Hubbry Logo
True (cigarette)True (cigarette)Main
Open search
True (cigarette)
Community hub
True (cigarette)
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
True (cigarette)
True (cigarette)
True (cigarette)
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia
True
Old logo of True cigarettes
Product typeCigarette
OwnerReynolds American
Produced byR.J. Reynolds
CountryUnited States
IntroducedSeptember 1966; 59 years ago (1966-09)
Related brandsKent, Pall Mall
MarketsUnited States[1][2][3]
Previous ownersLorillard (1966–2015)
Tagline"Shouldn't your brand be True?"
Carcinogenicity: IARC group 1

True is an American brand of cigarettes, currently owned by Reynolds American and manufactured through its subsidiary R.J. Reynolds. The brand was created and formerly owned by the Lorillard Tobacco Company.

History

[edit]

True was introduced in September 1966 by Lorillard in 10 major U.S. markets, with national distribution beginning on November 1, 1966.[4] The tagline for the new brand was "Shouldn't your brand be True?".[5] The cigarette, when first introduced, was full flavored. It was later available in a reduced tar and nicotine version during the 1970s and 1980s. During that time, True deceptively targeted people who wanted to quit smoking ("Considering All I'd Heard, I decided To Either Quit Or Smoke True. I Smoke True.").[6][7]

True cigarettes, like Parliament cigarettes, have a recessed filter. However, whereas Parliaments have nothing in the recessed space, Trues have a plastic piece (round with a triangle in the middle and radials which extend to the outside) which prevents the top of the cigarette from being broken, torn, or crushed.

In 2015, Reynolds American acquired the brand after they bought the Lorillard Tobacco Company.

Advertising

[edit]
Pack of True cigarettes

Lorillard made various poster advertisements to promote the True brand as a "low tar, low nicotine" brand.[8][9]

A few TV ads were also made to promote the brand in the late 1960s to early 1970s.[10][11]

Varieties

[edit]
  • Filters Kings: Soft Pack, Box
  • Filters 100s: Soft Pack, Box
  • Menthol Kings: Soft Pack, Box
  • Menthol 100s: Soft Pack, Box

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

True (cigarette)

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia

True is an American brand of cigarettes introduced by the in September 1966 as a low-tar, low-nicotine filtered product targeted at smokers concerned with health risks associated with tobacco use. Following Lorillard's acquisition by in 2014, True is now owned by and manufactured by its subsidiary , offering varieties such as full flavor, lights, and . The brand's marketing emphasized reduced and yields, positioning it as a "forward step in filter smoking" during an era of growing awareness of smoking's dangers, though empirical studies have indicated that low-yield cigarettes often fail to deliver proportional risk reduction due to smokers' behavioral adaptations like deeper inhalation.

History

Launch and Early Development

True cigarettes were developed by the as a low- and low- product during the mid-1960s, with approximately two years invested in research and formulation to position it as a healthier alternative amid growing public awareness of risks following the 1964 U.S. Surgeon General's report. The brand launched initially in September 1966 through test marketing in ten major U.S. metropolitan areas, including variants such as True and True , before achieving full national distribution on , 1966. Early highlighted the 's reduced and levels with the "True has everything you expect from a . And less that you don’t," aiming to appeal to smokers seeking reassurance without sacrificing satisfaction. This introduction occurred during a period of industry-wide innovation in filtered and low-yield s, driven by competitive pressures and regulatory scrutiny, though True's ultra-low specifications—often under 1 mg and per —distinguished it from contemporaries.

Growth and Market Positioning

True cigarettes achieved modest initial growth following their national launch by on November 1, 1966, after test marketing in select U.S. markets earlier that year. Positioned as a low-tar, low-nicotine filtered , the brand appealed to health-conscious smokers amid rising public awareness of risks, with internal identifying this demographic as the core target for its reassuring name and formulation. Sales volume peaked at 3.0 billion units in 1968, securing 0.6% of the overall U.S. market and 2.8% within the mentholated filter segment. Volumes subsequently fluctuated, declining to 2.3 billion units (0.4% total ) in 1970 before recovering to 2.65 billion units in and 2.78 billion units in 1972, stabilizing at approximately 0.5% . Advertising expenditures supported this trajectory, with budgets ranging from $1.6 million in 1970 to $3.2 million in , though competition from other low-tar entrants eroded the brand's early differentiation by the mid-1970s. Over later decades, True transitioned into the or discount tier, capitalizing on smokers' increasing price sensitivity amid hikes and premium price escalations. U.S. surveys indicate the proportion of smokers using discount brands rose steadily from 2002 to 2011, with greater switching from premium to discount options, a trend that bolstered volume for value-oriented labels like True despite overall market contraction. The 2015 acquisition of Lorillard by for $27.4 billion integrated True into a larger portfolio, enhancing distribution but relegating it to a peripheral role behind high-share brands such as Newport (Lorillard's menthol leader) and Reynolds' and Pall Mall. This merger elevated Reynolds' combined U.S. to about 34%, though True retained its niche as a full-flavor, filtered economy option without notable expansion in prominence.

