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Italy of Values
Italy of Values
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Italy of Values (Italian: Italia dei Valori, IdV) is a populist and anti-corruption political party in Italy. The party was founded in 1998 by former Mani pulite prosecutor Antonio Di Pietro, who entered politics in 1996 and finally left the party in 2014. IdV has aimed at gathering and giving voice to different sectors of the Italian society. From the beginning of its existence one of its major issues has been the so-called "moral issue".[17] In the early 2010s, IdV was eclipsed by the new-born Five Star Movement, founded by comedian Beppe Grillo, which used the same populist and anti-corruption rhetoric.[18]

Key Information

History

[edit]

Background and formation (1996–2001)

[edit]

Antonio Di Pietro was minister of Public Works in the Prodi I Cabinet from May to November 1996, when he resigned because he was under investigation in Brescia.[19] In November 1997 Di Pietro was elected senator for The Olive Tree in a by-election in Mugello, a stronghold of the Democrats of the Left (DS) in Tuscany, with 67.7% of the vote, much more than centre-right independent Giuliano Ferrara (16.1%) and Communist Sandro Curzi (13.0%).[20]

In March 1998, Di Pietro established Italy of Values (IdV), alongside Willer Bordon of the Democratic Union and Rino Piscitello and Franco Danieli of The Network,[21] led by Leoluca Orlando (a future IdV member).

In February 1999, Di Pietro integrated IdV into The Democrats, a new centrist party founded by Romano Prodi with the goal of transforming The Olive Tree coalition in a single "Democratic" party.[22] In the 1999 European Parliament election The Democrats scored 7.7% and Di Pietro was elected MEP. He was also appointed organisational secretary and Senate floor leader of the party. In April 2000, Di Pietro abruptly left in opposition to the appointment of Giuliano Amato, a long-time member of the Italian Socialist Party (which was the main subject of investigation of Di Pietro as prosecutor), as Prime Minister of Italy after the resignation of Massimo D'Alema.[23] Shortly afterwards, Di Pietro set up IdV again.[24]

IdV took part to the 2001 general election as a stand-alone party on a populist platform, which included tough management of illegal immigration and protest against waste of public money. IdV's campaign was focused principally against Silvio Berlusconi, who was the candidate for Prime Minister of the House of Freedoms (CdL) centre-right coalition. IdV won 3.9% in the election, 0.1% short of the 4% threshold, and obtained no seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The party elected one senator, Valerio Carrara, but, after a few days from the election, he surprisingly switched to Berlusconi's Forza Italia (FI) party,[25] leaving IdV without parliamentary representation for the next five years.[26]

From isolation to electoral success (2001–2009)

[edit]

In the 2004 European Parliament election Di Pietro teamed up with Achille Occhetto, a former leader of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS), under the banner "Civil Society Di Pietro–Occhetto". The electoral list gained 2.1% of the national vote and both men were elected MEPs. After the election, Occhetto immediately renounced to his seat and was replaced by Giulietto Chiesa, a communist journalist, who sat with the Party of European Socialists Group.[27]

In 2005 IdV joined The Union, a new centre-left coalition led by Prodi, who won the primary election with 74.2% of the vote, defeating also Di Pietro (3.3%). In early 2006 Leoluca Orlando, former mayor of Palermo, some splinters from the Union of Democrats for Europe (UDEUR), including Pino Pisicchio and Egidio Pedrini, and former DS such as Fabio Evangelisti and Federico Palomba, joined the party, in an effort of broadening its electoral base.

The Union narrowly won the 2006 general election, IdV scored a mere 2.1% and Di Pietro was sworn in as Minister of Infrastructures in the Prodi II Cabinet.

After the fall of Prodi's government, Di Pietro formed an alliance with the Democratic Party (PD) for the 2008 general election. The coalition was defeated by Berlusconi's centre-right, but IdV obtained 4.4% of the vote, 29 deputies and 14 senators. Following the election, IdV formed its own groups in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, instead of joining the Democrats in a joint group as promised, and started a competition with its main ally.[28][29] In October 2008, Veltroni, who distanced from Di Pietro many times, declared that "on some issues he [Di Pietro] is distant from the democratic language of the centre-left";[30] however, the PD decided to support Carlo Costantini (IdV) in the 2008 regional election in Abruzzo.[31] Costantini was defeated, but in the event IdV came close to the PD (15.0%–19.6%).

In the 2009 European Parliament election the list got 8.0% of the national vote, quadrupling the votes obtained five years before and gaining 7 seats. In the run-up for the election Di Pietro recruited to run in IdV lists Pino Arlacchi, a former senator for the DS, Gianni Vattimo, a left-wing philosopher,[32] Maurizio Zipponi, a former trade unionist and deputy of the Communist Refoundation Party (PRC), and Luigi de Magistris, a left-wing[33] former prosecutor of Catanzaro who inquired Romano Prodi.[34] Arlacchi, De Magistris and Vattimo were all elected to the European Parliament. From the results of the European election, IdV was the fourth largest party in the country.

Following these results, Di Pietro said that IdV "will remove his name from the symbol of the party, in order to build something larger, more useful and that represents something more important". He also said that "we need to become a great progressive party that supports a proposal for a credible government".[35] The party's executive decided not to remove the name of its founder, considering that name still too important for the party.

Populist turn and discontents (2009–2013)

[edit]
Antonio Di Pietro in 2010

Since de Magistris's strong showing in the 2009 European election there was talk of an underground row between him and Di Pietro for the leadership of the party. Moreover, as some members of the party were entailed with corruption charges, others like Francesco Barbato urged Di Pietro to be more earnest in cleaning up the party.[36][37] De Magistris, keen on aligning the party with the far left and the most radical groups in opposition to Berlusconi, dubbed Di Pietro as too moderate and denounced that the party "risks of becoming the DC of the third millennium".[38] While the party's grassroots supported a change of leadership and de Magistris initially did not rule this out,[39][40] the party's old guard (Silvana Mura,[36] Massimo Donadi,[41] Felice Belisario, Luigi Li Gotti and Leoluca Orlando) staunchly defended the leader. Finally an agreement was reached between the two: during 5–7 February 2010 party congress de Magistris would support Di Pietro in exchange of a leading role in the party.[42] In any event Di Pietro was re-elected as party president unopposed, while de Magistris did not become party secretary as he wanted.[38][43]

The populist course taken by the party, that enforced its co-operation with the far left, and the emergence of more "extreme" figures like de Magistris led Pino Pisicchio and his centrist faction to leave the party in order to join Francesco Rutelli's Alliance for Italy (ApI) in November 2009. While leaving the party along with other three MPs, Pisicchio told the press that lining up IdV in the "antagonist camp" was a departure from its original nature of a "centrist party of liberal-democratic inspiration".[44][45] Giuseppe Astore, a senator, offered similar views: "De Magistris is too far on the left for me ... . I want a reformist not an extremist party".[39] In the summer of 2010 two MEPs, Arlacchi and Vincenzo Iovine, left IdV citing the lack of democracy in the party.[46] Arlacchi, a former senator of the PDS, joined the PD,[47] while Iovine, a former Christian Democrat, the ApI.[48] In December two deputies, Antonio Razzi[49] and Domenico Scilipoti,[49] left the party in order to support Berlusconi's government.

