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Bai Suocheng or Bai Xuoqian (Chinese: 白所成; pinyin: Bái Suǒchéng; Burmese: ပယ်ဆောက်ချိန်; born 14 May 1950) is a Burmese Kokang politician from Shan State. He was the deputy commander of the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army who later became the MP of the Shan State Hluttaw representing Laukkai and first leader of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone. In 2024 he was extradited to the People's Republic of China for running online and telephone scam centres.[3]

Key Information

Life and career

[edit]

Bai was a deputy commander of the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) who assisted Pheung Kya-shin in ousting Yang Mao-liang from the leadership in 1992. He later tried to replace Pheung himself with the support of Myanmar's government.[4][5] Bai allied himself with the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) to oust Pheung during the three-day Kokang incident in 2009. Remnants of the MNDAA were reorganized into Border Guard Force #1006 under Bai's supervision afterwards.[6]

He was elected as an MP of the Shan State Hluttaw representing Laukkai Constituency No. 2.[7] during the 2010 general election. Bai's agreement led to the formation of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone on 20 August 2010 where Bai would become its the first head of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone.[8][9]

Under his rule, the region became known for drugs and weapons trafficking.[8] Bai was not very popular and survived an assassination attempt in March 2012.[10] Bai's deputy, Liu Gaoxi, was elected in the same general election in 2010, and was known for his involvement with drugs trafficking.[11] Bai Suocheng, his children and his associates dominated a multi-billion-dollar hotel and casino business empire, including online gambling operations. These businesses extend to Karen State and internationally to Sihanoukville, Cambodia. Chinese court records have heard multiple cases involving the Bai and Liu family's companies relating to gambling, smuggling, and kidnapping from Kokang hotels and casinos.[12]

On 10 December 2023, China issued a warrant for him.[13][14][15] He was later arrested by Burmese authorities, which transferred him along with other nine people, including his son Bai Yingcang, to China on 30 January 2024.[16][17] On 11 July 2025, Bai was prosecuted by the Shenzhen People's Procuratorate.[18]

From 19 to 22 September 2025, Bai was tried in the Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court.[19] On 4 November 2025, the court sentenced Bai to death.[20]

On 11 November 2025, the BBC reported that Bai was taken to hospital the day after the death sentence was handed down and died before it could be carried out.[21]

See also

[edit]

References

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Bai Suocheng

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Bai Suocheng (Chinese: 白所成; born c. 1950 – died November 11, 2025) was an ethnic Chinese figure from Myanmar's region in , who formerly served as chairman of the under Myanmar's military-backed administration and led the Bai family syndicate, one of four dominant groups controlling the border town of . Under his leadership, the group oversaw scam compounds engaged in telecommunications targeting Chinese victims, alongside activities including , , , illegal , , human , and drug trafficking, resulting in at least six Chinese deaths and over 31,000 cases. In 2024, Myanmar's junta extradited Bai Suocheng to , where the Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court sentenced him to death on November 4, 2025, for fraud, intentional murder, and other crimes; however, he died of illness eleven days later, at age 75, before the sentence could be executed. His operations exemplified the entrenched criminal networks in northern , sustained through alliances with local militias and the military regime, contributing to a regional of cross-border .

Early Life and Background

Birth and Ethnic Origins

Bai Suocheng was born in 1950 in Hongyan village, located in the self-administered region of , . Accounts of his precise birth date differ across sources, with May 14 cited in several reports, while others reference April 1 or place the year as 1949. Of ethnicity, Bai hails from , a remote border enclave historically populated by descendants of loyalists and later Yunnanese migrants fleeing conflicts, who established a distinct Chinese cultural domain within . This ethnic Han majority in speaks primarily Mandarin and southwestern Chinese dialects, maintaining familial and economic links across the Myanmar-China border, which shaped the region's insular identity amid Myanmar's multi-ethnic federal structure. Bai's background reflects this heritage, as local elites like him trace origins to these settler communities rather than indigenous Shan or Burmese groups.

