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Split-ticket voting
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Split-ticket voting or ticket splitting is when a voter in an election votes for candidates from different political parties when multiple offices are being decided by a single election, as opposed to straight-ticket voting, where a voter chooses candidates from the same political party for every office up for election. Split-ticket voting can occur in certain mixed-member systems which allow for it, such as mixed-member proportional and parallel voting systems.

Examples

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Australia

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In Australia, federal elections in recent times have usually involved a House of Representatives election and a half-Senate election occurring on the same day.[1] The states, with the exception of Queensland and Tasmania,[2] also hold elections for both houses of parliament simultaneously. An example of split-ticket voting in Australia is a voter who gives their first preference to the Liberal Party on the House of Representatives ballot paper and to the One Nation party in the Senate.

In the 2013 election, the Senate vote for both the Liberal and Labor parties was considerably lower than their lower house vote, demonstrating that a large number of people voted for a major party in the House of Representatives and a minor party or micro-party in the Senate.[3] There are many reasons why a voter may do this, including the fact that many parties only stand candidates for the Senate (leaving their supporters unable to vote for them on their lower house ballot), the much lower quota required for election to the Senate compared to the House of Representatives (14.3% versus 50%), and a desire to check the power of the government by preventing it from controlling the Senate.

From 1978 to 2008, when the Australian Democrats held representation in the Senate, the Democrats benefited greatly from split-ticket voting, as their Senate vote was always much higher than their House of Representatives vote.[4] The party built its campaigns around "keeping the bastards honest", a reference to holding the balance of power in the Senate so as to prevent the chamber from becoming either a rubber stamp for the government or a tool of obstruction for the opposition.

Ghana

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Ghanaian federal presidential and parliamentary elections are held every four years, and local elections are held before or after a 6-month window. Presidents are elected using the two-round system, while MPs are elected with the first-past-the-post system.[5]

In Ghana, split-ticket voting is called skirt-and-blouse voting,[6] and refers to voting for a President and member of parliament of different parties.[7] It can be seen as a form of protest against particular presidential or legislative candidates, or as a vote of no confidence.[8] The phenomenon of skirt and blouse voting has grown in recent years, with 11 constituencies voting skirt and blouse in 1996 compared to 26 constituencies voting skirt and blouse in 2012.[9][10]

During the 2024 election, 12% of New Patriotic Party members said that they intended to vote skirt-and-blouse.[11] National Democratic Congress candidate John Dramani Mahama advocated against skirt-and-blouse voting, stating that a strong majority in both the presidency and parliament would allow the government to be more effective.[12]

Indonesia

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During the 2024 Indonesian general election, despite winning the most votes in the legislative election in traditionally PDIP-supporting provinces such as Central Java and Bali, the PDIP presidential ticket, Ganjar-Mahfud, failed to secure victories in those provinces. A similar phenomenon occurred in East Java, where PKB won the most legislative votes, but its presidential ticket, Anies-Muhaimin, also failed to win the province. The eventual winner, Prabowo-Gibran, won 36 out of 38 provinces, securing 58% of the national vote.[13]

Italy

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Since the reintroduction of a mixed electoral system in 2017, ticket splitting had been banned in national elections[14] while some regions allow it. In the 2024 Sardinian regional election, centre-right candidate Paolo Truzzu received 45% losing the election while the parties who supported him got 48.4%. Some later accused of Lega of ticket splitting.[15]

Philippines

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In the Philippines, elections for multiple positions are held on the same day. In elections where the presidency is at stake, the vice presidency is elected separately. Voters have split their ticket to provide checks and balances to the top two positions.[16] In the operation of the 1987 constitution until 2022, the president and vice president came from different parties in three out of four elections. Having the elected president and vice president coming from different parties is seen as undesirable.[17]

The president may also endorse a senatorial slate, and candidates for House representatives and local officials; all of these are elected separately and voters may split their ticket down-ballot.