Ownership Transitions

The True cigarette brand was developed and owned by from its launch in the 1960s until 2015. On July 15, 2014, Inc. announced its agreement to acquire Lorillard in a cash-and-stock transaction valued at $27.4 billion, including the assumption of $9 billion in debt, which transferred ownership of True and other Lorillard brands to upon completion. The acquisition was finalized on June 12, 2015, after regulatory approvals and divestitures of certain brands to Imperial Tobacco, strengthening 's portfolio with low-tar brands like True. British American Tobacco plc, which already held a 42.2% stake in Reynolds American, agreed on January 17, 2017, to acquire the remaining 57.8% for $49.4 billion in a stock-and-cash deal, creating the world's largest publicly traded tobacco company by market share. The transaction closed on July 20, 2017, integrating Reynolds American, including the True brand, as a subsidiary under BAT's control, with manufacturing continuing through R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. Since then, True has remained part of Reynolds American's offerings, now ultimately owned by BAT.

Product Characteristics

Composition and Manufacturing

True cigarettes, manufactured by , consist primarily of a processed filler derived from an American-style blend incorporating burley, flue-cured , and smaller proportions of oriental tobaccos, which are shredded into cut rag form after curing, , and reconstitution processes. This filler is augmented with casing materials and top flavors, including sugars, cocoa products, licorice extracts, and in applicable varieties, to modify taste, aroma, and burn characteristics; R.J. Reynolds employs over 100 such FDA-approved or GRAS ingredients across its brands, selected to achieve desired sensory profiles without intent to heighten . The rod is wrapped in paper engineered for controlled combustion, often with burn additives like to ensure even burning. Filters in True cigarettes typically comprise cellulose acetate tow, formed into a ventilated or non-ventilated plug depending on the variety, such as the full-flavor options with denser . Reconstituted tobacco sheets, made from stems, dust, and scraps via techniques, supplement the leaf blend to optimize yield and uniformity, comprising up to 20-30% of the filler in standard U.S. cigarettes. Humectants like glycerin and are incorporated to preserve moisture during storage and processing. Production follows automated high-speed lines at facilities, including those in , where tobacco is blended, weighed, and fed into rod-making machines that form, cut, and attach filters to produce up to 20,000 cigarettes per minute per line. involves spectrometry for additive levels and dimensional checks, with final in soft or hard packs of 20 cigarettes; the process adheres to federal reporting requirements under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act for ingredient disclosure. Unlike additive-free brands, True incorporates these elements as standard for mainstream U.S. products, reflecting industry practices for consistency and consumer appeal.

Tar, Nicotine, and Emissions Profile

True cigarettes feature low machine-measured yields of , , and (CO), as assessed via the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) standardized smoking machine protocol, which simulates fixed puff volumes, durations, and intervals to quantify mainstream smoke constituents. represents the dry particulate matter excluding water and , serving as a proxy for total particulate emissions, while and CO are key toxicants linked to and cardiovascular effects, respectively. These yields position True as an ultra-low delivery brand relative to full-flavor counterparts, reflecting design elements like ventilated filters that dilute smoke with air to reduce measured uptake under test conditions. In the FTC's 1998 report covering 1,294 domestic varieties, True offerings consistently showed tar yields of 4–7 mg per , at 0.4–0.6 mg, and CO at 4–7 mg, lower than the sales-weighted averages of approximately 12 mg and 0.9 mg across U.S. brands at the time. King-size varieties generally exhibited the lowest levels, with soft-pack (SP) and hard-pack (HP) formats varying slightly due to filter and paper differences. variants mirrored non-menthol yields, as flavoring additives do not substantially alter FTC-measured emissions.
VarietyTar (mg/cig)Nicotine (mg/cig)CO (mg/cig)
True King F SP40.45
True King F HP40.44
True King F SP Menthol40.45
True 100 F SP60.67
True 100 F HP70.67
True 100 F SP Menthol60.67
Data from FTC machine testing; F denotes filtered. These profile metrics stem from Lorillard's original engineering focus on air to minimize and delivery, a strategy introduced in the and refined through subsequent manufacturing by post-2015 acquisition. However, empirical studies indicate that FTC yields underestimate real-world human exposure, as smokers often compensate by altering puff topography—taking more or deeper puffs—to maintain levels, potentially elevating actual and CO intake comparable to higher-yield brands. This discrepancy arises because machine testing ignores behavioral adaptations, rendering cross-brand comparisons based solely on FTC data unreliable for assessing relative harm.

Varieties and Packaging

Standard Varieties

The standard varieties of True cigarettes include king-size (85 mm) and 100 mm lengths in both regular (non-) and menthol flavors, available in soft pack and hard box packaging. These configurations represent the core lineup produced by , emphasizing full-flavor tobacco taste without additives. King-size variants, such as True Kings and , feature standard filter tips and are marketed for everyday , with the regular version often packaged in blue for non-menthol and green for menthol. The 100s length provides a longer experience with similar flavor profiles, including True 100s and True Menthol 100s. All standard varieties incorporate recessed filters to reduce sidestream smoke, distinguishing them from non-fire-safe cigarettes while maintaining combustion characteristics compliant with state fire safety standards.

