the Michigan high school class BB football championship, and in 2006 and 2007 won the Michigan High School Class B football championship, winning 28 consecutive games over the last 2 years, and reaching the state playoffs for the last 11 years.[32]

In 1971, the Corning High School Cardinals of Corning, California had a 9–0 undefeated season utilizing a balanced single-wing offense under coach Tag McFadden. They were the number one rated school Division 4 in the state and McFadden was garnered coach of year by Cal-Hi Sports.

In 1974 and 1975, St. Mark's School (MA) compiled a 13–1 record running the Princeton Single Wing.

In 1980, Coach Ted Hern brought the single-wing to Moriarty High School, the "Fighting" Pintos made three state championship appearances winning 2 state titles, one undefeated season and suffering only 3 losses in four seasons. Coach Frank Ortiz was an assistant coach in the later seasons.

Since 1985, Santa Rosa High School has used the single-wing formation under Coach Frank Ortiz. The Lions have made the playoffs every year except three, won their district title 17 times, won the New Mexico AA State Championships in 1955 (Under John Salvo) 1993, 1996, 1998, 2007 (Under Frank Ortiz), 2010, 2011,2012, (Under former SRHS Lion Mario Trujillo) and made a total of 17 State Finals appearances.[33]

Xavier High School's (NYC) Head Coach Chris Stevens recently changed the team's offense to the single-wing. In 2007, they went 11–1, and averaged 39 points in the New York Catholic High School Football League A Division. They had two 1,000-yard rushers in Seamus Kelly and Jimmy Kowalski, while both also scored 17 TDs. In the championship game trailing by two scores with less than 8 minutes to play, Xavier scored 31 unanswered points to win their first championship in over 10 years. The following week they beat Fordham Prep 20–14 in the annual "Turkey Bowl", a game that dates back to the late 1800s. Running the single-wing since 2006, they have been at the top of league in rushing. In 2007, they were in the top three rushing and scoring schools in New York. They again won a championship in the New York Catholic High School Football League in 2012 this one coming in the AA division. They averaged 34 points a game scoring 35 or more points 9 times, rushed for 46 touchdowns and 3,700 yards with a 9–2 record.[34]

In 2005, St. Mary's of Lynn in Massachusetts won the D4A Eastern Mass Title following two consecutive division titles with Ed Melanson running the Single Wing. Prior to Coach Melanson installing the Single Wing there in 2002, St. Mary's had not had a winning season since 1977.

In Kansas, Mark Bliss installed the Single Wing offense at Conway Springs High School in 1997, coaching the team to Kansas Class 3A state championships in 1998, 2001, 2002, and 2003. During his seven seasons at Conway Springs, his teams compiled a record of 81–4, including a 62-game winning streak.[35] Conway Springs continues to run the Single Wing offense and added state titles in 2004, 2008, and again in 2011 and are perennial playoffs contenders under Coach Matt Biehler.[36]

In Kansas, Ed Buller created a football dynasty centered around the Single Wing offense. In his 40 years of coaching, which ended in 1984, Buller's only losing season was his first. Buller compiled a record of 335–78–7 and coached the Clyde Bluejays to 10 undefeated seasons along with 39 consecutive winning seasons.[37][38]

In Nebraska Dave Cisar's Screaming Eagle youth football teams have been running the Single Wing offense for 8 seasons. During that time period those teams have gone 78-5 and averaged over 35 points per contest and won two State Titles. He did this with 6 totally different teams in 4 different leagues in various age groups. His teams even used the famous "fullback full spinner series" along with the other traditional Single Wing plays. Coach Cisar published a book "Winning Youth Football a Step by Step Plan" in 2006 to help youth coaches install this "old school" offense.[39]

In Connecticut, Anthony Sagnella runs the single wing with his North Haven High School Team that reached the 2015 Class L state Championship Game and were defeated by New Caanan, 42–35.[40] Tailback Mike Montano was an All-State Selection as a RB with over 1800 Rushing yards and 30 TDs. More recently, Sagnella won back-to-back CIAC Class MM State Championships running the single wing in 2022 and 2023 with Adam Pandolfi at Taiback.[41]

In Colorado, Brian Christensen's Akron Rams (Class 1A) high school football team has made running the Single Wing offense a local tradition. Akron won back-to-back undefeated state championships in 2001 and 2002. They also took home State titles in 2006, 2007, and 2008.[42] Christensen's teams have made the playoffs every year since 1996 and have made it to at least the semi-finals of the state playoffs all but 4 times within that span. The Akron Rams are renowned for their "exceptional prowess executing the single-wing offense."[43] One coach characterized Akron's single-wing attack as, "A Chinese fire-drill in the backfield every single play. You have to play mistake-free defense or Akron's single-wing attack will burn you."[44] Christensen took over the Akron program in 1996, his overall record at Akron is: 163–31 (.841 winning percentage).

