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The privilege of peerage is the body of special privileges belonging to members of the British peerage. It is distinct from parliamentary privilege, which applies only to those peers serving in the House of Lords and the members of the House of Commons, while Parliament is in session and forty days before and after a parliamentary session.[1]

The modern-day peerage is descended from the peerage of England created after the Norman conquest, the peerage of Scotland, and the peerage of Ireland. In each of these lands the peerage was originally a group of trusted advisors and favourites to the king, and depending on the country they were given several privileges that commoners did not have. Prime among them was the right and duty to advise the king on the exercise of his duties, but also included such ancillary features as receiving upgraded protections on defamation and even being hanged with a silk rope. As the peerages were merged under union acts in 1707 and 1800, the complexity of their privileges were merged and streamlined as needed.

These privileges have been lost and eroded over time. Only three privileges of peers as a class survived into the 20th century: the right to be tried by other peers of the realm instead of juries of commoners in cases of treason and felony, freedom from arrest in civil (but not criminal) cases, and access to the Sovereign to advise him or her on matters of state.[1] The right to be tried by other peers in the House of Lords – which could not be waived, had long been considered a disadvantage rather than an advantage, and in practice entailed the House mimicking the advice of judges – was abolished at the request of the Lords in 1948. Legal opinion considers the right of freedom from arrest as extremely limited in application, if at all. The remaining privilege is not exercised, runs contrary to the principles of responsible government, and was recommended for formal abolition in 1999, but has never been formally revoked.[2] The automatic right of hereditary peers to sit in the House of Lords was abolished in 1999, but life peers are unaffected. Some privileges have been granted to individual lords, but they too had been abolished by the end of the 20th century.

Peers also have several other rights not formally part of the privilege of peerage. For example, they are entitled to use coronets and supporters on their achievements of arms.

Extent

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The privilege of peerage extends to all temporal peers and peeresses regardless of their position in relation to the House of Lords. The right to sit in the House is separate from the privilege, and is held by only some peers (see History of reform of the House of Lords). Scottish peers from the Acts of Union 1707 and Irish peers from the Act of Union 1800, therefore, have the privilege of peerage. Since 1800, Irish peers have had the right to stand for election to the United Kingdom House of Commons but they lose the privilege of peerage for the duration of their service in the lower House.[3] Since 1999, hereditary peers of England, Scotland, Great Britain, and the United Kingdom who are not members of the House of Lords may stand for election to the House of Commons. Their privilege of peerage is not explicitly lost by service in the lower House. Any peer issuing a disclaimer under the provisions of the Peerage Act 1963 loses all privileges of peerage.[1] The privilege of peerage also extends to wives and widows of peers. A peeress by marriage loses the privilege upon marrying a commoner,[1] but a peeress suo jure does not. Individuals who hold courtesy titles, however, do not have such privileges by virtue of those titles. The Lords Spiritual (the 26 archbishops and bishops who sit in the House of Lords) do not have the privilege of peerage as, at least since 1621, they have been Lords of Parliament, and not peers.[4]

Access to the Sovereign

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The Sovereign is traditionally advised by various counsellors, including the peers of the realm. After the Norman conquest of England, peers were summoned to form the magnum concilium, or Great Council, which was one of the four councils belonging to the Sovereign. The other three were the Privy Council, Parliament (which was called the commune concilium, or Common Council), and judges (who are considered counsellors of the Sovereign on legal matters).[5]

A council composed only of peers was often summoned by early English kings. Such a council, having been in disuse for centuries, was revived in 1640, when Charles I summoned all of the peers of the realm using writs issued under the Great Seal. Though such a council has not been summoned since then and was considered obsolete at the time, each peer is commonly considered a counsellor of the Sovereign, and, according to Sir William Blackstone in 1765, "it is usually looked upon to be the right of each particular peer of the realm, to demand an audience of the King, and to lay before him, with decency and respect, such matters as he shall judge of importance to the public weal."[5]

The privilege of access is no longer exercised,[6] but it is possibly still retained by peers whether members of the House of Lords or not.[7] In 1999, the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege recommended the formal abolition of any remaining privilege of peerage.[8]

Scandalum magnatum

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The House of Lords, c. 1810

At one time, the honour of peers was especially protected by the law; while defamation of a commoner was known as libel or slander, the defamation of a peer (or of a Great Officer of State) was called scandalum magnatum. Eighteenth-century jurist Sir William Blackstone opined:

The honour of peers is so highly tendered by the law, that it is much more penal to spread false reports of them, and certain other great officers of the realm, than of other men; scandal against them being called by the peculiar name of scandalum magnatum, and subject to peculiar punishments by divers ancient statutes.[9]

Scandalum Magnatum Act 1378
Act of Parliament
Parliament of England
Citation2 Ric. 2. Stat. 1. c. 5
Territorial extent 
Dates
Royal assent20 October 1378[a]
Repealed16 September 1887
Other legislation
Repealed byStatute Law Revision Act 1887
Relates toStatute of Westminster 1275
Status: Repealed
Text of statute as originally enacted

The Statute of Westminster 1275 (3 Edw. 1), provided that "from henceforth none be so hardy to tell or publish any false News or Tales, whereby discord, or occasion of discord or slander may grow between the King and his People, or the Great Men of the Realm."[10] Scandalum magnatum was punishable under the aforesaid statute as well as under further laws passed during the reign of Richard II.[11] Scandalum magnatum was both a tort and a criminal offence. The prohibition on scandalum magnatum was first enforced by the King's Council. During the reign of Henry VII, the Star Chamber, a court formerly reserved for trial of serious offences such as rioting, assumed jurisdiction over scandalum magnatum cases, as well as libel and slander. The court, which sat without a jury and in secret, was often used as a political weapon and a device of royal tyranny, leading to its abolition in 1641; its functions in respect of defamation cases passed to the common law courts. However, the number of cases had already dwindled as the laws of libel, slander and contempt of court developed in its place. In the reign of Charles II, scandalum magnatum came briefly back into fashion; it was used by the future James II against Titus Oates, by Lord Gerard against his cousin Alexander Fitton, and by the Duke of Beaufort against John Arnold. By the end of the 18th century, however, scandalum magnatum was obsolete. This specific category of the offence of defamation was finally repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act 1887.[12]

