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Hexis (Ancient Greek: ἕξις) is a relatively stable arrangement or disposition, for example a person's health or knowledge or character. It is an Ancient Greek word, important in the philosophy of Aristotle, and because of this it has become a traditional word of philosophy. It stems from a verb related to possession or "having", and Jacob Klein, for example, translates it as "possession". In modern texts it is translated occasionally as "state" (e.g., H. Rackham), but more typically as "disposition".

General description

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Joe Sachs translates it as "active condition", in order to make sure that hexis is not confused with passive conditions of the soul, such as feelings and impulses or mere capacities that belong to us by nature. Sachs points to Aristotle's own distinction, explained for example in Categories 8b, which distinguishes the word diathesis, normally uncontroversially translated as disposition. In this passage, diathesis only applies to passive and shallow dispositions that are easy to remove and change, such as being hot or cold, while hexis is reserved for deeper and more active dispositions, such as properly getting to know something in a way that it will not be easily forgotten. Another common example of a human hexis in Aristotle is health (hugieia, or sometimes eu(h)exia, in Greek) and in cases where hexis is discussed in the context of health, it is sometimes translated as "constitution".

Humans

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Apart from needing to be relatively stable or permanent, in contexts concerning humans (such as knowledge, health, and good character) hexis is also generally understood to be contrasted from other dispositions, conditions and habits, by being "acquired" by some sort of training or other habituation.[1]

According to Plotinus, virtue is a hexis of the soul that is not primarily related to praxis and habituation; hexis is a quality of being in an active state of possession that intellectualizes the soul in permanent contemplation of the intelligible world (Enn. VI.8.5.3–37).[2]

Other uses also occur, for example it is sometimes translated as "habit", based upon the classical translation from Greek to Latin "habitus", which also comes from a verb indicating having.

The Latin term is also used in English and as a result "habitus" is for example also a term used in sociology.

Aristotle

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Being in a truly fixed state, as opposed to being stable, is not implied in the original Aristotelian usage of this word.[3] He uses the example of "health" being a hexis.

"Having" (hexis) means (a) In one sense an activity (energeia), as it were, of the haver and the thing had, or as in the case of an action (praxis) or motion; for when one thing makes and another is made, there is between them an act of making. In this way between the man who has a garment and the garment which is had, there is a "having (hexis)." Clearly, then, it is impossible to have a "having" (hexis) in this sense; for there will be an infinite series if we can have the having of what we have. But (b) there is another sense of "having" which means a disposition (diathesis), in virtue of which (kath' ho) the thing which is disposed is disposed well or badly, and either independently or in relation to something else. E.g., health is a state (hexis), since it is a disposition of the kind described. Further, any part of such a disposition is called a state (hexis); and hence the excellence (arete) of the parts is a kind of state (hexis).

— Aristot. Met. 5.1022b[4]

So according to Aristotle, a "hexis" is a type of "disposition" (diathesis) which he in turn describes in the same as follows...

"Disposition" means arrangement (taxis) of that which has parts, either in space (topos) or in potentiality (dunamis) or in form (eidos). It must be a kind of position (thesis), as indeed is clear from the word, "disposition" (diathesis).

— Aristot. Met. 5.1022b[5]

And specifically it is the type of disposition "in virtue of which (kath' ho) the thing which is disposed is disposed well or badly, and either independently or in relation to something else".

The wording "in virtue of which" was also described in the same passage...

"That in virtue of which" has various meanings. (a) The form or essence of each individual thing; e.g., that in virtue of which a man is good is "goodness itself." (b) The immediate substrate in which a thing is naturally produced; as, e.g., color is produced in the surface of things. Thus "that in virtue of which" in the primary sense is the form, and in the secondary sense, as it were, the matter of each thing, and the immediate substrate. And in general "that in virtue of which" will exist in the same number of senses as "cause." For we say indifferently "in virtue of what has he come?" or "for what reason has he come?" and "in virtue of what has he inferred or inferred falsely?" or "what is the cause of his inference or false inference?" (And further, there is the positional sense of kath' ho, "in which he stands," or "in which he walks"; all these examples denote place or position).

