Hubbry Logo
Absentee ballotAbsentee ballotMain
Open search
Absentee ballot
Community hub
Absentee ballot
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Absentee ballot
Absentee ballot
Absentee ballot
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia
Part of the Politics series
Voting
Balloting
Ballots
Candidates and Ballot measures
Collection
Counting
Electoral systems
Plurality and majoritarian systems
Proportional and semi-proportional systems
Mixed-member systems
Voting strategies
Protest votes
Voting patterns and effects
Protest votes
Electoral fraud and prevention
Prevention
icon Politics portal

An absentee ballot is a vote cast by someone who is unable to attend the official polling station to which the voter is normally allocated. Methods include voting at a different location, postal voting, proxy voting and online voting. Increasing the ease of access to absentee ballots is seen by many as one way to improve voter turnout through convenience voting, though some countries require that a valid reason, such as infirmity or travel, be given before a voter can participate in an absentee ballot. Early voting overlaps with absentee voting. Early voting includes votes cast before the official election day(s), by mail, online or in-person at voting centers which are open for the purpose. Some places call early in-person voting a form of "absentee" voting, since voters are absent from the polling place on election day.[1]

In the electoral terminology of some countries, such as Australia, "absentee voting" means specifically a vote cast at a different polling station to one to which the voter has been allocated. "Early voting", "proxy voting" or "postal voting" are separate concepts in these countries. The history of absentee voting dates back to the 19th century, and modern-day procedures and availability vary by jurisdiction. Absentee voting may be available on demand, or limited to individuals meeting certain criteria, such as a proven inability to travel to a designated polling place. Many electors are required to apply for absentee voting, although some may receive a postal ballot by default. In some elections postal voting is the only voting method allowed and is referred to as all-postal voting. Typically, postal votes must be mailed back on or before the scheduled election day. However, in some jurisdictions return methods may allow for dropping off the ballot in person via secure drop boxes or at voting centers.

Electoral laws typically allow for the integrity and secrecy of the submitted ballot to be maintained, and stipulate a series of checks to protect against voter fraud. Voting at a distant polling place is subject to the same controls as voting locally, though distant staff are less likely to recognize an impersonator than local staff. Voting by mail is sometimes controlled by using security printing, such as special paper,[2] or by requiring signatures of voters and sometimes witnesses, though signature comparisons have 10-14% error rates.[3] Thousands of ballots fail these checks and are rejected.[4] Evidence of fraud is uncommon, but Russia has been reported to use absentee voting for vote monitoring enabling voter intimidation.[5] While postal voting has a greater risk of fraud than in-person voting, on an absolute level cases of known fraud are extremely rare.[6] The principle of secret ballot might be violated before the ballot is submitted.[7]

Methods

[edit]

Voting at a different polling station

[edit]

Among countries where voters are allocated to one or several specific polling station(s) (such as the polling station closest to the voter's residential address, or polling stations within a particular district, province or state), some countries provide a mechanism by which voters can nevertheless cast their ballots on election day at a different polling station.

The reasons for allocating voters to specific polling stations are generally logistical. Absentee voting at a different polling station might be catered for by, for example, designating some larger polling stations as available for absentee voting, and equipping such polling stations with the ballot papers (or the means to produce ballot papers) applicable to an absentee voter.

Postal voting

[edit]

In a postal vote, the ballot papers are posted out to the voter – usually only on request – who must then fill them out and return them, often with the voter's signature and sometimes a witness signature to prove the voter's identity.[8] Signature verification is an imperfect endeavor; the best academic researchers have 10-14% error rates.[3] Some jurisdictions use special paper, ballot tracking, or printing to minimize forged ballots.[2][9]

All-postal voting

[edit]

All-postal voting is the form of postal voting where all electors receive their ballot papers through the post, not just those who requested an absentee ballot. Depending on the system applied, electors may have to return their ballot papers by post, or there may be an opportunity to deliver them by hand to a specified location.

There is some evidence that this method of voting leads to higher turnout than one where people vote in person or have to apply for a postal vote. Critics suggest that this is only a temporary impact, and that there are dangers in people using ballot papers intended for other electors.[citation needed]

It has been tested by a large number of local authorities in the United Kingdom for their elections, and in 2004 it was used for elections to the European Parliament and local authorities in four of the English regions (see below for more details). In 2016, the Australian Marriage Law Postal Survey was conducted via all-postal voting with a turnout of 79.5 percent.

Proxy voting

[edit]
Main article: Proxy voting

To cast a proxy vote, the user appoints someone as their proxy, by authorizing them to cast or secure their vote in their stead. The proxy must be trusted by the voter, as in a secret ballot there is no way of verifying that they voted for the correct candidate. In an attempt to solve this, it is not uncommon for people to nominate an official of their chosen party as their proxy.

Internet voting

[edit]
Main article: Electronic voting § Online voting

Security experts have found security problems in every attempt at online voting,[10] [11] [12] [13] including systems in Australia,[14] Estonia[15][16] Switzerland,[17] Russia,[18][19][20] and the United States.[21][10] More information is in the sections for each country below.

Online voting is widely used privately for shareholder votes.[22][23] The election management companies do not promise accuracy or privacy.[24][25][26] In fact one company uses an individual's past votes for research,[27] and to target ads.[28]

By country

[edit]

Australia

[edit]

In Australia the term "absentee ballot" refers specifically to the procedure used when a voter attends a voting place which is not in the electoral district in which they are registered to vote. Instead of marking the ballot paper and putting it in the ballot box, the voter's ballot paper is placed in an envelope and then it is sent by the voting official to the voter's home district to be counted there.[29]

Postal voting and early voting are separate procedures also available to voters who would not be in their registered electoral districts on a voting day. At the 2016 Australian federal election, there were 1.2 million postal votes cast, amounting to 8.5 percent of total votes.[30]

Postal voting in Australia was introduced for federal elections in 1902, and first used at the 1903 election. It was abolished by the Fisher government in 1910, following claims that it was open to abuse and biased towards rural voters. The Cook government's bill to restore postal voting was one of the "triggers" for the double dissolution prior to the 1914 election. Postal voting was eventually restored by the Hughes government in 1918 and has not been challenged since, although the provisions and requirements have been amended on a number of occasions.[31]

Prior to Federation in 1901, Western Australia introduced a form of postal voting in 1877 with strict eligibility criteria. South Australia introduced postal voting for seamen in 1890,[32] and a further act in 1896 gave postal votes to any elector who would be more than 15 miles (24 km) from home on election day, as well as for any woman unable to travel "by reason of her health". Victoria passed a similar law in 1899, and the first federal postal voting legislation was also modelled on the 1896 South Australian act.[31]

Procedure in Australia

[edit]

Postal voting at a federal level is governed by the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 and administered by the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). Postal votes are available to those who will be absent from their electoral division through travel, or who those are unable to attend a polling booth due to illness, infirmity, "approaching childbirth", caring responsibilities, reasonable fears for their safety, religious beliefs, imprisonment, status as a silent elector, or employment reasons.[33]

Eligible voters may make a postal vote application (PVA) prior to each election, or apply for status as a "general postal voter" and receive a postal ballot automatically. Postal voters receive their ballot(s) and a prepaid envelope containing their name and address, as well as a predetermined security question from the PVA. Voters are required to sign the envelope and provide the correct answer to the security question. They are also required to have a witness sign and date the envelope.[34] As of 2016, postal votes were able to be received and entered into the count up to 13 days after election day. Following the 2016 election, it was observed that the strict scrutiny process afforded to postal votes was a "significant contributor" to delays in declaring the results of close elections.[30]

Austria

[edit]

Austria enabled postal voting in 2007 by amending Article 26 of the Constitution of Austria. Electors request an electoral card that can be completed in person or in private and sent via post. In the 2017 election, roughly 780,000 postal ballots were cast representing 15% of all ballots.[35]

Canada

[edit]

The ability to vote when in-person voting is not possible was first introduced with the federal Military Voters Act in 1917, giving all Canadian soldiers and their spouses the right to vote. Public servants became eligible in 1970. The right was further extended to civilian support personnel on Canadian Forces bases in the 1977. In 1993, Bill C-114 extended the special ballot vote (Special Voting Rules) by mail to all Canadian citizens.[36]

Use of special voting rules including vote by mail has grown with each election. In the 42nd general election (2015), the number of voters increased by 117 percent over the previous election to roughly 619,000.[37] This number grew to roughly 660,000 in the 43rd election (2019) representing 3.6 percent of electors.[38]

Czech Republic

[edit]

In the Czech Republic voters have several options to cast their vote in absence. Since 2003, it has been possible to use a voter card (cz. voličský průkaz) to vote at different polling station.[39] Voter cards can be used in all elections except for municipal elections.[40] In the case of Presidential elections and elections to the Chamber of Deputies, electors with voter card can cast their ballots in person at any open polling station within or outside of Czech borders, even outside their assigned district. For elections to the European parliament, voting is possible at any polling station within the country. In case of regional elections and elections to the Senate, it is possible only within their assigned electoral district.[40]

Postal voting was established in the Czech Republic in 2024.[41] It is available to all voters living or stationed abroad. It can be used in elections to the Chamber of Deputies, Presidential elections and elections to the European Parliament.[42]

If electors cannot attend the polling station due to health limitations, they can request portable ballot box. Two members of the electoral committee then take the portable box and allow the voter to vote from their home or a medical facility.[43]

Estonia

[edit]

Since 2005, Estonia has allowed voters to cast votes via the Internet (encrypted to protect voter anonymity); 2% of Estonians cast ballots via the Internet initially, and 44% did so in 2019.[44] The Estonian Internet-voting system uses the Estonian national identity card, which is associated with a PINs unique to each voter: "all Estonians are issued a government ID with a scannable chip and a PIN number that gives them a unique online identity — they can use this identity to file their taxes or pay library fines or buy bus passes."[45]

The security of the Estonian I-voting system remains a matter of political debate.