Split ticket presidential/vice presidential results:

United Kingdom

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In the United Kingdom the Additional Member System is used for the devolved assemblies of Scotland and Wales, as well as the London Assembly[18][19][20] and is considered to increase the likelihood to split-ticket. As each voter casts two votes: one vote for a candidate standing in their constituency (with or without an affiliated party), and one vote for a party list standing in a wider region. In the constituency vote a single representative is elected using the traditional First-Past-The-Post system. The regional vote is used to elect multiple representatives from party lists to stand in regional seats, taking into account how many seats were gained by that party in the constituency vote, using a system of proportional representation: the number of seats a party receives will roughly reflect its percentage of the vote. Between the 1997 and 2003 elections in London, Scotland, and Wales between 17 and 28 percent of voters split their tickets.[21]

United States

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In the United States, multiple elections for many different offices are often held on the same day. This may be true of primary elections and may also include the placing of candidates for federal, state, and local offices on the same ballot. One of many possible examples of split-ticket voting in the United States is a voter who seeks to elect the Democratic Party's candidate for the Senate, the Republican Party's candidate for House of Representatives, the Green Party's candidate for County Supervisor, and the Libertarian Party's candidate for Coroner.

One example is the 2004 Montana gubernatorial election, where Democratic gubernatorial candidate Brian Schweitzer was elected governor 50.4% to 46.0%, while incumbent Republican President George W. Bush defeated Democrat John Kerry 59% to 39%. This suggests that a large number of the electorate voted for a split-ticket, selecting a Republican presidential candidate and a Democratic Party gubernatorial candidate. Another example is the 2016 West Virginia gubernatorial election, where Democrat (now Republican) Jim Justice won by eight points while Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump won in the state with 68% of the vote. Jim Justice later switched as a Republican in 2017. Another example is the 2020 United States Senate election in Maine where incumbent Susan Collins won by a 8.6% margin against Democratic challenger Sara Gideon, despite Joe Biden defeating Donald Trump in Maine by a 9.1% margin.

Ticket-splitting was less common in the 1940s, with just 6 states splitting tickets for President and Senator in 1948. However, by 1968 ticket-splitting became more common with Richard Nixon making inroads nationally but Democratic Congressmen winning re-election by large margins. Jimmy Carter provided a brief resurgence for Southern Democratic hopes before split-ticket voting became even more common in the 1980s under Ronald Reagan. 2004 saw a sharp decline in split-tickets among President and Senator with just 7 total. 2016 and 2020 saw just one split-ticket victory: Republican Susan Collins defeated Sara Gideon by an eight-point margin while Joe Biden won the state of Maine. However, Donald Trump won the 2nd district.

Recent history

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Split-ticket voting has seen a drastic decline in recent elections. In the 2020 presidential election, only 16 "crossover districts" — congressional districts that elected a presidential candidate and a House candidate of a different party — were recorded, in comparison to 35 in 2016 and 83 in 2008. The 2020 numbers represent only four percent of the overall congressional districts in the U.S., and a record low. In addition, the 2020 United States Senate elections left six states with a split representation between Democrats and Republicans, in comparison to 21 states with a split representation after 1992. This was attributed to the increasing polarization and nationalization of politics in the U.S., in which members of both political parties have regarded one another with antipathy.[22][23]

Later, in the 2022 United States elections, there was a resurgence in split-ticket voting in a number of states. In some cases, concurrent gubernatorial and Senate races went to candidates of different parties. For example, in Georgia, Republican Brian Kemp defeated Democrat Stacey Abrams in the gubernatorial election by seven points, drastically outperforming Republican Herschel Walker in the concurrent Senate race, which Walker lost to Democrat Raphael Warnock after a runoff election in December. In other cases, there was a performance gap between gubernatorial and Senate candidates in the same state. For example, in Ohio, Governor Mike DeWine won the gubernatorial election by about 26 percentage points, while JD Vance won the concurrent Senate race by less than seven percentage points. The results of the 2022 elections were attributed by experts to the quality of candidates.[24][25][26] The number of "crossover districts" also slightly increased from 16 to 23.[27]

Notable split-ticket U.S. elections:

Motivations

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Although less common, split-ticket voting can potentially be used as a form of tactical voting. One possible example of this is a voter who prefers candidate A but does not believe that candidate A can win the election, so the voter votes for candidate B (who may be of a different political party from candidate A) because candidate B is better than other more competitive candidates C, D, etc.

Split-ticket voting may also occur in elections where multiple voting systems are employed. Another possible motivation is if the voter does not have significant preference to either party and tactically looks to elect different party members in symbiotic roles to limit the impact of each. One possible example of this is a voter who, in a parallel voting system selects a candidate from a minority party for seats allocated by a proportional representation election system and selects a candidate from a larger party for a seat decided by a first past the post system. In mixed-member proportional systems large-scale strategic split ticket voting and the use of decoy lists may be used to subvert the compensatory effect of the system.

Split ticket preferences

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See also

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Look up split ticket in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.

