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Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
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This article is part of the series: Courts of England and Wales
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House of Lords
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
StyleThe Right Honourable
Lord or Lady
AppointerThe Monarch
on the advice of the Prime Minister following the Lord Chancellor's approval of a recommendation from an independent selection commission
Term lengthJustices are required to retire on becoming 75 years old;[nb 1] may be removed on the address of both Houses of Parliament
Formation1 October 2009
Salary£226,193[1]
Websitehttp://www.supremecourt.uk/

Justices of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom are the judges of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom other than the president and the deputy president of the court.[2] The Supreme Court is the highest court of the United Kingdom for all civil cases, and for criminal cases from the jurisdictions of England and Wales and Northern Ireland. Judges are appointed by the British monarch on the advice of the prime minister, who receives recommendations from a selection commission.[3][4]

The number of judges is set by section 23(2) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which established the Supreme Court, but may be increased by Order in Council under section 23(3). There are currently twelve positions on the court: the president, the deputy president, and ten justices. Judges of the Court who are not already peers are granted the judicial courtesy title of Lord or Lady.[3][5]

The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom is required to have judges with experience of, and practice in, the legal systems of England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland. Once appointed to the Supreme Court, each judge acts as a representative for their distinct legal system in which they practice, whether it be English law, Scots law or Northern Ireland law.[6]

Lords of Appeal in Ordinary

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Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, colloquially known as law lords, were judges appointed to the House of Lords of the United Kingdom to carry out the House's judicial functions under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876, which included serving as the final court of appeal for most domestic matters.

On 1 October 2009, the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 was repealed[7][8] by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which created the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. The House of Lords thus lost its judicial functions[9] and the power to create law life peers lapsed, although the validity of extant life peerages created under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 remains intact. Lords of Appeal in Ordinary who were in office on 1 October 2009 automatically became justices of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.[10] At the same time, those Supreme Court justices who already held seats in the House of Lords lost their right to speak and vote there until after retirement as justices of the Supreme Court.[11]

Background

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The House of Lords historically had jurisdiction to hear appeals from the lower courts. Theoretically, the appeals were to the King (or Queen) in Parliament, but the House of Commons did not participate in judicial matters. The House of Lords did not necessarily include judges, but it was formerly attended by several judges who gave their opinions when the Lords desired. They did not, however, have the power to vote in the House.

In January 1856, to permit legally qualified members to exercise the House's appellate functions without allowing their heirs to swell the size of the House, Sir James Parke, a judge, was created a life peer as Baron Wensleydale.[12] As the House of Lords eventually decided that a peerage "for the term of his natural life" did not allow him to sit and vote, Parke also received a hereditary peerage on 23 July 1856.[13]

Sir Colin Blackburn, the first law lord appointed under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876
Sir Brian Kerr, the last law lord appointed under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876

In 1873 William Ewart Gladstone's government passed the Judicature Act 1873, which reorganised the court system and abolished the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords in respect of English appeals. In February 1874, before the Act came into force, Gladstone's Liberal Government fell. The Conservative Benjamin Disraeli became prime minister. In 1874 and 1875 Acts were passed delaying the coming into force of the Judicature Act 1873. The Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 repealed the provisions rescinding the jurisdiction of the House of Lords. Additionally, the Act provided for the appointment of two persons to be Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, who were to sit in the House of Lords under the dignity of baron. Originally, though they held the rank of baron for life, they served in Parliament only while holding judicial office. In 1889, however, an Act was passed allowing Lords of Appeal to continue to sit and vote in Parliament even after retirement from office.

The last person to be made a law lord under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 was Sir Brian Kerr on 29 June 2009. On 1 October 2009, the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 was repealed by Schedule 18 to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005[7][14] owing to the creation of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. As a result, the power to create life peers under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 lapsed, although the validity of peerages created thereunder remains intact.

Qualifications and functions

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Qualifications of candidates for appointment

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To be appointed a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary under the 1876 Act, a person was required to have been a practising barrister for a period of fifteen years or to have held a high judicial office—as Lord Chancellor (before 2005) or judge of the Court of Appeal, High Court or Court of Session—for a period of two years. Lords of Appeal in Ordinary were required to retire from judicial office at 70 or 75 years of age, though as barons they continued to serve as members of the House of Lords in its legislative capacity for life.

Letters patent appointing Lords of Appeal in Ordinary

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While letters patent issued by the Monarch under the terms of the Life Peerages Act 1958 just name the recipient of the life peerage, letters patent issued under the terms of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 also name the retired Lord of Appeal in Ordinary in whose stead the recipient is appointed. In the final form used in 2009, these read:

Elizabeth the Second by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Our other Realms and Territories Queen Head of the Commonwealth Defender of the Faith / To whom these Presents shall come Greeting / Whereas Our [name of retired Lord of Appeal in Ordinary] has resigned his Office of a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary and the same is now vacant Now Know Ye that We of Our especial grace have in pursuance of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 as amended by subsequent enactments nominated and appointed and by these Presents Do nominate and appoint Our [name of the new appointee] to be a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary by the style of [full peerage title of the new appointee] to hold the said Office so long as he shall well behave himself therein subject to the provisions in the said Act mentioned with all wages profits privileges rank and precedence whatsoever to the said Office belonging or in anywise appertaining and to hold the said style of Baron unto him the said [name of the new appointee] during his life / In Witness whereof We have caused these Our Letters to be made Patent / Witness Ourself at Westminster the [day] day of [month] in the [year] Year of Our Reign.[15]

Retirement age of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary

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The statutory retirement age for Lords of Appeal in Ordinary depended on when they were first appointed to judicial office: for those who first became a judge before 31 March 1995, the retirement age was 75 years of age; for those appointed on or after that date, retirement was at 70 years of age (though they were permitted to continue sitting in a part-time capacity as a "Lord of Appeal" until the age of 75 years).[16] There have been recent suggestions that the retirement age for the United Kingdom's most senior judges should revert to 75 years of age.[17]

Number of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary

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The Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 originally provided for the appointment of two Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, who would continue to serve while holding judicial office, though in 1887, they were permitted to continue to sit in the House of Lords for life, with the style and dignity of baron. The number of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary was increased incrementally over the years—to three in 1882, to four in 1891, to six in 1913, to seven in 1929, to nine in 1947, to eleven in 1968 and to twelve in 1994. The Administration of Justice Act 1968 allowed the Sovereign to make a statutory instrument, if each House of Parliament passed a resolution approving a draft of the same, increasing the maximum number of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary.

Remuneration

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Of all members of the House of Lords, only Lords of Appeal in Ordinary ever received state salaries by virtue of their position (other Lords have only ever received a daily allowance for attending sittings, plus expenses of attendance). In 2004, the salary for the Senior Lord of Appeal in Ordinary was £185,705, and for other Lords of Appeal in Ordinary it was £179,431.