Finland

[edit]

Finland introduced vote by post in 2019, but only for the eligible voters living permanently abroad or staying abroad at the time of the elections. Vote by post is not available for voters residing in Finland.[46]

France

[edit]

France allows voting by "procuration", which is literally proxy voting.[47] It has been said access to it has been eased in regard to the coronavirus pandemic.[48]

In the 2012 French legislative election, French citizens living abroad were permitted to cast votes electronically in the parliamentary elections (but not in the presidential election). In 2017, however, the system was dropped after the French National Cybersecurity Agency assessed an "extremely high risk" of cyberattacks in the wake of Russian interference in the 2016 United States elections.[49]

Germany

[edit]

Absentee voting has existed in Germany since 1957, originally in order to ensure that all German citizens, especially the old, sick, and disabled, and citizens living abroad, have the opportunity to participate in elections. At first, postal voters had to state why they could not cast their vote in person on Election Day; but this requirement has been dropped in 2008, allowing everyone to use postal voting. Like in many other countries, in more recent years, voting by mail has become increasingly popular among younger and non-disabled citizens residing within the country; as such, various tools Archived 2021-03-10 at the Wayback Machine are being developed to help citizens, both domestic and abroad, more easily apply for postal voting.[50]

Hungary

[edit]

Hungarian citizens living abroad who do not have an official address in Hungary are allowed to vote by mail.[51] They are only allowed to vote for party lists, but not for local representatives.[52] In the last parliamentary election in 2018, 267,233 votes (4.6% of all votes) were submitted via mail. 48% of all valid postal votes were submitted from Romania.[53][54]

India

[edit]
Main article: Elections in India § Absentee voting

Only certain categories of people are eligible to register as postal voters. The Representation of the People Act-1950[55] (RPA) section 20(8) allows postal ballots for people on polling duty; members of the armed forces and state police as well as their spouses; employees of the Government of India who are officially posted abroad; and the President;, these are also called service voters.[56][57][58] Additionally, people in preventive detention, disabled and those above the age of 65 years old can use postal vote. Prisoners can not vote at all.[59][60][61]

Postal voting in India is done only through the Electronically Transmitted Postal Ballot Papers (ETPB) system of the Election Commission of India, where ballot papers are distributed to the registered eligible voters and they return the votes by post. When the counting of votes commences, these postal votes are counted first before the counting of votes from the electronic voting machines of all other voters.

The Communist Party of India (Marxist) has alleged that postal ballots "will adversely effect the verifiability of a large number of voters, thus, transparency and integrity of the process", and expressed concerns with "instances of manipulation and malpractice" with postal ballots.[62][63][64]

Section 20 of the RPA-1950 disqualified non-resident Indians (NRI) from getting their names registered in the electoral rolls. Consequently, it also prevented non-residents from voting. In August 2010, Representation of the People (Amendment) Bill-2010 which allows voting rights to NRI's was passed in both Lok Sabha with subsequent gazette notifications on Nov 24, 2010.[65] With this NRI's could vote in Indian elections if physically present at the time of voting. Civic society organizations have urged the government to amend the RPA act to allow NRI's and people on the move to cast their vote through absentee ballot system.[66][67][68]

Indonesia

[edit]
Postal voting documents sent to an Indonesian voter in the United Kingdom during the 2019 Indonesian general election.

Eligible Indonesians living abroad are able to vote by mail in national elections by registering at the Indonesian overseas election commission in their country of residence. Besides presidential elections, they are also able to vote in DPR elections. All overseas Indonesian voters are included in the Jakarta 2nd constituency, which also contains Central and South Jakarta.[69]

Republic of Ireland

[edit]

In the Republic of Ireland, postal votes are used in Seanad Éireann elections for the university constituencies and the vocational panels, both of which have restricted franchises. Otherwise, postal voting is only available in a restricted set of circumstances. The Irish constitution requires a secret ballot and the courts have interpreted this quite narrowly. Postal votes are available to people who by reason of their occupation cannot vote normally. They are also available to students living away from home, to people with disabilities, to prisoners (since January 2007), and to long-term residents of hospitals, nursing homes and other similar institutions.

Israel

[edit]

Israel does not have an absentee ballot system for all citizens. Absentee ballots are restricted to soldiers, prisoners, sailors, overseas diplomats, disabled persons and hospitalized people. The votes are not cast directly but placed in a double envelope with identifying information and counted directly by the elections committee only after verifying that the voter has not voted at his or her official polling station. Most absentee ballots are cast the day of the elections in alternate polling stations. Early voting is limited to civil servants overseas. There is no postal voting.

Italy

[edit]
Electoral package sent to an Italian voter in South America during the 2013 Italian general election.

Since 2001 Italian citizens living abroad have the right to vote by mail in all national elections and referendums being held in Italy (provided they had registered their residence abroad with their relevant consulate).

Malaysia

[edit]

In Malaysia, opposition leader and former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim alleged that postal votes have been used by the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition in securing seats in certain constituencies.[70] He also said that in one particular constituency (Setiawangsa), he claimed that his Parti Keadilan Rakyat had actually won during the 2008 elections, before 14,000 postal votes came in awarding the incumbent BN parliamentarian the seat with a majority of 8,000 votes.[71] In Malaysia, only teachers, military personnel, and policemen based away from their constituencies are eligible to submit postal votes.

Mexico

[edit]
Postal ballot paper for Mexico federal election 2012

In Mexico, since the 2006 federal elections, postal voting for people living abroad has been permitted. A request can be made to the National Electoral Institute which then sends the ballots outside the country.

Netherlands

[edit]

In the Netherlands, liberalised proxy voting is available. Voters can authorise someone else to cast their ballot without having to go through a registration procedure. Voters can cast a maximum of 2 proxy votes along with their own ballot. Postal ballots and Internet voting are only available to Dutch citizens living abroad, or having occupational duties abroad on election day.[72]

Electronic voting was banned in the Netherlands in 2007, and in 2017 Dutch authorities also abandoned electronic vote counting, conducting an all-paper, all-manual vote count in an effort to block foreign interference in its elections.[73]

Philippines

[edit]

As provided by the Overseas Absentee Voting Act, absentee voting in Philippine elections is only available in certain circumstances, such as for Overseas Filipino Workers or other migrants. Before 2025, votes had to be cast in person at select polling places, such as consulate offices, or through mail-in ballots in select countries. However, internet voting was used for the first time during the 2025 general election in selected foreign posts.[74]

Local absentee voting as pursuant to Republic Act No. 7166 and Executive Order No. 157 is only available for members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine National Police, and government personnel on duty on election day.[75] The absentee voting in both overseas and local is still manual vote counting system.

Recently, absentee voting in Hong Kong and Singapore was done through the optical scan voting due to COMELEC Resolution No. 8806 in the 2010 general elections.[76]

Absentee voters can only vote for candidates elected by the entire electorate: the President, Vice President, senators, and party-list representatives.

Poland

[edit]

In Poland, each citizen registered in the local voters' register, can get an absentee voter's certificate (AVC), which is a piece of paper with the person's details and the local government's stamp. The person can vote with AVC at every polling station countrywide and worldwide (in Polish embassies and consulates; the polling stations abroad are created by the Minister of Foreign Affairs before every elections). An AVC is issued only for President of Poland elections, parliamentary elections and elections to the European Parliament (in that case, the AVC can be got by Polish or EU citizen, so the EU citizen can vote for Polish deputies at polling station in Poland and Polish embassies or consulates, or for deputies from the country of origin. Although, if the EU citizen registers himself in the Polish voters' register, the local officials informs appropriate office in the country of origin). In case of Senate by-elections, AVC may be issued only for voters living and registered in given single-member constituency.

Postal voting and proxy voting are also possible. Postal voting is possible both in country and abroad, but proxy voting is possible only in Poland. The proxy must be registered at the same local voters' register as a voter. The mail with the voter's ballot in postal voting is free of charge in Poland, but voter resides abroad must pay to send his ballot to the appropriate consulate.

Russia

[edit]

Absentee ballots have been reportedly used for vote monitoring in Russia.[5]

Slovakia

[edit]

Slovak voters have several options to cast their vote in absence. To vote at a different polling station within Slovakia, it is possible to utilize a voter card (sk. Hlasovací preukaz). Voter cards can be used for elections to the National Council, Presidential elections and the elections to the European parliament.[77]

Postal voting was introduced in 2004. It is allowed for elections to the National Council and for national referendums.[78]

If electors cannot attend the polling station due to health limitations, they can request portable ballot box and cast their vote from their home or medical facility.[79]

Spain

[edit]

In Spain, for European, regional and municipal elections, voters who will be absent from their town on election day or are ill or disabled, may request a postal vote at a post office. The application must be submitted personally or through a representative in case of illness or disability certified by a medical certificate.

Switzerland

[edit]
Main article: Voting in Switzerland

Swiss federal law allows postal voting in all federal elections and referendums,[80] and all cantons also allow it for cantonal ballot issues. All voters receive their personal ballot by mail and may either cast it at a polling station or mail it back. As of 2019, approximately 90% of Swiss voters cast ballots using Remote Postal Voting.[81]

In Switzerland, starting in 2004, 15 cantons conducted electronic voting pilot programs. In three cantons, Swiss voters resident abroad voted electronically; Geneva Canton, Canton of Neuchâtel, and Basel-Stadt. The programs were closed in June and July 2019, and the plan is for new designs to be available by 2023.[82]

In 2019 the Swiss government invited researchers to test the security of online voting, and in early March 2019 researchers found back doors which let insiders, and hackers who accessed management systems, change results without detection.[17]

Thailand

[edit]

Absentee balloting started in Thailand first time in the 2000 general election. It is promulgated according to a provision in the 1997 constitution. The absentee ballot can be cast within Thailand and in foreign countries, where Thailand has diplomatic missions. Voters can cast the absentee ballot in 2 cases: (1) those who have their household registration in their constituency but will not be at their constituency on the election day, and wish to cast their vote in advance; and (2) those who physically reside in other locations out of their constituency at least 90 days prior to the election day, and will not be able to travel back to their constituency on the election day.