References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Split-ticket voting

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Split-ticket voting, also known as ticket splitting, refers to the electoral practice in which a voter selects candidates from different for distinct offices on the same , rather than supporting a single party's slate across all races. This form of voting has been most prominently studied and observed , where ballots often combine federal, state, and contests, allowing voters to mix partisan choices such as supporting one party's presidential candidate while backing another for congressional or gubernatorial seats. Historically prevalent from the mid-20th century through the , split-ticket voting facilitated outcomes, where control of the executive and legislative branches split between parties, often yielding compromises or institutional as causal mechanisms for balancing power. Empirical analyses of aggregate data reveal its peak incidence during periods of weaker partisanship, with rates exceeding 20-30% in presidential-congressional alignments in the and , driven by candidate-specific evaluations over strict party loyalty. In recent decades, however, split-ticket voting has sharply declined to near-historic lows, with party-line voting dominating due to intensified polarization, nationalized campaign messaging, and structural factors like closed primaries that reinforce partisan cues. For instance, in the 2020 , ballot-level data from battleground states showed split-ticket rates below 2% among partisans for presidential and congressional races, underscoring a causal shift toward uniform partisanship that minimizes cross-party deviations. This trend has notable implications, reducing the likelihood of and amplifying unified control, which can accelerate legislative agendas but also heighten risks of overreach absent internal . Despite its diminished prevalence, split-ticket voting persists in select contexts, such as state and races where personalized appeals override national brands, and it continues to intrigue scholars for evidencing residual voter amid dominant ideological sorting.

Definition and Fundamentals

Core Definition

Split-ticket voting refers to the electoral behavior in which a voter selects candidates from more than one for different offices contested in the same . This contrasts with , where all selections align with a single party's candidates, and typically arises in systems featuring multi-office ballots that allow independent choices per race. The phenomenon presupposes designs permitting granular selection, as , where federal, state, and local partisan contests often appear together, facilitating cross-party choices without mechanical constraints like party-line levers. Empirical measurement often relies on aggregate precinct data or validated voter surveys, revealing rates that have varied historically but generally indicate voters prioritizing qualities or issue alignments over pure ship in specific contests.

Distinction from Straight-Ticket Voting

refers to the practice in which a voter selects candidates from only one across all partisan offices on a . This behavior aligns with consistent partisan loyalty, often facilitated in certain U.S. states by a mechanism allowing a single mark or electronic selection to cast votes for an entire party's slate of candidates, thereby streamlining the process and reducing the need for individual race-by-race decisions. As of 2023, only six states—, , , , , and —offered this straight-ticket option on ballots, though voters in other jurisdictions can still engage in straight-ticket behavior by manually selecting same-party candidates for each office. In direct opposition, split-ticket voting occurs when a voter chooses candidates from multiple for different offices within the same , such as supporting a Democratic presidential and a Republican congressional . This approach necessitates deliberate, office-specific selections without the efficiency of a party-wide vote, highlighting voter from strict party lines and potentially reflecting evaluations of individual qualifications, positions, or local issues over blanket partisanship. The primary distinction between the two lies in partisan consistency and ballot mechanics: straight-ticket voting emphasizes uniformity and expediency, often reinforcing party cohesion and down-ballot coattails effects, while split-ticket voting underscores selective cross-party support, which can dilute and contribute to outcomes, as observed in U.S. elections where congressional majorities have opposed the . Where straight-ticket options exist, their use correlates with higher rates of uniform party voting, whereas their absence or voter opt-out encourages more split-ticket instances by requiring explicit choices per race. This behavioral divide has measurable impacts on electoral outcomes, with straight-ticket dominance linked to stronger partisan sweeps in state legislatures and split-ticket patterns associated with ideological moderation or protest voting.

