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Idaenam (Korean: 이대남; Hanja: 二代男),[1] abbreviated from Isipdaenamsung (20대 남성; 二十代男性; lit. man in his twenties), is a term used in South Korea to refer to men in their 20s. The term first emerged in the late 2010s to refer to men who have voting rights but recently it is often used to men with negative tendencies toward feminism.[2] Its political and social antonym is Idaenyo (이대녀; 二代女), abbreviated from Isipdaeyosung (20대 여성; 二十代女性; lit. woman in her twenties).[3][4]

Background

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At the end of 2018, the term Idaenam began to emerge after a poll rating the Moon Jae-In administration's first-year plunged. In particular, media began to pay attention to the large gender gap in a poll of 20s. Moon Jae In's approval rating among Korean men in their 20s fell below 30%. The figure is the lowest among all age groups, including the elderly with strong conservative tendencies. On the other hand, the approval rating of President Moon among women in their 20s was 63.5%, the highest among men and women by age group.[5]

In Han Gui Young's analysis examining the phenomenon of Idaenam, men in their 20s were the most conservative in subjective ideological orientation and evaluation of presidential performance.[6] The use of the word Idaenam exploded as the proportion of Oh Se-hoon's votes among men in their 20s exceeded 70% during the Seoul mayoral election of the 2021 by-elections.

Views

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Idaenam have a negative tendency toward feminism. They have been compared to "Angry Young Men" in Susan Faludi's 1991 book Backlash.[7] Idaenams are strongly opposed to misandry ('남성혐오' or '남혐').[8]

In 2021, a survey by National Human Rights Commission of Korea found that 70 percent of men in their twenties opposed affirmative action for women.[9] Many Idaenam believe that the gender quotas are discriminatory.[10] In addition, according to statistics from 2021, men in their twenties and thirties ("Idaenam") were less receptive to LGBT rights than men in their 40s and 50s ("386 Generation male"), but more than men above the age of sixty.[11]

Idaenam in South Korean politics

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Lee Jun-seok is one of the most representative Idaenam politicians of South Korea.

The Idaenam phenomenon often leads to political conservatism or populism (Including both left and right sides). The JoongAng Ilbo, a South Korean centre-right publication, reported that Lee Jun-seok, the then leader of the People Power Party, used anti-feminist investigations to win the votes of Idaenam.[12]

South Korea's liberal Moon Jae-in government implemented a more feminist policy than the previous conservative government, and men in their 20s had severe antipathy against it.[13] Yoon Suk-yeol of right-wing conservative People Power Party and Lee Jae-myung of liberal Democratic Party of Korea, who were the main candidates for the 2022 South Korean presidential election, took a negative attitude toward feminism to win the votes of Idaenam.[3]

Centrist conservative-liberal People Party's Ahn Cheol Soo criticized Yoon and Lee for promoting misogyny to pander to sexist Idaenam.[14][13][15][16]

In 2024, during the martial law crisis, the protests against Yoon invoking martial law were marked by a lack of turnout from young men.[17] Yoon was then impeached, and during the next presidential election held in 2025, the gender/age divisions persisted, as also Lee Jun-seok ran as a third-party, Reform Party candidate, and received a plurality (37.2%) of the votes of men aged 18-29, beating out People Power Party candidate Kim Moon-soo by a mere 0.3%. The support for Lee Jae-myung, who ran again and this time won the election, was once again the lowest amongst men aged 18-29, at just 24%; while people in their 40s and 50s, regardless of gender, again backed Lee Jae-Myung by about 70%.[18]

See also

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General:

References

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Idaenam

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from Grokipedia
Idaenam (Korean: 이대남), an abbreviation of isipdaenam (二十代男, "men in their twenties"), designates a cohort of young South Korean men who have coalesced around grievances related to perceived gender-based disadvantages, including mandatory exclusively for males, selective policies favoring women in and , and higher male rates. This demographic emerged prominently in the late , driven by empirical disparities such as South Korea's OECD-leading gender wage gap alongside policies that young men view as exacerbating their economic and social burdens. The idaenam phenomenon reflects a backlash against institutional feminism, with surveys indicating that men in this age group disproportionately report discrimination in areas like university admissions quotas and job opportunities reserved for women, contributing to delayed marriages and low birth rates. Politically, idaenam voters shifted en masse toward conservative candidates in the 2022 presidential election, propelling Yoon Suk-yeol to victory by a margin attributable in part to their support, as exit polls showed over 58% of men in their twenties backing him over his feminist-leaning opponent. Figures like Lee Jun-seok, former leader of the People Power Party, have capitalized on this sentiment by advocating reforms to address male-specific conscription and quota systems. Controversies surrounding idaenam include mainstream characterizations of their views as misogynistic, yet data underscores causal factors such as exemptions for women correlating with resentment, and academic sources note systemic biases in media portrayals that downplay male disadvantages in favor of narratives emphasizing . This group's online mobilization via platforms like and forums has amplified anti-feminist discourse, influencing broader cultural debates on gender equity without reliance on state-backed institutions often critiqued for ideological uniformity.