In both cases, voters wishing to cast their absentee ballot must register with the election committee 30 days in advance prior to the general election date. Voters within Thailand can cast their vote either at the designated district offices for absentee voting in their provinces or through mail. Likewise, voters overseas can register to vote with the Thai missions in their country of residence or send the ballot to them by mail. The absentee voting date is normally designated a week ahead of the general election date.[83][84]

United Kingdom

[edit]
Main article: Absentee voting in the United Kingdom

Absentee voting in the United Kingdom is allowed by proxy or post (known as postal voting on demand) for any elector. Postal voting does not require a reason,[85] apart from in Northern Ireland, where postal voting is available only if it would be unreasonable to expect a voter to go to a polling station on polling day as a result of employment, disability or education restrictions.

Proxy voting is allowed for people who will be away, working, or medically disabled.[86] Anyone eligible to vote in the election may be a proxy for close relatives and two unrelated people.[87]

In May 2003, 35 local authorities trialled all-postal voting. The outcome of those pilots was a recommendation from the UK Electoral Commission that all-postal voting should be adopted as the normal method of voting at local elections in the UK. This reflected the positive impact on voter turnout at these elections (in some places, turnout doubled) and the fact that there was no evidence of an increase in electoral fraud.[88]

A 2016 government review said about postal voting, that "Evidence was presented of pressure being put on vulnerable members of some ethnic minority communities, particularly women and young people, to vote according to the will of the elders... the possibilities of undue influence, theft of postal votes and tampering with them after completion were all still risks."[89]

United States

[edit]
Further information: Early voting and Postal voting in the United States

Voters may vote early or get a mailed ballot to mail back or take to a secure box or office.[90] Most areas do not require a reason.[91] Five states and some counties have all-postal elections.[91][92] Vote-by-mail has been implemented in both Republican and Democratic states,[93] but it became a political controversy in 2020. Availability of postal voting increases turnout.[94][93][95]

Americans living outside the United States and members of the military and merchant marine even inside the country, and their families, may register and vote under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA). Almost half the states require these ballots to be returned by mail. Other states allow mail along with some combination of fax, or email; four states allow a web portal.[96]

Security of mailed ballots is controlled by using special paper in some areas,[2] and, more often, by requiring signatures of voters and sometimes witnesses. Signature comparisons are imperfect; the best academic researchers have 10-14% error rates.[3] Thousands of ballots fail the signature checks and are rejected.[4] Evidence of fraud is uncommon, though postal voting has a greater risk of fraud than in-person voting.[6] Not all states have standards for signature review.[97] There have been concerns that signatures are improperly rejected from young and minority voters at higher rates than others, with no or limited ability of voters to appeal the rejection.[98] [99] Processing large numbers of ballots and signature verifications accurately has numerous challenges other than fraud.[100][98][101]

In the 2016 US presidential election, approximately 33 million ballots were cast via mailed out ballots (about a quarter of all ballots cast).[102]

The number of people who voted early or with mail-in ballots set records in the 2020 election. This is because of the coronavirus pandemic and people choosing the option of absentee ballots.[103] Only five states required a valid reason to vote by mail in 2020, compared with 19 states in 2016.[104] Across states that did not require a reason to vote by mail, 44% of votes were cast by mail in 2020. Across states that did require a reason, 12% of votes were cast by mail in 2020, up from 8% in 2016.[104]

Uruguay

[edit]

In Uruguay there is no mail in voting, online voting, or proxy voting. Every citizen is required by law to register as voter at 18 years old, and is assigned a voter ID that contains a photo ("Credencial Cívica"). Each citizen is assigned a specific voting circuit that is close to his/her registered address. You cannot vote anywhere else, except you are an election worker assigned to a different circuit than yours. To vote you need to go in person to the circuit and show election workers your physical voter ID. Else you need to remember the ID number. On both cases your data is compared with a copy of that ID in the circuit. If you do not even remember your ID, you can vote by fingerprint plus showing a national ID card. Every absentee ballot is manually controlled after election day to avoid the same voter casting more than one vote. The system is regarded as extremely difficult to tamper with, and accepted by all involved parties as safe and anonymous.

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Absentee ballot

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
An absentee ballot is a mechanism allowing eligible voters unable to appear at their designated polling place on to submit their vote remotely, most commonly by but also via drop boxes, early in-person delivery, or electronic means in certain jurisdictions. This process typically requires voters to request a in advance, complete it securely, and return it by specified deadlines, with verification steps such as matching or requirements to authenticate the voter. ![Indonesian abroad postal voting package](.assets/Indonesian_abroad_postal_voting_package_(2019) In the United States, absentee voting traces its roots to the early 19th century, with first authorizing mailed ballots for soldiers during the , though widespread adoption began during the Civil War to enable military participation without disqualifying voters for absence from their home districts. Expansion accelerated in the world wars, as states accommodated overseas troops, leading by to nearly every state permitting military absentee voting and casting millions of such ballots. Postwar, civilian access grew unevenly, with rules varying by state—some mandating excuses like illness or travel, others shifting to no-excuse options since the 1980s to boost turnout amid declining in-person voting. Globally, analogous systems like operate in over half of democracies, often for expatriates or the disabled, though full mail-in elections remain rare outside experiments like all-postal local votes in parts of . Absentee ballots enhance accessibility for groups such as the elderly, rural residents, and those with disabilities or conflicting schedules, contributing to higher participation rates where adopted broadly, as evidenced by surges in usage during the U.S. elections. However, the method's reliance on unsecured transmission and decentralized verification has sparked debates over vulnerabilities to , harvesting, or , with documented cases—including double-voting and unauthorized submissions—comprising a small but nonzero fraction of elections despite safeguards. Empirical analyses, drawing from conviction databases, estimate incidence in mail voting at rates below 0.0001% in most contexts, yet critics argue that underreporting and prosecutorial hurdles mask risks amplified by universal expansions, underscoring the causal tension between convenience and chain-of-custody integrity.

Definition and Purpose

Core Definition

An absentee ballot enables qualified voters unable to attend their assigned polling place on to cast votes remotely, primarily through mail or limited in-person options prior to the . This method accommodates individuals absent from their voting jurisdiction, such as deployed overseas, travelers, those with disabilities or illnesses preventing physical presence, or observers of religious holidays conflicting with polling hours. In jurisdictions requiring justification, voters must typically provide a valid ; however, many U.S. states permit no-excuse absentee voting, allowing any registered voter to request one. The process generally involves submitting an application to election officials, receiving a by mail, marking selections privately, verifying identity through signatures or enclosures, and returning it before statutory deadlines—often by mail, drop box, or in-person delivery, with postmarks or receipt dates determining validity. Ballots are then aggregated and counted alongside in-person votes, subject to verification protocols like signature matching to prevent . While absentee voting expands access, it requires safeguards such as secure chain-of-custody for mailed materials and deadlines ensuring timely , as delays can invalidate submissions. Internationally, absentee voting analogs exist but vary; for instance, some nations restrict it to specific groups like expatriates, while others integrate it into broader postal or proxy systems. In the U.S., under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 mandates states provide absentee ballots to military and overseas voters, underscoring its role in enfranchising those physically separated from polls. Usage surged during events like the , with over 43% of 2020 votes cast absentee or by mail across states.

Historical and Practical Rationale

The historical rationale for absentee balloting emerged from the need to enfranchise unable to return home due to . In 1813, became the first U.S. state to authorize absentee voting specifically for soldiers serving in the , permitting them to cast ballots by mail upon swearing an oath that travel constraints prevented their physical presence at polls. This measure addressed the disenfranchisement of troops defending national interests, ensuring their voices in governance aligned with their sacrifices. During the (1861–1865), absentee voting expanded rapidly as states recognized the impracticality of requiring deployed soldiers to vote in person. Wisconsin enacted the first comprehensive soldier absentee voting law in 1862, allowing ballots to be cast at regimental camps and mailed, a model adopted by at least 20 Northern states by war's end to accommodate over 2 million Union troops scattered across fronts. Confederate states similarly permitted military absentees, with six of eleven enabling such voting by late 1861, driven by the causal reality that wartime mobilization inherently conflicted with fixed election-day polling. These provisions stemmed from empirical observations of voter exclusion—soldiers' letters and petitions highlighted lost franchises—prioritizing electoral inclusion for those in service over logistical uniformity. Practically, absentee balloting rationalizes voting access for individuals with verifiable barriers to in-person participation, such as geographic displacement, occupational demands, or physical limitations, without altering core election integrity mechanisms like verification. Post-Civil War extensions to civilians, beginning in states like (1888) for the ill or absent, reflected data showing modest turnout gains among constrained groups; for instance, saw 3.2 million military absentee ballots, demonstrating scalability via postal infrastructure. This approach leverages established mail systems for secure transmission—envelopes with affidavits and witness signatures minimized risks empirically observed in early implementations—enabling broader grounded in the principle that temporary absences should not nullify rights. By 1944, federal legislation like the Soldier Voting Act standardized protections, underscoring absentee methods' role in sustaining democratic representation amid mobility constraints.

