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The North Eastern State (Somali: Gobolka Waqooyi Bari ee Soomaaliya), previously known as Khatumo State (Somali: Maamul-goboleedka SSC-Khaatumo ee Soomaaliya) until July 2025,[2][3] is a federal member state in northern Somalia with its capital in Las Anod.[4] It includes parts of the Sool, Sanaag and Togdheer regions (combined under the acronym "SSC"). The name Khaatumo means a positive or final decision.[5]

Key Information

It was bordered to the west by the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, which claims the territory also claimed by SSC-Khaatumo.[5] To the east, it borders Puntland, a fellow federal member, which does not recognize the existence of SSC-Khaatumo as it considers all Dhulbahante-inhabited areas to be an integral part of its territory.[6] To the south, it borders Ethiopia's Somali Region.

Several months into the Las Anod conflict that erupted in early 2023, SSC-Khatumo forces effectively took over those regions, securing most of their claimed area and establishing a new front line about 170km from Las Anod between the villages of Oog and Guumays in western Sool.[7][8][5]

SSC-Khaatumo was acknowledged as an interim administration by the Federal Government of Somalia on 19 October 2023,[9] following its re-establishment on 6 February 2023, as SSC-Khaatumo after a period of mass civil unrest in Las Anod.[4] On 30 July 2025, delegates meeting in the city of Las Anod officially announced the reconstitution of Khatumo as the North Eastern State of Somalia, "Waqooyi Bari".[10][11]

History

[edit]

First iteration (SSC)

[edit]
Main article: SSC (militia)

The territory claimed by SSC-Khatumo has long been disputed between the self-declared Republic of Somaliland and the Puntland. From the 1990s through most of the 2000s, the Dhulbahante in the area were torn between supporting Somaliland, Puntland, or the formation of an independent entity. Several clan conferences were held during this period, but none succeeded in resolving the issue. According to Markus Virgil Hoehne, the idea of establishing an administration independent from both Somaliland and Puntland already existed as early as 2003, with many Dhulbahante interviewed by him in the disputed regions advocating for it, as aid organizations were prevented from working in the area by Somaliland and Puntland. Some proposed the name of "Dervishland", alluding to the Dervish movement.[12]

The movement for a SSC (Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn) administration emerged in 2009 within the Somali diaspora, cumulating in a conference held in Nairobi in October. Participants included Ali Khalif Galaydh, former prime minister of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, Mohamed Abdi Hashi, former prime minister of Puntland, and various diaspora organizations. Here, the formation of SSC as a regional government of Somalia was declared, with Suleiman Haglotosiye "Xaglo Toosiye" and Cali Xasan "Saberi" elected as president and vice-president respectively. The terms were set for two and a half years. The ultimate goal was recognition as a federal member state and the establishment of partnerships with the international community.[13]

The idea of SSC appealed to Dhulbahante in the borderlands, as well as several prominent clan leaders, including Garad Jama Garad Ali, Garad Jama Garad Ismail Duale, and Garad Mukhtar Garad Ali, the three of whom had backgrounds in the diaspora. Its capital was Las Anod, but as the city was controlled by Somaliland, Dharkayn Geenyo acted as the transitional capital. Another center of operations was Buuhoodle. To these irredentist SSC activists, Dhulbahante lands extended beyond current realities, encompassing territory lost to other clans in conflicts and demographic changes during the 1900s, stretching from east of Burao (Isaaq/Habar Jeclo) to north of Erigavo (Habar Jeclo and Habar Yoonis). In practice, SSC exercised control only over the area between Las Anod and Buuhoodle.[14]

From its inception, the SSC was economically weak, despite diaspora support, and had to deal with a divided Dhulbahante. Although the government sought to represent all Dhulbahante clans, the majority of manpower, weaponry, and funding came from the Farah Garad, while other clans tended to favor Puntland. SSC officials operated without salaries, there was little visible administrative infrastructure in the areas it claimed, and it lacked a formal army, relying instead on poorly organized and under-equipped militias.[15]

On 21 May 2010, SSC forces launched an attack on Somaliland positions south of Widhwidh. Skirmishes continued until July, culminating in another clash at Kalabaydh. Xaglo Toosiye would later claim that Somaliland had initiated the conflict and that SSC was not seeking war but rather "good neighbourhood". This escalation occurred during the campaign for the 2010 Somaliland presidential election. Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud "Silanyo", who as a Habar Jeclo claimed he better understood the challenges facing eastern Somaliland than his Gadabuursi opponent, defeated incumbent President Dahir Riyale Kahin. On 2 November, Silanyo sent a delegation to meet with Garaad Abshir Saalax, the highest-ranking traditional leader from Widhwidh, and other local leaders. The agreement they reached was quickly denounced by Saalax, who had left for Sweden, where he had a home.[16]

On 9 November 2010, an SSC delegation met with officials of the federal government to brief them on the situation in the SSC regions and confirm the SSC's allegiance to the rest of Somalia. Xaglo Toosiye claimed he did not request financial or military assistance as "weapons do not build Somalia". While Xaglo Toosiye insisted SSC had no direct relationship with the Ethiopian government, he acknowledged that some of the SSC's leadership had met Ethiopian officials, and that SSC and Ethiopian officials met frequently in Buuhoodle.[17]

On 9 January 2011, following deaths in the Kalshaale area from a land dispute, Somaliland declared the area a military zone and ordered all clan militias to vacate. This move was widely viewed by Dhulbahante communities as another illegal occupation of their land, allowing the SSC to coordinate armed resistance with lineages around Buuhoodle. On 30 January, SSC and Somaliland forces clashed near Hagoogane, followed by anti-Somaliland demonstrations in Las Anod the next day.[18]

On 7 February, better equipped SSC forces clashed with Somaliland troops in the Kalshaale area. Fighting between the two sides continued into mid-February. On 21 February, Puntland President Abdirahman Farole declared he would not stand by and watch "his people" being "massacred", before backing down after meeting with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Unofficially, he tolerated some assistance to the SSC, including the movement of several dozen technicals. The SSC failed to secure territory during the fighting that year. Throughout the rest of 2011, the SSC collapsed due to internal conflict, with its leaders retreating abroad or to the countryside.[19]

Second iteration (Khatumo state)

[edit]
Flag of Khatumo State (2012-2025)