Family and Initial Involvement in Kokang Affairs

Bai Suocheng was born in 1949 in Kokang, a semi-autonomous ethnic Chinese enclave in northern Shan State, Myanmar. Little is publicly documented about his immediate family origins, though he emerged as the patriarch of the influential Bai clan, which later dominated local governance and economic enterprises in the region. At age 16, Bai joined the insurgent forces under Peng Jiasheng, the founder of Kokang's primary militia, marking his entry into the area's volatile ethnic and territorial conflicts. These groups traced their roots to the Communist Party of Burma's operations in the 1960s, where Peng, an ethnic Chinese warlord, established control over Kokang after breaking from the broader communist insurgency in 1963. Bai's early allegiance positioned him within this structure, which relied on opium trade revenues and cross-border ties with China to sustain autonomy amid Myanmar's central government pressures. By the late 1980s and into the 1990s, Bai had ascended to deputy commander of the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the rebranded force that negotiated ceasefires with in 1989, securing self-rule. In this role, he helped administer 's special administrative zone, overseeing security and rudimentary governance while Peng held titular leadership. Bai's family ties facilitated his integration into this power network, with relatives later assuming key posts in the militia and associated businesses.

Military and Political Involvement

Role in the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army

Bai Suocheng served as deputy of the (MNDAA), functioning as second-in-command to its founder and leader, Peng Jiasheng. In this role, he contributed to the armed group's military structure and operations in the , a predominantly ethnic Chinese area in northern where the MNDAA maintained de facto control following its formation from the 1989 splintering of the . The MNDAA, with an estimated force of several thousand fighters, focused on defending territorial autonomy against encroachments by the while navigating complex alliances among ethnic armed organizations. Under Peng's leadership, Bai Suocheng's position placed him at the core of internal decision-making, including responses to escalating pressures from the government in the mid-2000s, such as demands for ethnic militias to integrate as under army command. While specific operational commands attributed to Bai during this period remain limited in documentation, his deputy status aligned him with the "four families" of influence, which wielded significant sway over local and militia loyalties within the MNDAA framework. This involvement underscored the factional dynamics that later contributed to divisions, as Bai's group reportedly sought pragmatic engagement with authorities amid the MNDAA's resistance to full disarmament or subordination.

The 2009 Kokang Conflict and Assumption of Leadership

In August 2009, tensions escalated in Kokang when the Myanmar junta, under the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), demanded that ethnic armed groups, including the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) led by Peng Jiasheng, transform into Border Guard Forces (BGF) under army command to facilitate integration ahead of the 2010 elections. Peng refused, viewing it as a loss of autonomy, which prompted clashes starting on August 8, 2009—the so-called "88 Incident." As MNDAA deputy commander, Bai Suocheng defected and aligned with the Tatmadaw, leading a factional coup against Peng that fragmented the group and enabled junta forces to intervene decisively. The coup, reportedly encouraged by then-regional commander , resulted in Peng's ouster and flight into exile, with remnants of his loyalists engaging in skirmishes that displaced over 30,000 civilians, many fleeing to . Bai's forces, numbering around 1,000-2,000 fighters, avoided direct combat with the army by cooperating, allowing them to consolidate control over and surrounding areas. This alignment secured Bai's position, as he pledged loyalty to the SPDC and committed to participating in the electoral process. Following the conflict's resolution by late August 2009, Bai Suocheng assumed leadership as chairman of the , transforming his militia into the BGF under oversight, designated as Battalion 1001 with approximately 200 personnel initially. This shift marked a pragmatic pivot from to collaboration, enabling Bai to entrench familial influence—appointing relatives to key roles—and exploit 's border position for economic gains, though it drew criticism from Peng's exiled supporters for betraying ethnic autonomy. The junta's tolerance of Bai's rule reflected strategic priorities to neutralize resistance in northern , prioritizing stability over full disarmament.

Rule Over Kokang and Laukkai

Governance Structure and Alliance with the Myanmar Junta

Following the 2009 Kokang conflict, in which the original Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) under Peng Jiasheng clashed with Myanmar's Tatmadaw, Bai Suocheng—previously the MNDAA's deputy commander—defected with four Kokang clans and struck a deal to integrate his forces into the military as the Kokang Border Guard Force (BGF). This arrangement transformed Kokang into a semi-autonomous Special Administrative Zone (SAZ) under nominal Tatmadaw command, granting Bai's faction effective local control in exchange for disbanding insurgent activities and providing loyalty to the central regime. The BGF, comprising around 6,000 troops by the post-2021 period, served as the primary security apparatus, handling counter-insurgency, border patrols, and internal policing while facilitating trade corridors into China's Yunnan Province. Governance in the SAZ operated through a clan-based hierarchy dominated by four ethnic Chinese families—the Bai (led by Bai Suocheng), , Wei, and Li—which collectively oversaw administration, taxation, and economic enterprises spanning approximately 10,000 square kilometers in northern . Bai exercised near-absolute authority within his clan's sphere, where familial directives functioned as law, enforced via the BGF and private militias, enabling unchecked control over local institutions without formal democratic processes. This structure prioritized economic extraction, including like Baisheng under Bai's influence, over broader public services, with clan elites managing hotels, , and narcotics alongside administrative duties. The alliance with the junta was pragmatic and mutually beneficial, rooted in the 2009 pact that permitted illicit revenue streams—such as and border trade—to flow freely in return for political endorsement, including pro- parades, support for the , and tactical aid against rivals like the exiled MNDAA faction. After the 2021 coup, Bai reinforced ties by securing junta appointments to Kokang's administrative bodies, donating funds to institutions, and deploying BGF units against ethnic organizations, thereby legitimizing the regime's in the . This relationship persisted until external pressures, including Chinese demands over scam operations, prompted the junta to extradite Bai in January 2024.