In early 2011 IdV proposed three referendums. Thanks to its activists, the party was able to collect two million signatures among the Italian population in support of these referendums, which were concerned with the abrogation of the so-called legittimo impedimento (an Italian law which permits the Prime Minister to postpone potential trials if prosecuted by the judiciary), the abrogation of a law allowing the construction of nuclear power plants in Italy and the abrogation of a law allowing the privatisation of water management. The referendums took place in June 2011 and the "yes" prevailed in all three cases.

On 30 May 2011 de Magistris was elected mayor of Naples by a landslide. The IdV candidate, who had received just 27.5% of the vote in the first round (enough to beat the Democratic candidate off the second round), won a thumping 65.4% of the vote against the centre-right candidate in the run-off. This was a huge success for IdV and its main ally, the Federation of the Left, which together also gained the majority in the municipal council.[50] On 21 May 2012 the party had another major electoral breakthrough when Leoluca Orlando was elected mayor of Palermo with 72.4% of the vote in a run-off.[51] Both mayors would distance from IdV in a few years.

In October 2012 IdV came under pressure after some news inquiries reported obscurities in party finances, while suffering heavy losses in opinion polls due to the success of a new protest party led by comedian Beppe Grillo, the Five Star Movement (M5S). In an interview to Il Fatto Quotidiano, Di Pietro declared IdV "dead" and, foreseeing its exclusion from Parliament after the next election, stated that the party would fight from the outside and would endorse the M5S.[52][49] Grillo proposed Di Pietro as President of the Republic,[53] but ruled out any alliance between M5S and IdV.[54] The interview caused unrest within party ranks[55] and led to the exit of a "moderate" wing led by Massimo Donadi, who was replaced as floor leader in the Chamber by Antonio Borghesi.[49] Donadi, along with other three deputies (Nello Formisano, Giovanni Paladini and Gaetano Porcino) and one senator (Stefano Pedica), launched Rights and Freedom (DL),[56][57] which later joined the Democratic Centre (CD).

In October 2012, de Magistris quit the party and formed the Orange Movement (MA), which was joined by many IdV left-wingers.[49] As soon as late December, both IdV and MA were founding components of Civil Revolution (RC), a far-left coalition led by Antonio Ingroia.[49]

Decline and re-organisation (2013–present)

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In the 2013 general election RC won a mere 2.2% of the vote and IdV was thus out of Parliament for the first time in almost ten years.

After RC's debacle, Di Pietro resigned from party president.[58] On 13 May Di Pietro, on behalf of the party's executive, announced that the experience of RC was over for IdV and that the party would elect a new leader during a congress to be held in June.[59] In the meantime, Leoluca Orlando, Felice Belisario, Carlo Costantini and other leading members of IdV left the party to launch the 139 Movement (139 being the number of the articles of the Italian Constitution).[60]

In the 2014 European election, IdV received just 0.65% of the vote, losing the party's remaining representation in the European Parliament.

In the party congress, convened for 28–30 June, delegates chose the new leader, a secretary instead of a president, among five candidates: Antonio Borghesi, Matteo Castellarin, Ignazio Messina, Niccolò Rinaldi and Nicola Scalera. In the last ballot Messina was elected with 69.1% of the vote over Rinaldi, who had received the endorsements of Borghesi, Castellarin and Scalera.[61] In October Di Pietro left the party altogether.[62]

Since 2015 the party was joined by three senators (Alessandra Bencini, Maurizio Romani and Francesco Molinari) and saw the return of a deputy (Formisano). In 2017, Formisano left again in order to join the Democratic and Progressive Movement (MDP), which was also joined by Di Pietro.

In December 2017 IdV was a founding member of the Popular Civic List (CP), a centrist electoral list within the centre-left coalition, along with Popular Alternative (AP), the Centrists for Europe (CpE), Solidary Democracy (DemoS), the Union for Trentino (UpT), Italy Is Popular (IP), and minor parties/groups.[63][64][65]

In the 2018 general election, CP obtained 0.5% and no seats, and IdV was again excluded from Parliament.

In 2022, Ignazio Messina announced the federation of IdV with Us with Italy and the support for Us Moderates (a centrist list within the centre-right coalition) in the 2022 general election.[66]

Ideology and factions

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While the party had been generally aligned with the centre-left, its members had been very diverse ideologically, ranging from the far left (i.e. Franca Rame, a former member of Soccorso Rosso, and Pancho Pardi, a former activist of Potere Operaio) to the right, thanks to the populist message of the party. The party includes former Communists and former LN members, as well as former MSI members and several former Christian Democrats. According to 2009 a study by Pino Pisicchio, a political scientist who was then deputy of IdV, 57.1% of the party's MPs were former Christian Democrats or members of post-Christian Democratic parties (including 11.9% from the UDEUR), 9.5% were former Communists, 4.8% came from far-left parties and movements, 2.4% were former MSI members and 2.4% former LN members.[67]

The party is a supporter of legality, law and order, the police forces, first-past-the-post voting,[68] federalism, corporate reform, lowering the costs of politics, improving the efficiency of public services, fighting corruption, simplifying trials bureaucracy to achieve faster verdicts and regulating conflict of interest.

During the Prodi II Cabinet IdV was one of the most centrist voices in the centre-left coalition and sometimes, despite its harsh criticism of Berlusconi, it switched sides in Parliament on some key issues. At some point, Di Pietro even proposed an electoral alliance between its party, the UDEUR and the Union of Christian and Centre Democrats (UDC), while ruling out any future alliance with the far left.[69][70][71] Also during the Berlusconi IV Cabinet, IdV supported some plans of the government, notably the introduction of fiscal federalism; however, due to its uncompromising anti-berlusconismo, IdV has been at times very popular among left-wing voters, a fact that was highlighted also by the increasing number of communists in party ranks[72] and often forms stable alliances with the parties of the far left at the local level, such as in the case of Luigi de Magistris' election as mayor of Naples or in the 2012 regional election in Sicily. The shift to the left embodied by the emergence of figures like de Magistris and Franco Grillini (honorary president of Arcigay, who joined in November 2009).[39] was criticised by Pisicchio because, in his view, it was endangering the centrist nature of the party.[73] The party has also continued to recruit people on the right, such as Alessandro Cè, a social-conservative former member of Lega Nord.[74]