Historical Development

Origins in Military Voting

The practice of absentee voting emerged primarily to accommodate unable to return to their home polling places due to deployment, with the earliest statutory provision enacted by in 1813 during the War of 1812. This law permitted soldiers absent from their electoral districts for more than 30 days to submit ballots by mail, marking the initial legal recognition of remote voting for armed forces members in the United States. The (1861–1865) catalyzed broader adoption and refinement of military absentee voting, as mobilization displaced hundreds of thousands of soldiers from their residences. pioneered comprehensive legislation in 1862, authorizing the establishment of polling stations at military camps where troops could cast ballots, which were then sealed and forwarded under military supervision to county clerks for verification and counting. This approach addressed logistical challenges, including illiteracy and battlefield conditions, by allowing regimental officers to assist in the process while requiring affidavits of identity. By late 1861, six of the eleven Confederate states had similarly enacted laws granting absentee voting rights to their military personnel, often via proxy or mail mechanisms, reflecting a shared recognition across Union and Confederate lines that denying soldiers electoral participation undermined morale and legitimacy. Union states exhibited varied implementation; for instance, provided pre-printed envelopes for soldiers to mail ballots during the 1864 presidential election, while others like and permitted field voting under military oversight. In the 1864 contest between and George McClellan, absentee military ballots—estimated at over 100,000 from Union forces alone—proved decisive in key states, with soldiers overwhelmingly supporting Lincoln, thereby demonstrating the electoral impact of these provisions and solidifying absentee voting as a wartime necessity. Fraud concerns arose, including coerced voting and ballot tampering allegations, prompting safeguards like witnessed oaths, yet the system's causal role in enabling participation amid conflict established enduring precedents for future military voting reforms.

Civilian Expansion and Key Milestones

passed the first state law permitting civilian absentee voting in , allowing eligible voters unable to attend their home precinct to cast ballots at alternative polling places due to absence caused by travel or other unavoidable circumstances. This marked the initial shift from military-exclusive provisions to broader civilian access, though ballots were typically cast in person rather than by and required justification. By the early , spurred by increasing mobility such as railroad work and urbanization, additional states enacted similar laws; and followed in 1911, extending absentee options to civilians for excused absences like business travel or illness. further accelerated adoption, as returning veterans and wartime disruptions highlighted logistical barriers to in-person voting, leading to provisions for specific civilian groups beyond the military. By 1938, nearly all U.S. states had implemented civilian absentee voting statutes, generally restricting eligibility to verifiable excuses such as physical incapacity or occupational demands. Post-World War II reforms emphasized accessibility for overseas civilians alongside military personnel; the Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955 streamlined procedures for U.S. citizens abroad, indirectly benefiting civilian expatriates by standardizing federal absentee ballot requests. The 1970s and 1980s saw liberalization, with Washington state becoming the first to offer no-excuse absentee voting in 1974, eliminating the need for justifications and enabling any registered voter to request a mail ballot. Beginning in the 1980s, numerous states relaxed excuse requirements and expanded mail-in options, reflecting technological improvements in ballot security and postal reliability. A pivotal milestone occurred in 1998 when Oregon voters approved a referendum for universal mail voting, implemented statewide by 2000 as the nation's first all-mail election system, where nearly all ballots are sent automatically to voters. This model influenced subsequent adoptions, with states like and achieving high mail voting rates by the 2010s through automatic distribution and drop-off options. Internationally, civilian expansions paralleled U.S. trends; for instance, formalized postal voting for citizens abroad in the 1970s, while enabled overseas postal ballots in the 2010s to accommodate workers.

Post-20th Century Reforms

The Help America Vote Act (HAVA), enacted on October 29, 2002, introduced federal standards for and election administration, including requirements for states to offer provisional ballots and maintain computerized statewide voter lists, which indirectly facilitated absentee voting by reducing registration barriers for absent voters. While HAVA focused primarily on in-person voting systems, it allocated funds for upgrading election infrastructure, enabling some states to enhance mail ballot processing capabilities. The Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act of 2009 amended the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) to mandate that states transmit absentee ballots to covered voters at least 45 days before federal elections, provide for electronic ballot delivery where feasible, and prohibit refusal of properly submitted applications or ballots. This reform addressed documented delays in ballot delivery that had disenfranchised thousands of in prior cycles, with federal data showing over 20% of UOCAVA ballots rejected due to late arrival in 2008. Implementation required states to designate points of contact for UOCAVA coordination and report compliance annually, leading to a reported 10-15% increase in valid overseas ballots cast in subsequent elections. At the state level, the saw widespread adoption of no-excuse absentee voting, expanding from 25 states in 2000 to 46 states plus , by 2024, allowing any qualified voter to request a mail ballot without justification. Notable expansions included in 2005, in 2006, and a surge post-2010, such as Georgia's shift to no-excuse amid litigation, reflecting efforts to boost participation amid rising mobility and work demands. These changes correlated with mail voting comprising 43% of ballots in the 2020 presidential election, up from 21% in 2000, though empirical analyses indicate modest turnout gains primarily among consistent voters rather than new participants. The prompted temporary reforms in 2020, with 34 states easing absentee rules, including automatic mail ballot distribution in eight states like and , and extended deadlines or drop box installations in others to mitigate in-person risks. Post-election, at least 19 states enacted permanent changes, such as Idaho's 2021 no-excuse expansion and North Carolina's 2023 adoption, while others like and strengthened verification with signature matching or ID requirements, citing isolated fraud incidents involving absentee ballots in 2020. These reforms balanced access expansions with safeguards, as federal audits found error rates in mail voting under 0.0001% but highlighted vulnerabilities in chain-of-custody absent standardized processes.

Voting Methods

Mail and Postal Voting

and , a primary form of absentee balloting, enables voters unable to attend polling places to receive ballots via post, mark them privately, and return them by to election officials. This method relies on secure postal infrastructure, with ballots typically enclosed in tamper-evident envelopes and accompanied by affidavits affirming eligibility. In practice, voters request ballots through applications submitted by , , or in person, though some jurisdictions automatically distribute them to registered voters. In the United States, procedures vary by state: implemented universal mail voting in 1998, mailing ballots to all active voters for the 2000 , while others require excuses such as illness, travel, or military service. Returned ballots undergo signature verification against voter records, with many states employing barcode tracking for chain-of-custody monitoring via the U.S. . Additional safeguards include requirements or notarization in select states, and cure processes allowing voters to resolve mismatched signatures within deadlines, typically 3 to 7 days post-election. Internationally, postal voting accommodates absent or overseas electors in over 100 countries, often limited to specific groups like expatriates or the disabled, with ballots submitted physically by post to electoral authorities. permits optional postal voting for all citizens, requiring statutory declarations and secure envelopes, while the restricts it to those proving inability to attend polls, with verification via unique codes and postal tracking. Full-scale all-postal elections remain rare due to concerns over and verification, as evidenced by limited adoption beyond trials. Logistical challenges include postal delays, with U.S. guidelines recommending ballots be mailed at least 7 days before to ensure receipt, and international examples like Indonesia's overseas packages incorporating prepaid return envelopes for expatriates. Empirical data from U.S. states show rejection rates for ballots averaging 0.8% to 2%, primarily due to issues or late arrival, underscoring the method's reliance on timely processing and robust .

In-Person Early or Absentee Voting

In-person permits registered voters to cast ballots at designated polling sites before , providing a controlled environment similar to standard polling with added convenience for scheduling conflicts or avoidance of crowds. Voters typically present identification or undergo signature verification upon arrival, receive a —either paper or electronic—and deposit it directly into secure tabulation equipment or locked boxes under official oversight, ensuring immediate chain-of-custody protocols. This method contrasts with mail absentee voting by minimizing transit-related risks, as ballots do not leave the supervised premises until counted or stored. Availability and duration vary: as of 2024, 46 states offer early in-person voting, with periods ranging from 4 to 46 days prior, and operational hours often mirroring or extending beyond standard polling times. In jurisdictions without universal , in-person absentee voting serves as an alternative for those qualifying under state-specific excuses, such as anticipated absence, illness, or religious observance, allowing application and casting of an at a election office rather than via post. This hybrid approach requires prior application approval but enables direct verification, reducing potential for mishandling compared to mailed submissions; for instance, voters , complete the privately, and seal it on-site for official processing. No-excuse in-person absentee options exist in select states, effectively overlapping with frameworks. Usage data reflect growing adoption, driven by accessibility and perceived reliability: in the 2024 U.S. presidential election, early in-person voting contributed to pre-Election Day ballots comprising over half of total turnout in many states, with mail-in shares declining to 30.3% from 43% in 2020 amid voter preferences for verifiable, supervised processes. State-level examples include North Carolina, where over 4.2 million early in-person ballots were cast in 2024, surpassing prior records, and Tennessee, recording more than 200,000 on the first day alone. These trends correlate with reduced logistical vulnerabilities, as in-person methods facilitate real-time eligibility checks and limit opportunities for unauthorized interference, though state laws dictate ID requirements and site numbers to balance access and security.

Proxy and Third-Party Assistance

In the context of absentee ballots, entails authorizing another person to select and cast votes on behalf of the absent voter, a practice generally prohibited in general elections to preserve the principle and direct voter accountability. This restriction applies uniformly across states, where laws mandate that voters personally mark their ballots, even in absentee formats, to minimize opportunities for manipulation or misrepresentation of voter intent. Historical exceptions, such as Civil War-era provisions allowing military officers to facilitate soldier votes, have long been supplanted by individualized absentee processes requiring personal completion. Third-party assistance, by contrast, permits limited help with the mechanical aspects of absentee ballot completion—such as reading instructions or marking selections—for voters unable to do so independently due to physical disabilities, illness, or language barriers. Regulations vary by state but commonly restrict assistants to members, caregivers, or up to two non-partisan individuals, with requirements for affidavits attesting to the absence of or influence over the voter's choices. For example, Alabama's 2023 law classifies unauthorized assistance, including marking ballots without voter direction or influencing selections, as a punishable by up to 10 years , reflecting concerns over exploitation in vulnerable populations like the elderly or institutionalized. Federal guidelines under the Help America Vote Act of 2002 further mandate accessible processes for disabled voters, yet emphasize voter-directed assistance without altering intent. Such assistance carries inherent risks of , , or ballot harvesting, where third parties collect and submit multiple ballots under pretext of aid, potentially enabling in group settings like nursing homes or among non-English speakers. Documented cases include the 2018 9th District , where an operative assisted absentee voters through ballot collection and completion, leading to over 700 invalid or fraudulent ballots and a new election; similar schemes in (2019), involved operatives forging absentee ballots with third-party help, resulting in 19% of mail ballots being fraudulent. To counter these vulnerabilities, many states impose chain-of-custody requirements, numerical limits on collectible ballots (e.g., no more than 10 in some jurisdictions), or outright bans on non-family third-party returns, as in and , prioritizing verifiable voter autonomy over . Empirical analyses indicate that while assistance remains infrequent relative to total ballots—comprising less than 0.0001% in audited elections—it clusters in absentee systems with lax oversight, underscoring the causal link between reduced direct verification and elevated risks.