In Iowa, Bob Howard, the coach of the Sigourney-Keota Savage Cobras (2A), has led the Cobras to three state championships (1995, 2001, 2005), using the single-wing offense. He used the offense when he first started coaching at Sigourney in the 1970s, before Sigourney and Keota conjoined teams. In 2005 the vaulted Cobra single-wing offense set a new state record for points in a season with 696, 537 of which coming in the nine regular season games, and in 2007 the Cobras set a new state rushing record racking up 718 yards in a single game.[citation needed] Howard left Sigourney-Keota after the 2006 season to become the new head coach at Webster City High School and was charged with rebuilding a once-proud program that hadn't won over six games or made the Class 3A playoffs since 1996. Installing his vaunted single-wing offense, in 2007 the Lynx led District 2 in rushing by gaining over 2,200 yards on the ground despite their overall record of 3–6. However, in 2008, the Lynx not only made the playoffs for the first time in 12 years, but also finished the season with a final record of 7–4. Tailback John Hill rushed for 1,420 yards—the sixth highest total in school history.

On September 21, 2008, the Miami Dolphins used a version of the single-wing offense (specifically the Wildcat offense) against the New England Patriots on six plays, which produced five touchdowns (four rushing and one passing) in a 38–13 upset victory,[45] after its successful adoption on the college and high school level by several teams.

The 1957 Cass Township, exclusively used single-wing offense. The Cass (Schuylkill County) PA Condors rolled through a season unbeaten, untied, and unscored upon over 50 years ago, going 9–0 in the regular season before defeating Shamokin, 2–0, in a special playoff for the Eastern Conference Southern Division title for a season of 10–0. They are the only high school football team in Pennsylvania that can lay claim to that feat. The late Coach Pat Droskinis, listed in the PA Sports Hall of Fame, coached them and led by a strong 4–5–2 defense that featured All-State ends in 6-foot-3 Russ Frantz and 6-2 Harry Butsko, the Cass Twp Condors blanked Minersville, Nescopeck, West Mahanoy Township, Schuylkill Haven, Ashland, Blythe Township, Mahanoy Township, Lansford and Saint Clair, and then Shamokin in the playoff game (2–0).

In Pittsburgh, Coach Pete Dimperio ran the single wing at Westinghouse High School from 1946 to this retirement in 1966. Westinghouse played in the City League championship game every one of those 21 years and they won 17 times. Coach Dimperio's league play record was a phenomenal 118–5–1 and (158–26–1 overall). His Bulldog teams ran the single-wing formation with mostly buck-lateral and fullback spinner plays. He did not use a multitude of plays, rather he won because his players were so well-schooled and disciplined they were all but unstoppable. When Coach Dimperio started at Westinghouse the student body was mostly the children of Italian immigrants, but by the late 1950s it was almost 100% African American. It didn't matter to Coach Dimperio; he and his single wing won nonetheless. Being from a relatively poor inner city school, Westinghouse usually had no assistant coaches and rarely suited up more than 40 players. Yet, in exhibition games against some of the biggest suburban schools, Westinghouse usually won. Once in an exhibition game against South Hills Catholic which suited up 90 players and had five coaches, Coach Dimperio's deceptive single wing made mincemeat of the heavier and slow opponent to the point where one of the South Hills Catholic coaches remarked, "they (the Westinghouse backs) ran down the field so many times it looked like track practice." Coach Dimperio was inducted into the Pennsylvania Sports Hall of Fame in 1964.