Definition and Origins

Etymology and Terminology

Idaenam (Korean: 이대남) is an of isipdae namseong (이십대 남성), literally translating to "men in their twenties" or "twenties males," referring to South Korean males aged approximately 20 to 29. The term parallels idaenyo (이대녀), an for isipdae yeoseong (이십대 여성), denoting women in the same age bracket, though idaenam has gained prominence in discussions of gender antagonism and political behavior. This linguistic shortening mirrors patterns in Korean internet slang, where generational cohorts are condensed for brevity in online forums and media. The emerged in the late amid rising online debates over roles, with initial usage traceable to around 2018 following surveys highlighting divergent views between young men and women on issues like employment quotas and . By 2021, it had entered mainstream political discourse, particularly during the 2022 , where it described a demographic bloc of young men voicing socioeconomic frustrations often framed as opposition to feminist policies. Usage proliferated on platforms like DC Inside and Ilbe, male-dominated communities, before spreading to broader media, though a 2022 survey by the Korea Press Foundation indicated that 71% of respondents perceived the term as negative, associating it with exacerbating generational and divides. In , idaenam is not strictly demographic but carries connotative weight, frequently invoked to explain electoral shifts, such as the 58% support for conservative candidate Yoon Suk-yeol among men in their 20s in March 2022 exit polls, contrasted with 34% among women in the same group. Critics argue the label oversimplifies diverse motivations, reducing complex grievances to stereotypes, while proponents view it as a neutral identifier for a cohort facing structural disadvantages like mandatory absent for women. No formal etymology exists beyond the phonetic abbreviation, distinguishing it from traditional Sino-Korean compounds.

Historical Emergence

The socio-political phenomenon associated with idaenam—referring to men in their twenties voicing grievances against perceived gender-based disadvantages—traces its roots to the early 2010s amid South Korea's expanding digital landscape. Online platforms like Ilbe Storage, established in 2012 as an imageboard akin to 4chan, became incubators for anti-feminist discourse, where users articulated frustrations over mandatory military service for men, competitive job markets with gender quotas favoring women in certain sectors, and cultural narratives emphasizing female empowerment at male expense. These communities framed men as systemic victims, drawing on real disparities such as women's exemption from conscription and higher female enrollment in universities (reaching 55% by 2015), which fueled a backlash against progressive gender policies. A pivotal event amplifying this sentiment occurred in August 2013, when activist , founder of the Man of Korea group, died by suicide during a against the abolition of the registry system, which he argued disadvantaged men in custody and matters by promoting what he called "female supremacy." This incident garnered widespread media attention and galvanized early men's , transitioning informal online rants into structured narratives of male victimhood. The mid-2010s saw escalation with the emergence of radical feminist responses like in 2015, which mirrored Ilbe's misogynistic tactics, intensifying gender polarization and solidifying young men's identification as a aggrieved bloc. By the late , these dynamics coalesced into the idaenam label, first noted in media around 2018-2019 to describe the demographic's growing discontent, evidenced by surveys showing stark gender divides in attitudes toward —such as only 30% of men in their 20s identifying as feminists by , compared to higher rates among women. Groups like New Men's Solidarity, active from the late , formalized this through campaigns against policies like the anti-spycam laws, which they critiqued for potentially enabling false accusations against men. This period marked the shift from subcultural venting to proto-political mobilization, setting the stage for electoral influence, though mainstream coverage often downplayed underlying socioeconomic pressures like rates exceeding 9% in in favor of labeling it mere .