The fact that IdV was a member of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party, formerly known as European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR), does not mean that it is a liberal party.[75] Notwithstanding its former European affiliation, the party has rarely been regarded as liberal in Italy due to its "justicialist" and "populist" tendencies; the party's character is that of a "protest party" and it opposes many policies generally supported by liberals.[76] On the left, Di Pietro is described as a right-wing populist by Fausto Bertinotti,[77] as well as by some political commentators.[78][79] According to Panorama, the reason for these bitter comments by Bertinotti is that Di Pietro is very able to attract votes from the far-left electorate, as well as the right, and this could prevent a resurgence of those parties which were driven out of Parliament in the 2008 general election.[80] During a council meeting in Rome, ELDR President Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck underlined that European Liberals are honored to have IdV as one of its Italian member parties as it exemplifies a political party of integrity and high quality politics. Di Pietro added that "ELDR as the common house of European Liberals is the political home for us in terms of common convictions and a strong support for the cause of political freedoms in Italy".[81] During the 2010 party congress, Di Pietro remarked IdV's liberal identity and denounced what he called "Berlusconi's false liberalism".[82]

In May 2012, IdV became the first Italian political party to announce publicly that it would push for marriage equality. Di Pietro said: "Our party has been the first in Italy to follow U.S. president Barack Obama. We invite other Italian parties to support gay marriage. You don't have to be shy, you have to say yes".[83]

[edit]

The 2001–2010 electoral results in the 10 most populated regions of Italy, plus Abruzzo and Molise (the party's main strongholds), are shown in the table below.[84] Generally speaking, the party is stronger in the South than in the North, where the protest vote is absorbed primarily by Lega Nord.

2001 general 2004 European 2005 regional 2006 general 2008 general 2009 European 2010 regional
Piedmont 4.1 2.4 1.5 2.6 5.0 8.7 6.9
Lombardy 3.9 1.7 1.4 2.0 4.0 6.5 6.3
Veneto 4.6 2.1 1.3 2.2 4.3 7.2 5.3
Emilia-Romagna 3.5 1.9 1.4 1.7 4.2 7.2 6.4
Tuscany 2.5 1.8 0.9 1.4 3.5 6.8 9.4
Lazio 2.8 2.1 1.0 1.9 4.1 8.3 8.6
Abruzzo 6.3 3.9 2.4 4.1 7.0 13.8 15.0 (2008)
Molise 14.3 7.8 8.8 (2006) 8.1 27.7 28.0 8.8 (2011)
Campania 3.8 2.1 2.4 2.6 4.7 8.9 4.5
Apulia 5.1 2.8 2.4 1.8 4.6 8.9 6.5
Calabria 3.6 2.3 - 2.2 3.6 9.1 5.4
Sicily 3.9 2.7 - (2006) 4.4 3.4 7.1 1.9 (2008)
ITALY 3.9 2.1 - 2.3 4.4 8.0 -

Electoral results

[edit]

Italian Parliament

[edit]
Chamber of Deputies
Election year Votes % Seats +/− Leader
2001 1,443,725 (6th) 4.0
0 / 630
–
Antonio Di Pietro
2006 877,159 (9th) 2.3
20 / 630
Increase 20
Antonio Di Pietro
2008 1,593,675 (5th) 4.4
29 / 630
Increase 9
Antonio Di Pietro
2013 into RC –
0 / 630
Decrease 29
Antonio Di Pietro
2018 into CP –
0 / 630
–
Ignazio Messina
Senate of the Republic
Election year Votes % Seats +/− Leader
2001 1,140,489 (6th) 3.4
1 / 315
–
Antonio Di Pietro
2006 986,046 (9th) 2.8
5 / 315
Increase 5
Antonio Di Pietro
2008 1,414,118 (5th) 4.2
14 / 315
Increase 9
Antonio Di Pietro
2013 into RC –
0 / 315
Decrease 14
Antonio Di Pietro
2018 into CP –
0 / 315
–
Ignazio Messina

European Parliament

[edit]
European Parliament
Election year Votes % Seats +/− Leader
1999 in Dem –
1 / 87
–
Antonio Di Pietro
2004 695,179 (10th) 2.1
2 / 72
Increase 1
Antonio Di Pietro
2009 2,450,643 (4th) 8.0
7 / 72
Increase 5
Antonio Di Pietro
2014 181,373 (10th) 0.7
0 / 73
Decrease 7
Ignazio Messina

Regional Councils

[edit]
Region Election year Votes % Seats +/–
Aosta Valley 2018 — —
0 / 35
–
Piedmont 2014 13,658 (13th) 0.7
0 / 50
Decrease 3
Lombardy 2018 into CP –
0 / 80
–
South Tyrol 2018 — —
0 / 35
–
Trentino 2018 — —
0 / 35
–
Veneto 2015 into VC –
0 / 51
Decrease 3
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 2018 — —
0 / 49
–
Emilia-Romagna 2014 into CpB –
0 / 50
Decrease 2
Liguria 2015 — —
0 / 31
Decrease 3
Tuscany 2015 — —
0 / 41
Decrease 5
Marche 2015 into UpM –
0 / 31
Decrease 4
Umbria 2015 — —
0 / 20
Decrease 1
Lazio 2018 into CP –
0 / 51
–
Abruzzo 2019 5,577 (14th) 0.9
0 / 31
Decrease 1
Molise 2018 — —
0 / 21
Decrease 1
Campania 2015 25,913 (16th) 1.1
1 / 51
Decrease 3
Apulia 2015 into ESdP –
0 / 51
Decrease 6
Basilicata 2019 — —
0 / 21
–
Calabria 2014 — —
0 / 30
Decrease 3
Sicily 2017 — —
0 / 70
–
Sardinia 2019 — —
0 / 60
Decrease 1

Leadership

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Italy of Values

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from Grokipedia
Italia dei Valori ( of Values, IdV) is a populist in founded in 1998 by , a former public prosecutor who played a leading role in the investigations exposing widespread in the early 1990s. The party emphasizes measures, legality, and transparency in , positioning itself as a personalist vehicle driven by Di Pietro's public image as an incorruptible figure. Drawing on the momentum from the Tangentopoli scandals that dismantled much of Italy's traditional political class, IdV entered the electoral arena advocating and accountability, aligning primarily with center-left coalitions to secure parliamentary representation. The party achieved modest success, including seats in the and , and Di Pietro served as Minister of Infrastructure in Romano Prodi's second government from to , where it pushed for policies aimed at oversight amid ongoing graft concerns. However, IdV faced defining controversies, as some of its office-holders were implicated in , and Di Pietro drew criticism for alleged and misuse of state party funding, undermining its moral authority on integrity. By the 2010s, the party declined sharply due to voter shifts toward newer forces like the Five Star Movement, internal divisions, and failure to adapt beyond its founder's persona, resulting in marginal electoral performance and reduced relevance in Italian politics. Despite this, IdV's emergence highlighted public demand for ethical governance, though its trajectory illustrates challenges in sustaining personalist parties without institutionalizing broader structures.

