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YubiKey
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Key Information
The YubiKey is a hardware authentication device manufactured by Yubico to protect access to computers, networks, and online services that supports one-time passwords (OTP), public-key cryptography, authentication, and the Universal 2nd Factor (U2F) and FIDO2 protocols[1] developed by the FIDO Alliance. It allows users to securely log into their accounts by emitting one-time passwords or using a FIDO-based public/private key pair generated by the device. YubiKey also allows storing static passwords for use at sites that do not support one-time passwords.[2] Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Twitter, and Facebook use YubiKey devices to secure employee accounts as well as end-user accounts.[3][4][5] Some password managers support YubiKey.[6][7] Yubico also manufactures the Security Key, a similar lower-cost device with only FIDO2/WebAuthn and FIDO/U2F support.[8][9][10]
The YubiKey implements the HMAC-based one-time password algorithm (HOTP) and the time-based one-time password algorithm (TOTP), and identifies itself as a keyboard that delivers the one-time password over the USB HID protocol. A YubiKey can also present itself as an OpenPGP card using 1024, 2048, 3072 and 4096-bit RSA (for key sizes over 2048 bits, GnuPG version 2.0 or higher is required) and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) p256, p384 and more, depending on version,[11] allowing users to sign, encrypt and decrypt messages without exposing the private keys to the outside world. Also supported is the PKCS#11 standard to emulate a PIV smart card. This feature allows code signing of Docker images as well as certificate-based authentication for Microsoft Active Directory and SSH.[12][13][14][15]
Founded in 2007 by former CEO now Chief Evangelist Stina Ehrensvärd, Yubico is a Public company with offices in Santa Clara, CA, Bellevue, WA, and Stockholm, Sweden.[16] Yubico CTO, Jakob Ehrensvärd, is the lead author of the original strong authentication specification that became known as Universal 2nd Factor (U2F).[17]
YubiKey released the YubiKey 5 series in 2018, which adds support for FIDO2.[18]
History
[edit]Yubico was founded in 2007 and began offering a Pilot Box for developers in November of that year.[19] The original YubiKey product was shown at the annual RSA Conference in April 2008,[20][21] and a more robust YubiKey II model was launched in 2009.[22] Yubico's explanation of the name "YubiKey" is that it derives from the phrase "your ubiquitous key", and that "yubi" is the Japanese word for finger.[23]
YubiKey II and later models have two "slots" available, for storing two distinct configurations with separate AES secrets and other settings. When authenticating, the first slot is used by only briefly pressing the button on the device, while the second slot gets used when holding the button for 2 to 5 seconds.
In 2010, Yubico began offering the YubiKey OATH and YubiKey RFID models. The YubiKey OATH added the ability to generate 6- and 8-character one-time passwords using protocols from the Initiative for Open Authentication (OATH), in addition to the 32-character passwords used by Yubico's own OTP authentication scheme. The YubiKey RFID model included the OATH capability plus also included a MIFARE Classic 1k radio-frequency identification chip,[24] though that was a separate device within the package that could not be configured with the normal Yubico software over a USB connection.[25]
Yubico announced the YubiKey Nano in February 2012, a miniaturized version of the standard YubiKey which was designed so it would fit almost entirely inside a USB port and only expose a small touch pad for the button.[26] Most later models of the YubiKey have also been available in both standard and "nano" sizes.
2012 also saw the introduction of the YubiKey Neo, which improved upon the previous YubiKey RFID product by implementing near-field communication (NFC) technology and integrating it with the USB side of the device.[27] The YubiKey Neo (and Neo-n, a "nano" version of the device) are able to transmit one-time passwords to NFC readers as part of a configurable URL contained in a NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF) message. The Neo is also able to communicate using the CCID smart-card protocol in addition to USB HID (human interface device) keyboard emulation. The CCID mode is used for PIV smart card and OpenPGP support, while USB HID is used for the one-time password authentication schemes.[28]
In 2014, the YubiKey Neo was updated with FIDO Universal 2nd Factor (U2F) support.[29] Later that year, Yubico released the FIDO U2F Security Key, which specifically included U2F support but none of the other one-time password, static password, smart card, or NFC features of previous YubiKeys.[8] At launch, it was correspondingly sold at a lower price point of just $18, compared to $25 for the YubiKey Standard ($40 for the Nano version), and $50 for the YubiKey Neo ($60 for Neo-n).[30] Some of the pre-release devices issued by Google during FIDO/U2F development reported themselves as "Yubico WinUSB Gnubby (gnubby1)".[31]
In April 2015, the company launched the YubiKey Edge in both standard and nano form factors. This slotted in between the Neo and FIDO U2F products feature-wise, as it was designed to handle OTP and U2F authentication, but did not include smart card or NFC support.[32]
The YubiKey 4 family of devices was first launched in November 2015, with USB-A models in both standard and nano sizes. The YubiKey 4 includes most features of the YubiKey Neo, including increasing the allowed OpenPGP key size to 4096 bits (vs. the previous 2048), but dropped the NFC capability of the Neo.
