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The Spitting Image
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The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory and the Legacy of Vietnam is a 1998 book by Vietnam veteran and sociology professor Jerry Lembcke. The book is an analysis of the widely believed narrative that American soldiers were spat upon and insulted by anti-war protesters upon returning home from the Vietnam War.[1] The book examines the origin of the earliest stories; the popularization of the "spat-upon image" through Hollywood films and other media, and the role of print news media in perpetuating the now iconic image through which the history of the war and anti-war movement has come to be represented.

Key Information

Lembcke contrasts the absence of credible evidence of spitting by anti-war activists with the large body of evidence showing a mutually supportive, empathetic relationship between veterans and anti-war forces. The book also documents efforts of the Nixon Administration to drive a wedge between military service members and the anti-war movement by portraying democratic dissent as a betrayal of the troops. Lembcke equates this disparagement of the anti-war movement and veterans with the similar stab-in-the-back myth propagated by Germany and France after their war defeats, as an alibi for why they lost the war.[2] Lembcke details the resurrection of the myth of the spat-upon veteran during subsequent Gulf War efforts as a way to silence public dissent.

Origins

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A persistent but unfounded criticism leveled against those who protested in opposition to the Vietnam War is that they spat upon and otherwise derided returning soldiers, calling them "baby-killers". During the late 1980s and early 1990s, years after the Vietnam War ended, the proliferation of these spitting stories increased greatly. As both a Vietnam veteran and a member of the anti-war movement, Lembcke knew this criticism ran counter to what he personally experienced and witnessed. To the contrary, one of the hallmarks of the period's anti-war movement was its support for the troops in the field and the affiliation of many returning veterans with the movement. Lembcke was motivated to look further into the truth and origins of this spat-upon veteran myth, and the contradiction between historical fact and popular collective memory. Other observers had already noticed the proliferation of stories and questioned whether the spitting stories even made sense. In 1987, columnist Bob Greene noted:

Even during the most fervent days of anti-war protest, it seemed that it was not the soldiers whom protesters were maligning. It was the leaders of government, and the top generals—at least, that is how it seemed in memory. One of the most popular chants during the anti-war marches was, "Stop the war in Vietnam, bring the boys home." You heard that at every peace rally in America. "Bring the boys home." That was the message. Also, when one thought realistically about the image of what was supposed to have happened, it seemed questionable. So-called "hippies," no matter what else one may have felt about them, were not the most macho people in the world. Picture a burly member of the Green Berets, in full uniform, walking through an airport. Now think of a "hippie" crossing his path. Would the hippie have the nerve to spit on the soldier? And if the hippie did, would the soldier—fresh from facing enemy troops in the jungles of Vietnam—just stand there and take it?

By 1992, the Director of the Connelly Library and curator of the Vietnam War Collection at LaSalle University listed the spitting myth as one of the "Top Six Myths" from the Vietnam era, and observed the myth "derives from the mythopoeic belief that returning GIs were routinely spat upon at some time during their repatriation to the USA. This particular round of tales has become so commonplace as to be treated reverently even among otherwise wisely observant veterans."[3] In 1994, scholar Paul Rogat Loeb wrote, "to consider spitting on soldiers as even remotely representative of the activist response is to validate a lie", and noted that myths like that of anti-war activists spitting on soldiers have rewritten or "erased history".[4] An academic study into the making and shaping of a collective memory found that evidence of antiwar activists targeting troops was virtually nonexistent. Instead, it found popular memory was manipulated by national security elites and a complicit news media by frequently labeling resistors to U.S. war efforts as "anti-troop".[5] As observed by Clarence Page after interviewing Lembcke and Greene, "the stories have become so widely believed, despite a remarkable lack of witnesses or evidence, that ironically the burden of proof now falls on the accused, the protesters; not their accusers, the veterans. Antiwar protesters must prove the episodes didn't happen, instead of the veterans having to prove they did."[6]

Given this complete lack of evidence that spitting occurred, but acknowledging that it is impossible to prove something never happened, Lembcke set out:[7]: 4–5 

to show how it is possible for a large number of people to believe that Vietnam veterans were spat upon when there is no evidence that they were. In effect, my strategy was to set aside the question of whether or not such acts occurred and to show why even if they did not occur it is understandable that the image of the spat-upon veteran has become widely accepted. Indeed, given the manipulation of information and images that began with the Nixon administration and continued at the hands of filmmakers and the news media during the 1970s and 1980s, it would be remarkable if a majority of Americans had not come to believe that Vietnam veterans were abused by the anti-war movement.

Synopsis

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At the time he wrote The Spitting Image, Lembcke had not found a single substantiated media report to support the now common claims of spitting. He theorizes that the reported "spitting on soldiers" scenario was a mythical projection by those who felt "spat upon" by an American society tired of the war; an image which was then used to discredit future anti-war activism and serve political interests. He suggests that the manufactured images of pro-war antipathy against anti-war protesters also helped contribute to the myth. Lembcke asserts that memories of being verbally and physically assaulted by anti-war protesters were largely conjured, noting that not even one case could be reliably documented. He further suggests the "baby-killer" and "murderer" components of the myth may have been reinforced, in part, by the common chants by protesters aimed at President Lyndon Baines Johnson, like "Hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids did you kill today?"