Lords of Appeal

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See also: List of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary

In exercising the judicial functions of the House of Lords, Lords of Appeal in Ordinary were sometimes joined by other Lords of Appeal. Lords of Appeal included holders or former holders of high judicial office who were members of the House of Lords, but not by virtue of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act (e.g. life peers under the Life Peerages Act 1958). The Lords of Appeal continue to hold the style for life.

Senior and Second Senior Law Lord

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See also: President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and Deputy President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom

The two most senior Lords of Appeal in Ordinary were designated the Senior and Second Senior Lords of Appeal in Ordinary respectively. The Senior Lord of Appeal in Ordinary historically was the Law Lord who was senior by virtue of having served in the House for the longest period. With the appointment of Lord Bingham of Cornhill in 2000, however, it became an appointed position.

The Second Senior Lord of Appeal in Ordinary became the peer who had served for the longest period. Lord Hope of Craighead succeeded to this position on Lord Hoffmann's retirement on 20 April 2009.[18]

Qualification

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The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 sets out the conditions for the appointments of a President, Deputy President or Justice of the Court. That person must have held high judicial office (judge of the Supreme Court, English High Court or Court of Appeal, Northern Irish High Court or Court of Appeal, or Scottish Court of Session) for at least two years,[19] or have held rights of audience at the higher courts of England, Scotland or Northern Ireland for at least fifteen years.[20] This means it is not necessary for someone applying to become a judge of the Supreme Court to have previous judicial experience (allowing Jonathan Sumption QC, a leading barrister, to successfully apply for the role in 2011).

Appointment

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Judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the King by the issue of letters patent,[21][22] on the advice of the Prime Minister, to whom a name is recommended by a special selection commission. The Prime Minister is required by the Constitutional Reform Act to recommend this name to the King and not permitted to nominate anyone else.[23]

Selection commission

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The selection commission is made up of the President of the Court, another senior UK judge (not a Supreme Court Justice), and a member each from the Judicial Appointments Commission, the Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland and the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission. By law, at least one of these cannot be a lawyer.[24][25] Should the President's place on the commission be unfilled, that place is to be taken by the next most senior judge of the court, either the Deputy President or, if they are also vacant, the most senior Justice.[26][27] However, there is a similar but separate commission to appoint the next President, which is chaired by one of the non-lawyer members and features another Supreme Court Justice in the place of the President. Both of these commissions are convened by the Lord Chancellor.[25]

Selection procedure

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Once the commission is formed, there are a number of people it is required to consult. The first group is a set of "senior judges" defined by the Act who do not wish to be considered for nomination.[28] Section 60 of the Act defines "the senior judges" as (a) the other judges of the Supreme Court, (b) the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, (c) the Master of the Rolls, (d) the Lord President of the Court of Session, (e) the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, (f) the Lord Justice Clerk, (g) the President of the King's Bench Division, (h) the President of the Family Division and (i) the Chancellor of the High Court.[29]

In the event that no judge from one of the UK's three jurisdictions has been consulted (e.g. if the Lord President and Lord Justice Clerk, the two most senior judges in Scotland, both wish to be considered for appointment, they will both be excluded from the consultation), the commission must consult the most senior judge in that jurisdiction who is not a member of the commission and does not wish to be considered for appointment.[29] The commission is then also required to consult the Lord Chancellor, the First Minister of Scotland, the First Minister for Wales and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.[30]

The selection must be made on merit, in accordance with the qualification criteria of section 25 of the Act (above), of someone not a member of the commission, ensuring that the judges will have between them knowledge and experience of all three of the UK's distinct legal systems, having regard to any guidance given by the Lord Chancellor, and of one person only.[31]

Lord Chancellor's role

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Once the commission has selected a nomination to make, this is to be provided in a report to the Lord Chancellor,[32] who is then required to consult the judges and politicians already consulted by the commission before deciding whether to recommend (in the Act, "notify") a name to the Prime Minister, who in turn advises the King to make the appointment. The Act provides for up to three stages in the Lord Chancellor's consideration of whether to do so:

  1. When the selection is first put forward, the Lord Chancellor is entitled to accept the nomination, to reject it, or to ask the commission to reconsider.
  2. If the nomination was rejected in Stage One, the commission must put forward a new name for Stage Two. The Lord Chancellor must either accept or ask the commission to reconsider. If instead the Lord Chancellor asked for reconsideration at Stage One, the commission may put forward either the same name or a new one. In either case, the Lord Chancellor must either accept or reject the name. In other words, the Lord Chancellor has one opportunity to reject and one to ask for reconsideration.
  3. At Stage Three (i.e. when the Lord Chancellor has both rejected and asked once for reconsideration), the name put forward by the commission must be accepted and forwarded to the Prime Minister, with one caveat: in the event the commission was asked to reconsider a name and then forwarded a new name, the Lord Chancellor may choose to accept the earlier name.[33]

Original judges

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The Supreme Court was established on 1 October 2009. It assumed the former judicial functions of the House of Lords, which were removed by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. The twelve Lords of Appeal in Ordinary became judges of the Supreme Court,[34] except for The Lord Scott of Foscote, who retired the day before the Court began business, and The Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, who resigned to become Master of the Rolls.[35] A former Master of the Rolls, The Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony, became a judge of the Supreme Court on its first day, the first Justice directly appointed to the Court.[36] Sir John Dyson was appointed as the twelfth member on 13 April 2010, the first Justice not to be a peer.

The Senior Law Lord on 1 October 2009, The Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, became the Court's first President,[37] and the former Second Senior Law Lord, The Lord Hope of Craighead, the first Deputy President. The Court originally had one female Justice, The Baroness Hale of Richmond; two Scottish justices, The Lord Hope of Craighead and The Lord Rodger of Earlsferry; and one Northern Irish Justice, The Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore.

Of the original justices, The Lord Saville of Newdigate was the first to retire, on 30 September 2010, and The Lord Rodger of Earlsferry was the first to die in office, on 26 June 2011. Lord Dyson stood down to become Master of the Rolls on 1 October 2012, the first time a Justice had left the Court to take up another judicial office. The last of the original justices to retire was The Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore on 30 September 2020.

List

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Current judges

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See also: List of judges of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom

The most recent to join the court is Lady Simler, who joined on 14 November 2023 in place of Lord Kitchin. In order of seniority, they are as follows:

Portrait Name Born Alma mater Invested Mandatory
retirement 		Prior senior judicial roles
The Lord Reed
of Allermuir
(President) 		7 September 1956
(age 69) 		University of Edinburgh School of Law

Balliol College, Oxford 		6 February 2012 7 September 2031 Senator of the College of Justice:
Lord Hodge
(Deputy President) 		19 May 1953
(age 72) 		Corpus Christi College, Cambridge

University of Edinburgh School of Law 		1 October 2013 19 May 2028 Senator of the College of Justice:
Lord Lloyd-Jones 13 January 1952
(age 73) 		Downing College, Cambridge 2 October 2017 13 January 2027 Lord Justice of Appeal (2012–2017)

Justice of the High Court, QBD (2005–2012)
Lord Briggs
of Westbourne 		23 December 1954
(age 70) 		Magdalen College, Oxford 2 October 2017 23 December 2029 Lord Justice of Appeal (2013–2017)