Economic Development Through Casinos and Construction

Following Bai Suocheng's assumption of leadership in after the 2009 conflict, his administration, in alliance with the Myanmar military, expanded the casino sector in as a core economic pillar, attracting Chinese gamblers due to gambling prohibitions in . This built on earlier licensing of since 2003 to offset opium eradication losses, with revenues funding local operations and . By the 2010s, hosted approximately 30 , generating billions of dollars annually across operations controlled by Bai and allied families, which processed high-volume bets and provided tax-like contributions to the regime. The boom spurred extensive construction, erecting around 50 hotels alongside gaudy high-rise complexes and associated facilities, converting the formerly impoverished into a neon-lit hub with ongoing building projects evident in dust-covered renovations and new developments. Bai's family, through entities like the Baisheng Corporation, participated in ventures tied to this growth, while the four dominant families—including Bai's—oversaw the influx of Chinese for these projects, aiming to position as a regional destination rivaling . This development created for thousands in gaming, , and support roles, though it remained heavily dependent on cross-border illicit flows. Proposals for further , such as an airstrip at Shwe Htan to handle 1.8 million visitors yearly, reflected ambitions for sustained expansion, though realization stalled amid regional tensions. Overall, casino-driven revenues under Bai's rule prioritized rapid over diversified growth, with construction focusing on tourism-oriented assets rather than broad .

Criminal Enterprises and Allegations

Operation of Scam Centers and Telecom Fraud

Bai Suocheng, as the primary leader of the Bai family crime group in Myanmar's region, oversaw the establishment and operation of multiple large-scale telecommunications fraud compounds, known as "scam parks," primarily in and surrounding areas since at least 2009. These facilities targeted Chinese citizens through phone-based and online s, including investment and romantic deception schemes, generating substantial illicit revenue under the protection of the group's private of approximately 2,000 personnel. The operations involved coercing individuals into performing fraudulent activities, with the Bai family providing , , and direct oversight to ensure compliance and profitability. The centers flourished due to Kokang's semi-autonomous status and lax enforcement, where Bai's control over local governance allowed for the unchecked expansion of these criminal enterprises alongside and . Chinese authorities documented that the Bai group, including family members such as Bai Yingcang and Bai Yingxiang, systematically organized these networks, employing tactics like armed enforcement against defectors and integration with to staff the compounds. Reports indicate that the targeted victims across , with scams often masquerading as legitimate financial opportunities or personal relationships to extract funds via digital transfers. This model mirrored broader patterns in northern , where ethnic armed groups like Bai's profited from providing "full-spectrum" services to scammers, including electricity, internet, and suppression of escapes. By 2023, the scale of operations had drawn international scrutiny, with enforcement identifying Bai as a key figure in cross-border telecom , leading to his designation as a wanted suspect by the Ministry of Public Security on December 10, 2023. The compounds' reliance on forced labor and violence underscored their criminal nature, distinct from voluntary enterprises, as evidenced by survivor accounts of and confinement used to maintain productivity. proceedings in 2024 revealed evidence of billions in defrauded assets funneled through the Bai-controlled networks, though precise figures for the Bai family remain classified in official indictments. ![Dalian Public Security Bureau wanted notice for Bai Suocheng on telecom fraud charges][float-right] Under Bai Suocheng's leadership of the Border Guard Force, developed into a major center for cyber scam compounds that systematically incorporated to coerce labor for telecommunications fraud. Individuals from , , , and other countries were deceived with fraudulent job offers, then transported across borders, confined in guarded facilities, and subjected to , , or execution if they resisted or underperformed in scam operations targeting global victims. Bai, alongside family members such as his son Bai Yingcang, allegedly directed or profited from these networks, which expanded post-2009 conflict under his control, generating billions in illicit revenue while ensnaring tens of thousands in forced labor. Chinese law enforcement reports estimate that scam centers in and trafficked thousands of foreign nationals specifically for fraud schemes, with Bai's group providing protection, infrastructure, and enforcement against escapes. Related crimes intertwined with trafficking included organized , where victims paid ransoms for release—often unfulfilled—and the facilitation of rings preying on trafficked women within the same compounds. Bai's administration licensed and taxed these activities, fostering an ecosystem of violence that included illegal detention and intentional injury to maintain compliance. Following the 2023-2024 offensive that disrupted his hold, Myanmar authorities extradited Bai to on January 30, 2024, where he faced prosecution for , , illegal detention, and associated offenses directly tied to these and trafficking enterprises.