Socioeconomic Grievances

Mandatory Military Service

South Korea mandates for all able-bodied male citizens, requiring approximately 18 to 21 months of active duty typically beginning between ages 18 and 28, with the exact duration varying by branch—18 months for the , 20 months for the , and 21 months for the . Women face no such compulsory obligation, though they may enlist voluntarily, a policy rooted in historical security needs amid the North Korean threat but increasingly contested as gender-discriminatory. This male-only imposes significant opportunity costs, including deferred , career entry, and earnings, with studies indicating long-term negative effects on physical health such as increased and chronic conditions post-service. For idaenam—young men born in the 1990s and later—these requirements exemplify systemic gender inequity, as men bear a national defense burden without equivalent female reciprocity, exacerbating resentments amid perceptions of affirmative action policies favoring women in employment and education. Anti-feminist groups frame conscription as a punitive obligation that disadvantages men in a hyper-competitive job market, where service interruptions hinder skill accumulation and networking, despite some empirical evidence of modest post-service wage premiums for completers. This grievance has intensified with South Korea's declining birth rates, projecting only 220,000 eligible male conscripts by 2025, straining military readiness while underscoring the policy's gendered asymmetry. Politically, idaenam mobilization leverages conscription debates to critique feminism, with conservative factions advocating female inclusion to achieve equity, as proposed by parties tapping male discontent over the 18-month male-only term. A 2025 constitutional challenge argued the draft's male exclusivity violates equality principles amid evolving norms, reflecting broader tensions where service is invoked not just as duty but as evidence of uncompensated male sacrifice. While government responses emphasize national security over reform, rejecting female conscription extensions, the issue persists as a flashpoint, with public opinion data showing gendered divergences in military trust and support for change.

Employment and Education Disparities

In , women have achieved higher rates of attainment than men, with 77% of women aged 25-34 holding such qualifications compared to 63% of men as of 2023. This trend reflects women's enrollment in higher education surpassing men's since 2013, driven by expanded access and cultural shifts prioritizing female academic achievement. However, mandatory for men—requiring 18 to 21 months of typically beginning in their early 20s—imposes a significant temporal disadvantage, delaying their entry, , or early career progression by up to two years while women face no equivalent obligation. This service obligation, in place since for able-bodied males aged 18-35, disrupts educational continuity and contributes to men entering the job market at an older age, exacerbating hiring biases favoring younger candidates in a competitive labor market. Employment disparities further compound these issues, as affirmative action policies under the Gender Equal Employment Act mandate preferential treatment for women in , promotion, and roles to address historical imbalances, though empirical analyses indicate limited overall impact on female employment rates. Among young adults, men often exhibit higher employment rates post-service despite the delay, attributed to societal expectations of male breadwinning and military experience signaling discipline, yet idaenam perceive these policies as reverse , prioritizing less-qualified female hires to meet quotas in public and private sectors. For instance, completion of military duty can enhance long-term labor market outcomes for men through networks and perceived maturity, but the initial setback aligns with broader grievances over unequal starting points. These structural gaps fuel idaenam narratives of , where men's compulsory service—absent for women—intersects with gender-targeted hiring incentives, leading to perceptions of forfeited opportunities in education-to-employment pipelines. Official data underscore persistent challenges, with men facing compounded pressures from service-related resume gaps amid a job market valuing recency and . While women's higher has not translated proportionally to labor force participation—owing to factors like childcare and cultural norms—the emphasis on advancement is viewed by critics as overlooking men's unique burdens, intensifying intergenerational tensions.

Mental Health and Social Metrics

South Korea exhibits one of the highest rates globally, with young adults aged 20-29 facing particularly acute risks, where accounted for over half of all deaths in the twenties demographic as of 2022. Among males in this age group, the rate stands at approximately 26.41 per 100,000, exceeding that of females and reflecting broader disparities in which men's mortality is more than double women's (35.3 versus 15.1 per 100,000 in 2022). These figures position as the leading for South Koreans aged 10-39, with young men disproportionately affected amid socioeconomic pressures including instability and mandatory . Mental health challenges compound these outcomes, with Korean men demonstrating lower help-seeking behaviors due to entrenched stigma; surveys indicate rates as low as 35.7% for males aged 30-39, extending patterns observed in younger cohorts. The male rate overall is 2.3 times that of females, correlating with underreported depression and anxiety, where prevalence in men aged 30s rose post-2020 pandemic from prior baselines. Government initiatives, such as biennial mental health check-ups for those aged 20-34 introduced in 2023, aim to address this, yet access remains limited, with only 11.5% of those needing care seeking it in 2021. Social isolation exacerbates these metrics, with 5.2% of young South Koreans in or isolation as of 2024, a rate doubled since 2022, driven by job precariousness, , and delayed life milestones. Among isolated youth, nearly 60% report poor physical and , and three-quarters endorse , patterns intensified in urban areas like where one in 20 young residents withdraws socially. This phenomenon mirrors trends, with young men facing heightened withdrawal amid competitive societal demands, contributing to broader declines and economic disengagement.