Keith W. Piper, head coach at Denison University (Ohio) had played center in the single wing in high school and at Baldwin-Wallace University, and he went against trends by using that offense for three seasons at Denison in the early 1960s. After the Big Red went 0–8–1 in 1977, he returned to the single wing for good because tailback Clay Sampson offered a dual threat. He became the only player in Division III history to rush for 3,000 yards and pass for 3,000 in a career when he totaled 6,920 yards for Denison from 1977 to '80. In 1985, Piper's single wing offense featured a potent mix of speed, athleticism and experience that produced an average victory margin of 29.6 points. That year Denison set nine school season team records—including most total yards of offense (4,330), most rushing yards (3,510) and most points (377)—and set five single game school marks.[46]

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Single-wing formation

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The single-wing formation is an unbalanced offensive alignment in , characterized by a line with five linemen shifted toward the strong side, accompanied by four backs positioned behind the line—including a tailback receiving a direct snap from several yards deep, a fullback, a blocking back (often functioning as a non-throwing ), and a wingback aligned to the strong side for blocking and misdirection. This setup emphasizes power running, double-team blocks, and trick plays to confuse defenses, with the tailback serving as the primary ball carrier capable of running, passing, or kicking. Developed by coach Glenn "Pop" Warner in 1907 at the Carlisle Indian Industrial School in Pennsylvania, the formation—initially dubbed the "Carlisle formation"—emerged shortly after the legalization of the forward pass in 1906, allowing for innovative plays that integrated running, passing, and kicking without telegraphing intent. Warner refined it during his tenures at the University of Pittsburgh and Stanford University, where it powered dominant teams through the 1910s and 1920s, including undefeated seasons and national championships. The formation's deceptive nature and emphasis on speed and power were showcased by stars like Jim Thorpe at Carlisle, contributing to its rapid adoption across college football. By the 1930s and 1940s, the single-wing became the dominant offense in major college programs, employed by coaches such as Knute Rockne at Notre Dame, Bob Neyland at Tennessee, and Fritz Crisler at Michigan, as well as in the early NFL by the Chicago Bears under George Halas. It produced legendary runners like Red Grange at Illinois and Heisman Trophy winner Dick Kazmaier at Princeton, while influencing professional play until the mid-20th century. However, its decline began in the 1940s with the rise of the T-formation, which offered greater passing efficiency and simplicity against evolving defenses, exemplified by the Bears' 1940 NFL championship win using the T under quarterback Sid Luckman. Though largely phased out at higher levels by the — with Princeton as the last major college holdout in —the single-wing persists in high school, youth, and some small college programs for its run-heavy effectiveness and suitability for undersized teams with strong linemen. Modern adaptations, such as the wing-T offense, trace their to Warner's innovations, blending single-wing principles with contemporary schemes to counter spread defenses.

Description

Player Positions

The single-wing formation employs four backfield players whose roles are designed to facilitate a run-heavy offense through direct snaps, misdirection, and blocking support. The tailback, aligned deep behind the center in a shotgun-like position, receives the direct snap and serves as the primary ball carrier, executing cuts and runs through gaps in the offensive line created by blockers. The fullback positions behind or adjacent to the tailback, primarily functioning as a lead blocker to clear paths for the tailback while also handling short-yardage runs when needed. The wingback aligns offset to the strong side, typically diagonally outside the end, offering versatility as a blocker for sweeps or as a receiver of handoffs for perimeter plays, which helps stretch the defense horizontally. The operates as a blocking back near the , delivering lead blocks on interior runs or occasional handoffs, thereby prioritizing physicality over traditional passing duties. The offensive line consists of five linemen in an unbalanced configuration to emphasize power on one side, including a who snaps the ball directly to the tailback, two guards (a quick guard on the weak side for pulling duties and a power guard on the strong side for down blocks), two tackles (inside for and outside for edge support), and often a aligned on the strong side to bolster blocking angles. Traditional implementations strengthen the right side of the line to align with the wingback's offset positioning, enhancing the formation's deceptive run execution.