Electronic and Remote Digital Voting

Electronic and remote digital voting enables eligible absentee voters, such as or overseas citizens, to submit ballots via electronic means including , , web portals, or internet-based systems, bypassing physical or in-person delivery. In the United States, this primarily serves Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) voters, who include active-duty service members, their dependents, and American civilians abroad; as of 2023, at least 14 states and territories authorize electronic ballot return through or for federal elections, while others employ secure portals for ballot marking and transmission. Pilot programs, mandated by in 2009, have tested full remote electronic systems for UOCAVA voters, though adoption remains limited due to challenges. Internationally, has implemented a nationwide internet voting (i-voting) system since , allowing any registered voter to cast ballots remotely using a national ID-card for over a four-day period preceding . In its 2023 parliamentary elections, i-voting accounted for 51% of total votes, marking the highest share yet and demonstrating scalability for broad absentee use. The system requires voters to access a dedicated platform via secure computers or mobile devices with PIN codes, and ballots are encrypted and transmitted to central servers for verification against voter registries. Despite operational successes, electronic methods face substantial vulnerabilities, including risks of , infection, and server breaches during transmission or storage. Cybersecurity analyses indicate that no current technology can fully secure voting against sophisticated attacks, such as man-in-the-middle exploits or coerced revoting from shared devices, which undermine vote and . In the U.S., and transmissions lack in many implementations, exposing ballots to unauthorized access, while Estonia's system, though resilient to detected hacks over two decades, relies on voter-side measures that cannot prevent family or employer pressure in uncontrolled environments. Empirical evidence of widespread remains sparse; reports no verified instances of successful tampering since inception, attributing this to layered audits and real-time monitoring, yet independent reviews highlight unproven but plausible risks absent physical oversight. U.S. pilots have similarly shown minimal discrepancies, but experts caution that low detection rates may reflect underreporting rather than absence, given the difficulty of auditing digital trails without auditable backups. Overall, while enhancing for remote voters—evidenced by turnout increases in adopting jurisdictions—these systems prioritize over verifiable chain-of-custody, prompting ongoing debates on balancing innovation with causal safeguards against manipulation.

Advantages

Enhanced Voter Accessibility

Absentee ballots enable participation for voters impeded by physical disabilities, mobility impairments, or transportation deficits, circumventing barriers at polling sites such as inaccessible entrances or lack of adaptive equipment. National surveys reveal that transportation challenges affect roughly 25% of voters with disabilities, versus 10% of those without, underscoring absentee voting's role in addressing these core issues. Individuals with disabilities, including those requiring assistance for or , disproportionately rely on absentee methods to vote privately and independently at home, avoiding potential or breaches from in-person aid. Usage data from 2010 indicate 27% of disabled voters cast absentee ballots, compared to 17% of non-disabled voters, with self-care-limited individuals employing absentee options at over twice the baseline rate. Jurisdictions permitting no-excuse absentee voting record higher disabled turnout, as evidenced by analyses narrowing the disability voting gap to 3% in 2010 from 7% in 2008. For elderly voters, health declines—rather than age alone—erode in-person voting feasibility, but absentee access preserves participation by accommodating frailty, chronic conditions, or caregiving demands without necessitating travel. Rural residents, frequently separated from polling stations by vast distances and sparse , gain equitable access through ballots, with at-will absentee policies linked to elevated turnout in these communities. Uniformed service members and overseas citizens, covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986, exercise federal voting rights via absentee ballots despite deployments or expatriation, as states are mandated to facilitate registration and transmission for these groups.

Empirical Effects on Turnout and Participation

Empirical analyses of absentee voting's impact on overall reveal modest or negligible effects in many cases, often because such methods primarily substitute for Election Day voting rather than mobilizing non-voters. A comprehensive study of universal vote-by-mail implementations across five U.S. states from 1996 to 2018, using a difference-in-differences design, found no statistically significant change in aggregate turnout rates or partisan vote shares following the policy shifts. Similarly, regression discontinuity analyses in and during the 2020 election cycle showed that eligibility expansions for no-excuse absentee voting did not substantially elevate turnout among newly eligible demographics, such as younger voters or racial minorities, with increases limited to under 1 in targeted groups. Some identifies small gains, particularly among subpopulations with logistical barriers. For example, a of convenience voting methods, including absentee ballots, from 2004 to 2018 across U.S. states indicated average increases of 1-3 percentage points in jurisdictions adopting no-excuse absentee policies, though these effects diminished over time and varied by election competitiveness. Early adoption states like , which expanded absentee access in the , experienced correlated rises in participation among elderly and absentee-heavy voters, but aggregate effects were attenuated by substitution effects where in-person voters shifted modes without net addition. Causal identification challenges persist, as self-selection into absentee voting correlates with higher baseline propensity to vote, inflating apparent effects in observational data. Peer-reviewed syntheses emphasize that while absentee options enhance —evidenced by disproportionate uptake among disabled voters, who saw turnout surges to 68.5% in 2020 from prior lows—broader turnout boosts require complementary efforts, as convenience alone does not overcome or disinterest. In high-stakes elections like 2020, where national turnout reached 66.8%, absentee expansion facilitated record mail volumes (43% of votes) but did not independently drive the overall elevation beyond pandemic-induced salience.

Risks and Criticisms

Vulnerabilities to Fraud and Coercion

Absentee ballots introduce vulnerabilities to primarily because they are completed and returned outside the supervised environment of polling places, severing the direct between the voter and officials. This detachment enables opportunities for , where signatures or votes are fabricated, as seen in a 2022 case in , where a nursing home employee forged signatures on absentee ballot applications, leading to a guilty plea for attempted . Similarly, in October 2024, an nursing home worker was accused of completing an absentee ballot application for a without consent, highlighting how unsecured handling facilitates unauthorized voting. Ballot harvesting, permitted in 27 states, exacerbates these risks by allowing third parties to collect and submit ballots, potentially enabling tampering or selective delivery, as evidenced by the 2018 9th Congressional District , where illegal harvesting of over 10,500 ballots prompted a new . Coercion risks are amplified in private settings, particularly among vulnerable groups such as elderly residents in facilities, where dependents or caregivers exert without oversight. In the 2003 East Chicago, Indiana, mayoral election, supporters of incumbent Robert Pastrick coerced voters into casting absentee ballots through bribes and , affecting 1,950 votes and resulting in the election's overturn. environments compound this, as residents may face pressure from staff or family, with historical patterns showing bulk absentee requests from facilities raising red flags for coordinated manipulation. Absentee systems often lack real-time verification, such as voter ID checks at submission, and rely on post-facto signature matching, which rejected 1.3 million ballots across the last four federal elections due to discrepancies, underscoring detection challenges. Logistical flaws further heighten potential, including mail delivery failures, with over 28 million ballots unaccounted for between 2012 and 2018 due to misdirection or non-return. Historical cases illustrate scalability: In 1997 , , "boleteros" generated 5,000 fraudulent absentee ballots through and of deceased voters' ballots, overturning the . While some analyses assert overall rates remain low upon statewide adoption of mail voting, structural incentives persist in high-volume scenarios, where even isolated incidents can sway tight races, as demonstrated by the Heritage Foundation's database documenting 138 proven U.S. cases, many involving absentee methods. These vulnerabilities stem from the absence of polling-place protections against electioneering and , allowing and to occur undetected until audits reveal irregularities.

Logistical and Verification Challenges

Absentee ballots encounter logistical difficulties stemming from dependence on postal infrastructure, which can result in delays, lost , and post-election processing overloads. In the 2020 U.S. election, the U.S. Postal Service notified 46 states and the District of Columbia that operational limitations might prevent timely delivery of all returned ballots, even those postmarked by deadlines. An examination of data from that year identified over 50,000 absentee and mail-in ballots rejected nationwide solely for late arrival, highlighting systemic handling inefficiencies. These issues persisted into later cycles; in 2022, processed 54.4 million ballots from September to December but faced criticism for inconsistent delivery speeds in high-volume periods. administrators in 2024 reported ongoing U.S. disruptions, including sorting backlogs, threatening voter disenfranchisement in states with strict receipt deadlines. Verification processes introduce further complications, as absentee systems lack the immediate identity checks available in-person. Signature comparison against registration records, required in 34 states, relies on subjective human judgment and yields inconsistent outcomes; mismatches constituted the primary rejection reason in the 2020 general election across multiple jurisdictions. Empirical analysis of 2020 data showed absentee rejection rates averaging 0.8% nationally, with spikes in states like (1.5%) attributable to signature discrepancies, late arrivals, and incomplete applications. A 2024 peer-reviewed study documented annual rejections of tens of thousands of ballots due to signature verification errors, exacerbated by inadequate worker and lack of standardized calibration tools. Additional verification hurdles arise from disparate state requirements, such as supplemental identifiers, which amplify error rates without enhancing security proportionally. In Montana's 2024 , a new mandate to include birth year alongside signatures led to hundreds of otherwise valid ballots being discarded for non-compliance. Jurisdictions without ballot curing mechanisms—available in only about half of states—foreclose opportunities to resolve minor discrepancies, resulting in higher disenfranchisement of legitimate votes compared to in-person methods. These challenges underscore the trade-offs in scaling absentee voting without uniform protocols, as remote submission severs direct oversight of voter intent and eligibility.

