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Two Sessions
Simplified Chinese两会
Traditional Chinese兩會
Literal meaningtwo sessions
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinLiǎnghuì
Wade–GilesLiang3 Hui4

The Two Sessions (Chinese: 两会) is the collective term for the annual plenary sessions of the National People's Congress and of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which are typically both held every March at the Great Hall of the People in Xicheng, Beijing around the same dates.[1][2] The Two Sessions last for about ten days.[3]: 61–62 

During the Two Sessions, the National People's Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) hear and discuss reports from the premier of the State Council, the president of the Supreme People's Court, and the procurator-general.[3]: 61–62 

Use

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The Two Sessions refer to the annual plenary sessions of the National People's Congress and the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which are held at the same administrative level and around the same time. Meetings that do not belong to the same administrative region, are not at the same level, or are not held around the same time are not called the Two Sessions. The National People's Congress and the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference usually convene around the same time in early March each year, and are therefore often referred to together as the Two Sessions.[4]

The meetings of the local people's congresses at all levels and the local committees of the CPPCC are usually held around the same time at the beginning of each year, hence they are often referred to together as the local two sessions. The local two sessions is a general term for all local "two sessions", not referring to any one specific place.

The local people's congresses of China divided into:[4]

1. Local people's congresses at the county level and above:
  • The people's congresses of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government ;
  • The people's congresses of autonomous prefectures and cities with districts (prefecture-level cities);
  • The people's Congresses of counties, autonomous counties, cities without districts (county-level cities), and municipal districts;
2. People’s Congress of townships, ethnic townships and towns.

The local committees of the CPPCC are divided into:[5]

  1. Provincial, autonomous region, and municipal committees;
  2. Autonomous prefectures, cities with districts, counties, autonomous counties, cities without districts, and municipal district committees.

"Local people's congresses and political consultative conferences" can only exist in the following administrative divisions:[5]

  1. Provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government;
  2. Autonomous prefectures and cities with districts;
  3. Counties, autonomous counties, cities without districts, and municipal districts.

In townships, ethnic townships, and towns, only the People's Congress exists, but there are no township, ethnic township, or town committees of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Therefore, there is no "Two Sessions" in townships, ethnic townships, and towns.[4]

For the "local two sessions," the term "two sessions" also refers to the People's Congress and the CPPCC sessions held at the same administrative level and roughly concurrently. For example, the People's Congress session and the local CPPCC session at the same administrative level are collectively referred to as the "local two sessions." Similarly, "Shanghai two sessions" refers to the "[number]th session of the [number]th Shanghai Municipal People's Congress" and the " [number]th session of the [number]th Shanghai Municipal Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference," both held roughly concurrently. Likewise, "Shaanxi two sessions" refers to the "[number]th session of the [number] th Shaanxi Provincial People's Congress" and the "[number]th session of the Shaanxi Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference," both held roughly concurrently.[4]

History

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On 21 September 1949, the first plenary session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) opened, and the conference elected the members of the 1st National Committee of the CPPCC. In September 1954, the first session of the 1st National People's Congress (NPC) was held. On 25 December 1954, the first session of the 2nd National Committee of the CPPCC adopted the Charter of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. In 1959, the first session of the 3rd National Committee of the CPPCC was held simultaneously with the first session of the 2nd National People's Congress (NPC), marking the first time that the NPC and the CPPCC were held simultaneously. The same was true in 1964. During the Cultural Revolution, they were no longer held simultaneously. In 1978, the first session of the 5th NPC and the first session of the 5th CPPCC were held simultaneously, thus making the number of sessions of the NPC and the CPPCC consistent.[6]

The timing of the meetings of the local people's congresses at all levels and the meetings of the local committees of the CPPCC at the same level in the same administrative region has also been adjusted, and the situation varies from place to place. Moreover, since the local CPPCCs were established and started to hold meetings in the early 1949 to 1950s, while the local people's congresses were established and started to hold meetings after the promulgation and implementation of the first Constitution of the People's Republic of China in 1954, and the situation of the change of the people's congresses and CPPCCs in various places during the Cultural Revolution was different, the number of terms of the local people's congresses and CPPCCs is not necessarily the same. Moreover, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference must establish committees only in provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government; while in autonomous prefectures, cities with districts, counties, autonomous counties, cities without districts and municipal districts, it is only stipulated that committees can be established, on the premise of "wherever there are conditions", so these administrative regions may not establish CPPCCs. Some of these administrative regions started to establish CPPCCs very late, so their number of terms is even less likely to be the same as that of the people's congresses at the same level.[5]

Currently, most local people's congresses and political consultative conferences are held at the beginning of each year, but there are still cases where they are not held at the beginning of the year. In some places, the people's congress and political consultative conferences are not held at the same time, and therefore cannot be called the Two Sessions. Like the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which are usually held in the autumn, the Two Sessions are a key political event in the People's Republic of China and attract much attention and coverage from the news media. The term “Two Sessions” only began to appear gradually in the 1990s. It was initially used mainly in news media reports, and later gradually became familiar to the public.[7]

Shared services

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News service

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The news preparation work for the annual "Two Sessions" usually begins very early. The news reporting group of the "Two Sessions" is responsible for the news reporting work of the NPC and the CPPCC. It and the general affairs group of the conference are the earliest organizations to start the preparation work for the conference.[8]

The head of the news reporting team for the NPC and the CPPCC is the proposed spokesperson for the NPC. Other responsible persons usually include one deputy secretary-general of the Standing Committee of the NPC and one deputy secretary-general of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC National Committee, the director of the News Bureau of the General Office of the NPC Standing Committee and the Director of the News Bureau of the General Office of the CPPCC National Committee, as well as the heads of the CCP Publicity Department, the State Council Information Office, the National Radio and Television Administration, the People's Daily, Xinhua News Agency, and other units. Including the heads of news organizations in the news reporting team can give a general understanding of the issues that news organizations are concerned about, so "there are basically no issues that suddenly emerge".[8]