Measurement and Data Challenges

Measuring split-ticket voting poses significant challenges due to the , which precludes direct observation of individual voter choices across multiple offices in most jurisdictions. , where the phenomenon is most studied, precinct-level aggregate election returns are the primary data source, requiring statistical techniques like ecological inference (EI) to estimate the proportion of voters supporting candidates from different parties for different races, such as presidential and congressional contests. These methods, including Gary King's , infer individual-level behavior from marginal vote totals but rely on assumptions of parameter constancy across precincts and specific distributional forms, such as the truncated bivariate normal, which are frequently violated in real data. A core limitation is aggregation bias, where split-ticket rates correlate with precinct characteristics like presidential vote shares, leading to systematically skewed estimates. Simulations demonstrate that EI can produce results deviating by over 25 standard errors from true values (e.g., estimating 0.5 split rates as highly biased), while regressions yield implausible negative proportions, such as -10.8% of one candidate's voters supporting an opposing party. Tomography diagnostics often reveal uninformative bounds (e.g., [0.28, 0.91] for certain parameters), indicating insufficient data to constrain estimates reliably, particularly in small or homogeneous precincts. Multi-stage estimation further compounds errors, undermining district-level inferences. Survey-based alternatives, drawing from self-reported data like the Cooperative Election Study, face recall inaccuracies, favoring partisan consistency, and overestimation of split-ticket rates by an average of 2.14 percentage points, with errors around 6.18 points. Validation against anonymized cast vote records in states like (2010-2018) and (2016-2018) confirms higher errors for state-level races (standard deviation ~6.9 points) compared to national dyads (~3.8 points), attributed to smaller samples and temporal distance from elections. Aggregate methods also risk , overestimating splits relative to individual-level surveys (e.g., 25% vs. lower survey figures in some contexts), as they cannot disentangle voter-specific motivations without additional assumptions like demographic . These issues are exacerbated in diverse or low-information settings, where varying split rates across subgroups (e.g., by race or turnout) violate EI's independence assumptions, leading to unreliable national trends. While rare access to unit-level images in select jurisdictions provides "" for validation, such data remain exceptional and non-generalizable, highlighting the field's dependence on imperfect proxies that may conflate artifacts with behavioral shifts, such as the observed decline in split-ticket voting since the 1980s.

Historical Evolution

Early Instances and 19th-Century Roots

Prior to the widespread adoption of the secret Australian ballot in the late 1880s, split-ticket voting in the United States was constrained by the dominant party ballot system, which emerged in the 1830s and 1840s during the Second Party System. Political parties produced and distributed pre-printed tickets listing their slate of candidates for multiple offices, distributed openly at polling places by party workers, which incentivized voters to deposit entire straight tickets to avoid scrutiny, intimidation, or loss of patronage benefits. This system, replacing earlier oral voting and handwritten ballots, bundled candidates to reinforce party discipline, but it did not eliminate splitting entirely. Early instances of split-ticket voting relied on rudimentary alterations to these party tickets, such as ""—crossing out disfavored names and writing in alternatives—or applying "pasters," small slips of paper with opposing candidates' names pasted over the original ticket. These practices, though feasible, were visible to onlookers and poll watchers, exposing splitters to social pressure, bribery reversal, or violence in a non-secret voting environment. and pasters were documented in urban elections from the 1850s onward, particularly in competitive locales like , where nativist American Party challenges to Democrats and Whigs prompted some voters to mix tickets for local offices while supporting presidential nominees from another party. By the 1880s, as party competition intensified amid third-party movements like the Greenback and parties, scratched ballots gained attention in national elections. In the 1884 presidential contest between and , newspapers reported instances of voters scratching electoral tickets to swap presidential electors or congressional candidates across party lines, reflecting occasional prioritization of individual candidate appeal over strict partisanship. However, such deviations remained infrequent, with estimates suggesting split-ticket rates below 10% in most jurisdictions before reforms, as party tickets' design and distribution minimized deviations to preserve organizational control. The 19th-century roots thus lay in these imperfect mechanisms amid a system favoring party unity, setting the stage for expansion only after the Australian ballot—first adopted in in 1888 and spreading nationwide by 1896—introduced government-printed, secret ballots that shielded voters from observation and simplified mixing choices without physical alterations.

Peak Prevalence in the Mid-20th Century

Split-ticket voting reached its zenith during the mid-20th century, particularly from the through the 1970s, as measured by aggregate election outcomes and survey data on voter behavior. This era featured frequent divergences between presidential preferences and down-ballot choices, driven by regional cross-pressures, candidate-centered campaigns, and relatively weaker national party cohesion compared to earlier or later periods. For example, in the 1964 presidential election, 14 states produced split presidential-Senate outcomes, the highest in the postwar period, with Republican senators elected in states overwhelmingly won by Democrat . Similarly, the 1968 election saw 16 such split states, largely in the South where voters supported independent for president but returned Democratic senators amid lingering regional loyalties. At the congressional district level, splits were commonplace, reflecting broader voter willingness to cross party lines. In 1952, 86 House districts diverged from presidential results, a figure that rose over subsequent decades as party tickets weakened. By 1972, approximately 193 districts—nearly 44% of the total—split their votes between Republican Richard Nixon and Democratic House candidates, with Southern districts accounting for a disproportionate share due to conservative Democratic incumbency. American National Election Studies (ANES) data corroborate this, showing elevated rates of individual president-House ticket-splitting in the 1950s and 1960s relative to post-1980s declines, with splits often exceeding 20% in key cycles before partisan realignments intensified. This peak contrasted with the more uniform straight-ticket patterns of the early and the sharp drop-off after the , attributable to factors like the erosion of machine politics and the rise of ideological sorting. Scholars such as David Kimball observe that split-ticket prevalence climbed from the , fostering frequent —such as Democratic Congresses during Republican presidencies—but waned as parties polarized along national lines. Overall, mid-century data underscore a electorate more pragmatically detached from strict partisanship, enabling outcomes where local or personal candidate appeal trumped national party cues.