Packaging and Labeling Evolution

True cigarettes were introduced by in September 1966 with packaging featuring a soft pack design and prominent "True" branding to emphasize the cigarette's aerated filter intended for reduced and delivery, alongside voluntary disclosure of FTC-measured levels on the pack. Initial packs included the federally mandated warning "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health" effective January 1, 1966, under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. By the , packaging evolved to include variants such as True Lights, with color-coded elements like blue accents on white backgrounds to differentiate reduced- options, while retaining and content listings as promoted by Lorillard. The 1969 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act updated warnings to "Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Health," appearing on True packs from 1971, with subsequent rotations and strengthening under the 1984 Comprehensive Smoking Education Act requiring four alternating statements covering 25% of the front and rear panels. Pack designs for extended lengths, such as True 100s, incorporated vertical pinstripes on white backgrounds to distinguish from king-size versions. The 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, upheld in court rulings by , prohibited descriptors like "," "low," and "mild" on , prompting Lorillard to modify True Lights labels by removing such terms and relying on color schemes (e.g., for lower-yield variants) to signal differences, a practice consistent across major brands to maintain consumer recognition without explicit claims. True variants featured with lettering during the 1980s-1990s, aligning with ultra-low positioning before descriptor restrictions. Following Reynolds American's 2015 acquisition of Lorillard, True packaging underwent minimal aesthetic changes, preserving core design elements like the recessed filter highlight and white-dominant schemes, though integrated into Reynolds' production standards. As of 2025, packs display one of the four rotating textual warnings required since 1985, with tar and nicotine figures no longer mandatory after FTC policy shifts, but the FDA's planned enforcement of graphic warnings—cleared by the in November 2024 and set for December 2025—will require covering 50% of front and back panels with images depicting smoking's effects. This marks the first major U.S. labeling overhaul since , potentially altering True's visual presentation significantly.

Marketing and Advertising

Key Campaigns and Slogans

True cigarettes were launched nationally by on November 1, 1966, as a low-tar, low-nicotine filtered product, with initial emphasizing reliability and satisfaction over explicit benefits to navigate regulatory constraints. The core , "Shouldn't your brand be True?", appeared in and print ads starting in 1967, positioning the brand as a trustworthy for smokers aware of emerging tar and nicotine data, often closing with phrases like "Now that the truth is out, shouldn't your brand be TRUE?". Lorillard supported this launch with increased ad budgets, spending $41.5 million overall in 1967, though True's specific allocation focused on building loyalty among health-conscious consumers via subtle reassurances rather than tar yield claims. By the mid-1970s, amid heightened public scrutiny from reports, True's campaigns shifted to address quitting pressures directly through testimonial-style narratives. A prominent 1975 print series featured individuals reflecting on , culminating in the "Either quit or smoke True—I smoke True," portraying True as a rational compromise for continuing smokers seeking lower exposure without cessation. These ads, often depicting everyday scenarios like or , implied reduced harm via the brand's established low-tar profile (e.g., 4 mg tar, 0.4 mg per in early formulations) while avoiding unsubstantiated promises. Later variants extended these themes; for instance, the introduction of True Gold used "Born Rich" to evoke premium quality in a lights segment, though it retained the core low-yield positioning. Overall, True's marketing avoided aggressive imagery, prioritizing factual appeals to tar/ levels amid FTC oversight, which later drew criticism for fostering risk underestimation despite empirical evidence of no safety advantage.

Target Demographics and Strategies

True cigarettes were developed and marketed specifically to smokers expressing concerns, a demographic identified through prior industry research as the brand's primary . Internal documents from the 1960s indicate that aimed to appeal to this group by offering an ultra-low and product, positioning True as a response to growing of smoking-related diseases without explicitly claiming reduced harm, in compliance with regulatory limits on such assertions. This strategy capitalized on consumer demand for perceived lower-risk options amid rising anti-smoking sentiment in the mid-20th century. Marketing efforts focused on print advertisements that highlighted True's measurable attributes, such as its status as having the lowest reported (1 mg) and (0.1 mg) levels among major U.S. brands by the , often using slogans like "The Lowest" to imply relative safety. Imagery in ads frequently featured professional, intelligent-appearing individuals, such as in setting, to resonate with educated, health-aware adults seeking reassurance rather than cessation. The brand name "True" was deliberately chosen to evoke trustworthiness and authenticity, drawing on cultural associations like "true-blue" to subliminally suggest purity and reliability, bypassing direct health claims prohibited by the . Packaging reinforced these strategies, with non-menthol variants in blue-and-white designs symbolizing cleanliness and low emissions, while menthol versions used green-and-white to imply natural freshness. Distribution emphasized retail visibility in supermarkets and pharmacies, locations frequented by health-conscious consumers, to facilitate switching from full-flavor brands. Overall, the approach relied on empirical testing data from smoking machines to market quantifiable reductions in yields, targeting existing smokers motivated by fear of disease rather than youth initiation, though broader industry practices raised questions about unintended appeal to vulnerable groups.