Ideological Perspectives

Core Anti-Feminist Positions

Idaenam articulate anti-feminist positions rooted in perceptions of systemic disadvantages imposed by policies favoring women, asserting that these measures discriminate against men in and . They criticize initiatives, such as gender quotas for university admissions and corporate hiring, which they argue prioritize female candidates over more qualified males, thereby eroding in South Korea's hyper-competitive economy. For instance, in sectors like science and technology, quotas have reportedly led to male applicants facing higher rejection rates despite equivalent or superior qualifications, fueling resentment among young men who view such policies as state-sanctioned reverse . A key contention is the framing of men as perpetual beneficiaries of , which idaenam reject by emphasizing male-specific burdens like compulsory —requiring 18-21 months of enlistment exclusively for men aged 19-28, resulting in delayed education and career progression that correlates with a 10-15% penalty over lifetimes compared to non-serving peers or women. This obligation, absent for women despite equal , is cited as evidence that feminist advocacy ignores causal asymmetries in obligations, positioning men as the true underclass in contemporary society. Idaenam further highlight elevated male suicide rates—four times higher than women's in 2023, per national statistics—and custody biases in courts, where mothers receive primary custody in over 90% of cases, as indicators of unaddressed male vulnerabilities overlooked by frameworks. Many idaenam subscribe to a male victimhood narrative, portraying as promoting through rhetoric that labels all men as "potential perpetrators" or inherent oppressors, which they see as dehumanizing and unsubstantiated by data on interpersonal violence where socioeconomic factors, not gender alone, drive outcomes. They advocate for gender-neutral policies, such as abolishing the Ministry of and —established in 2001 and criticized for allocating resources disproportionately to women's programs while neglecting male issues—and replacing outcome-focused equality with strict to align incentives with individual achievement rather than demographic balancing. This stance extends to opposition against expanded welfare for single mothers or settlements perceived as incentivizing dissolution, arguing such provisions distort traditional roles without empirical justification for gender-specific aid. Critics within idaenam circles often distinguish their views from , maintaining support for equal legal rights but decrying feminism's evolution into advocacy for female supremacy, evidenced by online campaigns against "feminist terrorism" tied to incidents like the 2016 Gangnam station stabbing, which amplified perceptions of ideological . Empirical defenses include data showing women's representation in higher education surpassing men's since 2008 (57% female enrollment in universities by 2022), yet persistent gender pay gaps attributed more to occupational choices and hours worked than , challenging claims of endemic . These positions coalesce around causal realism: policies should address verifiable disparities without presuming male privilege in a where men's labor force participation exceeds women's by 20 percentage points amid .