History

Origins and Formation (1996–2001)

Antonio Di Pietro, a former prosecutor renowned for leading the Mani Pulite anti-corruption investigations that dismantled much of Italy's post-war political establishment in the early 1990s, transitioned to politics in 1996. Appointed Minister of Public Works in Romano Prodi's first center-left cabinet on May 17, 1996, Di Pietro resigned on November 14, 1996, following announcements by prosecutors of investigations into complaints against him regarding alleged undue influence in prior judicial matters, though he maintained his innocence and was later cleared of wrongdoing. This brief tenure highlighted his commitment to transparency but also exposed him to scrutiny from opponents seeking to discredit his prosecutorial legacy. In November 1997, Di Pietro secured election to the Italian Senate in a in the district of , representing The Olive Tree center-left coalition and defeating opponents with approximately 67% of the vote, capitalizing on his public image as an uncorrupted outsider. His independent streak soon led to tensions within coalition structures; aligning temporarily with centrist groups like I Democratici after his 1999 election to the , Di Pietro prioritized advocacy over partisan loyalty. On March 21, 1998, Di Pietro formally established the (Italia dei Valori) as a , emphasizing moral renewal, judicial integrity, and opposition to entrenched in Italian institutions. The initiative's initial focus included gathering signatures for referendums on to promote greater , reflecting Di Pietro's first-principles approach to combating systemic graft through direct rather than reliance on compromised parties. By mid-2000, following his departure from I Democratici on June 13, 2000, the movement reorganized into a distinct list, Italia dei Valori - Lista Di Pietro, positioning itself for the general elections as a populist, force independent of major coalitions. This evolution marked the consolidation of its organizational structure, drawing supporters disillusioned by ongoing scandals in both left- and right-wing formations.

Electoral Rise and Center-Left Alliances (2001–2006)

In the 2001 general elections, Italy of Values, contesting as the Lista Di Pietro, achieved 1,443,725 votes, equivalent to 3.89% of the proportional ballot for the , conducted independently without coalition backing. This result reflected early traction from 's public profile as a former lead investigator in the anti-corruption probes, yet yielded no seats in either chamber due to the electoral system's 75% majoritarian districts favoring larger coalitions and a 4% threshold effectively barring standalone lists from proportional allocation. The performance, while modest in outcomes, signaled the party's potential to draw voters disillusioned with established politics, particularly on judicial integrity issues. From 2001 to 2006, Italy of Values expanded its organizational base and visibility through regional campaigns and Di Pietro's media presence, emphasizing reforms amid persistent graft scandals involving figures from both major coalitions. This period saw incremental gains in subnational polls, positioning the party as a vehicle against perceived systemic . By 2004, in the elections, the party secured representation by aligning selectively with centrist lists, though exact national shares remained below 5%, underscoring limits as an outsider force. The pivotal shift occurred in late 2005, when Italy of Values joined L'Unione, the center-left led by , comprising , Daisy Democracy-Popular Party, and smaller groups like the Rose in the Fist, to challenge Silvio Berlusconi's House of Freedoms. This alliance integrated IdV's platform into a broader anti-Berlusconi front, trading autonomy for electoral viability under Italy's coalition-dependent system. In the April 9–10, 2006, general elections, IdV polled 877,052 votes (2.30%) within L'Unione's proportional lists for the Chamber, securing 16 deputies and 3 senators via the coalition's overall 49.81% vote share and majoritarian wins, which granted a near-absolute majority. The outcome elevated IdV from fringe status to coalition partner in Prodi's second government (2006–2008), with Di Pietro appointed Minister of Infrastructure and Transport, tasked with oversight to align with the party's integrity focus. This governmental entry marked the zenith of its early ascent, though internal tensions over policy concessions foreshadowed future strains.

Peak Influence in Government and Opposition (2006–2009)

In the April 9–10, 2006, general election, Italy of Values (IdV) obtained 1,104,846 votes (4.37%) in the proportional lists for the Chamber of Deputies as part of the center-left L'Unione coalition, which narrowly secured a parliamentary majority. This victory enabled the formation of the Prodi II Cabinet on May 17, 2006, in which IdV leader Antonio Di Pietro was appointed Minister of Infrastructure and Transport, holding the position until May 8, 2008. As the sole IdV minister, Di Pietro focused on enhancing transparency in public procurement and infrastructure projects, pledging to maintain continuity with prior plans for roads and railways while combating corruption in sector spending. IdV's participation provided the government with a centrist, anti-corruption voice amid coalition tensions. The Prodi government proved unstable, surviving multiple parliamentary defeats before losing a Senate confidence vote on January 24, 2008, prompted by withdrawals from smaller allies like UDEUR. Snap elections followed on April 13–14, 2008, where IdV campaigned in alliance with the Democratic Party (PD), receiving 1,414,741 votes (4.42%) in Chamber proportional lists and contributing to the center-left's parliamentary presence despite its overall defeat. In opposition to Silvio Berlusconi's fourth cabinet, IdV emerged as a vocal critic, emphasizing judicial reforms, opposition to perceived conflicts of interest, and continued advocacy, with Di Pietro leading parliamentary challenges against executive overreach. IdV's influence peaked further in the June 6–7, 2009, elections, where it garnered 1,631,071 votes (8.17%), its highest national share to date, securing seven seats and outperforming expectations amid voter dissatisfaction with the center-right . This result underscored IdV's role as a populist alternative, drawing support from those prioritizing integrity in during a period of governmental instability and economic strain.

Populist Shift, Internal Fractures, and Electoral Setbacks (2009–2013)

Following the 2008 general elections, where Italia dei Valori (IdV) secured 4.4% of the vote, the party intensified its populist rhetoric, emphasizing anti-establishment critiques amid Italy's deepening economic woes and political scandals. Led by Antonio Di Pietro, IdV positioned itself as a bulwark against corruption and elite privilege, with Di Pietro's frequent media appearances amplifying calls for judicial reforms and transparency. This shift manifested in heightened opposition to Silvio Berlusconi's government, framing it as emblematic of systemic rot, though empirical evidence of IdV's causal impact on anti-corruption measures remained limited to rhetorical pressure rather than legislative breakthroughs. In the 2009 European Parliament elections, IdV achieved a peak of 8.17% nationally, translating to seven seats, buoyed by Luigi de Magistris's strong preferential vote in the and voter disillusionment with mainstream parties. However, this success masked emerging tensions, as IdV's refusal to compromise on alliances strained relations with the Democratic Party (PD), the center-left anchor. Di Pietro's leadership style, often personalistic and uncompromising, began fostering internal unease, with some members advocating for broader coalitions to sustain relevance, yet the party's core identity resisted dilution. The 2011 eurozone crisis precipitated a pivotal fracture when Mario Monti's technocratic government, installed after Berlusconi's resignation, received external support from PD and others, but IdV vehemently opposed its measures. Di Pietro publicly lambasted Monti, attributing rising suicides to the government's policies and rejecting any collaboration, which isolated IdV from potential center-left unity. This stance, while aligning with IdV's populist aversion to perceived elite-imposed sacrifices, alienated moderate voters and exacerbated rifts within the , as PD prioritized stability over confrontation. By 2013, internal cohesion frayed further amid debates over strategy, with Di Pietro's dominance stifling dissent but failing to adapt to the Five Star Movement's (M5S) surge, which captured the anti-system vote with fresher appeals. IdV's electoral performance plummeted in the February general elections, garnering just 2.25% in the —below the 4% threshold for coalition bonuses—and even less in the , resulting in no parliamentary representation. This setback stemmed from voter migration to M5S's 25.6% haul, competition for the same disaffected base, and IdV's perceived staleness, underscoring the perils of unyielding without organizational renewal.

