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Operation 1027
Operation 1027
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Operation 1027
Part of the Myanmar civil war

Map as of July 2024 (not including gains made by anti-SAC forces before 27 October)
  Gains made by anti-SAC forces
For a detailed accurate up-to-date map, see here
Date27 October 2023 – present
(2 years and 4 days)
Location
Status

Ongoing

  • Haigeng ceasefire from 11 January-25 June[a][3][4]
  • Bai Suocheng, Wei Huairen, Liu Zhengxiang and other former major leaders of the Kokang Autonomous Region were arrested by the junta on suspicion of Internet fraud and handed over to the Chinese police[5]
Territorial
changes
Anti-SAC forces capture 42 towns and 36+ strategic hilltop outposts/major command centers (23 towns and 24+ major command centers captured by Three Brotherhood Alliance)[6][7][8][9]
Belligerents

State Administration Council


Shan State Army – North[1]
Three Brotherhood Alliance, Communist Party of Burma[2] and other anti-SAC forces
Commanders and leaders

Colonel Sai Su
Major Sai Hpone Han[1]

Units involved

 Tatmadaw

Kokang Big Four Families (remnants of their militias)

Three Brotherhood Alliance:

Other anti-junta forces:

Strength
Unknown 20,000[25]
Casualties and losses
3,783 killed, 810 wounded, 967 captured, 6,891 surrendered (Northern Shan State Theatre, per the MNDAA)[26][16][27]
1,500+ casualties (as of 13 Nov.; per The Irrawaddy)[28]
298 killed (as of 8 Nov.; per the military)[12]
650+ captured (as of 19 Dec.; per The Irrawaddy)[29][30]
1 FTC-2000G jet trainer shot down
[31]
1 Mil Mi-17 helicopter shot down[31]
600+ MNDAA fighters killed, 1,000+ MNDAA fighters wounded (Northern Shan State Theatre, per the MNDAA), other rebel groups unknown[32][33]
363 civilians killed,[34][35] 461 injured (as of 5 Jan.)
335,000 displaced (before 2024)[36][37]
150,000+ displaced (since 2024)

Operation 1027 (Burmese: ၁၀၂၇ စစ်ဆင်ရေး, MLCTS: 1027 Cachcangre:, Burmese pronunciation: [tə.sʰɛ̀ n̥ə.sʰɛ̼.θóʊɴ sɪʔ.sʰɪɴ.jè]) is an ongoing military offensive conducted by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, a military coalition composed of three ethnic armed organisations in Myanmar: the Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), allied with other rebel forces in the country, against the Tatmadaw, Myanmar's ruling military junta.[38][39]

The joint rebel forces launched simultaneous attacks on multiple targets in northern Shan State, targeting the Myanmar Army, the Myanmar Police Force, and other military installations along the border with China.[40][41] The Brotherhood Alliance successfully took control of the strategically important Kokang Self-Administered Zone (SAZ) following their decisive victory in the Battle of Laukkai.[42][43] The offensive has sparked rebel offensives outside Shan State and across the country, including the Rakhine Offensive in Rakhine State, Operations 1107 and 1111 in Kayah State, and other offensives in Sagaing Region and Chin State.[44][45][46] Resistance forces across the country captured scores of towns, with the Brotherhood Alliance claiming by 28 November 2023 to have captured over 220 junta positions.[47] The exiled civilian government of Myanmar, the National Unity Government, declared its support for the military offensive, and its armed wing, the People's Defense Force (PDF), has participated in military operations against regime forces.

The surprise offensive's series of victories against the military regime have led observers to call it "by far the most difficult moment" for the regime "since the early days of the coup."[48] The regime has been unable to effectively respond to the wave of losses it has suffered, resorting to indiscriminate shelling and airstrikes to retaliate.[49] The sides agreed to a ceasefire in December, but the agreement quickly collapsed. The sides agreed to another China-brokered ceasefire for northern Shan State on January 11, but following skirmishes and allegations that the regime had conducted airstrikes in violation of the ceasefire's terms, the ceasefire broke down in June as rebel forces resumed offensive actions.[50][51]

Background

[edit]

Ethnic rebellion and conflicts

[edit]

The major rebel coalition that has fought during Operation 1027 is the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which is composed of three established anti-government ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). One of these is the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an ethnic armed organization whose members are of the Kokang Chinese ethnicity. The other two members of the group are the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), which operates in Shan State, and the Arakan Army that operates in Rakhine State.[52]

During Myanmar's conflict, the military has struggled to enforce its power over ethnic minority regions, as it mainly recruits from the Bamar majority population who are mostly unfamiliar with the language and landscapes of ethnic areas. To compensate, it has made deals with some local militias in which the militias agree to be subordinated as Border Guard Forces (BGFs), but have retain large amounts of autonomy. In exchange for following the military's orders "to some extent", the leadership of these groups are able to run businesses.[52]

Following two years of persistent efforts across various regions of Myanmar, the Myanmar military found its resources increasingly strained by late 2023.[53] On 9 October 2023, the military attacked Mung Lai Hkyet base, three kilometers north of Laiza, the headquarters of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), a close ally of the Brotherhood Alliance. KIA Lieutenant General Gun Maw stated in an interview that the conflict had been brought to the KIA's doorstep, necessitating a military counteraction.[54]

Cyber-scamming in Myanmar since 2021

[edit]

Due to the corruption within the Tatmadaw and the lack of their control on the borderland, many armed groups on both sides began in the fields of mining and trade, but moved towards more illicit business over time, like gambling and cyber-scamming, in which the latter gained the most attention.[52] The cyber-scamming industry has particularly plagued Myanmar since the February 2021 coup. The military junta has worked with Chinese criminal gangs to traffic over 120,000 people into the country. These fraud factories have earned billions of dollars in revenue for the junta and the gangs that operate them.[55] Criminal gangs have trafficked Chinese nationals and others including as Indian, Cambodian, Vietnamese, Thai, Malaysian, Tajik, Filipino and Kyrgyz people through various other Southeast Asian and Central Asian gangs.[56][57][58]

In Northern Myanmar, they were forced to work in inhumane and degrading conditions. According to Vietnamese charity organization Blue Dragon, trafficking victims were forced to work in scamming operations. They were held against their will and forced to sell their organs if they failed to meet quotas.[59] The cyber-scamming militias have been a significant disturbance to Myanmar's neighbor China in particular, from where individuals have been led to Myanmar under false pretenses and then forced into fraud factories.[52] As a result, China has exerted pressure on the regime to end the practice, and had been actively working with the Three Brotherhood Alliance to extricate individuals with pending Chinese warrants.[55][23][25][60] According to an emergency meeting of the National Defense and Security council, the junta leader Min Aung Hlaing noted that long-standing tensions and scam call centers along the border were exacerbated by Chinese investment.[citation needed]

On 20 October 2023, a rescue attempt [zh] by prisoners at a cyber-scamming facility in Laukkai within the Kokang SAZ resulted in a massacre in which fleeing prisoners were killed by guards. The facility and the paramilitary forces were under the control of cybercrime ringleader and former pro-military member of parliament Ming Xuechang [zh].[61] Reports allege that upwards of 80 people were killed, and that four undercover Chinese police officers had been buried alive. This incident has been credited with forcing China to tacitly allow anti-junta forces to begin Operation 1027.[62][63]

Timeline

[edit]

Operation 1027 (Phase 1)

[edit]

October 2023

[edit]
27 October
[edit]

The Three Brotherhood Alliance released a joint statement declaring the start of Operation 1027 on 27 October 2023. The alliance had the combined capability to draw on 15,000 troops.[64] The statement detailed the primary objectives of the operation, being to:

  • Safeguard the lives of civilians
  • Assert [their] right to self-defence
  • Maintain control over [their] territory
  • Respond resolutely to ongoing artillery attacks and airstrikes perpetrated by the State Administration Council
  • [Eradicate] the oppressive military rule
  • [Combat] the widespread online gambling fraud that has plagued Myanmar, particularly along the China–Myanmar border[65][66]

At 4:00 am, the MNDAA attacked military bases in Kokang and reported that junta forces had been killed and some captured along with their weapons.[67] Reports indicated that the TNLA captured junta's 13 Mile Camp and Microweave Camp on the Namhkam-Namphatka Road in Namhkam Township.[68] The MNDAA reportedly had seized control of the town of Chinshwehaw and blocked the Lashio-Muse Highway and Lashio-Chin Shwe Haw Road to prevent the regime from bringing reinforcements along these routes.[69]

The regime responded with aerial bombardments and heavy shelling.[70] The SAC's spokesperson Major General Zaw Min Tun confirmed that fighting had occurred near Hsenwi and some security police stations and militia stations were destroyed.[71] He also admitted that some security forces personnel were killed and injured, but did not provide an exact number. According to Al Jazeera, the German news agency Deutsche Presse-Agentur reported that about 20 soldiers were killed in an attack on one of the customs offices in Chinshwehaw.[41] A member of Luakkiang's police force reported that 17 police officers were killed after the MNDAA attacked checkpoints.[66] The Bamar People's Liberation Army (BPLA) stated it was involved in the operation alongside the Brotherhood Alliance, which has been training BPLA fighters.[72]

The AA engaged in multiple skirmishes with junta forces in Htigyaing Township, a township bordering northwestern Shan State in Sagaing Region. The AA claimed multiple junta casualties after clashes south of Mt. Mawkun.[73][74]

Nine rebel groups raided a military checkpoint on the Taungtha-Myingyan road in the Taungtha Township. The groups used drones to bomb the base before their assault, and claimed to have killed 20 junta troops. Other rebels ambushed a junta convoy bringing reinforcements, but were forced to withdraw.[75][76]

A child and a woman were killed and at least 5 others were injured due to an artillery strike on Namphatka village in Kutkai Township.[68]

28 October
[edit]

According to rebel sources, the MNDAA ambushed junta soldiers coming from Hopang and seized three junta outposts — two of them near the China-Myanmar border in the town of Mong Ko. They also claimed to have defeated paratroopers dropped near Chinshwehaw and captured paradropped weaponry.[75] The TNLA claimed to have seized three outposts in Namhkam Township and two outposts in the Lashio area. Junta spokespeople acknowledged losing certain outposts and expressed their desire for peace and stability.[77]

About 600 IDPs from Lashio were displaced by heavy weapons and gunfire through the 27th and 28th. Clashes disrupted roads and villages near Lashio, including the Hopaik toll gate on the Lashio-Muse Highway. However, Lashio itself remained mostly untouched.[78] The Mandalay-Lashio road and the Hopaik Toll Gate, which saw fighting on the 27th, returned to normal on the 28th. Fighting, however, continued to occur further away from Mandalay towards Kyaukme, Hsenwi, and Kutkai.[79]

29 October
[edit]

Clashes in Htigyaing Township continued into 29 October with the junta dispatching air force planes to engage in the area.[73]