Downfall and Extradition to China

The 2023-2024 MNDAA Offensive and Loss of Control

In October 2023, the (MNDAA), led by , initiated as part of a coordinated offensive by the against Myanmar's , targeting border areas in northern , including the controlled by Bai Suocheng's forces. The MNDAA specifically aimed to recapture , the administrative center of , which had been under Bai's rule since his 2009 coup against the previous MNDAA leadership, during which he aligned his with the junta as a Border Guard Force. MNDAA forces justified the campaign partly as an effort to dismantle centers and cyber-fraud operations prevalent in under Bai's governance, operations that had drawn international scrutiny, including from . By mid-November 2023, MNDAA troops had encircled , engaging junta-allied positions and Bai's in intense fighting, with reports of heavy artillery exchanges and the capture of outlying towns like Chin Shwe Yee. The offensive accelerated in December, as MNDAA forces overran junta command centers and scam compounds, prompting the flight or surrender of many local militiamen. On December 26, 2023, the junta's 105th Infantry Division and Bai Suocheng's Border Guard Force personnel in surrendered en masse to the MNDAA, marking a critical collapse of defenses. The MNDAA declared full control of on January 5, 2024, after over a month of and urban combat, effectively ending Bai Suocheng's 14-year hold on the region. This victory displaced Bai and his family from power, with his forces unable to mount effective resistance due to dwindling supplies, internal defections, and the junta's prioritization of other fronts. The loss exposed vulnerabilities in Bai's alliance with the junta, which had provided nominal support but failed to reinforce amid broader insurgent gains. By early 2024, MNDAA patrols dominated the city, and scam operations were dismantled or relocated, though sporadic clashes persisted in surrounding areas.

Handover by Myanmar Authorities

![Wanted poster issued by Dalian Public Security Bureau for Bai Suocheng][float-right] On January 30, 2024, 's handed over Bai Suocheng, along with nine other suspects, to Chinese authorities at as part of a bilateral cooperation mechanism. The transfer included Bai's son, Bai Yingcang, and daughter, Bai Yinglan, among leaders of criminal syndicates operating in northern 's region. The handover followed the collapse of Bai's control over amid the 2023-2024 offensive by ethnic armed groups, including the Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), which targeted scam centers allied with the junta. Despite prior alliances with Myanmar's , Bai and his associates were extradited to address cross-border telecom and operations that had drawn intense pressure from . Chinese state media described the suspects as key figures in "extremely heinous" networks, with Bai specifically accused of leading enterprises that defrauded victims of billions of yuan. This marked a rare instance of Myanmar's junta cooperating with against its former ethnic allies, reflecting Beijing's prioritization of combating scam operations over regional insurgencies. Independent reports confirmed the transfer involved three prominent "warlords" from Kokang's ruling families, underscoring the junta's strategic concessions to maintain economic ties with amid ongoing civil conflict.

Charges Filed and Key Evidence

![Wanted poster for Bai Suocheng issued by Dalian Public Security Bureau][float-right] In July 2025, Chinese authorities indicted Bai Suocheng and key members of his criminal for a range of offenses including and online , intentional , intentional injury, , , operating illegal casinos, illegal detention, organizing , drug trafficking, , and harboring fugitives. The Shenzhen People's Procuratorate formally charged 21 defendants, with Bai Suocheng identified as the principal leader, alleging that the group had entrenched itself in Kokang, northern , since August 2009, orchestrating activities that generated over 200 billion yuan (approximately 28 billion USD) from gambling and fraud operations. These charges stemmed from joint investigations by Chinese and , which documented the syndicate's role in defrauding over 50,000 victims across more than 31,000 cases. Key evidence presented included confessions from the defendants, victim testimonies detailing coerced participation in scam centers and physical abuses, and financial records tracing illicit funds through and telecom fraud schemes in . Prosecutors highlighted specific instances of violence, such as the deliberate killings of six Chinese citizens and injuries to multiple others, often linked to enforcing compliance in and debt collection within the scam compounds. Seized documents and from raided facilities in substantiated the organization's hierarchical structure, with Bai Suocheng and relatives like Bai Yingcang directing operations that combined cross-border of personnel and narcotics with investment scams targeting Chinese nationals. The evidence also encompassed arrest warrants issued as early as December 2023 by Dalian Public Security Bureau, naming Bai as a top suspect in cyber scams, corroborated by intelligence from the Army's offensive that exposed the syndicate's infrastructure.