An effort to rectify the shortcomings of the earlier attempt at an independent administration was undertaken at a ten-day conference held in Taleh, known as Khatumo II, coming after Khaatumo I held in London in April 2011. On 12 January 2012, approximately 2,300 representatives of the Dhulbahante, encompassing all major sub-clans, formally declared the establishment of the "Khatumo State of Somalia", claiming the same territory previously claimed by the SSC. The new government included a rotating presidential council composed of Ahmed Elmi Osman "Karaash", Mohamed Yusuf Jama "Indhosheel", and Abdinuur Biindhe, with each leader serving a six-month term. Karaash was the first president. The outcome of the conference was broadly supported by the Dhulbahante population, both within the region and in the diaspora, but was rejected by both Somaliland and Puntland.[20]

Two days after the declaration of Khatumo, clashes broke out between Dhulbahante militias and Somaliland forces near Buuhoodle. On 15 January, Somaliland launched an attack against Buuhoodle, temporarily occupying parts of the town. A subsequent assault on 26 January was repelled by local forces. During these confrontations, Somaliland deployed tanks and heavy artillery, leading to civilian casualties. Images of the dead and wounded circulated online, sparking pro-Khatumo demonstrations in Las Anod, Sarmaanyo, and other areas of Sool. In Las Anod, Somaliland troops opened fire on demonstrators, resulting in several deaths and the arrest of over 70 individuals. Skirmishes continued through early February in the vicinity of Buuhoodle and south of Las Anod.[21]

Khatumo prioritized the "liberation" of Las Anod, considered the most important city for the Dhulbahante. At the time, an estimated 3,000 Somaliland troops were stationed around the city. By the end of March, Khatumo had assembled a force of 500-1,000 men and around 50 technicals, positioning themselves to the east and south of the city. On 1 April, fighting erupted between the two, with heavy weapons being used on both sides. Ultimately, the Khatumo forces were forced to retreat to areas around Taleh, Hudun, and Bo'ame. On the same day, clashes occurred near Buuhoodle.[22]

Khatumo forces had also captured Tukaraq from Puntland troops. On 16 June, Somaliland and Puntland coordinated a counteroffensive to recapture the town. As Somaliland troops moved in, Khatumo forces withdrew, and control of Tukaraq was handed over to Puntland. In August, a delegation led by Xaglo Toosiye began negotiations with the Somaliland government. The talks led to the withdrawal of Somaliland forces from the Buuhoodle area to their prior positions around Qoorlugud, where they had been before the Kalshaale fighting in 2010, a prisoner exchange, and Xaglo Toosiye's appointment as a minister in the Somaliland government. From September to July 2014, no significant fighting occurred between Dhulbahante militias and Somaliland forces around Buuhoodle. In the town, a war memorial was created for those killed by Somaliland between January 2011 and February 2012, featuring an armoured troop carrier captured by Khatumo forces, mimicking the Hargeisa War Memorial.[23]

With the absence of any tangible success, Khatumo was already crumbling within a year of its founding, only exacerbated by defections to Puntland.[24] By 2015, the proto-state had practically ceased to function.[25]

In August 2016, Khatumo commenced peace talks with Somaliland.[26][27] The talks, however, caused a major disagreement between the president and vice-president of the administration, Ali Khalif Galaydh and Abdulle Agalule respectively, which eventually produced two separate administrations that both claimed to be the legitimate government.[28] The group led by Ali Khalif reached an agreement with Somaliland, at the town of Aynabo in October 2017, which stipulated that under the condition of changing the constitution of Somaliland, the organization would become integrated within the Somaliland government.[29]

The agreement made by Ali Khalif Galaydh and Silanyo in October 2017 couldn't be implemented because of the civil unrest in the Sool region. This marked the end of the Khatumo until its reestablishment in 2023 during the 2023 Las Anod conflict.

2023 conflict and establishment of SSC-Khaatumo

[edit]
Main article: Las Anod conflict (2023–present)

On 6 February 2023, the Dhulbahante clan elders declared their intent to form a state government named "SSC-Khatumo" within Somalia.[30] On 19 March, the traditional leaders met with a delegation of MPs from Federal Government of Somalia.[31][32]

After mass protests continuing from December into January 2023, the retreat of the Somaliland troops paved the way for the return of the supreme Garad of Dhulbahante, Garad Jama Garad Ali – a community leader exiled from Las Anod since 2007.[33] Rumor spread of a grand meeting of all Dhulbahante clan elders, followed by speculation that the elders would vote to exile Somaliland security forces from the city.[34] On 6 February 2023, the Dhulbahante clan elders declared their intent to form a state government named "SSC-Khatumo" within the Federal Government of Somalia.[30] Fighting broke out earlier on the same day in Las Anod between Somaliland troops and Dhulbahante militias in the Sayadka Hill suburb (reportedly home to two committee members), with shots heard in the streets surrounding Hamd Hotel where Somaliland dignitaries were staying.[35]

On 8 February, the supreme Garad of Dhulbahante, Garad Jama Garad Ali, accused the Somaliland government of genocide, called for peace and declared Las Anod's intent to be governed from Mogadishu under the Federal Government of Somalia.[36] Within the same week of February, fighting and civilian bombardments had killed at least 82 people in total and displaced 90% of the residents. The region had produced 185,000 internally displaced people and 60,000 refugees in February.[37] On 2 March, the mayor of Las Anod reported that Somaliland forces were bombing public buildings from the surrounding countryside including government institutions and hospitals. The UN also reported a casualty count of over 200 deaths.[38]

On 7 June, the UN Security Council released a statement reaffirming its "full respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and unity of Somalia." They also stated, "The members of the Security Council called for the immediate withdrawal of 'Somaliland' security forces and urged all parties to exercise restraint, refrain from provocative actions, incitement to violence, and inflammatory rhetoric. This is in order to de-escalate the situation on the ground, rebuild trust, and create the conditions for peace."[39] The following day, the Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement expressing their view that the UNSC "appears to be misinformed about the facts on the ground", stating that they took care to rigorously avoid civilian casualties, only firing to protect their defensive positions against the militia forces.[40]

On 25 August, the SSC administration overran two strongholds of the Somaliland National Army in Maraaga and Goja’adde, claiming to have captured numerous towns, weapons, vehicles.[41] On the same day, the Somaliland Ministry of Defense released a statement saying, "The National Army is in the midst of reorganization and serious preparation to confront the enemy."[41]

Following the capture of the Goojacade army base, in Fall 2023 the frontline shifted to western Sool, emerging between the villages of Oog and Guumays. According to the Crisis Group, this division roughly corresponded to boundaries between Isaaq and Dhulbahante clans.[7]

As of August 2024, the front line lies about 100km away from the city of Las Anod, where a military stalemate presently holds, and the carrying of weapons is strictly prohibited within the city.[5][42]