A TNLA-led force, alongside Mandalay PDF forces, attacked a junta camp in Kyaukkyan village, three miles from the town of Nawnghkio. The junta retreated from the camp, moving towards a missile site on the Nawnghkio-Yetsawk road. At the same time, another rebel contingent attacked and captured junta personnel on the Goktwin Bridge on the Nawnghkio-Kyaukme road near the Goteik viaduct cutting off access along the Mandalay-Muse Union Highway.[80] Other TNLA and PDF groups attacked a military unit near Ahtet Nyaung Kone, in Mogok Township.[75]

30 October
[edit]

Five clashes continued through northern Shan State, including at an outpost in Hsenwi Township and the Hsenwi General Administration Department office. The Brotherhood Alliance further claimed to have captured junta forces in Mongli village, Hsenwi Township, and to have surrounded Nawnghkio Township. By the end of 30 October, the Brotherhood Alliance claimed to have captured a total of 67 army outposts and taken 34 junta personnel as prisoners.[73] The rebel forces were also able to capture two Ukrainian-made MT-LBMSh armored vehicles from the Junta.[81] Four WMA301 105mm fire support vehicles were also destroyed by rebel groups in several days' fighting.[82] The TNLA and MDY-PDF were also able to capture areas around the town of Nawnghkio.[83]

A spokesperson for the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) stated that the group was collaborating with the Brotherhood Alliance as part of the operation, and reaffirmed their shared goal of toppling the military junta.[74] The Alliance also announced that they were cooperating with the KIA in the battles in Sagaing.[76]

31 October
[edit]

At around 5 am, joint KIA and AA forces attacked Maliyan camp near the Kantawyang [my] junta base on the Myitkyina-Bhamo road in Waingmaw Township. The battle involved airstrikes from the Myanmar Air Force which reportedly destroyed six houses after attacks aimed towards Aungja. The junta lost control of the base to rebel forces in the morning. Heavy weapon firing and aerial attacks continued in the area, including strikes targeted towards Laiza, the headquarters of the KIA.[84] During the attack, the commander of the junta's 387th battalion was killed.[85] The Tatmadaw's 71st Infantry Battalion reportedly arrested around 20 refugees to use as human shields and allegedly mutilated seven of them in Tabayin.[86]

November 2023

[edit]
1 November
[edit]

On 1 November, the Junta arrested around 200 foreign workers to use as human shields at the front line of Laukkai.[87]

A SAC convoy advances on Nawnghkio (30 October 2023)
2 November
[edit]

By 2 November 92 junta bases and four towns had been captured by the Brotherhood Alliance and its allies.[88] It was also reported that 14 civilians had been killed by junta shelling and airstrikes since the start of the operation.[88] The Alliance claimed to be in "complete control" of both Chinshwehaw and Hsenwi.[89] The Three Brotherhood Alliance also imposed a siege on Nawngkhio, blocking junta troops from all of northern Shan.[25] Peng Hseng, a border town east of Muse, also came under alliance control.[90]

3 November
[edit]

Rebel forces occupied Kawlin's police station on 3 November after simultaneous attacks on at least 10 junta positions in eight townships across Sagaing and Magwe regions as part of the operation. The NUG Ministry of Defense said that at least six junta camps and police stations had been seized by rebel forces in northern Sagaing in Kawlin, Kantbalu, Kyunhla, Wuntho, Kalewa, Kale, Homalin and Tamu townships.[91]

4 November
[edit]

By 4 November 106 junta bases and four towns has been captured by the anti-junta alliance in the states of Shan and Kachin.[92] Myanmar's junta launched several airstrikes in Kawlin, Sagaing Region, as rebel forces attacked regime strongholds, according to residents.[91] The KIA, AA and ABSDF are fighting alongside PDF and LPDF forces in the Sagaing-Magway front as part of the operation.[93]

During the conflict, a shell landed on the Chinese border, causing the death of one Chinese citizen and multiple injuries to others.[94]

6 November
[edit]

After assaulting Kawlin for three days, KIA, AA and PDF combined forces were finally able to capture the town.[95][96] Namhkam was also taken by the TNLA. Only one junta base remains on a hill about two miles from the town.[97] AA and MNDAA forces were also able to seize Panlong base in Kunlong Township. Brigadier General Aung Kyaw Lwin, commander of the 99th Infantry Division, was killed in the battle.[98][99] It's also reported that the Junta launched daily artillery strikes and air strikes on the city of Laiza as retaliation for its massive losses.[100]

It was reported that more than 20 civilians, including 3 children, had been killed by junta airstrikes and shelling since the beginning of the operation.[101]

7 November
[edit]

The town of Khampat in Sagaing Region was taken by the PDF. The battle for the town started on 4 November. In three days, all the police stations and military camps were captured by the rebel forces. The town came under the complete control of the PDF forces on the morning of 7 November. KIA and Chin National Defense Force (CNDF) forces also participated in the assault.[102] The city of Mong Ko along the China-Myanmar border was captured by the MNDAA.[103] Mongko base, one of the most important bases in Northern Shan State, was also captured by the MNDAA. They captured ammunition and other military equipment, including an armored car.[104]

In southeastern Kayah State, the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force launched Operation 1107 in support of Operation 1027,[105] capturing three junta bases in Maesae Township within the day.[106] It was the first skirmish to happen in the region since the start of the operation.

8 November
[edit]

Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing called up all military reservists to prepare for military operations after the high losses experienced in the fighting.[107] Military doctors still studying for degrees have also been called to front-line combat.[108] The TNLA gained control of the last remaining Tatmadaw base in Namhkam, killing 13 junta soldiers while capturing 3 others as well as 30 pieces of ammunition.[109]

9 November
[edit]
Kunlong suspension bridge

The junta lost control of the city of Kunlong.[110] Junta forces attacked a camp manned by TNLA and MDY-PDF forces near Ommkha village near Nawnghkio with three armored cars. One of the armored cars was destroyed and captured by TNLA/MDY-PDF forces and the two remaining armored cars retreated. The KIA also captured three military bases in Hpakant Township. In Kalewa, the PDF engaged the junta in a battle in which 10 Tatmadaw soldiers were killed, and 50 weapons were seized by the rebels.[111] The same day, the Junta summoned all its reserves into action.[112]

10–11 November
[edit]

A junta group consisting of about 200 combatants were attacked on their way to Kawlin by local PDF forces on 10 November. The battle lasted for about three hours. The PDF claimed that they had seized about 50 firearms.[113] The MNDAA skirmished with junta forces in Kunlong. A combined force of the PDF, KIA, AA, and ABSDF continued to assault Htigyaing. The junta forces received support from aircraft bombing the town.[114]

On 11 November, it was reported that more than 300 junta soldiers and allied junta-aligned militia members had surrendered to rebel forces since the beginning of the operation.[115]

12 November
[edit]

The TNLA attacked a Kyinti military base on a bridge near Hsipaw in the morning of 12 November and had completely captured it by 5:30 AM.[116] Military bases on the western bank of the Salween River in Kunlong were taken by the MNDAA and both sides of the town came under its control. Equipment seized by the group included two D-30 howitzers, one 122mm MAM-01 MRLS, one 240mm MAM-02 MRLS, one BTR-3U armoured vehicle, one EE-9 armoured vehicle, one MT-LB armoured vehicle and several mortars.[117][118] The military regime imposed martial law in Kunlong, Kutkai, Muse, Namhkan, Hsenwi, Lashio,[119] Laukkai and Konkyan.[120] The same day, 127 junta soldiers from the 129th Infantry Battalion stationed in Laukkai surrendered to the MNDAA within the city.[121]

13 November
[edit]

China issued arrest warrants for junta-aligned Ming Xuechang and three other Ming family members for their involvement in online scamming operations.[122] According to The Diplomat, this move signals China's "tacit support for the removal of the Kokang SAZ's leadership".[123] The MNDAA was able to capture more Ukrainian-made armored vehicles.[124] The mansion of the Ming family, in Shiyuanzi Village, Kokang SAZ, was bombed. The MNDAA denied responsibility.[125]

The first fighting in Rakhine since the operation began took place in Rathedaung and Minbya townships, breaking an informal ceasefire that had been in place in the region and marking the beginning of the Rakhine Offensive. The AA reported that it had seized outposts and arrested some officers.[126]

14–15 November
[edit]

On 14 November, 43 Myanmar Army soldiers attempted to flee across the border into the Indian state of Mizoram. Most of them were disarmed by the Assam Rifles and sent back to Myanmar.[77][127] According to reports from the MNDAA, they had begun to attack Myanmar Army positions in Mawhtike, capturing two posts and killing 20 regime soldiers.[128]

On 15 November, rebel forces reported that the entire 129th battalion of army forces surrendered to them in Shan State. The surrender of 127 soldiers and 134 family members would mark the largest such surrender since the conflict escalated after the 2021 coup.[129][130] The Junta used air-strikes against refugees in Loikaw.[131] MNDAA rebels captured two M-56А1 105 mm howitzers from junta force positions in Mawhtike.[132]

The State Administration Council further announced that junta-aligned Kokang SAZ chairman Myint Swe would be temporarily replaced by Brigadier General Tun Tun Myint. Tun Tun Myint was previously the commander in charge of northern Shan State operations. The move was suggested to be in anticipation of Operation 1027 moving towards Laukkai.[10]

The 6th light infantry battalion and 425th light infantry battalion of the junta's 66th light infantry division were severely damaged during fighting in Loikaw University, with the battalions' commander and second in command killed in both battalions despite excessive air and artillery support. The remaining 38 soldiers under the command of captain Kaung Myat Ko, the only officer left, surrendered to the KNDF.[133]

16–17 November
[edit]

The same day, cybercrime ringleader Ming Xuechang and his family were arrested by Myanmar junta authorities and handed over to China. Ming Xuechang died in police custody, and the Consulate General of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar in Kunming claims that Ming Xuechang committed suicide.[134][135] Ming Julan was later found by rebel forces and was handed over as well.[136][137][additional citation(s) needed] On 17 November, Bai Xuoqian, former deputy commander of the MNDAA and former head of the Kokang SAZ, was stopped by the Myanmar Army when he tried to leave Kokang.[138]

18 November
[edit]

The military launched a successful offensive to retake their Sakhan Thit Kone base in Namhkam Township, which had been captured by the TNLA the previous day. The TNLA accused the junta of using chemical weapons during their offensive by dropping bombs which caused "dizziness, breathlessness, nausea, extreme agitation, fatigue, and low blood oxygen" among its troops.[139] Chemical weapons are illegal under international law and their use would constitute a war crime. The TNLA said they would attempt to gather more conclusive evidence of the attack with technical and laboratory investigations.[140]

23 November
[edit]

The MNDAA accused the junta of using chemical weapons during an airstrike on a recently captured junta base. Troops affected by the weapons reportedly suffered from dizziness and vomiting. The MNDAA warned that the junta "could launch more chemical attacks on both civilians and revolutionary forces," and said it was equipping its soldiers to protect them from further chemical attacks.[140]

A drone attack at the Kyin San Kyawt border crossing with China destroyed over 100 cargo trucks and caused over K 30,000,000 (around US$14,000,000) in losses. A drone was used to drop bombs on junta soldiers guarding the crossing, which started fires that burned for hours and destroyed goods trapped at the crossing by the outbreak of fighting.[141] No group claimed responsibility for the attack.