The NPC and the CPPCC news reporting team consists of four groups: the Mainland Reporters Group, the Hong Kong and Taiwan Reporters Group, the Foreign Reporters Group, and the Press Conference Group, as well as one office. Among them, the Press Conference Group is mainly responsible for the preparation of the Premier's press conference. Its members come from the Foreign Affairs Committee of the NPC, the News Bureau of the General Office of the NPC Standing Committee, the State Council Information Office, and the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Press Conference Group is generally led by the head of the news reporting team.[8]

The news reporting team for the NPC and the CPPCC usually starts operating from the end of December or the beginning of January. First, a news reporting plan is formulated. At the same time, the press conference team begins to prepare relevant materials. The first step in the preparation work of the news reporting team is to invite the heads of relevant ministries and commissions of the State Council to hold a symposium and ask them to introduce the situation of the issues that are of concern to domestic and foreign media in their respective fields of work. Such symposiums are usually held seven or eight times, covering areas including politics, economy, finance, political and legal affairs, Hong Kong and Taiwan, foreign affairs, the National People's Congress, social work, etc. On this basis, relevant departments put forward a list of relevant questions and suggestions on the answer guidelines. Subsequently, the news team summarizes the "Questions of Concern to the News Media and All Sectors of Society" and the reference draft of the answer guidelines based on these materials and the symposium situation.[8]

During the tenure of Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, Wen Jiabao and Li Keqiang as Premiers of the State Council, a press conference was held after the closing of the Two Sessions. Before the press conference, the news reporting team and the heads of relevant departments of the State Council would usually hold a small symposium under the chairmanship of the Premier of the State Council to check the preparations in all aspects.[8] The Two Sessions often set up a common "Two Sessions News Center" which is responsible for news services for the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. The National Two Sessions have been setting up news centers since the end of the 20th century. The situation of setting up news centers in local Two Sessions varies, and some places have not yet established the habit of setting up news centers for the Two Sessions.[9]

Service and reception

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Since a large number of NPC deputies and CPPCC members will be gathered during the Two Sessions, the service and reception work for them has become the focus of the relevant government departments. The service and reception work includes accommodation, catering, transportation, security and other work. Among them, the service and reception work for the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference is the most arduous, and is jointly undertaken by the relevant departments of the central government and Beijing.[10]

The Two Sessions period is generally a critical time for the security work of the central government and local governments. Taking the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (NPC and CPPCC) as an example, on the eve of the 2009 NPC and CPPCC sessions in Beijing, the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau stated that the number of auxiliary police security personnel for the NPC and CPPCC sessions, composed of community patrol members, security guards, etc., had reached 600,000.[11] On the eve of the 2010 NPC and CPPCC sessions in Beijing, the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau stated that 700,000 community residents in Beijing participated in the security work for the NPC and CPPCC sessions.[12]

Other uses of the term

[edit]
Further information: Internet censorship in China

During the 2011 Chinese pro-democracy protests, the term for the Two Sessions in Chinese, lianghui, became a covert means of avoiding Internet censorship.[13][14][15] When PRC censors attempted to limit news of the Arab Spring by disabling internet searches for Chinese words such as "Egypt," "Tunisia," and "jasmine", protest organizers urged bloggers and activists to call planned protests lianghui. If the government were to censor this dissenters' circumlocution, it would effectively block internet news about the governmental NPC and CPPCC meetings.[13]

See also

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References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Two Sessions

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
![National emblem of the People's Republic of China](./assets/National_Emblem_of_the_People's_Republic_of_China_22 The Two Sessions, known in Chinese as Lianghui (两会), refer to the annual plenary sessions of the (NPC), China's highest legislative body, and the (CPPCC), its principal advisory council, convened concurrently in each March. These gatherings, attended by nearly 3,000 NPC delegates and over 2,000 CPPCC members representing diverse sectors, ethnic groups, and political parties, focus on reviewing the implementation of the prior year's national economic and social development plan, deliberating the draft plan for the upcoming year, and approving the central government's budget. The centerpiece is the Government Work Report delivered by the , which outlines policy priorities, sets quantitative targets such as GDP growth rates, and signals shifts in economic strategy amid challenges like post-pandemic recovery and international tensions. While the NPC holds formal powers to enact laws, amend the , and confirm key appointments including the and State Council members, its proceedings predominantly endorse agendas shaped by the of China's central leadership, functioning more as a mechanism for and public communication than independent . The CPPCC, comprising non- participants, contributes through consultative proposals on issues ranging from social welfare to technological advancement, though without binding authority. Notable outcomes from recent sessions include adjustments to fiscal policies, emphasis on high-quality development through and consumption stimulation, and affirmations of continuity in core directives under Xi Jinping's administration, reflecting the events' role in aligning elite consensus with national objectives.

Overview

Definition and Components

The Two Sessions, known in Chinese as lianghui (两会), denote the annual plenary sessions of the (NPC) and the (CPPCC), convened concurrently in , typically in March. These meetings, which last about two weeks, focus on reviewing government work reports, approving the national budget, setting economic targets, and endorsing high-level personnel appointments, though decisions largely align with prior directives from the (CCP) Central Committee. In practice, the sessions exhibit near-unanimous approval rates for proposed legislation and policies, reflecting the NPC's role as a formal ratification body rather than an independent . The primary component, the NPC, functions as China's unicameral legislature and the highest organ of state power under the 1982 Constitution. Composed of nearly 3,000 deputies indirectly elected for five-year terms by provincial-level people's congresses from 35 electoral units (including provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities, and special administrative regions), the NPC convenes annually to exercise powers such as amending the constitution, enacting basic laws, electing the president, , , and Central Military Commission chairman, and supervising the State Council. Its Standing Committee, with about 170 members, handles legislative work between sessions, including drafting bills and conducting oversight. The CPPCC serves as an advisory and consultative body within China's "multiparty cooperation and political consultation" system, emphasizing the uniting the CCP with eight other registered parties and non-party elites. The National Committee, numbering over 2,000 members from diverse sectors including ethnic minorities, intellectuals, business leaders, and religious figures, meets annually to offer proposals on matters, conduct democratic supervision over organs, and facilitate patriotic unity without binding legislative authority. Proposals from CPPCC members, often numbering in the thousands per session, are forwarded to relevant state bodies for consideration, though implementation depends on alignment with CCP priorities.