Federal recognition and conflict with Puntland

[edit]
See also: Las Anod conflict (2023–present) § Conflict with Puntland
Interior Minister Fiqi (left) with Firdhiye (right)

In accordance with a joint press release, Abdulqadir Firdhiye, the President of the newly formed SSC-Khatumo interim administration, was invited, along with a delegation, to Mogadishu. During a 10-day period, extensive discussions were held on the political, security, and humanitarian situation in the disputed region.[43]

Ultimately, on 19 October 2023, the Federal Government agreed to endorse the statement by traditional elders during their conference in Las Anod on 6 February 2023, which stated that SSC-Khatumo was not under the authorities of Puntland or Somaliland, but under the Federal Government.[9] Additionally, the Federal Government called on Somaliland authorities and SSC-Khatumo to halt hostilities and release prisoners, expressing readiness to facilitate associated activities.[43]

This recognition brought SSC-Khatumo in conflict with neighboring Puntland (which claims the territory of Khatumo), who condemned its establishment as unconstitutional.[44] These tensions aided in Puntland's decision to withdrawal recognition of the Somali federal government in March 2024.

On May 24, 2025, Khatumo-associated militias seized the border village of Shahda, prompting Puntland to deploy troops before clan elders negotiated a temporary withdrawal. Puntland's Minister of Information, Mahmoud Aydiid Dirir, publicly condemned SSC-Khaatumo's actions.[45] On July 9, elders from Sanaag and Haylaan rejected SSC-Khatumo affiliation, declaring their regions "historically and constitutionally part of Puntland" and demanding an end to federal interference.[46] On July 15, heavy fighting broke out in Dhahar between Puntland Maritime Police Force and Khatumo militias after the PMPF occupied the town.[47]

North Eastern State

[edit]

On 30 July 2025, delegates meeting in the city of Las Anod officially announced the reconstitution of Khatumo as the North Eastern State, "Waqooyi Bari".[48][49] The administration of the North Eastern State was integrated into the Somali federal system by September 2025, with the establishment of an 83 member parliament on 17 August, the election of parliament Speakers on 23 August, and the presidential election on 30 August. Abdikhadir Ahmed Aw-Ali and Abdirashid Yusuf Jibril were elected as the first President and Vice President of the North Eastern State.[50]

Government

[edit]

Khaatumo's government structure comprises a legislative body and an executive body, with ongoing initiatives to establish a judicial body.

The Legislative Assembly Council of the SSC-Khaatumo administration commenced its term on 7 July 2023, with the swearing-in of 45 members. These members were selected by regional Garaads and Sultans on 6 July 2023.[51]

The SSC-Khatumo Legislative Assembly Council assembly convened on 1 August 2023, in Las Anod to select its leadership. Jama Yasin Warsame secured the position of Speaker, garnering 25 votes out of the available 45, while Jama Adan Osman was elected as the Vice Speaker.[52]

Abdiqadir Ahmed Aw-Ali (Firdhiye) became the President of the SSC-Khatumo Administration on 5 August 2023, receiving 30 out of 45 total votes. Mohamed Abdi Ismail (Shiine) was elected as the Deputy President.[53][54]

President Abdiqadir Ahmed Aw-Ali announced the appointment of cabinet secretaries on 12 September, each nominated secretary underwent a vote of confidence from the SSC-Khaatumo 45-member committee to ensure their alignment with the administration's objectives.[55]

The Legislative Assembly Council unanimously approved the nine cabinet secretaries appointed by the President on 26 September, officially concluding the formation and assembly of both the executive and legislative bodies of the government.[56]

Military

[edit]
From Left – Chief of Staff, Khatumo Army

Khatumo maintains its own security forces. Exclusively financed by the state administration, they are tasked with assuring local security and defending the region's borders.[57] According to Khatumo President Abdikhadir Ahmed Aw-Ali, the forces are well trained and armed.[58]

Khatumo troops have been deployed in defense positions in Guumays area against Somaliland troops and SSB militia in Oog and other border towns near the frontline.[59][60][61][62][63][64]

On 11 February 2024, President Firdhiye appointed General Saleban Barre Hasan to be the head of Khatumo military forces,[65] with Mohamed Saleban Cabbi serving as the official spokesman.[66]

See also

[edit]

References

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Works cited

[edit]
  • Höhne, Markus Virgil (2015). Between Somaliland and Puntland: marginalization, militarization and conflicting political visions. London: Rift Valley Institute. ISBN 978-1-907431-13-5.
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Khatumo State

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from Grokipedia
The Khatumo State, also known as SSC-Khaatumo, is a federal member state of encompassing the , , and Cayn (SSC) regions in the country's north, with its capital in . Formed in the aftermath of a 2023 uprising against Somaliland's administration in , it emerged as a pro-federal entity rejecting Somaliland's secessionist claims and asserting loyalty to the Somali Federal . The administration gained formal recognition as Somalia's sixth federal member state from the Federal in April 2025, following military successes in expelling Somaliland forces from key SSC territories. This status was solidified through a July 2025 conference in , where delegates voted to establish the entity, later referred to as the Northeastern State of Somalia. However, its creation has intensified territorial disputes, sparking ongoing armed clashes with Somaliland since 2023 and tensions with , which claims overlapping regions in and and refuses to acknowledge Khatumo's authority.

Geography and Demographics

Territorial Claims and Borders

The Khatumo State asserts claims over the , , and Cayn regions, collectively known as SSC territories, in northern . These areas, encompassing approximately 70,000 square kilometers, include districts such as in , and parts of , and Buhoodle in Cayn, which is centered on the Ayn region and extends into province. The claims are rooted in historical and clan-based affiliations, particularly among the sub-clan of the , who predominate in these districts and reject incorporation into . Khatumo's territorial assertions overlap significantly with those of Somaliland, which administers the regions as integral parts of its claimed sovereign territory based on colonial-era boundaries from . To the east, boundaries with are contested, as maintains claims over portions of and grounded in shared ties, leading to intermittent clashes, such as the 2012 capture and recapture of the Tukaraq post. The southern frontier abuts Ethiopia's along the porous near Buhoodle, facilitating cross-border and trade networks but also and movements. Following military successes in the 2023 Las Anod conflict, Khatumo forces secured control over and surrounding areas, effectively delineating borders westward against positions, though eastern extensions into remain partial and disputed with both and . These borders are not internationally recognized, with Khatumo positioning itself as an interim administration seeking integration as a federal member state of rather than pursuing independence. Ongoing territorial fluidity underscores the claims' reliance on local clan consensus and military outcomes rather than fixed demarcations.