The Spitting Image asserts that the image of abuse of soldiers by anti-war demonstrators only really became ingrained in the American consciousness years after the war had come to a close. Lembcke attributes part of the legend's growth to films relating to Vietnam, notably First Blood, in which a "spat-upon veteran" image is popularized. He writes that the myth of the spat-upon veteran was later revived by President George H. W. Bush as a way to help suppress dissent when selling the Gulf War to the American people. Lembcke believes that resurrection of the myth was useful in promoting the yellow ribbon Support our Troops campaign, as it implies that for one to support the troops, one must also support the war. It conflates the ideas of anti-war sentiment and anti-troop sentiment, despite a common anti-war chant being "Support the Troops: Bring them Home!"

The "spat-upon veteran" meme became so pervasive that some found it hard not to believe. In 1989, Bob Greene's book Homecoming reprinted letters he had solicited, asking to hear from veterans if they had been spat upon.[6] Greene's book includes 63 alleged accounts involving spitting, and 69 accounts from veterans who do not believe anyone was spat upon after returning from Vietnam, among other stories. Greene admits he couldn't validate the authenticity of the accounts in the letters he received, but he did believe spitting must have occurred, stating, "There were simply too many letters, going into too fine a detail, to deny the fact." Greene concluded, "I think you will agree, after reading the letters, that even if several should prove to be not what they appear to be, that does not detract from the overall story that is being told."[8] "Greene was too willing to suspend disbelief", says Lembcke, who cited Greene's book as an example of how prolific the stories had become and also for the patterns that appeared in them.[7]: 80  Lembke said, "These stories have to be taken very seriously, but as historical evidence they are problematic. In the first place, stories of this type didn't surface until about ten years after the end of the war. If the incidents occurred when the story tellers say they did, in the closing years of the war, why is there no evidence for that? Moreover, many of the stories have elements of such exaggeration that one has to question the veracity of the entire account."[9]

Lembcke points out that there were several newspaper accounts of pro-war demonstrators spitting on anti-war demonstrators and suggests that these oral accounts could easily have been reinterpreted and inverted and made into stories about activists spitting on veterans.[9] He highlights the contradictions between the collective memory of today and contemporaneous historical records, like the results from a 1971 poll showing over 94% of returning Vietnam soldiers received a "friendly" welcome.[7][failed verification] Lembcke also notes how it was older vets from previous wars who most often scorned the returning Vietnam Vets; in 1978 the Vietnam Veterans of America vowed in its founding principle: "Never again will one generation of veterans abandon another".[10]

In The Spitting Image, Lembcke acknowledges that he cannot prove the negative—that no Vietnam veteran was ever spat on—saying it is hard to imagine there not being expressions of hostility between veterans and activists.[11] "I cannot, of course, prove to anyone's satisfaction that spitting incidents like these did not happen. Indeed, it seems likely to me that it probably did happen to some veteran, some time, some place. But while I cannot prove the negative, I can prove the positive: I can show what did happen during those years and that that historical record makes it highly unlikely that the alleged acts of spitting occurred in the number and manner that is now widely believed."[9]

Reception and influence

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Reviews

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A review published in the Los Angeles Times reads: "The image is ingrained: A Vietnam veteran, arriving home from the war, gets off a plane only to be greeted by an angry mob of antiwar protesters yelling, 'Murderer!' and 'Baby killer!' Then out of the crowd comes someone who spits in the veteran's face. The only problem, according to Jerry Lembcke, is that no such incident has ever been documented. It is instead, says Lembcke, a kind of urban myth that reflects our lingering national confusion over the war."[7]

A review published in The Berkshire Eagle called the book "Well-argued and documented."[7] Maurice Isserman of the Chicago Tribune wrote: "The myth of the spat-upon veteran is not only bad history, but it has been instrumental in selling the American public on bad policy."[7] A review published in the San Francisco Chronicle argued that "Lembcke builds a compelling case against collective memory by demonstrating that remembrances of Vietnam were almost at direct odds with circumstantial evidence."[7] Peace activist David Dellinger referred to the book as the "best history I have seen on the impact of the war on Americans, both then and now."[7]

Karl Helicher of Library Journal wrote that Lembcke "presents a stunning indictment of this myth, an illusion created, he maintains, by the Nixon-Agnew administration and an unwitting press to attribute America's loss in Vietnam to internal dissension. In fact, the antiwar movement and many veterans were closely aligned, and the only documented incidents show members of the VFW and American Legion spitting on their less successful Vietnam peers. But Lembcke's most controversial conclusion is that posttraumatic stress disorder was as much a political creation—a means of discrediting returning vets who protested the war as unhinged—as it was a medical condition. The image of the psycho-vet was furthered through such Hollywood productions as The Deer Hunter and Coming Home. This forceful investigation challenges the reader to reexamine assumptions about the dark side of American culture that glorifies war more than peace. Highly recommended for large public libraries and for all academic peace studies collections."[12]