At CES 2017, Yubico announced an expansion of the YubiKey 4 series to support a new USB-C design. The YubiKey 4C was released on February 13, 2017.[33] On Android OS over the USB-C connection, only the one-time password feature is supported by the Android OS and YubiKey, with other features not currently supported including Universal 2nd Factor (U2F).[34] A 4C Nano version became available in September 2017.[35]
In April 2018, the company brought out the Security Key by Yubico, their first device to implement the new FIDO2 authentication protocols, WebAuthn (which reached W3C Candidate Recommendation status in March[36]) and Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP). At launch, the device is only available in the "standard" form factor with a USB-A connector. Like the previous FIDO U2F Security Key, it is blue in color and uses a key icon on its button. It is distinguished by a number "2" etched into the plastic between the button and the keyring hole. It is also less expensive than the YubiKey Neo and YubiKey 4 models, costing $20 per unit at launch because it lacks the OTP and smart card features of those previous devices, though it retains FIDO U2F capability.[9]
Product features
[edit]This section needs to be updated. The reason given is: Missing Yubikey Bio. (December 2024) |
This section appears to contradict itself on Yubikey 4 nano/edge-n features and production time span. Cited sources are inconsistent.. (December 2024) |
A list of the primary features and capabilities of the YubiKey products.[37]
| Model | Years sold | Secure static passwords |
OTP standards | Smartcards | FIDO standards | HSM | FIPS 140-2 variant |
Interface | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OATH OTP |
Yubico OTP |
OATH: HOTP (event) |
OATH: TOTP (time) |
PIV | OpenPGP | U2F | FIDO2 | NFC | USB-A | USB-C | Lightning | |||||
| YubiKey VIP | 2011–2017 | Yes | Yes | |||||||||||||
| YubiKey Nano | 2012–2016 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |||||||||||
| YubiKey NEO | 2012–2018 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ||||||
| FIDO U2F Security Key | 2013–2018 | Yes | Yes | |||||||||||||
| YubiKey Plus | 2014–2015 | Yes | Yes | Yes | ||||||||||||
| YubiKey NEO-n | 2014–2016 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |||||||
| YubiKey Standard | 2014–2016 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |||||||||||
| YubiKey Edge-n | 2015–2016 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ||||||||
| YubiKey 4 Nano | 2016–2017 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | ||||||||
| YubiHSM 1 | 2015–2017 | Yes | Yes | |||||||||||||
| YubiKey 4 | 2015–2018 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |||||||
| YubiKey 4 Nano | 2015–2018 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |||||||
| YubiKey 4C Nano | 2017–2018 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |||||||
| YubiKey 4C | 2017–2018 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |||||||
| YubiHSM 2 | 2017– | Yes | Available | Yes | ||||||||||||
| Security Key by Yubico | 2018–2020 | Yes | Yes | Yes | ||||||||||||
| Security Key NFC by Yubico | 2019– | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |||||||||||
| YubiKey 5C Nano | 2018– | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Available | Yes | |||||
| YubiKey 5C | 2018– | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Available | Yes | |||||
| YubiKey 5 Nano | 2018– | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Available | Yes | |||||
| YubiKey 5 NFC | 2018– | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Available | Yes | Yes | ||||
| YubiKey 5Ci | 2019– | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Available | Yes | Yes | ||||
| YubiKey 5C NFC | 2020– | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Available | Yes | Yes | ||||
ModHex
[edit]When being used for one-time passwords and stored static passwords, the YubiKey emits characters using a modified hexadecimal alphabet which is intended to be as independent of system keyboard settings as possible. This alphabet is referred to as ModHex and consists of the characters "cbdefghijklnrtuv", corresponding to the hexadecimal digits "0123456789abcdef".[38]
Since YubiKeys use raw keyboard scan codes in USB HID mode, there can be problems when using the devices on computers that are set up with different keyboard layouts, such as Dvorak. ModHex was created to avoid conflicts between different keyboard layouts. It only uses characters that are located in the same place on most Latin alphabet keyboards, but is still 16 characters, allowing it to be used in place of hexadecimal.[39] Alternatively, this issue can be addressed by using operating system features to temporarily switch to a standard US keyboard layout (or similar) when using one-time passwords. However, YubiKey Neo and later devices can be configured with alternate scan codes to match layouts that aren't compatible with the ModHex character set.[40]
This problem only applies to YubiKey products in HID mode, where it must emulate keyboard input. U2F authentication in YubiKey products bypasses this problem by using the alternate U2FHID protocol, which sends and receives raw binary messages instead of keyboard scan codes.[41] CCID mode acts as a smart card reader, which does not use HID protocols at all.
Security issues
[edit]YubiKey 4 closed-sourcing concerns
[edit]Most of the code that runs on a YubiKey is closed source. While Yubico has released some code for industry standard functionality like PGP and HOTP it was disclosed that as of the 4th generation of the product this is not the same code that the new units ship with.[42][43] Because new units are permanently firmware locked at the factory it is not possible to compile the open source code and load it on the device manually, a user must trust that the code on a new key is authentic and secure.
Code for other functionality such as U2F, PIV and Modhex is entirely closed source.