Justice of the High Court, CD (2006–2013)
Lord Sales 11 February 1962
(age 63) 		Churchill College, Cambridge

Worcester College, Oxford 		11 January 2019 11 February 2037 Lord Justice of Appeal (2014–2018)

Justice of the High Court, CD (2008–2014)
Lord Hamblen
of Kersey 		23 September 1957
(age 68) 		St John's College, Oxford

Harvard Law School 		13 January 2020 23 September 2032 Lord Justice of Appeal (2016–2020)

Justice of the High Court, QBD (2008–2016)
Lord Leggatt 12 November 1957
(age 67) 		King's College, Cambridge

Harvard University

City Law School 		21 April 2020 12 November 2032 Lord Justice of Appeal (2018–2020)

Justice of the High Court, QBD (2012–2018)
Lord Burrows 17 April 1957
(age 68) 		Brasenose College, Oxford

Harvard Law School 		2 June 2020 17 April 2032 None: first Justice to be appointed directly from academia[38]
Lord Stephens
of Creevyloughgare 		28 December 1954
(age 70) 		University of Manchester 1 October 2020 28 December 2029 Lord Justice of Appeal (NI) (2017–2020)

Justice of the High Court (NI) (2007–2017)
Lady Rose
of Colmworth 		13 April 1960
(age 65) 		Newnham College, Cambridge

Brasenose College, Oxford 		13 April 2021 13 April 2035 Lady Justice of Appeal (2019–2021)

Justice of the High Court, CD (2013–2019)
Lord Richards
of Camberwell 		9 June 1951
(age 74) 		Trinity College, Cambridge 3 October 2022 9 June 2026 Lord Justice of Appeal (2015–2021)

Justice of the High Court, CD (2003–2015)
Lady Simler 17 September 1963
(age 62) 		Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge

University of Amsterdam 		14 September 2023 17 September 2038 Lady Justice of Appeal (2019–2023)

Justice of the High Court, QBD (2013–2019)


Acting judges and supplementary panel

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Under section 38 of the Constitutional Reform Act, the President of the Court is empowered to request the service of additional judges on the Court, drawn from two categories of people: the first is any person serving as a "senior territorial judge", defined by section 38(8) as a judge of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, the Inner House of the Court of Session, or the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland (unless the judge holds the latter office only by virtue of being a puisne judge of the High Court in Northern Ireland). The Lord Judge[39][40] occasionally sat on cases in the Supreme Court when he was Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, as did Neuberger when he was Master of the Rolls. Both Reed (prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court) and Lord Clarke, judges of the Court of Session, sat on the Supreme Court during Rodger's last illness.

The second category of additional judges is the supplementary panel: approved Supreme Court justices and territorial judges who have retired from judicial service within the past five years and are younger than 75.

As of 2025 the supplementary panel consists of:[41]

Salary

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As of 1 October 2019, justices of the Supreme Court, including the deputy president, were in Group 2 of the judicial salary scheme, with an annual salary of £226,193. This is the same group as the chancellor of the High Court, Lord Justice Clerk, president of the Family Division and president of the King's Bench Division.[1] The president of the Supreme Court, Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, Lord President of the Court of Session and Master of the Rolls make up Group 1.1 of the scale on £234,184, below only the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, who earns £262,264.[1]

Style and address

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Following a Royal Warrant dated 10 December 2010,[3] all justices of the Supreme Court who are not already peers are granted the judicial courtesy title of Lord or Lady followed by a surname, territorial designation or a combination of both, for life.[3][42] Wives of male Supreme Court justices are styled as if they were wives of peers.

Dress

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On ceremonial occasions, such as the State Opening of Parliament, the ceremony at Westminster Abbey to mark the beginning of the judicial year, and at the swearing in of a new member of the Court, the justices wear ceremonial robes of black silk damask trimmed with gold lace and frogs, in the same pattern as the Lord Chancellor's state robes. The robe has no train, and the flap collar and shoulder caps bear the Supreme Court insignia.

The justices do not wear wigs or court dress as others in the legal and official positions do. The Baroness Hale of Richmond took to wearing a black velvet Tudor bonnet with gold cord and tassel which is the common headwear for doctorates in British academical dress.[citation needed] The robes were made by Ede & Ravenscroft with the embroidery by Hand & Lock.[43]

On other occasions, the justices wear day dress. This follows the convention adopted by the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, which was, technically, not a court but a committee of that House.

See also

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References

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Notes

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Sources

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom

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from Grokipedia

Justices of the of the United Kingdom are the judges appointed to serve on the country's highest , which determines final appeals in civil matters across the and in criminal cases from , , and on points of of general public importance. The , comprising exactly twelve such Justices including a President and Deputy President, was established by the to separate the judiciary from the legislative functions previously performed by the , thereby enhancing and transparency in the constitutional framework. Appointed by the on the advice of the following recommendations from an independent ad hoc selection commission, Justices are selected based on merit, emphasizing exceptional intellectual ability, sound judgment, and relevant expertise across the UK's legal jurisdictions, with conventions ensuring representation from and . Statutory qualifications require candidates to have held high judicial office for at least two years or been qualifying practitioners—such as barristers, solicitors, or advocates entitled to practice in senior courts—for at least fifteen years. Panels of five or more Justices typically hear cases, delivering collegial judgments that shape legal precedents while maintaining the Court's role in clarifying and principles without creating new law. This structure underscores the Justices' pivotal function in upholding constitutional principles through rigorous, evidence-based legal reasoning, free from political influence.

Role and Constitutional Position

Judicial Responsibilities

Justices of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom exercise their primary judicial function by sitting as judges in the final court of appeal for the , determining appeals that raise arguable points of law of general public importance. The Court's jurisdiction encompasses all civil proceedings originating anywhere in the , as well as criminal proceedings from , , and ; criminal appeals from are handled separately by the . Additionally, the Court adjudicates devolution matters arising under the , the Government of Wales Act 2006, and the , ensuring compliance with the constitutional frameworks devolved to those jurisdictions. Appeals are typically heard by panels of five Justices, though panels of seven or nine may be convened for cases involving exceptional difficulty or constitutional significance, such as challenges to primary legislation under the Human Rights Act 1998. Justices participate collegially in deliberations, assessing applications for permission to appeal and deciding substantive matters through reasoned judgments that interpret statutes, develop the , and clarify legal principles binding on lower courts. Judgments are delivered in writing, often individually or jointly, and must reflect the highest standards of legal analysis to maintain public confidence in the Court's authority. In addition to domestic appeals, Justices may sit on the Judicial Committee of the , hearing cases from overseas territories and realms on points of analogous to those in UK jurisprudence. Their decisions in the bind all UK courts below it, establishing precedents that shape legal development across jurisdictions while respecting the distinct systems of English, Scots, and Northern Irish . This appellate role underscores the Justices' responsibility to uphold the without usurping legislative or executive functions, focusing solely on legal interpretation rather than policy or factual disputes.