— Aristot. Met. 5.1022a[6]

In Aristotle then, a hexis is an arrangement of parts such that the arrangement might have excellence, being well arranged, or in contrast, might be badly arranged. Also see Aristotle's Categories viii[7] where a hexis ("habit" in the translation of Edghill) is contrasted with a disposition (diathesis) in terms of it being more permanent and less easy to change. The example given is "knowledge" (epistemē).

In perhaps the most important case, Aristotle contrasted hexis with energeia (in the sense of activity or operation) at Nicomachean Ethics I.viii.1098b33 and Eudemian Ethics II.i.1218b. The subject here was eudaimonia, the proper aim of human life, often translated as "happiness" and hexis is contrasted with energeia (ἐνέργεια) in order to show the correctness of a proposed definition of eudaimonia - "activity (ἐνέργεια) in conformity with virtue"

Now with those who pronounce happiness to be virtue, or some particular virtue, our definition is in agreement; for ‘activity (ἐνέργεια) in conformity with virtue’ (aretē) involves virtue. But no doubt it makes a great difference whether we conceive the Supreme Good to depend on possessing virtue or on displaying it—on disposition (ἕξις), or on the manifestation of a disposition in action. For a man may possess the disposition without its producing any good result, as for instance when he is asleep, or has ceased to function from some other cause; but virtue in active exercise cannot be inoperative—it will of necessity act (praxis), and act well (eu praxei). And just as at the Olympic games the wreaths of victory are not bestowed upon the handsomest and strongest persons present, but on men who enter for the competitions—since it is among these that the winners are found,—so it is those who act rightly who carry off the prizes and good things of life.

— Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1098b[8]

Happiness

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Happiness then, is an energeia, but virtue of character (often translated as "moral virtue") is made up of hexeis. Happiness is said to deserve honoring like the divine if it be actually achieved, while virtue of character, being only a potential achievement, deserves praise but is lower.[9]

New Testament

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14 But strong meat belongeth to them that are of full age, even those who by reason of use(1838) have their senses exercised to discern both good and evil.

— Hebrews 5:14 (KJV)

...and defined in the Strong's concordance...[10]

1838 ἕξις [hexis /hex·is/] n f. From 2192; GK 2011; AV translates as “use” once. 1 a habit whether of body or mind. 2 a power acquired by custom, practice, use.

References

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Bibliography

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Hexis

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Hexis (: ἕξις, héxis) is a philosophical denoting a stable , state, or condition of possession, particularly referring to a habitual arrangement of the , body, or character that influences actions, feelings, and choices. In Aristotle's ethical philosophy, as outlined in the , hexis serves as the foundational term for understanding moral , defining it as an active, enduring state (hexis) of character acquired through repeated practice and rather than innate talent or . This enables individuals to consistently choose and perform actions that align with reason, achieving a balanced mean between excess and deficiency in emotions and behaviors, such as as the mean between rashness and . Unlike mere (epistēmē), which can be possessed without application, a virtuous hexis actively integrates rational with affective responses, ensuring that virtues like or temperance are not just understood but reliably enacted in varying circumstances. Aristotle emphasizes that hexeis develop from early habituation, where repeated actions shape the non-rational parts of the to conform to rational principles, ultimately contributing to (human flourishing) as the highest good. Vices, conversely, represent corrupt hexeis, such as intemperance, which distort this equilibrium and lead to habitual wrongdoing. This framework distinguishes from intellectualist traditions, highlighting the causal role of hexis in by actively guiding choices toward the good. Beyond ethics, the term appears in Aristotle's broader works, such as physics and , to describe stable conditions like bodily health or natural capacities. The concept of hexis later influenced , appears in the , and extends to modern interpretations in and , notably as habitus in , underscoring its versatility in denoting controlled, dispositional states.