On May 16, 2016, Yubico CTO Jakob Ehrensvärd responded to the open-source community's concerns with a blog post saying that "we, as a product company, have taken a clear stand against implementations based on off-the-shelf components and further believe that something like a commercial-grade AVR or ARM controller is unfit to be used in a security product."[44]
Techdirt founder Mike Masnick strongly criticized this decision, saying "Encryption is tricky. There are almost always vulnerabilities and bugs -- a point we've been making a lot lately. But the best way to fix those tends to be getting as many knowledgeable eyes on the code as possible. And that's not possible when it's closed source."[45]
ROCA vulnerability in certain YubiKey 4, 4C, and 4 Nano devices
[edit]In October 2017, security researchers found a vulnerability (known as ROCA) in the implementation of RSA keypair generation in a cryptographic library used by a large number of Infineon security chips, as used in a wide range of security keys and security token products (including YubiKey). The vulnerability allows an attacker to reconstruct the private key by using the public key.[46][47] All YubiKey 4, YubiKey 4C, and YubiKey 4 Nano devices within the revisions 4.2.6 to 4.3.4 were affected by this vulnerability.[48] Yubico remedied this issue in all shipping YubiKey 4 devices by switching to a different key generation function and offered free replacements for any affected keys until March 31, 2019. In some cases, the issue can be bypassed by generating new keys outside of the YubiKey and importing them onto the device.[49]
OTP password protection on YubiKey NEO
[edit]In January 2018, Yubico disclosed a moderate vulnerability where password protection for the OTP functionality on the YubiKey NEO could be bypassed under certain conditions. The issue was corrected as of firmware version 3.5.0, and Yubico offered free replacement keys to any user claiming to be affected until April 1, 2019.[50]
Reduced initial randomness on certain FIPS series devices
[edit]In June 2019, Yubico released a security advisory reporting reduced randomness in FIPS-certified devices with firmware version 4.4.2 and 4.4.4 (there is no version 4.4.3), shortly after power-up.[51] Security keys with reduced randomness may leave keys more easily discovered and compromised than expected. The issue affected the FIPS series only, and then only certain scenarios, although FIPS ECDSA usage was "at higher risk". The company offered free replacements for any affected keys.
Infineon ECDSA private key recovery
[edit]In September 2024, security researchers from NinjaLab discovered a cryptographic flaw in Infineon chips that would allow a person to clone a Yubikey if an attacker gained physical access to it. The security vulnerability permanently affects all Yubikeys prior to firmware update 5.7. Yubico rated the issue as "moderate" citing the need for an attacker to have physical access to the key, expensive equipment, and advanced cryptographic and technical knowledge.[52][53][54]
Social activism
[edit]In 2018, Yubico gave away free YubiKeys with laser engraved logos to new WIRED and ArsTechnica subscribers.[55]
Yubico provided 500 YubiKeys to protesters during the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests. The company states the decision was based on their mission to protect vulnerable Internet users and work with free speech supporters.[56][57]
See also
[edit]References
[edit]- ^ "Specifications Overview". FIDO Alliance. 22 December 2014. Retrieved 4 December 2015.
- ^ "What Is A Yubikey". Yubico. Retrieved 7 November 2014.
- ^ McMillan (3 October 2013). "Facebook Pushes Passwords One Step Closer to Death". Wired. Retrieved 7 November 2014.
- ^ Diallo, Amadou (30 November 2013). "Google Wants To Make Your Passwords Obsolete". Forbes. Retrieved 15 November 2014.
- ^ Blackman, Andrew (15 September 2013). "Say Goodbye to the Password". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 3 January 2014. Retrieved 15 November 2014.
- ^ "YubiKey Authentication". LastPass. Retrieved 15 November 2014.
- ^ "KeePass & YubiKey". KeePass. Retrieved 15 November 2014.
- ^ a b "Yubico Releases FIDO U2F Security Key". Yubico (Press release). 2014-10-21. Retrieved 2018-05-05.
- ^ a b "Yubico Launches New Developer Program and Security Key for FIDO2 and WebAuthn W3C Specifications" (Press release). 2018-04-10. Retrieved 2018-05-06.
- ^ Lemos, Robert (2014-10-22). "Google Offers USB Security Key to Make Bad Passwords Moot". Ars Technica. Archived from the original on 2018-10-18.
- ^ "YubiKey 5.2 Enhancements to OpenPGP 3.4 Support – Yubico". 23 September 2020.
- ^ "Launching The 4th Generation YubiKey". Yubico. Retrieved 20 November 2015.
- ^ "With a Touch, Yubico, Docker Revolutionize Code Signing". Yubico. Retrieved 20 November 2015.
- ^ "Setting up Windows Server for YubiKey PIV Authentication". Yubico. 3 August 2020. Archived from the original on 2021-06-06. Retrieved 2021-06-06.
- ^ "SSH user certificates". developers.yubico.com. Retrieved 2021-06-06.
- ^ "The Team". Yubico. Retrieved 12 September 2015.
- ^ "History of FIDO". FIDO Alliance. FIDO Alliance. Archived from the original on 26 August 2018. Retrieved 16 March 2017.
- ^ "Yubico launches new YubiKey 5 Series 2FA keys, supports passwordless FIDO2 and NFC". Android Police. 2018-09-24. Retrieved 2019-10-07.
- ^ "Yubico launches YubiKey Pilot Box". Yubico. 2007-11-26. Archived from the original on 2008-02-21. Retrieved 2018-05-06.
- ^ Steve Gibson (April 2008). "Security Now! Notes for Episode #141". Security Now!. Gibson Research Corporation. Retrieved 2018-05-05.