24 November
[edit]

The TNLA retook their Mine Kyat base in Lashio Township after a 28-day battle, seizing heavy equipment, including one D-30 howitzer. They had previously abandoned the base after junta airstrikes.[142] The MNDAA and other rebel groups managed to seize four military bases in Hseni Township, northern Shan State after six days of attacks. The rebels claimed that 16 junta soldiers were killed and 31 captured in the battle. The rebels also seized one BTR-3U armoured vehicle, two Soltam M-845P 155 mm howitzers and other weapons and ammunition from the junta bases.[143]

Nine resistance groups jointly raided junta bases in Aung Thayar village, Sagiang Region. The People's Liberation Army of CPB, which participated in the attack, said they had killed over ten and captured seven regime troops, while seven of their own troops were injured.[144]

25 November
[edit]

Several resistance groups launched a joint attack on junta positions in four villages: Nyaung Kaing, Thee Kone, Zee Phyu Kone, and Tal Thee Taw, with the latter two falling into resistance hands. At least 20 junta and pro-junta militia troops were killed during the attack, the groups claimed.[144]

China announced it would be conducting live-fire military exercises on the border with Myanmar, following the attack at the Kyin San Kyawt border crossing. They said the drills would run until the 28th and aimed to test the "rapid maneuverability, border sealing and fire strike capabilities" of troops stationed in the region.[145]

26 November
[edit]

An attack by PDFs on a junta checkpoint in the Myingyan township of Mandalay Region killed two regime soldiers, with a follow-up attack killing another. The groups also claimed to have killed eight junta troops using mines in an ambush.[144]

The MNDAA announced that they had captured the Kyin San Kyawt border crossing in Muse District. This was the fourth such border crossing seized during the operation.[146] The crossing was previously targeted in an attack that destroyed around 120 trucks parked at the border.[147]

27 November
[edit]

On 27 November, the Brotherhood Alliance launched an offensive to seize the 105-Mile Trade Zone, a stretch of border in the Muse District that accounts for a major portion of trade with China. The rebel forces used drones to strike junta positions in the region, with the junta retaliating with heavy shelling and airstrikes that reportedly killed two civilians. Rebel forces seized attacked bases in Kyaukme and Laisho townships, seizing weapons.[148] On the same day, Mandalay PDF said they had carried out a joint attack with the TNLA against a junta camp in Madaya Township, Mandalay. The group claimed that over 15 junta soldiers were killed, but that the resistance forces suffered no casualties.[47]

On 29 November, it was reported that the MNDAA had captured the town of Konkyan in the Kokang SAZ, following the surrender of Light Infantry Battalion 125 of the Tatmadaw.[149] A total of 186 Tatmadaw soldiers and 86 family members surrendered in Konkyan.[150]

December 2023

[edit]
1 December
[edit]

Over the second half of November, the MNDAA encircled the town by capturing a number of junta outposts. The junta found it difficult to retain its foothold after losing Chinshwehaw, which was a key entry point into the Kokang SAZ along the main Lashio-China road. On 1 December, the MNDAA started penetrating the Tong Chain neighbourhood in southeastern Laukkai, beginning the Battle of Laukkai.[151]

On the same day, the MNDAA ambushed a battalion of junta troops who had previously fled Konkyan on 29 November. The entire battalion was killed, with casualties numbering between a few dozen and 100+.[152]

4–13 December
[edit]

They seized a D-30 howitzer.[153] On 6 December, the MNDAA captured the military outpost on Four Buddhist Statues Hill immediately south of Laukkai.[154][155] This was the last junta outpost between the Brotherhood Alliance and Laukkai proper.[citation needed]

On 7 December, the town of Monglon in Kyaukme township was seized by the TNLA.[156]

On 10 December, Chinese authorities issued arrest warrants and offered substantial rewards for the capture of 10 key figures leading telecom fraud rings operating in the Kokang region of Myanmar's Shan State, including former Kokang region chairman Bai Xuoqian and several pro-junta Kokang militia leaders.[157]

On 13 December, the KIA, along with the All Burma Students' Democratic Front and Indaw PDF, took the town of Maw Luu from junta forces. The junta targeted the town with airstrikes following the town's capture.[158]

15 December
[edit]

The Ta'ang National Liberation Army seized the town of Namhsan after around two weeks of fighting.[159] The rebels seized two D-30 howitzers and two M-56A1 howitzers from junta forces in Namhsan.[160] The TNLA suffered approximately 200 casualties (49 killed and 145 wounded) while capturing the Sakham Thit Kone stronghold in Namhsan. At least 60 junta troops were killed and more than 150 surrendered to the TNLA.[161] Brigadier General Min Min Tun, commander of the 101st Infantry Division of the Tatmadaw, was also captured by TNLA.[14] The Brotherhood Alliance took control the 105-Mile Myanmar-China Trade Zone and a military base in Muse Township in Shan State, the AA rebels seized a BTR-3U armored vehicle and an MT-LB armored vehicle there.[162]

18–22 December
[edit]

On 18 December, anti-junta forces fully gained control of Namkham and the surrounding Namhkam Township.[163][164] On the same day, the Myanmar Air Force launched three airstrikes towards MNDAA troops in Hitn Par Keng, a village directly north of Laukkai after a week of respite during peace talks.[165] On 19 December, the MNDAA gained control of the Yanlonkyaing border gate and the Border Point 125 IDP camp on the Chinese border with Nansan, Yunnan, three north of Laukkai.[166][167]

The junta bombed an internally displaced persons camp in Mantong on 21 December, destroying at least 15 homes and a monastery. This bombing was part of a larger bombing operation in which the air force has bombed Mantong Township more than 180 times.[168] TNLA captured Mantong in the evening of 22 December, completely capturing the Pa Laung Self-Administered Zone.[168] TNLA seized one 155mm Soltam M-71 howitzer from Tatmadaw in Mantong.[169]

26–31 December
[edit]

In Laukkai, 90 soldiers of the Tatmadaw's 55th Light Infantry Division and BGF troops reportedly surrendered to the MNDAA on 26 December, while another 90 junta troops were killed in previous fighting.[170] On 28 December it was reported that "most" of Laukkai was now under MNDAA control, with junta forces largely abandoning the city.[171]

On 29 December, the TNLA took control of Namtu prompting junta forces to bombard the town.[172]

On 31 December, the TNLA seized Mongngaw town in Kyaukme township, following attacks that had begun on the 28th.[173]

January 2024

[edit]
3–7 January
[edit]

On 3 January, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army claimed to have taken control of the town of Mongngaw in Kyaukme Township in Shan State.[174] The Irrawaddy reported that the Ta'ang also seized a military camp in Nawnghkio Township, with junta forces launching a counterattack in an attempt to retake it.[175]

On 5 January, the MNDAA gained full control of Laukkai, the capital of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone, following the mass surrender of the last junta forces and officials within the city.[176][177][178] 2,389 Tatmadaw soldiers, including 6 brigadiers, and 1,601 family members surrendered to MNDAA and were deported back to Lashio.[179] According to a junta spokesperson, the decision was made prioritizing the safety of military families.[180] On the same day, footage appeared on social media suggesting that the United Wa State Army had taken control of Hopang, the nominal capital of the Wa Self-Administered Division, with junta forces losing control of the east bank of the Salween River.[181][182]

On 7 January, the Brotherhood Alliance claimed that it had captured Kutkai and Hsenwi on midnight after seizing junta military posts in the towns, including the headquarters of the 16th Military Operations Command in Hsenwi.[183] The capture of the towns ended sieges that had lasted since the start of the Operation.[184] The Arakan Army captured the Taung Shay Taung and Kyittaw Taung outposts of the Tatmadaw in Rakhine State. According to reports from the Arakan Army, 200 junta soldiers surrendered and the rebels captured 2 M-56А1 howitzers.[185]

12–13 January
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Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning replies to a query about the cease-fire at a daily press briefing

On 12 January, the Brotherhood Alliance agreed to a temporary cease-fire inside of North Shan State between the junta forces leading to the end of the operation, after peace talks between the Three Brotherhood Alliance and junta correspondents mediate by China. The peace talks took 3 days and occurred inside Kunming, China.[186][187] However, the very next day, TNLA reported that the junta had broken their ceasefire agreement with airstrikes in various townships in Northern Shan, including Lashio Township and Kyaukme Township. Additionally, there were also attacks in Mogok Township in neighbouring Mandalay Region.[188]

Haigeng Ceasefire

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15–24 January

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On 21 January, the Kachin Independence Army, along with the All Burma Students' Democratic Front and local PDFs, seized the town of Mabein after a three-day siege. The KIA claimed that the junta retaliated by dropping more than 60 bombs on the town and surrounding villages. The town is 50 kilometers north of Momeik, which is also besieged by rebel forces.[189][190]

The Kachin Independence Army captured the base of the Tatmadaw's 123rd Infantry Battalion in Nampaka village, Kutkai Township, thereby cutting off the access from the junta-controlled areas to the border trading city of Muse. The Kachin Independence Army captured a D-30 howitzer and an anti-aircraft gun during the battle.[191]

26–30 January

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Fighters from the Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLA) and the KNDF attacked the town of Hsi Hseng in Southern Shan State. The PNLA had been a signatory of the National Ceasefire Agreement, but following escalating tensions with the junta, including a skirmish at a PNLA convoy, the group ended their neutrality and declared war against the regime. The battle is the first in Southern Shan State since the operation began.[192][193][194]

Also on 30 January, Bai Xuoqian was arrested by the junta, which transferred him along with other nine people, including his son Bai Yingcang, to China. Wei Huairen and Liu Zhengxiang were also among those handed over to China.[195]

February 2024

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On 7 February, it was reported that the Tatmadaw counter-offensive to retake Kawlin was proceeding and that they were getting closer to the city. The Tatmadaw was supported by air. PDF formations in Kawlin said they were preparing to defend the city.[196]

On 11 February, pro-junta media reported that the junta had recaptured Kawlin in Sagaing Region from the People's Defense Force and Kachin Independence Army. The National Unity Government President's Office spokesperson Kyaw Zaw denied that the Tatmadaw took control of Kawlin but acknowledged that it had entered the town.[197] On 12 February, pro-NUG media acknowledged that junta forces had fully recaptured Kawlin.[198]

Map of anti-junta gains from Phase 1 of Operation 1027 as of 19 March 2024

April 2024

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On 25 of April the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army executed three of their own soldiers in Laukkai after it found them guilty of murder and other crimes linked to the online scam centers in the region.[199]