Independence from Executive and Legislature

The establishment of the of the under the marked a deliberate separation of the from the , ending the practice where Law Lords served as both judges in the Appellate Committee of the and members of the . This reform addressed concerns over perceived , ensuring that Supreme Court justices do not participate in parliamentary proceedings or legislative debates, thereby preserving judicial and preventing any influence from legislative roles on judicial decisions. Justices hold office during good behaviour, with security of tenure reinforced by the requirement that removal can only occur upon an (resolution) presented to both Houses of , a mechanism that has not been invoked for any senior judge in modern . This high threshold for dismissal insulates justices from executive pressure or retaliatory actions following unpopular rulings, such as those challenging government policies. Appointments are handled by an independent selection commission, minimizing executive discretion, while the —now a cabinet minister without judicial functions—plays a limited vetting role without veto power over selections. Financial independence is further secured by provisions charging justices' salaries directly to the , bypassing annual parliamentary appropriations that could be withheld as leverage. The Act explicitly mandates that the and other ministers uphold judicial independence, prohibiting improper interference in judicial processes or decisions. These structural safeguards align with broader constitutional principles of , though critics have noted potential vulnerabilities in overall court funding, which remains subject to executive allocation via the budget. The justices of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom shape the legal system by delivering judgments that serve as binding precedents on all lower courts in , , and , thereby ensuring consistency in the application of law and driving the evolution of principles. These decisions, typically unanimous or majority opinions authored or joined by the justices, interpret statutes, clarify constitutional conventions, and resolve conflicts between jurisdictions, with the Court hearing approximately 80 to 100 appeals annually from appellate courts below. In 2020, for instance, the Court allowed 49% of appeals, overturning lower court rulings in a substantial portion of cases and thereby correcting errors or refining legal standards across civil, criminal, and domains. In constitutional law, justices have constrained executive actions through landmark rulings, such as R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the UKSC 5 on 24 January 2017, which held that the government could not trigger Article 50 of the without parliamentary authorisation, underscoring the principle of over prerogative powers. Similarly, in R (Miller) v The UKSC 41 on 24 September 2019, an 11-justice panel unanimously declared the prorogation of unlawful, as it frustrated the constitutional requirement for effective legislative scrutiny, establishing that such acts must have a legitimate purpose and not undermine democratic accountability. These precedents have limited executive discretion in high-stakes political contexts, influencing subsequent government conduct and reinforcing judicial oversight without encroaching on legislative supremacy, as the lacks authority to strike down primary legislation. On and , justices have delineated competences under the , , and Government of Wales Act 2006, as seen in cases like Reference by the Attorney General and the Advocate General for Scotland – Continuity Bill UKSC 64, which invalidated provisions exceeding Holyrood's powers and affirmed the UK's enduring post-Brexit. Under the , which incorporates the , the Court issues interpretations compatible with convention rights where possible, or declarations of incompatibility prompting legislative response, as in claims succeeding in about 28-29% of cases reviewed under recent presidencies. A 2025 ruling in For Women Scotland v Scottish Ministers affirmed that "woman" under the refers to biological sex, excluding gender recognition certificates for sex-based rights, thereby safeguarding single-sex provisions in services, sports, and employment while navigating tensions with claims under equality and frameworks. This jurisprudence promotes legal uniformity amid jurisdictional diversity—Scotland's civilian-influenced system alongside the of , , and —while justices' emphasis on textual over expansive judicial policymaking has moderated shifts toward greater rights-based adjudication compared to pre-2009 practice. Overall, the justices' output fosters causal in , with empirical reversal rates indicating rigorous of inferior decisions, though critics note occasional deference to political branches to avoid overreach in a .

Qualifications and Eligibility

Statutory Requirements

The eligibility criteria for appointment as a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom are set out in section 25 of the , as amended by the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. A candidate must satisfy one of three alternative statutory qualifications, designed to ensure extensive legal expertise applicable across the jurisdictions of , , and . The first route requires that the individual has held high judicial office for at least two years. High judicial office is defined in section 60(2) of the same Act to include positions such as a of the of , the Inner House of the in , the in , or an equivalent role in the senior courts. This pathway prioritizes proven judicial experience at appellate levels. The second route mandates that the person has been a qualifying practitioner for at least 15 years. Qualifying practitioners include barristers or solicitors in entitled to conduct litigation or exercise , advocates or solicitors in Scotland entitled to appear before the Court of Session or , or members of the Bar of or solicitors of the Court of Judicature there. This experience encompasses full-time legal practice, including roles as judges, arbitrators, or employed lawyers post-qualification. The third route applies to those who satisfy the judicial-appointment eligibility condition on a 15-year basis, as referenced in section 25(1)(b). This condition, amended in , accommodates individuals with a relevant legal qualification—such as those under section 51(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act —and at least 15 years of substantial legal experience, which may include judicial functions, academic contributions, or other roles demonstrating equivalent expertise. This broader criterion allows for recognition of non-traditional paths while maintaining a high threshold for legal proficiency. These requirements, unchanged in substance since their enactment, ensure that appointees possess deep familiarity with UK-wide legal principles, though the Act does not mandate specific jurisdictional balance at the eligibility stage.

Practical Experience and Merit Assessment

Candidates for appointment as Justices of the of the must possess substantial practical legal experience, typically evidenced by senior judicial service or equivalent high-level practice, to handle the complexity of appellate cases involving constitutional, civil, and criminal matters across UK jurisdictions. In practice, the majority of appointees qualify through at least two years in high judicial office, such as the Court of Appeal in , the Inner House of the Court of Session in , or the Court of Appeal in , reflecting the need for proven expertise in appellate decision-making. Qualifying practitioners with 15 years of post-qualification experience—encompassing barristers, advocates, solicitors, or legal academics—must similarly demonstrate depth in relevant fields, including knowledge of the distinct legal systems of , , and , as the Court collectively requires balanced representation of these traditions. The ad hoc selection commission evaluates merit rigorously, prioritizing exceptional intellectual and legal ability, sound judgment, and decisiveness as core attributes for interpreting and developing law. Assessments involve reviewing applications, conducting interviews, and consulting stakeholders, focusing on candidates' capacity for incisive analysis, impartiality, and authoritative reasoning in judgments that influence nationwide. Further criteria encompass collaborative skills for collegiate deliberation, awareness of societal diversity to ensure accessible , and aptitude for public representation, such as lectures or media engagement, underscoring the Justices' role beyond adjudication. Selections adhere strictly to merit as the primary principle, with secondary considerations like diversity in , , or professional background applied only among candidates deemed of equal merit, alongside ensuring the Court's overall composition reflects without compromising competence. This framework, derived from the , aims to maintain judicial excellence while addressing historical underrepresentation, though empirical data indicate persistent challenges in broadening the pool of eligible senior practitioners.

