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Kadima (Hebrew: קדימה, lit. 'Forward') was a centrist and liberal[3] political party in Israel. It was established on 24 November 2005 by moderates from Likud largely following the implementation of Ariel Sharon's unilateral disengagement plan in August 2005,[4] and was soon joined by like-minded Labor politicians.[5]

Key Information

With Ehud Olmert as party chairman following Sharon's stroke, it became the largest party in the Knesset after the 2006 elections, winning 29 of the 120 seats, and led a coalition government.

Kadima also won the most seats in the 2009 elections under Tzipi Livni's leadership. It was originally in opposition to the Likud-led coalition government under Benjamin Netanyahu. Kadima was briefly a member of the coalition with Netanyahu, joining the government in May 2012 after striking a deal with Netanyahu;[6] however, Kadima returned to the opposition two months later, leaving the government over a dispute over the Tal Law.[7]

Livni was defeated by the more conservative Shaul Mofaz in the March 2012 leadership election. The party's progressive wing, under Livni's leadership, broke away at the end of 2012 to form the new centre-left Hatnua party.[8][9][10] In the 2013 elections, Kadima became the smallest party in the Knesset, winning only two seats and barely passing the electoral threshold. The party ceased its political activities in March 2015 when it chose to not contest the 2015 elections.

History

[edit]

Formation

[edit]
"Kadima Israel", original logo from 2005

The party was founded by Sharon after he formally left Likud on 21 November 2005 to establish a new party that would grant him the freedom to carry out the disengagement plan—removing Israeli settlements from Palestinian territory and fixing Israel's borders with a prospective Palestinian state.

The name Kadima (literally: "Forward") emerged within the first days of the split and was favored by Sharon. However, the party was initially named "National Responsibility" (Hebrew: אחריות לאומית‎, Ahrayaut Leumit),[11] which was proposed by Justice Minister Tzipi Livni and endorsed by Reuven Adler, Sharon's confidante and strategy adviser. Although "National Responsibility" was regarded as provisional, subsequent tests conducted with focus groups proved it more popular than Kadima.[citation needed] However, on 24 November 2005 the party registered as Kadima.

The title Kadima may have had a symbolic connotation for many Israelis who associated it with the Hebrew battle cry, meaning 'forward march,' but it was common in Israeli political rhetoric. It had been used by early Zionist leader Nathan Birnbaum, and was the motto of the Jewish Legion of World War I formed by Ze'ev Jabotinsky and Joseph Trumpeldor. The name was criticised by Shinui leader Yosef Lapid, who compared it to Benito Mussolini's newspaper Avanti (Italian for "Forward").[12]

Shimon Peres, former leader of the Labor Party, formally joined Kadima and before being elected President of Israel was in the second place in the Kadima Knesset list after the Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and before the Foreign and Justice Minister, Tzipi Livni.

On the day after its founding, Kadima had nearly[clarification needed] 150 members, mostly defectors from Likud.[13] Several Knesset members from Labor, Likud, and other parties joined the new party, including cabinet ministers Ehud Olmert, Tzipi Livni, Meir Sheetrit, Gideon Ezra and Avraham Hirschson. Deputy ministers Ruhama Avraham, Majalli Wahabi, Eli Aflalo, Marina Solodkin, Ze'ev Boim and Yaakov Edri also joined, along with Likud MKs Roni Bar-On and Omri Sharon. Former Histadrut chairman Haim Ramon of Labor decided to join shortly thereafter.

On 30 November 2005, former Prime Minister Shimon Peres left the Labor Party after more than 60 years with the party and joined Kadima to help Sharon pursue the peace process. In the wake of Sharon's poor health, there was speculation that Peres might take over as leader of Kadima. One poll suggested the party would win 42 seats in the March 2006 elections with Peres as leader compared to 40 if led by Ehud Olmert. Most senior Kadima leaders were former members of Likud and indicated their support for (former Likud) Olmert as Sharon's successor.

Doubts following Sharon's medical problems

[edit]

The ramifications of Sharon's close identification with Kadima moved the party in an unexpected direction due to his mounting medical problems, which began only a few weeks after Kadima was formed. First, Sharon was hospitalized on 18 December 2005 after reportedly suffering a minor stroke.[14] This introduced a serious element of uncertainty for Sharon's and Kadima's supporters.

During his hospital stay, Sharon was also diagnosed with a minor hole in his heart and was scheduled to undergo a cardiac catheterization to fill the hole in his atrial septum on 5 January 2006. However, on 4 January 2006, 22:50 Israel Time (GMT +0200), Sharon suffered a massive hemorrhagic stroke, and was evacuated to Hadassah Ein Kerem hospital in Jerusalem to undergo brain surgery.

Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert succeeded him as Prime Ministerial candidate. Without Sharon, there was uncertainty about the future of the party. Nevertheless, three polls taken shortly after Sharon's illness showed that Kadima continued to lead its rivals by large margins.[15] Later polls showed Kadima strengthening its power base further, particularly amongst left wing voters who had opposed Sharon in the past.

In government

[edit]

On 16 January 2006, party members chose Ehud Olmert as acting chairman for the March elections.[16] Kadima won 29 seats, and was asked to form a government by president Moshe Katsav. Olmert formed a coalition with Labor, Shas and Gil, the government being sworn in on 4 May.

Yisrael Beiteinu joined the coalition in October 2006, but left again in January 2008 in protest at negotiations with the Palestinian Authority.

In opposition

[edit]

Olmert resigned as party leader in 2008, resulting in a leadership election, held on 17 September. The vote was won by Tzipi Livni, who beat Shaul Mofaz, Meir Sheetrit and Avi Dichter. Following her victory, Livni failed to form a coalition government, as she refused to agree to Shas' demands, resulting in early elections in February 2009. In the elections Kadima remained the largest party in the Knesset, winning 28 seats, one more than Likud. However, Likud's Netanyahu was asked to form a government by President Peres following talks with delegations from all parties represented in the Knesset.

Split

[edit]

Livni lost the leadership of Kadima to Shaul Mofaz, considered the leader of the party's right wing,[17][18] in a leadership election in March 2012.[19] In November, Livni, supported mainly by Kadima's dovish flank,[20][21][22][23] left Kadima with seven other Kadima MKs to form a new centrist political party, Hatnua.[24]

In the 2013 legislative election, Kadima lost almost 90% of its vote share from 2009. The party narrowly avoided being ejected from the Knesset, crossing the 2% threshold by just a few hundred votes. The party was reduced to just two MKs, Mofaz and Yisrael Hasson, making it the smallest of the 12 factions in the chamber. Prior to the 2015 elections Mofaz retired from politics after Kadima decided against joining the Zionist Union alliance.[25] Hasson had already left the Knesset in 2013 to become chairman of the Israel Antiquities Authority.