Timing and Format

The Two Sessions refer to the annual plenary sessions of the (NPC) and the National Committee of the (CPPCC), which convene concurrently in early March each year in . The CPPCC session typically opens one day before the NPC session, with both lasting about one week; for instance, in 2025, the CPPCC met from March 4 to March 10, while the NPC session ran from March 5 to March 11. This timing aligns with the end of the Chinese Lunar New Year period and precedes the NPC Standing Committee's spring session, allowing for policy synchronization under oversight. The format emphasizes structured proceedings at the , beginning with preparatory meetings for credential reviews and presidium elections. Opening ceremonies feature keynote reports, including the premier's government work report and proposals for the NPC, alongside proposal submissions and consultations for the CPPCC. Subsequent days involve delegate group discussions, specialized committee deliberations on legislation and oversight, and limited public sessions like press conferences. Closing sessions culminate in votes on resolutions, which are pre-aligned with party directives, with the entire process compressed since 2018 to roughly 10-14 days from prior lengths of up to three weeks. These meetings accommodate over 3,000 NPC deputies and 2,000 CPPCC members, respectively, through parallel tracks that facilitate unified policy endorsement.

Historical Background

Establishment in the Early PRC

The (CPPCC) held its First from September 21 to 30, 1949, marking its formal establishment as a organization uniting the (CCP) with non-Communist parties and groups. This session adopted the Common Program, which functioned as the provisional of the newly founded (PRC), outlined the state's political, economic, and social policies, and proclaimed the establishment of the central people's government on October 1, 1949. The CPPCC initially served both legislative and consultative roles in the absence of a permanent national legislature, reflecting the CCP's strategy to consolidate power through multi-party cooperation under its leadership. By the early , the need for a formalized supreme organ of state power prompted the transition to a more structured legislative body, as the CPPCC's nature limited sustained governance. The (NPC) was established as the PRC's highest organ of state power through the convening of its from September 15 to 28, 1954, in . This session, attended by 1,147 deputies elected indirectly through local people's congresses, adopted the 1954 Constitution, which enshrined the NPC as the sole legislative authority, and the Organic Law of the NPC. The NPC also elected key state leaders, including as chairman of the PRC, formalizing the separation of legislative functions from the CPPCC. Following the NPC's creation, the CPPCC shifted to a purely advisory and consultative role, continuing to meet periodically to provide policy recommendations while aligning with CCP directives. The practice of holding annual sessions of the NPC and CPPCC in parallel, later termed the "Two Sessions" (Lianghui), emerged in this foundational period, with the bodies convening jointly in to deliberate national agendas, though the NPC retained primary decision-making authority. These early meetings emphasized economic reconstruction and socialist transformation, setting precedents for ritualized approval of government work reports and five-year plans under tight CCP oversight. Disruptions occurred during political campaigns, such as the Anti-Rightist Movement in 1957, which curtailed deliberative openness.

Reforms and Institutionalization Post-1978

Following the Third Plenary Session of the 11th of the in December 1978, which shifted national priorities toward economic reform and opening up, the (NPC) and (CPPCC) underwent reforms to formalize their operations and align with modernization goals, including building a rudimentary legal framework. The CPPCC resumed regular activities in February 1978 after a 12-year suspension during the , marking its reintegration into the political system as a consultative body under principles of multiparty cooperation articulated by , such as long-term coexistence and mutual oversight among political parties. These changes positioned the CPPCC to contribute to work, with its functions—political consultation, democratic supervision, and participation in governance—enshrined in the national framework. The NPC's institutionalization accelerated with the adoption of a revised in December 1978, which emphasized the restoration of legal order and the NPC's role as the highest organ of state power, though it retained provisions for guidance in selections. A pivotal advancement came in 1979 with the passage of the Electoral Law for the and Local People's Congresses, which mandated direct elections at the county level and introduced secret balloting, aiming to enhance representativeness while maintaining indirect selection for higher levels. Legislative committees, dormant since the , were reestablished, enabling specialized review of bills and increasing the NPC's capacity for oversight and representation beyond pre-Cultural Revolution levels. The 1982 Constitution, promulgated on December 4 by the fifth NPC, further entrenched these reforms by expanding the Standing Committee's (NPCSC) powers to interpret the constitution, enact laws during intersessional periods, and supervise administrative enforcement, thereby professionalizing legislative processes to support economic policies like decollectivization and foreign investment. Post-1978 legislative activity surged, with the NPC and NPCSC enacting foundational laws such as the 1979 Criminal Law, the 1980 Marriage Law revisions, and subsequent codes on civil procedure and economic contracts by the mid-1980s, totaling dozens of statutes to underpin market-oriented reforms. For the CPPCC, the sixth National Committee in 1983 adopted a revised charter that clarified its advisory mechanisms and organizational structure, facilitating proposal submissions on policy matters, with over 1,000 proposals reviewed annually by the 1990s to inform governance. These developments institutionalized the Two Sessions as annual platforms for agenda-setting and endorsement, with NPC sessions growing to include about 3,000 deputies by the 1980s, focusing on budget approvals and leadership transitions amid economic liberalization. However, reforms preserved the Chinese Communist Party's dominance, as delegate nominations and major decisions required prior party vetting, limiting independent deliberation despite procedural enhancements. Subsequent iterations, such as 1990s constitutional amendments under Jiang Zemin, codified multiparty consultation as a core system, but empirical assessments note persistent constraints on oversight efficacy due to centralized control.