Regulatory Constraints and Changes

The (FTC) initially permitted cigarette manufacturers to advertise and yields based on the standardized Cambridge Filter Method, adopted as the FTC test in the 1960s, which allowed brands like True to promote themselves as having the lowest levels among major brands. For instance, True advertisements in the and highlighted government test results showing it delivered the lowest and of the 20 best-selling brands, with varieties such as True Lights registering 4-6 mg and 0.4-0.6 mg per FTC reports. This regulatory framework, stemming from FTC guidance in 1966, aimed to provide comparative information but overlooked human smoking behaviors like compensatory inhalation, which undermined the method's reliability. In a significant shift, the FTC rescinded its 1966 enforcement policy on November 26, 2008, advising manufacturers against citing FTC method yields in or labeling, as such numbers misled consumers into assuming lower yields equated to reduced health risks, despite evidence of where smokers adjust behavior to maintain intake. This change directly constrained True's core marketing proposition, which had relied on ultra-low positioning since its introduction by Lorillard (later acquired by in 2015), forcing discontinuation of numerical claims without alternative substantiation. The FTC's 2009 biennial report further emphasized that these yields do not reflect actual exposure, reinforcing the policy amid broader scrutiny of low-tar deceptions. Parallel constraints emerged on additive-free claims for varieties like True Blue, marketed as containing no chemical additives beyond the itself. The FTC's 1999 consent order with for Winston "no additives" required disclosures that additive-free cigarettes are not safer or less harmful, highlighting how such claims implied reduced without , a applicable to True's similar positioning. The 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act amplified these limits by prohibiting unsubstantiated modified risk claims, subjecting any implication of lower harm from additives or yields to FDA premarket authorization, effectively curtailing True's ability to differentiate on purity or exposure grounds without rigorous scientific backing. Additionally, the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement imposed youth-oriented marketing bans, such as no cartoon imagery or event sponsorships appealing to minors, further narrowing True's promotional avenues.

Health Claims and Scientific Evaluation

Industry Assertions on Reduced Exposure

Lorillard Tobacco Company launched True cigarettes in 1967, asserting that the brand's patented aerated filter—featuring a recessed design and air ventilation holes—delivered reduced and yields compared to other filtered cigarettes, without compromising taste or draw. The company specifically claimed this filtration system incorporated "air mixed with smoke" to lower exposure to these substances, positioning True as an advancement in for smokers concerned with tar intake. Marketing materials from the late and reinforced these assertions by highlighting True's machine-measured and levels, often stating it achieved "the lowest in and of the 20 best-selling filter kings." Lorillard promoted the filter's efficiency in ads, implying it provided a smoother, less harsh profile indicative of diminished harmful constituents, with slogans like "True Cracks Taste Barrier!" underscoring full flavor alongside reduced yields. By the and , as consumer demand for lower-yield options grew, Lorillard evolved True's positioning to emphasize its status as a "reduced and cigarette," with campaigns claiming greater popularity than competitors in this category, such as "More people enjoy True than any other reduced and cigarette." These assertions relied on (FTC) testing methodologies for and quantification, which the company cited to substantiate comparative reductions, though without explicit health risk mitigation guarantees. Following Reynolds American's acquisition of Lorillard's assets in 2015, True continued under with similar filter-based yield profiles, maintaining historical claims of exposure reduction through ventilation technology in product descriptions.

Empirical Evidence on Risk Compensation

Studies of smoking have consistently demonstrated that smokers of low-yield (low-tar and low-) cigarettes, including ultra-light varieties comparable to True, engage in compensatory behaviors to achieve similar levels of intake as with higher-yield brands. These behaviors include increasing puff volume, puff frequency, inhalation depth, and the number of cigarettes smoked per day, as well as blocking filter ventilation holes with fingers or lips. For instance, a review of brand-switching experiments found that participants derived comparable yields from low-yield cigarettes through such adjustments, with mean compensation ranging from 70% to over 100% of the difference in machine-measured yields. Similar patterns were observed in measurements where smokers of cigarettes with tar-to- ratios like True's (approximately 11.5:1) exhibited altered puff profiles to elevate exposure beyond machine predictions. Biomarker analyses, such as urinary and levels, further corroborate these findings by showing that actual and uptake among low-yield smokers often matches or exceeds that of regular users, undermining claims of reduced exposure. In controlled trials, smokers switching to low-tar brands increased daily consumption by up to 20% and puff volumes by 30-50% within days, stabilizing delivery but elevating and other toxicant intakes due to deeper . These mechanisms explain why low-yield designs, intended to deliver less harm via ventilated filters, fail to do so in practice, as human patterns override machine-testing assumptions. Epidemiological aligns with , revealing minimal or no reduction in smoking-related risks for low-tar smokers. Pooled analyses of case-control studies indicate that while some report a 20-30% lower for low-tar versus high-tar smokers, cohort studies and adjustments for show attenuated or null effects, attributable to compensation inflating actual exposures. The National Cancer Institute's Monograph 13 synthesizes this body of work, concluding that compensatory negates potential benefits of low-yield cigarettes, with no verifiable decrease in overall morbidity or mortality rates. Industry assertions of for products like True, based on machine yields, have been critiqued for ignoring these behavioral adaptations, as validated by independent human-subject research.