Following Mofaz's retirement, Akram Hasson was elected party leader, becoming the first Druze leader of a predominantly Jewish party.[26] However, his leadership was short-lived, with Hasson soon quitting the party to join the Kulanu list,[27] receiving the 12th slot. Kadima subsequently opted to sit out the election.[28]

Platform

[edit]
Part of a series on
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  • The Israeli nation has a national and historic right to the whole of Israel. However, in order to maintain a Jewish majority, part of the Land of Israel must be given up to maintain a Jewish and democratic state.
  • Israel shall remain a Jewish state and homeland. Jewish majority in Israel will be preserved by territorial concessions to Palestinians.
  • Jerusalem and large settlement blocs in the West Bank will be kept under Israeli control.
  • The Israeli national agenda to end the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and achieve two states for two nations will be the road map. It will be carried out in stages: dismantling terror organizations, collecting firearms, implementing security reforms in the Palestinian Authority, and preventing incitement. At the end of the process, a demilitarized Palestinian state devoid of terror will be established.
  • Israel's political system will be modified to ensure stability. One possibility to achieve this goal would be to hold primary, regional and personal elections to the Knesset and the Prime Minister's office.
  • Kadima would not rule out a future coalition partnership with any Israeli political party or person.
  • promoting equality for minorities
  • negative income tax and national pension
  • increasing social security benefits and national health insurance
  • civil marriage for same-sex couples
  • reform of police

Political objectives and policies

[edit]

In the early stages, the policies of Kadima directly reflected the views of Ariel Sharon and his stated policies.

Early statements from the Sharon camp reported by the Israeli media claimed that they were setting up a truly "centrist" and "liberal" party. It would appear that Sharon hoped to attract members of the Knesset from other parties and well-known politicians regardless of their prior beliefs provided they accepted Sharon's leadership and were willing to implement a "moderate" political agenda.

On the domestic front, Sharon had shown a tendency to agree with his past political partner, the pro-secular and outspokenly anti-religious Shinui party (his allies in the 2003 government), which sought to promote a secular civil agenda as opposed to the strong influence of Israel's Orthodox and Haredi parties. One of the Haredi parties, United Torah Judaism, joined Sharon's last coalition at the same time as the Labor Party, after Shinui had left Sharon's original governing coalition. In the past, Shinui had also called itself a "centrist" party because it rejected both Labor's socialism (its economic policies were free-market) and the Likud's opposition to a Palestinian state (however, from an international standpoint, Shinui may have actually been on the centre-right).

Justice Minister Tzipi Livni reportedly told Israel Army Radio that Kadima intended to help foster the desire for a separate Palestinian state, a move applauded by leftist Yossi Beilin.[citation needed]

Sharon was one of the prime architects pushing for the construction of the Israeli West Bank barrier that has been criticized by left-wing and right-wing Israeli politicians, but was a cornerstone of Sharon's determination to establish Israel's final borders, which he saw himself as uniquely suited to do in the so-called "Final Status" negotiations.

In a 22 November 2005 press conference, Sharon also mentioned that he favored withdrawing from untenable Israeli settlements in the West Bank, although he declined to give an actual timeline or specifics for the proposed action.[29]

Kadima favors continuing a market-based economy with adequate welfare benefits.[30][31]

Place in the political spectrum

[edit]

There has been some debate over where Kadima lies on the political spectrum. Many in the Western media use the term centrist,[32][33][34][35] (in that it is positioned between the Labor Party and Likud). Over the last thirty years, Israel has seen a movement by both the right and the left towards the center. Founder Ariel Sharon spent a career switching between the right of Israeli politics and the left—notably in the 1970s when he served as an aide to then Prime Minister Rabin. Most of its elected membership are former Likud party members, but it also has a number of notable ex-Labor MKs. The previous government of Ehud Olmert was considered left of center, collaborating with the Labor and two sector-socialist parties, Gil and Shas. Following the 2009 elections, with its subsequent political negotiations for a centrist coalition with the Likud and the Labor, it is suggested that the ideological differences of the center-left and center-right in Israel are fairly minor, but the fact that this only lasted 60 days belies this.

When Kadima was trying to form a coalition in 2006, the BBC reported that the new party leaned center-right in economic terms while its main coalition partner, Labor, leaned center-left. Labor wanted the Finance Ministry to push through some costly social reforms. It failed to get it, but still insists that the minimum wage, and pension and health benefits, be raised in Israel. At the time, Labor favored a negotiated land agreement with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, and Kadima had so far refused to speak to any Palestinian leader since the Hamas election and has spoken openly of taking unilateral steps in the West Bank, which the Palestinians oppose. Since then, however, Kadima has directly negotiated with the Palestinian Authority.[36]

Following the 2009 elections, Kadima led the opposition in the Knesset. During the elections, Kadima successfully attracted left-of-center voters, to the dismay of Labor and Meretz leaders, who discouraged their supporters from doing so.[37][38] Neither Labor nor Meretz, who were initially expected to be Kadima's natural allies, recommended Livni as prime minister to Peres, reportedly due to Livni's courting of Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael Beiteinu party.[39][40] Shimon Peres told Ynet in 2006 that "there is no difference" between Kadima and Labor, and suggested that the two groups unite. He added that neither he nor Kadima founder Ariel Sharon liked the economic policy of Likud chairman Benjamin Netanyahu.[41] The Haaretz diplomatic correspondent Aluf Benn suggested in November 2009, that Kadima does not have any ideological differences with the Labor Party that would prevent a merger.[42]

Leaders of Kadima

[edit]
# Image Leader Took
office		 Left
office		 Prime
Ministerial
tenure		 Knesset elections Elected/reelected
as leader
1 Ariel Sharon 2005 2006 2001–2006
2 Ehud Olmert 2006 2008 2006–2009 2006 2006 (interim leader)[43][44]
3 Tzipi Livni 2008 2012 2009 2008
4 Shaul Mofaz 2012 2015 2013 2012
5 Akram Hasson 2015 2015 2015

In addition, Shimon Peres, a former head of Labor, served as Deputy Leader, and was elected President as the Kadima candidate.