Etymology and Definition

Etymology

The Greek term hexis (ἕξις) is derived from the verb echein (ἔχειν), meaning "to have," "to hold," or "to possess," with the noun form indicating a state of having or possession. This etymological root reflects an active sense of maintaining or being in a particular condition, evolving from concrete physical notions to more abstract dispositions over time. The earliest attested uses of hexis appear in 5th-century BCE Greek literature, where it denotes a physical state or condition, particularly of the body. It entered medical discourse in the Hippocratic Corpus, referring to bodily conditions, habits, or customary patterns of physical state, as in discussions of health, posture, and physiological dispositions in texts like On Regimen. These early applications highlight its primary association with tangible, corporeal states rather than abstract qualities. The term also appears in Herodotus' Histories, denoting stable states or conditions. In classical of the 5th and 4th centuries BCE, hexis begins to appear in philosophical contexts, with preliminary mentions in Plato's dialogues indicating a state of possession or stable condition, often linked to the body or . The Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-English Lexicon defines it fundamentally as "state, condition, especially of body," citing examples from , Hippocratic texts, and later authors to illustrate this evolution from prose to philosophical usage. This linguistic development, spanning from 5th-century BCE medical and historical prose to 4th-century BCE philosophical refinement, laid the groundwork for more technical applications in later thought.

Core Meaning and Distinctions

In , particularly in the , hexis (ἕξις) refers to a stable, active or "having" that represents a maintained state of being, enabling the potential for activity without being either a transient passion () or a fully actualized exercise (energeia). This emphasizes a dynamic equilibrium in which the subject actively sustains the disposition, such as through ongoing choice or arrangement, distinguishing it as a principle of continuity rather than mere potentiality or completion. Key distinctions clarify hexis within Aristotle's framework: unlike diathesis (διάθεσις), which denotes a temporary or passive arrangement easily altered or removed (e.g., a fleeting state like temporary coldness), hexis is enduring and actively held, requiring effort to maintain its stability. In contrast to energeia (ἐνέργεια), the actual "being-at-work" or realization of an action, hexis serves as the preparatory condition that makes such activity possible, without itself being the exercise. Compared to (πάθος), which involves momentary, passive affections or impulses like or desire that occur without deliberate control, hexis is a settled, self-sustaining state that overcomes such transience through . Additionally, the Latin habitus—often rendered in English as ""—misrepresents hexis by implying mere passive acquisition, whereas the term inherently conveys an active, causal role in sustaining the disposition. Non-ethical examples illustrate hexis beyond moral contexts: bodily health (eugieia, εὐεξία) exemplifies a well-arranged physical state that is actively maintained to enable vital functions, not a static possession but a prone to disruption if neglected. Similarly, functions as a hexis in the realm, representing a dispositional "holding" of truths or skills that requires active retention and application, rather than passive storage. Translation challenges persist due to the term's nuanced dynamism; while traditional renderings like "" or "state" suggest inertness, alternatives such as ' "active condition" better capture its requirement for ongoing agency, aligning with 's emphasis on hexis as a vital, self-perpetuating .

Aristotelian Philosophy

Hexis in Metaphysics and Categories

In Aristotle's Categories (chapter 8), hexis (ἕξις) is categorized as a specific kind of , defined as a stable or (hexis) that differs from more transient states. It represents a lasting in a subject, such as the possession of or virtues, which is difficult to alter without significant disruption, like a severe illness affecting . Unlike diathesis (διάθεσις), which denotes a temporary or easily changeable —exemplified by fleeting conditions like , , sickness, or recovery—hexis implies permanence and firmness, allowing qualities to endure over time unless forcibly removed. illustrates this with examples where a person is said to "have" a inherently, such as being just or healthy, emphasizing hexis as a relatively fixed state within the category of . In Metaphysics (Book V, chapter 20, 1022b1–15), defines hexis ("having" or "") as (1) a kind of activity between the haver and what is had, like having a garment; (2) a according to which that which is disposed is either well or ill disposed, either in itself or with reference to something else (e.g., is such a ); (3) a portion of such a , such that even the excellence of the parts is a of the whole. This sense of hexis contrasts with ergon (ἔργον), or function, as it pertains to a static state of possession or holding rather than active operation; for instance, being armed is a hexis of having weapons, enabling readiness without ongoing activity, while wielding them constitutes the function. Similarly, possessing exemplifies a hexis that persists as a dispositional holding, disrupted only by forgetting or contrary conditions, underscoring its role in ontological stability. Within Aristotle's broader ontological framework, hexis occupies an intermediate position between potentiality (dynamis, δύναμις) and actuality (energeia, ἐνέργεια), functioning as a first actuality or second potentiality that prepares a subject for full realization without demanding continuous . This placement highlights hexis as a dispositional readiness, bridging mere capacity (e.g., the potential to know) and complete activity (e.g., active knowing), thus foundational to his categories of being and change.