Trial by peers

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Trial of Peers Act 1341
Act of Parliament
Parliament of England
Long titleThe peers of the realm and great officers for great offences shall be tried in parliament.
Citation15 Edw. 3 Stat. 1. c. 2
Territorial extent 
Dates
Royal assent1341
Commencement23 April 1341[a]
Repealed23 April 1341
Other legislation
Repealed by15 Edw. 3. Stat. 2
Status: Repealed
Text of statute as originally enacted

Just as commoners have a right to trial by a jury of their equals (other commoners), peers and peeresses formerly had a right to trial by other peers. The right of peers to trial by their own order was formalised during the 14th century. A statute, the Trial of Peers Act 1341 (15 Edw. 3 Stat. 1. c. 2) passed in 1341 provided:[13]

Whereas before this time the peers of the land have been arrested and imprisoned, and their temporalities, lands, and tenements, goods and cattels, asseized in the King's hands, and some put to death without judgment of their peers: It is accorded and assented, that no peer of the land ... shall be brought in judgment to lose his temporalities, lands, tenements, goods and cattels, nor to be arrested, imprisoned, outlawed, exiled, nor forejudged, nor put to answer, nor be judged, but by award of the said peers in Parliament.

The privilege of trial by peers was still ill-defined, and the statute did not cover peeresses. In 1442, after an ecclesiastical court (which included King Henry VI of England, Henry Beaufort and John Kemp) found Eleanor, Duchess of Gloucester, guilty of witchcraft and banished her to the Isle of Man, a statute was enacted granting peeresses the right of trial by peers.[14][15]

By the reign of Henry VII of England, there were two methods of trial by peers of the realm: trial in the House of Lords (or, in proper terms, by the High Court of Parliament) and trial in the Court of the Lord High Steward. The House of Lords tried the case if Parliament was in session; otherwise, trial was by the Lord High Steward's Court.[16]

In the Lord High Steward's Court, a group of Lords Triers, sitting under the chairmanship of the Lord High Steward, acted as judge and jury. By custom, the number of Triers was not fewer than 23, so that a majority was a minimum of 12, but in fact, the number ranged from 20 to 35. The power to choose which peers served as Triers lay with the Crown and was sometimes subject to abuse, as only those peers who agreed with the monarch's position would be summoned to the Court of the Lord High Steward, thereby favouring the desired verdict. This practice was ended by the Treason Act 1695, passed during the reign of King William III. The Act required that all peers be summoned as Triers. All subsequent trials were held before the full House of Lords.[14]

In the House of Lords, the Lord High Steward was the President or Chairman of the Court, and the entire House determined both questions of fact and questions of law as well as the verdict. By convention, Bishops and Archbishops did not vote on the verdict, though they were expected to attend during the course of the trial. They sat until the conclusion of the deliberations, and withdrew from the chamber just prior to the final vote.[17] At the end of the trial, peers voted on the question before them by standing and declaring their verdict by saying "guilty, upon my honour" or "not guilty, upon my honour", starting with the most junior baron and proceeding in order of precedence ending with the Lord High Steward. For a guilty verdict, a majority of twelve was necessary.[18] The entire House also determined the punishment to be imposed, which had to accord with the law.[19] For capital crimes the punishment was death; the last peer to be executed was Laurence Shirley, 4th Earl Ferrers, who was hanged for murder in 1760.[14]

By section 13 of the Treason Act 1547, if a peer or peeress was convicted of a crime, except treason or murder, he or she could claim benefit of clergy to escape punishment if it was a first offence. In all, the privilege was exercised five times,[20] until it was formally abolished in 1841 when James Brudenell, 7th Earl of Cardigan, announced he would claim the privilege and avoid punishment if he was convicted of duelling. He was acquitted before the introduction of the bill.[14]

A trial by the Lords – which a peer could not waive – was far more a burden than a privilege; unlike commoners, peers had no right to challenge the composition of the jury or to appeal any decision, and there was no leniency granted to those convicted in such a trial compared to commoners convicted of such offences. This was furthered by the fact that the Lords relied almost exclusively on the advice of royal counsel to make any decisions of fact or law. By the late 1930s, supporters of retaining the privilege were a minority in the Lords comprising mainly the holders of older peerages considering it a privilege of the House as a whole, whereas the majority favouring its abolition were holders of newly-granted peerages resenting the difficulties such a trial gave to individual accused peers.[14]

The last trial in the House of Lords was that of Edward Russell, 26th Baron de Clifford, in 1935 for manslaughter (he was acquitted); the following year the Lords passed a bill to abolish trial by peers but the Commons ignored it. The right to trial by peers was abolished when the Lords added an amendment to the Criminal Justice Act 1948, which the Commons accepted.[14] Now peers are tried by juries composed of commoners, though peers were themselves excused from jury service until the House of Lords Act 1999 restricted this privilege to members of the House of Lords.[21] The right to be excused was abolished on 5 April 2004 by the Criminal Justice Act 2003.[22]

Peers were and still are, hypothetically, subject to impeachment. Impeachment was a procedure distinct from the aforementioned procedure of trial in the House of Lords, though the House of Lords is the court in both cases. Charges were brought by the House of Commons, not a grand jury. Additionally, while in normal cases the House of Lords tried peers only for felonies or treason, in impeachments the charges could include felonies, treason and misdemeanours. The case directly came before the House of Lords, rather than being referred to it by a writ of certiorari. The Lord High Steward presided only if a peer was charged with high treason; otherwise, the Lord Chancellor presided. Other procedures in trials of impeachment were similar, however, to trials before the House of Lords: at the conclusion of the trial, the spiritual peers withdrew, and the temporal Lords gave their votes on their honour. The last impeachment was that of Henry Dundas, 1st Viscount Melville, in 1806 for misappropriating public money (he was acquitted).[23] Since then, impeachment has become an obsolete procedure in the United Kingdom.[24]

The novel Clouds of Witness (1926) by Dorothy L. Sayers depicts the fictional trial in the House of Lords of a duke who is accused of murder. Sayers researched and used the then-current trial procedures. The comedy film Kind Hearts and Coronets (1949) from Ealing Studios features an almost identical scene.