Knesset election results

[edit]
Election year Party Leader Votes % Seats won +/- Government
2006 Ehud Olmert 690,901 22.02 (No. 1)
29 / 120
 Increase15 Coalition
2009 Tzipi Livni 758,032 22.47 (No. 1)
28 / 120
 Decrease1 Opposition
2013 Shaul Mofaz 79,081 2.09 (No. 12)
2 / 120
 Decrease26 Opposition

Knesset members

[edit]

After the 2013 election the party had two MKs:

Former Knesset members

[edit]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Kadima

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Kadima (Hebrew: קָדִימָה, lit. 'Forward') was a centrist political party in Israel founded in November 2005 by then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon following his resignation from the Likud party amid disagreements over the Gaza disengagement and further territorial concessions. The party attracted defectors from both Likud and Labor, positioning itself as a pragmatic centrist force advocating unilateral separation from Palestinian-populated areas to enhance Israel's security and demographic integrity. In its debut 2006 elections, Kadima secured 29 seats to become the Knesset's largest party, enabling Ehud Olmert to form a coalition government after Sharon's incapacitating stroke. The party repeated as the top vote-getter in 2009 under Tzipi Livni with 28 seats, though it entered opposition when Likud's Benjamin Netanyahu built a broader coalition. Despite initial successes in moderating Israel's political landscape and advancing disengagement policies, Kadima grappled with leadership instability, Olmert's corruption convictions, the fallout from the 2006 Lebanon War, and repeated electoral erosion—dropping to two seats in 2013—culminating in its effective dissolution by 2015 after failing to field candidates.

History

Formation and Founding Principles

Kadima was established on November 21, 2005, when Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced the creation of a new centrist political party after resigning from the leadership of the Likud party. The split from Likud stemmed primarily from internal opposition within the party to Sharon's unilateral disengagement plan from Gaza, implemented in August 2005, which had led to significant rifts and a leadership struggle. Sharon's departure was precipitated by at least half of Likud members rejecting the disengagement, prompting him to seek a platform more aligned with his pragmatic approach to security and territorial issues. The party's founding principles were publicly outlined on November 28, 2005, emphasizing the preservation of Israel's Jewish majority through territorial concessions if necessary to maintain democratic character and security. Kadima advocated for delineating permanent borders, continuing withdrawals from parts of Gaza and the West Bank, and ensuring maximum security while affirming Israel's historic right to the whole of the land, balanced against the need for a demilitarized Palestinian state. The platform supported a two-state solution to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, combining Zionist ideology with bold actions against terrorism and separation from Palestinians, while promoting social welfare and economic policies aimed at growth. Positioned as a "forward"-moving centrist force, Kadima sought to transcend the traditional dominance of Likud and Labor by attracting moderate voters disillusioned with ideological extremes, focusing on national responsibility and pragmatic governance over rigid partisanship. This approach reflected Sharon's vision of unilateral steps for peace and security when bilateral negotiations stalled, prioritizing Israel's Jewish and democratic nature amid ongoing threats.

Sharon's Incapacity and Transition to Olmert


Ariel Sharon, the founder and leader of Kadima, suffered a massive stroke on January 4, 2006, entering a coma from which he never recovered. Ehud Olmert, serving as Sharon's deputy prime minister, was immediately designated acting prime minister on January 5, 2006. Two weeks later, on January 16, 2006, Kadima's central committee confirmed Olmert as the party's interim leader, ensuring continuity amid the leadership vacuum. Sharon was initially declared temporarily incapacitated by Attorney-General Menahem Mazuz on January 6, 2006. On April 11, 2006, after 97 days of assessing his condition, the Israeli cabinet unanimously declared Sharon permanently incapacitated, formally terminating his tenure as prime minister. This decision elevated Olmert to interim prime minister effective April 11, 2006, solidifying his control over both the government and Kadima as the party prepared for national elections. The transition preserved Kadima's momentum from Sharon's disengagement initiatives, with Olmert committing to pursue similar pragmatic policies on security and territorial concessions.

Governments and Policy Implementation

Following the March 28, 2006, Knesset elections, in which Kadima secured 29 seats amid Ariel Sharon's incapacitation, Ehud Olmert formed Israel's thirty-first government on May 4, 2006. The coalition encompassed Kadima, Labor (19 seats), Shas (12 seats), Gil (7 seats), Yisrael Beiteinu (initially), and United Torah Judaism (6 seats), commanding a 67-seat majority in the 120-seat Knesset. This assembly prioritized security-driven territorial realignment, economic liberalization, and social welfare enhancements, though external conflicts and internal scandals constrained execution. Central to the government's agenda was the "convergence" or realignment plan, extending Sharon's 2005 Gaza disengagement by proposing unilateral evacuation of isolated West Bank settlements—potentially affecting up to 80,000 residents—to fortify major settlement blocs along a security barrier, thereby defining defensible borders without Palestinian coordination. Initial preparations advanced in 2006, including settlement mapping and compensation frameworks, but the July-August Second Lebanon War against Hezbollah derailed momentum, as public focus shifted to military shortcomings exposed by the conflict's inconclusive outcome. The subsequent Winograd Commission, appointed in September 2006 and reporting in April 2007, lambasted Olmert's wartime decision-making for inadequate preparation and strategic ambiguity, eroding support for further withdrawals. No major West Bank evacuations occurred, marking the plan's effective abandonment by 2007. In foreign policy, Olmert pivoted to bilateral diplomacy post-Annapolis Conference in November 2007, which he hosted to relaunch Israeli-Palestinian talks under U.S. auspices. Negotiations with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas yielded Olmert's September 2008 proposal, offering over 93% of the West Bank (with land swaps for the remainder), shared sovereignty in Jerusalem, and symbolic refugee returns, but Abbas rejected it amid Olmert's impending resignation over corruption probes. Security implementation included authorizing Operation Cast Lead on December 27, 2008, a large-scale Gaza incursion against Hamas rocket barrages that had intensified since the 2005 disengagement, aiming to degrade militant infrastructure and restore deterrence. The operation, involving air and ground phases until January 18, 2009, reduced rocket launches temporarily but drew international scrutiny for civilian casualties. Domestically, the administration pursued centrist reforms to mitigate poverty and social disparities, allocating an additional 2.9 billion shekels (approximately 800 million USD at 2007 rates) to social budgets in the 2007 fiscal plan. Policies emphasized export promotion, antitrust measures to heighten market competition, and poverty alleviation through targeted welfare expansions, aligning with Kadima's platform to balance growth with equity. Olmert also advanced trilateral trade pacts with Egypt and the U.S. to bolster regional economic ties, though coalition frictions—exemplified by Shas's demands for ultra-Orthodox subsidies—occasionally stalled legislative progress. By mid-2008, mounting corruption investigations against Olmert precipitated coalition strains and his July 2008 resignation announcement, curtailing the government's capacity for sustained policy execution until early elections.