Operation 1027 (Phase 2)

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June 2024

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Beginning in June, tensions began to grow in Northern Shan State. On 9 June, the TNLA accused the junta of violating the China-brokered ceasefire after the junta launched airstrikes on TNLA positions in Mongmit Township.[200] On 13 June, the TNLA reported that junta forces had destroyed roads connecting several Three Brotherhood Alliance-held townships, possibly due to reported buildups of Alliance forces around Lashio.[201] Junta forces also began to amass forces in towns surrounding Brotherhood Alliance-held territory, fortifying positions in Mongyai, Muse, Kyaukme, Hsipaw, Pyin Oo Lwin, and Lashio with "tens of thousands" of soldiers, leading military sources to warn residents to take cautionary safety measures.[202]

On 18 June, junta forces bombed Hsum Hsai village, killing 2 TNLA soldiers. The next day, junta forces bombed Taungni and Shwe Nyaung Bin villages, killing 1 civilian and 2 TNLA soldiers respectively.[203] On 23 June, the junta and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army clashed near Lashio. On 24 June, fighting erupted around Kyaukme, Nawnghkio Township, and Mogok Township between junta forces and the TNLA.[204] The next day, the TNLA announced that it had restarted "anti-junta offensive operations" in Northern Shan State.[4] Residents of Kyaukme reported that the town had been encircled by the TNLA.[205] Tatmadaw officials also met with battalion commanders for the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) and United Wa State Army (UWSA) on the same day, unsuccessfully attempting to bribe them to end arms sales to other ethnic armies, a bribe the SSPP and UWSA turned down.[206]

In response to the renewed offensive, the Tatmadaw designated Pyin Oo Lwin as an "unyielding fortress", intensifying defensive measures in the town.[207] The NUG announced that it had joined in the offensive through its People's Defense Forces, calling the attacks a "Shan Man" operation.[208]

On 26 June, Nawnghkio was captured by PDF and TNLA forces, and most of Kyaukme also fell to rebel forces.[209] On 27 June, TNLA forces burnt down the Kyatpyin Police Station, attempting to capture Kyatpyin to encircle junta forces in neighboring Mogok. It was also reported that the TNLA had entered eastern areas of Mogok.[210] By 28 June, the TNLA had captured Kyaukme and continued attacking the junta bases around the town.[211] On 29 June, the MNDAA clashed with the junta north of Lashio after the junta attempted to advance into MNDAA territory.[212]

July 2024

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On 2 July, the MNDAA relaunched attacks against the junta's headquarters in Lashio. The TNLA joined the offensive the next day, both armies attacking four junta bases surrounding Lashio. Pro-junta Telegram channels accused the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) of joining the offensive.[213]

As part of Operation 1027, the Mandalay People’s Defence Force captured 14 junta positions from 25 June to 3 July throughout northern Mandalay Region.[214] Junta forces blockaded Madaya following clashes in the northern part of Madaya Township. Resistance forces also attacked villages in Singu and Mogok Townships, halting traffic on the Mandalay-Mogok road.[215]

On 4 July, family members of junta soldiers in Lashio were evacuated by helicopter to Naypyidaw, while thousands of civilians fled the fighting.[216] On 5 July, the TNLA attacked an SSPP camp near Kyaukme.[217] On 6 July, the MNDAA captured Nampawng village south of Lashio, encircling the town. After Nampawng's capture, alliance forces began launching attacking into Lashio.[218] The TNLA again accused the junta of using chemical weapons during clashes.[216]

On 5 July, SSA-N fighters attacked TNLA forces in Noung Pain village, Kyaukme Township. The latter faction suffered six casualties, including three officers. Three TNLA fighters escorting captured Myanmar Army troops were also ambushed, resulting in the death of a Tatmadaw POW and a TNLA captain. The TNLA alleges that the SSPP aided in the escape of Tatmadaw soldiers from Kyaukme and Hsipaw townships in exchange for transferring control of their bases. The TNLA also states that SSA-N also seized weapons from a local PDF in Kyaukme Township.[1] The TNLA attacked an SSPP camp near Kyaukme on the same day.[219]

On 6 July, the MNDAA captured Nampawng village south of Lashio, encircling the town, and began launching attacks into Lashio.[220] MNDAA forces also clashed with junta forces in Mongyai Township.[221] On the same day, it was reported that the SSPP requested help from the UWSA in "restraining" the TNLA, with the TNLA also seeking mediation via the UWSA-led FPNCC.[222] On 8 July, the TNLA accused the SSPP of launching attacks on its soldiers and aiding junta troops in withdrawing from bases, condemning the Shan group for "disrupting" the alliance offensive.[223]

On 11 July, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), a neutral ethnic organization that controls a large amount of territory in northeast Shan State, deployed troops to Tangyan to prevent the spread of fighting to that town. The group said it entered negotiations with the junta to take over administration of the town after the civilians asked for protection against resistance offensives.[224] SSPP forces numbering around 1,000 occupied Mongyai, with residents claiming that clashes might break out in the town.[225]

On 14 July, the MNDAA announced a four-day ceasefire in response to the Third Plenary Session of the CCP.[226] However, the ceasefire was largely ignored by both sides, with the rebel groups claiming to be responding to bombing by junta forces.[227] TNLA and SSPP leaders also met in Panghsang, Wa State, to discuss an end to clashes.[228]

On 17 July, the Mandalay PDF claimed to have taken control of the town of Singu. It also said it captured the nearby Alpha cement factory from retreating junta forces, who burned it as they fled.[229] Clashes intensified around the junta's 501st and 502nd Light Infantry Battalion bases in Kyaukme and near the Nattaung area.[230]

On 18 July, the TNLA reported seizing five junta positions East of Mogok. The group also accused the junta of dropping bombs from drones into civilian areas in Mongmit and Nawnghkio. The same day, fighting was reported in Kyaukme as junta battalions unsuccessfully attempted to retake the town.[231] Also on the 18th, the military dropped bombs onto the TNLA-occupied city of Hsenwi, killing over 20 civilians.[232]

On 19 July, the MNDAA said it had extended a temporary ceasefire with the junta until 31 July at Beijing's request.[233][234] On the same day, despite the ceasefire, junta reinforcements launched renewed attacks on Kyaukme.[235]

On 20 July, the junta claimed that it had recaptured the town of Singu after a day of fighting with the support of the navy and air force. A spokesman for the Mandalay People’s Defense Force denied the junta's claim.[233]

On 24 July, the TNLA announced that it had fully captured the city of Mogok after pushing out remaining junta forces that day. Residents in the city were seen welcoming the rebel forces with flowers.[236] The Irrawaddy reported that over 150,000 people been displaced by the fighting in Shan and Mandalay and fled to Mandalay city.[237]

On 30 July, MNDAA forces ambush junta reinforcements attempting to reach Lashio, inflicting heavy casualties.[238] On 31 July, TNLA forces took complete control over Mongmit after capturing the last junta in the town.[239]

August 2024

[edit]

On 3 August, the MNDAA announced that it had seized the headquarters of the junta’s Northeastern Command base in Lashio. As a result, the rebels took full control of the city of Lashio.[9] A few days earlier on 27 July, UWSA forces entered Lashio with the permission of both the MNDAA and junta to protect their external relations offices.[240]

On 9 August, the 3 Brotherhood Alliance called on Northeastern Command chief Brigadier-General Soe Hlaing to surrender himself and Muse, from which he directs Northeastern Command operations. The town is the last junta stronghold in the area, and has not been attacked in Operation 1027 due to the proximity with the Chinese border.[241]

On 10 August, TNLA forces launched an offensive against Hsipaw, capturing the town’s prison.[242]

On 12 August, the PDF took control of the town of Tagaung following a battle that had begun the previous day.[243]

On 19 August, the PDF captured the town of Thabeikkyin after junta troops fled from their positions. However, a military training school in Thabeikkyin Township remained under junta control.[244] On 25 August, the TNLA and MDY-PDF completed seizing Thabeikkyin Township and brought the entirety of Thabeikkyin District under their control.[245]

In late August, The Irrawaddy reported that multiple sources close to the military junta had learned that the military was planning a counteroffensive to retake towns lost in Shan State. Reportedly named "Operation Sin Phyu Shin," the offensive would be led by the junta's second-in-command, Soe Win. TNLA spokesperson responded by saying that high-level junta planning is divorced from the strategic situation on the ground, and that soldiers sent by the junta to the frontlines routinely desert or have no military experience. Other sources agreed that the junta had no capacity for a counteroffensive against increasingly victorious rebel forces.[246]

On 21 August, fighting broke out at Taung Hkam, a village on the road between Nawnghkio and Lawksawk, as junta forces tried to stop the TNLA's advance south.[246]

The armed forces of the Communist Party of Burma during the offensive around Mandalay seized land from the junta, and in the process captured almost 140 elephants due to elephant handlers entering Communist bases while escaping from the war. The general secretary of the Burmese People's Liberation Army stated their desire to protect the elephants from the black market and poaching and provided food aid to their handlers.[247]

Impact

[edit]

The UNOCHA reported that as of 30 October 2023, over 6,200 individuals have been newly displaced, with around 1,000 of them seeking refuge in forests and more than 5,000 IDPs taking shelter in temporary sites, mostly religious compounds. In Kutkai township, electricity was cut off due to the destruction of power lines during the fighting, and mobile communication services have been disrupted in several townships, including Hsenwi, Kutkai, Muse, Namhkan, and Kokang Self-Administered Zone.[248] Myanmar Now reported that according to local aid workers, over 25,000 people had been displaced by the fighting, with around half fleeing to Namtit in Wa state.[89] As of 21 November, an estimated 335,000 people had been displaced throughout Myanmar as a result of rebel offensives, with hundreds of civilians injured and killed.[36]

The offensive resulted in the halt of cross-border trade with China. Fighting has stopped traffic on all major trade roads to the Chinese border, and the border posts at Muse and Laukkai have been closed. Cargo has been redirected to Loi Je in Kachin State, but the town is too small to handle as much trade as the Northern Shan border, which accounts for 70% of all trade with China. The Irrawaddy estimated that the junta is losing an estimated US$423,000 per day in tax revenue from the stoppage.[249]

As a result of the military operation, the cyber-scamming base in northern Myanmar was heavily damaged, and a large number of Chinese nationals involved were sent back to China for further screening and trial.[250] Small numbers of Thai, Filipino, and Singaporean nationals in Kokang were also evacuated to Bangkok through the Chinese province of Yunnan.[251]

In Rakhine State, the conflict between the regime and the Arakan Army has displaced thousands of people. The destruction has led to food shortages among the population, with people resorting to catching fish from streams to feed themselves and their families. With harvests disrupted by the fighting, food stocks have run low, and the region is reportedly "nearing starvation."[252]

Reactions

[edit]