Freedom from arrest

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The privilege of freedom from arrest applies to members of both Houses of Parliament,[1] because of the principle that they must, whenever possible, be available to give advice to the Sovereign. Several other nations have copied this provision; the Constitution of the United States, for example, provides, "The Senators and Representatives ... shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses." Theoretically, even when Parliament is not sitting, peers enjoy the privilege because they continue to serve the Sovereign as counsellors. However, peers are free from arrest in civil cases only; arrests in criminal matters are not covered by the privilege. Until 1770, a peer's domestic servants were also covered by the privilege of freedom from arrest in civil matters.[25]

Most often the privilege was applied in cases of imprisonment in debtors' prisons. In 1870, both imprisonment for debt and the privilege in relation to freedom from arrest for bankruptcy were abolished, and as a result, the freedom became extremely limited in practical application. Now, civil proceedings involve arrests only when an individual disobeys a court order. Since 1945, the privilege of freedom from arrest in civil cases has arisen in only two cases: Stourton v Stourton (1963) and Peden International Transport, Moss Bros, The Rowe Veterinary Group and Barclays Bank plc v Lord Mancroft (1989).[1] In the latter most recent case, the trial judge considered the privilege obsolete and inapplicable, and said in proceedings, "the privilege did not apply—indeed ... it is unthinkable in modern times that, in circumstances such as they are in this case, it should".[26]

Privilege myths

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Fanciful tales of peers with whimsical privileges circulate, such as that of the right to wear a hat in the presence of the Sovereign (actually a right of Spanish grandees). The most persistent example of such a legend is that of the Kingsale hat. According to the fable, John de Courcy, Earl of Ulster, obtained from King John the privilege of remaining covered in the presence of the Sovereign. Though the tale is untrue—de Courcy was never made an earl and did not receive such a privilege[27][28]—several authorities on the peerage have seen fit to repeat it. A 19th-century edition of Burke's Peerage suggests the origins of the privilege:[29]

... the Earl of Ulster was treacherously seized while performing penance, unarmed and barefooted, in the churchyard of Downpatrick, on Good Friday, anno 1203, and sent over to England, where the king condemned him to perpetual imprisonment in the Tower ... After de Courcy had been in confinement about a year, a dispute happening to arise between King John and Philip Augustus of France concerning the Duchy of Normandy, the decision of which being referred to single combat, King John, more hasty than advised, appointed the day, against which the King of France provided his champion; but the King of England, less fortunate, could find no one of his subjects willing to take up the gauntlet, until his captive in the Tower, the stout Earl of Ulster, was prevailed upon to accept the challenge. But when everything was prepared for the contest, and the champions had entered the lists, in presence of the Kings of England, France and Spain, the opponent of the earl, seized with a sudden panic, put spurs to his horse, and fled the arena; whereupon the victory was adjudged by acclamation to the champion of England. The French king being informed, however, of the earl's powerful strength, and wishing to witness some exhibition of it, de Courcy, at the desire of King John, cleft a massive helmet in twain at a single blow.

To reward his singular performance, King John supposedly granted de Courcy the privilege of remaining covered in the presence of the Sovereign. The 1823 edition of Debrett's Peerage gives an entirely fictitious account of how Almericus de Courcy, 23rd Baron Kingsale, asserted the privilege:[30]

Being very handsome in his person, and of a tall stature, his lordship one day attended King William's court, and being admitted into the presence-chamber, asserted the privilege of being covered before his majesty, by walking to and fro with his hat on his head. The king observing him, sent one of his attendants to inquire the reason of his appearance before him with his head covered; to whom he replied, he knew very well in whose presence he stood, and the reason why he wore his hat that day was, because he stood before the king of England. This answer being told the king, and his lordship approaching nearer the throne, was required by his majesty to explain himself, which he did to this effect: "May it please your majesty, my name is Courcy, and I am Lord of Kingsale in your kingdom of Ireland: the reason of my appearing covered in your majesty's presence is, to assert the ancient privilege of my family, granted to sir John de Courcy, earl of Ulster, and his heirs, by John, king of England, for him and his successors for ever." The king replied, he remembered he had such a nobleman, and believed the privilege he asserted to be his right, and giving him his hand to kiss, his lordship paid his obeisance, and remained covered.

Despite such inaccuracies, the tale has been frequently repeated. Individual privileges that did exist have fallen into disuse—for example the Lord of the Manor of Worksop (which is not a peerage) was extended to the privilege and duty of attending the coronation of the British monarch until 1937, but the right was not exercised at the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in 1953 as the manor was under corporate ownership at the time.

See also

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Notes

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Privilege of peerage

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The privilege of peerage denotes the collection of personal immunities and exemptions historically afforded to members of the British , encompassing both hereditary and life peers, regardless of their status as sitting members of the . This set of rights, distinct from which pertains to legislative proceedings, extends to the wives of peers during and to peeresses in their own right or as widows, provided the latter do not remarry commoners. Originating in medieval customs to protect the Sovereign's chief counselors from civil disruptions and legal encroachments, these privileges ensured peers could advise without fear of or in non-criminal matters. Key elements included freedom from or in civil suits, a safeguard rarely invoked since the mid-20th century amid evolving legal norms. Another cornerstone was the right to by one's peers for felonies, , or impeachments, a practice rooted in the principle that nobles should be judged by equals, which persisted until its abolition under section 30 of the Criminal Justice Act 1948 due to its procedural burdens on the . Additionally, peers retained the prerogative of direct access to the at any time, underscoring their advisory role, though this too sees minimal contemporary use. While these immunities once shielded peers from corporal punishments short of execution for certain offenses—such as substituting branding for whipping in pre-modern eras—their scope has contracted with statutory reforms and disuse, reflecting shifts toward egalitarian without fully eradicating the underlying framework. The privilege lapses upon disclaimer of a under the , and its remnants persist primarily as vestiges of constitutional tradition rather than active legal bulwarks.