Comparative Risks Versus Regular Cigarettes

True cigarettes, marketed with ventilated filters designed to dilute smoke and lower machine-measured yields of , , and , do not reduce smokers' actual exposure to harmful toxins compared to regular cigarettes. Smokers typically compensate by blocking ventilation holes with or fingers, inhaling more deeply, or consuming more cigarettes per day to maintain levels, resulting in equivalent or higher intake of carcinogens. Epidemiological studies indicate that users of low-yield cigarettes like True experience disease risks comparable to those of regular cigarette smokers, with no significant reduction in incidence of , heart disease, or (COPD). For instance, a analysis found that tar exposure from ventilated "" cigarettes matches or exceeds that from full-flavor varieties due to behavioral adjustments. Similarly, cohort data from over 1 million participants showed no protective effect against smoking-related mortality for low-tar smokers after adjusting for consumption patterns. The filters in True cigarettes fail to selectively trap toxicants, as evidenced by assays demonstrating that ventilation primarily reduces measured yields under standardized machine testing but not real-world puffing conditions. Peer-reviewed reviews confirm that such filters do not mitigate health harms and may exacerbate certain risks, such as , by promoting deeper inhalation of peripheral smoke containing higher levels. Industry claims of reduced exposure, based on (FTC) machine yields, have been discredited for ignoring human compensation, leading to equivalent biomarker levels of and volatile organic compounds in low-tar versus regular smokers.

Litigation Over Misleading Claims

In the 1990s and 2000s, multiple lawsuits targeted R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company for allegedly misleading consumers through marketing of True cigarettes, particularly True Lights variants, which advertised low Federal Trade Commission (FTC)-measured tar yields (e.g., 6 mg or less per cigarette) alongside claims of delivering "full flavor" via patented filter technology. Plaintiffs argued these representations implied reduced health risks compared to regular cigarettes, despite internal company knowledge that smokers often engaged in compensatory behaviors—such as taking deeper puffs, inhaling more frequently, or smoking additional cigarettes—to maintain nicotine intake, resulting in actual tar and nicotine exposure comparable to or exceeding that of full-flavor brands. A landmark federal racketeering case, United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (initiated 1999, verdict 2006), implicated R.J. Reynolds among major tobacco firms in systematically defrauding the public by marketing low-tar products like True as less dangerous, based on evidence from over 14,000 internal documents revealing awareness of compensatory smoking since the 1970s. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that such marketing constituted fraud under RICO statutes, ordering corrective statements—including acknowledgments that "there is no such thing as a safe cigarette, no matter how it is advertised"—to be disseminated via ads, packaging, and websites starting in 2012 (after appeals). One statement specifically addressed low-tar deception: "Low tar and light cigarettes are just as harmful as regular cigarettes." Class actions and state-specific suits further challenged True's claims. In Dahl v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (, 2007), plaintiffs alleged the company's advertising conveyed health benefits from light cigarettes like True Lights, though the state supreme court initially dismissed on grounds under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA); this stance shifted after the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Good v. Group, Inc., which held that state fraud claims based on deceptive of "light" descriptors were not preempted if they targeted implied safety assurances beyond FTC yield data. Similar challenges arose in progeny cases from the Engle litigation (certified 2000, Phase I verdict 2006), where juries found widespread industry concealment of light cigarette risks, leading to billions in verdicts against for brands including True; for instance, compensatory awards often hinged on evidence of manipulation and misleading representations. R.J. Reynolds maintained that True's advertising relied on accurate FTC machine-testing protocols (established 1967, revised 1984 for lower yields) without explicit health superiority claims, arguing consumer interpretation of "low " as risk-reducing was unsubstantiated. However, courts rejected this defense where evidence demonstrated foreseeable deception, as FTC yields (e.g., True's 1-6 mg ) systematically understated human by ignoring behavioral adaptation confirmed in peer-reviewed studies showing no net reduction in biomarkers of exposure among smokers. In response to mounting litigation and a 2009 FDA warning deeming "" and "low" terms inherently misleading, R.J. Reynolds phased out such descriptors by 2010, rebranding products like True Lights to numeric ratings (e.g., "5.0") while settling select cases, though broader class certifications were often denied due to individualized proof requirements.