Hexis in Nicomachean Ethics

In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, particularly in Book II, moral virtue (arete) is defined as a hexis, a stable state or disposition of the soul that concerns choice (prohairesis) and enables one to act and feel appropriately in matters of pleasure and pain. This hexis is not innate but arises through habituation (ethos), distinguishing it from natural capacities, as humans are predisposed by nature to acquire virtues but require repeated practice to perfect them. Aristotle emphasizes that moral virtues develop from performing the relevant actions consistently, such as becoming just through just acts or temperate through temperate ones, thereby transforming potentiality into an active, reasoned disposition. The formation of this hexis involves deliberate guided by reason, rather than mere repetition without reflection, as it cultivates a settled condition where one chooses the mean relative to circumstances. Unlike intellectual virtues, such as (sophia), which are primarily contemplative and acquired through and experience, moral hexeis are practical and pertain to the appetitive part of the soul, which obeys reason but involves and desires. Intellectual virtues focus on theoretical , whereas moral ones regulate to align with rational principles in everyday actions. A pivotal passage in Book II, Chapter 6 (1106a23–24), articulates this: "The virtues then are states [hexeis] concerned with , consisting in a , the relative to us, defined by reason and as a prudent man would define it." This definition underscores the hexis as an active, -oriented state that balances excess and deficiency, achieved not by alone but by habitual actions that habituate the to rational .

Ethical Applications

Virtues as Hexeis

In 's ethical framework, virtues are conceptualized as hexeis, which are stable dispositional states of character that enable individuals to consistently choose actions aligned with the mean relative to circumstances. These hexeis dispose the agent to act appropriately by avoiding extremes of excess and deficiency in emotions and actions, such as as the hexis that balances and between rashness and . Temperance, similarly, functions as a hexis moderating appetites for bodily pleasures, positioning it midway between insensibility and self-indulgence. Vices, in contrast, represent defective hexeis that distort this balance, leading to habitual deviations from rational . exemplifies a vice as a hexis characterized by excessive fear-avoidance, rendering the agent prone to shunning necessary risks, while intemperance manifests as a hexis of unrestrained in desires, undermining . Such defective states arise from repeated actions that reinforce imbalance, contrasting with the virtuous hexeis that foster equilibrium. The acquisition of virtuous hexeis occurs through , a process guided by , or practical wisdom, which discerns the appropriate mean in particular situations. emphasizes that individuals, especially children, develop these dispositions via repetitive practice under societal and parental guidance, as "we become just by doing just acts" and similarly for other virtues. integrates intellectual insight with habitual training, ensuring that hexeis evolve into reliable capacities for ethical action. Specific virtues illustrate this doctrine: justice operates as a hexis concerned with fair distribution and rectification, maintaining equity between overreach and undue deprivation in social exchanges. Generosity, as another example, constitutes a hexis of balanced giving and receiving of wealth, avoiding the extremes of prodigality and stinginess to promote harmonious relations. These hexeis, when fully formed, contribute to the agent's overall ethical excellence.

Relation to Happiness

In Aristotle's ethical framework, , or happiness, is understood as the activity (energeia) of the in accordance with complete , rather than the mere possession of a virtuous disposition (hexis) itself. This definition emerges in the , where argues that the human good consists in "activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete." Such activity must span a complete life to achieve fulfillment, emphasizing dynamic exercise over static state. The hexis serves as an essential prerequisite for this eudaimonic activity, providing the stable disposition that enables consistent and excellent rational functioning of the . Without a well-habituated hexis, virtuous actions remain sporadic or accidental, rendering happiness incomplete or unreliable, as the capacity for sustained excellence depends on ingrained character traits. Aristotle underscores that virtues as hexeis equip individuals to perform activities aligned with reason, ensuring that is not fleeting but a patterned realization of . This relation draws on a divine , portraying ultimate as a godlike activity of rational (theoria), for which the hexis of intellectual virtue forms the foundational base. In the , posits that the gods' supreme blessedness lies in contemplative activity, and human most closely approximates this when the rational soul, stabilized by hexis, engages in uninterrupted theoretical pursuit. Such represents the highest form of , self-sufficient and continuous, transcending lesser pursuits. Aristotle critiques alternative conceptions of , such as those equating it with mere or honor, arguing that these fail to capture true actualization through virtuous hexeis. , often seen by the masses as the good, is dismissed as a suitable to beasts rather than a for rational beings, while honor depends on external opinions and thus lacks intrinsic stability. In contrast, arises from the actualization of one's nature via hexis-guided activity, integrating ethical and intellectual virtues into a cohesive life of excellence.