Population Composition and Clan Dynamics

The population of the SSC-Khaatumo regions, encompassing , , and Cayn (including district), is predominantly drawn from Somali clans, with the sub-clan of the forming the core demographic majority across much of the claimed territory. This clan inhabits central and eastern , including , as well as significant portions of Cayn, where they maintain traditional pastoral and nomadic lifestyles amid arid landscapes. In , the Warsangeli, another sub-clan, predominate in the eastern areas, sharing broader kinship ties with the but asserting distinct territorial claims. Minority populations include elements of the clan-family, particularly the sub-clan, concentrated in western and parts of western , where they have settled through historical migrations and colonial-era displacements. These communities, often aligned with Somaliland's administration, represent a smaller fraction of the overall populace and have been involved in border skirmishes, exacerbating ethnic tensions. Exact data remains scarce due to ongoing instability and lack of centralized governance, but clan-based estimates underscore numerical dominance, estimated to comprise over 70% in core SSC-Khaatumo districts based on conflict participant mobilizations and local reports. Clan dynamics in Khatumo State are characterized by Dhulbahante intra-clan cohesion forged through opposition to perceived hegemony under , which many view as diluting their identity and autonomy. This unity propelled the 2023 Las Anod uprising, where militias expelled Somaliland forces, leveraging kinship networks for rapid mobilization across sub-clans like the Reer Hiyow and . Relations with neighboring groups, such as Puntland's Majerteen, involve both alliance potential—rooted in shared heritage—and rivalry over resource control, including grazing lands and trade routes, as seen in periodic disputes over Cayn's borders. Tensions with Isaaq minorities persist, often manifesting as localized clashes over checkpoints and taxation, with Dhulbahante-led administrations enforcing clan-based recruitment in to consolidate control. Broader dynamics reflect a rejection of clan models favoring Isaaq dominance, favoring instead integration into Somalia's federal framework to amplify Dhulbahante political leverage, though internal sub- rivalries occasionally undermine governance efficacy. These patterns prioritize degaan (traditional territories) in decision-making, influencing everything from militia alliances to .

Historical Background

Pre-2012 Origins in SSC Regions

The , , and Cayn (SSC) regions, primarily inhabited by the clan of the confederation, have long been contested between and due to overlapping territorial claims rooted in colonial boundaries and post-1991 clan alignments. Following 's in May 1991, elders consistently rejected affiliation with the breakaway entity, viewing it as dominated by interests and incompatible with their preference for reintegration into a federal Somali framework. This stance was formalized in the Bo'ame Declaration of 22 November 2007, issued by traditional garads (chiefs) at a conference in Bo'ame, which explicitly denounced 's administrative control over SSC territories, affirmed Somali national unity, and called for the withdrawal of forces from areas like . By mid-2009, escalating incursions prompted the to organize a unified resistance, establishing the SSC administration as a provisional governing structure to administer the regions autonomously from both and . This initiative, often referred to as the , , and Cayn or autonomous , aimed to defend deegaan (traditional territories) and counter perceived encroachments, drawing on local rather than formal state alliances. The SSC framework emerged amid sporadic clashes, including 's occupation of key towns like in 2007, which heightened local grievances over taxation, security, and representation. Tensions boiled over into open conflict in 2010–2011, with SSC militias engaging Somaliland forces in battles around Buhoodle and Taleex, resulting in dozens of casualties and displacement of thousands. These early skirmishes underscored the SSC's defensive posture, as Dhulbahante fighters sought to expel Somaliland checkpoints and assert control over trade routes and water points critical to pastoralist livelihoods. By late 2011, the SSC had solidified as a clan-based entity rejecting subnational secessionism, setting the stage for formalized state-building efforts while navigating internal divisions and external pressures from al-Shabaab incursions in adjacent areas.

Initial Declarations and Early Iterations (2012–2022)

The Khatumo State was formally declared on 12 January 2012 during a conference in , attended by over 400 clan delegates representing major sub-clans, with the aim of establishing an autonomous administration for the , , and Cayn (SSC) regions to counter Somaliland's territorial claims and pursue integration with Somalia's federal system. The declaration emphasized rejection of Somaliland's and focused on local , , and development independent of both Somaliland and influences. Initial leadership included Abdinour Elmi Qaaje as president, selected to oversee and administrative setup amid preparations for potential confrontations. Early operations involved mobilizing clan militias for defense, with reports of troop preparations numbering in the hundreds by mid-2012, though exact figures remained unverified due to the nascent stage. Tensions escalated into armed clashes with forces, including a February 2012 offensive by troops against that resulted in at least three deaths and over 80 casualties in prior skirmishes, highlighting the immediate contest over border towns. These conflicts stemmed from 's efforts to enforce control in disputed SSC areas, leading to a pattern of intermittent reported in UN assessments as clan-related and tied to the new entity's self-declared status. By 2014–2015, Somaliland security forces routinely suppressed Khatumo supporters in and , limiting territorial gains and reducing the entity to largely declarative and diaspora-supported activities rather than effective . A 2017 agreement between Khatumo representatives and , mediated in , temporarily eased hostilities by committing to dialogue on local administration, though underlying disputes persisted without resolving core claims. Throughout the period to 2022, iterations involved sporadic conferences and leadership transitions, such as efforts to revive momentum post-2015 under figures like , but operational control remained fragmented, with the movement functioning more as a resistance framework against occupation than a consolidated state. This phase underscored causal factors like solidarity against perceived marginalization, yet was hampered by military asymmetry and lack of international recognition beyond initial Somali transitional acknowledgments.

2023 Las Anod Conflict and Military Victories

The 2023 Las Anod conflict erupted following the December 6, 2022, assassination of Saahil sub-clan elder and opposition politician Ali Khalif Galaydh in Las Anod, a city administered by Somaliland but predominantly inhabited by the Dhulbahante clan aligned with SSC-Khatumo. Protests against Somaliland's governance intensified, leading to a January 2023 siege and curfew imposed by Somaliland forces, which escalated into armed clashes by early February. The conflict pitted Somaliland's national army, primarily from the Isaaq clan, against Dhulbahante militias organized under the SSC-Khatumo framework, with the latter rejecting Somaliland's secessionist claims over the Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC) regions. By February 6, 2023, sustained fighting had begun around , with SSC-Khatumo forces launching offensives to break the siege and assert control over disputed territories. Throughout spring and summer, intermittent battles occurred, including clashes on the city's outskirts where claimed tactical successes in March, but SSC-Khatumo militias maintained pressure through guerrilla tactics and local support. The fighting displaced thousands and strained 's resources, as SSC-Khatumo forces, bolstered by clan fighters and defectors, expanded operations beyond into surrounding areas. The conflict reached a decisive phase in August 2023, when SSC-Khatumo forces launched a major assault on , capturing Somaliland's key military bases at Gojaacade and Maraaga on 's periphery. These victories included the seizure of Gojaacade, 's largest remaining outpost, and the capture of high-ranking officers such as General Faisal Abdi Botan. troops subsequently retreated from entirely, allowing SSC-Khatumo to raise the Somali federal flag and declare administrative control over the city and broader SSC territories by August 26. This outcome marked a significant military triumph for SSC-Khatumo, reversing 's decade-long hold and reinforcing the entity's push for integration with Somalia's federal government.