Decline from the 1980s Onward

Split-ticket voting in the experienced a marked decline beginning in the , with the share of voters casting ballots for candidates from different parties in presidential and congressional races dropping from 27% in 1980 to 17% in 2000, according to American National Election Studies (ANES) respondents. This erosion extended to aggregate outcomes, as the number of split congressional districts—those supporting opposing parties for president and —fell to 86 in 2000, the lowest since 1952, and further to just 26 out of 435 in 2012. At the state level, split presidential-Senate outcomes, which affected 11 of 34 states in , became increasingly rare, reflecting a broader of electoral behavior where local races aligned more closely with presidential preferences. Several interconnected factors drove this decline, foremost among them the intensification of partisan polarization. Ideological distances between congressional parties, as quantified by DW-NOMINATE scores, widened substantially from 0.39 in 1972 to 0.87 in 2000, elevating the salience of party labels and diminishing incentives for cross-party support. Concurrently, the proportion of strong partisans rose from 32% in 1976 to 41% in 2000, while the share of voters perceiving significant differences between parties increased from 55% to 79% over the same period, fostering a view of elections as zero-sum interparty contests rather than evaluations of individual candidates. The contraction of local media coverage exacerbated these trends by reducing voter exposure to candidate-specific information, leading to greater reliance on national partisan cues. Empirical analysis of the mid-20th-century introduction of commercial television, which eroded local revenues and coverage, demonstrates that affected areas exhibited higher rates of across national and local races, with persistent effects into recent decades. Closures of local newspapers in subsequent years correlated with increased and fewer split-ticket voters, as diminished scrutiny of district-specific issues allowed national narratives to dominate local contests. This dynamic, combined with rising negative partisanship—where aversion to the opposing party outweighs candidate appeal—has entrenched straight-ticket tendencies, rendering split voting a marginal phenomenon by the .

Geographic Prevalence

United States Focus

Split-ticket voting in the occurs nationwide but varies geographically, with higher incidences typically observed in politically competitive battleground states where cross-party voter defections are more feasible due to balanced partisan competition. In less polarized, solidly partisan regions such as the or rural Plains states, straight-ticket voting predominates, reflecting stronger local party loyalty and fewer incentives for splitting. Aggregate election outcomes serve as a proxy for underlying voter behavior, as individual-level data from cast vote records is limited to select jurisdictions due to ballot secrecy. In 2018, 14 states produced split-ticket results in statewide races, electing executives or legislators from opposing parties, compared to only 8 states in 2020, indicating geographic concentration in swing areas amid national polarization trends. Battleground states like , , , and have shown elevated splitting in recent cycles; for instance, in the 2024 election, approximately 7.9% of voters in supported the Democratic Senate candidate, while 4% of Trump voters in backed Democrat . Such patterns contrast with minimal splitting in non-competitive states like or , where partisan majorities exceed 10-15 points in presidential races.
Election YearStates with Split Statewide Outcomes (Examples)Notes
201814 states (e.g., , , )Higher due to midterm dynamics and local factors.
20208 states (e.g., Georgia, )Decline amid presidential-year coattails.
20226 states (e.g., , for Senate/Governor splits)Focused on Rust Belt competitiveness.
2024At least 3 battlegrounds (e.g., , , )Trump voters drove Republican-to-Democratic splits at 3-8%.
Suburban counties within these states often exhibit higher splitting than urban cores or rural exurbs, as voters there balance national partisanship with candidate evaluations. For example, in 2020 battleground states, only 1.9% of Republican voters who supported GOP congressional candidates split their presidential vote, but rates edged higher in suburban precincts with independent-leaning demographics. This geographic nuance underscores how electoral , rather than fixed regional ideology, sustains residual split-ticket behavior despite its overall rarity—fewer than 6% of voters nationally in recent cycles.