Controversies and Debates

Election Integrity Concerns

Absentee ballots, by design, are requested, completed, and returned outside the supervised environment of polling places, creating opportunities for unauthorized interference, including forgery, coercion of voters, and improper handling or harvesting by third parties. This decentralized process lacks real-time verification of voter and intent, relying primarily on signatures and postal systems, which can be vulnerable to manipulation. Empirical analyses highlight that while in-person voting benefits from immediate oversight and identification checks, absentee methods separate the voter from the ballot's chain of custody, elevating inherent risks. In the 2018 North Carolina 9th Congressional District , absentee ballot irregularities in Bladen County prompted a state investigation revealing systematic , including the collection and alteration of ballots by Republican operative McCrae Dowless, who paid individuals to harvest votes and discard those unfavorable to his client. The North Carolina State Board of Elections determined the process was corrupted, leading to the certification's refusal and a new in 2019, where Democrat Dan McCready initially led but lost the redo to Republican Dan Bishop. Four individuals later pleaded guilty to absentee ballot related to the 2016 and 2018 races in the district. A similar incident occurred in the May 2020 Paterson, New Jersey, Third Ward City Council , where a invalidated results after uncovering absentee involving fictitious registrations and submissions by candidates and , who faced charges for tampering with mail-in ballots. Nearly 20% of absentee ballots were deemed fraudulent or suspicious, prompting a redo and highlighting vulnerabilities in ballot collection and verification. Jackson and Mendez were indicted on offenses, including and unauthorized possession of ballots. Further examples include a 2023 federal conviction in , where Kim Phuong Taylor orchestrated a scheme to fraudulently generate absentee votes for her husband's congressional primary campaign by coercing residents, including non-citizens, to submit ballots on his behalf. The U.S. Department of Justice prosecuted the case, resulting in Taylor's guilty plea to ballot fraud charges. Databases compiling proven convictions, such as the Heritage Foundation's Election Fraud Database, document over 1,500 instances nationwide since the , with a significant portion involving fraudulent absentee ballot use, such as requesting votes without voter knowledge or altering completed forms. These cases, though not ubiquitous, demonstrate that fraud in absentee systems can decisively influence close races, underscoring persistent integrity challenges despite safeguards like signature matching.

Empirical Evidence and Case Studies

Empirical analyses of absentee ballot systems reveal that while overall voter fraud remains infrequent across all voting methods, absentee voting exhibits a higher incidence of documented irregularities compared to in-person voting due to extended chain-of-custody vulnerabilities and opportunities for third-party interference. A 2020 study examining state transitions to vote-by-mail estimated an increase in reported fraud cases, particularly involving absentee ballots, though the absolute numbers remained low relative to total ballots cast. Peer-reviewed tests applied to the 2020 U.S. presidential election data provided mixed but indicative evidence of potential fraud in absentee processes, including statistical anomalies in ballot rejection rates and signature mismatches that were inconsistent with in-person voting patterns. On , empirical studies demonstrate a modest positive effect from expanded absentee voting access. For instance, states adopting no-excuse absentee voting saw turnout increases of approximately 2-5% in general elections, attributed to convenience for specific demographics like the elderly and rural voters, though universal mail-in systems showed no significant partisan skew in participation rates. However, these gains are tempered by evidence of rejection rates—often 1-2% higher in absentee systems due to errors in completion or verification—suggesting not all mailed ballots translate to counted votes. Notable case studies underscore vulnerabilities in absentee processes. In the 2019 4th Congressional District primary, Kim Phuong Taylor was convicted in 2023 for orchestrating a scheme involving over 20 fraudulent absentee ballots cast on behalf of non-English-speaking voters without their knowledge or consent, aiming to boost her husband's candidacy; she received a four-month sentence. Similarly, in Paterson, New Jersey's 2020 municipal , absentee ballot fraud allegations— including over 1,900 suspect applications from a single address and organized harvesting—led to the invalidation of results and a redo after investigations confirmed irregularities exceeding the vote margin. The Heritage Foundation's database, compiling over 1,500 proven U.S. fraud convictions since 1982, indicates that absentee-related cases constitute a disproportionate share, often involving , , or unauthorized voting, with examples spanning multiple states like North Carolina's 2018 congressional race where nine individuals were convicted for absentee ballot tampering affecting 700+ votes. These instances, while not indicative of systemic collapse, highlight causal risks from lax verification, as contrasted with in-person voting's real-time oversight.

Safeguards and Reforms

Verification and Security Measures

Election officials across U.S. states employ multiple layers of verification to ensure absentee ballots are cast by eligible voters and remain untampered. Upon receipt, ballots are first logged into systems to track arrivals and prevent duplicates, with signatures on the return envelope compared against those in records—a in all states. This process often involves bipartisan teams reviewing matches, though variations exist; for instance, 16 states mandate signature verification as the primary method, while others incorporate additional affidavits or database cross-checks for eligibility. Voter eligibility is further confirmed by matching against state registration databases, sometimes requiring photocopies of identification or numbers in states like Georgia and . To address potential discrepancies, many states implement cure processes allowing voters to resolve issues such as mismatched signatures through affidavits or supplemental verification, with 18 states offering formal mechanisms for this. deadlines and receipt windows provide temporal controls, ensuring ballots are submitted timely, often verifiable via unique barcodes printed on envelopes that link to voter records and enable duplicate prevention. In states requiring witnesses or notaries, such as and , affidavits must include signatures from designated individuals to authenticate the voter's identity and intent. Security measures extend to physical and logistical protections during transit and storage. The U.S. Postal Service applies Intelligent Mail Barcodes for end-to-end tracking of mail, coordinating with federal agencies like the FBI and CISA for inspections at processing facilities to detect tampering. Ballot envelopes feature design elements like watermarks, serial numbers, and inner secrecy sleeves to obscure contents and verify authenticity upon opening. Drop boxes, used in numerous states, are equipped with locks, tamper-evident seals, and surveillance cameras, emptied only by authorized bipartisan teams on scheduled routes. Voter-facing tracking portals, available in 43 states plus the District of Columbia, allow individuals to monitor ballot status from issuance to tabulation, enhancing transparency. Internationally, absentee voting security aligns with postal standards but varies by system; for example, countries like and use tracked mail with witness requirements similar to U.S. practices, though centralized national systems often incorporate digital verification absent in decentralized U.S. elections. These measures collectively aim to balance with , though signature verification's reliance on subjective matching has drawn scrutiny for inconsistent application across jurisdictions.

Recent Legislative Adjustments

In the aftermath of the 2020 U.S. elections, which saw unprecedented expansion of absentee and mail-in voting amid the , multiple states enacted laws to bolster verification and security measures for these ballots, addressing vulnerabilities such as inadequate signature matching, unmonitored drop boxes, and unsolicited applications. These reforms, predominantly in Republican-controlled legislatures, emphasized first-verifiable identity, chain-of-custody tracking, and penalties for mishandling, while empirical analyses indicated that while widespread remained unsubstantiated, isolated irregularities underscored the need for procedural tightening. Georgia's (SB 202), signed by on March 25, 2021, mandated that absentee ballot applicants provide a Georgia number, state ID number, or the last four digits of their , with non-matching applications rejected unless cured within three days. The law restricted drop boxes to one per county at sites, requiring continuous , tamper-evident features, and availability only during , effectively curtailing 24/7 unmanned access used in 2020. It also criminalized third-party distribution of unsolicited absentee applications and enhanced signature verification by allowing voters a post-rejection opportunity to affirm identity. Florida's Senate Bill 90, approved by Governor on April 6, 2021, prohibited drop boxes except at elections supervisor offices or sites, confining their use to 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. during periods with mandatory attendance by an elections employee and real-time monitoring via video. Absentee ballot requests now require a or ID number for first-time applicants since 2020, and the law banned mass-mailing of applications by outside groups while imposing penalties for false eligibility claims on ballots. Texas Senate Bill 1, enacted during a on September 9, 2021, by Governor Greg Abbott, eliminated drive-thru and 24-hour voting options, limited drop boxes to one per county at a single supervised location with tracking serial numbers on ballots, and required county-wide tracking of all mail ballots from issuance to receipt. It further prohibited election officials from sending unsolicited absentee applications and strengthened rejection protocols for ballots lacking required affidavits or signatures, with provisions for voter notification and cure periods. More recent adjustments include House Bill 458, signed , 2023, which mandated photo ID for in-person absentee voting—such as a current Ohio DL, , or military ID—and shortened the window for drop box availability to align strictly with hours, while enhancing bipartisan oversight of processing. In 2023, North Carolina's Senate Bill 747 required documentary proof of identity for absentee cures and banned private funding for election administration to prevent undue influence on mail operations. These measures reflect a broader trend, with at least 18 states adding or reinforcing absentee ID requirements between 2021 and 2023, though critics from organizations like the Brennan Center argue they impose undue burdens despite low incidence rates below 0.0001% in audited contests.