Post-2023 Consolidation and Name Evolutions

Following the military successes in the Las Anod conflict, SSC-Khatumo forces announced the end of active fighting against on August 28, 2023, after capturing key positions including Gojacade, thereby consolidating control over much of the , , and Cayn (SSC) regions. This victory enabled the administration to shift focus from defense to governance, with the raising of the Somali national flag in symbolizing alignment with the federal system over 's claims. In October 2023, the granted formal recognition to SSC-Khatumo as an interim administration, marking a pivotal step in its integration into the national framework and providing legitimacy against ongoing Somaliland incursions. By early , this recognition facilitated coordination on security and administration, including joint efforts to counter al-Shabaab incursions in the region, though clan-based militias remained the primary force for territorial defense. Consolidation accelerated in 2025, with Somalia's National Consultative Council affirming SSC-Khatumo's status as a federal member state on May 8, 2025, followed by the federal government's full acceptance announcement on April 14, 2025, which included provisions for local governance structures and parliamentary seat allocation. A in from July 24 to 31, 2025, finalized an interim constitution, flag, and administrative framework, resolving disputes over representation with entities like by allocating specific seats in the federal parliament. Name evolutions reflected this federal alignment: initially SSC-Khatumo post-2023, the entity reconstituted as the North Eastern State of Somalia (also termed Waqooyi Bari State) on July 30, 2025, during the Las Anod conference, emphasizing its role as the sixth federal member state while merging the SSC districts into a unified administration. This shift from autonomous declarations to federal integration aimed to enhance legitimacy, though it prompted tensions with over overlapping claims in and Cayn. By August 2025, the new entity focused on establishing local laws and institutions, with federal oversight via a ministerial appointed in July 2025 to guide formation.

Government and Administration

Political Structure and Institutions

The SSC-Khaatumo administration functions as an interim executive and legislative framework transitioning to a full federal under Somalia's provisional , with a president heading the executive and a unicameral forming the legislative branch. Following formal recognition by Somalia's National Consultative Council on May 8, 2025, the process emphasized clan-based representation to ensure broad legitimacy among sub-clans. The legislative assembly comprises 83 members, selected on July 31, 2025, through consultations involving traditional elders and district representatives to allocate seats proportionally across the region's five districts: Taleh, Las Anod, Buuhoodle, Cayn, and Hudun. This body convened to elect executive leadership, prioritizing stability amid ongoing territorial disputes. The parliament holds authority to pass laws, approve budgets, and oversee ministerial appointments, operating from Las Anod as the provisional capital. Abdiqadir Ahmed Aw-Ali, commonly known as Firdhiye, serves as president, elected by the assembly on August 31, 2025, with 62 votes in a contested reflecting internal rivalries. The executive branch, under the president, includes a responsible for portfolios such as interior, finance, and security, appointed to coordinate with federal institutions in . Judicial institutions remain underdeveloped, with reliance on customary systems and ad hoc federal courts for dispute resolution, though plans for a formal were outlined in the July 2025 governance conference. Governance emphasizes decentralized administration through district councils, integrating clan militias into state security roles while pursuing aligned with federal disarmament efforts. Challenges persist due to militia influence over formal institutions, limiting centralized authority and complicating fiscal independence from federal allocations.

Leadership and Governance Challenges

The SSC-Khatumo administration has encountered significant internal divisions stemming from clan sub-factionalism within the predominant Dhulbahante clan, complicating unified leadership and policy implementation. Traditional elders from regions such as Sanaag and Haylaan have publicly rejected incorporation into the SSC-Khatumo framework, reaffirming allegiance to Puntland and highlighting fractures that undermine the administration's authority over claimed territories. These disputes reflect broader challenges in reconciling competing clan interests, which have historically led to fragmented governance in similar Somali entities, as seen in the stagnation of interim administrations like Hirshabelle due to persistent elite rivalries. Leadership instability is exacerbated by reliance on militia structures rather than formalized institutions, rendering the administration vulnerable to internal power struggles and external pressures. Reports indicate that SSC-Khatumo's governance remains militia-dominated, with limited progress toward establishing durable civil service or judicial systems, fostering perceptions of fragility amid ongoing territorial contests. Federal government interventions, including pledges for integration, have drawn criticism for perceived meddling that prioritizes Mogadishu's influence over local consensus, further eroding administrative cohesion. Efforts to transition toward federal member state status have been hampered by these dynamics, with lesser factors such as political and clan violence contributing to stalled development. The administration's recognition by Somalia's federal government in October 2023 provided interim legitimacy but has not resolved underlying leadership divisions, which continue to impede effective service delivery and security coordination. Overall, these challenges underscore the tension between clan-based mobilization that propelled SSC-Khatumo's formation and the institutional demands of sustainable governance in a federal .

Integration with Somali Federal System

The SSC-Khaatumo administration, re-established in February 2023, initially aligned with the (FGS) to affirm its commitment to Somalia's federal framework, rejecting Somaliland's claims over the SSC territories. On , 2023, the FGS formally acknowledged SSC-Khaatumo as an interim administration, marking the first official step toward its incorporation into the federal structure and enabling coordination on security and governance matters. This recognition positioned SSC-Khaatumo alongside existing Federal Member States (FMS), though it required further institutional development to achieve full status. By April 2025, the FGS escalated its support, officially recognizing SSC-Khaatumo as the sixth FMS, thereby affirming the SSC regions—Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn—as undisputed Somali territory and integrating them into the national federal system. This declaration invited SSC-Khaatumo leadership to the National Consultative Council and emphasized harmonization of local militias with federal security forces, amid ongoing challenges in resource allocation and inter-FMS coordination. The move strengthened FGS influence in northeastern Somalia but drew criticism from Puntland, which viewed it as encroaching on its territorial interests, prompting SSC-Khaatumo to defend the partnership as constitutionally grounded. In June 2025, the FGS outlined a roadmap for SSC-Khaatumo's , committing federal resources to administrative capacity-building and electoral processes to transition from interim to provisional status. This culminated in a in from late July 2025, where delegates adopted a new , dissolved the interim administration, and endorsed the entity's evolution into a formalized federal state—initially referred to as the Northeastern State in some announcements—pending elections for a president and . As of August 2025, the FGS endorsed these outcomes, facilitating SSC-Khaatumo's full operationalization within the federal model, though implementation hinges on resolving clan-based security integrations and conducting verifiable local elections to ensure stability. Integration efforts have emphasized decentralizing federal authority to address local governance gaps, with FGS pledges for infrastructure and anti-al-Shabaab operations, yet observers note persistent risks of fragmentation if electoral timelines slip or rival administrations like escalate disputes.