Christian G. Appy of The Chronicle of Higher Education wrote that "Lembcke's debunking of the spitting stories is quite persuasive. But he has much broader aims. Not only was there no spitting, he argues, but there was no hostility or tension at all between veterans and protesters. In fact, he characterizes their relationship as 'empathetic and mutually supporting.' ... My own view is that the spitting stories are largely mythic, but that the myth itself reflects the deep anger and animosity that many veterans harbored toward the antiwar movement. Their anger often reflected a sense of class injustice that gave their more privileged peers greater freedom to avoid the war. ... I base my conclusions on extensive interviews I have conducted with Vietnam veterans since the early 1980s. Lembcke, however, gives no credence to the possibility that veterans themselves played a role in creating the myth of antiwar spitters, or that the myth teaches us anything meaningful about the class and wartime experiences of veterans. For him, the myth is almost entirely a product of Hollywood and right-wing politicians."[13]

Mary Carroll of Booklist wrote that Lembcke "makes a strong case that tales of antiwar activists spitting at returning vets are myth. ... He notes that contemporary media, government, and polling data show no evidence of antiwar spitting incidents; the few events reported had supporters of the war targeting opponents. But later studies reported hostility toward veterans; "the spitting image" epitomized that narrative. Similar images were common in post-World War I Germany and France after Indochina; Lembcke suggests the Nixon administration cultivated this notion of betrayal because it stigmatized both the antiwar movement and veterans against the war."[12]

Online debate and investigation

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In 2000,[14] 2004,[15] and again in 2007,[16][17][18][19][20] journalist Jack Shafer rekindled firestorms when he berated news media outlets for uncritically repeating the myth of the spat-upon veteran. Shafer's Slate Magazine online articles on the matter, which frequently cited Lembcke's research, generated enormous feedback; the May 2000 article alone received nearly 300 postings on the subject in just a few days, one of its largest-ever responses.[21]

According to Shafer, the myth persists primarily because:

  1. "Those who didn't go to Vietnam—that being most of us—don't dare contradict the 'experience' of those who did;
  2. The story helps maintain the perfect sense of shame many of us feel about the way we ignored our Vietvets;
  3. The press keeps the story in play by uncritically repeating it, as the Times and U.S. News did;
  4. Because any fool with 33 cents and the gumption to repeat the myth in his letter to the editor can keep it in circulation. Most recent mentions of the spitting protester in Nexis are of this variety."

Shafer acknowledges that it's possible that a Vietnam veteran somewhere might have been spat upon during the war years, and notes that Lembcke concedes as much because nobody can prove something never happened. Shafer announced a challenge to his readers, "Indeed, each time I write about the spit myth, my inbox overflows with e-mail from readers who claim that a spitting protester targeted them while they were in uniform. ... If you can point me to a documented case of a returning Viet vet getting spat upon, please drop a line."

Likewise, Lembcke joined the discussion and also commented on it in the Humanity & Society journal, saying the stories just keep getting better, and asking for any evidence to be raised. The discussions spawned yet another round of more than 60 stories, yet only one was credible.[21]

Northwestern Law School professor James Lindgren also joined the discussions and, after a review of contemporary news sources, found many news accounts from the 1960s and 1970s that discussed spitting incidents against servicemembers, contrary to Lembcke's claims that stories about spitting only began occurring in 1980.[22] Lembcke provided an 18-point response to Lindgren's research, offering rebuttals to most of his claims and expressing interest in one of them.[18][failed verification] A December 27, 1971 CBS Evening News report on veteran Delmar Pickett who said he was spat at in Seattle appeared, according to Lembcke, to have some validity as a claim.[23][24]

Some second-hand news accounts that mention spitting do actually exist, although there has been no evidence to support the narrative that anti-war demonstrators were responsible. Documented accounts exist where the anti-war demonstrators were actually the victims, not the perpetrators.[25] Other commentators have since addressed the myth to various degrees, even referencing the debate spawned by the Slate files.