Appointment Mechanism

Composition of the Selection Commission

The selection commission is an body established under the and the Supreme Court (Judicial Appointments) Regulations 2013 for each vacancy among the Justices. It must comprise at least five members, with a requirement that at least two be non-legally qualified lay persons to ensure diverse perspectives in the process. For the appointment of an ordinary Justice or the Deputy President, the President of the Supreme Court serves as chair and nominates one senior UK judge who is not a current Supreme Court Justice to join the commission. The remaining members consist of one nominee selected by the (responsible for ), one by the Judicial Appointments Board for , and one by the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission. These nominees are chosen to reflect the jurisdictional balance of the Court, with the lay requirement distributed among them where possible. In cases of appointing a new President, the Deputy President assumes the chairing role and performs the nomination of the senior judge, while the commission otherwise mirrors the standard composition with representatives from the three devolved judicial appointments bodies. If the Deputy President is unavailable or disqualified, the position is filled by the most senior available ordinary . This variation maintains continuity and prevents conflicts of interest in leadership selections.

Selection Criteria and Procedure

The selection criteria for appointment as a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom combine statutory eligibility requirements with a merit-based assessment to ensure candidates possess the requisite expertise for the Court's appellate and constitutional functions. Under section 25 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, eligibility mandates that a candidate has either held high judicial office for at least two years, satisfied the judicial-appointment eligibility condition on a 15-year basis, or practiced as a qualifying practitioner for at least 15 years. High judicial office encompasses senior roles such as a judge of the Court of Appeal in England and Wales, the Inner House of the Court of Session in Scotland, or the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland. The judicial-appointment eligibility condition requires qualifications equivalent to those for appointment to a higher court, scaled to 15 years of relevant experience to reflect the demands of Supreme Court adjudication. Qualifying practitioners include barristers or solicitors in England, Wales, or Northern Ireland, or advocates or solicitors entitled to appear before the higher courts in Scotland. These thresholds prioritize depth of legal practice or judicial service across the UK's jurisdictions, ensuring familiarity with civil and common law systems as applicable. Merit assessment extends beyond eligibility to evaluate intellectual capacity, analytical precision, impartial judgment, and collaborative aptitude essential for collegiate in complex cases. Selection commissions seek candidates demonstrating outstanding contributions to legal , precedent-setting judgments, or advocacy in high-stakes matters, with primary emphasis on judicial excellence over secondary factors like diversity, though the latter is considered to reflect the Court's composition. The appointment procedure, outlined in sections 26–31 and Schedule 8 of the (as amended), operates through an ad hoc selection commission to minimize executive interference. Vacancies trigger consultation between the and the President (or a senior judge) to confirm the need for filling the post. The then convenes the commission, which comprises five members: the President as chair, the Deputy President, and one representative each from the Judicial Appointments Commissions of , , and . The commission publicly advertises the vacancy, solicits applications including personal statements, work samples (e.g., judgments or legal opinions), and assessor references, then shortlists eligible candidates for interviews assessing merit against the Court's needs. It recommends a single candidate—the one deemed best qualified—to the Lord Chancellor, who may accept, reject (prompting a new selection), or request reconsideration. Accepted recommendations proceed to the Prime Minister for formal advice to the monarch, effectuating appointment. This framework, implemented since the Court's inception in 2009, has yielded selections based on documented judicial records, with commissions dissolving post-recommendation to preserve independence.

Vetting by the Lord Chancellor

The selection commission submits a report to the identifying the candidate selected to fill a vacancy on the , along with reasons for the selection and confirmation that the candidate meets the statutory qualification requirements under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. The , as , then undertakes a formal vetting process, which includes mandatory consultations with specified persons to assess the recommendation's alignment with merit principles and jurisdictional needs. These consultations encompass the President of the , the Lord Chief Justice (or equivalents in devolved jurisdictions), the (for Scottish vacancies), the First Minister for Wales (for Welsh-related expertise), and the Judicial Appointments Commission (for Northern Irish vacancies). The process ensures devolved considerations are addressed, particularly for vacancies requiring expertise in Scots or Northern Irish law, where at least one commission member must possess such knowledge. Upon completing consultations, the has three statutory options: accept the selection and notify the to recommend the appointment to the ; reject the selection outright, which can occur only once and requires the commission to select anew without the rejected candidate; or require the commission to reconsider its choice, potentially by nominating an alternative from the original pool or broadening it. Rejection or reconsideration is constrained to specific grounds, such as the Lord Chancellor determining that the selected candidate lacks the requisite qualifications—defined as an outstanding legal mind with the ability to conduct supreme-level appellate work—or that exceptional circumstances warrant a different selection to maintain judicial standards. This limited veto power, introduced by the , serves as a safeguard against commission errors while preserving the process's independence, with no recorded instances of rejection in the Supreme Court's history since 2009. The Lord Chancellor's vetting also involves verifying compliance with diversity and merit criteria outlined in the Supreme Court Rules, though the primary merit assessment remains with the commission. In practice, this step incorporates background checks on professional conduct and potential conflicts, drawing on Judicial Appointments Commission protocols, but remains subordinate to the commission's recommendation to avoid executive overreach. The process concludes with the Prime Minister's formal advice to the Monarch for appointment if no objections arise, emphasizing the Act's intent to insulate selections from direct political influence while allowing ministerial accountability.

Limited Parliamentary Scrutiny

The appointment process for Justices of the of the , governed by sections 26 to 31 and Schedule 8 of the , excludes direct parliamentary involvement in the selection or approval of individual candidates. An selection commission, convened by the and comprising at least five members including the Court President or Deputy President, a senior judge, and lay members, identifies a single recommended candidate based on merit, judicial excellence, and diversity considerations. The Lord Chancellor may accept the recommendation, request its reconsideration, or reject it solely on grounds of the candidate's unsuitability or lack of merit, but such rejections have not occurred in practice since the Court's establishment in 2009. Parliament's oversight is confined to indirect accountability through the Lord Chancellor, who must justify any deviation from the commission's recommendation in a statement laid before both Houses if exercising veto powers, though this mechanism has remained unused. Unlike appointments to lower courts, where select committees conduct pre-appointment hearings for certain senior roles, no equivalent scrutiny applies to Supreme Court vacancies, reflecting the 2005 Act's emphasis on insulating the judiciary from legislative influence to safeguard independence. The Prime Minister, upon the Lord Chancellor's advice, formally recommends the appointee to the monarch, bypassing parliamentary ratification. This limited role stems from constitutional design prioritizing meritocratic, apolitical selection over democratic oversight, as articulated in the Act's framework to separate judicial appointments from executive and legislative branches following the removal of the Lord Chancellor's historic judicial functions. Proponents argue it prevents the politicization observed in systems like the confirmations, where ideological battles can delay or derail appointments; critics, including some parliamentary reports, have proposed lay-led hearings to enhance transparency without compromising , but these have not been adopted, with the citing risks to candidate candor and judicial detachment. As of 2025, no legislative changes have expanded Parliament's purview, maintaining the process's focus on professional assessment by experts rather than elected representatives.