Leadership Transition and Ongoing Decline (2013–present)

Following the Italia dei Valori's poor performance in the February 2013 general elections, where the party received 2.25% of the proportional vote for the and 1.89% for the —resulting in no parliamentary seats—founder resigned as secretary on June 28, 2013. At the party's national held shortly thereafter, Ignazio Messina, a and former elected in 2008, was chosen as Di Pietro's successor, securing 63% of the delegates' votes. Messina pledged a renewal focused on themes and broader alliances, but the transition coincided with internal challenges, including the departure of prominent figures and difficulty in adapting to Italy's fragmenting political landscape dominated by newer populist movements. Under Messina's leadership, Italia dei Valori continued its electoral erosion, failing to regain meaningful traction. In the May 2014 European Parliament elections, the party allied with the Pensioners' Party under the "Italia dei Valori-Pensionati" banner, obtaining 1.12% of the national vote—below the 4% threshold for proportional representation—and no seats. Subsequent contests yielded even lower visibility: the party did not contest the 2018 general elections independently, scattering candidates across other lists with negligible impact, and similarly abstained from standalone runs in the 2019 European elections, where affiliated efforts polled under 1%. By the 2022 general elections, Italia dei Valori had no significant presence, reflecting a vote share collapse from its mid-2000s peaks of 4-8% to marginal levels under 1%, attributable to voter migration to Five Star Movement and other anti-establishment forces, as well as the erosion of its core anti-corruption niche amid widespread disillusionment. The party's organizational decline persisted into the , with membership dwindling and no recovery in institutional roles since losing all seats in 2013. Messina maintained the secretary position, emphasizing and critiques, but efforts to reposition toward centrist or moderate coalitions—such as joining the "Noi Moderati" federation in 2024, which includes elements from across the spectrum—have yielded limited success, confining Italia dei Valori to peripheral status without parliamentary voice or polling above threshold levels as of 2025. This trajectory underscores the challenges faced by legacy parties in sustaining support amid Italy's volatile electorate and the rise of broader populist alternatives.

Ideology and Policy Positions

Anti-Corruption Focus and Populist Foundations

Italia dei Valori originated from the widespread public outrage over exposed by the investigations in the early 1990s, in which founder served as a lead prosecutor, uncovering a vast network of and illicit party financing known as Tangentopoli that implicated politicians across major parties. The party was established by Di Pietro in 2000 as a vehicle to institutionalize this crusade, emphasizing rigorous enforcement of laws against malfeasance, lifetime ineligibility for convicted public officials, and enhanced transparency in and financing. Its platform framed corruption not merely as isolated crimes but as a systemic betrayal by the political class, advocating for and citizen oversight mechanisms to prevent recurrence. The populist underpinnings of Italia dei Valori stemmed from its direct appeal to "honest " against an entrenched , employing that highlighted moral values and over institutional privileges, akin to broader sentiments in post-Tangentopoli Italy. Di Pietro's personal narrative as an outsider prosecutor-turned-politician reinforced this positioning, mobilizing support through public denunciations of "the caste" (la casta) of unaccountable leaders and calls for tools like binding referendums. While rooted in valence issues of integrity rather than ideological extremism, the party's strategy exploited disillusionment with traditional parties, achieving resonance by promising radical renewal without alienating centrist voters. This blend of moralism and populist mobilization distinguished Italia dei Valori in the fragmented Italian political landscape of the early .

Economic, Judicial, and Social Stances

Italia dei Valori promotes a healthy grounded in free competition and compliance with regulations, coupled with state interventions to rectify market failures and promote equitable resource allocation, especially for underdeveloped regions and vulnerable populations. The party views as requiring integration of market dynamics with social and environmental to avoid unchecked globalization's downsides. In practice, this stance has translated to support for public investments in , , and job creation, as articulated in regional campaign materials emphasizing sustainable growth over short-term fiscal . On judicial matters, the party centers its platform on reinforcing the rule of law through strict adherence to legality, impartial justice, and clear separation of powers to eliminate conflicts of interest in governance. Italia dei Valori excludes from membership individuals with criminal convictions that undermine these principles, as determined by internal guarantee commissions. Rooted in founder Antonio Di Pietro's role in the 1992–1994 Mani Pulite investigations, the party attributes systemic corruption primarily to political failures and advocates comprehensive reforms to streamline judicial processes, reduce case backlogs, and bolster magistrate independence from executive interference. Socially, Italia dei Valori upholds foundational principles of , equality, and while incorporating modern emphases on equal opportunities, , and solidarity across diverse groups. It acknowledges contributions from environmental, , and youth movements to inform policies on and new entitlements within a federal European framework. The party's commitments extend to initiatives, including transparency in public affairs, legitimate rights, and welfare-oriented measures addressing inequality, though without detailed positions on divisive cultural issues like structures or in available foundational documents.

Evolution and Internal Factionalism

The Italy of Values (IdV) initially positioned itself as a transversal, movement emphasizing moral renewal and institutional reform, drawing on founder Antonio Di Pietro's legacy from the investigations, without strict ideological alignment to traditional left-right divides. By the mid-2000s, participation in Romano Prodi's center-left governments (2006–2008) prompted a pragmatic evolution toward supporting progressive policies on justice and infrastructure, including Di Pietro's role as Minister of Infrastructure, though the party retained its core focus on combating and . This phase marked a shift from pure outsider to governance, but tensions arose over compromises perceived as diluting principles. From 2011 onward, IdV's opposition to Mario Monti's technocratic government and measures signaled a sharper populist turn, rejecting elite-driven reforms in favor of and economic , aligning temporarily with emerging anti-system forces like the Five Star Movement. Under subsequent leadership, the party attempted to incorporate and elements, but this evolution was inconsistent, hampered by Di Pietro's dominant , which prioritized charismatic appeals over programmatic depth, leading to accusations of ideological vagueness. Internal factionalism intensified after 2011, fueled by Di 's leadership style and responses to scandals, including a 2012 investigation alleging misuse of party funds by Di Pietro, which eroded trust and prompted public admissions from him that the party had "died" with the exposé. This triggered defections, notably Massimo Donadi's 2012 exit with a group of deputies to join Monti's Scelta Civica, citing over IdV's rigid anti-Monti stance and internal rigidity. Further splits occurred as local scandals involving figures like Silvana Mura amplified perceptions of , exacerbating divides between Di Pietro loyalists and reformists seeking broader alliances. The 2013 national congress formalized a transition, with Di Pietro resigning as president on amid poor electoral results (3.2% for Rivoluzione Civile coalition), handing over to Ignazio , who aimed to institutionalize the party and shift toward left-wing coalitions. However, lingering factionalism culminated in Di Pietro's full departure by October 2014, after briefly serving as honorary president, as he criticized the party's direction; this left IdV fragmented, with remaining members attempting but facing ongoing decline due to unresolved personalist vs. collective tensions. Multiple parliamentary exits followed, reducing representation and underscoring how unchecked internal conflicts, rather than external factors alone, accelerated the party's marginalization.