Later Developments

In Neoplatonism

In Neoplatonism, Plotinus adapts the Aristotelian concept of hexis as a stable disposition, transforming it into an active intellectual state of the soul that facilitates its ascent toward the divine. Drawing from Aristotle's ethical framework, Plotinus reinterprets hexis not merely as a habituated quality but as a dynamic possession enabling the soul to contemplate the eternal Forms and achieve likeness to the divine Intellect (Nous). In the Enneads, virtue is defined as such a hexis of the soul, where purification through contemplative practice detaches it from bodily attachments, allowing assimilation to the higher principles of reality. This adaptation is elaborated in I.2, where describes virtues as stable dispositions (hexeis) that purify the soul, progressively ordering its faculties from the lower, appetitive levels to the higher, rational ones. The four —, , temperance, and —function as instruments of this purification, stripping away material influences to reveal the soul's innate affinity with the divine. Unlike Aristotle's emphasis on practical moral training, distinguishes lower "civic" virtues, which regulate social life and bodily passions, from higher "purificatory" and "contemplative" hexeis, which elevate the soul to intellectual unity with the One, the ultimate source of all being. This underscores hexis as an active holding of intelligible truths, fostering the soul's inner and beyond mere ethical moderation. Central to Plotinus' metaphysics, hexis plays a pivotal role in the soul's return (epistrophē) to the intelligible realm, transcending Aristotelian habituation by enabling a mystical reversion to its origin in the One. Through virtuous hexeis, the soul not only contemplates but participates in the divine, achieving a state of perpetual intellectual activity that restores its primordial unity and beauty. This process of epistrophē via hexis marks Neoplatonism's shift toward a contemplative ethics, where virtue culminates in the soul's deification rather than civic flourishing.

In the New Testament

The term hexis (ἕξις) appears only once in the Greek , in 5:14, where it describes the process through which spiritual maturity is achieved. The verse states: "But solid food is for the mature [teleioi], who because of [dia] hexis have their senses trained to discern " (Hebrews 5:14, NASB). Here, hexis denotes a habitual state or acquired through repeated practice, emphasizing not isolated acts but a cultivated readiness of the mind and senses for moral and spiritual discernment. In the broader context of Hebrews 5:11-13, the author contrasts spiritual immaturity—likened to those who require "" and remain unskilled in the word of —with maturity attained via hexis. This immaturity is portrayed as a failure to progress beyond basic teachings, leading to dull hearing and an inability to teach others. Through hexis, believers develop trained senses (aistheteria gegymnasmena), enabling them to distinguish between , which aligns with the epistle's theme of advancing toward (teleiotes) in and obedience. Theologically, this usage links hexis to , not as sinless flawlessness but as a habitual orientation toward , fostered by consistent engagement with Scripture and , ultimately supporting endurance in trials and priestly service. English translations render hexis variably to capture its nuance of habitual practice. The King James Version (KJV) translates it as "use," yielding: "even those who by reason of use have their senses exercised to discern both good and evil." The English Standard Version (ESV) uses "constant practice": "for those who have their powers of discernment trained by constant practice to distinguish good from evil." The New American Standard Bible (NASB) opts for "practice": "who because of practice have their senses trained to discern good and evil." These choices highlight hexis as an active, ongoing formation rather than mere possession, drawing from its classical Greek sense of acquired habit but applying it to spiritual growth.