Tenure, Remuneration, and Accountability

Appointment Term and Mandatory Retirement

Justices of the Supreme Court hold office during good behaviour, with tenure secured against arbitrary removal except by an address presented to the Crown by both Houses of Parliament on grounds of misbehaviour or incapacity. This arrangement, established under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, provides security of tenure to safeguard judicial independence, mirroring historical protections for senior judges while ensuring accountability through parliamentary oversight. Appointments carry no predetermined end date, allowing justices to serve indefinitely subject to the mandatory retirement provision. Mandatory retirement is required upon reaching the age of 75, a threshold set to balance judicial experience with renewal of the bench. This age was increased from 70 effective 31 March via the Public Service Pensions and Judicial Offices Act , reversing a reduction implemented in amid concerns over pension costs and perceived fitness for office at advanced ages. The prior limit of 70, enacted under the Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act , had led to premature losses of expertise, prompting the restoration to 75 to address recruitment challenges and maintain institutional capacity without compromising competence. Justices appointed before the change who were below 75 could continue serving, with provisions for extensions in exceptional cases to complete ongoing cases, though such acting roles post-retirement are limited and unpaid beyond pension entitlements. In practice, retirement at 75 has been the standard exit, with no recorded removals since the Court's inception in 2009.

Salary Structure and Financial Independence

Salaries for Justices of the Supreme Court are recommended annually by the Senior Salaries Review Body (SSRB), an independent advisory body that assesses for senior judicial and public roles based on factors including economic conditions, comparability with other high-level professions, and needs. The SSRB's recommendations are reviewed and approved by the with consent before implementation, typically effective from 1 April each year. Effective 1 April 2025, regular Justices and the Deputy President receive an annual of £280,311, while the President is paid £290,213. These figures represent increases from prior years—£269,530 for Justices in 2024—to account for and maintain competitiveness, as determined through the SSRB . Justices are also entitled to membership in the Judicial Pension Scheme, providing defined benefits funded separately to support long-term financial security without reliance on personal savings. To ensure financial independence, salaries are charged directly to the under Schedule 1, paragraph 11 of the , bypassing annual parliamentary estimates and executive budgetary control. This mechanism prevents the government from using funding decisions to exert pressure on judicial salaries, thereby insulating Justices from political interference and upholding the . Salaries cannot be diminished during a Justice's tenure, a protection rooted in constitutional convention and reinforced by the Act's structure, further securing impartiality in adjudication.

Grounds for Removal and Judicial Security

Justices of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom hold office quamdiu se bene gesserint, meaning during good behaviour, with removal possible only upon an address presented to the Sovereign by both Houses of Parliament. This mechanism, enshrined in section 33 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, applies specifically to Supreme Court judges and mirrors protections for other senior judiciary under the Act of Settlement 1701. The absence of enumerated statutory grounds—such as specific acts of misconduct or incapacity—leaves determination to parliamentary discretion, though historical precedents suggest it targets grave breaches like corruption, criminality, or persistent inability to perform duties. The removal process requires a motion in each House, typically initiated after investigation by bodies like the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office, followed by debate and voting; approval demands majorities in both the House of Commons and House of Lords. No Supreme Court justice has ever been removed since the court's establishment on 1 October 2009, reflecting the high threshold and political risks involved, as parliamentary action could undermine judicial legitimacy. Lesser disciplinary matters, such as complaints of impropriety, fall under Part 4 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, handled by the Lord Chancellor and senior judiciary, potentially leading to reprimands or advice but not dismissal without parliamentary involvement. This security of tenure safeguards by insulating justices from executive or legislative pressure, ensuring decisions are based on law rather than fear of reprisal. Originating from the Act of Settlement to prevent royal interference, it was reaffirmed in the 2005 reforms separating judicial from executive functions, though critics argue the vague "good behaviour" standard could invite politicized removals in polarized climates. In practice, tenure ends mandatorily at age 75 under the Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993 (as amended), with no extensions beyond transitional provisions allowing service to 80 for pre-1995 appointees. Physical or operational security for justices, including protection from threats, is managed through standard judicial arrangements but does not alter tenure protections.

Membership and Composition

Fixed Number of Justices

The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom is composed of a fixed total of twelve justices, comprising the President, the Deputy President, and ten other justices. This number is prescribed by section 23(2) of the , which established the court and took effect on 1 October 2009, replacing the Appellate Committee of the . The statutory limit ensures a stable judicial complement for handling the court's appellate workload across civil, criminal, and matters from , , and . While the total membership is capped at twelve, the Act permits an increase via an following consultations with the , the First Ministers of and , the Lord President of the , and the Lord Chief Justice of ; no such adjustment has been made since inception. This provision allows flexibility for potential future caseload growth without necessitating primary , though the fixed baseline reflects an initial assessment of needs post-separation from the Lords. Cases are heard by panels drawn from these twelve justices, typically five for standard appeals, but expandable to seven or nine—and exceptionally eleven—for matters of exceptional public importance, such as constitutional challenges or points of . The use of odd-numbered panels avoids ties, and the fixed total membership supports efficient rotation while maintaining expertise across jurisdictions. As of October 2025, the court operates at full strength with twelve justices, underscoring the enduring adequacy of this structure.

Inaugural Appointments in 2009

The of the commenced operations on 1 October 2009, following the implementation of the , which provided for the automatic transfer of sitting Lords of Appeal in Ordinary from the ' Appellate Committee to become the initial Justices of the new court. At that time, eleven such Lords held office, having reduced from twelve due to the retirement of Lord Scott of Foscote on 30 June 2009; these eleven individuals transitioned seamlessly into the roles of Justices without a formal selection process, preserving continuity in the UK's highest appellate function. To achieve the statutory complement of twelve Justices, the twelfth inaugural appointment was made in July 2009 with the selection of Anthony Clarke, Baron Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony, then serving as , to replace the vacancy left by Lord Scott's retirement. This appointment followed the standard procedure under the Act, involving recommendation by the and formal issuance by the , though adapted for the transitional context. The senior-most among the transferred Justices, Nicholas Phillips, Baron Phillips of , assumed the role of first President, while David Hope, Baron Hope of Craighead, the second senior, became Deputy President; both positions were designated by their prior seniority in the . All twelve inaugural Justices were sworn into office during a ceremony on 1 October 2009 at the in , marking the formal opening of the court and the separation of judicial functions from the legislative branch. Among them, Brenda Hale, Baroness Hale of Richmond, became the first female Justice, having been appointed a Law Lord in 2004; the group otherwise comprised exclusively male justices with extensive experience in senior appellate roles across UK jurisdictions. This inaugural cohort retained their life peerages in the but were barred from participating in its legislative proceedings, underscoring the Act's intent to enhance .