Leadership and Organization

Key Founders and Leaders

founded Italia dei Valori in 1998 as a movement focused on promoting legality and combating corruption, drawing on his background as a in the scandal that exposed widespread political graft in the early 1990s. Born in 1950 in Montenero di Bisaccia, Di Pietro transitioned from magistracy to politics in 1997, securing election as an independent senator aligned with the Ulivo coalition before launching the party. He led as president until February 2013, overseeing the party's participation in center-left alliances and its peak electoral performances, including serving as Minister of Infrastructure and Transports in the Prodi II government from May 2006 to May 2008. Following Di Pietro's resignation in 2013—prompted by the party's dismal 2013 general election results, where it garnered under 2% of the vote—Ignazio Messina was elected national secretary in June 2013 during an internal . A Sicilian lawyer born in in 1964, Messina joined Italia dei Valori at its inception in 1998, rising to regional spokesperson in and later serving as a from 2008 to 2013. He has since steered the party through further decline and attempts at revival, including alliances with centrist groups like Noi Moderati, maintaining his role as secretary into 2025. Prominent early leaders included Massimo Donadi, a longtime and leader who coordinated much of the party's legislative efforts until defecting to other formations in 2013 amid internal fractures. Felice Belisario also served as group president, contributing to the party's institutional presence during its opposition phases. The structure emphasized Di Pietro's personalist style, with limited internal democracy until post-2013 reforms aimed at base elections for roles.

Organizational Structure and Changes

The of Italia dei Valori (IdV) is defined by its national statute, which establishes the as the sovereign body responsible for approving the party's program, electing the national leadership, and making key strategic decisions. The National Executive, composed of members appointed by the President and , handles day-to-day operations and policy implementation, while the National President serves as the party's figurehead with authority over executive appointments and representation. An Office of the Presidency supports the leader in coordination roles, and regional and local circles provide nominal decentralized input, though the structure has historically emphasized central control over broad membership engagement. In 2009, IdV enacted statutory amendments that transitioned it from a loose ("Italia dei Valori – Lista Di Pietro") to a formalized , expanding the National Executive's powers to include broader decision-making on alliances and candidacy approvals, and limiting the presidential term to three years to promote renewal. These changes aimed to strengthen internal , shifting leader selection from a party council to mechanisms allowing greater congress involvement, amid the party's growth following its electoral gains. However, the reforms did not substantially deepen organizational roots, as IdV retained a minimal focused on electoral necessities rather than robust territorial networks, reflecting its origins as a leader-driven vehicle. Post-2013, following electoral declines, founder Antonio Di Pietro resigned as President on September 14, 2013, prompting a symbol redesign to remove his name and signaling a depersonalization effort. Ignazio Messina was elected National Secretary on February 23, 2014, by the party's assembly, introducing a secretariat role alongside the presidency to distribute authority and stabilize operations amid membership erosion. Under Messina, the structure persisted with statutory continuity but adapted through federations, such as the January 25, 2024, alliance with Noi Moderati, which integrated IdV into a broader moderate coalition while preserving core organs. Analyses describe this evolution as constrained by the party's persistent centralization and limited institutionalization, hindering adaptation to Italy's fragmented party system.

Electoral Performance

National Parliamentary Elections

Italia dei Valori (IdV) first contested national parliamentary elections in 2001 as Lista Di Pietro - Italia dei Valori, securing 1,443,725 votes (3.89%) in the election but no seats there, while obtaining 1,140,489 votes (3.37%) and one seat in the . The party ran independently under the centrist Ulivo coalition umbrella but failed to surpass thresholds for amid a fragmented opposition to the centre-right House of Freedoms alliance. In the 2006 elections, IdV participated within the centre-left L'Unione led by , which secured the majority prize. The party's proportional votes totaled 877,052 (2.30%) in the Chamber, yielding 16 seats, and 986,191 (2.89%) in the Senate, yielding 4 seats; additional seats stemmed from victories in single-member districts. This marked IdV's entry into as a minor partner, leveraging appeals during the Prodi government's brief tenure. IdV reached its electoral peak in 2008, allied with Walter Veltroni's Democratic Party in the centre-left coalition. It received 1,594,024 votes (4.37%) and 28 seats in the Chamber, and 1,414,730 votes (4.32%) and 14 seats in the under the . Despite the coalition's defeat to Silvio Berlusconi's centre-right, IdV's performance reflected growing voter disillusionment with established parties post-Mani Pulite scandals.
Election YearChamber Votes (%)Chamber SeatsSenate Votes (%)Senate Seats
20011,443,725 (3.89%)01,140,489 (3.37%)1
2006877,052 (2.30%)16986,191 (2.89%)4
20081,594,024 (4.37%)281,414,730 (4.32%)14
Subsequent elections saw sharp decline. In 2013, IdV joined the Rivoluzione Civile coalition with Antonio Ingroia, which garnered approximately 2.14% nationally but failed to win seats due to the 4% threshold for coalitions outside major alliances. The party did not contest independently, reflecting internal fractures and voter shift toward newer anti-establishment forces like the Five Star Movement. By 2018 and 2022, IdV fielded no national lists, endorsing minor centrist or progressive coalitions without securing representation, as its vote share fell below detectable thresholds amid rising abstention and polarization. This trajectory underscores IdV's reliance on coalition dynamics and niche, eroded by judicial reforms, party splits, and competition from broader populist movements.