On 1 November 2023, the United Wa State Party (UWSP) declared Wa State a neutral zone after the Three Brotherhood Alliance conducted Operation 1027 against the Tatmadaw. The UWSP threatened the use of force against hypothetical anti-junta or Tatmadaw incursions via its military wing the United Wa State Army while promising to aid refugees and other displaced persons.[253]

On 20 November 2023, supporters of the junta staged a protest in Yangon outside City Hall and the Chinese embassy, accusing China of aiding the Brotherhood Alliance and the PDF in their fight against the military regime.[254] China was also accused by the pro-regime protestors, who are members of the Patriotic Monks Union and the Myanmar Nationalist Organization, of purchasing rare earth elements from the KIA for cheap prices.[255]

Analysis

[edit]

International observers have pointed to the influential role of China as a key factor in the operation's launch, while others have cautioned against reducing the motives of the rebels to simply an extension of China's wishes. China's stance is multifaceted, driven by concerns about cyber-scam centers, the pursuit of favorable concessions from the junta on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, and the opportunity to gain influence with the rebels in light of evolving collaborative dynamics between NUG and EAO groups.[256] The junta's loss of strategic control of key locations and hills in northern Shan is evidence of the unforeseen collaboration between majority Bamar PDF groups and minority EAO groups combined with widespread revolt that the junta was ill-prepared for.[257] The Brotherhood Alliance has maintained good relations with China, allowing China to play a role in managing the conflict along China's border and along the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. Additionally, the operation sourced arms from the United Wa State Army, a neutral EAO in Shan State whose weapons manufacturing has been historically restricted by China. Reports suggest that loosening these restrictions have made the operation possible.[258] According to the TNLA, China also reached out for cooperation to take down the fraud group shortly before the operation.[259]

Analysts have highlighted that the cooperation between the PDFs and EAOs during Operation 1027 is a continuation of Myanmar's Spring Revolution, countering narratives that attribute its formation to Chinese influence. This perspective is supported by the continued public support of the armed resistance, the involvement of frontline medical professionals from the Civil Disobedience Movement, and the adoption of drone warfare tactics, a strategy that has been notably utilized by the PDF.[260] Additionally, experts underscore the autonomy and strategic motivations of the EAOs, advocating for an interpretation of the operation as a component of a larger national movement.[257] In this context, Operation 1027 is seen not as a byproduct of external forces like Chinese intervention, but rather as a logical extension of the ongoing struggle within Myanmar.[260]

The State Administration Council (SAC) junta believes the operation and attack to be targeted towards damaging China-Myanmar relations from its focus on disrupting the opening of a major bridge in Kunlong Township and the Union highway overland trade in general.[261]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Operation 1027 was a coordinated offensive launched on 27 October 2023 by the —comprising the (MNDAA), (TNLA), and (AA)—against Myanmar's military junta in northern , targeting junta-held outposts and border areas near . The operation achieved rapid initial successes, with alliance forces capturing dozens of military posts, several towns including in region, and key infrastructure such as bridges vital for trade with , inflicting significant defeats on the junta including mass surrenders and equipment losses. The offensive disrupted scam syndicates operating in border areas, aligning with Chinese interests in curbing cross-border fraud, which prompted tacit support despite its general backing of the junta. In response, the junta resorted to intensified airstrikes and a forced campaign, but suffered from low morale, manpower shortages, and inability to retake lost territory, marking some of the most substantial losses in its history and shifting momentum toward resistance forces in Myanmar's . By late 2024, Operation 1027 had inspired further ethnic armed offensives, eroding junta control over peripheral regions while exposing vulnerabilities in its centralized command structure.

Background and Context

Historical Ethnic Armed Conflicts

Myanmar's ethnic armed conflicts originated shortly after independence in 1948, as minority groups in peripheral states resisted the central Burmese government's failure to honor federalist commitments from the 1947 , which promised autonomy to ethnic Shan, Karen, and others. In , armed resistance began in the 1950s with groups like the Shan State Independence Army, evolving into the (SSA) in 1964, which fought for amid incursions, forced relocations, and resource exploitation. Northern , bordering , became a hotspot due to its ethnic diversity, including Shan, Palaung (Ta'ang), and Kokang Han Chinese populations, whose insurgencies were intertwined with dynamics, including Kuomintang remnants and the (CPB), which controlled border areas from the 1960s until internal mutinies in the late 1980s. The region, a enclave historically tied to production and cross-border trade, saw the emergence of the (MNDAA) in 1989 following a CPB led by (Peng Jiasheng), who established de facto control under a agreement with the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) government. This accord granted the MNDAA autonomy in exchange for demobilizing some forces and ceasing hostilities, allowing to function as a semi-independent zone until 2009, when demands to transform into a Tatmadaw-controlled Border Guard Force (BGF) triggered clashes. The ensuing offensive displaced the MNDAA leadership and over 30,000 civilians to , with a pro-junta splinter faction assuming local control, underscoring the fragility of amid centralization efforts and narcotics-related tensions. Post-2009, sporadic fighting persisted in northern , fueled by operations against remaining insurgents and competition over illicit economies, including methamphetamines and gambling. The (TNLA), formed in 2009 to represent Palaung interests, joined earlier Shan factions in resisting perceived Burmanization and military abuses, setting the stage for coordinated ethnic alliances. By 2015, renewed MNDAA offensives to reclaim involved TNLA and nascent (AA) cooperation, reflecting enduring grievances over unaddressed autonomy demands and junta overreach, which had claimed thousands of lives across decades of intermittent warfare.

Proliferation of Cyber-Scam Syndicates

Cyber-scam syndicates proliferated in Myanmar's border regions, especially northern , following the 2021 military coup, as central authority eroded and local power brokers tolerated or profited from the operations to fund militias and armed groups. These compounds, often sprawling complexes resembling gated cities, emerged in areas like in the , where weak enforcement and proximity to facilitated cross-border movement of personnel and capital. By 2023, such hubs had transformed previously underdeveloped frontiers into hubs for , with syndicates relocating from crackdowns in and to exploit Myanmar's instability. Local ethnic militias, including those nominally allied with the junta, provided armed protection in exchange for kickbacks, enabling rapid expansion despite occasional nominal raids. The syndicates, predominantly operated by Chinese mafia networks, relied on human trafficking to staff operations, deceiving recruits from , , and beyond with promises of lucrative jobs before confining them in compounds and forcing participation in fraud schemes like "pig-butchering" investment cons and romance scams. Victims faced , , and execution threats if quotas were unmet, with estimates indicating tens of thousands into Myanmar's scam centers by mid-2023, contributing to a regional crisis documented by UN experts as involving forced criminality on an unprecedented scale. In northern , compounds in and districts alone housed thousands of coerced workers operating call centers equipped with advanced software for targeting global victims, primarily in the U.S. and . The U.S. Treasury Department noted these networks' role in scams defrauding Americans of billions, underscoring the syndicates' shift to sophisticated, high-yield fraud amid proliferation. Economically, the industry generated immense illicit revenue, with Southeast Asian scam operations—including Myanmar's—estimated to produce tens of billions in annual profits by 2023, funneled through and networks to evade detection. In , leaders like , who controlled the region until 2023, derived significant funding from these activities, using proceeds to arm forces and maintain autonomy from the junta while paying nominal taxes. This financial entrenched the syndicates, as local actors overlooked abuses to sustain revenue streams amid Myanmar's , though it later fueled tensions with over victim and prompted external pressure that influenced resistance alliances. Despite sporadic junta-led dismantlements, such as in early 2023, the compounds rebuilt quickly, adapting by diversifying s and relocating within territories.

Emergence of the Three Brotherhood Alliance

The coalesced in June 2019 as a formal military pact among three ethnic armed organizations—the (MNDAA), (TNLA), and (AA)—to coordinate resistance against Myanmar's military, known as the . This alliance built on prior informal collaborations, particularly following the Tatmadaw's 2016-2017 offensives in northern that displaced thousands and targeted ethnic minorities, prompting the groups to pool resources for mutual defense rather than fight in isolation. The MNDAA, representing Kokang ethnic Chinese whose had been overrun in 2009 after a ceasefire breakdown, re-emerged under leaders like Peng Dage to reclaim territory; the TNLA, advocating for Palaung autonomy amid forced relocations and resource exploitation, had roots tracing to 1960s insurgencies but formalized in 2009; and the AA, focused on Rakhine , extended operations beyond western Myanmar to northern fronts for strategic depth. The alliance's emergence reflected causal pressures from the Tatmadaw's divide-and-rule tactics, which had historically exploited ethnic divisions through ceasefires with select groups while intensifying operations against others, eroding trust in bilateral peace processes like the 2015 . By 2019, shared grievances over central government encroachments on ethnic autonomies, coupled with the Tatmadaw's aerial and artillery campaigns displacing over 100,000 civilians in Shan and Kachin states, necessitated unified action; the groups publicly affirmed commitments to and territorial control without subsuming their distinct commands. This structure allowed tactical —such as joint patrols and intelligence sharing—without full merger, preserving each organization's agency amid Myanmar's fragmented landscape. Preceding the 2021 military coup, the alliance tested its coordination in skirmishes, including TNLA-MNDAA clashes with forces near the border, where ethnic ties and geographic proximity (northern Shan as a contiguous operational theater) outweighed regional differences, such as the AA's primary western base. Reports from the period indicate the pact deterred isolated attacks, with the groups issuing joint statements condemning aggression, setting the stage for escalated offensives post-coup when junta resources strained under nationwide resistance. The alliance's durability stemmed from pragmatic alignment against a common adversary enforcing Burman-majority dominance, rather than ideological uniformity, though internal frictions over trade and flows persisted.

Strategic Objectives and Planning

Alliance Goals Against the Junta

The , comprising the (MNDAA), (TNLA), and (AA), launched Operation 1027 on October 27, 2023, with explicitly stated objectives centered on countering the (SAC), Myanmar's military junta. In a joint declaration, the alliance outlined its aims as safeguarding civilian lives, asserting the right to , maintaining control over their territories, and mounting a resolute response to the SAC's attacks and airstrikes, which had intensified in the preceding months. These goals framed the operation as a defensive and retributive campaign against junta aggression, particularly in northern , where SAC forces had encroached on ethnic armed organization (EAO) areas following the 2021 coup. A core element of the alliance's strategy against the junta involved dismantling cyber-scam and syndicates operating along the -Myanmar border, which were protected by SAC-aligned militias and . The declaration explicitly committed to cracking down on these fraudulent operations, viewing them as extensions of junta corruption and economic exploitation that fueled regime finances and stability. This objective aligned with broader pressure from , which had suffered significant losses from scams targeting its citizens, and served to undermine the SAC's alliances with proxy militias like the United Wa State Army-linked groups and border guards that had defected or collaborated post-2009. By targeting these networks, the alliance aimed to sever revenue streams and territorial footholds that bolstered junta control in peripheral regions. Overarching the tactical aims was the alliance's aspiration to contribute to the defeat of the military regime, described in the statement as a "shared aspiration of the populace." This positioned Operation 1027 not merely as ethnic self-preservation but as a pivotal strike to erode SAC authority, recapturing key positions like Laukkaing—the MNDAA's pre-2009 capital—and disrupting supply lines in northern . While the groups pursued autonomous ethnic governance, their coordinated offensives sought to exploit junta overextension, forcing resource diversion from other fronts and amplifying resistance momentum nationwide. The alliance's restraint from advancing toward central underscored a focus on sustainable territorial consolidation over immediate regime overthrow, prioritizing junta expulsion from border enclaves.