Current Justices as of 2025

The of the comprises 12 s: a president, a deputy president, and 10 s, all appointed by the King on the recommendation of the following selection by an independent commission. As of October 26, 2025, the president is Lord Reed of Allermuir, who has held the role since January 11, 2020, following his initial appointment as a in 2011. The deputy president is Lord Hodge, appointed to the Court in 2013 and elevated to deputy in 2022, with his tenure set to conclude at the end of December 2025. Lord Sales has been selected to succeed as deputy president effective January 2026. The justices include Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Briggs of Westbourne, Lord Hamblen of Kersey, Lord Leggatt, Lord Burrows, Lord Stephens of Creevyloughgare, Lady Rose of Colmworth, Lord Richards of , and Lady Simler. Lord Richards announced his retirement on October 24, 2025, though the effective date remains unspecified. Recruitment for a replacement justice and the new deputy position (to be filled by Lord Sales in his expanded role) was initiated in April 2025 due to impending vacancies.
JusticeRole/Notes
Lord Reed of AllermuirPresident
Lord HodgeDeputy President (until Dec 2025)
Lord Lloyd-JonesPuisne Justice
Lord Briggs of WestbournePuisne Justice
Lord SalesPuisne Justice (Deputy from Jan 2026)
Lord Hamblen of KerseyPuisne Justice
Lord LeggattPuisne Justice
Lord BurrowsPuisne Justice
Lord Stephens of CreevyloughgarePuisne Justice
Lady Rose of ColmworthPuisne Justice
Lord Richards of HerstmonceuxPuisne Justice (retirement announced Oct 2025)
Lady SimlerPuisne Justice
By convention, at least two justices hail from (currently Lord Reed and Lord Hodge) and one from (Lord Stephens), ensuring representation across UK jurisdictions, while the remainder are from . All justices also serve on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

Use of Acting and Supplementary Judges

The of the United Kingdom maintains a supplementary panel of retired senior judges to provide flexibility in constituting hearing panels beyond its twelve permanent justices, particularly when recusals, illnesses, or workload demands necessitate additional members. Established under section 39 of the , the panel comprises individuals eligible upon ceasing qualifying judicial office, including former justices or senior territorial judges (such as the Lord President of the or Lord Chief Justice of ), provided they apply or are approved by the President within two years of retirement and remain under age 75. Membership is not automatic for all retirees; it requires presidential consent and notification to the , with tenure limited to five years post-office or until age 75, whichever occurs first, excluding those who resigned prematurely or were removed. As of 2025, the panel includes Lady Black of Derwent, Lord Burnett of Maldon, Lord Kitchin, and Sir Declan Morgan, none of whom hold permanent justiceships. Members of the supplementary panel serve as acting judges only when specifically requested by the President to sit on cases, enabling the court to assemble panels of five, seven, or more justices as required by its rules for and deliberation. This mechanism supplements the permanent bench without expanding fixed membership, drawing on experienced retirees to maintain judicial continuity and expertise in specialised areas like commercial or . Acting judges from the panel exercise full powers equivalent to permanent justices during hearings, including delivering judgments, but receive no ongoing —only allowances for sittings—and must comply with the court's Guide to Judicial Conduct, emphasising and . The panel's use is discretionary and infrequent, typically to address temporary shortages rather than routine supplementation, as evidenced by occasional sittings such as those by Lord Saville in the court's inaugural years (2009–2011) and Lord Lloyd-Jones post-retirement extension. Beyond the supplementary panel, the President may also invite serving senior judges from , , or —such as Court of Appeal or presidents—to act ad hoc, forming a second pool of non-permanent participants authorised under the to ensure operational resilience. These acting appointments, limited in duration per case, prevent bottlenecks in the court's caseload of approximately 80–100 appeals annually, prioritising efficiency without compromising the seniority threshold (typically 15 years' experience) mandated for all participants. Historical reliance on such arrangements has been minimal, with permanent justices handling the majority of proceedings, but the provisions underscore the court's design for adaptability amid fixed numbers and mandatory retirements at age 75 or after a single term. No remuneration beyond standard judicial fees applies to these acting roles, reinforcing tied to active service rather than supplementary status.

Formalities and Protocol

Titles, Styles, and Forms of Address

Justices of the of the hold the official title " of the ", as established under the , which created the court effective 1 October 2009. Following a Royal Warrant dated 10 December 2010, justices who are not hereditary or life peers are granted the judicial courtesy style of " " or "" followed by their territorial designation or surname, such as " Reed of Allermuir". This practice maintains ceremonial continuity with the former Lords of Appeal in Ordinary while adhering to by avoiding elevation to the peerage, which would permit legislative participation. In court, justices are addressed orally as "My Lord" or "My Lady", regardless of gender, during hearings and deliberations. The President of the Supreme Court, currently Lord Reed since 2020, is styled "The Right Honourable the Lord President" and addressed as "My Lord President" in formal judicial contexts. The Deputy President holds a parallel style, such as "The Right Honourable the Lord Deputy President". For written correspondence and formal documents, justices are typically addressed as "The Right Honourable the Lord/Lady [Surname]" or "Dear Lord/Lady [Surname]", with the full form "The Right Honourable Lord/Lady [Surname], Justice of the Supreme Court" used in official listings. This protocol extends to envelopes and salutations, emphasizing their judicial rank over academic or professional prefixes. Invitations or public announcements may employ the courtesy title alone, but the judicial office remains paramount in legal references.

Judicial Dress and Ceremonial Practices

Justices of the of the wear ordinary business attire, typically suits, during court sittings and hearings, eschewing traditional robes, wigs, or other formal judicial dress observed in lower courts. This practice, adopted since the court's establishment on 1 October 2009, reflects a deliberate choice to modernize the institution's image and emphasize its separation from the , where appellate functions were previously conducted amid parliamentary ceremonies. Unlike judges in the or Court of Appeal, who don simplified gowns in civil proceedings or red robes in criminal ones following reforms in 2008, justices maintain this unrobed approach to align with the court's role as a distinct judicial body focused on substantive legal deliberation rather than ritualistic display. Ceremonial practices are minimal and functional, centered on swearing-in and valedictory events rather than elaborate processions or state openings. New justices are sworn in via a public or closed in Courtroom 1, typically coinciding with the start of a legal term such as (early October) or Hilary (early ), where they recite the standard judicial —"I do swear that I will do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages of this realm, without fear or favour, affection or ill will"—preceded by an to the . For instance, on 3 October 2022, Sir David Richards was sworn in at 9:30 a.m. to mark the legal year's commencement, with the President or Deputy President presiding. These oaths bind justices to impartiality and constitutional fidelity, administered without robes or additional regalia, consistent with the court's everyday attire policy even in valedictory ceremonies honoring retiring members. The inaugural opening on 16 October 2009 featured a unique ceremonial address by Queen Elizabeth II in , attended by the 12 founding justices, but subsequent term openings lack such monarchical involvement, reverting to internal swearing-ins without processional elements or special vestments. Display cases in the court's public areas exhibit ceremonial robes for historical context, but these are not worn by sitting justices, underscoring the institution's preference for substantive over symbolic formality. This restrained approach contrasts with traditions in other jurisdictions, such as the Lord Chancellor's Breakfast for judges, which the Supreme Court does not participate in, reinforcing its autonomous operational ethos.