In his 2009 book War Stories, historian and Vietnam veteran Gary Kulik devoted a whole chapter to the myth of "Spit-upon veterans". He closely examined Greene's book of letters and the Slate files, as well as the research by Lindgren and Lembcke. Kulik noted the contradictory nature of the stories in Greene's book and concluded that Greene arrogantly dismissed the "surprising number" of veterans who "refuse to believe" the spitting stories, and wrote, "Greene was not just credulous, but negligently irresponsible." Kulik also criticized Lindgren's research, writing, "Lindgren's evidence includes only one single first-person ("I was spit upon") account—the stories that are at the heart of Lembcke's book—and it appears the none of the accounts he cites were actually witnessed by a reporter. Moreover, Lindgren does not cite a single case of a Vietnam veteran spit upon as he returned home, and that was the story that would ultimately be repeated and believed." Kulik concluded that the spitting stories were formulaic and unbelievable, and were propagated to serve the political goals of those who wished to vilify the anti-war movement. "The image of 'hippie' men and women hawking up gobs of phlegm to hurl at the ribbons of veterans, as a pervasive and commonplace act, is surely false."[25]

Specialist in civil-military relations and advisor to the National Institute of Military Justice, Diane Mazur, also examined the works by Greene, Lembcke and Lindgren, and concluded: "There is no contemporaneous evidence that Americans who opposed the war expressed those beliefs by spitting on or otherwise assaulting returning Vietnam Veterans. ... The idea, however, that spitting on or mistreating Vietnam veterans was in any way typical or representative of anything in that era is completely false. ... It is by far the most powerful Vietnam War meme—a cultural unit of information passed from one person to another, like a biological gene—because it can be deployed instantly to silence difficult but necessary conversations about the military. For that reason alone the conventional wisdom is important, because it explains much about our civil-military dynamic today. It is also important, however, to understand why that accepted memory is untrue, and who benefits most from keeping it alive. The myth of the spat-upon Vietnam veteran is a difficult one to challenge. ... One intrepid soul, Professor Jerry Lembcke, ... stepped into the fray ... Every time he discusses his findings in a public forum, a hail of angry responses follows, but his explanations and conclusions are compelling and unsettling."[10]

See also

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
was a British satirical television series created by caricaturists Peter Fluck and , featuring grotesque latex puppets with exaggerated physical features to prominent politicians, celebrities, and royals. First broadcast on ITV in February 1984, it ran for 18 series until 1996, drawing peak audiences of over 15 million viewers through its irreverent, often crude depictions that lampooned figures across the without favour. The programme received acclaim for pioneering adult-oriented puppet satire, securing multiple BAFTA Television Awards and Emmy nominations for its topical humour that influenced public perceptions of power during the . Though controversies arose from its unsparing portrayals—such as those of and the royal family—the show's creators emphasized balanced mockery of left and right-wing targets to sustain its edge. A short-lived revival launched on in 2020, attempting to recapture the original's anarchic spirit amid modern sensitivities.

Historical Context of Vietnam War Homecomings

Troop Rotations and Public Sentiment

U.S. forces in operated under an individual rotation policy, requiring most personnel to complete 12-month tours before returning stateside singly or in small groups, rather than as intact units redeploying together. This system, intended to maintain by staggering replacements, resulted in fragmented homecomings without the organized mass arrivals or celebratory parades characteristic of prior conflicts like . Unlike earlier wars, where troops debarked en masse at ports for public welcomes, veterans typically flew commercial charter flights directly to civilian airports, often changing from uniforms to civilian clothes en route to avoid attention. The peak period for these returns aligned with U.S. troop withdrawals from 1969 to 1973, as force levels declined from a high of 543,400 in April 1969 to under 25,000 by December 1972 under the Nixon administration's strategy. Domestic public opinion on the war grew increasingly polarized, with anti-war sentiment surging amid escalating casualties and strategic setbacks. Protests intensified after the , which eroded confidence in U.S. progress, and peaked through events like the October 1969 Moratorium demonstrations involving an estimated two million participants nationwide. By mid-1970, Gallup polling reflected majority opposition, with 56 percent of respondents viewing the decision to send troops as a mistake—a sharp rise from 24 percent in 1965. This shift was driven by factors including draft calls affecting younger demographics, economic costs exceeding $100 billion annually by 1968, and revelations of tactical limitations, fostering a divide between war supporters, often older and conservative, and opponents concentrated among youth and urban liberals. Media reporting on protests amplified perceptions of anti-military animus by emphasizing fringe radical actions over broader peaceful dissent. Coverage of the in , for instance, fixated on clashes between police and demonstrators labeled as "riots," with networks airing footage of rock-throwing and chants decrying the "military-industrial complex," while downplaying mainstream anti-war rallies. Such portrayals, recurrent in depictions of draft-card burnings and campus occupations through 1971, cultivated an image of the movement as dominated by extremists hostile to uniformed service members, even as surveys indicated most differentiated between policy disapproval and personal respect for troops. This selective focus contributed to a cultural narrative of division, where returning soldiers navigated airports and cities amid lingering echoes of protest rhetoric, though large-scale encounters remained logistically improbable due to dispersed arrivals.