European Parliament and Regional Elections

In the 2004 European Parliament elections, Italia dei Valori, running under the banner of Società Civile Di Pietro - Italia dei Valori, secured 2 seats aligned with the ALDE group. The party's representation reflected its emerging anti-corruption appeal amid national lists using proportional allocation for Italy's 78 seats at the time. The 2009 elections marked Italia dei Valori's peak European performance, with the party earning 7 seats in the ALDE group out of Italy's 72 allocated positions. This outcome, yielding approximately 2,439,250 votes or 7.99% nationally, stemmed from voter dissatisfaction with established parties post-economic crisis onset, though the seats were distributed via favoring larger coalitions indirectly. Subsequent terms saw IdV MEPs focus on transparency reforms, but internal shifts limited impact. By the 2014 elections, Italia dei Valori's support collapsed to 179,693 votes (0.66%), failing to cross effective thresholds for representation amid Italy's 73 seats and dominance by PD (40.8%) and M5S (21.2%). The party did not contest independently in later cycles like 2019 or 2024, reflecting organizational decline and voter migration to newer populist forces. In regional elections from 2005 to 2013, Italia dei Valori typically allied with center-left coalitions, achieving council seats in over half of contested regions during its zenith, including (supporting Giovanni Pace's 2005 win with ~7% list votes), , and Puglia. These gains, often 4-8% in allied contexts, enabled influence on local probes but proved fragile without national momentum. Post-2013, performances dwindled to marginal levels—e.g., under 2% in 2015 and negligible in subsequent races—yielding few or no seats as the party splintered and coalitions excluded it. This trajectory underscored reliance on Di Pietro's personal draw, absent sustained structural reforms.

Geographic and Demographic Patterns

The electoral support for Italia dei Valori (IdV) displayed notable geographic variations, with stronger performances in , particularly , where party founder Antonio Di Pietro's local prominence translated into heightened backing. In the 2008 Abruzzan regional election, Di Pietro's centre-left coalition secured victory with 49.2% of the vote (660,307 votes), narrowly defeating the centre-right's 47.8% (641,217 votes), underscoring regional affinity tied to his leadership and messaging. Nationally, IdV's 2008 results (4.37% for the ) showed elevated shares in (around 7% in some provincial breakdowns) and , regions linked to the investigations' origins in and broader appeals, compared to lower figures in southern extremes like and , where clientelistic networks may have diluted resonance. By the 2013 , amid national decline to 2.25%, regional disparities persisted, with residual strength in central areas but erosion in the north due to emerging competitors like the Five Star Movement absorbing similar protest votes. Demographic patterns of IdV voters remain understudied in peer-reviewed analyses, with available data sparse and largely inferred from broader voting trends rather than party-specific exit polls. Support skewed toward middle-aged and older voters (over 40), often in professional or public-sector occupations, reflecting appeal to those prioritizing institutional integrity amid post-Mani Pulite disillusionment, though no granular breakdowns by education, income, or gender are systematically documented for IdV alone. Urban and suburban areas, particularly in mid-sized cities with exposure to corruption scandals, contributed disproportionately, aligning with the party's judicial origins rather than rural or agrarian bases. This profile mirrored early populist formations emphasizing over socioeconomic redistribution, but lacked the youth or low-education mobilization seen in later movements.

Shifts in Support Over Time

Italy of Values initially garnered support in the wake of the corruption scandals, leveraging founder Antonio Di Pietro's prosecutorial reputation to appeal to voters disillusioned with established parties. In the 2001 general elections, the party's list received 3.9% of the valid votes for the , positioning it among smaller lists but below the threshold for significant gains outside coalitions. Support fluctuated modestly through the mid-2000s, with approximately 2% in the 2006 general elections, reflecting sustained but limited appeal amid broader center-left alliances. The party reached a peak in visibility and vote share during the 2008 general elections, allied with the Democratic Party, obtaining around 4.4% nationally and securing 29 seats in the and 14 in the . This uptick correlated with heightened public demand for judicial integrity and transparency, bolstered by Di Pietro's personal brand. Post-2008, support eroded amid intensifying competition from newer anti-system forces. In the 2009 elections, IdV achieved 8%—its electoral high—capitalizing on similar themes, but national polls in 2013 fell to 2.2% within the Rivoluzione Civile alliance. By 2014 European elections, the party polled below 1%, signaling marginalization. The sharp decline after 2013 stemmed primarily from the Five Star Movement's rapid ascent, which redirected and populist voters toward a fresher, tech-savvy platform less tainted by parliamentary compromises. Internal factors exacerbated this, including factional rifts, skipped congresses amid organizational disarray, and Di Pietro's 2014 withdrawal from active politics, which deprived the party of its charismatic anchor. Alliance instability, such as uneasy ties with the Democratic Party, alienated purist supporters without broadening the base, leading to IdV's effective dissolution into irrelevance by the late .

Controversies

Ties to Mani Pulite and Judicial Overreach Claims

Italia dei Valori (IdV) was established in 1998 by Antonio Di Pietro, a prominent prosecutor in the Mani Pulite investigations that commenced on February 17, 1992, with the arrest of Socialist politician Mario Chiesa for accepting a bribe. Di Pietro's role in uncovering systemic corruption, which implicated over 5,000 individuals and contributed to the dissolution of major parties like the Christian Democrats and Socialists, formed the core of the party's identity as an anti-corruption movement. The party's platform explicitly drew on this legacy, advocating for judicial-led moral renewal in politics and positioning Di Pietro as a symbol of integrity against entrenched elites. Critics have linked IdV to claims of judicial overreach during Mani Pulite, arguing that the investigations exemplified prosecutorial excess through tactics such as aggressive use of , extensive , and media leaks that amplified public outrage. These methods, while yielding confessions via plea incentives, were accused of constituting "judicial populism," where magistrates framed themselves as champions of the virtuous public against corrupt leaders, potentially undermining and contributing to over 50 suicides among suspects under investigation pressure. Despite uncovering verifiable networks, outcomes included low effective convictions—only about 2% of defendants imprisoned due to statutes of limitations and procedural delays—raising questions about sustainable reform versus temporary destabilization. Such critiques extended to IdV, portraying the party as an institutionalization of 's activist judiciary, with Di Pietro's transition to blurring and prioritizing moralistic crusades over legislative solutions. Figures like accused the Milan prosecutors, including Di Pietro, of politically motivated bias, labeling them a " minority" using for partisan ends, a view echoed in claims of a "judicial coup" that targeted politicians disproportionately while sparing business accomplices. Di Pietro himself faced investigation for abuse of office in 1995 related to his prosecutorial conduct but was acquitted, fueling ongoing debates about the inquiries' integrity. Italian academics have noted that while demonstrated judicial efficacy against , its excesses fostered public tolerance for extralegal methods and failed to prevent corruption's persistence, with Italy's scores remaining stagnant post-1990s.