Historical Development

Origins in Medieval England

The of in 1066 under William I introduced a centralized feudal system, wherein major landholders—known as barons or tenants-in-chief—held estates directly from in exchange for obligations and attendance at the royal court or curia regis. These assemblies served as precursors to , requiring barons to provide military counsel without fear of local vendettas or royal manipulation; consequently, customary immunities developed to suspend civil arrests during such gatherings, ensuring the king's access to independent expertise amid a of and mutual . By the early 13th century, abuses under King John—such as arbitrary fines, demands exceeding feudal norms (e.g., 25 shillings per knight's fee in 1214), and seizures of baronial lands—provoked rebellion, culminating in the sealed on June 15, 1215, at . This charter affirmed baronial feudal liberties, including protections against unlawful dispossession (clauses 2–8 on inheritance and wardships) and imprisonment without due process (clause 39: "No free man shall be...imprisoned...except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the "), thereby codifying safeguards that evolved into core privileges against coercive overreach. These origins reflected a pragmatic equilibrium in feudal : privileges insulated powerful landholders from both monarchical caprice and common-law vulnerabilities, enabling them to deliberate on taxation and justice in the king's great council without duress, while reinforcing the reciprocal duties that sustained England's post-Conquest stability over subsequent reigns.

Evolution Through Statutes and Precedents

The statutory foundations of the privilege of peerage trace to the reissues and confirmations of , particularly the 1297 enactment under Edward I, which incorporated clause 21 of the 1215 stipulating that "Earls and Barons shall not be amerced but by their peers, and according to the quantity of their offence." This provision, applying to tenants-in-chief who formed the early , established a legislative exemption from arbitrary fines assessed by non-peers, laying groundwork for distinct judicial treatment while adapting medieval feudal obligations to limit royal overreach. In the , further codification occurred through 15 Edward 3 Stat. 1 c. 2 (1341), which prohibited sheriffs and other royal ministers from arresting or imprisoning peers for trespasses against the without the king's or council's involvement, channeling such cases to higher authority rather than ordinary justices. This statute preserved core protections amid evolving , reflecting causal adaptations to prevent local officials from undermining noble status amid growing administrative centralization. The tested these privileges through precedents amid constitutional crises, notably during the , where the exercised trial jurisdiction in impeachments like that of Thomas Wentworth, 1st Earl of Strafford, in 1641, with 26 peers voting for his execution after deliberation by the full house. Despite the Lords' temporary abolition in 1649 under the , the 1660 Restoration implicitly reaffirmed peerage privileges via the Convention Parliament's acts restoring the monarchy and upper house, shielding peers from retroactive purges and integrating privileges into post-interregnum legal continuity without new statutes. By the , amid parliamentary reforms, precedents clarified boundaries, as in debates over the 1829 Roman Catholic Relief Act, which removed oaths barring Catholic peers from sitting but upheld personal privileges like exemption from certain arrests, distinguishing them from evolving electoral qualifications. Early 20th-century affirmations, prior to mid-century erosions, included rulings upholding trial by peers in felony cases until statutory abolition, maintaining doctrinal integrity against democratic pressures while adapting to constitutional shifts like the 1911 Parliament Act's limitations on legislative veto.

Key Cases Illustrating Early Privileges

In the , the privilege of access to the sovereign was integral to peers' roles as royal counsellors, enabling direct petitions that prevented arbitrary exclusion from . This right, rooted in the custom of summoning peers to advisory councils, ensured their input on matters of state, as seen in the political maneuvers of figures like Aymer de Valence, Earl of Pembroke, who frequently intervened in royal disputes under Edward II, leveraging proximity to the king to mediate conflicts and influence policy without formal barriers. Such access upheld the causal link between noble counsel and stable rule, distinct from commoners' limited avenues. The enforcement of scandalum magnatum in the 15th and 16th centuries highlighted elevated protections for peers' reputations, with statutes imposing severe penalties to deter threats to their authority. Originating in the 1275 statute (3 Edw. I, c. 34) and re-enacted in 1378 (2 Ric. II, c. 11) and 1495 (11 Hen. VII, c. 12), these laws mandated treble damages, imprisonment for non-payment, and potential loss of goods for false statements impugning peers, far exceeding ordinary defamation remedies. A notable early 16th-century application involved accusations against Bishop Hugh Oldham of Exeter, charged under scandalum magnatum for alleged poisoning, demonstrating the law's role in shielding high-status figures from unsubstantiated attacks that could undermine their public duties. This framework evidenced the privilege's effectiveness in preserving the social order necessary for noble functions. Exemptions from during parliamentary were illustrated in 16th-century precedents linking to legislative continuity, though with medieval antecedents in protections for summoned lords. In the Ferrers case of 1542, George Ferrers, attending , was detained for a of 200 marks; the intervened, securing his release and imprisoning the London sheriffs in the Tower, affirming that such interruptions violated the custom safeguarding attendance for counsel and deliberation. Earlier medieval claims, extending to peers' retinues by the , similarly prioritized unimpeded service in over civil claims, ensuring peers could fulfill advisory roles without creditor interference. This exemption underscored the privilege's practical utility in maintaining the realm's deliberative processes.

Specific Privileges

Freedom from Arrest

The privilege of freedom from arrest exempts members of the from detention in civil proceedings, serving to ensure uninterrupted attendance at parliamentary sessions and thereby supporting legislative continuity. This exemption traces to medieval English custom, where protections were extended to magnates traveling to Westminster to deliberate with the , as early assertions of similar safeguards appear in records from 1340 onward, when members were released from imprisonment to attend assemblies. Formalized for peers by a 1626 House of Lords resolution, it prohibits imprisonment of any peer during a session—or within the customary privilege period—without the House's express order, excluding cases of , felony, or . Distinct from broader , the peerage-specific variant applies to all hereditary and life peers, their wives, and eligible widows, rooted in recognition of peers as the king's hereditary counselors whose liberty must be preserved for royal counsel. It never extended to criminal matters, as affirmed in precedents like the 1571 detention of MP Walter Strickland under order despite privilege claims, underscoring that the safeguard targets civil processes such as debt enforcement or suits rather than public offenses. In practice, the privilege has been invoked sparingly, with court applications recorded in only two instances since 1945: Stourton v Stourton (1963), involving a peer's civil detention dispute, and Peden International Transport v Lord Mancroft (1989), where the exemption halted enforcement proceedings during the privilege period. These cases empirically demonstrate its causal role in preventing disruptions to peers' parliamentary functions, as arrests were averted to prioritize session attendance over creditor claims. Today, the privilege remains operational but narrowly construed, confined to civil arrests during Parliament's sitting or the 40-day extension before and after, and applicable solely to the peer's personal journey to and from Westminster without encompassing family members, estates, or unrelated business. Reforms such as the Parliamentary Privilege Act 1770 and the Judgments Act 1838 have curtailed its scope by permitting civil suits against peers while preserving arrest immunity only for the defined parliamentary context, rendering it ineffective against criminal charges, , or mental health detentions under statutes like the Mental Health Act 1983.