Focus on Northern Shan State and Border Areas

The targeted northern in Operation 1027 primarily to dismantle cyber-scam syndicates operating under the protection of junta-aligned militias, which had proliferated in areas and inflicted significant financial losses on Chinese citizens. These operations, centered in towns like and along the Myanmar-, were run by groups such as the , a proxy of the notorious for ties to . The alliance's stated military objectives included combating online fraud and gambling, asserting self-defense rights against junta encroachments, and securing territorial control in ethnic homelands. Northern Shan State's proximity to made it a focal point for disrupting junta supply lines and economic lifelines, as the region hosts critical border crossings essential for trade and logistics. The MNDAA, leading efforts in the , sought to reclaim areas lost in prior conflicts, while the TNLA aimed to expand influence in adjacent northern territories plagued by junta-backed militias. Initial strikes on October 27, 2023, rapidly captured border outposts like , halting traffic on major trade roads and closing key posts at and , thereby isolating junta forces and pressuring their peripheral control. This border-centric strategy leveraged the alliance's operational advantages, including cross-border support networks and the junta's overstretched defenses, to achieve disproportionate gains in a resource-rich but fragmented . By prioritizing these areas, the offensive not only neutralized criminal enterprises funding regime proxies but also positioned the alliance to control economic gateways, potentially influencing regional dynamics with .

Operational Timeline

Phase 1: Launch and Initial Advances (October 2023–January 2024)

Operation 1027 commenced on October 27, 2023, when the —comprising the (MNDAA), (TNLA), and (AA)—launched coordinated attacks against junta forces and their ethnic allies in northern . The offensive targeted junta-controlled border areas rife with cyber-scam operations, with the alliance deploying approximately 15,000 fighters across a 260 km front. Initial strikes focused on outposts near key trade routes to , exploiting junta vulnerabilities through surprise assaults that led to rapid withdrawals from dozens of positions. In the first two weeks, the alliance captured over 100 junta positions, including hilltop strongholds, and seized towns such as and Monekoe, securing control over critical border crossings like the Kyin-San-Kyawt gate. The MNDAA advanced swiftly in the region, destroying bridges on Highways 3 and 34 to disrupt junta supply lines and trade, while the TNLA contested Namkham for access to additional crossings. By early November, the alliance had overrun around 180 military bases and four towns, including Hsenwi under joint efforts, with reports of junta troops surrendering en masse due to low morale and ammunition shortages. By mid-November, the MNDAA had shut down most cyber-scam compounds in , repatriating over 31,000 Chinese nationals and scam operators under Chinese pressure, which aligned with the alliance's stated goals of eradicating syndicates protected by the junta. The offensive expanded to capture 161 positions by late November, liberating border ports such as Qingshui River, Menggu National Gate, and Bangsai, thereby severing significant revenue streams for the junta estimated at over $1.8 billion annually from scam-related trade in areas like township alone. Junta countermeasures included airstrikes and reinforcements, but these failed to halt advances, resulting in the capture of heavy weapons and munitions by alliance forces. Into December and January 2024, the MNDAA pressed toward , capturing outposts like Four Buddhist Statues Hill on December 6 and arresting a junta on November 27, signaling continued momentum. By early January, the alliance controlled large swathes of northern , prompting China-mediated talks that culminated in the Haigeng ceasefire agreement, temporarily halting major offensives while allowing consolidation of gains. The phase inflicted heavy casualties on junta forces, with MNDAA claims of thousands killed or captured, though independent verification remains limited; the rapid territorial losses exposed systemic weaknesses in junta .

Haigeng Ceasefire and Stalemate (January–May 2024)

On January 11, 2024, China brokered the Haigeng Agreement in Kunming, Yunnan Province, between the Myanmar junta (State Administration Council) and the Three Brotherhood Alliance—comprising the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Arakan Army (AA)—to halt hostilities in northern Shan State following the alliance's rapid territorial gains in late 2023. The agreement stipulated an immediate ceasefire effective from 9:00 p.m. that day, prohibiting troop confrontations, with disputes to be resolved through dialogue rather than gunfire; the alliance pledged not to assault junta military camps or strategic hills, while the junta committed to refraining from artillery or airstrikes on alliance-controlled areas. Both sides also agreed to safeguard China-Myanmar border security and protect Chinese investments, reflecting Beijing's prioritization of economic stability amid disrupted overland trade routes disrupted by the conflict. China's mediation stemmed from concerns over escalating border instability and potential junta collapse, which could exacerbate chaos from dismantled cyber-scam operations in alliance-captured zones like , initially tacitly encouraged by to curb but now threatening spillover effects. The resulting stalemate froze front lines across northern , preventing major offensives and allowing the to consolidate administrative control in seized territories, including Kokang's under MNDAA oversight, where utilities and trade were partially restored under Chinese pressure by early June. The junta, meanwhile, exploited the pause to reinforce positions through forced —adding approximately 15,000 troops by year's end—and arms procurements, though it relied heavily on airpower for defensive operations without ground recaptures of significance. Tensions persisted through May 2024, marked by low-level violations and faltering bilateral talks hosted in Province, as the junta launched assaults on TNLA positions, including airstrikes in Mongmit Township, prompting alliance accusations of bad-faith compliance. Despite these incidents, no large-scale breakthroughs occurred, with the focusing on internal governance and coordination with allies like the , whose concurrent Operation 0307 in March further strained junta resources without directly breaching the Haigeng framework in . This uneasy equilibrium underscored the ceasefire's fragility, driven more by Chinese economic leverage—such as trade restrictions and power supply manipulations—than mutual trust, setting the stage for renewed hostilities beyond May.

Phase 2: Renewed Offensives and Expansions (June 2024–Present)

In June 2024, the accused Myanmar's junta of breaching the China-brokered Haigeng ceasefire with multiple airstrikes and artillery shelling on positions held by the (TNLA) in Mongmit Township as early as June 9 and 12. In response, the TNLA and (MNDAA) relaunched offensives across northern on June 25, initiating Phase 2 of Operation 1027 and targeting junta outposts near key transport routes. Alliance forces rapidly overran dozens of junta bases in the ensuing weeks, with TNLA and MNDAA capturing approximately 80 regime troops—including a , a major, and other officers—while killing scores more in clashes around Nawnghkio and other townships west of the Shan plateau. By mid-July, they had seized a strategic town near on July 10, expanding control over supply lines and threatening junta logistics in the region. These advances disrupted junta reinforcements and extended resistance-held territory eastward and southward toward , with coordinated drone and ground assaults neutralizing positions. The offensive peaked in early August 2024 when MNDAA forces, supported by allied People's Defence Force units, captured Lashio on August 3—the largest city in northern Shan State and site of the junta's Northeastern Regional Military Command headquarters—after encircling defenders and overrunning the command center, which housed two brigadier generals among the captured. This victory, verified through MNDAA statements and junta admissions of defeat, represented the alliance's deepest penetration yet, controlling over 16 townships and severing junta access to China border trade routes. Expansions continued into late 2024, with TNLA consolidating positions along the Mandalay-Muse highway, though Arakan Army (AA) elements focused primarily on parallel operations in Rakhine State rather than northern Shan. Subsequent Chinese diplomatic pressure led to MNDAA withdrawals from in April 2025, enabling junta reoccupation amid stalled talks. By October 2025, junta airstrikes and ground pushes had recaptured towns like Kyaukme after 21 days of fighting, though alliance forces retained broader territorial gains in northern Shan amid ongoing skirmishes.

Military Dynamics

Tactics Employed by Resistance Forces

The resistance forces in Operation 1027, led by the (comprising the , , and ), prioritized coordinated multi-axis offensives to exploit junta vulnerabilities in northern . On October 27, 2023, alliance fighters—estimated at around 15,000 experienced personnel—launched simultaneous attacks on over 100 targets, including military outposts, police stations, and Border Guard Force positions, overwhelming isolated garrisons through synchronized ground assaults and rapid tactics. This approach disrupted junta command structures early, capturing key border towns like and Chin Shwe Haw within days by severing supply lines and forcing surrenders of approximately 200 troops in initial engagements. Drone warfare emerged as a pivotal tactic, enabling precision strikes and that compensated for limited heavy armor. units deployed commercially acquired drones to drop grenades and improvised munitions, inflicting heavy casualties—such as 25,000 projectiles in MNDAA operations—and neutralizing junta without risking advances. These unmanned systems, often sourced from foreign markets, facilitated standoff attacks on fortified positions, as evidenced in the rapid seizure of four border crossings (Qingshui River, Menggu, Bangsai, and Muse ports) by early November 2023. Ground operations combined assaults with barrages and opportunistic alliances, including truces with rival Shan militias to consolidate gains. In Phase 2 offensives from June 2024, forces like the MNDAA employed strategies to isolate larger targets, culminating in the 2024 overrun of Lashio's Northeastern Military Command headquarters after months of warfare and coordinated flanking maneuvers with TNLA units. This methodical progression, supported by years of preparation and diverse funding streams, yielded control over dozens of towns and compelled over 6,000 junta surrenders, though it relied heavily on exploiting terrain familiarity and junta overextension rather than superior firepower.

Junta Countermeasures and Technological Responses

In response to the rapid territorial losses during the initial phase of Operation 1027 launched on October 27, 2023, the Myanmar military, known as the , relied heavily on its air superiority to conduct intensive airstrikes targeting resistance-held positions in northern . These operations involved fighter jets and helicopters bombing towns and outposts controlled by the , aiming to disrupt advances and support ground reinforcements. By late 2023, the junta escalated aerial bombardments, with reports of strikes on civilian areas in TNLA-held territories to consolidate control over key trade routes near the Chinese border. The junta's campaign intensified through 2024 and into 2025, with over 1,600 documented strikes in the first eight months of 2024 alone, many concentrated in to counter renewed offensives. Specific incidents included bombings of Kyaukme town in July 2025 to seize strategic areas from the TNLA, and attacks on Mantong, Namhsan, and Naungcho in northern Shan, often coinciding with failed peace talks or holidays. In November 2024, 25 incidents in northern Shan and adjacent states resulted in at least 35 deaths, including children, underscoring the sustained use of air power despite high civilian costs. Technologically, the adapted by increasing deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and drones, learning from resistance forces' effective use during Operation 1027, where opponents launched approximately 25,000 drone munitions. Post-2023 losses prompted of advanced drone components, including EU-sourced technology integrated into systems, to conduct precision strikes and against ethnic armed groups. This shift marked a departure from traditional reliance on manned , enabling the junta to counter drone swarms on remote outposts and regain some battlefield initiative by mid-2024. Combined with artillery barrages, these measures formed the core of the junta's defensive strategy, though they failed to fully reverse alliance gains in contested border regions.