Regulatory Scrutiny and FTC Involvement

The established oversight of cigarette tar and nicotine yield claims in the 1960s to address potential deception in advertising, developing the standardized Cambridge filter method for machine-smoked testing that yielded numerical ratings voluntarily reported by manufacturers. introduced True cigarettes in 1967, promoting its "micronite" and later "microblue" filters as reducing tar delivery while preserving flavor, with FTC-method yields typically ranging from 4 to 6 mg tar and 0.4 to 0.6 mg nicotine per cigarette across variants like Full Flavor and Lights. These figures were featured in marketing materials implying lower exposure compared to full-tar brands, though Reynolds avoided direct health superiority assertions after early FTC guides prohibited unsubstantiated comparative low-tar claims. By the late 1990s and 2000s, empirical studies revealed that the FTC method failed to capture human dynamics, as consumers of low-yield cigarettes like True often inhaled deeper, smoked more intensively, or consumed more units—known as —resulting in actual and uptake comparable to regular cigarettes. On December 8, 2008, the FTC rescinded its 1966 guidance permitting the advertising of Cambridge-method numbers, determining that such disclosures could deceive consumers by suggesting reduced disease risk without accounting for compensatory behaviors; the agency explicitly warned that future use of these ratings risked enforcement under Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts. This policy shift applied to all brands relying on yield data, including True, effectively curtailing implicit "safer" messaging tied to low numbers. While the FTC did not pursue a targeted enforcement action against Reynolds specifically for True's tar-focused promotions—unlike its 1997 complaint alleging youth targeting via the campaign—the brand's advertising fell under ongoing FTC monitoring of low-tar descriptors industry-wide. Annual FTC tar and nicotine reports through the 2000s listed True's yields but emphasized their limitations, contributing to heightened scrutiny that paralleled state-level fraud lawsuits over and low-tar marketing, which the U.S. declined to preempt in Altria Group, Inc. v. Good (). The rescission underscored causal evidence that machine yields did not translate to empirical , prompting manufacturers to phase out such claims amid broader regulatory pressures from the FDA's 2009 tobacco control authority banning explicit "" and "low-tar" labels.

Broader Industry Context

The tobacco industry developed low-tar and low-nicotine cigarettes in the 1960s as a response to escalating health concerns following the 1964 U.S. Surgeon General's report linking smoking to lung cancer and other diseases, aiming to reassure smokers and sustain market share amid declining trust in full-flavor products. Brands such as True, introduced during this period by Lorillard Tobacco Company (later acquired by R.J. Reynolds in 2015), featured design modifications like ventilated filters with air dilution holes and porous paper to reduce machine-measured tar yields under Federal Trade Commission (FTC) testing protocols established in the late 1960s. These innovations allowed companies to advertise lower "tar numbers" without substantively altering tobacco blends or combustion chemistry, initially capturing older smokers and women concerned about health risks. Internal industry research, including from , demonstrated early awareness that such cigarettes prompted compensatory behaviors—such as deeper inhalation, blocking ventilation holes with lips or fingers, or increased cigarette consumption per day—resulting in actual and exposure comparable to or exceeding that of regular cigarettes. This phenomenon, documented in peer-reviewed analyses of , undermined claims of reduced , as mainstream smoke toxins from remained the primary causal agents of regardless of yield category. By the , low-tar brands grew to comprise about 15% of U.S. market volume, rising to over 80% by the 1990s, yet epidemiological data showed no corresponding decline in smoking-attributable mortality rates among users of these products. Regulatory evolution reflected recognition of these deceptions: the FTC's 1970 ban on unsubstantiated health claims in advertising, followed by mandatory tar/ disclosures, failed to curb misleading descriptors like "" or "ultra-light" until the 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Act granted the FDA authority to prohibit such terms in , citing their role in false reassurance. In the broader industry landscape, major players like —R.J. Reynolds' parent, acquired by in 2017—faced volume declines in combustibles (down to about 180 billion cigarettes annually in the U.S. by 2023 from peaks over 600 billion in the ) due to higher taxes, smoke-free laws, and litigation under the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement. This prompted a strategic shift toward non-combustible alternatives, such as heated and e-cigarettes, rebranded as "reduced-risk" products under FDA's modified risk product pathway, though legacy low-tar brands like True persist in niche segments amid ongoing scrutiny for historical .

Market Impact and Current Status

Sales Performance and Market Share

The True cigarette brand, acquired by in 2015 as part of its $27.4 billion purchase of Lorillard, has maintained a negligible presence in the U.S. market. Internal Lorillard documents from the early 2000s indicate True's monthly hovered around 0.47% to 0.49%, reflecting limited consumer uptake even for variants like True , which saw low trial rates and high rejection among testers. Post-acquisition, True was grouped with other minor Lorillard brands such as , Maverick, and , which collectively contributed minimally to Reynolds' portfolio amid focus on high-volume labels like Newport and . Specific shipment volumes or revenue figures for True remain undisclosed in or parent filings through 2024, underscoring its marginal commercial performance. In contrast to industry leaders— at 45.8% and Newport at around 12% in 2024—True does not appear in rankings of top-selling U.S. brands, consistent with broader declines in volumes (down 8% in 2023) and the brand's failure to gain traction despite as a filtered, lower-tar option. This positions True as a low-share niche product, with sales likely comprising a fraction of Reynolds' overall segment, which faced organic revenue contraction amid shifting consumer preferences toward smokeless alternatives.