Shift to Opposition under Livni

Following Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's resignation on September 1, 2008, amid ongoing corruption investigations, Kadima held a leadership primary election on September 17, 2008. Tzipi Livni, the party's foreign minister, narrowly defeated Transportation Minister Shaul Mofaz, securing 46.1% of the votes to Mofaz's 41.7%, with the remainder going to minor candidates. President Shimon Peres subsequently tasked Livni with forming a new coalition government, granting her 42 days to negotiate with other parties. Livni's efforts to build a coalition faltered primarily over disputes with ultra-Orthodox parties, including Shas, which demanded concessions on a bill standardizing conversions to Judaism—a measure Kadima supported to ease immigration for non-Orthodox converts. Shas and United Torah Judaism refused to join without revisions that would preserve rabbinical court authority, leading to a deadlock. On October 26, 2008, Livni conceded failure and recommended dissolving the Knesset, triggering early legislative elections for February 10, 2009. In the 2009 elections, Kadima under Livni secured 28 seats in the 120-member Knesset, one more than Likud's 27, making it the largest party. Despite this, Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu, with support from right-wing and religious parties, formed a coalition government commanding a 74-seat majority by March 31, 2009. Kadima thus transitioned to the opposition benches, with Livni assuming the role of leader of the opposition. As opposition leader from 2009 to 2012, Livni criticized Netanyahu's policies on settlements and peace negotiations while advocating for renewed talks with the Palestinian Authority, though Kadima's influence waned amid internal divisions and public fatigue with centrist politics. The party's inability to capitalize on its 2009 plurality highlighted the fragmented Israeli political landscape, where coalition arithmetic favored the right-wing bloc.

Leadership Instability and Splintering

Following Tzipi Livni's leadership of Kadima in opposition after the 2009 elections, internal tensions escalated, culminating in a contentious party primary on March 27, 2012, where Shaul Mofaz defeated Livni with 61.7% of the vote to her 37.2%. Mofaz's victory, which some observers attributed to his appeal among party voters disillusioned with Livni's inability to form a government in 2009, immediately fractured party unity, as Livni's supporters accused the process of irregularities and low turnout among her base. Livni resigned from the Knesset on May 1, 2012, citing the leadership loss and broader political dysfunction, though she initially pledged to remain active in Kadima; however, this marked the beginning of her departure, as she formally left the party later that year to establish Hatnuah, a new centrist faction that drew away several Kadima figures and voters focused on peace negotiations. Mofaz's subsequent decisions exacerbated divisions: in May 2012, he led Kadima into Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's coalition, securing a temporary postponement of elections, but the alliance collapsed on July 17, 2012, over irreconcilable differences regarding military draft exemptions for ultra-Orthodox Jews, with Mofaz withdrawing the party's support amid accusations that Netanyahu prioritized coalition stability over reform. This rapid entry and exit highlighted Mofaz's precarious hold, as internal critics within Kadima viewed it as opportunistic maneuvering that alienated both hawkish and dovish wings. The Mofaz era saw further splintering through defections and factional maneuvering; for instance, in July 2012, Mofaz attempted to expel four Kadima MKs negotiating separately with Likud, underscoring deepening rifts over coalition loyalty. Attempts at reconciliation, such as a short-lived January 2013 agreement between Mofaz and Livni for a joint electoral list with rotating leadership, collapsed amid mutual distrust, leaving Kadima isolated as Livni's Hatnuah competed independently. By late 2012, the party's cadre had fragmented, with members defecting to emerging parties like Yesh Atid, reflecting Kadima's eroding ideological coherence and Mofaz's failure to consolidate a stable base amid repeated leadership gambles.

Final Decline and Dissolution

In March 2012, Shaul Mofaz defeated incumbent leader Tzipi Livni in Kadima's primaries, securing approximately 67% of the vote in a landslide victory that highlighted deepening internal divisions. Livni, who had led the party since 2008, resigned shortly thereafter and founded the rival Hatnua party in November 2012, further fragmenting Kadima's centrist base. Under Mofaz, Kadima briefly joined Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's coalition in May 2012, forming a unity government aimed at advancing legislative reforms including military draft changes for ultra-Orthodox Jews. However, the alliance collapsed on July 17, 2012, when Kadima withdrew from the government amid failure to enact the promised conscription reforms, prompting Mofaz to declare the exit unavoidable and triggering early elections for January 2013. In the January 22, 2013, legislative elections, Kadima suffered a catastrophic decline, capturing only 2 seats in the 120-member Knesset with 2.08% of the vote, a sharp drop from 28 seats in 2009, as voters shifted to emerging parties like Yesh Atid. The party's two remaining Knesset members were Mofaz and Yisrael Hasson, rendering Kadima marginal in opposition. Kadima's remnants continued in obscurity, with no significant legislative influence or public revival. The party ceased political activities in March 2015 and opted not to contest the March 17, 2015, elections, effectively dissolving as its members dispersed to other factions, including Hasson's defection to Likud. This marked the end of Kadima as a viable political entity, seven years after its founding dominance.

Ideology and Positions

Centrist Framework and Evolution

Kadima positioned itself as a centrist political force upon its founding on November 24, 2005, by Ariel Sharon and defectors from Likud, seeking to bridge ideological divides after the contentious Gaza disengagement of August 2005. The party's framework emphasized pragmatic realism in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, endorsing the U.S.-backed road map for peace while demanding a demilitarized Palestinian state, disarmament of terrorist groups, and no additional unilateral territorial withdrawals beyond Gaza. This approach reflected a consensus-driven centrism that prioritized Israel's security fence and rejection of full return to 1967 borders, viewing Palestinian territorial claims as threats to Jewish statehood, rather than idealistic territorial maximalism or concessions. Domestically, Kadima advocated reducing social inequalities and poverty through enhanced market competition and greater transparency in public fund distribution, blending economic liberalization with compassionate welfare measures to appeal broadly across ethnic and religious lines. Unlike narrower centrist predecessors, it incorporated diverse figures from Sephardic, religious, and even Arab communities, aiming for inclusive governance over sectarian politics. The party's centrist orientation evolved modestly through leadership transitions but ultimately eroded amid external pressures. Under Sharon, it focused on unilateral security actions; after his January 2006 stroke, Ehud Olmert led Kadima to 29 seats in the March 2006 elections, maintaining core tenets while navigating coalition governance and security challenges like the 2006 Lebanon War. Tzipi Livni's September 2008 leadership sustained advocacy for a two-state solution and peace process advancement, securing 28 seats in February 2009, yet the framework faced dilution from internal scandals, polarized electorates, and failure to adapt to shifting voter priorities, contributing to electoral collapse to two seats by January 2013. This trajectory highlighted centrism's historical fragility in Israel's high-stakes politics, where pragmatic consensus proved vulnerable to ideological flanks.