Early Reports of Civilian Hostility

In the late , anti-war protests on U.S. college campuses increasingly targeted military recruiters as symbols of the effort, leading to disruptions that constituted early instances of civilian antagonism toward active-duty personnel. Students organized sit-ins, chants, and invasions of placement offices to halt recruiting sessions, viewing recruiters as complicit in the draft and escalation of the conflict. For example, on November 30 at , approximately 200 students created disturbances in the appointments board to prevent military interviews from proceeding. These campus actions, peaking in 1967–1968 amid growing draft resistance, often featured verbal confrontations where protesters shouted accusations against the and those enforcing it, though physical altercations remained limited to shoving or blocking rather than assaults. Such was directed primarily at recruiters and ROTC participants in visible roles, rather than veterans returning home, who demobilized quietly through individual rotations without ceremonial processions that might invite scrutiny. Counterculture rhetoric amplified this sentiment, with some anti-war factions labeling U.S. troops "baby killers" in chants and writings by , portraying soldiers as agents of alleged atrocities and eroding public regard for . While not ubiquitous—appearing on few placards amid broader demands for withdrawal—this language contributed to a cultural disdain that blurred distinctions between critics and personal vilification of personnel, setting a for later anecdotal claims of .

Origins and Publication of the Book

Author Jerry Lembcke's Background

Jerry Lembcke, born June 26, 1943, was drafted into the U.S. Army in 1968 and served in as a Chaplain's Assistant with the 41st Artillery Group until 1969. Following his discharge, Lembcke became active in the , including participation in (VVAW), where he engaged in leafleting and public actions against the conflict as early as fall 1971. His firsthand transition from military service to opposition shaped a perspective critical of narratives portraying veterans as uniformly victimized by domestic dissent, potentially influencing his later analyses of war memory. Lembcke pursued an academic career in sociology, earning a Ph.D. from the in 1978. He joined the faculty at the in , rising to Associate Professor Emeritus of Sociology, with research interests encompassing social movements, , and the cultural legacies of military conflicts. Prior to The Spitting Image, his publications addressed themes of worker organizing and , reflecting a focus on power dynamics and that informed his examination of post-Vietnam myths. As both a combat-zone and VVAW participant, Lembcke's background positions him to challenge mainstream depictions of anti-war , though his activist affiliations introduce a potential ideological lens favoring interpretations that downplay intra- divisions and emphasize media-driven distortions over anecdotal hostilities. This dual identity underscores a motivation rooted in reconciling personal military experience with sociological inquiry into how societal narratives construct victimhood.

Development and Release in 1998

Jerry Lembcke, a U.S. veteran who served in and later earned a Ph.D. in , began developing The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory, and the Legacy of Vietnam in the early 1990s. Motivated by the resurgence of the "" trope during the 1991 —where supporters invoked it to marginalize anti-war voices, as noted in the book's preface—Lembcke undertook systematic archival reviews of period newspapers, conducted interviews with returning veterans, and scrutinized cultural representations of troop homecomings from the late and early 1970s. This multi-year effort aimed to contextualize memory and media narratives surrounding the war's domestic impact. The manuscript was accepted by New York University Press, which released the hardcover edition on July 1, 1998, under 0814751466. At 217 pages, it featured contributions from consulting editor Harvey J. Kaye and drew on Lembcke's academic position at the to frame its inquiry into historical myths. The publication coincided with sustained cultural retrospection on the era, including the 1995 release of , which grossed over $677 million worldwide and portrayed veteran reintegration challenges, alongside journalistic and academic reflections approaching the 23rd anniversary of the . Initial outreach emphasized Lembcke's firsthand veteran experience alongside sociological rigor, marketing the work as an evidence-based challenge to cinematic and anecdotal depictions of anti-veteran hostility in films like Rambo: First Blood Part II (1985) and Born on the Fourth of July (1989).

Core Arguments and Methodology

Thesis on the Spitting Narrative as Myth

Lembcke's central posits that accounts of anti-war protesters on returning veterans constitute a cultural , unsupported by any contemporaneous such as police records, photographic documentation, or arrests at airports and other public venues during the war's end in –1975. He argues that exhaustive searches of period newspapers and official reports yield no verified incidents of such directed at veterans, contrasting sharply with documented cases of pro-war groups on anti-war demonstrators. This narrative, according to Lembcke, originated and proliferated through Nixon administration efforts in the late and early to politically isolate anti-war activists by framing them as betrayers of the troops, thereby fostering division between veterans and protesters to bolster support for the . He traces the motif to rhetoric from figures like , who in publicly accused dissenters of undermining military morale, with the spitting imagery serving as a potent symbol in conservative media to equate opposition with personal hostility toward service members. Lembcke further contends that the endurance of these stories stems from distortions in collective memory, where post-war experiences of trauma, societal rejection, and repeated media reinforcement—such as in films and veteran memoirs from the 1980s onward—generate false recollections conflating general public disdain with specific acts of spitting. He emphasizes that memory's susceptibility to suggestion, particularly among veterans processing reintegration challenges, explains why retrospective testimonies dominate without matching empirical traces from the era.