Conspiracy Theories and Narratives

Certain segments within Idaenam online communities endorse narratives portraying as an orchestrated designed to institutionalize subordination, often framing policies on quotas and exemptions as evidence of a deliberate anti-male agenda. These accounts emphasize perceived reverse , where women's higher university enrollment rates—reaching 55% for women versus 48% for men in 2022—and preferential hiring in public sectors are interpreted not as outcomes of socioeconomic trends but as engineered outcomes of feminist influence in policy-making. Such views align with a broader victimhood , which posits young men as a marginalized class victimized by state-sponsored , despite empirical data showing men's advantages in lifetime earnings and corporate leadership positions. A specific gaining traction among Idaenam is the finger-pinching hypothesis, which alleges a covert campaign by feminists to embed a hand gesture— and pinched closely together, evoking imagery of diminutive male anatomy—in commercial advertisements, emojis, and public media to subliminally degrade men and propagate . Originating from the 2015 adoption of the gesture by the radical feminist Megalia as a satirical jab at men's self-perceived endowments, proponents claim its subsequent proliferation in , such as in product packaging and promotional videos, represents intentional signaling by feminist sympathizers within industries to normalize . This theory has prompted boycotts and public backlash against companies like Apple and Korea, with accusations leading to executive apologies and design alterations by mid-2025, though no verifiable evidence supports coordinated intent beyond coincidental stylistic use. Influenced by global manosphere rhetoric, some Idaenam narratives adopt "red pill" frameworks depicting society as a "matrix" of gynocentric control, where feminism serves as a tool for elite manipulation to suppress male agency through cultural conditioning, mandatory conscription, and economic disincentives for traditional masculinity. Figures like Andrew Tate have amplified this among Korean youth via social media, framing personal failures as systemic entrapment rather than individual or market-driven factors, contributing to distrust in institutions perceived as feminist-aligned. These ideas intersect with domestic claims of media bias, where outlets are accused of downplaying male suicides—numbering 7,213 for men versus 2,627 for women in 2023—while amplifying female narratives, fostering a cycle of alienation without substantiation of unified conspiratorial orchestration. Critics from academic sources, often aligned with progressive viewpoints, dismiss these as exaggerated responses to legitimate gender debates, yet the persistence underscores underlying causal tensions from unequal service obligations and labor market entry barriers.

Political Mobilization

Role in the 2022 Presidential Election

In the March 9, 2022, South Korean presidential election, Idaenam voters—primarily men in their twenties—provided crucial support to conservative People Power Party candidate Yoon Suk-yeol, contributing to his narrow victory over Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung by a margin of 0.73 percentage points (48.56% to 47.83%). Yoon's platform explicitly addressed grievances associated with Idaenam, including promises to abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, which he criticized as promoting "reverse discrimination" against men through policies favoring women in employment and education. This stance aligned with widespread perceptions among young men of systemic disadvantages, such as mandatory military service for males and gender quotas in university admissions, driving a surge in conservative turnout among this demographic despite historically low youth voter participation rates. Exit polls conducted by major broadcasters (KBS, MBC, SBS) revealed stark gender polarization among voters under 30: approximately 59% of men aged 18-29 supported Yoon, compared to 34% for Lee, while women in the same age group favored Lee by 63% to Yoon's 34%. This 25-point among youth marked a significant shift from prior elections, where age-based divides dominated; Idaenam transformed gender issues into a pivotal electoral fault line, with online forums and channels amplifying anti-feminist narratives that framed Yoon as a defender against perceived feminist overreach. Voter turnout among 20-something men reached about 66%, lower than women's 75% but sufficient to tip balances in competitive regions like the Seoul metropolitan area. The influence of Idaenam extended beyond raw numbers, as their support reflected a broader backlash against progressive policies, evidenced by Yoon's pre-election statements linking structural claims to male disenfranchisement. Post-election analyses attributed Yoon's win partly to this demographic's rejection of Lee's campaign, which was seen as aligned with feminist priorities despite his attempts to court moderates. However, outlets, often critiqued for progressive leanings, emphasized in coverage, potentially understating socioeconomic factors like (around 7.2% for those under 30 in early 2022) that fueled the shift. This mobilization foreshadowed ongoing gender-based voting patterns in subsequent elections.

Developments from 2023 to 2025

In the April 2024 parliamentary elections, men in their 20s continued to exhibit distinct voting patterns, supporting the conservative People Power Party (PPP) at rates approximately 15-30 percentage points higher than women in the same age group, though nearly half expressed dissatisfaction with both major parties by backing third-force options or abstaining from clear alignment. Exit polls indicated that while the PPP garnered around 34% of their vote in constituency races, support fragmented in proportional representation, with significant portions drawn to emerging parties criticizing establishment politics and gender policies. This reflected persistent socioeconomic frustrations, including employment barriers and mandatory military service, amid Yoon Suk-yeol's administration struggling with low approval ratings. The political landscape shifted dramatically in late 2024 when President Yoon declared on December 3, prompting widespread protests, his by the on December 14, and a ruling upholding the in early 2025, necessitating a snap presidential election on June 3. Despite the crisis eroding conservative unity, idaenam voters leaned further rightward, with exit polls from major broadcasters showing 37% support for Reform Party candidate —a former PPP youth leader known for critiquing feminist policies—compared to lower backing for Democratic Party winner Lee Jae-myung. In contrast, women in their 20s favored Lee Jae-myung at 58%, underscoring an entrenched gender divide exceeding 20 points. Campaign discourse in 2025 highlighted idaenam concerns, with candidates across parties proposing reforms, such as expanded voluntary enlistment or alternative service options, to address grievances over unequal obligations. Jun-seok's appeal in regions like , where he secured over 40% of young male votes, demonstrated the group's sway toward conservatives emphasizing and opposition to perceived gender quotas in and . However, his failure to broaden support beyond this demographic limited the party's overall gains, as Jae-myung's victory signaled broader voter priorities on and democratic norms over gender-specific appeals. By mid-2025, surveys and analyses confirmed a deepening generational schism, with young men increasingly associating with reverse , contributing to right-wing inclinations even amid liberal electoral successes. This polarization persisted alongside empirical data on labor market disparities, where 20-something men faced higher initial risks, fueling narratives of without resolution under successive governments.