Alignment and Setup

The single-wing formation features an unbalanced offensive line, typically skewed to the right side of the center to create numerical superiority and facilitate blocking schemes on that strong side. In this setup, the center is positioned directly over the ball, with the left tackle and left guard aligned to the immediate left of the center, the right guard immediately to the right of the center, followed by the right tackle and right end further to the right, often with tighter splits to emphasize power. This imbalance, pioneered by coach in the early 1900s, shifts the line's strength away from the weak side, allowing for deceptive pulls and double-team blocks without alerting the defense to the play direction. Behind the line, the backfield is arranged with the tailback positioned approximately seven yards deep directly behind or slightly offset from , serving as the primary ball recipient via a direct snap from , which eliminates a traditional under-center quarterback. The fullback aligns about one yard shallower than the tailback, typically behind the inside guard on the strong side, while the quarterback (or blocking back) sets up behind the outside guard or tackle, and the wingback is offset 1-2 yards behind the and outside the end on the strong side, often at a 45-degree angle for added versatility. This configuration draws from the player positions as foundational elements, ensuring a compact yet flexible arrangement. The spatial clustering of the backs on the strong side—tailback deep in the center, fullback and quarterback nearer the line, and wingback flanking the end—generates both power through concentrated personnel and deception by concealing the intended play side amid the unbalanced geometry. This setup enables quick pre-snap shifts or motions, as the grouped backs can realign rapidly to mask intentions, a hallmark of the formation's design for misdirection without relying on a balanced look. In textual representation of a typical diagram (strong right), the line might appear as: weak side end (absent or minimal), left tackle (LT), left guard (LG), center (C), right guard (RG), right tackle (RT), right end (RE); backfield with wingback (WB) outside RE, quarterback (QB) behind RT, fullback (FB) behind RG, tailback (TB) deep behind C.

History

Origins and Early Development

The single-wing formation was invented by coach Glenn "Pop" Warner at the in 1907, in direct response to significant rule changes implemented that year by the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States (precursor to the NCAA). These reforms, prompted by a surge in football-related fatalities in 1905, banned dangerous mass-momentum plays such as the , which had allowed interlocking groups of players to charge en masse and overwhelm defenses. Warner designed the formation, initially known as the "Carlisle Formation," to exploit the new rules emphasizing open play, individual skill, and reduced physical piling, while countering the brute-force tactics still favored by larger, more powerful teams. Early adaptations of the single-wing focused on a direct snap from to the tailback positioned several yards behind the line, enabling quick bursts of speed and power running that bypassed the banned formations. This setup unbalanced the offensive line to one side, creating mismatches and deceptive angles for the tailback to receive the ball and charge forward, often supported by pulling guards and wingbacks providing interference. The formation's emphasis on versatility allowed Carlisle's smaller, more agile players to outmaneuver heavier opponents, marking a shift toward over sheer mass in early 20th-century football. The formation's first notable implementations came during Carlisle's 1907 season, where it powered upsets against elite programs, including a 23-15 victory over Harvard on and a 26-6 win against the on October 26. These successes, achieved despite Carlisle's underdog status against physically superior foes, demonstrated the single-wing's effectiveness in leveling the playing field and drew widespread attention from coaches nationwide. By the early , elements of the formation had spread to other college programs, influencing offensive designs amid ongoing rule evolutions that further legalized the forward pass and expanded the neutral zone. Native American players like , who joined the team in 1907, contributed to refining its speed-oriented elements through their exceptional athleticism.