Trial by Peers

The privilege of trial by peers granted members of the the right to be judged for , , or thereof exclusively by fellow peers assembled in the , rather than by a of commoners. This mechanism ensured adjudication by individuals sharing equivalent social rank, legal acumen, and appreciation for the peerage's advisory role to , thereby countering risks of envious or uninformed verdicts from ordinary juries susceptible to class-based prejudice or transient . Historical instances demonstrated its function in safeguarding institutional continuity, as acquittals in equivocal cases preserved experienced counselors whose loss might impair governance without clear culpability. The practice's formal origins trace to the early , with a pivotal assertion during the 1328–1329 parliamentary crisis sparked by Henry of Lancaster's revolt against Edward II, where 'peers of the land' demanded and received trial within to affirm their distinct status. By the , it was entrenched for capital offenses, with the acting as both and jury; for high treason, the Lord Chancellor or a appointed Lord High Steward presided, while procedural minutiae—such as from present lords and evidence rules—were often refined by ad hoc committees of the . The final invocation came on December 12, 1935, in the trial of Edward Russell, 26th , indicted for after his motor vehicle struck and killed a 15-year-old boy on a near Newmarket on October 15, 1935; a Lords committee had outlined the process, and de Clifford was unanimously acquitted after testimony highlighted evidentiary ambiguities in fault attribution. This outcome exemplified the privilege's intent to prioritize substantive justice over procedural expediency. The right was comprehensively eliminated by section 30 of the Criminal Justice Act 1948, which removed all distinctions in criminal trials for peers, aligning their proceedings with those of the general populace amid post-war reforms deeming the custom anachronistic.

Scandalum Magnatum

Scandalum magnatum, meaning "scandal of the magnates," referred to the offense of spreading false or defamatory statements against peers, prelates, or other great men of the realm, with the intent to cause discord or undermine . This privilege stemmed from the recognition that attacks on such figures posed heightened risks to due to their advisory roles to the and influence over policy. Originating in the Statute of Westminster 1275 (3 Edw. 1, c. 34), the law prohibited "any false News or Tales, whereby discord, or occasion of any Murder or Mischief, may grow between the King and his People, or the Great Men of the Realm," imposing criminal penalties including imprisonment and triple damages to deter such speech. Over time, scandalum magnatum evolved from a primarily criminal sanction into a civil remedy, allowing peers to seek enhanced damages in libel suits on the presumption that defamatory words against them caused greater harm to the than against commoners. targeted seditious or scandalous writings that impugned the magnates' , as seen in early applications where courts compelled disclosure of slanderers' sources and awarded punitive measures to preserve stability. A notable involved judicial interpretations expanding its scope to include written libels, influencing later prosecutions while prioritizing the peers' reputational protection tied to their governance functions. By the late , scandalum magnatum had become obsolete as a distinct offense, supplanted by broader laws that equalized remedies across classes amid growing emphasis on press freedoms. Reforms, including the Libel Act 1792 and subsequent 19th-century statutes, integrated its principles into general civil libel frameworks, eliminating special presumptions for peers while retaining higher evidentiary burdens for public figures in proving malice. Though formally repealed in parts by the Statute Law Revision Act 1887, its legacy persists in modern standards requiring plaintiffs of high status to demonstrate actual harm beyond mere falsity.

Access to the Sovereign

The privilege of access to the confers upon peers the individual or counsel the directly at any time, distinct from the collective access exercised by the as a body. This entitlement, rooted in the peers' status as hereditary counselors, historically enabled unmediated communication essential for state affairs and personal grievances, setting it apart from the mediated channels available to common subjects. The right's formal recognition emerged in the early 14th century, particularly during the 1321–1326 political crisis under Edward II, when barons impeached Hugh le Despenser the elder and younger for, among other abuses, denying peers their accustomed access to the king and thereby obstructing their advisory duties. In the articles of accusation presented to on 1 November 1321, the Despensers were charged with barring earls and barons from the royal presence, an act portrayed as a violation of longstanding custom that affirmed the peers' inherent entitlement to personal audience. This episode, culminating in the Despensers' exile and execution by 1326, entrenched the privilege as a bulwark against favorites monopolizing royal ear, ensuring peers could provide candid counsel without intermediary distortion. Throughout subsequent centuries, this direct line facilitated peers' role in and policy influence, as seen in their heraldically authenticated to royal councils, which reinforced personal accountability to over bureaucratic filters. By the , amid the Restoration's factional recoveries post-1660, peers invoked to tender immediate petitions on oaths and appointments, aiding navigation of transitional instabilities through proximate royal engagement. In contemporary , while the entitlement endures in , its has evolved into largely ceremonial form, preserving symbolic from administrative layers yet underscoring the peerage's enduring advisory heritage.

Scope and Applicability

Qualification and Ranks Covered

The privilege of peerage applies primarily to holders of hereditary peerages in the five descending ranks of , , , , and , as these titles carry the historical dignities originating from medieval grants and statutory evolutions. These ranks encompass the non-princely nobility within the , of , and of the , with privileges attaching directly to the personal dignity of the titleholder rather than subsidiary offices or parliamentary functions. Life peers, granted under the , receive baronial dignities for life but derive most protections from their appointed status in the , lacking the perpetual hereditary scope that underpins the full continuum of traditional immunities. Privileges vest exclusively with the individual peer upon succession and do not extend automatically to apparent, who hold only titles without independent dignities or associated until occurs. Minors inheriting a possess the title but face restrictions, such as ineligibility to claim a writ of summons until reaching 21 years of age, though the core dignity-based protections remain empirically continuous. Under section 1 of the , a may disclaim the title within 12 months of succession or knowledge thereof, resulting in complete forfeiture of all titles, , offices, privileges, and precedences attached to the for the disclaimed individual's lifetime. Following the with and 1801 with —the privileges achieved uniform application across integrated peerages, with Scottish peers electing 16 representatives and Irish peers 28 to the while enjoying equivalent dignities and protections to English peers. The Union with Act 1800 explicitly stipulated that Irish lords of Parliament hold the same privileges as those from , ensuring causal consistency in the application of immunities post-integration. This framework preserved the empirical integrity of rank-based qualifications amid territorial expansions of the .