- ^ Leo Laporte and Steve Gibson (2008-04-24). "Episode #141 - RSA Conference 2008". Security Now!. Gibson Research Corporation. Retrieved 2018-05-05.
- ^ Mike (2009-08-27). "Yubikey II – got it". Read My Damn Blog. Retrieved 2018-05-05.
- ^ "Company Information". Yubico. Retrieved 2020-11-30.
- ^ "RFID YubiKey". Yubico Store. Archived from the original on 2011-08-29. Retrieved 2018-05-05.
- ^ "RFID YubiKey". IDivine Technology. Archived from the original on 2018-05-06. Retrieved 2018-05-05.
- ^ "Yubico Launches YubiKey Nano, The World's Smallest One-Time Password Token" (Press release). Yubico. 2012-02-28. Retrieved 2018-05-05.
- ^ Clark, Sarah (2012-02-22). "Yubico introduces one-time password token that secures access to the contents of NFC phones". NFC World. Retrieved 2018-05-05.
- ^ Maples, David (2012-12-26). "YubiKey NEO Composite Device". Yubico. Retrieved 2018-05-05.
- ^ "Yubico Introduces Industry's First FIDO Ready™ Universal 2nd Factor Device". Yubico (Press release). 2014-01-06. Retrieved 2018-05-05.
- ^ "YubiKey Hardware". Yubico. Archived from the original on 2014-11-07.
- ^ "pamu2fcfg doesn't support test devices". GitHub.
- ^ "Yubico Launches YubiKey Edge at RSA 2015; OTP and U2F Two-Factor Authentication in One Key". Yubico (Press release). Retrieved 2018-05-05.
- ^ "NEW YubiKey 4C featuring USB-C revealed at CES 2017 | Yubico". Yubico. 2017-01-05. Retrieved 2017-09-14.
- ^ "Can the YubiKey 4C be plugged directly into Android phones or tablets with USB-C ports? | Yubico". Yubico. Archived from the original on 2017-09-14. Retrieved 2017-09-14.
- ^ "Our Family is Growing! YubiKey 4C Nano Unveiled at Microsoft Ignite". Yubico. 2017-09-25. Retrieved 2018-05-05.
- ^ Jones, Michael (2018-03-20). "Candidate Recommendation (CR) for Web Authentication Specification". W3C Web Authentication Working Group. Retrieved 2018-05-06.
- ^ "What YubiKey Do You Have". Retrieved 2021-02-11.
- ^ E, Jakob (12 June 2008). "Modhex - why and what is it?". Yubico. Archived from the original on 16 November 2017. Retrieved 6 November 2016.
- ^ "Modified hexadecimal encoding (ModHex)". docs.yubico.com. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
- ^ Toh, Alvin (2013-07-24). "Expanding YubiKey Keyboard Support". Yubico. Retrieved 2018-05-05.
- ^ "FIDO U2F HID Protocol Specification". FIDO Alliance. 2017-04-11. Retrieved 2018-05-06.
- ^ Beaupré, Antoine (17 October 2017). "A comparison of cryptographic keycards". LWN.net. Retrieved 21 September 2020.
- ^ "Bad News: Two-Factor Authentication Pioneer YubiKey Drops Open Source PGP For Proprietary Version". techdirt. 16 May 2016. Retrieved 21 September 2020.
- ^ "Secure Hardware vs. Open Source". Yubico.com. 16 May 2016. Retrieved 18 September 2022.
- ^ Masnick, Mike (16 May 2016). "Bad News: Two-Factor Authentication Pioneer YubiKey Drops Open Source PGP For Proprietary Version". Techdirt. Retrieved 27 March 2020.
- ^ "ROCA: Vulnerable RSA generation (CVE-2017-15361) [CRoCS wiki]". crocs.fi.muni.cz. Retrieved 2017-10-19.
- ^ "NVD - CVE-2017-15361". nvd.nist.gov. Retrieved 2017-10-19.
- ^ "Infineon RSA Key Generation Issue - Customer Portal". Yubico.com. Retrieved 11 June 2019.
- ^ "Yubico Mitigation Recommendations". Yubico.com. Archived from the original on 21 November 2018. Retrieved 11 June 2019.
- ^ "Security Advisory YSA-2018-01 – Security Issue with Password Protection in Oath Applet on Yubikey NEO" (Press release). Yubico. 2018-01-16. Archived from the original on 2020-10-01.
- ^ "Security Advisory YSA-2019-02 – Reduced Initial Randomness on FIPS Keys" (Press release). Yubico. 2019-06-13. Archived from the original on 2019-06-14.
- ^ Roche, Thomas. (2024-09-03) "EUCLEAK: Side Channel Attack on the YubiKey 5 Series." (PDF) White Paper. Montpellier, France: NinjaLab. Archived from the original on 2024-09-03.
- ^ "Security Advisory YSA-2024-03 Infineon ECDSA Private Key Recovery" (Press release). Yubico. 2024-09-03. Archived from the original on 2024-09-03.
- ^ Goodin, Dan (2024-09-03). "Hackers Can Clone Yubikeys by Exploiting Side Channel that Leaks Their Private Key". Ars Technica. Archived from the original on 2024-09-03.
- ^ Manning, Ronnie (2018-02-01). "WIRED and Ars Technica Experts Choose YubiKey 4 for New Subscribers". Yubico. Retrieved 2023-09-01.