Alliance Instability and Political Opportunism

The Italy of Values (IdV) party's alliances were marked by recurrent instability, primarily due to clashes between its rigid anti-corruption demands and the compromises required in coalition politics. During the Prodi II center-left government (2006–2008), leader served as Minister of Infrastructures from 17 May to 21 November 2006, resigning after six months amid frustrations over blocked reforms and coalition infighting, which exemplified early tensions within the Union alliance. IdV's uncompromising votes against certain government measures further strained the fragile coalition, contributing to its collapse in January 2008 following the withdrawal of support by smaller partners like UDEUR. Such episodes fueled criticisms that IdV prioritized ideological purity over governmental stability, exacerbating the broader volatility of Italian center-left coalitions. A pivotal fracture occurred in November 2011 with the formation of Mario Monti's technocratic government, which IdV opposed as an undemocratic austerity imposition, while its center-left counterpart, the Democratic Party (PD), provided external support. This divergence isolated IdV, accelerating the erosion of its alliance ties and electoral viability, as it positioned itself in opposition alongside parties like the Northern League. Critics argued this stance reflected not principled resistance but tactical that undermined potential influence, leading to IdV's sharp decline in the 2013 elections where it garnered under 2% of the vote. Accusations of political opportunism dogged IdV, with opponents portraying its shifts—such as Di Pietro's brief ministerial stint followed by vehement opposition—as self-serving maneuvers to exploit sentiment for personal and party gain. For instance, right-wing commentator labeled Di Pietro a "voltagabbana" () for allegedly abandoning commitments to justice referendums he had promoted, prioritizing power over consistency. Mutual barbs with UDC leader intensified this narrative; Casini denounced Di Pietro as an "opportunistic " scavenging on crises, while Di Pietro countered that Casini embodied "political prostitution" by courting winning factions. These exchanges, peaking around 2010–2011 amid third-pole speculations, highlighted perceptions of IdV's alliances as fluid and expedient, adapting to electoral winds rather than fixed values, ultimately hastening the party's 2013 dissolution into smaller entities.

Internal Scandals and Ineffectiveness Critiques

In 2012, Italia dei Valori (IdV) faced multiple internal scandals that eroded its anti-corruption credentials, including an investigative report by the program exposing questionable use of public reimbursements and party funds by parliamentarians, prompting leader to acknowledge embarrassment and decry media "killeraggio." Regional-level issues compounded this, such as the arrest of regional councilor Mario Maruccio on charges of extortion and corruption tied to public contracts, leading IdV to enact new internal screening rules to avoid "wrong people" in candidate selection. These events, alongside defections and probes into other figures like former secretary Enrico Maria Moscardelli, fueled accusations of hypocrisy, as the party—founded on principles—struggled with members implicated in the very malfeasance it condemned. Critics within and outside IdV lambasted Di Pietro's as authoritarian, with party members publicly labeling him a "" amid demands for democratic reforms, contributing to a that saw Massimo Donadi and others call for a to address alliance missteps and internal fractures. This personalistic structure, reliant on Di Pietro's persona, exacerbated ineffectiveness, as evidenced by the party's sharp electoral decline—from 8.3% in the 2008 general elections to marginal results by 2013—attributed to failure in sustaining voter trust post-scandals and inability to deliver tangible reforms beyond . Analysts noted IdV's oscillation between opposition rigidity and opportunistic coalitions, such as initial support for the Monti technocratic government followed by withdrawal, rendered it "condemned to ineffectiveness" in influencing policy or building a viable alternative to mainstream parties. The cumulative impact highlighted systemic weaknesses: despite advocating legalità, IdV's internal lacked transparency, with scandals revealing lax vetting and fund oversight, ultimately leading Di Pietro to exit in 2014 amid ongoing divisions under successor Ignazio Messina. Observers, including political commentators, argued this self-inflicted damage underscored the party's long-term viability failure, as anti-corruption zeal devolved into factionalism without institutionalizing reforms or preventing member misconduct.

Achievements and Criticisms

Anti-Corruption Advocacy Successes

During its participation in the Prodi II government from 2006 to 2008, Italy of Values, led by Antonio Di Pietro as Minister of Infrastructure, advocated for enhanced transparency in public procurement processes. Di Pietro committed to incorporating anti-corruption provisions into the third corrective decree of the Public Contracts Code (Codice degli Appalti), focusing on stricter oversight of infrastructure tenders prone to graft. These efforts aimed to reduce illicit practices in appalti pubblici by mandating detailed reporting and competitive bidding safeguards, building on the party's Mani Pulite heritage. In , Italy of Values sponsored and adopted multiple legislative proposals targeting prevention. In 2010, the party took ownership of bill AS 2156 and associated drafts, which sought to establish mechanisms for detecting and penalizing corrupt acts in , including whistleblower protections and asset disclosure requirements for officials. Although not all passed into law due to dynamics, these initiatives influenced subsequent debates and contributed to incremental reforms in administrative . The party also advanced Italy's international commitments against corruption by proposing ratification bills for global treaties. Parliamentary commissions approved a ratification measure put forward by , aligning domestic laws with frameworks like the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), ratified by in 2009, to harmonize penalties and investigative powers. As opposition voices, challenged Silvio Berlusconi's immunity legislation, such as the 2008 law shielding top officials from prosecution. Di criticized it as self-serving, and the group's push for a alongside constitutional challenges culminated in the Italian Constitutional Court's October 2009 ruling declaring the law unconstitutional, thereby enabling ongoing corruption probes against political figures. This outcome underscored the party's role in preserving against perceived protective statutes.

Failures in Systemic Reform and Long-Term Viability

Despite its origins in the anti-corruption fervor of the investigations, Italy of Values (IdV) failed to catalyze enduring systemic reforms in Italy's entrenched political and bureaucratic structures, which continued to exhibit and inefficiency post-1990s scandals. The party's emphasis on individual prosecutions rather than institutional overhauls—such as merit-based or streamlined judicial processes—limited its impact, as broader regulatory changes were necessary to prevent recurrence beyond punitive measures. During its participation in Romano Prodi's center-left from 2006 to 2008, IdV secured ministerial roles but contributed to no comprehensive addressing root causes like opaque public procurement or political financing, with the government's collapse amid internal fractures underscoring reform gridlock. Critics attributed IdV's reform shortcomings to strategic inconsistencies, including alliances with established left-wing parties that compromised its outsider and diluted demands for radical transparency. In opposition phases, the party often prioritized rhetorical attacks over constructive policy proposals, failing to build cross-partisan consensus for changes like overhauls or depoliticized appointments, which Italy repeatedly attempted but abandoned amid vested interests. Empirical indicators, such as Italy's persistent low rankings in perception indices (e.g., scores hovering around 50-60 out of 100 from 2006-2013), reflected the absence of IdV-driven transformations, as pre-Mani Pulite patronage networks adapted rather than dissolved. IdV's long-term viability eroded due to its dependence on founder Antonio Di Pietro's personal appeal, rendering it vulnerable as public fatigue with grew and newer movements like the Five Star Movement captured similar grievances. Electoral performance declined sharply: from 4.4% of the vote in the general elections to 2.25% in 2013, falling below thresholds in key races and yielding minimal parliamentary seats thereafter. By 2014, Di Pietro's exit amid internal scandals and voter disillusionment left IdV fragmented, with subsequent mergers into minor entities and vote shares under 1% in 2018 and 2022, confirming its marginalization in a fragmented resistant to single-issue reformers. This trajectory highlighted causal limitations: without scalable organizational depth or adaptive , IdV could not sustain viability against Italy's cyclical political volatility and competing forces.

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