International Examples

In mixed-member electoral systems, such as Germany's Bundeswahlleiter system, voters cast two distinct votes in federal elections: one for a (Erststimme) and one for a party list (Zweitstimme), enabling split-ticket voting when the votes support different parties. This practice has been empirically analyzed using official electoral statistics from 1953 to 1990, revealing patterns consistent with rational voter strategies, including tactical deviations from party loyalty to influence seat outcomes. Split-ticket rates, defined as the proportion of votes for candidates without party list support or cross-party allocations, vary by election but demonstrate voter responsiveness to local viability over strict partisanship. In Germany's 2021 federal election, for instance, the second vote's proportionality incentive led to observed splits, though aggregate data indicate overall low but persistent levels, often below 15% in constituencies with competitive independents or minor parties. Japan's parallel mixed-member majoritarian system, introduced in 1994, similarly facilitates ticket splitting through separate (SMD) and (PR) ballots. In the 2000 House of Representatives election, candidate-centered campaigns drove disproportionate splits favoring the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in SMDs over PR lists, with LDP SMD vote shares exceeding PR by margins attributable to personal candidate appeal rather than party uniformity. This pattern reflects strategic voter behavior in non-compensatory systems, where splits amplify major-party advantages in winner-take-all districts; analyses of post-reform elections show split rates correlating with district competitiveness, often resulting in 10-20% divergence between SMD and PR outcomes for the same parties. In the United Kingdom, split-ticket voting manifests during concurrent general and local elections, allowing voters to diverge between national parliamentary candidates and councilors from different parties on separate ballots. The 2015 simultaneous contests across 279 local authorities exhibited median general election vote shares as percentages of local votes deviating by party, with splits influenced by local incumbency and national tides; for example, Conservative national support outpaced local in marginal wards, indicating tactical splitting. Earlier instances, such as 1979 and 1997, confirmed through multivariate analysis that splits stem from voter attitudes toward local issues and party strategies, with rates higher in urban areas where independents or cross-party alliances compete effectively. These events highlight contextual drivers, though overall prevalence remains episodic due to infrequent overlaps. Comparative studies across mixed systems, including , , and , underscore that split-ticket voting is more pronounced in proportional variants than majoritarian ones, driven by incentives for balance-seeking or candidate evaluation. In , preferential voting for House candidates and Senate groups permits effective splits via preference flows, though formalized group voting tickets historically channeled votes; post-2016 reforms increased optional preferential splitting, correlating with dealignment trends in inconsistent ballots.

Drivers and Voter Behavior

Ideological and Personal Motivations

Split-ticket voting often arises from ideological positions that do not align strictly with a single party's platform, particularly among moderate voters who perceive parties as ideologically divergent and seek to balance policy outcomes. Empirical analysis of 2004 American National Election Studies (ANES) data indicates that ideologically moderate respondents exhibited split-ticket voting rates of 21.1%, compared to lower rates among strong liberals (14.3%) or conservatives (12.5%), suggesting that moderation facilitates crossing party lines to support candidates aligning with specific issue preferences rather than partisan consistency. Similarly, 56.8% of 2004 ANES respondents expressed a preference for divided government control over unified party control, associating split tickets with moderated policy outputs amid perceived extremism in party positions. However, evidence for intentional policy balancing remains limited, as aggregate trends show split-ticket rates declining alongside increasing ideological distance between parties (e.g., DW-NOMINATE scores rising to 0.8 by 2000), implying that clearer partisan cues reduce ideological incentives for splitting. Personal motivations emphasize individual candidate evaluations over party loyalty, with weaker partisan attachments enabling voters to prioritize personal assessments of competence, incumbency, or familiarity. In 2004 ANES data, weak partisans split tickets at 18.8%, independents at 27.8%, and strong partisans at only 9.6%, highlighting how diminished affective ties to parties allow personal candidate appeal to dominate. Incumbency advantages further drive this, as voters familiar with a sitting representative's performance may support them irrespective of presidential or senatorial choices, contributing to unintentional divided outcomes without strategic intent. Higher internal —confidence in one's understanding of issues—also correlates with elevated split-ticket rates (50.7% among those agreeing with efficacy statements in 2008 ANES), reflecting personal agency in evaluating candidates on merit. These factors underscore candidate-centered voting, where personal trust in institutions (e.g., 27.8% split rate among those trusting government "always" in 2004) reinforces splits absent strong ideological or partisan overrides.