Analysis of Media and Cultural Influences

Lembcke contends that Hollywood films from the late 1970s onward played a pivotal role in embedding the "spat-upon veteran" trope as a symbol of societal betrayal, even absent literal depictions of . The 1978 film Coming Home, directed by and starring as an anti-war activist and as a paralyzed , portrays the homefront as a site of emotional and moral disloyalty toward returning soldiers, framing the veteran's alienation as stemming from domestic radicalism rather than battlefield realities. This narrative arc, which earned the film Oscars for and , reinforced interpretations of the era as one of national ingratitude, with the activist's symbolizing broader rejection of . Lembcke identifies Coming Home as a foundational text in constructing the betrayed-veteran , influencing subsequent by conflating anti-war sentiment with personal treachery. The Rambo franchise, launched with First Blood in 1982 and continuing through films like Rambo: First Blood Part II (1985), extended this motif by depicting protagonist —a decorated —as enduring persecution from civilian authorities and societal indifference upon returning stateside, evoking the emotional equivalent of . Though these portrayals emphasize physical confrontations and bureaucratic neglect over explicit protester , Lembcke argues they mythologized the as a victim of homefront sabotage, aligning with 1980s cultural shifts toward rehabilitating military honor amid Reagan-era . The series' box-office success—First Blood grossed over $47 million domestically—amplified the imagery of isolated heroism against ungrateful civilians, embedding the betrayal narrative in popular consciousness without reliance on verified historical incidents. In print media, Lembcke traces the narrative's endurance to news features and memoirs that recirculated anecdotal claims of confrontations, often in retrospectives timed to anniversaries or policy debates like the 1991 buildup. Outlets including and regional papers published pieces aggregating unverified stories of s being jeered or spat upon, framing these as emblematic of anti-war excess despite scant contemporaneous police or press records from the 1960s–1970s. Memoirs such as B.G. Burkett's (1998), released contemporaneously with Lembcke's work, cataloged similar uncorroborated episodes, prioritizing emotional testimony over empirical validation to underscore perceived cultural amnesia. Lembcke posits that this media selectivity functioned to reframe Vietnam's defeat not as a strategic or political failure but as a consequence of eroded homefront cohesion, thereby advancing agendas that absolved wartime while vilifying as the causal agent of division. By prioritizing resonant symbols of humiliation—rooted in biblical and historical precedents of as degradation—over documented troop rotations via commercial airports with minimal public fanfare, these influences cultivated a consensus narrative that obscured mutual veteran-activist evident in era-specific records. This causal dynamic, Lembcke maintains, aligned with conservative cultural reclamation efforts, as seen in the 1985 National Salute to Vietnam Veterans parade, which juxtaposed martial pageantry against evoked memories of civilian scorn.

Empirical Evidence Examined

Contemporary News Reports and Absence Thereof

A comprehensive review of major U.S. newspapers and media archives from to 1975, the period encompassing peak troop returns from , reveals no verifiable contemporary reports of anti-war protesters on returning s at s or other public venues. Scholarly searches of databases such as , covering terms like "spit," "," and "" in conjunction with "" or "protester," produced zero matching incidents during this timeframe, despite extensive coverage of anti-war demonstrations and veteran homecomings. This absence persists even in outlets like and , which documented numerous protests but omitted any such targeted hostility toward individual service members. In contrast, media from the era recorded instances of spitting in reversed contexts, where pro-war supporters or bystanders directed aggression toward anti-war activists. For example, during the in , eyewitness accounts and news dispatches described pro-Nixon demonstrators and police allies spitting on peace marchers amid clashes outside the convention hall. Such reports, appearing in real-time in publications like , highlight a pattern of hostility flowing toward protesters rather than from them toward veterans, though these events involved crowds rather than isolated returnees. The logistical structure of veteran returns further undermines the plausibility of widespread spitting incidents. U.S. troops were rotated home individually or in small groups via military flights to West Coast bases like , after which they received vouchers for commercial flights to dispersed destinations across the country, arriving at varied civilian s without or mass assemblies. encouraged or required changing into civilian attire upon stateside arrival—often in base or facilities—to blend into public spaces and minimize visibility, reducing opportunities for coordinated protester encounters. This decentralized process, handling over 500,000 returns annually by 1972 without centralized welcoming events, made systematic targeting improbable amid the era's fragmented travel networks.