Global Implementation

United States

In the , absentee voting enables qualified electors unable to attend polling places on election day to cast ballots by mail, a practice administered primarily by states under their constitutional authority over elections, with federal requirements applying to specific groups. The process originated in the early 19th century, with authorizing absentee ballots for military personnel during the in 1813, though widespread adoption began during the Civil War to accommodate absent soldiers. By , all states permitted absentee voting for service members, and post-war expansions gradually extended it to civilians under varying conditions. Eligibility for absentee ballots differs across states, with no uniform national standard beyond federal mandates. As of 2024, 28 states plus the District of Columbia allow no-excuse absentee voting, meaning voters need only request a ballot without justifying absence, while the remaining states require an excuse such as illness, travel, disability, or religious observance. Seven states—, , , , , , and Washington—conduct all-mail elections, automatically mailing ballots to all registered voters. Voters typically request ballots via state election office forms, portals, or in person, with deadlines ranging from 7 to 50 days before depending on the . The standard process involves receiving the by , marking it privately, enclosing it in a signed secrecy envelope, and returning it via , drop box, or election office by the state's deadline—often requiring by election day and receipt within a of 3 to 14 days. Verification methods vary: 47 states use signature comparison against records, while others require witness signatures, attestation, or tracking; rejected absentee ballots in 2020 averaged 0.8% nationally, primarily for late arrival or mismatched signatures. under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA, enacted 1986 and amended by the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act of 2009) mandates that states provide absentee registration and ballots to active-duty military, merchant mariners, their dependents, and U.S. citizens abroad for federal elections, with the Federal Post Card Application serving as both registration and ballot request, transmissible by , , or . Usage of absentee ballots has surged in recent decades, facilitated by legislative expansions. In the 2020 presidential election, amid restrictions, approximately 43% of votes were cast by mail, totaling over 65 million ballots, compared to 25% in 2018 midterms. By 2022 midterms, the share declined to about 35% as pandemic measures eased, and in 2024, mail voting accounted for 30.3% of turnout. States like and processed millions of such ballots, with tracking systems and prepaid postage in many jurisdictions aiding logistics.

Europe

Absentee voting in Europe primarily occurs through postal ballots or proxy arrangements, with practices varying widely by country and election type. In many nations, postal voting is available to registered voters unable to attend polling stations, often requiring an application but no specific justification. For European Parliament elections, EU member states must facilitate voting for citizens abroad, typically via postal methods or registration in the home country, though implementation differs. Germany permits any eligible voter listed in a voters' register to apply for a postal , allowing them to vote from home or abroad by mailing the completed . This system applies to federal, state, and European elections, with ballots returned to offices for verification against voter registers. Usage has risen steadily, reflecting convenience for domestic and voters. In the , is accessible on demand for general, local, and devolved elections in , , and , without needing to provide a reason beyond inability to attend the . Voters apply to their local authority, receive a pack by post, and return it by mail or in person; restricts to defined circumstances like illness or travel. At the 2024 general election, 19.9% of registered voters used postal votes. is also available for those unable to mark their own . France relies predominantly on for absentee participation, where a voter designates one proxy—often a relative or acquaintance—to cast the in person at the . is not generally permitted for domestic elections, emphasizing in-person verification; exceptions exist for citizens abroad in certain referenda or consular votes. This approach limits absentee access compared to postal systems elsewhere. Italy facilitates postal voting for citizens residing abroad (AIRE-registered) in national parliamentary elections and referenda, sending ballots via diplomatic channels or mail for return to consulates or municipalities. Domestic voters generally vote in person, with limited proxy options; for the 2013 general election, postal packages were used for overseas participation. European elections follow similar abroad provisions. Other countries, such as and , offer for specific groups or all voters with applications, while broader European trends show postal methods more common for expatriates than universal domestic absenteeism, prioritizing verification through signatures, identifiers, and postmarks.

Asia-Pacific

In Australia, postal voting serves as a primary form of absentee balloting for federal, state, and local elections, enabling eligible voters unable to attend polling places on election day to receive and return ballots by mail. Administered by the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), any enrolled voter may apply for a postal vote if they will be away from their electorate, ill, or otherwise unable to vote in person; applications must be submitted before close of polls, with ballots mailed upon request. Overseas Australians can enroll for postal voting up to six years after leaving the country, though voting is not compulsory abroad, and in the 2022 federal election, approximately 2.5 million postal votes were cast, representing about 15% of total turnout. New Zealand employs special voting provisions for absentee ballots, allowing enrolled voters absent from their polling place to cast votes at other locations or by post during advance voting periods and on election day. The Electoral Commission facilitates special vote applications, which include postal returns for those traveling or overseas, with ballots verified against enrollment records before counting; overseas voters must apply in advance and may vote at embassies or by mail for general elections every three years. In the 2023 general election, special votes accounted for around 20% of total votes, highlighting the system's role in accommodating mobility while maintaining in-person verification where possible. India restricts postal ballots primarily to specific categories under the Electronically Transmitted Postal Ballot System (ETPBS), managed by the (ECI), including armed forces personnel, state police, government employees on poll duty, persons with disabilities, and seniors over 80, as expanded for the 2024 elections. Eligible voters receive ballots electronically or by post, complete them in the presence of an authorized officer, and return them by mail before counting; non-resident Indians remain ineligible for , limited instead to in-person options abroad, with postal ballots comprising less than 1% of total votes due to stringent eligibility. Indonesia facilitates overseas absentee voting through a combination of in-person balloting at diplomatic missions and postal options, established under election laws since 1953 to include expatriates, with voters registering via the General Elections Commission (KPU) and receiving ballot packages for return by . In the 2019 presidential election, around 250,000 overseas votes were cast, primarily via mailed packages from abroad, though turnout remains low at about 0.2% of total due to logistical hurdles like mail delays and verification requirements at returning offices. South Korea's National Election Commission (NEC) administers overseas absentee voting for nationals abroad, requiring voters to file an absentee report and register with Korean missions or online, after which ballots are issued for completion and postal return or in-person submission during designated periods before presidential or elections. Eligible overseas Koreans, including those without domestic residency, participated in the 2022 presidential election with over 200,000 absentee votes, emphasizing early registration to mitigate risks of non-delivery amid international constraints. Japan offers limited absentee voting, known as "fuzoku" or , where voters temporarily absent from their precinct can apply to the local election board for a to be mailed within the same , requiring return by post or in person before polls close; overseas Japanese typically vote at embassies for national , with no universal postal system. This restricted approach, introduced incrementally since the , prioritizes proximity verification, resulting in low absentee usage, under 5% of votes in recent Diet , to curb potential in a predominantly in-person framework.

Other Regions

In , absentee voting for expatriates has been adopted in multiple countries to extend to populations, though often with low participation rates due to administrative hurdles and logistical issues. implemented absentee voting for citizens abroad in the 2006 , enabling an estimated several million expatriates to participate via , a reform aimed at enfranchising non-resident voters previously excluded. Similar systems exist in countries like and , where external voting includes postal options, but empirical analysis of 104 elections across 15 nations from 1990 to 2017 reveals turnout influenced by rational factors such as registration simplicity and method accessibility, frequently resulting in single-digit percentages. In , postal absentee voting remains rare, constrained by unreliable postal infrastructure and security concerns that favor in-person voting at embassies over mail-based systems. incorporated external postal voting into its electoral framework post-independence in 1980, yet stringent restrictions—such as limited eligibility and verification requirements—have curtailed its practical application, reflecting broader regional hesitance toward remote voting amid fraud risks. , for example, permits out-of-country voting exclusively at diplomatic missions for national elections, eschewing postal ballots to ensure direct oversight, with voters required to present identification in person. Middle Eastern countries generally lack established absentee ballot mechanisms, as electoral systems in the region prioritize in-country participation and often operate under non-democratic frameworks that do not accommodate voting by . Where out-of-country voting occurs, it typically relies on consular voting rather than postal methods, limited by factors including political restrictions and inadequate reliability, consistent with global trends in developing contexts where only select nations enable such provisions.