Modern Interpretations

Influence on Psychological Concepts

In , the Aristotelian of hexis—an acquired disposition toward action—serves as a precursor to understandings of and skilled performance, where repeated practice builds stable behavioral patterns that enhance efficiency without fully eliminating conscious oversight. This aligns with research on expertise acquisition, as in Anders Ericsson's framework of deliberate practice, which emphasizes structured repetition to develop dispositional expertise, mirroring hexis as a cultivated state of readiness for goal-directed action. Ericsson's model posits that such practice transforms novice behaviors into fluid, expert-level execution through focused effort, much like Aristotle's view of hexis fostering reliable performance in skilled domains. The influence extends to early modern psychology through , whose (1890) describes habits as enduring neural pathways formed by repetition, echoing hexis as a stable that automates responses while retaining adaptability. James argued that these pathways arise from associative learning, creating "plasticity" in the that predisposes individuals to consistent action, a notion traceable to Aristotelian habituation in ethical contexts. This conceptualization laid groundwork for viewing habits not merely as rote mechanisms but as foundational to character and behavioral consistency. In contemporary , Martin Seligman's work on character strengths portrays them as hexis-like dispositions that, when cultivated, promote through intentional practice and reflection. Seligman and Peterson's classification of 24 strengths, such as perseverance and authenticity, functions as stable traits acquired over time, akin to Aristotle's excellences of character that enable flourishing. These strengths are empirically linked to and resilience, emphasizing their role in fostering eudaimonic . A key distinction in modern approaches lies in their empirical measurement of habit formation, as exemplified by Charles Duhigg's habit loop model—comprising cue, routine, and reward—which prioritizes observable, mechanistic processes over Aristotle's teleological emphasis on purposeful ends. Duhigg's framework, drawn from , enables quantifiable interventions for habit change, contrasting with hexis's integration of rational aim toward the good. This shift highlights psychology's focus on testable mechanisms rather than normative ideals.

Habitus in Sociology

In the field of sociology, the concept of habitus was prominently developed by Pierre Bourdieu during the 1970s and 1990s as a system of internalized dispositions that unconsciously structure individuals' perceptions, appreciations, and actions within social practices. Bourdieu explicitly derived this notion from Aristotle's hexis, a state of acquired disposition for action, which was translated and elaborated as habitus by Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century to denote cultivated moral proficiencies that become second nature through repeated practice. He further infused it with Marxist elements, emphasizing how social class positions and power relations shape these dispositions to generate class-specific behaviors and worldviews. Central to Bourdieu's formulation in Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977) is the idea of habitus as an embodied, class-conditioned that produces practical —enabling agents to generate appropriate actions and responses without deliberate rule-following or explicit . These dispositions are durable yet adaptable, forged by an individual's history of social conditions and transposed across contexts to yield improvised yet patterned practices that align with objective social structures. Habitus thus operates below the level of , much like a , ensuring that actions appear spontaneous while reproducing the logic of the social field. In contrast to Aristotle's hexis, which focused on individually cultivated virtues through personal for ethical ends, Bourdieu's habitus is collectively produced by the material and symbolic conditions of social existence, integrating power asymmetries and the role of in maintaining dominance. This sociological reframing shifts emphasis from to how habitus mediates between , perpetuating inequality by embedding class-based inclinations that naturalize hierarchical relations. Bourdieu applied habitus to the in Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture (1970), arguing that it explains the reproduction of social inequalities by aligning students' embodied dispositions with the arbitrary yet dominant cultural norms imposed by schooling systems. Through this dispositional mismatch or harmony—such as working-class students' habitus clashing with middle-class academic expectations—educational institutions legitimize and reinforce class divisions without overt , as habitus makes the prevailing order seem inevitable.

References

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  22. https://biblehub.com/greek/1838.htm
  23. https://www.preceptaustin.org/hebrews_513-14
  24. https://www.studylight.org/commentary/hebrews/5-14.html
  25. https://biblehub.com/commentaries/hebrews/5-14.htm
  26. https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Hebrews%205%3A14&version=KJV
  27. https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Hebrews%205%3A14&version=ESV
  28. https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Hebrews%205%3A14&version=NASB
  29. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4217385/
  30. https://www.pdcnet.org/acpq/content/acpq_2022_0099_0001_0245_0270
  31. https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/human-neuroscience/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00522/full
  32. https://stpeter.im/writings/aristotle/positive-psychology.html
  33. https://loicwacquant.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/lw-2004-habitus-interencyecosoc.pdf
  34. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/outline-of-a-theory-of-practice/193A11572779B478F5BAA3E3028827D8
  35. https://books.google.com/books/about/Reproduction_in_Education_Society_and_Cu.html?id=TPp4o2EpTK8C
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