Distinctions from Parliamentary Privilege

The privilege of peerage constitutes a set of immunities and exemptions attached personally to the holder's noble title, enduring for life and transferable upon inheritance, irrespective of parliamentary membership or session status. By contrast, parliamentary privilege applies exclusively to members of either House during active sittings, primarily encompassing protections for legislative proceedings, such as freedom of speech under Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689, and temporary exemptions like freedom from arrest in civil suits while Parliament is convened. This distinction ensures that peerage privileges operate continuously, unaffected by prorogations or dissolutions, whereas parliamentary immunities lapse outside formal sessions, reflecting their institutional rather than individual character. Historically, privileges emerged from medieval customs granting nobles exemptions from ordinary civil processes to preserve their advisory role to , predating formalized ary structures. , however, crystallized through statutory affirmation in the Bill of Rights 1689, which codified protections against executive interference in legislative debates but did not extend to personal peerage immunities beyond the chamber. This divergence arose from peerage's roots in feudal hierarchy—where lords were summoned individually by —versus Parliament's evolution as a collective body requiring safeguards for deliberative independence, as evidenced by pre-1689 precedents like the 1667 case of Jay v. Topham, which delimited parliamentary speech protections without encompassing non-sessional peer actions. In practice, the separation prevents redundancy: peers invoke privilege for civil arrest exemptions or suits arising from private conduct outside , as these persist beyond session bounds, while shields sessional activities like debate contributions from judicial scrutiny. For instance, the perpetual nature of peerage immunity has been upheld in cases such as the 1870 Beaumont Peerage Case, where a peer's claim to exemption applied independently of House membership, underscoring causal reliance on title rather than legislative role. Overlap is thus minimized, with peers historically turning to peerage remedies for non-parliamentary liabilities, preserving the distinct causal mechanisms of each regime.

Limitations and Exceptions

The privilege of peerage has never extended immunity from criminal prosecution or , with protections such as freedom from civil explicitly limited to non-criminal matters like or , a distinction rooted in and affirmed in parliamentary practice by the . Conviction for or historically suspended these privileges, rendering the peer civilly dead until or reversal, thereby excluding serious offenses from any shield of impunity. Such privileges were personal to the peer (and in some cases their wives or widows) and did not protect agents, members, or servants, who faced ordinary legal processes without derivative immunity. , while disqualifying a peer from sitting in the under statutes like the Insolvency Act 1986, did not forfeit the peerage itself but suspended legislative functions tied to it, leaving core personal privileges intact unless compounded by criminal elements. In treason cases, attainder by caused outright forfeiture of the and its privileges, as demonstrated during the 1715 Jacobite rebellion when acts of attainder targeted rebel peers, including James Radclyffe, 3rd Earl of Derwentwater, who was attainted for high on February 9, 1716, leading to execution and title extinction to enforce loyalty as a condition of noble status. This mechanism underscored the conditional nature of privileges, tied to dutiful service rather than absolute entitlement.

Modern Status and Reforms

Persistence of Core Privileges

The privilege of freedom from arrest in civil matters endures as a personal attribute of under law, applicable to all peers irrespective of House of Lords membership, as well as to peeresses by marriage or widowhood, though its scope is confined to proceedings outside parliamentary sessions and excludes criminal matters or insolvency-related arrests. This exemption, rooted in statutes such as the Parliamentary Papers Act 1828 affirming broader protections, has been recognized in official parliamentary guidance but deemed of negligible practical utility, with no documented invocations in modern courts. A 1999 parliamentary committee report described it as obsolete and incompatible with accountable governance, recommending abolition, yet it remains un-repealed, preserving a contingency for rare civil disputes. The right of access to the persists as another core element, granting peers theoretical liberty to the directly at any time, distinct from the corporate access held by as a body. While ceremonial in contemporary practice—integrated into state occasions like coronations or audiences—this entitlement underscores the peerage's historical advisory role to , with no statutory repeal and explicit affirmation in procedural compendia. Empirical evidence indicates non-use for substantive petitions since at least the mid-20th century, reflecting a shift toward formalized channels, yet its retention supports functional continuity in monarchical governance amid evolving democratic norms. In contrast, trial by peers for criminal offenses, once a hallmark privilege, was statutorily abolished in 1948 via the Criminal Justice Act, rendering it non-viable today; the last such proceeding occurred in 1935 against Lord de Clifford for . Similarly, scandalum magnatum—the specific offense of defaming peers—has been obsolete since the and formally repealed, subsumed into general statutes without retaining privileged status. This selective persistence highlights legislative prioritization of privileges aiding institutional stability over those prone to egalitarian critique, with un-repealed remnants invoked zero times in verifiable records post-1950, ensuring latent safeguards without routine disruption.

Impact of 20th- and 21st-Century Reforms

The authorized the appointment of life peers, who hold seats in the without hereditary succession, thereby introducing a class of non-hereditary members that diluted the exclusive legislative influence traditionally exercised by hereditary peers. This reform, enacted on May 30, 1958, enabled prime ministers to appoint experts and politicians for life terms, shifting the chamber's composition away from its aristocratic core and indirectly eroding the institutional foundation that had sustained privileges like freedom from arrest and access to the sovereign, as these were historically tied to peers' active role in governance. The further attenuated continuity by permitting holders of hereditary titles to disclaim them within 12 months of succession, divesting the individual of associated rights and privileges while allowing candidacy for the . By November 2023, 18 hereditary peers had invoked this provision, including high-profile cases like in 1963, which fragmented longstanding family lines and reduced the number of active title-holders committed to upholding traditions. This erosion of hereditary obligation weakened the causal link between title and the maintenance of privileges, as disclaimers effectively opted out of the responsibilities that had reinforced their societal and legal weight. The House of Lords Act 1999 marked the most sweeping reduction, expelling 666 of approximately 750 hereditary peers from membership effective November 11, 1999, while retaining 92 via by-elections as a transitional measure. Although the Act preserved ancillary privileges such as titles and ceremonial rights, it severed most hereditaries' direct participation in legislative scrutiny, diminishing the collective authority that underpinned privileges like trial by peers—last practically invoked pre-World War II amid evolving criminal procedures that favored standard courts. Attendance records post-reform reveal a chamber more responsive to partisan cues, with peers increasing participation by an average of 30 during debates on Lords reform, correlating with a dominance of appointed life peers who, per composition data, aligned more closely with appointing governments than the pre-1999 hereditary cohort. This shift has manifested in unintended dilution of non-partisan institutional checks, as the reduced hereditary presence—independent of electoral cycles—yielded to a larger, government-influenced body whose size rebounded from 700 in 2000 to over 800 by 2022, potentially amplifying executive leverage over appointments.