Military and Security Apparatus

Force Composition and Clan Militias

The military apparatus of Khatumo State, also referred to as SSC-Khatumo, relies predominantly on decentralized clan militias recruited from the sub-clan within the confederation, supplemented by fighters from allied groups such as the Majerteen and occasional support from non- subclans like the Fuqshini (Ayr-Habargidir-Hawiye). These forces lack a centralized formal structure, operating instead as a of subclan-based units, such as those from the Yahye and Ugaadhyahan lineages, with coordinated through traditional councils rather than hierarchical command. Estimates of Khatumo forces' strength vary, with SSC activists citing over 10,000 fighters during the 2023 Las Anod conflict, while a 2025 assessment places the security forces at approximately 8,000 personnel, primarily clan militias. The composition includes defectors from Somaliland's army, Somalia's federal forces, and security units, enhancing capabilities with experienced personnel and captured equipment during engagements like the repulsion of Somaliland assaults in February and March 2023. Leadership draws from traditional Dhulbahante garads (elders), including a supreme council of 14 figures such as and Garaad Cabdullaahi Garaad Saleebaan, who oversee strategy via consensus, while military operations have featured commanders like General Saleban Barre Gesod, a former Somaliland officer who defected in June 2023 to lead forces before resigning in April 2025. Clan militias form the core of Khatumo's defense, activated through , local councils, and subclan networks to counter perceived Somaliland occupation, emphasizing territorial control in , , and Cayn regions without reliance on state-funded professional troops. This militia model, rooted in unity against external claims, proved effective in key victories, such as the fall of bases at Gojacade and Maraaga in August 2023, but poses challenges for unified command and long-term professionalization amid ongoing regional tensions.

Key Conflicts and Engagements

The most significant military engagement for SSC-Khaatumo forces was the Las Anod conflict, which commenced on February 6, 2023, pitting local clan militias aligned with SSC-Khaatumo against the over control of the disputed city in the region. Intense urban fighting persisted for approximately seven months, resulting in hundreds of casualties on both sides and the displacement of thousands of civilians, with SSC-Khaatumo forces ultimately expelling troops and assuming control of by late August 2023. This victory extended SSC-Khaatumo authority over much of the and eastern regions, bolstered by tacit logistical support from during the siege. Subsequent clashes with Somaliland have occurred in contested border areas, reflecting ongoing territorial disputes in the SSC regions. In Buqdharkayn, region, heavy fighting erupted on March 7, 2025, involving armed convoys from both sides, with mutual accusations of initiating hostilities over livestock disputes and territorial incursions; the skirmish intensified local mobilizations but did not result in major territorial shifts. Similarly, in , region, confrontations on December 14–15, 2024, led to at least three deaths and 18 injuries from exchanges, as SSC-Khaatumo forces sought to challenge checkpoints, prompting counteroffensives that both parties claimed as defensive successes. These incidents underscore the reliance of SSC-Khaatumo on clan-based militias for , often leveraging local knowledge against 's more structured army. Relations with , initially cooperative during the 2023 Las Anod campaign, have deteriorated into border tensions without large-scale battles. Disputes over and Haylan territories escalated in May 2025, featuring military standoffs and minor skirmishes amid Puntland's rejection of SSC-Khaatumo claims, though no verified major engagements have materialized as of late 2025. SSC-Khaatumo forces have reported sporadic encounters with al-Shabaab elements in securing rural areas, but these remain secondary to state rivalries and lack detailed documentation of scale or outcomes. Overall, these conflicts highlight SSC-Khaatumo's defensive posture in consolidating gains while facing resource constraints against better-equipped adversaries.

Security Implications for Civilians

The 2023 Las Anod conflict between SSC-Khaatumo forces and troops resulted in significant civilian casualties, with hospital data reporting 299 deaths and 1,913 injuries in the initial months, alongside the displacement of over 200,000 people from the region. Early estimates placed displacement at more than 185,000 individuals by February 2023, exacerbating humanitarian needs in an area already strained by and limited . documented over 100 killings and 600 injuries, including dozens of civilians, amid allegations of indiscriminate shelling by forces on populated areas. Civilians faced direct threats from artillery barrages, ground assaults, and the destruction of essential , such as hospitals and schools in , which hindered medical access and . The International Committee of the Red Cross reported that ongoing fighting in 2023 drove nearly 200,000 displacements across the region, with families resorting to makeshift camps lacking adequate water, sanitation, and protection from further violence. data indicated 308 civilian casualties in the Las Anod area by mid-2023, comprising 36 deaths and 272 injuries, underscoring the disproportionate impact on non-combatants caught in clan-based territorial disputes. Post-2023, sporadic clashes along SSC-Khaatumo borders with , such as in Buqdharkayn in March 2025, have perpetuated civilian vulnerabilities through ambushes on civilian routes and retaliatory abductions, intensifying ethnic divisions between and communities. Reports from SSC-Khaatumo authorities in December 2024 accused incursions of displacing 50,000 families near , while independent analyses highlight how militia reliance on loyalties exposes civilians to targeted reprisals and recruitment pressures. The U.S. State Department's 2023 human rights report noted persistent civilian deaths and displacements from such engagements, compounded by weak governance structures that fail to provide consistent security or . Overall, the militia-dominated security apparatus of SSC-Khaatumo, while effective against external threats, has limited capacity to protect civilians from internal clan frictions or spillover from al-Shabaab activities in adjacent areas, leaving populations reliant on amid chronic instability. This dynamic has hindered return of displaced persons and economic recovery, with ongoing tensions risking further escalations that prioritize territorial control over civilian welfare.