Composition and Participants

National People's Congress (NPC)

The (NPC) comprises 2,977 deputies serving five-year terms, elected indirectly through 35 electoral units that include provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the central government, and special administrative regions such as and . Deputies are selected via a process where candidates, nominated by electoral units and required to outnumber available seats by 20 to 50 percent, are approved by secret ballot in provincial-level people's congresses. This indirect mechanism, originating from the Electoral Law of the NPC and Local People's Congresses, prioritizes candidates aligned with state policies, with nominations often vetted through party and organizational channels prior to voting. Demographically, deputies predominantly reflect China's Han majority, with ethnic minorities accounting for approximately 12 percent of seats to ensure representation from all 55 officially recognized groups, though smaller groups may have only one delegate each. The body includes delegates from diverse occupational backgrounds, such as workers, farmers, intellectuals, entrepreneurs, and members of the (PLA), which elects a fixed contingent of about deputies. Women hold around 26 percent of seats in recent sessions, though male dominance persists, and urban-rural balances are maintained through allocated quotas per electoral unit. Participants extend beyond full deputies to the NPC Standing Committee, a smaller body of about 170 members that convenes between annual sessions to handle legislative review, , and appointments. Standing Committee members are elected by the full NPC and include key figures like the chairman, who holds significant ceremonial and protocol roles. Deputies and committee members operate under the overarching authority of the (CCP), with a substantial majority—over 95 percent in recent congresses—being CCP members, ensuring policy continuity with central directives.

Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)

The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) functions as China's principal united front organization, facilitating consultation between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and non-CPC elites across political parties, ethnic groups, and social sectors. Established on September 21, 1949, through its First Plenary Session from September 21 to 30, it initially served to consolidate support for the newly founded People's Republic by incorporating former Kuomintang members, democratic parties, and patriotic figures into a CPC-led framework. The CPPCC operates without legislative authority, instead submitting advisory proposals on political, economic, and social matters to CPC and state organs, aligning with the party's united front strategy to co-opt influential non-party actors while maintaining centralized control. The CPPCC's National Committee comprises around 2,172 members for its 14th term, elected in 2023 for a five-year cycle, with similar numbers attending annual sessions. Members are selected by the standing committee at each level to represent diverse constituencies, including the eight minor democratic parties (such as the and Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese ), non-party independents, national and local people's organizations, ethnic minorities (with dedicated seats for groups like and Tibetans), religious figures, private entrepreneurs, intellectuals, artists, scientists, and . Approximately 40% of members hold CPC membership, ensuring ideological alignment, while the majority derive from categories designed to broaden symbolic participation without diluting CPC dominance; for instance, earlier committees included over 600 women and representatives from all 55 ethnic minorities. Local committees mirror this structure at provincial, municipal, and county levels, numbering over 600,000 members nationwide, and report to the national body. In the context of the Two Sessions, CPPCC participants convene annually in , typically preceding or concurrent with the , to review government work reports, deliberate draft policies, and submit roughly 1,000-3,000 proposals per session for CPC consideration—such as suggestions or social harmony initiatives—though adoption depends on party vetting rather than independent . The Standing Committee, with a chairman (currently , a CPC Politburo member) and vice-chairmen from non-CPC backgrounds, handles intersessional duties like inspections and targeted consultations. This setup promotes the appearance of consultative democracy but operates as an extension of CPC influence, where proposals rarely challenge core policies and serve to legitimize decisions through elite endorsement.

Proceedings and Agenda

Opening Ceremonies and Reports

The annual sessions of the (CPPCC) and the (NPC), collectively known as the Two Sessions, begin with formal opening ceremonies typically held in early March at the in . The CPPCC session opens first, usually on a or , presided over by its chairperson, who delivers an opening address emphasizing political consultation, democratic supervision, and participation in state affairs under the leadership of the (CCP). These ceremonies include the arrival of delegates from various non-CCP parties, mass organizations, and sectors, followed by procedural formalities such as agenda approval, but lack the legislative reports central to the NPC session. The NPC session opens the following day, marked by a more elaborate attended by nearly 3,000 delegates, including CCP leaders and state officials, with proceedings broadcast nationally. NPC Chairman presides, announcing the session's agenda, which includes reviewing key state documents. A pivotal element is the delivery of the Government Work Report by Premier Li Qiang, presented on the opening day to outline the State Council's achievements from the prior year, economic targets such as around 5% GDP growth, policy priorities like technological and consumption stimulation, and fiscal measures including budget deficits. This report, prepared by the State Council and submitted for NPC deliberation, serves as the primary policy blueprint, with its content reflecting CCP directives finalized months earlier. Additional reports introduced at or near the NPC opening include the NPC Standing Committee's work report, delivered by its vice chairman, detailing legislative activities such as law revisions and supervision efforts from the previous year. of the central and state revenue-expenditure are also presented for review, though detailed budget deliberations follow later in the session. These documents, drawn from official state data, undergo nominal scrutiny by delegates, with proposals and recommendations submitted for feedback, totaling over 8,000 in recent sessions. While portray these openings as showcases of unity and progress, independent analyses note their scripted nature, aligning closely with pre-determined CCP outcomes rather than open debate.

Deliberations and Voting

Deputies of the (NPC) conduct deliberations primarily through small-group meetings, where they review and discuss key documents such as the government work report, , , and draft laws. These sessions allow delegates to propose amendments, submit bills (requiring support from a delegation or at least 30 deputies), and offer suggestions, which are then forwarded to relevant committees for refinement. Senior leaders, including members of the Standing Committee, participate in specific groups to listen to feedback and explain policies, fostering a structured exchange before plenary sessions. In the 2024 session, for example, NPC deputies submitted over 8,000 suggestions, with 95.1% addressed by government departments post-session. Voting in the NPC occurs during plenary sessions, typically via electronic means for routine resolutions or for critical elections like state positions, overseen by appointed scrutineers to ensure procedural integrity. Items put to vote include approval of the central , development plans, personnel appointments, and legislative drafts, often resulting in near-unanimous outcomes reflecting pre-session consensus within the framework. In the 2024 annual session, the resolution on the 2023 national economic plan passed with 2,952 votes in favor, 3 against, and 10 abstentions out of 2,965 delegates; similarly, the 2024 resolution received 2,935 yes votes, 5 no, and 26 abstentions from 2,966 delegates. Such results, consistently above 99% approval in recent sessions, underscore the body's role in formalizing decisions largely vetted upstream by party mechanisms. In parallel, the (CPPCC) focuses on consultative deliberations without binding voting authority, emphasizing proposal submission and policy advice during group and plenary discussions. CPPCC members deliberate on the same core reports as the NPC, offering input through thousands of annual proposals that influence but do not mandate government action. In 2024, over 4,800 CPPCC proposals were handled by state organs, contributing to policy adjustments in areas like and social governance. This process aligns with the CPPCC's mandate for multiparty consultation under leadership, prioritizing unity and supplementary perspectives over adversarial voting.