Strategic and Contextual Factors

Strategic voters may split tickets to achieve policy moderation through , selecting opposing parties for executive and legislative branches to constrain potential excesses and produce centrist outcomes. This balancing hypothesis, prominent in analyses of U.S. elections, posits that rational voters weigh median preferences against risks of unified control, as articulated in models by Alesina and Rosenthal (1989, 1995). However, empirical studies using aggregate data from the 1988 U.S. elections reject intentional strategic balancing as a primary driver, finding split outcomes more attributable to uneven congressional campaign quality—such as well-funded incumbents facing weak challengers—rather than deliberate efforts to foster . Candidate-centered motivations also underpin strategic splitting, where voters prioritize individual appeal over , such as supporting a high-profile or ideologically aligned candidate in a down-ballot race despite partisan presidential leanings. Early surveys from the identified "conflicting motives" tied to personal candidate traits, like incumbency advantages or media exposure, leading to splits in 10-25% of U.S. ballots during mid-20th-century elections. This pattern persists in competitive districts, where voter uncertainty about party platforms amplifies focus on personal qualities, though aggregate evidence shows splits declining as nationalized cues strengthen party identification. Contextual factors, including ballot mechanics, significantly shape split-ticket prevalence by altering the cognitive and procedural costs of deviating from straight-party voting. In historical U.S. systems using party-specific ballots and envelopes—prevalent until the early 20th century—splitting required physically combining multiple ballots, effectively disenfranchising preferences for non-executive races and favoring straight tickets; modern electronic or office-block designs reduce these barriers, boosting splits by facilitating independent race evaluations. States offering straight-ticket options, like Michigan until its 2022 abolition, suppress splitting by 5-10 percentage points compared to jurisdictions without, as voters default to simplified partisan levers amid time constraints or low information. Electoral competitiveness and district heterogeneity further contextualize splits, with higher rates in battleground areas where local issues diverge from national tides or incumbents enjoy cross-party appeal. For instance, data reveal splits correlating with lopsided House races, where dominant candidates draw votes irrespective of presidential alignment, independent of strategic intent for balance. Institutional features like staggered terms and single-member districts enable such divergences, though rising polarization since the 1990s has eroded this by aligning voter cues across races, reducing splits to near-zero in polarized cycles like and 2020.

Systemic Impacts

Positive Effects on Governance

Split-ticket voting contributes to , where different parties control the executive and legislative branches, fostering legislative compromise and moderating policy extremes. Theoretical models posit that voters engage in split-ticket voting to intentionally balance power, anticipating that cross-party negotiations will yield centrist outcomes even amid partisan polarization. Empirical analyses support this, showing that divided governments produce policies closer to the ideological ; for instance, U.S. state-level regression discontinuity studies reveal that divided executives implement less ideologically extreme fiscal policies compared to unified partisan control. This dynamic enhances governance stability by curbing hasty or radical reforms, as veto points introduced by opposing branches compel deliberation and bipartisan support for major . Divided governments have been associated with higher infrastructure expenditures, averaging 10-15% more in U.S. states than unified ones, reflecting negotiated investments less prone to partisan pork-barreling. In the post-World War II era, elevated split-ticket rates (peaking at 25-30% in presidential-congressional contests) correlated with sustained divided control, enabling cross-aisle achievements like the 1964 and 1983 Social Security reforms, which required supermajorities transcending party lines. Furthermore, split-ticket voting signals voter heterogeneity, pressuring parties to prioritize broad appeals over base mobilization, thereby aligning governance more closely with median voter preferences and reducing the risk of policy volatility from unified majorities. While not eliminating , this mechanism empirically tempers ideological drift, as evidenced by moderated budget outcomes under divided U.S. federal control from 1946-1992, where averaged 1.2% of GDP less than under unified periods, adjusted for economic cycles.