Territorial and Control Outcomes

Captured Positions and Administrative Takeovers

The and allied forces captured over 180 junta military outposts and bases in northern within weeks of Operation 1027's launch on October 27, 2023, including key positions along the China-Myanmar border such as the Kyin-San-Kyawt crossing. Initial advances secured towns like on the first day, followed by Monekoe, Theinni, and Kunlong townships by early November 2023, disrupting junta supply lines and border trade routes. By January 2024, the (MNDAA) had fully seized , the administrative center of the , after encircling and overrunning junta defenses in a multi-month battle that yielded hundreds of surrendered troops and seized weaponry. The (TNLA) and Shan State Army-North (SSA-N) similarly overran multiple townships, contributing to the loss of junta control over approximately 24 towns across 17 townships in northern by mid-2024. In captured territories, resistance groups rapidly implemented administrative structures to replace junta governance. The MNDAA annulled all junta administrative orders on January 19, 2024, restoring the and extending its Special Region 1 designation to include newly seized areas like by August 2024, with measures such as entry restrictions and economic integration efforts to stabilize local control. The TNLA consolidated authority in over 11 , announcing town-level administrations in September 2024 focused on military-civilian cooperation and planning for an interim revolutionary government, while contending with SSA-N over shared areas like Namkham . These takeovers emphasized local ethnic , scam center dismantlement, and basic services resumption, though inter-group rivalries complicated unified administration.

Subsequent Losses and Junta Recaptures

Following the initial successes of Operation 1027, resistance forces in northern Shan State suffered territorial losses as the Myanmar junta intensified counteroffensives, leveraging superior air power through relentless airstrikes and helicopter gunship attacks to support ground troops. In July 2025, junta forces recaptured Naunghkio, a town in northern Shan State previously occupied by resistance groups during the offensive's expansion phase. By early October 2025, after a 21-day ground and air operation, the junta retook Kyaukme, a critical town on the China-Myanmar border trade route that the (TNLA) had captured on August 5, 2024, during Phase 2 of the operation; clearance operations extended within a five-mile radius to secure the area. On October 17, 2025, junta troops announced the full recapture of Hsipaw, another key northern Shan town on a vital corridor, wresting it back from TNLA control amid heavy fighting. These gains formed part of a limited junta recovery effort, with reports indicating seven towns recaptured nationwide by mid-2024—some facilitated by direct Chinese diplomatic and logistical support—though overall territorial reclamation remained minimal, amounting to less than 1% of areas lost since October 2023. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army's (MNDAA) ceasefire agreement with the junta, finalized on January 20, 2025, in , , further enabled junta advances in regions, contributing to resistance setbacks along the border.

Civilian and Humanitarian Consequences

Impacts on Local Populations in

The launch of Operation 1027 on October 27, 2023, by the Brotherhood Alliance in northern triggered immediate displacement among local populations, with approximately 50,000 to 60,000 residents fleeing intense ground clashes and artillery exchanges between resistance forces and junta troops. Many sought temporary refuge across the border in or in safer inland areas, facing challenges with food, shelter, and medical access amid disrupted supply lines. Junta countermeasures, including airstrikes and use, inflicted direct harm on civilians, as evidenced by an attack in Namkham Township on December 1–2, 2023, which killed one resident and injured five others while damaging homes. These operations, aimed at halting resistance advances, often struck populated areas, contributing to broader civilian casualties in the region, though precise Shan-specific tallies remain limited due to restricted reporting access. Renewed fighting in 2024, including Phase 2 offensives around and other townships, displaced tens of thousands more, compounding pre-existing vulnerabilities among Shan, Palaung, and communities. losses, such as the destruction of a bridge on the Lashio-Kunlong highway, severed vital transport routes, impeding aid delivery and daily commerce for remaining residents. Local populations experienced heightened food insecurity and health risks, with inter-ethnic frictions emerging as control shifted to non-Shan-led groups like the .

Displacement, Casualties, and Infrastructure Damage

The launch of Operation 1027 in northern on October 27, 2023, triggered significant population displacement, with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reporting approximately 50,000 displaced in the area since late October due to intensified fighting between the and junta forces. Independent estimates from humanitarian monitors indicated nearly 100,000 displacements specifically within by mid-December 2023, as clashes expanded and junta airstrikes targeted civilian areas. Subsequent phases of the offensive, including renewed attacks in 2024, exacerbated outflows, contributing to broader humanitarian strains along border regions with , though precise updated figures remain limited due to access restrictions. Civilian casualties mounted rapidly, predominantly from junta artillery shelling and aerial bombardments in response to resistance advances, with monitors documenting nearly 100 civilian deaths from shelling alone during the first month of operations. In November 2023, recorded 60 civilian fatalities and 44 injuries directly linked to the offensive, reflecting indiscriminate junta tactics amid territorial losses. highlighted unlawful killings, arbitrary detentions, and by junta forces targeting suspected resistance sympathizers, urging investigations into potential war crimes, though resistance groups were also accused of abuses in isolated incidents. Military casualties were substantial on the junta side, with resistance claims of hundreds of soldiers killed in early captures of outposts, corroborated indirectly by reports of over 180 junta positions lost by December 2023, though independent verification is scarce and both parties underreport their own losses. Infrastructure suffered targeted destruction by resistance forces to hinder junta reinforcements and logistics, including bridges along key trade roads connecting to , which disrupted overland commerce and isolated junta garrisons. Junta counteroffensives inflicted further damage, with and airstrikes leveling over 300 buildings in villages and towns along trade highways in affected townships, compounding hardships through destroyed homes and disrupted local economies. These actions halted critical supply lines, exacerbating and goods shortages in northern , though no widespread reports emerged of systematic power grid or utility failures specific to the operation.

Economic and Criminal Dimensions

Targeting and Dismantling Scam Operations

The , comprising the (MNDAA), , and , launched Operation 1027 on October 27, 2023, with an explicit objective to eradicate telecom fraud operations, scam compounds, and their criminal patrons across Myanmar, particularly along the China-Myanmar border. These cyber-scam centers, concentrated in the and especially , functioned as vast criminal enterprises run predominantly by Chinese syndicates, involving , forced labor, and scams such as investment and "pig butchering" schemes that defrauded victims globally, including billions in losses to Chinese nationals. The syndicates operated under the protection of the Kokang Border Guard Force, a pro-junta led by figures like Peng Deren, who profited from renting facilities, providing security, and facilitating logistics for the scams. Alliance forces, led by the MNDAA in , integrated the dismantling of these operations into their military advances, viewing the scam networks as intertwined with junta-aligned militias controlling key border towns. During the offensive's initial phase, chaos in from November 2023 onward enabled some trafficked victims to escape compounds amid fighting, with reports of individual cases like forced laborers fleeing during skirmishes. By early January 2024, MNDAA forces captured after junta troops surrendered over 2,000 soldiers on , allowing systematic raids on scam facilities; this led to the shutdown of multiple compounds, seizure of equipment, and disruption of operations that had generated an estimated $14 billion annually in illicit revenue. Post-capture efforts resulted in the of over 40,000 individuals—primarily Chinese nationals as workers—to , facilitated by Beijing's coordination with the following the Haigeng Agreement ceasefire on January 12, 2024. Specific rescues included more than 500 Thai nationals freed from centers and returned home in the ensuing months. Key syndicate leaders, such as Ming Zhenzhen and Ming Guoping, were arrested and extradited to by November 16, 2023, with warrants issued for 10 additional figures by December 10, 2023, pressuring remaining networks to collapse or relocate. While these actions significantly curtailed s in northern , some operators shifted to regions like Karen State near the Thai border, perpetuating the industry despite the crackdown. The dismantling also exposed the economic dependency of local elites on revenues, contributing to broader disruptions in the region's illicit economy.

Disruptions to Trade and Regional Economies

The offensive launched on October 27, 2023, rapidly disrupted cross-border trade between Myanmar and China, particularly through the Chinshwehaw and Muse border gates in northern Shan State, which together handle approximately 91% of bilateral border commerce. Resistance forces captured Chinshwehaw on October 29, 2023, leading to an immediate cessation of trade activities at the gate, while intensified fighting around Muse prompted merchants to suspend operations, effectively halting daily cross-border flows valued at an average of US$8.91 million. These gates, positioned opposite towns in China's Yunnan Province, serve as critical conduits for exports like agricultural products, timber, and minerals from Shan State, alongside imports of consumer goods and machinery. The scale of the interruption compounded over subsequent months, with bilateral border trade volumes plummeting from US$640.43 million in April-May 2023 to US$416.867 million in the same period of 2024, reflecting a US$223.564 million decline attributable to blockades on the Mandalay-Lashio-Muse highway—a primary linking central to the Chinese border. Destruction of bridges and control of towns such as and Hsenwi by the further severed supply lines, exacerbating logistical breakdowns in an already fragile post-coup economy. While the junta retained nominal control over the Muse gate itself, ongoing skirmishes rendered it non-operational for extended periods, diverting to less efficient routes and inflating transportation costs. Regionally, northern Shan State's , reliant on border for livelihoods in trading, trucking, and small-scale processing industries, suffered acute setbacks, with local businesses reporting up to 50% losses amid stalled movement and heightened risks. The resource-extractive sectors, including and in and adjacent areas, faced indirect strains from disrupted export channels, contributing to broader scarcities of commodities and upward pressure on prices in downstream markets. Prolonged closures threatened merchandise shortages for essentials like fuel and foodstuffs, amplifying vulnerabilities in rural Shan communities dependent on these trade networks for income and supplies. These effects persisted into , underscoring the operation's role in undermining the junta's streams while imposing hardships on local populations caught in the .