Leadership Transitions

The (NPC) session within the Two Sessions serves as the primary venue for formalizing leadership transitions in China's state apparatus, particularly during the first annual session following a National Congress of the (CCP), which occurs every five years. Delegates to the NPC, numbering approximately 2,977 in recent sessions, vote on nominations for key positions including the President and of the , the and Vice Premiers of the State Council, the President of the , the Chief Procurator of the , and members of the Central Military Commission. These elections follow nominations put forward by the Presidium of the NPC, which in practice reflects decisions made by the CCP's Standing Committee in advance, ensuring alignment with party priorities. The process adheres to constitutional requirements under Article 62 of the PRC Constitution, stipulating simple majorities for approval, though outcomes consistently show near-unanimous support, with opposition votes typically numbering in the single digits or zero. Major transitions unfold over several days in the NPC's annual meeting, often concluding the session. For instance, during of the 14th NPC on March 10, 2023, was elected President for a third consecutive term, receiving 2,952 votes in favor, zero against, and three abstentions from a total of 2,977 delegates. The following day, March 11, 2023, was elected , succeeding , with 2,952 votes in favor, zero against, and one abstention, marking a shift toward greater emphasis on technological in . Similar patterns occurred in prior cycles; in the session of NPC, Xi was re-elected President amid constitutional amendments abolishing presidential term limits, approved by 2,958 votes to two against. These events underscore the ceremonial nature of NPC votes, as substantive selections occur through opaque CCP internal processes, with no public campaigning or alternative candidates permitted. The (CPPCC), convening concurrently, handles its own leadership elections, such as selecting the Chairman of the National Committee, but these carry advisory weight rather than executive authority. In the 2023 CPPCC session, was elected Chairman on March 4, replacing Wang Yang, in a vote reflecting CCP alignment on work. Transitions at both bodies reinforce CCP dominance, as NPC and CPPCC delegates are predominantly party members or affiliates, limiting independent input. Mid-term sessions, such as the 2025 Two Sessions, focus less on wholesale changes, approving instead routine appointments like State Councilors or ministerial roles, with no major upheavals reported that year amid economic stabilization efforts. Critics, including reports from Western analysts, note that this structure precludes competitive politics, prioritizing loyalty to CCP directives over deliberative selection.

Role in Governance

Formal Legislative Functions

The (NPC), as China's highest organ of state power, exercises formal legislative authority during its annual plenary session, which forms a core component of the Two Sessions, primarily through the enactment, amendment, and interpretation of laws as stipulated in Article 62 of the . This includes the power to amend the itself, formulate and revise basic laws on criminal, civil, administrative, and state organ matters, and address other fundamental legal frameworks when the Standing Committee deems it necessary. Legislative bills are adopted by a simple majority vote among the approximately 3,000 deputies present, with constitutional amendments requiring a two-thirds majority. During the Two Sessions, typically held in March, NPC deputies deliberate draft laws submitted by the State Council, the NPC Standing Committee, the , the , or special committees, focusing on priority areas such as , , and social governance. For instance, the NPC has the exclusive authority to enact core statutes like the and , with plenary sessions serving as the venue for final approval of major drafts after preliminary reviews by the Standing Committee. In practice, sessions often involve voting on bundled legislative items, including approvals of the national budget and five-year economic and social development plans, which carry quasi-legislative force under Article 62(15). The NPC Standing Committee, operating between plenary sessions, handles routine legislation, but the Two Sessions plenary reinforces formal oversight by examining enforcement of existing laws and ratifying treaties with legislative implications, such as those affecting or economic cooperation. Deputies may propose bills—numbering in the hundreds annually, as seen with 269 proposals submitted in one recent session—though adoption rates remain low without prior alignment through internal channels. These functions underscore the NPC's constitutional role in codifying state policy into law, distinct from the advisory proceedings of the concurrent .

Advisory and Symbolic Dimensions

The (CPPCC), convened during the Two Sessions, functions primarily as a consultative and advisory body to the (NPC) and the (CCP), offering proposals on policy matters drawn from its approximately 2,100 national committee members representing non-CCP parties, independents, and various sectors. These members deliberate government work reports, submit suggestions—numbering in the thousands annually—and engage in group discussions to refine inputs, with a stated emphasis on multiparty cooperation and patriotic principles under CCP leadership. However, the advisory influence is constrained, as proposals are filtered through CCP oversight, and implementation depends on alignment with predetermined party directives rather than independent deliberation. In practice, the NPC's advisory elements involve deputies reviewing and discussing legislative drafts during sessions, but these processes culminate in near-unanimous approvals, underscoring the endorsement rather than origination of policies. For instance, in the 2025 Two Sessions, CPPCC proposals were highlighted for their "pivotal role" in policymaking by accounts, yet external analyses describe the body as largely powerless, serving to legitimize CCP decisions through formalized consultation. This dynamic reflects a system where advisory inputs provide expertise—such as from business leaders or ethnic representatives—but do not alter core outcomes, as evidenced by consistent alignment with priorities announced prior to sessions. Symbolically, the Two Sessions project national unity and policy continuity, convening nearly 5,000 delegates in Beijing to showcase inclusive governance amid CCP dominance, with extensive media coverage amplifying signals on economic targets or leadership transitions. The events serve as a platform for controlled public engagement, where delegates from diverse backgrounds—ethnic minorities, professionals, and overseas Chinese—participate in ceremonies and press interactions, reinforcing the narrative of "whole-process people's democracy" as articulated in official discourse. Yet, this symbolism often masks substantive limitations, with critics noting the gatherings' role in manufacturing consensus rather than fostering genuine pluralism, as voting patterns and outcomes remain predictably synchronized with party lines. The sessions' annual timing in March, post-Lunar New Year, further enhances their ceremonial weight, positioning them as a ritual of state renewal despite underlying centralization.