Trial Outcomes and Family Members' Involvement

The Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court conducted the first-instance public trial of Bai Suocheng, his son Bai Yingcang, and 19 other defendants associated with the Bai family criminal group from September 19 to 22, 2025. The defendants faced charges including , intentional , intentional injury, , , illegal detention, opening casinos, , organizing illegal border crossings, drugs, illegal possession of firearms, harboring fugitives, and covering up criminal proceeds. Prosecutors presented evidence during the proceedings, including victim testimonies and financial records linking the group to telecom operations in northern Myanmar's region that defrauded Chinese citizens of billions of yuan. On November 4, 2025, the court sentenced Bai Suocheng, Bai Yingcang, Yang Liqiang, Hu Xiaojang, and Chen Guangyi to death, despite Bai Suocheng's age of 75, invoking the exception under Article 49 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China for crimes involving particularly cruel means causing death, such as instigating murders. Bai Suocheng died of illness on November 11, 2025, in hospital, preventing execution of his sentence. The remaining defendants appealed, but the Guangdong High People's Court rejected the appeals on December 24, 2025, upholding the original judgments, which were approved by the Supreme People's Court; the four co-defendants were executed in February 2026. Bai Suocheng, as the primary leader, and his son Bai Yingcang were central figures in the prosecution, accused of directing the group's scam centers, , and violent enforcement activities. Other family members and close associates among the 21 defendants included relatives who managed operational aspects of the enterprises, such as recruitment for forced labor in compounds and oversight of and . Bai Suocheng's in July 2025 explicitly highlighted the familial structure of the syndicate, which leveraged kinship ties to maintain control over territories and evade local authorities. Not all family members faced trial; Bai Suocheng's other son, Bai Yingneng, remains at large, reportedly fleeing to southern along with female relatives who avoided capture during the 2023-2024 offensive. This partial apprehension underscores challenges in fully dismantling the network, as escaped members may retain influence over residual operations or assets. The proceedings emphasized the Bai family's role in coordinating cross-border crimes, with evidence showing intra-family division of labor in scripting, victim coercion, and fund laundering.

Controversies and Assessments

Perspectives on Stability vs. Criminality in Kokang

![Chinese arrest warrant issued for Bai Suocheng][float-right] Bai Suocheng's tenure as leader of from 2009 until the 2023 (MNDAA) offensive exemplified a tension between regional stability and entrenched criminality. Following the 's displacement of MNDAA founder Peng Jiasheng in 2009, Bai established the Kokang Border Guard Force (BGF), a junta-aligned that secured the against insurgencies and maintained order for over a decade. Under his management, avoided major internal conflicts, supported legal agricultural shifts from to crops like rubber and after eradication efforts, and facilitated cross-border corridors vital to 's . Analysts have credited this arrangement with providing a semblance of in 's volatile borderlands, where fragmented ethnic s often lead to perpetual violence. However, this stability relied heavily on revenues from illicit activities, including protection rackets for scam centers, illegal casinos, and smuggling networks. Bai's family and allies, such as the family, dominated enterprises like the Baisheng Group, which operated multi-billion-dollar casinos tied to , narcotics, and , laundering profits through regional banks. He explicitly offered sanctuary to Chinese criminal syndicates running telecom fraud operations, extracting substantial payments that bolstered his BGF and benefited the junta, with over 1,300 documented cross-border cases linked to since 2010. These activities victimized tens of thousands, particularly Chinese nationals coerced into scams, prompting to issue arrest warrants for Bai and his associates in late 2023. Perspectives diverge sharply along stakeholder interests. Pro-junta and local business viewpoints, reflected in Bai's self-presentation as a regulator via entities like a gaming board, portray his rule as pragmatic order amid anarchy, arguing that suppressing all illicit economies would collapse fragile stability. In contrast, Chinese state media and authorities emphasize Bai's criminal as a primary destabilizer, fueling transnational epidemics that eroded China's and . Rebel groups like the MNDAA framed their offensive as a crusade against such patrons, eradicating dens while advancing territorial gains, though post-capture reports indicate persistent low-level criminality. Independent assessments, such as those from the , highlight the causal linkage: Bai's criminal empire underwrote the very militias enforcing stability, creating a self-reinforcing cycle in Myanmar's ungoverned spaces where formal state absence necessitates such hybrid governance models. This duality underscores broader challenges in peripheral regions, where empirical peace often coexists with unchecked predation until external pressures—here, China's anti- campaign—disrupt the equilibrium.