Prominent Coaches and Teams

, head coach of Notre Dame from 1918 to 1930, adopted and refined the single-wing formation in the , emphasizing speed, deception through shifts, and precise execution to maximize the backfield's versatility. His implementation featured the renowned "," a balanced-line variant of the single wing that allowed for quick lateral movements and unbalanced the defense. This approach powered the 1924 team's undefeated 10-0 season, highlighted by the "Four Horsemen" backfield—quarterback , halfbacks Don Miller and , and fullback —who executed deceptive runs and passes with remarkable efficiency. A pivotal demonstration of the formation's potency occurred in the October 18, 1924, game against at New York City's , where Notre Dame's single-wing attack overwhelmed the Cadets in a 13-7 victory before 60,000 spectators. The Four Horsemen's synchronized shifts and rapid ball-handling disrupted 's defense, with Stuhldreher completing key passes and the backs combining for crucial ground gains that secured the win and elevated the single wing's national profile. Rockne's innovations, including the pre-snap shift, not only led to multiple undefeated campaigns but also influenced generations of coaches by showcasing the formation's potential for explosive, misdirection-based plays. Glenn "Pop" Warner, a pioneering architect of the single wing during his earlier tenures at Carlisle and , continued its evolution at Stanford from 1924 to 1932, integrating elements of power and misdirection suited to West Coast play. His Stanford teams employed the single wing's and tailback snaps to generate consistent yardage, culminating in three Rose Bowl appearances and a 71-17-8 overall record. A notable clash came in the 1925 Rose Bowl against Rockne's Notre Dame, where Warner's wingback adaptations challenged the Irish's defense, though Stanford fell 27-10; this matchup underscored the formation's adaptability and helped popularize its deceptive elements nationwide. Jock Sutherland elevated the single wing to new heights of power and precision at the from 1924 to 1938, developing the "Sutherland single wing" that prioritized crushing blocks and straight-ahead runs behind a dominant line. His Panthers amassed a 144-28-14 record, including national championships in 1936 and 1937, by leveraging the formation's tailback as a workhorse runner supported by wingback pulls and fullback leads for interior power plays. Sutherland's emphasis on fundamentals—relentless blocking and quick ball distribution—made a , with the single wing's unbalanced setup allowing for unstoppable off-tackle assaults that overwhelmed opponents. In the professional ranks, the single wing transitioned to the NFL during the 1930s and early 1940s, with early adopters like George Halas's employing the single-wing offense in the early 1930s to exploit runners like and , achieving NFL championships in 1932 and 1933 through its deceptive runs and occasional passes. Similarly, the under coach employed the single wing in the early 1940s, building momentum with tailback passers like before evolving toward the ; this foundation contributed to their Eastern Division titles from 1947 to 1949 and back-to-back NFL championships in 1948 and 1949.

Decline and Transition

The single-wing formation's decline began in the early , driven by key rule changes that emphasized the forward pass and facilitated greater player specialization. In 1933, the legalized forward passes thrown from anywhere behind the , removing the previous five-yard restriction and encouraging aerial attacks that exposed the formation's run-heavy limitations. Although unlimited substitutions were not fully implemented until 1945 to support two-platoon systems, the passing rule shift alone prompted offenses to diversify beyond the single-wing's power-running focus. Tactical evolutions further eroded the single-wing's dominance, as its predictable, unbalanced backfield became vulnerable to sophisticated defenses. The formation's emphasis on massed power plays struggled against improving defensive schemes, particularly as passing gained traction; end revolutionized the position in the late 1930s, setting records with 99 receptions over his career and demonstrating how single-wing teams could integrate passes but often lacked the balance of newer setups. Hutson's success, including leading the league in receiving yards seven times from 1935 to 1945, underscored the single-wing's drawbacks in an era where offenses increasingly balanced run and pass to exploit mismatches. By the 1940s, the single-wing saw widespread abandonment at both college and professional levels, with most teams transitioning to T-formation variants by the decade's end. Army, under coach Earl "Red" Blaik, represented one of the last major college programs to rely on it briefly before switching to the T in 1943, contributing to their national championships in 1944–1946 but signaling the formation's obsolescence. In the pros, only a few holdouts like the clung to it into the late 1940s, but by the 1950s, it had largely vanished from high-level play in favor of more versatile schemes. A prominent example of this transition was Oklahoma's adoption of the split-T under Bud Wilkinson starting in 1947, which offered enhanced running flexibility and misdirection compared to the rigid single-wing alignments. Wilkinson's Sooners used the split-T to achieve a 31-game winning streak from 1948 to 1950, illustrating how such evolutions prioritized quarterback mobility and balanced attacks, hastening the single-wing's fade from prominence.