Integration with CCP Decision-Making

The Two Sessions function as a mechanism to formalize and legitimize decisions pre-determined by the (CCP) central leadership, particularly the Standing Committee, rather than serving as arenas for independent deliberation. Major policies, legislative proposals, and leadership transitions are formulated through CCP channels, such as party congresses and leading small groups, before being presented to the (NPC) for ratification and the (CPPCC) for consultation. For instance, following the 20th CCP National Congress in October 2022, the subsequent NPC session in March 2023 endorsed Xi Jinping's third term as state president and confirmed key appointments, reflecting prior party selections. CCP party groups embedded within the NPC and CPPCC apparatuses ensure alignment with party directives, overseeing agenda setting, candidate nominations, and voting outcomes to prevent deviations. Approximately 70-72% of NPC deputies are CCP members, with the remainder drawn from minor "democratic parties" and mass organizations that operate under CCP guidance, minimizing opportunities for substantive opposition. The NPC's Standing Committee, which handles routine legislative work between sessions, similarly operates under party pre-approval, as evidenced by near-unanimous passage rates for bills—over 95% approval in recent terms—indicating controlled rather than deliberative processes. The CPPCC's advisory role integrates with CCP through multiparty consultations that feed input into party policy formulation, but its recommendations lack enforcement power and are subordinate to CCP priorities. This structure underscores the Two Sessions' ceremonial function: publicizing CCP-endorsed targets, such as GDP growth or military budgets, while mechanisms like the enforce loyalty via ideological campaigns and personnel controls. Under Xi Jinping's centralization, authority has shifted further from state bodies to party organs, with NPC sessions increasingly serving to propagate unified narratives on issues like economic resilience and .

Criticisms and Limitations

Absence of Competitive Politics

The Two Sessions, comprising the (NPC) and the (CPPCC), operate without mechanisms for competitive electoral politics or adversarial deliberation, as all participants are selected through processes controlled by the (CCP) and required to align with its predetermined policy lines. NPC delegates, numbering around 2,977, are indirectly elected via lower-level congresses but vetted and approved by CCP organs to ensure loyalty, precluding open competition or independent candidacies that could challenge party directives. Similarly, CPPCC members, drawn from "democratic parties" and non-party figures, are hand-selected by the CCP's , with no provisions for rival slates or public contests; these groups explicitly accept CCP leadership as a condition of participation. This structure manifests in session proceedings through ritualized approval rather than debate or contestation. NPC plenary votes on key legislation, budgets, and leadership appointments routinely achieve near-unanimity, reflecting advance coordination rather than genuine contest; for instance, in March 2023, all 2,952 attending NPC delegates unanimously endorsed Xi Jinping's third term as president, with no opposing votes recorded. Even on contentious measures, such as the 2020 Hong Kong national security law, approval stood at 2,878 in favor, one against, and six abstentions out of nearly 3,000 delegates. CPPCC sessions, lacking formal voting authority, focus on scripted consultations and proposals that reinforce CCP priorities, with no recorded instances of organized opposition or amendments altering core agendas. The absence of competitive politics stems from the CCP's constitutional monopoly on power, which prohibits independent political organizations and enforces ideological conformity via mechanisms like the system. While nominal "non-CCP parties" hold seats—comprising about 30% in the NPC and up to 60% in the CPPCC—these entities operate as advisory appendages, barred from fielding alternative leadership or policies; empirical data from session outcomes shows zero instances of vetoes or blocks against CCP-initiated items since the system's formalization in 1954. This contrasts with competitive legislatures elsewhere, where divided votes and amendments reflect pluralistic input, but in , dissenting signals are rare and often symbolic, as evidenced by minimal abstentions or "no" votes in high-stakes approvals like the 2024 economic targets, passed by overwhelming majorities.

Control by the Chinese Communist Party

The (CCP) maintains dominant control over the Two Sessions—the annual meetings of the (NPC) and the (CPPCC)—through the vetting of delegates, pre-determination of agendas, and ratification of party-formulated policies. The NPC, with 2,977 delegates in the 14th Congress (2023–2028), draws primarily from CCP ranks and its allied "democratic parties" within the framework, ensuring ideological alignment; approximately 72% of delegates in the preceding 12th NPC were CCP members. Candidate selection occurs indirectly via provincial-level congresses, but requires CCP approval at each stage to filter out non-conforming individuals, resulting in a body that reflects party priorities rather than broad electoral competition. Leadership transitions and key appointments during NPC sessions follow CCP nominations, with the proposing candidates for roles like president, , and State Council members; these are then endorsed by the NPC and approved via votes that conventionally exceed 95% support. For example, in March 2023, secured unanimous approval for his third presidential term from all 2,952 voting delegates, while the 2024 session saw a constitutional revision pass 2,883–8 with nine abstentions. Such outcomes stem from the CCP's prior consensus-building in bodies like the Politburo Standing Committee, where substantive policy debates occur, rendering NPC proceedings largely confirmatory. The CPPCC, comprising over 2,100 members from non-CCP groups, functions as an advisory forum under CCP oversight, with its leadership and proposals coordinated to reinforce party lines without binding . Discussions during the Two Sessions focus on amplifying CCP initiatives, such as economic targets or , but lack veto power; empirical patterns of synchronized agendas and unanimous endorsements across sessions demonstrate the CPPCC's integration into the party's apparatus for mobilizing elite consensus. This control mechanism, evident in the absence of rejected major since the NPC's in 1954, prioritizes policy continuity over adversarial deliberation, as dissenting votes remain marginal (typically under 3% for salient items).