Controversies and Internal Conflicts

Human Rights Allegations Against Resistance Groups

documented multiple instances of abductions and forced recruitment by the (MNDAA), a key participant in Operation 1027, targeting civilians in northern amid the offensive launched on October 27, 2023. On November 24, 2023, MNDAA forces abducted seven men aged 18 to 27 traveling from to Chin Shwe Haw, assigning them to frontline military duties, according to reports from local media and witnesses. Similar detentions occurred on November 25 near Par Hsin Kyaw, where young men on motorcycles were seized for , as recounted by a local doctor who treated victims. In late October 2023, seven Ta'ang ethnic men were taken from Man Khite village in Namhsan township, with families reporting the abductions in a December 12 public letter. These actions extended to broader seizures, including confiscation of mobile phones from displaced persons fleeing and arbitrary detentions of unknown numbers of civilians, exacerbating displacement in the conflict zone. reported accusations against Operation 1027 coalition members, including the MNDAA and (TNLA), for forced civilian recruitment during the campaign's early phases. By May 2024, the MNDAA faced further claims of conscripting approximately 1,000 migrant workers from compounds and executing deserters, deploying them against junta positions in . United Nations monitoring identified recruitment of child soldiers by ethnic armed groups in Myanmar, with up to seven children enlisted or abducted by MNDAA forces in 2023, including enforcement of recruitment quotas that encompassed minors as young as 15, as evidenced by a December 5 video of an MNDAA official. The U.S. State Department's 2023 human rights report noted physical abuses by some opposition forces, including those aligned with the resistance, though emphasizing the junta's predominant role in violations. In April 2024, Amnesty documented extrajudicial executions by the MNDAA of its own personnel in northern Shan State, amid internal disciplinary actions. Reports from local organizations and witnesses highlighted over 100 young people arrested by MNDAA for enlistment in the post-October 2023 period, contributing to civilian fears despite the groups' anti-junta objectives. While the scale of these abuses appears limited compared to junta atrocities, they underscore accountability challenges for non-state actors in Myanmar's civil war, with calls from for influential governments to press armed groups to cease such practices.

Inter-Ethnic Tensions and Alliance Fractures

Despite initial coordination among the (3BA)—comprising the (MNDAA), (TNLA), and (AA)—and allied groups like the Shan State Army-North (SSA-North), Operation 1027 revealed underlying ethnic divisions exacerbated by competition over captured territories in northern . The , dominated by ethnic , prioritized control of key towns like after its capture on August 3, 2024, leading to friction with Shan-majority groups such as the SSA-North, which claimed historical rights to the region. Tensions escalated into direct clashes between the MNDAA and SSA-North as early as , 2024, when MNDAA forces bombed an SSA-North near Panna village in Hse-O , stemming from disputes over territorial boundaries and administrative authority in areas seized during the operation. These incidents intensified following the fall of , with sporadic fighting reported in July 2024 that displaced residents and turned parts of the city into a near-ghost , as MNDAA troops clashed not only with junta remnants but also with SSA-North units contesting control. By mid-2025, such fractures prompted the MNDAA to announce a retreat from and nearby Hsipaw by late April, amid pressure from and unresolved rivalries with Shan allies, highlighting the alliance's fragility in post-capture governance. Parallel strains emerged between the TNLA and MNDAA over administrative roles in northern territories captured post-October 2023, where TNLA efforts to establish governance faced pushback from MNDAA dominance and local ethnic rivalries, fostering a "conqueror-owns" mentality that undermined joint control. The broader Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC), encompassing these groups, grappled with escalating territorial disputes by July 2025, compounded by external influences like China's preferential dealings with MNDAA, which alienated non-Chinese ethnic factions and eroded operational unity. These fractures, rooted in ethnic claims rather than shared anti-junta goals, limited the alliance's ability to consolidate gains beyond initial offensives.

International Dimensions

China's Mediatory and Supportive Roles

China initially tolerated the launch of Operation 1027 in October 2023, as the Three Brotherhood Alliance's offensive targeted cyber-scam operations along the border that had defrauded Chinese citizens of billions, aligning with Beijing's interest in curbing . This tacit endorsement facilitated early rebel gains, including the capture of by the (MNDAA) in January 2024, which disrupted scam compounds but also threatened border stability. As rebel advances risked broader instability affecting China's economic investments and projects, Beijing shifted to mediation, facilitating talks in December 2023 between the junta and the , resulting in a temporary to protect and residents. In January 2024, brokered a formal truce in between the junta and the , committing both sides to halt hostilities along the northern and resume cross-border commerce. This agreement, however, proved fragile, collapsing amid renewed fighting, prompting to apply coercive pressure on the MNDAA and other groups to cease offensives toward and other strategic sites. By early 2025, 's mediatory role intensified, with securing another in January between the junta and MNDAA after seven rounds of talks, enabling trade resumption and rebel preparations to hand back captured areas like . Concurrently, increased to the junta, including equipment to counter drone attacks during the operation, reflecting a supportive tilt to prevent and safeguard 's geopolitical interests over ethnic autonomy. This dual approach—initial operational tolerance followed by assertive diplomacy and junta bolstering—underscored 's prioritization of border security and economic continuity amid Myanmar's .

Involvement of Neighboring States and Global Powers

played a pivotal role in the dynamics surrounding Operation 1027, initially providing tacit approval for the offensive launched by the on October 27, 2023, primarily to eradicate online scam syndicates in northern that had defrauded Chinese citizens of an estimated $40 billion annually through cross-border fraud operations. This stance marked a shift from Beijing's prior tolerance of the junta, as the scam centers, often protected by junta-aligned militias, threatened 's internal security and economic interests. However, as resistance forces advanced beyond initial targets, capturing towns like by January 2024, reversed course, brokering ceasefires—such as the January 2024 agreement between the (MNDAA) and the junta—and pressuring ethnic armed organizations to consolidate holdings rather than pursue further incursions that could destabilize border trade routes and infrastructure projects like oil and gas pipelines. Other neighboring states adopted more passive stances focused on border security and humanitarian fallout. , sharing a 2,400-kilometer with , hosted influxes of over 10,000 refugees from clashes by late 2023 and facilitated ASEAN-level discussions on , though it avoided direct intervention amid concerns over disrupted and potential spillover of armed groups. , bordering western peripherally to the operation's theater, monitored developments through bilateral channels and participated in regional consultations, emphasizing stability for its own northeastern insurgencies and investments, but refrained from engagement. , with a shorter eastern adjacency, expressed similar apprehensions via ASEAN frameworks but maintained minimal public involvement, prioritizing junta relations to advance its own economic ties. Among global powers, bolstered the Myanmar junta's defenses against Operation 1027 by increasing arms deliveries, including MiG-29 jets and helicopter gunships valued at over $100 million since the 2021 coup, enabling aerial counteroffensives that inflicted casualties on resistance positions in . The , in contrast, provided non-lethal support to pro-democracy elements through sanctions totaling $1.7 billion in frozen assets against junta entities by 2024 and diplomatic backing for the , but offered no direct military aid to Operation 1027 participants, viewing the offensive as an organic escalation in the broader anti-junta resistance. These divergent engagements underscored a lack of unified international pressure, with Western powers prioritizing isolation of the junta while pursued opportunistic military exports.

Assessments and Implications

Military Achievements and Strategic Gains

Operation 1027, launched on October 27, 2023, by the —comprising the , , and —achieved rapid territorial advances in northern , capturing over 130 military outposts and strategic bases within the initial weeks of the offensive. This included the seizure of key border towns such as by January 5, 2024, following intense fighting that resulted in over 4,000 junta troops surrendering, including high-ranking officers. The operation prompted widespread defections, with estimates of more than 6,000 junta personnel surrendering across fronts linked to the campaign by mid-2024. Subsequent phases extended these gains, with resistance forces capturing on August 3, 2024, marking the first fall of a junta regional command headquarters and involving the surrender of 4,783 troops, including a major general and two brigadier generals. Dozens of towns in northern and adjacent areas fell to the alliance, forcing the junta into a defensive posture and disrupting its supply lines. These military successes also captured advanced equipment and hundreds of junta casualties, bolstering resistance capabilities. Strategically, the operation secured control over critical border regions with , blocking junta access to northern and establishing secure supply routes for further advances into central , including toward . It fostered unprecedented coordination among ethnic armed organizations and people's defense forces, reshaping the civil war dynamics by confining the junta to urban enclaves and diminishing its territorial dominance. The gains elevated the alliance's influence, providing a launchpad for offensives in Rakhine, Kachin, and other states, while exposing junta vulnerabilities through mass surrenders and eroded morale.

Criticisms, Failures, and Long-Term Challenges

Despite initial territorial gains, Operation 1027 has faced criticism for its limited success in eradicating cyber scam operations, with many centers relocating rather than being dismantled, allowing fraudulent activities to persist in adjacent regions under shifting control. Analysts note that while the offensive targeted junta-linked scam hubs in northern , the underlying economic incentives and cross-border networks sustained by ethnic armed organizations have hindered comprehensive elimination, prompting accusations of to justify military expansion rather than genuine reform. The operation's reliance on rapid advances exposed logistical vulnerabilities, including ammunition shortages and overstretched supply lines, which stalled momentum by early as resistance forces struggled to consolidate control over captured areas exceeding 220 military posts by November 2023. Junta counteroffensives, bolstered by intensified airstrikes and conscription drives, recaptured key positions in Shan and Rakhine States, inflicting heavy casualties on alliance troops and underscoring failures in inter-group coordination that allowed the military to exploit divisions. Long-term challenges include deepening fragmentation among resistance factions, where competing ethnic agendas and resource disputes have undermined unified strategy, as evidenced by ceasefire violations in Phase 2 of the operation starting June 2024, which eroded external support from mediators like . The absence of robust structures in seized territories has fueled local discontent over service provision and , risking alienation of civilian populations essential for sustained legitimacy. External pressures compound these issues, with China's dual role in brokering fragile truces while prioritizing border stability has constrained alliance offensives, potentially forcing concessions that preserve junta remnants and prolong the civil war's . Without addressing internal rivalries and building administrative capacity, the operation's gains remain precarious against the junta's adaptive resilience, including air superiority and elite unit redeployments, limiting prospects for decisive overthrow.

Broader Effects on Myanmar's Civil War Trajectory

Operation 1027, initiated on October 27, 2023, by the , disrupted the post-2021 coup stalemate in Myanmar's by enabling coordinated seizures of over 300 junta positions in northern within weeks, including key towns like and , thereby eroding the military's perceived invincibility and prompting mass defections among regime forces. This offensive catalyzed unprecedented synchronization among ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and People's Defense Forces (PDFs), fostering multi-front campaigns that expanded resistance gains to Rakhine, Kachin, and regions by mid-2024, with anti-junta forces controlling approximately 60% of Myanmar's territory by early 2025. The operation accelerated the junta's territorial contraction, reducing its effective control to core urban centers and select border areas, as evidenced by the loss of six out of eight border gates with and strategic trade hubs like by May 2024, which strained regime finances reliant on illicit economies such as online scams and resource extraction. However, the (SAC) countered with intensified aerial bombardments—deploying over 1,000 airstrikes in 2024 alone—and external support, reclaiming pockets in by late 2024, indicating a shift toward that prolonged the conflict rather than resolving it decisively. Longer-term, Operation 1027 has tilted the war's trajectory toward fragmented ethnic autonomies over centralized collapse, as EAOs prioritize homeland reclamation amid uneven inter-group cooperation, with tensions persisting between alliances like the Brotherhood and non-aligned forces, potentially hindering unified governance post-junta. While resistance advances have drawn limited Western volunteer involvement and public donations, sustaining offensives into 2025, the absence of comprehensive international intervention—coupled with China's stabilization efforts—suggests a protracted , where junta resilience in air superiority and urban strongholds could enforce a partition, complicating prospects for national reconciliation.

References

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