References

  1. https://www.usvotefoundation.org/absentee-ballot-voting
  2. https://www.usa.gov/absentee-voting
  3. https://www.pa.gov/agencies/vote/voter-support/mail-in-and-absentee-ballot
  4. https://www.sos.nm.gov/voting-and-elections/voter-information-portal-nmvote-org/absentee-and-early-voting/
  5. https://www.nalc.org/news/the-postal-record/2024/september-october-2024/document/Absentee.pdf
  6. https://www.seafarers.org/seafarerslogs/2020/08/absentee-voting-has-deep-roots-in-u-s-history/
  7. https://electionlab.mit.edu/research/voting-mail-and-absentee-voting
  8. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2020/10/30/from-voter-registration-to-mail-in-ballots-how-do-countries-around-the-world-run-their-elections/
  9. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/low-rates-of-fraud-in-vote-by-mail-states-show-the-benefits-outweigh-the-risks/
  10. https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110938/documents/HHRG-116-JU00-20200728-SD036.pdf
  11. https://scvotes.gov/voters/absentee-voting/
  12. https://www.ohiosos.gov/elections/voters/absentee-voting/
  13. https://aceproject.org/main/english/em/eme10.htm
  14. https://www.elections.virginia.gov/casting-a-ballot/absentee-voting/
  15. https://www.si.edu/collections/snapshot/history-voting-mail
  16. https://www.history.com/articles/vote-by-mail-soldiers-war
  17. https://wcl.american.libguides.com/voting/history
  18. https://postalmuseum.si.edu/exhibition/voting-by-mail-exhibition/history-1861-2022
  19. https://nebraskalegislature.gov/pdf/reports/research/snapshot_history_of_military_voting_rights_in_america.pdf
  20. https://hsccnh.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Absentee-Voting-During-the-Civil-War-by-Alan-Rumrill.pdf
  21. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/how-mail-in-voting-began-on-civil-war-battlefields
  22. https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/-absentee-and-early-voting_155531845547.pdf
  23. https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/3295
  24. https://www.eac.gov/about/help_america_vote_act.aspx
  25. https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/senate-bill/1415/text
  26. https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/Military-and-Overseas-Voter-Empowerment-%25E2%2580%259CMOVE%25E2%2580%259D-Act.pdf
  27. https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/Policies/havamemo.pdf
  28. https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/table-1-states-with-no-excuse-absentee-voting
  29. https://electioninnovation.org/research/expansion-voting-before-election-day/
  30. https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/the-evolution-of-absentee-mail-voting-laws-2020-through-2022
  31. https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/04/what-methods-did-people-use-to-vote-in-2020-election.html
  32. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/how-voting-laws-have-changed-battleground-states-2020
  33. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10732234/
  34. https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/table-14-how-states-verify-voted-absentee-mail-ballots
  35. https://www.vote.org/absentee-voting-rules/
  36. https://about.usps.com/what/government-services/election-mail/
  37. https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/vbm/Signature_Verification_Cure_Process.pdf
  38. https://www.idea.int/data-tools/tools/special-voting-arrangements/postal-in-country
  39. https://theloop.ecpr.eu/the-dilemma-of-postal-voting/
  40. https://www.fvap.gov/citizen-voter/overview
  41. https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/early-in-person-voting
  42. https://www.lenawee.mi.us/Faq.aspx?QID=496
  43. https://ippsr.msu.edu/public-policy/michigan-wonk-blog/no-reason-absentee-voting-michigan
  44. https://www.npr.org/2025/07/01/nx-s1-5452536/mail-in-ballot-early-in-person-voting-2024-election
  45. https://www.ncsbe.gov/news/press-releases/2024/11/03/person-early-voting-ends-record-turnout-election-day
  46. https://tennesseelookout.com/briefs/over-200000-tennesseans-cast-ballots-on-the-first-day-of-early-voting/
  47. https://aceproject.org/main/english/po/poa02e.htm
  48. https://www.theusconstitution.org/blog/president-trump-ignores-the-long-history-of-absentee-ballots/
  49. https://alabamareflector.com/2024/08/01/alabama-law-criminalizing-some-absentee-ballot-help-goes-before-federal-judge/
  50. https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/voting-mail-absentee-voting
  51. https://www.heritage.org/election-integrity/report/four-stolen-elections-the-vulnerabilities-absentee-and-mail-ballots
  52. https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/ballot-collection-laws-and-litigation
  53. https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/electronic-ballot-return-internet-voting
  54. https://www.fvap.gov/info/laws/uocava
  55. https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/military-and-overseas-voting-projects
  56. https://www.valimised.ee/en/internet-voting-estonia
  57. https://e-estonia.com/how-did-estonia-carry-out-the-worlds-first-mostly-online-national-elections/
  58. https://ec.europa.eu/digital-building-blocks/sites/plugins/viewsource/viewpagesrc.action?pageId=533365949
  59. https://www.aaas.org/epi-center/internet-online-voting
  60. https://www.npr.org/2023/09/07/1192723913/internet-voting-explainer
  61. https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/Final_%2520Risk_Management_for_Electronic-Ballot_05082020_508c.pdf
  62. https://scholars.unh.edu/unh_lr/vol21/iss2/9/
  63. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/a/593435.pdf
  64. https://verifiedvoting.org/internet-voting-faq/
  65. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0740624X2200051X
  66. https://itif.org/publications/2012/05/21/importance-absentee-voting-accessible-elections/
  67. https://news.wisc.edu/poor-health-threatens-voting-in-older-age-absentee-and-early-voting-can-help-maintain-turnout/
  68. https://securedemocracyusa.org/s/Report-How-Current-Threats-to-Voting-Hurt-Rural-Americans.pdf
  69. https://www.eac.gov/uocava
  70. https://www.justice.gov/crt/uniformed-and-overseas-citizens-absentee-voting-act
  71. https://dthompson.scholar.ss.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/19/2020/08/Thompson_et_al_VBM_PNAS.pdf
  72. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8694609/
  73. https://people.reed.edu/~gronkep/docs/Gronke-Galanes-Rosenbaum-Miller-2007-Early-Voting-and-Turnout.pdf
  74. https://smlr.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/Documents/Centers/Program_Disability_Research/FactSheet_Disability_Voter_Turnout_2020.pdf
  75. https://www.michigan.gov/ag/news/press-releases/2022/02/24/macomb-county-nursing-home-employee-pleads-guilty-in-attempted-election-fraud-case
  76. https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article294739644.html
  77. https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/LM268_0.pdf
  78. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/2330443X.2021.1906806
  79. https://electionfraud.heritage.org/
  80. https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/usps-states-delayed-mail-in-ballots/2020/08/14/64bf3c3c-dcc7-11ea-8051-d5f887d73381_story.html
  81. https://www.npr.org/2020/07/13/889751095/signed-sealed-undelivered-thousands-of-mail-in-ballots-rejected-for-tardiness
  82. https://about.usps.com/what/government-services/election-mail/pdf/usps-2022-post-election-analysis.pdf
  83. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/widespread-problems-with-u-s-mail-system-could-disrupt-voting-election-officials-warn
  84. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/check-signature-mail-in-ballot-election_n_670ed25fe4b0c5b8c0afc1a0
  85. https://elections-blog.mit.edu/articles/deep-dive-absentee-ballot-rejection-2020-general-election
  86. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1532673X241254383
  87. https://dailymontanan.com/2025/10/23/hundreds-of-ballots-rejected-following-new-law-requiring-voters-write-birth-year-on-ballot-envelopes/
  88. https://mostpolicyinitiative.org/science-note/ballot-signature-verification-curing-2/
  89. https://dl.ncsbe.gov/State_Board_Meeting_Docs/Congressional_District_9_Portal/Order_03132019.pdf
  90. https://www.lawyerscommittee.org/north-carolina-voter-fraud/
  91. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/four-people-plead-guilty-north-carolina-ballot-probe-2016-2018-electio-rcna49534
  92. https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/20/politics/paterson-new-jersey-city-council-voter-fraud
  93. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/nyregion/nj-election-mail-voting-fraud.html
  94. https://www.njoag.gov/ag-grewal-announces-indictment-of-paterson-councilmen-michael-jackson-and-alex-mendez-on-charges-of-election-fraud-and-related-offenses/
  95. https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/woman-convicted-voter-fraud-scheme
  96. https://www.heritage.org/election-integrity/heritage-explains/voter-fraud
  97. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3756988
  98. https://www.amstat.org/docs/default-source/amstat-documents/pol-vote-by-mail.pdf
  99. https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1249&context=kjur
  100. https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/108824/documents/HHRG-116-JU00-20190129-SD020.pdf
  101. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/how-election-officials-verify-mail-in-and-absentee-ballots
  102. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/mail-ballot-security-features-primer
  103. https://www.uspis.gov/election-mail-security
  104. https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/2021-election-enactments
  105. https://www.legis.ga.gov/api/legislation/document/20212022/201121
  106. https://sos.ga.gov/news/court-continues-uphold-core-georgias-election-integrity-act
  107. https://ocfelections.gov/sites/default/files/SiteSectionFiles/Links%2520A/forms/SB90%2520Fact%2520Sheet%2520English.pdf
  108. https://boe.cuyahogacounty.gov/voters/2023-ohio-voting-law-changes
  109. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-may-2024
  110. https://time.com/5892357/voting-by-mail-history/
  111. https://ballotpedia.org/Absentee/mail-in_voting_eligibility%2C_2024
  112. https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/eavsdeepdive_earlyvoting_101717.pdf
  113. https://voteathome.org/portfolio/2022-mailed-out-ballot-use-rates-of-total-reg-voters/
  114. https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/2022_EAVS_Report_508c.pdf
  115. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/751457/EPRS_BRI%282023%29751457_EN.pdf
  116. https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/en/service/glossar/b/briefwahl.html
  117. https://electoralpolitics.org/en/articles/pochtovoe-golosovanie-na-vyborakh-v-germanii/
  118. https://www.gov.uk/how-to-vote/postal-voting
  119. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-7419/
  120. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7419/CBP-7419.pdf
  121. https://thehill.com/homenews/ap/ap-business/explainer-how-frances-old-school-voting-system-works/
  122. https://apnews.com/article/covid-health-business-elections-france-e06fab5cde84f23d682013e1661caf35
  123. https://consfiladelfia.esteri.it/en/servizi-consolari-e-visti/servizi-per-il-cittadino-italiano/servizi-elettorali/referendum/voto-per-corrispondenza-dei-cittadini-italiani-residenti-allestero-e-opzione-di-voto-in-italia/
  124. https://conssanfrancisco.esteri.it/en/news/dal_consolato/2025/04/abrogative-referendum-of-june-08-09-2025-voting-by-correspondence-by-italian-citizens-living-abroad-and-the-option-to-vote-in-italy/
  125. https://www.aec.gov.au/voting/ways_to_vote/
  126. https://www.aec.gov.au/overseas/
  127. https://vote.nz/voting/how-to-vote/what-to-do/
  128. https://www.govt.nz/browse/engaging-with-government/enrol-and-vote-in-an-election/vote-in-an-election/
  129. https://www.eci.gov.in/etpbs
  130. https://www.business-standard.com/elections/lok-sabha-election/postal-ballot-voting-eligibility-and-process-for-lok-sabha-elections-2024-124032100284_1.html
  131. https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/va/annex/country-case-studies/indonesia-a-long-established-system-for-external/mobile_browsing/onePag
  132. https://aerc.anfrel.org/country/indonesia/voters-living-abroad/
  133. https://www.nec.go.kr/site/eng/03/10305040000002024100205.jsp
  134. https://www.nec.go.kr/site/abroaden/main.do
  135. https://aceproject.org/main/english/po/poa02d02.htm
  136. https://www.pewresearch.org/race-and-ethnicity/2006/02/22/appendix-2-background-on-absentee-voting-in-latin-america/
  137. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0962629823000562
  138. https://aceproject.org/about-en/voting-from-abroad-in-18-latin-american-countries
  139. https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/va/annex/country-case-studies/zimbabwe-highly-restrictive-provisions/mobile_browsing/onePag
  140. https://www.elections.org.za/pw/VotingAbroad/About-Voting-Abroad
  141. https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/out-of-country-voting.pdf
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.