Criticisms and Debates

Progressive and Feminist Critiques

Progressive and feminist critics characterize the Idaenam movement as a form of modern and misogynistic backlash that constructs a of male victimhood, dismissing legitimate feminist advancements as threats to men's status. Scholars describe this as relying on unsubstantiated anecdotes rather than , with young men framing policies—such as in employment—as reverse while overlooking women's systemic disadvantages, including South Korea's widest wage gap among countries. A 2021 survey cited in analyses found 47% of young men viewing the rejection of feminist job applicants as acceptable and 41% opposing anti- laws, which critics interpret as indicative of broader extending beyond to other marginalized groups. Feminist perspectives emphasize that Idaenam sentiments perpetuate patriarchal structures rooted in and traditional gender norms, where mandatory for men is invoked to justify opposition to equality without acknowledging compensatory measures or women's exclusion from such burdens. For example, 79% of men in their twenties report believing men face , a view attributed by critics to entrenched stereotypes rather than policy inequities, contributing to , workplace repercussions for feminists (e.g., firings of women expressing feminist views in 2016 and 2023), and physical violence against perceived feminists. This backlash, intensified post-2016 feminist mobilizations like the Gangnam Station protests, is seen as evidence of progress under threat, with online communities radicalizing youth by portraying feminism as the instigator of "gender conflict" amid South Korea's 105th ranking in the 2022 Global Gender Gap Index. Critics further argue that Idaenam grievances misrepresent as a zero-sum , fueled by economic anxieties and marriage market imbalances (e.g., women's increasing rejection of , with only 8% of young women vs. 26% of young men deeming it highly important in a 2024 survey), leading to heightened hostile and benevolent when men perceive status threats. They contend this dynamic aligns with right-wing political exploitation, as seen in 2022 election rhetoric promising to dismantle the Ministry of , ultimately hindering societal progress on issues like and reproductive rights rather than resolving young men's real challenges such as .

Empirical Rebuttals and Data-Driven Defenses

Data from the Ministry of and Family indicate that in 2024, the employment rate for women aged 15-64 stood at 62.1%, compared to 76.8% for men, reflecting men's higher labor force participation amid mandatory obligations that delay career entry by 18-21 months. This service imposes long-term wage penalties, with analyses of recent veterans estimating negative impacts on post-service earnings due to interrupted skill accumulation and market entry. Such empirical costs counter claims that male grievances stem solely from entitlement, as equates to forgone productivity equivalent to several years of compounding professional experience, absent for women. Educational attainment further underscores structural asymmetries: among 25-34-year-olds, women exceed men by 13 percentage points in completion, per metrics, with female university enrollment surpassing male rates since 2013. Yet, policies amplifying female advancement, such as gender-specific scholarships and quotas, exacerbate perceived inequities for men, whose military interruptions often lead to higher dropout risks or deferred enrollment, despite equivalent or superior high school performance in STEM fields. Mental health disparities provide stark evidence of unaddressed male vulnerabilities, with South Korea's male-to-female incidence rate ratio reaching 2.3:1 in 2022, driven by factors including economic pressures and service-related trauma. Compulsory service correlates with elevated physical health declines persisting years post-discharge, compounding psychosocial stressors in a high-pressure job market where vulnerable employment affects 19.3% of men versus 16.8% of women. These metrics rebut narratives framing young men's discontent as irrational backlash, revealing instead causal links between policy-induced burdens—like unequal —and measurable outcomes in health and opportunity, independent of broader societal progress in female metrics.