Impact on China-Myanmar Relations

Bai Suocheng's oversight of telecom operations in , which defrauded Chinese citizens of billions of yuan, generated significant bilateral tension, as the scams prompted widespread public outrage in and prompted to issue arrest warrants for Bai and associates on December 10, 2023. These activities, centered in , exacerbated cross- crime concerns, with Chinese authorities estimating losses exceeding 20 billion yuan ($2.81 billion) from related violence alone. 's repeated diplomatic pressure on Myanmar's junta to dismantle such networks highlighted a key friction point in relations, as the fraud syndicates undermined Beijing's narrative of stable management despite its economic stakes, including pipelines and Belt and Road projects traversing the region. The 2023-2024 MNDAA offensive against Bai's junta-aligned forces in facilitated his capture, but the subsequent extradition of Bai, his son, and eight others to on January 30, 2024, by authorities marked a pivotal cooperative gesture. This handover, involving key figures from Kokang's "four families," signaled 's alignment with Chinese security priorities amid its , as had explicitly targeted these groups for enabling fraud targeting its nationals. Chinese state media framed the transfer as evidence of "" for elements at the border, framing telecom fraud as a novel challenge resolved through joint action over 70 years of ties. Post-extradition, the proceedings in , including Bai's 2025 trial in on charges of fraud, trafficking, and , reinforced bilateral mechanisms for repatriating suspects, with facilitating returns of over 40,000 operatives by mid-2024. This cooperation bolstered 's influence in 's border stability efforts, though critics noted it selectively targeted ethnic Chinese syndicates while junta ties to Bai persisted until his ouster. Overall, the episode shifted relations toward pragmatic security alignment, prioritizing eradication over broader political support for the junta, amid 's economic leverage.

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  48. https://www.facebook.com/globaltimesnews/videos/video/1081364679992704/
  49. https://www.nbd.com.cn/articles/2025-09-22/4070336.html
  50. http://www.news.cn/legal/20250922/ed5d313e5de04a15a9c3c1adff004175/c.html
  51. https://www.hk01.com/%25E5%258D%25B3%25E6%2599%2582%25E4%25B8%25AD%25E5%259C%258B/60278926/%25E7%25B7%25AC%25E5%258C%2597-%25E5%259B%259B%25E5%25A4%25A7%25E5%25AE%25B6%25E6%2597%258F-%25E7%2599%25BD%25E5%25AE%25B621%25E4%25BA%25BA%25E6%25B7%25B1%25E5%259C%25B3%25E5%258F%2597%25E5%25AF%25A9-%25E6%25B6%2589%25E8%25A9%2590%25E9%25A8%2599-%25E8%25B2%25A9%25E6%25AF%2592-%25E6%25AE%25BA%25E4%25BA%25BA%25E7%25AD%258912%25E5%25AE%2597%25E7%25BD%25AA
  52. https://www.zaobao.com.sg/news/china/story20250923-7559061
  53. https://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/zdgz/202511/t20251104_710279.shtml
  54. https://www.news.cn/legal/20260202/b9535504fdb140e6b185e167a9266527/c.html
  55. https://www.163.com/dy/article/KAQOBQUH0556135L.html
  56. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/ISEAS_Perspective_2015_37.pdf
  57. https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/01/myanmar-army-moves-against-chinese-crime-groups-autonomous-zones
  58. https://securityboulevard.com/2025/10/scam-compound-operators-members-of-the-four-great-families-sentenced-to-death-in-china/
  59. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202402/1306471.shtml
  60. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/15076256
  61. https://asiacrimecentury.substack.com/p/chinese-justice-for-myanmar-fraud
  62. https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/12/chinas-influence-increases-amid-myanmars-instability
  63. https://www.globalinitiative.net/analysis/chinas-acquiescence-to-myanmars-military-regime-fuels-foreigner-butchering-scam-epidemic/
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