Territorial Disputes and Regional Tensions

Disputes with Somaliland

The territorial disputes between Khatumo State and center on the , , and Cayn (SSC) regions, which has administered as integral parts of its claimed sovereign territory since its unilateral declaration of independence from in , while Khatumo asserts these areas' historical and clan-based affiliation with the rest of and rejects 's secessionist claims as illegitimate. The sub-clan of the , predominant in these regions, has consistently opposed integration into , viewing it as a source of insecurity and underdevelopment, leading to the formation of the SSC-Khatumo movement in the mid-2000s as a vehicle for resistance and advocacy for federal Somali reintegration. Tensions escalated into open conflict in , the administrative center of region, beginning on February 6, 2023, following protests sparked by the December 2022 assassination of a prominent opposition leader and Somaliland's subsequent imposition of a on the city. Full-scale urban fighting ensued between forces and SSC-Khatumo-aligned militias, resulting in hundreds of casualties, widespread displacement of over 100,000 civilians, and significant infrastructure damage over a nine-month period. By August 2023, Somaliland troops withdrew from under pressure from sustained Khatumo advances, allowing Khatumo forces to consolidate control over the city and expand into adjacent areas, marking a major setback for Somaliland's claims. Clashes have persisted post-2023, with notable engagements including heavy fighting in Buqdharkayn in region on March 7, 2025, where and Khatumo forces exchanged fire over control of strategic positions, underscoring unresolved border frictions. has accused Khatumo of harboring al-Shabaab elements to bolster its insurgency, though such claims remain unverified and contested by Khatumo leadership, which frames the conflict as a legitimate defense of against 's . In a gesture amid ongoing hostilities, Khatumo released 25 prisoners of war captured during the Las Anod campaign on April 15, 2025, highlighting intermittent humanitarian considerations despite the entrenched rivalry. These disputes have broader implications, weakening 's international recognition efforts and exacerbating -based militarization in the .

Conflicts with Puntland

The primary conflicts between Khatumo State (SSC-Khaatumo) and stem from overlapping territorial claims in the and regions, where both entities assert administrative authority based on clan affiliations and historical precedents. Khatumo State maintains that these areas, collectively known as SSC territories, fall under its jurisdiction as a distinct federal member state recognized by the Somali federal government, while views and parts of as integral to its own regional boundaries, rejecting Khatumo's autonomy as an infringement on its sovereignty. These disputes intensified after Khatumo's military successes against in 2023, during which initially provided logistical and military support to Khatumo forces, enabling the capture of key areas like . Relations deteriorated following Khatumo's formal recognition by the Somali federal government in 2023, prompting Khatumo leaders to reject participation in 's regional elections and assert independence from 's influence. In 2023, Khatumo's administration explicitly denied involvement in 's electoral processes, citing territorial sovereignty and alignment with federal structures over regional ones. This shift led to accusations from that Khatumo was being manipulated by to undermine regional stability, exacerbating political rifts. By mid-2025, these tensions manifested in border standoffs, such as the May 2025 deployment of troops to the Shaxda area in Karkaar region in response to Khatumo forces' presence, heightening risks of direct confrontation without reported large-scale clashes. Further escalations occurred in July 2025 amid disputes over eastern , where opposed Khatumo's territorial inclusions, leading to clashes involving Maakhir-aligned forces supportive of Khatumo against positions. imposed restrictions and asserted exclusive control over contested zones, while federal arms deliveries to were criticized by as provocative acts fueling instability. These incidents underscore a pattern of proxy tensions influenced by federal politics, with no sustained direct military campaigns between the two but persistent risks of clan-based skirmishes over resource-rich borderlands. Observers note that shared clan ties have so far prevented full-scale war, though unresolved claims continue to strain reconciliation efforts.

Broader Geopolitical Ramifications

The formal recognition of SSC-Khaatumo as Somalia's sixth federal member state by the federal government on April 14, 2025, has reshaped power dynamics in the Horn of Africa, directly contesting Somaliland's claims to the Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC) regions and weakening its bid for international legitimacy. This shift bolsters Mogadishu's unionist agenda but intensifies territorial frictions, as Khatumo's administration rejects Somaliland's sovereignty over these areas, leading to escalated military engagements that threaten cross-border spillover. The development also jeopardizes the January 22, 2024, memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland, which promised Ethiopia 20 kilometers of Red Sea coastline for commercial and naval use in exchange for potential recognition of Somaliland's independence; Khatumo's control aspirations diminish Somaliland's bargaining power and expose Ethiopia's strategic vulnerabilities in securing maritime access. Khatumo's emergence further fragments Somalia's federal framework, fostering clan-driven autonomies that could inspire similar declarations in regions like Awdal, thereby diluting central authority and complicating resource allocation under the provisional constitution. This internal balkanization hampers coordinated anti-insurgency operations against al-Shabaab, as divided loyalties among federal member states—now including Khatumo—undermine the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) drawdown scheduled for 2025, prolonging insecurity that affects trade routes and refugee flows across the region. Such divisions also strain Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mechanisms, which have mediated Somali disputes since 2005 but now face compounded challenges from overlapping claims with Puntland. Regionally, Khatumo's consolidation risks broader escalation, drawing in external powers like , whose Tigray-border concerns and port dependencies amplify proxy influences, while Egypt's disputes with indirectly heighten stakes over Somali coastal stability. The administration's unionist posture revives prospects for Somali reintegration but, absent diplomatic breakthroughs, sustains low-level conflicts that deter investment and exacerbate humanitarian crises, with over 100 clashes recorded in SSC areas since 2023 displacing thousands. Ultimately, without inclusive federal dialogues, Khatumo's trajectory could catalyze a cycle of retaliatory state formations, undermining the fragile post-1991 reconstruction and inviting opportunistic interventions from Gulf states seeking influence in the Bab el-Mandeb strait.

Economy and Society

Economic Base and Resource Dependencies

The economy of Khatumo State relies predominantly on , with rearing serving as the primary economic activity for the majority of its population in the , , and Cayn regions. Herders manage camels, , sheep, and across arid rangelands, where supports both subsistence needs and cash income through sales and exports. Limited crop , including and cultivation in riverine or irrigated pockets, provides supplementary livelihoods but is constrained by erratic rainfall and soil degradation. Livestock trade constitutes a key revenue stream, often routed through informal markets and cross-border exchanges with and , though volumes fluctuate due to veterinary barriers and regional instability. Exports, which mirror Somalia's broader contributing 60-65% to national , face vulnerabilities from international restrictions, such as the 2000-2009 Saudi ban that devastated herder incomes in adjacent and areas. conflicts disrupt access and market routes, amplifying reliance on mobile veterinary services and imports during droughts. Resource dependencies extend to diaspora remittances, which bolster household resilience and fund basic investments, akin to Somalia-wide patterns where they sustain over half of households amid sparse formal banking. and initiatives address livelihood gaps, as outlined in the 2024 SSC-Khatumo Needs Assessment, which prioritizes skills training for economic recovery but highlights persistent insecurity as a barrier to diversification. Water scarcity and pasture degradation further entrench dependence on seasonal migrations and external relief, limiting sustainable growth without stabilized .