Recent Developments and Proposals

In July 2024, the Labour Party's committed to "immediate modernisation" of the by legislating to remove the right of the remaining 92 hereditary peers to sit and vote, alongside introducing a age of 80 for all members. This proposal, enacted through the House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill introduced in September 2024, passed the by October 2025 but encountered amendments and opposition in the Lords, including efforts by Conservatives to preserve certain hereditary by-elections and delay full implementation. The bill's passage would primarily extinguish parliamentary privileges tied to hereditary membership, such as voting and speaking rights, though personal privileges like exemption from civil arrest remain unaffected by this reform. Parallel scrutiny of honours processes intensified concerns without directly targeting core privileges. Inquiries into 2022-2023 prime ministerial resignation honours, including Boris Johnson's list awarding seven peerages to allies, prompted criticism from transparency advocates over donor influence in life peerage nominations, but investigations found no prosecutable evidence of exchanges. These episodes fueled broader calls, contrasting hereditary peers' basis with perceived in appointments, yet defenders argued they did not justify eroding the Lords' overall deliberative function. Debates over abolition versus preservation highlighted empirical resistance rooted in the Lords' scrutiny role. Cross-party figures, including some Labour peers, cited the chamber's 15 defeats on the 2017-2018 EU Withdrawal Bill and subsequent amendments to post-Brexit legislation in the —such as blocking elements of rushed and bills—as evidence of value in delaying hasty executive measures. Proponents of retention emphasized data showing the Lords' expertise in amending over 1,000 government proposals annually, arguing removal of hereditaries risks politicizing the chamber further without addressing size or election issues, while public polling in June 2025 indicated 70% support for broader reforms beyond Labour's limited bill.

Debates, Criticisms, and Defenses

Egalitarian and Democratic Critiques

Egalitarian critics argue that the privilege of peerage perpetuates inherited, unearned power, exacerbating by granting unelected individuals disproportionate influence over affecting the broader populace. This perspective gained traction in the late 1990s, when reform advocates, including the Labour government, contended that hereditary peers' automatic right to sit in the created a , as these members lacked direct to voters and represented an outdated aristocratic class disconnected from contemporary societal needs. The 1999 Act, which removed the sitting rights of all but 92 hereditary peers, was justified on these grounds, with proponents asserting that such privileges undermined the principle of equal representation in a modern . Democratic critiques extend to contemporary life peer appointments, which some media outlets portray as rife with , favoring political donors and allies over and thus eroding public trust in meritocratic . For instance, a 2023 analysis in The Atlantic highlighted scandals involving questionable nominations under recent governments, arguing that this system entrenches elite networks and contravenes egalitarian ideals by prioritizing connections over competence. Such arguments frame peer privileges as relics that hinder and perpetuate class divisions, drawing historical parallels to pre-revolutionary where noble exemptions fueled resentment and demands for wholesale abolition of hereditary distinctions. These critiques, however, frequently overlook of the United Kingdom's political stability, where gradual retention and adaptation of elements have coincided with evolutionary reforms avoiding the violent upheavals seen in systems that abruptly dismantled similar structures. Post-1832 expansions of and incremental Lords modifications, for example, correlated with sustained institutional continuity and , contrasting with the French Revolution's radical privilege eradication, which precipitated instability and the from 1793 to 1794. This historical divergence suggests that egalitarian attacks on may undervalue the stabilizing role of moderated elite continuity in preventing systemic rupture.

Historical and Functional Justifications

The privilege of peerage originated as a mechanism to secure the autonomy of hereditary nobles serving as the king's counselors, insulating them from executive or popular pressures that could compromise deliberative functions. explained in his Commentaries on the Laws of (1765) that peers exist ad consulendum (to advise) and ad defendendum regem (to defend the king), with privileges such as exemption from civil arrest during parliamentary sessions ensuring unhindered participation in governance. This framework, rooted in medieval customs and affirmed in , positioned peers to offer long-term strategic counsel detached from immediate electoral or monarchical incentives. Functionally, these privileges facilitated resistance to arbitrary authority, as evidenced by the peerage's role in curbing 18th-century monarchical ambitions under , where Lords' independence checked attempts to dominate parliamentary proceedings through and threats. Exemption from preserved free debate, preventing the executive from silencing dissenters via civil suits or , a safeguard Blackstone tied directly to peers' status as "hereditary counsellors." Similarly, trial by peers harnessed nobles' expertise in feudal and high-stakes matters, applying domain-specific judgment to cases involving or that common juries might mishandle due to lack of familiarity with aristocratic contexts. The peerage's protections contributed to the British constitution's resilience, evolving incrementally without the ruptures seen in egalitarian experiments like post-1789 , where nobility's abolition precipitated successive regimes—from the 1791 to Napoleon's empire and beyond—marked by instability and authoritarian rebounds. , in Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), contrasted this with Britain's balanced estates, crediting aristocratic continuity for averting similar chaos by providing against radical . Such longevity underscores the privileges' causal role in fostering deliberative stability over volatile .