Broader Societal Impact

Online Communities and Media Influence

Online communities, particularly male-dominated forums such as DCInside, Ilbe Storage, and FM Korea, have served as primary incubators for Idaenam viewpoints, enabling anonymous discussions of grievances including mandatory military service for men, perceived affirmative action favoring women in employment and education, and critiques of feminist policies. These platforms feature high volumes of user-generated content, including text mining analyses revealing recurrent themes of opposition to feminism and demands for gender-neutral fairness in South Korean society. Participation in such spaces correlates with heightened anti-feminist sentiments among young men, who often cite empirical data like the 18-21 months of compulsory service for males versus voluntary options for females, and higher male youth unemployment rates amid gender quotas. YouTube channels have extended this influence beyond forums, with groups like New Men's Solidarity (NMS) transforming online grievances into organized and electoral mobilization. Led by Bae In-kyu, NMS promotes narratives framing young men as victims of institutional biases, garnering subscriber bases in the tens of thousands and real-world actions such as protests against policies. These digital ecosystems have amplified conspiracy-adjacent theories, such as claims of media-orchestrated emasculation campaigns, while fostering political alignment, as evidenced by their role in directing over 58% of male voters in their 20s toward conservative candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 2022 . Mainstream media coverage of these communities frequently emphasizes toxic elements, such as misogynistic or isolated violent incidents linked to groups like NMS, portraying Idaenam broadly as a reactionary force rather than addressing data-backed complaints like structural disadvantages in and job markets. Outlets with progressive leanings, including international reports, often amplify feminist counter-narratives while downplaying surveys showing 70% of men in their 20s opposing women-specific , potentially reinforcing perceptions of among participants. This selective framing has heightened public gender polarization, with online counter-mobilization challenging dominant media interpretations and influencing debates on exemptions and equality metrics through viral campaigns. Despite criticisms of extremism, these communities' emphasis on verifiable disparities—such as male rates exceeding female counterparts by factors of 2-3 times—has sustained their resonance amid for youth.

Effects on Gender Relations and Policy

The mobilization of idaenam—young men in their twenties disillusioned with perceived gender-based disadvantages—significantly influenced South Korea's 2022 , where candidate Yoon Suk-yeol secured 58% of votes from this demographic compared to 34% from young women, contributing to his narrow victory. This electoral shift enabled Yoon's administration to pursue reforms targeting policies seen as favoring women at men's expense, including mandatory for men (18-21 months) without equivalent obligations for women, and measures in and . Yoon campaigned on abolishing the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF), arguing it stigmatized men as "potential " and exacerbated divisions, a stance resonating with idaenam grievances over reverse . Upon assuming office in May 2022, Yoon scrapped gender quotas in hiring and cabinet appointments, emphasizing over sex-based targets, and appointed only a minority of women to senior roles. Efforts to dismantle MOGEF faced parliamentary resistance, leaving it in administrative through 2024, during which the administration downplayed women-specific initiatives and advocated tougher penalties for false sexual offense accusations, aligning with idaenam narratives of legal imbalances in courts and proceedings. These moves reflected a causal pushback against prior expansions of gender policies under liberal governments, which idaenam viewed as institutionalizing male disadvantages amid stagnant wages and high . The idaenam phenomenon intensified gender polarization, with voting gaps widening to 15-30 percentage points between young men and women in subsequent elections, including 74% conservative support among men under 30 in the 2025 parliamentary vote. This divide correlates with surveys indicating 70% of men in their twenties opposing women's , fueling online discourses framing as a barrier to equitable opportunity. Broader relational strains include declining rates—dropping to record lows by 2023, with men citing financial burdens, penalties, and perceived biases in laws as deterrents—exacerbating South Korea's crisis at 0.72 births per woman in 2023. Yoon's impeachment in December 2024 and the June 2025 victory of liberal Lee Jae-myung, backed by young women rejecting conservative , prompted a partial policy reversal: MOGEF was reformed in September 2025 with a broader mandate to address men's issues alongside women's, positioning it as a "control tower" for equal opportunities. Nonetheless, idaenam-driven scrutiny persists, with ongoing debates over integrating exemptions or credits into hiring and pensions to mitigate perceived inequities, highlighting enduring tensions between empirical asymmetries in obligations and aspirational equality frameworks.

References

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