Social Structure and Development Hurdles

The social structure of Khatumo State is predominantly clan-based, reflecting broader Somali societal norms where kinship ties and traditional leadership hierarchies govern community organization, dispute resolution, and political participation. The Dhulbahante sub-clans of the Harti Darod confederation form the demographic core, comprising the majority population alongside smaller Warsangeli and other Harti groups, with authority vested in hereditary leaders such as Garaads (spiritual and clan chiefs) and Sultans who convene conferences to select administrators and mediate internal affairs. This system fosters resilience through customary xeer law but perpetuates sub-clan rivalries, as evidenced by initial divisions among 13 Dhulbahante Garaads during the state's formation, where five opposed and eight supported the initiative. Development hurdles in Khatumo State stem primarily from protracted territorial conflicts with neighboring entities like and , which have disrupted economic activities, displaced populations, and diverted resources from public services. The local economy, reliant on and limited , suffers from heightened , reduced income opportunities, and widespread , exacerbated by conflict-induced disruptions as documented in a 2024 needs assessment. Infrastructure deficits are acute, with inadequate roads, schools, and healthcare facilities hindering access to basic services; for instance, while recent efforts aim to expand these, ongoing insecurity limits implementation and sustains reliance on clan militias for order rather than formalized institutions. Educational and health outcomes lag due to these intertwined challenges, with low enrollment rates and prevalent amid recurrent droughts and resource scarcity, mirroring Somalia's national trends but intensified by Khatumo's isolation from federal aid flows. Historical diversion of development funds by prior administrations has compounded underinvestment, though post-2023 state-building initiatives prioritize alleviation and service provision, their efficacy remains constrained by fiscal dependence on remittances and provisional federal support.

Recognition and International Status

Federal Recognition by Somalia

The initially recognized the SSC-Khaatumo administration on October 19, 2023, designating it as an interim federal member state in response to the ongoing conflict, which had seen local forces expel troops from key areas in the region. This step aimed to integrate the disputed , , and Cayn (SSC) territories into 's federal structure, countering 's claims over the areas. On April 14, 2025, granted full recognition to SSC-Khaatumo as its sixth Federal Member State (FMS), elevating it alongside , Hirshabelle, , , and South West State. Prime Minister announced this during a visit to on April 13, 2025, declaring the SSC territories as undisputed Somali land and inviting SSC-Khaatumo's leadership to the National Consultative Council for participation in national governance and security decisions. This recognition formalized SSC-Khaatumo's boundaries and administrative autonomy within the federal system, marking a shift in regional power dynamics. A landmark conference in from July 27 to 31, 2025, further solidified its status by approving a provisional , , and seat allocations in the federal , with 45 seats assigned to SSC-Khaatumo. The event resolved internal clan disputes, including allocations between SSC-Khaatumo and the former administration, and positioned the state for electing a local president and to achieve full functionality. By October 2025, SSC-Khaatumo operated as a self-administering FMS, though some reports indicated a transitional renaming to Northeastern State to align with federal nomenclature.

Stances of Disputing Entities and International Actors

maintains that the territories claimed by SSC-Khaatumo, encompassing , , and Cayn regions, constitute integral parts of its sovereign republic and rejects the administration as an illegitimate militia-led secessionist movement. has cited ongoing military engagements, including the 2023 [Las Anod](/page/Las Anod) conflict, as evidence of SSC-Khaatumo's destabilizing role and has condemned Somalia's federal recognition of the entity on April 15, 2025, as a direct infringement on its claimed borders. Puntland, which also asserts historical and constitutional claims over portions of the disputed regions, initially extended military and logistical aid to SSC-Khaatumo forces during clashes with in 2023 but has since escalated opposition. By July 17, 2025, Puntland's Ministry of Interior declared the SSC-Khaatumo administration illegal, reaffirmed its sovereignty over and , and imposed measures to counter its influence amid border skirmishes reported in May 2025. These tensions reflect Puntland's view of SSC-Khaatumo as a rival claimant undermining regional stability rather than a legitimate federal partner. International actors, including the , have consistently refrained from recognizing SSC-Khaatumo as an autonomous entity, treating it as part of 's internal political dynamics. The UN envoy to stated on November 2, 2023, that the organization does not officially acknowledge SSC-Khaatumo as a , a position aligned with broader non-recognition by the 193 UN member states, which prioritize 's territorial integrity over subnational fragmentation. Neither the nor major Western powers like the have extended formal endorsement, viewing support for such entities as counterproductive to federal stabilization efforts in .

Controversies Over Legitimacy and Stability

The legitimacy of SSC-Khaatumo remains highly contested, with authorities rejecting its formation as lacking any legal basis and asserting that the Dhulbahante-inhabited regions of , , and Cayn have been integral to 's administrative structure since 1998. This stance intensified following the Federal Government of Somalia's (FGS) recognition of SSC-Khaatumo as an interim local administration in October 2023 and as a full federal on April 14, 2025, which officials described as a serious breach of and an interference aimed at fragmenting northern . Traditional elders (Isimada) from and Haylan regions issued a statement in July 2025 explicitly rejecting affiliation with SSC-Khaatumo, denying participation in its conference, and reaffirming loyalty to while warning the FGS against meddling in clan affairs. Internal divisions further undermine claims of unified legitimacy, as SSC-Khaatumo's governance relies heavily on clan militias rather than formalized institutions, leading to accusations of it functioning as a fragmented militia-led entity prone to rivalries among sub-clans. Critics, including Somaliland-aligned analysts, argue that this structure exacerbates isolation, with no independent taxation system, blocked access to ports or trade routes, and denial of FGS or international donor funding, rendering it financially unsustainable. Stability has been precarious, marked by recurrent clashes and vulnerability to insurgent infiltration. Heavy fighting broke out on July 15, 2025, in Dhahar town of region between forces and militias linked to SSC-Khaatumo and the administration, triggered by disputes over 's inclusion in SSC-Khaatumo and resulting in unconfirmed casualties and troop reinforcements amid a volatile standoff. The militia-dependent security apparatus has reportedly created power vacuums exploited by al-Shabaab, which is gaining footholds through the region's and lack of basic services like healthcare and education. Observers warn that unresolved clan power-sharing disputes and external pressures could precipitate broader northern instability or even SSC-Khaatumo's collapse without institutional reforms.

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