Veteran Testimonies and Recollections

Numerous veterans have recounted personal experiences of physical and verbal upon returning home, including incidents of , primarily documented through retrospective memoirs, letters, and oral histories collected in the late 1980s and 1990s. In syndicated columnist Bob Greene's compilation Homecoming: When the Soldiers Returned from , over 80 letters from veterans explicitly described being spat upon at airports or in public spaces shortly after , often by individuals perceived as anti-war activists who also hurled epithets like "baby killer." These accounts typically involved isolated encounters during layovers or travel, with veterans reporting saliva directed at their uniforms or faces amid crowds. Contemporary surveys conducted closer to the war's end, however, indicate lower rates of reported hostility. A 1971 Harris Poll commissioned by the Veterans Administration found that only 1% of Vietnam veterans described their reception by the American public as unfriendly, with 99% reporting favorable treatment from family and friends; spitting was not singled out but encompassed within broader perceptions of public response. Later polls and veteran gatherings in the 1990s and 2000s elicited higher recollections of witnessed or personal incidents, with some informal surveys among veteran groups suggesting 10-20% of respondents claiming direct experience or observation of spitting, though these lacked the rigor of the earlier Harris inquiry and often relied on memory decades after events. Participants in events like the 1971 , organized by , occasionally referenced in their testimonies, including being called derogatory names, but physical acts like were less emphasized amid focus on wartime experiences. Memoirs such as those from individual veterans, including accounts in interviews from 1989, detail similar patterns: sudden, unprovoked by civilians in transit hubs like airports, contributing to a sense of societal rejection. Verification of these testimonies remains challenging due to their anecdotal nature and the passage of time, with potential for memory conflation arising from documented general civilian disdain—such as workplace or social —intensified by post-traumatic stress or reinforced by media portrayals of mistreatment. Empirical reliance on self-reports as data points underscores a pattern of perceived , even as causal factors like isolated agitators or exaggerated recall from trauma complicate attribution to organized anti-war efforts.

Criticisms and Debates

Challenges to Lembcke's Claims

Critics of Lembcke's work have highlighted its heavy dependence on the absence of contemporaneous media reports as disproof of widespread spitting incidents, arguing that this approach treats lack of documentation as conclusive evidence of non-occurrence. During the Vietnam era, a period of intense media alignment with anti-war perspectives, individual altercations at airports or bus stations—often involving isolated veterans reluctant to seek attention amid broader public antagonism—likely evaded journalistic coverage or were deemed insufficiently newsworthy for national outlets sympathetic to protesters. Lembcke's methodology has also drawn scrutiny for marginalizing oral histories and firsthand accounts, which form a body of consistent, if anecdotal, testimonies from non-academic collections. Detailed recollections, such as those from Mike Borah and Tom Huis in the Grand Valley State University Veterans History , describe specific encounters upon return, challenging the portrayal of these as fabricated or PTSD-induced false memories. By prioritizing archival silences over such corroborative narratives without rigorous case-by-case validation, Lembcke's analysis risks underweighting experiential data that aligns across disparate sources like memoirs and support networks. Concerns over confirmation bias stem from Lembcke's activist background, including his affiliation with , which may have inclined his research toward narratives absolving the of intra-left tensions with service members. Detractors contend that this alignment influenced source selection, favoring interpretations that downplay veteran-protester frictions in favor of a unified opposition to the war, potentially overlooking evidence of selective reporting or minimized conflicts within progressive circles.

Broader Interpretations of Anti-War Activism

The exerted significant public pressure that contributed to the U.S. decision to withdraw combat troops from by 1973, as declining domestic support amid mounting casualties and protests constrained presidential options and facilitated negotiations leading to the on January 27, 1973. Historians note that this shift in opinion, amplified by media coverage of demonstrations and events like the 1968 , helped avert further escalation and is credited with saving American lives by hastening de-escalation, though the movement's influence was one factor among strategic failures and diplomatic imperatives. Such focused on critiquing policy failures rather than individual soldiers, aligning with first-hand veteran testimonies that distinguished between opposition to the war and personal animosity toward troops. However, radical factions within the movement, such as the , employed inflammatory rhetoric portraying U.S. troops as complicit in imperialist aggression, which some analysts argue contributed to a dehumanizing that blurred lines between policy critique and hostility toward service members. The group's manifestos and actions, including bombings targeting military-related symbols, framed soldiers as extensions of an oppressive system, potentially inciting confrontational encounters at bases where protesters clashed with personnel, as documented in contemporaneous reports of disruptions at facilities like Fort Bragg. This fringe element's emphasis on revolutionary violence alienated moderates and fueled perceptions of the broader movement as endorsing domestic antagonism, though mainstream organizers distanced themselves from such extremism. Vietnam veterans exhibited divided attitudes toward anti-war activism, with empirical surveys revealing no unified stance: a 2025 poll found 46% of veterans viewed the war as unjustified, reflecting sympathy for protesters' policy critiques, while others reported feelings of betrayal from perceived domestic rejection. Organizations like (VVAW), founded in 1967, drew thousands of participants who testified against the war's conduct, as in the 1971 , yet countervailing sentiments persisted among those who associated activism with eroded public support for troops returning home. This schism underscores causal tensions in protester-veteran interactions, where constructive dialogue coexisted with instances of alienation driven by radical overtones and media portrayals.