Offensive Strategies

Core Plays and Tactics

The single-wing formation's core plays revolved around powerful running schemes executed with misdirection and speed, emphasizing the tailback as the primary ball carrier who received a direct snap from approximately seven yards deep. This direct snap allowed for quick starts, bypassing the quarterback under to accelerate the play's initiation and exploit defensive alignments. The , with extra blockers shifted to one side, facilitated overload blocking schemes that outnumbered defenders on the strong side, creating angles for runs. Key running plays included the power sweep, where the tailback received the snap and followed lead blocks from the wingback and pulling guards to the strong side, aiming to stretch the defense horizontally before cutting upfield. The wingback's lead block was crucial, often sealing the edge while the tailback read the for a bounce or cutback. Fullback plunges off-tackle provided a complementary power option, with the fullback diving through the guard-tackle gap after receiving a handoff or direct snap, supported by double-team blocks to drive defenders back. These plunges relied on the fullback's downhill and the quarterback's trap blocking from the weak side to neutralize pursuit. Misdirection was central to the offense, exemplified by the tailback spinner—a deceptive series where the fullback or tailback spun in the backfield to fake a handoff, freezing linebackers while the actual carrier (often the tailback) executed a sweep or counter. In this tactic, the tailback had options to keep the ball on an inside run, pitch to the wingback for a reverse, or hand off to the fullback, with the quarterback's 360-degree spin concealing the exchange. Backfield shifts, such as motion by the wingback or halfback, further confused defenses by simulating multiple threats before the snap. Short passes from the tailback added variety, typically quick slants or screens to the wingback, thrown after faking a run to draw defenders in. Typical play packages consisted of 3-4 core schemes per series, rotating between sweeps, plunges, and spinners to maintain unpredictability, with the offense prioritizing the backs' speed and power over extended passing routes. The , positioned as a blocking back, focused on trap blocks or lead pulls to protect the runner, enhancing the formation's reliance on ground control.

Strengths and Weaknesses

The single-wing formation's primary strength lay in its unbalanced offensive line, which positioned both tackles on the strong side to create numerical advantages at the point of attack, enabling superior run blocking through double-team schemes and trap plays that overwhelmed individual defenders. This setup, combined with the clustering of three backs behind the line, facilitated misdirection tactics such as the buck-lateral series and fullback spinner, which deceived defenses by disguising the ball carrier and exploiting gaps created by pulling linemen. In short-yardage situations, the formation's power-oriented design proved particularly effective against stacked defenses, allowing teams to generate consistent yardage with direct snaps to the tailback or fullback. During the through , the single-wing thrived in an era of limited passing rules and capabilities, where offenses typically relied on running plays for approximately 70% of , leveraging the formation's run-heavy emphasis to control the game's tempo and produce high-profile rushers like and . However, the formation's run-centric structure left it vulnerable to pass rushes, as the offered no dedicated protection for the tailback, who often faced immediate without specialized blocking assignments. Passing options were inherently limited, with the tailback serving as the primary thrower in a "triple-threat" —running, passing, and punting—but lacking the drop-back or receiver routes of balanced sets, which restricted deep threats and aerial versatility. Additionally, post-1933 substitution rules, which curtailed frequent player changes until further in the 1940s, demanded an exceptionally versatile tailback capable of handling multiple s without relief, straining team depth and adaptability. The single-wing dominated pre-1940 offenses due to its alignment with run-dominant strategies and defensive schemes of the time, but it faltered thereafter as the T-formation's introduction enabled better passing protection and quicker releases, aligning with rule changes that encouraged aerial attacks and free substitution by the mid-1940s.

Variations

Double Wing

The double wing formation serves as a symmetrical of the single-wing, positioning two wingbacks—one aligned on each side of the offensive line—to create equilibrium across the field. This configuration can employ a balanced or of linemen, with the center snapping the ball directly to the tailback positioned behind, facilitating broader execution of sweeps and enhanced protection for both flanks against defensive pursuits. Emerging in the , the double wing represented an evolutionary step pioneered by coaches like Glenn "Pop" , who integrated it into Stanford University's offensive schemes during that decade—often with an —predating his formal naming of it as the "Double Wing" in the early . Warner's implementation built on his earlier single-wing innovations, shifting toward dual-wing to amplify misdirection while maintaining the direct-snap core. The formation found particular favor in high school and small college programs throughout the early to mid-20th century, where its balanced appearance introduced heightened deception, confusing defenders on play direction without requiring the personnel depth of larger institutions. This suitability stemmed from its and in resource-limited settings, allowing coaches to exploit mismatches through varied backfield motions. Tactically, the double wing prioritizes outside runs and reverse plays, leveraging the dual backs to pull defenders laterally and create cutback lanes, thereby diminishing reliance on a dominant strong side as seen in the traditional single-wing. These elements emphasize power and misdirection, enabling the tailback to exploit gaps on either flank while the wingbacks provide blocking versatility.