Human Rights and Representation Issues

The (NPC) and (CPPCC), convened during the Two Sessions, feature delegates selected through indirect elections controlled by the (CCP), with candidates vetted for political loyalty rather than subjected to competitive or direct popular voting. NPC delegates, numbering around 2,977 in recent sessions, are elected every five years by provincial-level people's congresses, but the CCP influences nominations and outcomes to ensure alignment with party directives, resulting in approximately 72% of NPC members being CCP affiliates. This process prioritizes "broad representativeness" through quotas for ethnic minorities (about 12-15% of delegates), women, and professionals, yet excludes independent or dissenting voices, as evidenced by the disqualification of candidates perceived as disloyal. The CPPCC, as a body, includes non-CCP participants from eight minor "democratic parties" and independents, comprising roughly one-third of its over 2,000 members, but these groups operate under CCP guidance and avoid challenging core policies. Former delegates have described the assemblies as "rubber stamps" that lack mechanisms for genuine accountability or opposition, with deliberations confined to endorsing pre-approved agendas rather than reflecting diverse constituency interests. Representation of marginalized groups, such as or Tibetans, remains symbolic, as delegates from these areas must adhere to CCP narratives on regional policies, precluding advocacy for or . Human rights concerns during the Two Sessions include heightened suppression of dissent to maintain order, with authorities detaining activists and increasing surveillance in Beijing; for instance, in March 2019, security measures rounded up petitioners and protesters ahead of the meetings to prevent disruptions over issues like Xinjiang detentions and trade policies. The sessions rarely address documented abuses, such as mass detentions in Xinjiang or restrictions on religious and ethnic minorities, instead rubber-stamping budgets and laws that expand state control, including surveillance technologies criticized for enabling arbitrary arrests. Internal dissent within sessions is minimal, with delegates adhering to official lines to avoid repercussions, as public criticism of CCP leadership or policies is stifled, limiting any platform for rights advocacy. This structure perpetuates a cycle where representation issues compound human rights gaps, as unaccountable delegates approve measures without scrutiny from affected populations.

Policy Impacts and Outcomes

Economic Policy Announcements

The Two Sessions serve as the primary forum for announcing China's annual economic targets and policy directions, primarily through the Government Work Report delivered by the Premier at the (NPC) opening session. This report outlines macroeconomic goals, fiscal measures, and sectoral priorities, which are then formalized via NPC approvals of the national budget and development plans. These announcements reflect the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) central , emphasizing state-directed stimulus amid challenges like post-COVID recovery, property sector distress, and external trade pressures. Policy announcements from the Two Sessions, including economic targets, stimulus measures, and military budget details, often influence global markets and commodities, as verified by analyses of market reactions to these events. Key macroeconomic targets include the GDP growth rate, typically set ambitiously to signal confidence despite underlying structural issues such as accumulation and weak domestic . For instance, in the 2025 sessions held in March, announced a GDP growth target of around 5 percent, consistent with the prior year but exceeding independent forecasts of 4.6 percent, alongside consumer price goals aimed at stabilization. announcements highlight deficit expansion and bond issuance to fund and consumption boosts; the 2025 deficit was raised to 4 percent of GDP from 3 percent in 2024, with RMB 500 billion in special government bonds allocated to recapitalize state-owned banks and RMB 300 billion for consumer goods trade-in programs. Sectoral policies announced often prioritize technological self-reliance, manufacturing expansion, and property market stabilization over broad liberalization. In 2024, the sessions endorsed issuance of RMB 1 trillion in ultra-long special treasury bonds to support local government financing and real estate recovery, while reiterating "proactive" fiscal measures tempered by overall austerity to manage public debt risks exceeding 100 percent of GDP. Monetary policy hints, though not directly set by the NPC, align with announcements favoring moderate easing to counter deflationary pressures, as evidenced by repeated emphases on bolstering business confidence and domestic demand in both 2024 and 2025 reports. These directives underscore a continuity in state interventionism, with limited concessions to market reforms amid geopolitical tensions. Budget approvals during the sessions detail expenditures across categories, with economic outlays dominating; for 2025, augmented fiscal support included measures to enhance "" through critical technology investments and , reflecting priorities over consumer-led growth. Critics from independent analyses note that such announcements often prioritize headline targets over addressing root causes like overcapacity in and demographic decline, leading to implementation gaps where actual growth falls short of projections.

Foreign Affairs and Security Priorities

The Two Sessions feature announcements reinforcing China's emphasis on as integral to development, with the approving annual increases in defense spending to support modernization amid perceived external threats. In 2024, the defense budget rose by 7.2 percent to 1.67 trillion yuan (approximately $230.6 billion), prioritizing capabilities in areas such as hypersonic weapons, naval expansion, and cyber defense to deter challenges to sovereignty. A similar 7.2 percent increase was set for 2025, justified by defense officials as necessary given a "complex security environment" involving territorial disputes and great-power competition. These allocations align with broader priorities under Xi Jinping's "comprehensive " framework, which integrates , economic, and technological safeguards against risks like disruptions and . Foreign affairs priorities, articulated in the Government Work Report and Foreign Minister Wang Yi's press conferences, stress defending core interests while advancing Chinese-led global frameworks. Central to this is the commitment to 's reunification, pursued through peaceful means with "utmost sincerity" but without renouncing force, coupled with vows to hold "Taiwan independence" advocates accountable and counter external interference. In the South China Sea, sessions highlight dialogue with for stability while safeguarding China's claims against perceived infringements. Relations with major powers receive focus, including deepening the "no-limits" strategic partnership with for coordination on security issues, advocating mutual respect and win-win cooperation with the to manage competition, and promoting an independent partnership free of bloc confrontation. Sessions also promote initiatives like the (GSI), launched in 2022 and reiterated in subsequent meetings, which calls for common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security through sovereignty respect and multilateral dialogue centered on the , as an alternative to perceived Western alliance-based approaches. The remains a cornerstone for expanding influence via and economic ties, with 2024-2025 discussions emphasizing high-standard cooperation to counter efforts. These priorities reflect continuity in assertive , prioritizing national rejuvenation over accommodation of rival powers' concerns.