Security and Foreign Policy Stances

Kadima's security policy was rooted in Ariel Sharon's doctrine of unilateral disengagement to consolidate Israel's defenses along defensible borders, as demonstrated by the 2005 Gaza withdrawal, which removed 21 settlements and approximately 9,000 settlers to minimize exposure to Palestinian militancy and redirect military resources toward threats like Hezbollah and Iran. This approach prioritized separation over negotiation, viewing Gaza's isolation as a means to enhance security rather than a concession toward peace, despite subsequent rocket attacks from Hamas validating critics' concerns over the lack of security coordination. The party supported a conditional two-state solution, advocating retention of major West Bank settlement blocs (encompassing about 80% of settlers) in exchange for land swaps, alongside demands for Palestinian demilitarization, international security guarantees, and completion of the security barrier to curb terrorism. Under Ehud Olmert's leadership, Kadima authorized military responses to post-disengagement threats, including the 2006 Second Lebanon War—deploying over 30,000 troops against Hezbollah's rocket barrages—and Operation Cast Lead (December 2008–January 2009), which involved airstrikes and ground incursions into Gaza to degrade Hamas infrastructure after thousands of rockets targeted Israeli civilians. Diplomatically, Olmert advanced bilateral talks at the 2007 Annapolis Conference, offering Palestinians 93-97% of the West Bank with swaps, though stalled by Palestinian rejections and domestic scandals. Kadima regarded Iran's nuclear ambitions as Israel's paramount existential threat, with leaders committing to preventive action; Ehud Olmert declared in January 2006 that Israel "under no circumstances" would permit a nuclear Iran, while Shaul Mofaz, a senior Kadima figure, warned in June 2008 of potential Israeli strikes on Iranian facilities if diplomacy failed. The party's platform explicitly pledged "any way" to thwart Iranian weaponization, reflecting a hawkish stance on proliferation amid Tehran's support for proxies like Hezbollah. Foreign policy emphasized alliances with the United States for intelligence and defense aid—totaling $3 billion annually—and cautious engagement with moderate Arab states, though Kadima critiqued over-reliance on international forces in Gaza due to enforcement risks.

Domestic and Economic Policies

Kadima advocated a centrist approach to economic policy, combining market-oriented reforms with efforts to mitigate social inequalities. The party's 2006 socioeconomic platform proposed implementing a negative income tax to support low-income earners, alongside tax deductions for childcare expenses to encourage workforce participation, particularly among women. It emphasized increasing competition through privatization of state-owned enterprises, reallocating national priorities toward high-growth sectors, and attracting foreign investment to bolster economic dynamism. These measures aligned with Israel's ongoing shift from socialism to capitalism, reflecting continuity from the party's Likud origins while prioritizing efficiency over expansive redistribution. Under Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's Kadima-led government (2006–2009), fiscal policies included a significant expansion of social spending, with an additional 2.9 billion U.S. dollars allocated to social affairs in the 2007 budget to address poverty and gaps. Olmert described this as embodying an "economics of compassion," though critics from the left argued it insufficiently aided the poor, while right-leaning voices warned of potential distributive pressures undermining growth. The administration pursued structural adjustments, such as enhancing market competition, but economic performance during this period was influenced by external factors like the 2008 global financial crisis rather than uniquely partisan initiatives. Domestically, Kadima focused on social welfare enhancements, including education reforms and investments in early childhood development up to age six, aimed at reducing socioeconomic disparities. Policies also targeted minority sectors, such as Arab Israelis, through gap-closing programs, reflecting the party's commitment to combating poverty and fostering inclusion within a Jewish-democratic framework. On religion-state relations, Kadima endorsed the prevailing status quo, avoiding radical secularization while urging the Chief Rabbinate to adopt more flexible stances on issues like conversions and personal status laws. The party prioritized institutional reforms for political stability, advocating electoral changes such as primaries, regional voting, and personal elections to curb fragmentation and enhance governance accountability. In the 2012 unity government with Likud, Kadima's involvement under Shaul Mofaz emphasized domestic priorities like electoral overhaul to address systemic inefficiencies, though these efforts yielded limited legislative success amid coalition tensions. Overall, Kadima's domestic agenda sought pragmatic balances between welfare expansion and fiscal restraint, often constrained by Israel's multiparty dynamics and security imperatives.

Electoral Performance

2006 Election Victory

Ariel Sharon's massive stroke on January 4, 2006, left him in a vegetative state, prompting Ehud Olmert to assume the role of acting prime minister and leading Kadima into the upcoming elections. On January 16, 2006, Kadima members elected Olmert as the party's interim chairman, positioning him to campaign on Sharon's legacy of pragmatic security policies and territorial realignment. The election campaign centered on Olmert's "convergence plan," which advocated unilateral Israeli withdrawal from isolated West Bank settlements east of the security barrier to strengthen defensible borders and reduce friction with Palestinians, building on the 2005 Gaza disengagement. This approach contrasted with Likud's opposition to further withdrawals and Labor's push for renewed negotiations, amid public fatigue with stalled peace talks and rising security threats from Gaza. Held on March 28, 2006, the elections saw Kadima win 29 of 120 Knesset seats with voter turnout at 63.2 percent, securing a plurality but fewer mandates than pre-election polls had projected. The result marked a rebuke to Likud, which under Benjamin Netanyahu garnered only 11 seats, reflecting widespread support for Kadima's centrist path despite Sharon's absence. This victory enabled Olmert to form a coalition government, sworn in on May 4, 2006, with Kadima at its core.