Negative Consequences and Criticisms

Split-ticket voting has been criticized for facilitating in presidential systems like the , where control of the executive and legislative branches splits between parties, often resulting in legislative and policy inaction. This outcome arises because split votes produce incongruent partisan majorities across institutions, leading to , filibusters, and stalled bills; for instance, during the high-split-ticket era from 1968 to 1992, prevailed in six of seven presidential terms, correlating with elevated usage and reduced passage of major compared to unified periods. Critics, including political analysts, argue this dynamic fosters finger-pointing between branches rather than , exacerbating public dissatisfaction with Washington's inefficiency. A core concern is the erosion of party accountability, as split-ticket patterns dilute voters' ability to consistently reward or punish parties for collective performance. Under responsible party theory, cohesive straight-ticket voting enables clear electoral mandates and retrospective judgment, but split voting muddles causal links between party control and outcomes, allowing incumbents to evade blame for or failures. Empirical analyses of mid-20th-century elections show that widespread ticket-splitting contributed to permanent in some contexts, weakening incentives for parties to develop unified platforms and instead promoting opportunistic candidacies detached from national . Additionally, some political scientists contend that split-ticket voting reflects or reinforces voter indecision, potentially amplifying short-term tactical choices over long-term ideological coherence, which can destabilize by prioritizing individual candidate appeal over systemic policy alignment. While proponents view it as moderating , detractors highlight how it sustains status quo preservation through intentional or cognitive checks, as modeled in studies of "Madisonian" voter preferences for balance, yet at the cost of decisive action on pressing issues like or . This criticism gained traction in analyses of 1990s congressional-presidential mismatches, where split outcomes hindered reforms amid rising deficits and partisan standoffs. Split-ticket voting has declined substantially in the United States since the late , paralleling the rise in partisan polarization, where ideological differences between Democrats and Republicans have widened. Empirical analyses of data from 1972 to 2004 indicate that as elite polarization intensified—measured by increasing gaps in roll-call voting scores between congressional parties—voters exhibited greater partisan consistency, with split-ticket rates dropping from around 20-25% in presidential-congressional contests in the to under 10% by the . This trend reflects ideological sorting, whereby voters increasingly align their preferences with one party's platform across offices, reducing the cross-pressures that once encouraged splitting tickets. Polarization exacerbates this pattern by heightening the perceived incompatibility of supporting candidates from opposing parties, as voters view national party brands as more salient and ideologically rigid. Studies attribute much of the decline not to institutional changes like options, but to voters' growing awareness of partisan divides on core issues such as , , and , leading to stricter straight-ticket adherence. For instance, aggregate district-level data from 1988 to 2012 show that in areas with heightened polarization—proxied by divergent or —split outcomes in presidential and races fell to just 6% of districts by 2012, down from over 30% in earlier decades. Causal mechanisms include the of local campaigns, where candidates' positions increasingly mirror national party lines amid polarization, diminishing opportunities for cross-party appeal. Research controlling for confounders like incumbency and district competitiveness confirms that greater ideological distance between parties predicts lower split-ticket voting, as voters prioritize partisan loyalty over candidate-specific factors. This linkage underscores how polarization fosters a more binary electoral environment, where ticket-splitting serves as a of ideological moderation that has waned as parties diverge.

Post-2020 Developments and 2024 Election Data

In the 2022 midterm elections, split-ticket voting across gubernatorial, , and races remained at historically low levels, with voters largely aligning their choices by party despite some state-level splits between executive and legislative offices. For instance, six states exhibited splits between and gubernatorial winners, but national results showed Republicans securing 53% of the popular vote amid broad partisan consistency. This continued the post-2020 pattern of declining ticket-splitting, driven by increasing polarization, with granular ballot data from battleground areas confirming minimal crossover between parties for federal races. The 2024 presidential election further reflected this trend nationally, where Republican House candidates garnered 51.05% of the popular vote (75.9 million votes) compared to Donald Trump's 50.8% presidential share, a narrow 0.5 percentage point outperformance indicating limited aggregate split-ticket activity. However, state-level Senate outcomes revealed more pronounced splits: four states—Arizona, Michigan, Nevada, and Wisconsin—voted for Trump but elected Democratic senators (Kyrsten Sinema's successor Ruben Gallego in Arizona, Elissa Slotkin in Michigan, Jacky Rosen in Nevada, and Tammy Baldwin in Wisconsin), yielding a 12% mismatch rate across the 34 Senate contests, exceeding the two mismatches in the combined 2020-2022 cycles. These splits proved consequential in battlegrounds, enabling Democrats to retain competitiveness in the despite Trump's victories; for example, Republican Senate candidates underperformed Trump margins in and , where voter crossover prevented broader Republican gains. In , Democratic gubernatorial winner prevailed by 14 points even as Trump won the state by 3.5 points, with Democrats also capturing , , and a seat. At the district level, 13 House Democrats secured seats in Trump-carried districts, compared to three Republicans in Kamala Harris-carried districts, highlighting localized persistence of split-ticket patterns amid national rarity.

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