Consumer Perceptions and Loyalty

Consumers perceived True cigarettes primarily as a lower-risk option for health-conscious smokers seeking reduced and exposure, as evidenced by Lorillard's internal 1967 identifying such individuals as the brand's core . This view stemmed from the product's ultra-low yields—typically 1-5 mg —and marketing emphasizing dependability amid growing awareness of smoking's harms in the and . However, surveys on low- cigarettes broadly indicate that over 50% of smokers believed switching to such brands substantially mitigated risks, a misperception True's positioning likely amplified despite lacking empirical support for actual . The brand's blue-and-white packaging and name, deliberately evoking the "true-blue" symbolizing and trustworthiness, reinforced perceptions of reliability and subtle reassurance without direct claims restricted by FTC guidelines. Lorillard's advertisements further equated smoking True with quitting, portraying it as a viable compromise for those unable or unwilling to abstain entirely, which appealed to smokers' desire for a "safer" continuation of the habit. Loyalty to True has persisted in niche markets, with smokers reporting satisfaction from its consistent flavor profile and perceived quality, contributing to repeat purchases amid high overall cigarette brand retention rates of 85-90% annually. This fidelity aligns with industry patterns where perceived product attributes, such as milder taste from recessed filters, sustain adherence even as broader awareness of compensatory behaviors erodes trust in low-yield claims.

Availability and Production in 2025

In 2025, True cigarettes remain in production by , a subsidiary of , Inc., at manufacturing facilities including those in Winston-Salem and Tobaccoville, , where the company maintains operations for combustible tobacco products. The brand is certified for sale in multiple U.S. states, as evidenced by its inclusion in official directories such as North Dakota's list of compliant cigarette brands, updated as of July 14, 2025, covering variants like True Menthol Green Soft Pack. Similarly, Alabama's participating manufacturers' brands directory confirms True under , indicating ongoing regulatory approval and production for interstate commerce. Availability is limited to the U.S. market, with distribution through independent retailers, convenience stores, and online wholesalers such as Mohawk and Socal Distro LLC, where cartons and packs are actively offered without announced shortages or phase-outs. True does not feature prominently in Reynolds American's marketing emphasis, which prioritizes higher-volume brands like , Newport, and alongside a strategic pivot toward smokeless and vapor products to reduce reliance on combustibles by 2030. No federal or state-level bans specific to True have been enacted, though broader FDA oversight on product introductions continues to apply. Production volumes for True are not publicly detailed in 2025 reports, but the brand's persistence in certified and retailer inventories suggests steady, albeit niche, output amid industry contraction in low-tar segment sales. Reynolds American's overall cigarette supports a portfolio where True coexists with established lines, without indications of discontinuation akin to past removals of other minor variants.