2009 and Subsequent Declines

In the February 10, 2009, Knesset elections, Kadima, under the leadership of Tzipi Livni, received 750,762 votes, securing 28 seats and forming the largest parliamentary bloc, narrowly ahead of Likud's 27 seats. Despite this plurality, President Shimon Peres tasked Benjamin Netanyahu with forming a coalition government, as Likud garnered broader support from right-wing parties, leaving Kadima in opposition. Kadima's fortunes reversed sharply in the January 22, 2013, elections, where the party, now led by Shaul Mofaz, obtained 146,013 votes, translating to just 2 seats—a drop from 28 amid internal divisions and leadership instability. This result marked one of the most dramatic declines for any major Israeli party, reducing Kadima to marginal status in the 19th Knesset. The party's erosion culminated in its effective dissolution; Kadima chose not to field candidates in the March 17, 2015, elections and ceased political activities thereafter, ending its decade-long presence as a significant force in Israeli politics.

Factors in Electoral Erosion

Kadima's electoral support began eroding significantly after its 2006 victory, with the party securing 28 seats in the 2009 election but failing to form a governing coalition despite receiving the most votes. This decline accelerated in subsequent elections, culminating in just 2 seats in 2013. A primary factor was the perceived failure of the 2005 Gaza disengagement, which Kadima had championed under Ariel Sharon; Hamas's violent takeover of Gaza in June 2007 and the ensuing surge in rocket attacks on southern Israel—over 2,000 in 2008 alone—fostered widespread public regret and a shift toward skepticism of unilateral territorial concessions. This security backlash undermined Kadima's core platform of pragmatic centrism favoring phased withdrawals, as voters increasingly prioritized deterrence over disengagement, boosting right-wing parties like Likud. Leadership instability further exacerbated the erosion, beginning with Sharon's debilitating stroke on January 4, 2006, which removed the party's charismatic founder and left a vacuum. Ehud Olmert's subsequent tenure as prime minister was marred by multiple corruption investigations, including charges of bribery and breach of trust, leading to his resignation on September 30, 2008, and tarnishing Kadima's image. Tzipi Livni's ascension as party leader failed to stabilize support; despite Kadima's plurality in 2009, her inability to cobble together a coalition—due to refusals from parties like Shas and Yisrael Beiteinu—triggered early elections and portrayed the party as ineffective. By 2012, internal primaries saw Shaul Mofaz oust Livni with 75% of the vote, but his brief entry into Netanyahu's coalition in May 2012 and abrupt exit in July over ultra-Orthodox draft exemptions deepened perceptions of opportunism and disarray. Internal divisions and policy incoherence compounded these issues, as frequent leadership battles and defections fragmented the voter base; for instance, Mofaz's coalition maneuvers alienated centrists, while the 2013 Livni-Mofaz rotation agreement failed to inspire confidence amid ongoing scandals and a lack of clear ideological renewal. The emergence of competitors like Yesh Atid, which captured protest vote energy from the 2011 social justice demonstrations by promising economic reforms, siphoned moderate supporters seeking alternatives to Kadima's faltering centrism. Overall, these dynamics reflected a broader realignment in Israeli politics toward security-focused conservatism, rendering Kadima's original appeal—bridging Likud hawks and Labor doves—obsolete by the early 2010s.

Leadership

Ariel Sharon's Role

Ariel Sharon, serving as Prime Minister since 2001, initiated the formation of Kadima in November 2005 following his resignation from the Likud party amid internal opposition to his unilateral disengagement from Gaza, which had been implemented between August 15 and September 12, 2005. The disengagement involved the evacuation of approximately 8,500 Israeli settlers and the withdrawal of military forces from the Gaza Strip, a policy Sharon advocated to enhance Israel's security by reducing exposure to Palestinian violence and preserving a Jewish demographic majority. On November 21, 2005, Sharon publicly announced the creation of a new movement, initially termed "National Responsibility," which was soon renamed Kadima, attracting defectors from Likud and Labor who supported his pragmatic approach to territorial concessions for strategic gains. Sharon positioned Kadima as a centrist alternative emphasizing national security through phased separations from areas with dense Palestinian populations, while maintaining control over major settlement blocs in the West Bank. The party's platform, released on November 28, 2005, affirmed Israel's historic claim to the entire land but prioritized practical separation, including demands for Palestinians to dismantle terror organizations, collect illegal firearms, and enact security reforms as prerequisites for further Israeli withdrawals. This framework reflected Sharon's shift from hardline expansionism to "disengagement realism," driven by demographic pressures—whereby continued occupation risked eroding Israel's Jewish character—and the inefficacy of bilateral negotiations amid ongoing Palestinian terrorism, such as the Second Intifada's suicide bombings that had claimed over 1,000 Israeli lives since 2000. As Kadima's unchallenged leader, Sharon rapidly built it into a viable electoral force, polling ahead of rivals by late 2005, with projections of securing 40 or more seats in the upcoming March 2006 Knesset elections. His personal stature as a former military commander and decisive politician lent credibility to the party's "forward" (Kadima's Hebrew meaning) vision of proactive security measures over ideological rigidity. However, on December 18, 2005, Sharon suffered a minor stroke but resumed duties shortly after; a massive hemorrhagic stroke on January 4, 2006, necessitated emergency surgery and left him in a coma, effectively ending his active leadership before the elections. Sharon's incapacitation shifted Kadima's trajectory to interim leader Ehud Olmert, though the party's initial success in the 2006 vote—winning 29 seats—owed much to Sharon's foundational momentum and policy imprint.

Successive Party Leaders

Ehud Olmert assumed leadership of Kadima in January 2006 following Ariel Sharon's incapacitating stroke on January 4, 2006, becoming the party's interim chairman and candidate for prime minister. Olmert guided the party through the March 2006 legislative elections, where Kadima secured 29 seats and formed a coalition government, with Olmert serving as prime minister until September 2008, when he resigned amid ongoing corruption investigations that led to his eventual indictment. In September 2008 party primaries, Tzipi Livni was elected Kadima's new leader, defeating rival Shaul Mofaz and assuming the chairmanship as Olmert stepped down. Livni led the party into the 2009 elections, retaining 28 seats but failing to form a government, and continued as opposition leader until internal challenges mounted; she resigned the leadership after losing the March 27, 2012 primaries to Mofaz, who won with 62% of the vote. Shaul Mofaz chaired Kadima from March 2012 to 2015, during which the party joined a national unity government in May 2012 but suffered electoral collapse in January 2013, winning only two seats. Mofaz retired from leadership ahead of the 2015 elections, after which Akram Hasson, a Druze politician and former MK, was elected chair in late 2014, marking the first time a non-Jew led the party; Hasson's tenure was brief, as Kadima failed to contest the March 2015 elections effectively and won no seats, effectively ending its parliamentary presence.