- ^ "Swedish tech firm Yubico hands Hong Kong protesters free security keys amid fears over police tactics online". South China Morning Post. 2019-10-10. Retrieved 2019-10-18.
- ^ "Yubico 贊助香港抗爭者世上最強網上保安鎖匙 Yubikey | 立場新聞". 立場新聞 Stand News (in Chinese). Retrieved 2019-10-18.
External links
[edit]YubiKey
View on GrokipediaIntroduced in 2008, the device supports multiple open standards including FIDO2/WebAuthn for passwordless authentication, FIDO U2F for second-factor verification, and Yubico's one-time password (OTP) protocol, allowing seamless integration with services from providers like Google, Microsoft, and RSA SecurID.[2][3]
Yubico, founded in 2007 by Stina Ehrensvärd in Sweden with subsequent expansion to the United States, developed the YubiKey to address vulnerabilities in traditional password-based and SMS-based authentication by embedding tamper-resistant smart card technology in a compact USB, NFC, or Lightning form factor.[4][5]
Certain models achieve FIPS 140-2 certification, meeting stringent requirements for government and enterprise use, while the series has been adopted by major organizations to mitigate account takeover risks without introducing significant user friction.[3][6]
History
Founding of Yubico and Early Development
Yubico was founded in 2007 in Stockholm, Sweden, by Stina Ehrensvärd and Jakob Ehrensvärd to address vulnerabilities in online authentication, particularly phishing attacks and reliance on weak passwords.[7] The company's initial focus was developing a hardware token for simple, secure one-touch logins without requiring users to remember complex credentials.[4] Stina Ehrensvärd, who served as CEO for 16 years until 2023, drew from personal and professional experiences in security to prioritize usability alongside protection against man-in-the-middle exploits.[5] The inaugural YubiKey device, version 1.0, was designed as a USB-based one-time password generator emulating keyboard input for seamless integration with existing systems.[7] Manufacturing began in Sweden in 2008, marking the first production of a compact, durable key capable of generating event-based or time-based codes via a proprietary algorithm.[8] Early prototypes emphasized tamper resistance and broad compatibility, avoiding software dependencies to minimize attack surfaces.[5] By late 2008, the device supported initial deployments for enterprise and individual users seeking alternatives to SMS-based two-factor authentication.[9] Development progressed rapidly into 2009–2010, with the release of YubiKey 2.0 featuring a molded monoblock design for enhanced durability against physical wear and environmental factors.[5] This iteration incorporated refinements to the Yubico One-Time Password (OTP) protocol, allowing customization of secret keys and configuration slots for varied authentication modes.[7] Early adoption was driven by partnerships with tech communities and validation servers, enabling free personalization services to build ecosystem trust.[4] These advancements laid the groundwork for scalable hardware security, prioritizing hardware-bound cryptography over revocable software tokens.[5]Key Product Releases and Milestones
The first YubiKey device was publicly demonstrated at the RSA Conference in April 2008, introducing one-touch authentication via One-Time Password (OTP) emulation for enhanced user login security.[5] A more durable YubiKey II model followed in 2009, featuring improved hardware robustness while maintaining compatibility with Yubico's validation servers for OTP verification.[5] In 2012, Yubico released the YubiKey NEO, adding Near Field Communication (NFC) support for contactless authentication on mobile devices, alongside the compact YubiKey Nano form factor designed for semi-permanent USB port installation.[5] The 2014 launch of the FIDO U2F Security Key marked Yubico's entry into public-key cryptography-based second-factor authentication, certified under the FIDO Alliance standard to resist phishing attacks without relying on shared secrets.[10] The YubiKey 5 Series debuted on September 24, 2018, as the industry's first multi-protocol security keys supporting FIDO2 and WebAuthn for passwordless login, alongside protocols like OTP, U2F, PIV smart card, and OATH-HOTP/TOTP.[11] Variants such as the YubiKey 5Ci, released August 20, 2019, introduced dual USB-C and Lightning connectors for broader device compatibility, including iOS.[12] Subsequent advancements included the YubiKey 5 FIPS Series on May 3, 2021, achieving FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation for government and enterprise compliance while retaining multi-protocol capabilities.[13] The YubiKey Bio Series launched October 4, 2021, integrating biometric fingerprint authentication with FIDO2 for simplified passwordless access.[14] In May 2024, firmware version 5.7 rolled out across YubiKey 5 and Security Key Series, enhancing PIN complexity requirements, enterprise passphrase management, and attestation certificate handling for improved security posture.[15] This update became available in devices shipping from late May 2024, with the YubiKey Bio FIDO Edition following in August 2024 to prioritize FIDO-only protocols.[16]Expansion and Recent Advancements