Other Historical Adaptations

During the 1930s, Coach adapted the single-wing formation at the , using an unbalanced line to facilitate double-team and trap blocks while maintaining the formation's deceptive backfield alignment. introduced the as a shift-based adaptation of the single-wing in the 1920s, evolving into the 1930s with a balanced line and four backs aligned in a square behind the center, enabling collective motion to confuse defenders. The shift involved all backs moving simultaneously before the snap, creating opportunities for passing fakes and misdirection plays that masked the true ball carrier, though it prompted a 1927 rules change requiring motion to cease for one second prior to the snap. In professional football, tweaked the single-wing for the during their 1948 NFL Championship season, incorporating reverses and misdirection to emphasize deception while leveraging the formation's unbalanced structure for effective ground gains. This version added elements of motion in the backfield to further disguise plays, contributing to the Eagles' 7-0 victory over the in the title game amid harsh weather conditions. Teams in the and also employed setups in the single-wing, shifting the line to create overload blocking and exploit defensive alignments.

Modern Applications

Revival in Lower Levels

The single-wing formation maintains a niche but dedicated following in high school and football programs throughout the during the 2020s, prized for its straightforward implementation and heavy reliance on running plays that emphasize blocking and physicality over complex passing. This persistence is particularly evident in smaller or rural high school programs, where the offense allows teams to maximize limited athletic talent by focusing on fundamentals rather than requiring speed or arm strength at . In leagues, especially for ages 5 to 9, the single-wing excels at teaching core skills like direct snaps, ball security, and downfield blocking, while minimizing fumbles through reduced handoffs and no pitch sweeps. Its design promotes ball control and fewer turnovers, making it ideal for developing young players without overwhelming them with intricate schemes. High school teams employing the single-wing have achieved notable successes in the 2010s, often leveraging it to overcome undersized rosters and compete against more athletic opponents. For instance, Colorado's Akron Rams established the offense as a program tradition under coach Brian Christensen in the early 2000s, using it to secure multiple state titles, including back-to-back championships in 2007 and 2008. The program has continued to post strong records into the , such as a 54-14 victory over in 2025 and a 62-26 playoff win over Mancos on November 15, 2025. This approach has proven effective for programs facing talent disparities, enabling consistent rushing dominance without needing a traditional drop-back passer. At the college level, full implementations remain rare in Division III. The revival of the single-wing at these levels stems from its strategic advantages in countering prevalent spread offenses, which prioritize passing and , by delivering a grinding, misdirection-based run attack that wears down defenses. It thrives in no-huddle environments, allowing quick snaps and exploiting gaps without relying on precise route timing, and has gained traction amid ongoing talent shortages in high school and youth ranks, where many programs lack the skilled quarterbacks or linemen demanded by air-raid systems. resources and associations continue to promote it through clinics and materials, highlighting its adaptability for undersized or inexperienced squads as of 2025.

Influence on Contemporary Offenses

The single-wing formation's emphasis on direct snaps, unbalanced lines, and misdirection has directly influenced the wildcat offense, particularly as popularized by the under coach . In this scheme, the ball was snapped directly to running back , mimicking the single-wing's tailback role, while employing unbalanced runs to exploit defensive alignments and create deception. This approach allowed the Dolphins to achieve a league-leading 10 wins that season, revitalizing interest in archaic elements for modern unpredictability. In , option offenses such as Navy's flexbone system trace conceptual roots to the single-wing's misdirection and run-heavy principles, adapted through intermediate formations like the wing-T and wishbone. The flexbone, refined by coaches like Paul Johnson during his tenure at from 2007 to 2014, incorporates triple-option reads and direct handoffs that echo the single-wing's emphasis on mobility and unbalanced blocking to force defensive choices. This lineage has enabled service academies to sustain competitive rushing attacks against spread defenses, with Navy averaging over 350 rushing yards per game in Johnson's final seasons. Similarly, spread-option hybrids in during the 2010s and 2020s blend single-wing misdirection with spreads, as seen in schemes that use direct snaps to backs for option reads while stretching the field horizontally. These adaptations, often termed "spread single-wing," enhance (RPO) plays by layering fakes and unbalanced pulls to confuse linebackers. The broader impact of single-wing tactics persists in contemporary RPO strategies across and levels, where misdirection elements like fake handoffs and unbalanced shifts force defenses into reactive alignments. from recent seasons highlight the efficacy of these integrations, with RPO usage rising to account for a significant portion of offensive snaps, enabling teams to sustain drives through layered deception inherited from the formation's core principles.

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