Reception and Impact

Academic and Scholarly Reviews

Scholars in history and sociology have generally commended Jerry Lembcke's The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory, and the Legacy of Vietnam (1998) for its rigorous archival investigation into the cultural construction of Vietnam War memory, particularly the narrative of anti-war protesters spitting on returning veterans. Marita Sturken, in her review for the American Historical Review, highlighted the book's contribution to understanding how media portrayals and cinematic tropes, such as those in films like Coming Home (1978), perpetuated symbolic rather than literal accounts of veteran mistreatment, emphasizing Lembcke's analysis of memory as a socially constructed process. Similarly, the H-Net review praised Lembcke's methodological innovation in tracing the spitting motif's emergence through newspapers, veterans' memoirs, and popular culture from the late 1970s onward, arguing it effectively demonstrates the absence of contemporaneous evidence for widespread incidents. Critiques from military historians have focused on Lembcke's interpretive framework, contending that it may underemphasize documented instances of verbal harassment and social experienced by s, even if physical remains unverified in primary sources. Mark D. Van Ells, reviewing for the Journal of , noted that while Lembcke's debunking of the spitting image as a post-war is compelling, the work selectively prioritizes over oral histories and personal testimonies that convey real alienation, potentially minimizing the causal role of anti-war in trauma. Thomas D. Beamish, in Contemporary Sociology, acknowledged the archival depth but critiqued the thesis for implying a near-total fabrication without fully accounting for fragmented, anecdotal reports in accounts that align with broader patterns of public disdain. The book's influence extends to fields like and , where it has shaped discussions on how national traumas are mythologized; by the , it had been cited in over 200 scholarly works examining war remembrance and media distortion, including analyses of collective forgetting in U.S. narratives. Despite debates over its absolutism—Lembcke himself concedes isolated incidents cannot be ruled out—the remains a foundational text for privileging empirical voids in media records over claims.

Public Discourse and Media Coverage

Upon its 1998 publication, The Spitting Image received attention in mainstream media outlets, where it was often framed as a corrective to exaggerated depictions of anti-war activism, such as those popularized in films like Rambo that portrayed returning veterans as victims of widespread public scorn. Lembcke's analysis, emphasizing the absence of verifiable newspaper accounts or police reports of spitting incidents between 1965 and 1975, was presented as evidence that the narrative served to deflect blame from military policy failures onto domestic protesters. This coverage, including Lembcke's subsequent opinion pieces in newspapers like The New York Times and Boston Globe, positioned the book as contributing to a nuanced understanding of Vietnam-era divisions, highlighting how cultural myths reinforced a victimized veteran archetype. The work provoked backlash among segments of the community, who viewed its dismissal of the spitting stories as an invalidation of real emotional traumas and a form of revisionism that downplayed hostility from anti-war elements. Personal recollections from veterans, documented in memoirs and interviews, persisted in public narratives, with critics arguing that the lack of contemporaneous records did not negate individual experiences amid broader societal rejection, including job discrimination and media portrayals associating soldiers with atrocities. While anti-war organizations like endorsed Lembcke's thesis as debunking folklore, traditional groups and commentators expressed concern that it risked whitewashing the anti-war movement's role in stigmatizing service members, fueling ongoing debates in outlets like CounterPunch and historical analyses. Overall, the book stimulated public discourse on the reliability of in wartime legacies, raising awareness of how unverified anecdotes can shape without providing empirical resolution to evidential disputes. Media discussions acknowledged its role in questioning "" tropes in , yet controversies endured, as the persistence of veteran testimonies underscored unresolved tensions between documented history and subjective recall.

Influence on Vietnam War Memory

Lembcke's analysis in The Spitting Image has reinforced a historiographical portraying anti-war protesters as non-violent and supportive of returning veterans, thereby challenging accounts of widespread public hostility and emphasizing instead media-driven distortions of . This perspective gained renewed visibility in mainstream outlets, such as a New York Times by Lembcke himself, which reiterated the absence of verified incidents and framed such stories as postwar fabrications rather than empirical events. By privileging archival gaps in contemporary reports over later personal testimonies, this view has informed segments of public discourse that seek to rehabilitate the counterculture, positioning protesters as victims of conservative myth-making rather than agents of division. Despite these efforts, recollections of spitting and endure prominently within communities, sustaining a parallel memory of societal rejection that underpins critiques of left-wing during the era. Surveys and oral histories collected decades later, including those shared in forums and publications, frequently reference such encounters as emblematic of broader ingratitude, with incidents described in airports and urban centers from onward. This persistence has fueled right-leaning interpretations of the war's legacy, where the alleged myth serves as evidence of cultural amnesia or deliberate revisionism by academic and media elites, maintaining divisions in how the conflict's domestic fallout is remembered. The dichotomy in memory has manifested in contrasts with post-9/11 conflicts, where anti-war protests against and operations—peaking around 2003–2007—did not yield comparable widespread claims of physical on returnees, despite similar scales of opposition. This absence, amid documented verbal confrontations and media scrutiny, underscores the Vietnam-specific resilience of the motif as a , potentially amplified by the era's unique polarization and lack of immediate hero's welcomes, rather than a universal pattern of activist behavior. Ongoing debates thus highlight how Lembcke's framework influences selective emphases in remembrance, privileging systemic explanations over individualized experiences in shaping collective perceptions.

References

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