In 2021, Yubico completed an initial public offering on Nasdaq Stockholm, raising approximately SEK 1.15 billion to fund further development and market expansion. This capital infusion supported scaling production and global distribution, enabling the company to address rising demand for hardware-based authentication amid increasing phishing threats and regulatory requirements for multi-factor authentication. Yubico expanded its enterprise delivery model significantly in May 2025, increasing YubiKey availability to 175 countries and 24 territories—more than doubling prior coverage—to facilitate faster deployment of pre-configured devices for remote and office users.[17] This enhancement of the YubiKey as a Service subscription targeted organizations adopting passwordless strategies, reducing logistical barriers and accelerating phishing-resistant authentication rollout.[18] Product advancements continued with the July 2025 release of YubiKey 5 series variants featuring enhanced PIN controls, including automatic activation of PIN complexity requirements and a minimum six-character length, designed to comply with stringent regional standards in Europe and elsewhere.[19] Concurrent firmware version 5.7 introduced support for up to 100 resident passkeys (up from 25), FIDO2 Level 2 certification for improved biometric integration verification, and new cryptographic algorithms such as RSA 3072/4096, Ed25519, and X25519 for PIV operations.[20] These updates bolstered compatibility with emerging standards like WebAuthn while maintaining backward compatibility with legacy protocols.[21] Partnerships advanced integration capabilities, exemplified by the October 2025 collaboration with Dashlane to enable FIDO2-based, phishing-resistant passwordless access to encrypted vaults, prioritizing hardware-bound credentials over software alternatives.[22] Yubico's 2024-2025 initiatives also emphasized ecosystem growth, with expanded "Works with YubiKey" certifications enhancing interoperability across identity providers and endpoint management tools.[23] These developments reflect sustained revenue momentum, with Q2 2025 reports indicating recovering order intake despite macroeconomic pressures.[24]Technical Design
Hardware Architecture
The YubiKey employs a compact, tamper-resistant monoblock design encapsulated in epoxy for physical durability, lacking batteries or moving parts to ensure reliability across an operational lifespan exceeding 100,000 touch cycles.[4] Core models, such as those in the YubiKey 5 Series, integrate a single secure microcontroller as the primary computational and cryptographic element, paired with minimal passive components like capacitors and resistors for power regulation and signal processing.[25] This architecture supports multiple authentication protocols through firmware-defined applications stored in isolated memory slots within the chip, with a dedicated management application enforcing access controls via a 16-byte lock code.[25][26] The central secure element in YubiKey 5 Series devices is an Infineon M7893 B11 microcontroller (or variants like SLE78 CLUFX3000PH for most models and SLE78 CLUFX5000PH for YubiKey 5Ci), certified to Common Criteria EAL6+ for high-assurance security, featuring non-updatable firmware in non-volatile memory and hardware-enforced isolation between cryptographic operations.[27] This chip handles key generation, storage, and operations for protocols including FIDO, PIV, and OTP, with up to 144 KB of EEPROM for credential data across five application slots.[26] It exposes a composite USB interface operating at full speed (12 Mbps), emulating HID keyboard, CCID smart card reader, and FIDO authenticator classes, while NFC-enabled variants incorporate an ISO 14443-compliant antenna for contactless operation.[25][28] User interaction relies on a capacitive touch sensor connected via GPIO pins to the microcontroller, triggering authentication upon contact with the device's gold-plated sense plate, often accompanied by an LED indicator for status feedback.[27] Power is drawn directly from the host USB port (<50 mA consumption) or NFC field, enabling operation without external sources.[28] Form factors vary—such as USB-A, USB-C, Nano, or Lightning connectors—but share this uniform core chipset for consistent behavior, with dimensions typically around 18–45 mm in length and 3–5 mm thickness.[25] Earlier YubiKey generations, like the YubiKey 4 Series, utilized similar secure element principles but with distinct chipsets validated under FIPS 140-2 Level 2.[29]Supported Protocols and Interfaces
The YubiKey hardware security keys, particularly the YubiKey 5 Series, incorporate multiple applications that enable support for diverse authentication protocols, allowing compatibility with a wide range of services and systems. These protocols leverage the device's secure element to perform cryptographic operations without exposing private keys. Key supported protocols include FIDO2, which facilitates passwordless login and multi-factor authentication (MFA) using public-key cryptography and client-to-authenticator protocols (CTAP), with capacity for up to 25 resident credentials; FIDO U2F, an earlier standard for second-factor authentication across web services via universal second factor (U2F) challenges; and WebAuthn, a W3C standard integrated with FIDO2 for browser-based authentication supporting both hardware keys and platform authenticators.[2][30] Additional protocols encompass OATH for time-based (TOTP) and counter-based (HOTP) one-time passwords, storing up to 64 credentials; OpenPGP for smart card operations including signing, encryption, and authentication with RSA or ECC keys; Yubico OTP and static password modes for one-time password generation via HID interface; and PIV (Personal Identity Verification), compliant with NIST SP 800-73, enabling smart card middleware for certificate-based authentication, digital signatures, and key management across designated slots.[30] The device also supports HMAC-SHA1 challenge-response for legacy systems. These protocols operate independently or in combination, with firmware segmentation ensuring isolation between applications to mitigate cross-protocol risks.[30]| Protocol | Primary Function | Key Standards/Features |
|---|---|---|
| FIDO2/WebAuthn | Passwordless MFA, resident keys | CTAP2, up to 25 keys, PIN/biometric support[30] |
| FIDO U2F | Second-factor auth | Public-key crypto, no drivers needed[2] |
| OATH | Dynamic OTPs | TOTP/HOTP, up to 64 slots via CCID[30] |
| PIV/Smart Card | Certificate auth | NIST SP 800-73, RSA/ECC operations[2][30] |