References

  1. https://adage.com/article/adage-encyclopedia/lorillard-tobacco/98754/
  2. https://tobacco.stanford.edu/cigarettes/reassuring-brand-names/true/
  3. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/reynolds-american-to-acquire-lorillard-in-transaction-valued-at-274-billion-267143881.html
  4. https://mohawksmoke.com/true-cigarettes/
  5. https://tobacco-img.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/06212113/true_mentholbrandhistory.pdf
  6. https://www.nytimes.com/1981/01/18/business/lorillard-a-confrontation-ahead-in-low-tar.html
  7. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4038075/
  8. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4096818/
  9. https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/07/15/cigarette-maker-reynolds-american-buys-lorillard/12663291/
  10. https://www.marketwatch.com/story/reynolds-american-sales-buoyed-by-lorillard-2016-07-26
  11. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/reynolds-american-completes-acquisition-of-lorillard-and-related-divestitures-300098366.html
  12. https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/17/reynolds-american-announces-merger-agreement-with-british-american-tobacco.html
  13. https://www.bat.com/media/press-releases/_2017/july/Jul_25-BAT_Completes_Acquisition_of_Reynolds
  14. https://cancercontrol.cancer.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/m07_3.pdf
  15. https://rjrt.com/commercial-integrity/tobacco-product-ingredients/
  16. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK316400/
  17. https://rjrt.com/
  18. https://www.fda.gov/media/105114/download
  19. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2807204/
  20. https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2000-report-tar-nicotine-and-carbon-monoxide-covering-1998/1998tarnicotinereport_0.pdf
  21. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/8848540/
  22. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2008/12/08/E8-28969/rescission-of-ftc-guidance-concerning-the-cambridge-filter-method
  23. https://statefire.llr.sc.gov/osfm/forms/safecigarettes/BrandListing.html
  24. https://tobaccobarntucson.com/prodcat/cigarettes/
  25. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LwC1PjfxRpo
  26. https://time.com/archive/6629233/tobacco-its-true/
  27. https://vintagecigarette.com/product/late-1960s-true-cigarette-soft-pack-by-p-lorillard-company/
  28. https://famri.org/history-of-cigarette-warning-labels/
  29. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3725195/
  30. https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/business/19smoke.html
  31. https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/23/2/140
  32. https://kyhistory.pastperfectonline.com/webobject/C84884E8-C90F-4FE9-AFC3-363711578388
  33. https://www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/labeling-and-warning-statements-tobacco-products/cigarette-labeling-and-health-warning-requirements
  34. https://www.newsweek.com/supreme-court-rejects-appeal-cigarette-graphic-warning-labels-1991263
  35. https://calisphere.org/item/e913dc82f28ffd23460675ceeec4c99f/
  36. https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1548&context=studentengagement-honorscapstones
  37. https://tobaccofreekids.org/press-releases/id_1216
  38. https://tobacco.stanford.edu/cigarette/img3294
  39. https://www.ebay.com/itm/405610283822
  40. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3698830/
  41. https://truthinitiative.org/research-resources/tobacco-industry-marketing/truth-about-tobacco-industry-and-retail-environment
  42. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2563681/
  43. https://tobacco.stanford.edu/cigarette/img3290
  44. https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2008/07/ftc-proposes-rescinding-40-year-guidance-statements-concerning-tar-nicotine-yields
  45. https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2008/11/ftc-rescinds-guidance-1966-statements-concerning-tar-nicotine-yields
  46. https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-cigarette-tobacco-report-2007-and-2008/110729cigarettereport.pdf
  47. https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/1998-report-tar-nicotine-and-carbon-monoxide-covering-1996/1996tnrpt_0.pdf
  48. https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/1999/03/ftc-accepts-settlement-charges-ads-winston-no-additive-cigarettes-are-deceptive
  49. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6588395/
  50. https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/court-issues-order-requiring-cigarette-companies-post-corrective-statements-resolves-historic
  51. https://www.nytimes.com/1966/04/07/archives/p-lorillard-develops-cigarette-designed-to-cut-tar-nicotine-new.html
  52. https://www.nytimes.com/1966/04/13/archives/lorillard-delays-labeling-decision-listing-of-tar-and-nicotine-for.html
  53. https://calisphere.org/item/a1626b4788e44f17e544af8e7b5eb0e2/
  54. https://calisphere.org/item/ad98bf1272e7952642007903d382c7c4/
  55. https://www.adage.com/article/adage-encyclopedia/lorillard-tobacco/98754/
  56. https://cancercontrol.cancer.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/m07_12.pdf
  57. https://cancercontrol.cancer.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06/m13_3.pdf
  58. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2556105
  59. https://cancercontrol.cancer.gov/brp/tcrb/monographs/monograph-13
  60. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12955615/
  61. https://www.health.harvard.edu/cancer/low-tar-cigarettes-are-not-a-safer-choice
  62. https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-prevention/risk/tobacco/light-cigarettes-fact-sheet
  63. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2901853/
  64. https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/33/5/663
  65. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3088411/
  66. https://www.cancer.org/cancer/risk-prevention/tobacco/is-any-type-of-smoking-safe.html
  67. https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/consequences-smoking-appendix14-3-tobacco-litigation-case.pdf
  68. https://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-syn-light-2007.pdf
  69. https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/1997/09/ftc-proposes-new-method-testing-amounts-tar-nicotine-carbon-monoxide-cigarettes
  70. https://cancercontrol.cancer.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06/m7_1.pdf
  71. https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/press-releases/id_1089
  72. https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/1997/05/joe-camel-advertising-campaign-violates-federal-law-ftc-says
  73. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/07-562
  74. https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/global-resource/light_and_low_tar_cigarettes_major_scientific_findings_and_public_health_st
  75. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK222369/
  76. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2788397/
  77. https://cancercontrol.cancer.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06/m13_7.pdf
  78. https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/8/4/433
  79. https://www.nytimes.com/1976/10/30/archives/lowtar-cigarettes-creating-a-revolution.html
  80. https://gh.bmj.com/content/9/2/e013866
  81. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7581601/
  82. https://www.investors.com/research/the-new-america/reynolds-american-smoking-on-newport-tobaccos-comeback/
  83. https://www.reynoldsamerican.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Reynolds_Sustainability_Summary_2024-2.pdf
  84. https://www.blacknote.com/top-cigarette-brands-in-the-usa-2024/
  85. https://www.convenience.org/Media/Daily/2024/March/1/1-Cigarettes-Market-Decline-Continues_CatMan
  86. https://www.bat.com/content/dam/batcom/global/main-nav/investors-and-reporting/results-centre/pdf/HY_2024_Annoucement.pdf
  87. http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/yiu54c00
  88. https://cancercontrol.cancer.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/m07_9.pdf
  89. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8449822/
  90. https://www.reynoldsamerican.com/our-history/
  91. https://attorneygeneral.nd.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Cigarettes-by-Manufacturer.pdf
  92. https://www.revenue.alabama.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/PMCertsort.pdf
  93. https://socaldistrollc.com/products/true-cigarettes-carton-10ct
  94. https://www.reynoldsamerican.com/building-brands/
  95. https://www.lung.org/getmedia/23fa2c86-8e7c-4b02-a419-222502b765aa/Tobacco-Partners-Letter-on-Marketing-of-Unauthorized-New-Tobacco-Products-9-25-25.pdf
  96. https://tobaccoinsider.com/list-of-us-cigarette-brands/
  97. https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/09/15/440532864/fda-orders-four-cigarette-brands-pulled-from-the-market
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.