Controversies and Criticisms

Gaza Disengagement Consequences

The unilateral Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip, completed on August 22, 2005, involved the evacuation of all 21 Jewish settlements and approximately 8,000 settlers, along with the withdrawal of military forces from the territory. Proponents, including Ariel Sharon, argued it would reduce friction and improve Israel's security by removing troops from densely populated areas, but the absence of a robust enforcement mechanism or coordination with Palestinian authorities allowed militant groups to exploit the vacuum. Within months, Palestinian rocket attacks on southern Israel intensified, with thousands launched since 2005, resulting in dozens of Israeli deaths and hundreds of injuries. The disengagement facilitated Hamas's electoral victory in the Palestinian legislative elections on January 25, 2006, where the group secured a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council, emboldening its challenge to Fatah's authority. This culminated in the Battle of Gaza from June 10 to 15, 2007, a violent civil war in which Hamas ousted Fatah forces, seizing full control of the Strip and establishing an Islamist regime. Hamas's governance transformed Gaza into a base for anti-Israel operations, with rocket barrages escalating post-2007; for instance, attacks that were sporadic before the disengagement surged, necessitating Israeli military responses including Operation Cast Lead in December 2008–January 2009. The withdrawal's failure to include a "day-after" strategy for maintaining order contributed to this outcome, as Hamas diverted resources from development to armament, including smuggling advanced weaponry. Economically, Gaza experienced a brief post-disengagement uptick in activity due to eased restrictions, but Hamas's rule led to rapid deterioration, exacerbated by Israel's tightened blockade imposed after the 2007 takeover to curb arms inflows. The territory's economy collapsed under mismanagement, with unemployment soaring above 40% by the early 2010s and GDP per capita stagnating amid corruption and prioritization of military infrastructure over civilian needs. Recurrent conflicts, such as those in 2012, 2014, and 2021, further devastated infrastructure, while Hamas's rejection of peace initiatives perpetuated isolation. Long-term security consequences included a fortified perception in Israel that territorial withdrawals without reciprocal concessions or demilitarization incentives heighten terrorism risks, as evidenced by Gaza's evolution into a launchpad for attacks reaching deeper into Israeli territory via upgraded projectiles. Critics contend the policy strengthened rejectionist elements like Hamas, undermined moderate Palestinian leadership, and yielded no diplomatic progress, instead entrenching cycles of violence that persisted into the 2023 Hamas-led assault. This outcome contradicted Sharon's assurances of enhanced security, highlighting the challenges of unilateralism absent Palestinian buy-in or international guarantees.

Corruption Allegations and Scandals

Ehud Olmert, who succeeded Ariel Sharon as Kadima leader and served as prime minister from 2006 to 2009, faced multiple corruption investigations that significantly damaged the party's reputation. In the Talansky affair, revealed in May 2008, American businessman Morris Talansky testified that he delivered cash envelopes totaling around $150,000 to Olmert between 1998 and 2005, allegedly for legitimate purposes but raising suspicions of bribery and money laundering. Although Olmert was not convicted in this case, the scandal prompted his July 30, 2008, announcement to resign as party leader once a successor was chosen, amid mounting pressure from within Kadima and the public. Olmert's legal troubles continued post-resignation, culminating in convictions that substantiated some allegations. In the 2012 Investment Center case, he was found guilty of breach of trust for granting favorable approvals to clients of his former law partner Uri Messner, receiving undeclared benefits worth approximately 700,000 shekels ($187,000). More gravely, in the Holyland real estate scandal, a Tel Aviv court convicted him on March 31, 2014, of bribery for accepting 500,000 shekels ($137,000) in cash envelopes from contractor Shula Zaken and others to influence city planning approvals during his tenure as Jerusalem mayor in the 1990s, a case tied to Kadima's governance era. He was sentenced to six years in prison, later reduced on appeal, and served 16 months before release in 2017, with the judge decrying a "corrupt political system" enabled by such practices. Beyond Olmert, isolated scandals implicated other Kadima figures, though less centrally. In 2010, Kadima MK Roni Bar-On faced scrutiny over alleged irregularities, but broader party-level probes, such as a canceled 2011 Knesset hearing on Kadima funding corruption, highlighted ongoing concerns without leading to systemic convictions. These events, peaking during Olmert's leadership, eroded Kadima's centrist appeal, contributing to its electoral decline as voters associated the party with elite self-dealing rather than policy reform. No major corruption charges stuck to successors like Tzipi Livni, but the legacy of Olmert's cases fueled perceptions of institutional decay within Israeli politics.

Internal Fractures and Policy Incoherence

Following Ariel Sharon's stroke on January 4, 2006, which left him incapacitated, Kadima faced a leadership vacuum that intensified internal fractures. Ehud Olmert, as interim leader, guided the party to victory in the March 28, 2006, elections with 29 seats, but his tenure was undermined by corruption probes, culminating in his July 30, 2008, announcement to step down from the premiership and party leadership amid allegations including cash envelopes from a U.S. businessman. Tzipi Livni emerged victorious in the September 17, 2008, Kadima leadership primary, defeating rivals including Shaul Mofaz, but struggled to unify the party's disparate factions of ex-Likud hawks and Labor moderates. Her failure to form a coalition after the February 10, 2009, elections—where Kadima secured 28 seats to Likud's 27—pushed the party into opposition, highlighting governance instability. Internal dissent grew as members questioned the absence of a post-Sharon vision, with the party criticized for opportunism rather than ideological coherence. By 2012, fractures deepened during the March 27 primary, where Mofaz ousted Livni with 67% of the vote, promising stability but alienating her supporters. Mofaz's May 8, 2012, decision to join Benjamin Netanyahu's coalition over military draft exemptions for ultra-Orthodox Jews sparked backlash, leading to Kadima's July 17 withdrawal from the government amid intra-party revolts. This volatility prompted mass defections, including Livni's November 2012 exit to found Hatnua, eroding Kadima's base. Policy incoherence stemmed from Kadima's big-tent composition, blending unilateral security measures like the 2005 Gaza disengagement with diplomatic overtures such as Olmert's 2008 peace proposals, yet failing to forge a consistent alternative to Likud's territorial maximalism or Labor's concessions. Critics noted the party's rejection of prior Likud principles without substituting a viable framework, resulting in vague centrism that alienated voters seeking clarity on settlements, security, and Palestinian statehood. In opposition under Livni, Kadima offered no compelling domestic or foreign policy agenda, contributing to its electoral slide to 28 seats in 2009 and just 2 in 2013. These rifts culminated in Kadima's effective dissolution by 2015, as it abstained from elections.