Criticisms, Controversies, and Reforms

Debates on Politicization and Transparency

The 2019 prorogation judgment, in which the UK Supreme Court unanimously ruled on 24 September that Prime Minister Boris Johnson's advice to prorogue Parliament for five weeks was unlawful, intensified debates on the Court's potential politicization. Critics, including constitutional scholars associated with the Judicial Power Project, characterized the decision as an unprecedented judicial intervention into core executive and parliamentary functions, arguing it blurred the separation of powers by substituting judicial assessment for political accountability. The ruling, which halted parliamentary suspension amid Brexit negotiations, drew accusations from conservative commentators that the Court was aligning with Remain-oriented political pressures, thereby eroding public trust in judicial neutrality. Supporters countered that the judgment enforced constitutional limits on executive power without endorsing any policy outcome, emphasizing that justiciability turned on the motive's effect of frustrating parliamentary sovereignty rather than partisan bias. Further concerns arose from the Court's reversal rate, with a 2022 parliamentary report highlighting a "high number of instances" where the Supreme Court overturned its own precedents, fostering a "troubling appearance" of politicization amid evolving societal and political shifts like Brexit. This pattern, observed in cases revisiting issues such as human rights and devolution, prompted warnings that frequent doctrinal shifts could signal responsiveness to external pressures rather than strict legal evolution, particularly given the justices' backgrounds in pre-Brexit jurisprudence. In response, President Lord Reed has defended judicial independence as essential for impartiality, cautioning in a June 2025 speech that populist attacks portraying judges as elitist undermine public confidence without evidence of systemic bias, while affirming the Court's role in applying law uniformly regardless of political controversy. On transparency, the appointment process for justices, governed by the , relies on ad hoc selection commissions comprising senior judges and lay members, with recommendations forwarded to the for formal advice to the , yet lacks public disclosure of candidate deliberations or rejection rationales. Critics argue this opacity enables subtle executive influence, as the can reject a commission's nominee only for lack of merit, potentially allowing political filtering without , a concern echoed in analyses of ministerial veto powers fostering perceptions of undue interference. A 2023 public poll indicated divided opinion, with 37% favoring the current independent model and others supporting greater parliamentary or executive input to align selections with democratic mandates, though proponents of the status quo warn that overt politicization risks importing US-style ideological battles into the system. The Court has enhanced operational transparency through live-streamed hearings and published judgments since 2009, but selection processes remain insulated to safeguard candidate privacy, balancing openness against risks of politicized scrutiny.

Merit versus Diversity in Selections

The selection of Justices for the of the is governed by sections 25–31 and Schedule 8 of the , which establish merit as the foundational principle. Candidates must hold qualifications equivalent to at least 15 years of post-qualification legal practice or have served at least two years in high judicial office, such as the Court of Appeal. The selection commission, comprising serving Justices, lay members, and senior judicial figures, evaluates applicants on criteria including exceptional intellectual capacity, deep legal and judicial expertise across civil, criminal, and constitutional domains, integrity, sound judgment, and the ability to handle complex, high-stakes cases. These standards ensure selections prioritize proven competence over extraneous factors, reflecting the Court's role in interpreting law with impartial rigor. While merit is paramount, the Act permits limited consideration of diversity as a tie-breaker under section 27(5A): if two candidates are deemed of equal merit, the commission may prefer the one enhancing "diversity within the group of persons who are the judges of the Court." Similarly, subject to merit, the commission seeks an "appropriate balance of expertise and professional experience," which may indirectly favor varied backgrounds in practice. This subordinate role for diversity aims to mitigate homogeneity without diluting qualifications, as the pool of candidates meeting the stringent experience threshold—predominantly drawn from elite barristers and appellate judges—remains narrow. As of April 2025, judicial diversity statistics indicate persistent underrepresentation: women held approximately 25% of senior court positions overall, with ethnic minorities at 12%, trends extending to the where female Justices numbered fewer than four amid 12 total seats. Debates over emphasizing diversity have intensified, with advocates arguing that redefining merit to incorporate social perspectives could yield more representative rulings and bolster , as articulated in analyses questioning the objectivity of traditional metrics. Such views, often advanced in academic and media outlets with institutional incentives toward progressive reforms, propose mechanisms like or quotas to accelerate change, citing international comparators where affirmative measures increased female representation. Critics, however, warn that elevating diversity risks subordinating empirical judicial fitness—evidenced by case outcomes, doctrinal contributions, and peer assessments—to demographic engineering, potentially eroding the Court's authority in a system reliant on perceived expertise rather than identity. Empirical data on diversity's causal impact on decision quality remains inconclusive, with no robust studies demonstrating superior outcomes from diversified benches in common- apex courts; instead, slow progress reflects merit-gated pipelines, including fewer women and minorities attaining requisite in the Bar. The statutory framework's restraint—merit first, diversity only at parity—aligns with causal priorities of competence for legal , avoiding unverified assumptions about group-based enhancements to reasoning.

Challenges to Perceived Judicial Overreach

Criticisms of the UK Supreme Court's perceived judicial overreach have centered on its interventions in politically charged executive decisions, where detractors argue the judiciary has substituted its judgment for that of elected officials, potentially undermining and the . Such challenges often emanate from government figures, conservative think tanks, and legal scholars who contend that the Court has expanded into realms traditionally governed by political rather than legal standards. A landmark instance occurred in R (on the application of Miller) v The UKSC 41, where the Court unanimously ruled on 24 September 2019 that Boris Johnson's advice to prorogue for five weeks was unlawful, as it frustrated 's ability to function and hold the executive accountable during the process. Johnson immediately rejected the decision in , asserting "the Supreme Court was wrong" and framing it as an overstep into partisan territory that bypassed democratic processes. Commentators, including those from the Judicial Power Project, criticized the ruling for adopting an unprecedentedly assertive stance on Crown- relations, venturing into non-justiciable political questions like the timing and motive of , which historically fell outside judicial purview. This case amplified broader concerns, echoed in academic analyses, that the Court's reasoning prioritized abstract constitutional principles over deference to executive in fast-moving political crises. Further contention arose in AAA v Secretary of State for the Home Department UKSC 42, decided on 15 November 2023, when the Court held 5-0 that the government's Rwanda deportation policy violated the Refugee Convention by exposing asylum seekers to risks of refoulement, deeming Rwanda systemically unsafe despite diplomatic assurances. The ruling halted flights under the policy, prompting critics to decry it as judicial interference in immigration and foreign policy—domains requiring executive expertise on and . In response, the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024, enacted on 24 April 2024, legislatively declared Rwanda safe and restricted of removal decisions, illustrating parliamentary pushback against what some viewed as the Court's overextension into policy evaluation. Proponents of this critique, including reports from , argued that such rulings exemplify a pattern where the judiciary imposes evidentiary burdens on government actions that Parliament could more appropriately address through . These episodes have fueled calls for reform, as outlined in the 2021 Independent Review of (Faulks Review), which examined overreach claims and proposed codifying judicial deference in certain cases to prevent courts from "throttling" democratic . Critics from outlets aligned with reformist views maintain that while the Court upholds principles, its growing role in Brexit-related and migration disputes risks eroding public trust by appearing to align with outcomes favored by opposition forces, though empirical data on success rates show a decline in challenges against government policy post-2019, potentially indicating self-restraint.

References

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