| OpenPGP | Signing/encryption | ECC/RSA, smart card compatible[30] |
| OTP | One-time passwords | Yubico mode, challenge-response[30] |
Features and Operations
Authentication Mechanisms
YubiKeys facilitate authentication through hardware-bound cryptographic operations that prevent credential extraction, leveraging protocols such as FIDO2/WebAuthn, FIDO U2F, one-time passwords (OTP), OATH (HOTP/TOTP), smart card (PIV), and OpenPGP.[32][30] In FIDO2 and WebAuthn, the device generates a public-private key pair during registration, retaining the private key securely within its tamper-resistant chip; during authentication, it signs a server-issued challenge using the private key upon user touch, enabling phishing-resistant verification without transmitting secrets over the network.[32][30] FIDO U2F operates similarly but as a second-factor authenticator, confirming user presence via a touch-activated signature on a challenge, integrated into browsers like Chrome and services such as Google accounts since its standardization in 2014.[30][2] For OTP mechanisms, YubiKeys emulate keyboard input to deliver Yubico OTP—a proprietary 44-character code comprising a public ID, private ID, and AES-encrypted dynamic payload—or OATH-compliant HOTP (counter-based HMAC) and TOTP (time-based HMAC), where the device computes codes from a shared secret seed without exposing it.[32][30] Smart card authentication via the PIV application stores X.509 certificates and private keys, allowing certificate-based authentication (e.g., for VPNs or SSH) through challenge-response operations compliant with NIST SP 800-73 standards, with keys protected against export.[30][2] The OpenPGP application supports key pair generation for signing, encryption, and authentication, enabling GnuPG-compatible workflows where private keys remain non-exportable and operations require physical touch for user verification.[32][30] These mechanisms operate independently across applications on the YubiKey 5 Series and later models, with up to five protocols configurable per slot via USB, NFC, or Lightning interfaces, ensuring compatibility with legacy systems while prioritizing passwordless flows in modern deployments.[30][1] Authentication success relies on origin binding in FIDO protocols to thwart man-in-the-middle attacks, and monotonic counters or timestamps in OTP/OATH to prevent replay, with all operations executed in a secure element certified to FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or higher in validated variants.[2][33]Customization and Management Tools
YubiKey customization primarily involves configuring its multiple slots and applications, such as OTP (One-Time Password), FIDO2, PIV (Personal Identity Verification), and OpenPGP, using dedicated software tools provided by Yubico.[34][35] The primary tool for this is YubiKey Manager, a cross-platform application available in both graphical (yubikey-manager-qt) and command-line interface (ykman) variants, supporting Windows, macOS, and Linux.[34][36] It enables users to identify YubiKey models, firmware versions, and serial numbers; configure FIDO2 PINs and credentials; manage PIV certificates and keys; set up OTP slots for Yubico OTP, static passwords, or challenge-response modes; and reset specific applications if needed.[34][35] The ykman CLI offers advanced capabilities for scripting and automation, including detailed slot programming—such as loading AES keys for OTP generation, enabling touch-triggered responses, or appending user-defined prefixes/suffixes—and firmware version checks without altering the device.[35][36] For FIDO2 customization, users can set PINs, manage resident keys, and configure credentials via the tool, ensuring compatibility with passwordless authentication protocols.[34] PIV management includes generating key pairs, importing certificates, and slotting asymmetric keys for smart card-like operations, adhering to NIST SP 800-73 standards.[36] An older tool, the YubiKey Personalization Tool (including its GUI and library variants), was historically used for batch programming OTP credentials, checking firmware, and basic slot reconfiguration, particularly for static passwords or HMAC-SHA1 challenge-response.[37][38] However, Yubico announced its end-of-life effective February 19, 2026, recommending migration to YubiKey Manager for all configuration needs due to the latter's broader protocol support and ongoing maintenance.[39] YubiKey Manager supersedes it by integrating OTP, FIDO, and PIV functionalities into a unified interface, reducing the need for multiple tools.[34] For enterprise-scale management, Yubico offers integrations like YubiEnterprise Delivery for bulk provisioning and encoding, which automates customization workflows such as pre-loading credentials or enforcing policies via APIs, though core device-level tools remain YubiKey Manager.[40] These tools do not support user-initiated firmware updates, as YubiKey firmware is factory-set and non-upgradable on most models to maintain security integrity.[30] All configurations require physical access to the device, preventing remote tampering.[35]Proprietary Encoding: ModHex
ModHex is a custom base-16 encoding scheme developed by Yubico for use in YubiKey's one-time password (OTP) output, designed to mitigate ambiguities arising from diverse keyboard layouts.[41] Unlike standard hexadecimal, which employs digits 0-9 and letters A-F, ModHex substitutes a restricted alphabet of 16 characters—c b d e f g h i j k m n r t u v—each representing a unique 4-bit value to ensure consistent interpretation across input methods.[42] This mapping corresponds directly to hexadecimal values as follows: 0→c, 1→b, 2→d, 3→e, 4→f, 5→g, 6→h, 7→i, 8→j, 9→k, A→m, B→n, C→r, D→t, E→u, F→v.[42] The selected characters avoid visually similar glyphs (e.g., excluding 0, O, 1, I, l) and prioritize positions that yield reliable keycodes on QWERTY-derived layouts, thereby enabling keyboard-layout-independent data transmission during OTP entry.[43]