Implementation and Effectiveness

Policies announced during the Two Sessions, primarily through the Government Work Report and NPC resolutions, are executed via a top-down hierarchy led by the State Council, which translates legislative approvals into administrative action plans distributed to ministries and local governments. Local party committees, under (CCP) oversight, enforce compliance at provincial, municipal, and county levels, leveraging cadre responsibility systems that tie officials' promotions to policy outcomes. The NPC Standing Committee conducts supervisory reviews, including annual hearings on work reports from the State Council and , to assess implementation progress. This structure enables rapid mobilization for large-scale initiatives, such as and alleviation campaigns. For example, the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020), endorsed in Two Sessions proceedings, achieved or exceeded 86% of its 250 quantitative targets, including lifting 98.99 million rural poor out of by 2020, as verified by official audits. Economic policies, like fiscal stimulus and monetary easing announced in 2025 sessions targeting 5% GDP growth, have historically supported short-term expansions, with China's GDP averaging 6.5% annual growth from 2016–2019 despite global headwinds. Effectiveness, however, varies by domain and faces critiques for prioritizing quantitative metrics over qualitative . Industrial policies fostering "new " in semiconductors and renewables, reiterated in 2025, have driven leadership in production (over 80% global capacity by 2024) but contributed to overcapacity and exceeding 100 yuan. Oversight mechanisms, while formalized, lack independent , as CCP dominance limits ; reports from think tanks note persistent gaps in innovation-driven growth, with stagnating at 0.5–1% annually since 2010 amid state-directed . In foreign and security realms, Two Sessions priorities like military modernization have yielded tangible advances, with defense spending rising 7.2% in 2025 to support carrier fleets and hypersonic weapons, enhancing deterrence capabilities. Yet, challenges arise from execution rigidities, as evidenced by uneven policy rollouts pre-2023, where centralized directives clashed with local realities, leading to economic disruptions estimated at 2–3% GDP loss in 2022. Empirical assessments from non-partisan analyses indicate that while coercive ensures high adherence rates, long-term hinges on adapting to demographic declines and frictions, areas where sessions announcements have yet to demonstrate reversal.

Recent Developments

Sessions from 2020 to 2023

The 2020 sessions were significantly delayed due to the outbreak, with the CPPCC convening from May 21 to 27 and the NPC from May 22 to 28, marking the first postponement in decades. For the first time since 1990, no explicit GDP growth target was announced, as authorities cited uncertainties from the pandemic and global economic disruptions. Discussions emphasized pandemic containment measures, achieving the goal of eradicating by year's end, and completing the construction of a , with Premier highlighting fiscal support for affected sectors without specifying numerical targets for major indicators. In 2021, the CPPCC met from March 4 to 10, while the NPC session ran from March 5 to 11, a compressed schedule reflecting ongoing precautions. The government set a GDP growth target of over 6 percent, prioritizing recovery through expanded fiscal deficits to 3.2 percent of GDP and monetary easing to support employment and consumption. Key outcomes included approval of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025), focusing on technological self-reliance, economic strategy, and carbon peak by 2030, amid deliberations on normalizing stimulus without abrupt policy cliffs. The 2022 sessions occurred from March 4 to 10 for the CPPCC and March 5 to 11 for the NPC, underscoring continuity in policy amid persistent challenges and geopolitical tensions. A GDP target of around 5.5 percent was established, accompanied by a fiscal deficit of 2.8 percent of GDP and issuance of special treasury bonds totaling 1 trillion yuan for and enhancements. Emphasis was placed on stabilizing the economy through targeted support for small businesses, rural revitalization, and initiatives, while maintaining strict controls that later contributed to growth shortfalls relative to the target. During the 2023 sessions, held in March with the NPC from March 5 to 13, delegates formalized Xi Jinping's third term as state president and approved as premier, aligning with prior CCP leadership transitions. The GDP growth objective was set at around 5 percent, with a fiscal deficit of 3 percent of GDP and 1 trillion yuan in ultra-long special treasury bonds to bolster and local governments facing pressures. Announcements included institutional reforms consolidating regulatory bodies for and technology, vows for "forceful" overhauls in these sectors to enhance and , and priorities for high-quality development amid slowing post-pandemic recovery and external trade frictions.

2024 and 2025 Sessions

The 2024 Two Sessions, comprising the second session of the (NPC) and the 13th session of the 14th (CPPCC), convened from March 4 to 11 in . In the Government Work Report (GWR) delivered by Premier on March 5, set its GDP growth target at around 5 percent, matching the previous year's ambition despite a higher from 2023's performance. The report outlined targets for creating over 12 million urban jobs, maintaining an urban rate around 5.5 percent, and limiting the fiscal deficit to 3 percent of GDP, with local special-purpose bonds issuance at 3.9 trillion yuan. emphases included stabilizing the real estate sector through destocking unsold homes, promoting consumption via trade-in programs for consumer goods, and advancing technological in areas like AI and semiconductors amid external pressures. No major fiscal stimulus package was unveiled, signaling continuity in macroeconomic rather than aggressive intervention. The NPC approved the 2024 budget, amendments to the Tariff Law to support "law-based taxation," and personnel appointments reinforcing control, including extensions for key officials. The 2025 Two Sessions occurred from March 4 to 11, with the NPC session formally opening on March 5. Premier Li Qiang's GWR reiterated the GDP growth target of around 5 percent, aligning with long-term goals like doubling the economy by 2035, while introducing a record-high fiscal deficit of 4 percent of GDP to fund expanded stimulus. Additional targets encompassed over 12 million new urban jobs, CPI growth around 2 percent, and increased issuance of ultra-long special treasury bonds totaling 1 trillion yuan for and upgrades. Priorities shifted toward boosting domestic consumption as the "top task," enhancing support through reduced burdens and fair competition, and accelerating AI-driven industrial upgrades and high-tech to counter frictions. The sessions underscored resilience against external challenges, including U.S. tariffs, with commitments to expand capacity and critical technologies. The NPC endorsed the 2025 central and local budgets, a report on 2024 budget execution, and resolutions on promotion and technological advancement, while approving revisions to laws on and . Compared to 2024, fiscal loosening intensified without altering core growth ambitions, reflecting cautious optimism amid subdued domestic demand where consumption contributed under 30 percent to GDP in late 2024.

Expectations for the 2026 Sessions

The fourth session of the 14th Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is scheduled to open on March 4, 2026, in Beijing, followed by the fourth session of the 14th National People's Congress (NPC) on March 5, 2026. These sessions typically last about one week. Ahead of the 2026 Two Sessions, expectations include a more active fiscal policy with public spending growth around 5%, a narrow deficit rate of about 4%, and a broad deficit up to 8.3%, alongside moderately loose monetary policy focusing on steady growth, mild inflation recovery, and easing measures like potential rate cuts to support economic rebalancing.

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