Legacy

Policy Achievements and Short-Term Gains

Kadima's primary short-term gain was its rapid electoral success following its formation on November 24, 2005. In the March 28, 2006, Knesset elections, the party secured 29 seats, the largest share among all parties, enabling acting leader Ehud Olmert to form a coalition government sworn in on May 4, 2006. This outcome marked the first time a centrist party achieved a parliamentary plurality in Israel, temporarily disrupting the traditional dominance of Likud and Labor. Under Olmert's Kadima-led government, Israel experienced notable economic expansion. Gross domestic product grew by 4.6% in 2006, with projections for a record trade surplus of $6 billion, described by Olmert as unprecedented in Israeli history. Fiscal improvements contributed to Standard & Poor's upgrading Israel's sovereign credit rating from A to A+ in November 2007, signaling enhanced economic stability and investor confidence. The administration also advanced research and development initiatives, with Israel maintaining global leadership in national R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP, underscoring policy continuity in fostering innovation-driven growth. Kadima's platform emphasized pragmatic territorial realignment, building on the 2005 Gaza disengagement, though the proposed West Bank convergence plan faced delays and partial implementation amid shifting security priorities. These efforts provided short-term policy momentum toward economic resilience and centrist governance, despite subsequent challenges.

Long-Term Failures and Security Setbacks

The unilateral Israeli disengagement from Gaza, executed between August 15 and September 12, 2005, under Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's leadership as Kadima's founder, failed to deliver anticipated security benefits and instead facilitated a deterioration in Israel's southern border defenses. In the absence of Israeli settlements and military presence, Palestinian militant groups, particularly Hamas, rapidly militarized the territory; Hamas violently ousted Fatah forces and assumed full control of Gaza on June 14, 2007, establishing it as a base for sustained terrorist operations against Israel. This shift enabled the unchecked importation of weapons and construction of attack tunnels, directly contravening post-disengagement understandings that Gaza would not become a threat platform. Rocket and mortar fire from Gaza into Israel escalated dramatically post-disengagement, with over 22,570 projectiles launched between 2005 and May 2021 alone, according to Israeli security agency data. Prior to 2005, annual rocket launches were sporadic, but the removal of Israeli ground presence allowed for industrial-scale production and firing; for instance, by November 2007, 2,383 rocket hits had been recorded in the western Negev, inflicting civilian casualties, property damage, and necessitating the development of defensive systems like Iron Dome. This barrage prompted repeated Israeli military responses, including Operation Cast Lead (December 27, 2008–January 18, 2009), which aimed to degrade Hamas's capabilities but highlighted the ongoing vulnerability created by the withdrawal, as rocket fire resumed shortly thereafter. Kadima's governance under Ehud Olmert further exposed security shortcomings, exemplified by the perceived mishandling of the 2006 Second Lebanon War (July 12–August 14, 2006), where Hezbollah's rocket barrages—enabled indirectly by policy emphases on territorial concessions—exposed deficiencies in intelligence, rapid response, and northern deterrence. Critics, including Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu, explicitly linked intensified attacks on the western Negev in December 2008 to Kadima's strategic failures, arguing that the party's convergence policies undermined deterrence without securing reciprocal Palestinian commitments. Empirically, the disengagement did not reduce overall threats; instead, it correlated with Hamas's entrenchment, recurrent escalations (e.g., Operations Pillar of Defense in 2012 and Protective Edge in 2014), and a fortified terrorist infrastructure that persisted beyond Kadima's electoral decline. These setbacks eroded Kadima's credibility on security matters, contributing to its electoral erosion; polls and analyses post-2006 war reflected public disillusionment with the party's ability to translate territorial withdrawals into lasting peace, as Hamas exploited the vacuum to amass longer-range weapons targeting major Israeli cities. The policy's causal flaw lay in assuming Palestinian moderation would follow evacuation without enforced agreements, a miscalculation validated by the subsequent empowerment of rejectionist elements over pragmatic ones.

Influence on Israeli Political Landscape

Kadima's emergence in November 2005 disrupted Israel's bipolar party system dominated by Likud and Labor, offering a centrist platform that drew moderates from both the right and left, particularly those supportive of pragmatic security policies and territorial adjustments for demographic viability. By securing 29 seats in the March 2006 Knesset elections—the largest bloc—it formed a coalition government under Ehud Olmert, marking the first time neither Likud nor Labor led the executive since Israel's founding. This victory validated the appeal of personality-driven centrism anchored in Ariel Sharon's legacy, shifting voter alignments toward convergence plans that prioritized retaining major settlement blocs while contemplating unilateral withdrawals. The party's 2009 performance, retaining 28 seats amid scandals and policy fatigue, underscored its enduring draw for center-right voters disillusioned with ideological rigidity, though it failed to form a government as Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud (27 seats) built a broader coalition. Kadima's emphasis on dialogue with Palestinians and a two-state framework, coupled with its center-right lean on security matters, temporarily expanded the political center, fostering a realignment where traditional left-wing parties like Labor weakened further. However, its rapid decline to just 2 seats in 2013 elections highlighted the fragility of such movements without ideological cohesion, contributing to greater fragmentation on the center-right spectrum. Kadima's trajectory influenced subsequent centrist ventures, demonstrating voter receptivity to anti-establishment, pragmatic alternatives that echoed its model of aggregating disparate factions under strong leadership. Parties like Yair Lapid's Yesh Atid in 2013 capitalized on this precedent, replicating Kadima's success in mobilizing middle-class and security-conscious voters against perceived extremism. Ultimately, while Kadima eroded Likud's monopoly on the right by siphoning moderates, its collapse enabled Netanyahu's consolidation of power through alliances with more ideological partners, reshaping the landscape toward polarized coalitions rather than sustained centrism. This pattern of rise-and-fall for catch-all centrists has persisted, underscoring causal challenges in maintaining voter loyalty amid Israel's volatile security environment and shifting demographics.

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  116. https://jcpa.org/the-dangers-of-a-unilateral-israeli-withdrawal-from-the-west-bank-and-east-jerusalem/
  117. https://goodauthority.org/news/the-weakening-of-the-israeli-left/
  118. https://goodauthority.org/news/good-to-know-israeli-politics-netanyahu-rightwing-likud-gaza/
  119. https://fairvote.org/ranked-choice-party-list-raising-the-threshold-in-israel-without-hurting-arab-israelis/
  120. https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/yesh-atid-is-the-new-kadima
  121. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232952401_Kadima_and_the_Centre_Convergence_in_the_Israeli_Party_System
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