In YubiKey OTP generation, ModHex encodes binary data into human-readable strings for seamless integration with text-based authentication systems. A standard YubiKey OTP comprises 44 ModHex characters: the initial 12 characters encode a 6-byte public identifier (fixed per device configuration), while the subsequent 32 characters represent a 16-byte AES-128-encrypted payload incorporating unique elements such as a private ID, session counters, timestamps, and random data to prevent replay attacks.[44] This encoding packs 4 bits per character, yielding the compact 44-character format from 22 bytes of binary input (6 bytes public ID + 16 bytes encrypted).[44] Yubico introduced ModHex specifically for OTP to address early challenges with international keyboard variations, where standard hex characters could map to unintended inputs; for instance, non-QWERTY layouts might confuse l with 1 or alter positional outputs.[45]
The proprietary nature of ModHex stems from Yubico's tailored design choices, including the custom alphabet and validation rules integrated into their validation servers (e.g., YubiCloud), which decode ModHex exclusively for OTP verification.[41] Tools like Yubico's modhex utility facilitate conversion between ModHex strings and binary/hex equivalents for configuration and debugging, as in modhex -e test to encode ASCII "test" into ModHex.[42] While effective for OTP's low-bandwidth, touch-triggered use case, ModHex's layout-specific optimizations assume primary QWERTY compatibility, prompting Yubico recommendations to temporarily switch to US layouts for OTP entry in divergent configurations.[43] This encoding remains central to YubiKey's legacy OTP mode, distinguishing it from protocol-agnostic alternatives like FIDO2.[44]
Security Assessment
Core Security Principles
The YubiKey employs hardware-based cryptography where private keys are generated within the device's secure element and never exported or transmitted outside the hardware.[46][47] This isolation prevents extraction of secrets even if the host system is compromised, as all signing operations occur on-device using tamper-resistant components.[48] High-entropy key generation further ensures randomness resistant to prediction attacks.[47] Phishing resistance forms a cornerstone, particularly through FIDO protocols like U2F and FIDO2, which bind credentials to specific relying party origins via challenge-response mechanisms that verify the authentic domain before releasing assertions.[1] This design thwarts man-in-the-middle and credential phishing by rejecting signatures for mismatched origins, reducing successful phishing risk by 99.9% according to empirical studies.[1] Protocols such as SCP11 and CTAP2.2 incorporate mutual authentication and encrypted channels (e.g., AES-GCM, ECDH) without relying on pre-shared secrets, minimizing exposure to network-based attacks.[47] Physical and access protections include FIPS 140-3 validation at Level 3 for tamper-evidence, enabling detection of unauthorized access attempts.[47] Brute-force resistance is enforced via limited PIN attempts (e.g., three failures trigger lockout) and mandatory minimum PIN lengths of six characters in compliant modes.[47][1] The absence of batteries, moving parts, and wireless dependencies (beyond optional NFC) reduces attack surfaces from supply chain or environmental vectors, while IP68-rated durability supports operation in harsh conditions without compromising integrity.[1]Documented Vulnerabilities and Exploits
In September 2024, researchers disclosed a side-channel vulnerability (CVE-2024-45678) in the Infineon cryptographic library used by YubiKey 5 Series devices with firmware versions prior to 5.7.0, enabling extraction of ECDSA private keys through timing discrepancies during signature operations.[49][50] The attack, dubbed EUCLEAK by its discoverers at NinjaLab, requires physical possession of the device and thousands of signature measurements to recover keys, primarily affecting FIDO2 attestation and credential keys due to their default use of vulnerable ECDSA operations.[51] No remote exploitation is possible, and the flaw stems from implementation details in the underlying secure element rather than YubiKey firmware design.[50] In April 2025, Yubico reported CVE-2025-29991 affecting YubiKey firmware from 5.4.1 to 5.7.3 (prior to 5.7.4), involving a flawed implementation of the FIDO CTAP PIN/UV Auth Protocol Two that generates predictable nonces, facilitating offline brute-force attacks on user PINs.[52][53] This issue allows an attacker with physical access to attempt PIN recovery more efficiently than intended, though success depends on PIN complexity and the device's retry limits.[53] The vulnerability does not compromise keys directly but undermines the protocol's resistance to exhaustive search. Earlier vulnerabilities include a 2015 PIN validation logic flaw in YubiKey NEO's OpenPGP applet (YSA-2015-1), which permitted incorrect PIN handling under specific retry conditions, potentially enabling unauthorized access after exhaustion of attempts. Such issues have been limited in scope, with no public demonstrations of widespread exploits compromising deployed YubiKeys without physical tampering. Independent analyses, such as attempts to reverse-engineer devices, have not yielded scalable breaks beyond protocol-specific weaknesses.[54]| CVE ID | Affected Firmware | Description | Requirements | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-45678 | < 5.7.0 (YubiKey 5 Series) | ECDSA key extraction via timing side-channel | Physical access, repeated measurements | Key recovery, FIDO cloning possible |
| CVE-2025-29991 | 5.4.1–5.7.3 | Predictable nonces in PIN/UV auth protocol | Physical access, offline computation | Accelerated PIN brute-force |
| YSA-2015-1 | NEO variants | OpenPGP PIN validation bypass | Specific retry sequences | Potential unauthorized applet access |