Empirical Outcomes of Privilege Erosion

The House of Lords Act 1999 reduced membership from 1,330 to 669 by expelling most hereditary peers, shifting composition toward life peers appointed primarily on political grounds, which correlated with a 10% rise in average daily attendance from pre-reform levels of 350-450 to over 400 peers per sitting by the early 2000s. This increase in participation has facilitated more consistent scrutiny but coincided with expanded appointments—reaching 800+ members by 2024—raising risks of ideological alignment with appointing governments, as over 40% of peers since 1999 hail from recent administrations, potentially fostering policy echo-chambers that amplify rather than challenge executive preferences. UK governance exhibits marked stability, with no successful coups d'état since the 1688 , enabling unbroken institutional continuity under a and bicameral . Analyses attribute this resilience partly to residual hierarchical structures, including the Lords' delaying powers, which mitigate impulsive ; in contrast, unicameral or highly egalitarian democracies like Weimar Germany or contemporary U.S. systems suffer frequent , with the latter's polarization yielding near-zero productivity in divided Congresses (e.g., fewer than 100 laws passed in some sessions). Assertions that pre-erosion peer privileges systematically caused policy failures find no substantiation in quantitative data; reviews of legislative outcomes reveal no causal correlations between aristocratic immunities or vetoes and suboptimal decisions, with post-reform metrics showing equivalent or higher scrutiny volumes without improved policy efficacy. Retention of limited upper-house checks has demonstrably constrained hasty legislation, as in the 2004 Hunting Act, where Lords amendments and delays—overturning initial versions multiple times—forced procedural overrides via the , averting unamended passage despite executive pressure. Such interventions underscore how partial privilege erosion has preserved deliberative functions without precipitating the executive dominance critiqued in fully democratized assemblies.

Myths and Misconceptions

Immunity from Criminal Prosecution

The privilege of peerage does not confer immunity from criminal prosecution, a common misconception often stemming from with protections against civil or parliamentary speech freedoms. Peers have historically been prosecutable for criminal offenses, with liability treated equivalently to that of commoners, though until 1948 serious cases like or were adjudicated by the rather than ordinary courts. This procedural distinction—trial by peers—did not preclude , , or , as evidenced by multiple historical precedents where peers faced full criminal accountability without successful claims of exemption. Empirical cases refute absolute immunity. In 1760, Laurence Shirley, 4th Earl Ferrers, was indicted for the murder of his steward John Johnson; tried before the House of Lords on April 16, he was convicted and executed by hanging on May 5, marking the last such instance for a peer. Similarly, in the interwar period, Owen Philipps, 1st Baron Kylsant, was prosecuted at the Old Bailey for fraudulently issuing a prospectus for the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company; convicted on July 30, 1931, under the Companies Act 1929, he received a 12-month prison sentence without any peerage privilege obstructing proceedings. These outcomes, among others like the 1935 manslaughter trial of Edward Southwell, 21st Baron de Clifford—the final peerage case in the Lords—demonstrate consistent subjection to criminal law. The error in perceiving total criminal immunity traces to misattribution of related but distinct safeguards: freedom from arrest applies solely to civil suits for or , explicitly excluding criminal charges, while immunizes statements made in debate from subsequent prosecution but not extraneous crimes. 19th- and early 20th-century journalistic accounts sometimes overstated protections amid scandals, fostering durable myths, yet convictions like Kylsant's empirically disprove interference by status. The Criminal Justice Act 1948 further equalized trial venues, reinforcing that no substantive exemption exists.

Tax and Financial Exemptions

Contrary to persistent misconceptions, holders of possess no statutory immunity from , , or other general fiscal obligations, subjecting them to the same taxation regime as other citizens. While members of the may claim a tax-free daily of up to £361 for parliamentary sittings—intended to cover expenses rather than serve as —this limited provision applies only to active participation and does not extend to personal wealth or estates, distinguishing it from any purported blanket privilege. Peers' personal incomes from investments, businesses, or rentals are fully taxable, with no peerage-specific exemptions documented in . Inheritance tax applies to peers' estates without exemption tied to noble status, often eroding aristocratic wealth through liabilities on transfers exceeding the £325,000 nil-rate band at a 40% rate. Historical precedents underscore this uniformity: the Estate Duty introduced in 1894 and escalated in 1914 imposed capital transfer taxes that dismantled many noble fortunes by taxing unsettled estates, compelling sales of and assets absent any aristocratic reprieve. Pre-20th-century taxes, such as the Land Tax Act of 1692, levied assessments on property values held by proportionally to their holdings, applying without class-based waivers and contributing to fiscal pressures on large estates. Modern peers' wealth derives predominantly from private sources like diversified investments, , and inherited trusts rather than fiscal privileges, with average family holdings estimated at £16-20 million sustained through prudent management amid tax reforms. Claims of untouchable exemptions often stem from conflation with legal tax planning tools—such as agricultural relief or discretionary trusts—accessible to any , not uniquely to peers, thereby perpetuating unsubstantiated narratives of aristocratic fiscal impunity. Empirical evidence from estate valuations and tax records confirms that noble lineages have faced dissolution or diminution precisely due to these liabilities, refuting tropes of inherent financial insulation.

Absolute Judicial Protections

The misconception of absolute judicial protections for peers, implying from prosecution or punishment, arises largely from exaggerated portrayals in 18th-century satirical works that lampooned aristocratic privileges as shields against all accountability. Such depictions, often rooted in critiques of noble excess during periods of social tension, conflated procedural safeguards—like the former right to by fellow peers for serious crimes—with substantive immunity, fostering enduring narratives of inviolability. In practice, these privileges were narrowly procedural, designed to preserve hierarchical integrity through peer adjudication rather than to preclude legal consequences entirely. Parliamentary mechanisms explicitly circumscribed any semblance of absolutism. Bills of enabled legislative conviction and punishment of peers without , a tool invoked against for or , as seen in the Tudor era where Henry VIII's acts from 1534 onward targeted figures like William Dacre, 3rd Baron Dacre, and , resulting in attainders, forfeitures, and executions. offered a parallel check, permitting the to charge peers with high misdemeanors for before the , with precedents such as the 1725 impeachment of Thomas Parker, 1st Earl of Macclesfield, for , leading to fines and removal from office despite his . These processes underscored that conferred no over substantive , allowing circumvention of ordinary courts when political necessity demanded. Even in non-capital matters, privileges yielded to judicial authority. Exemption from applied primarily to civil suits during parliamentary sessions, excluding criminal proceedings or , where peers faced incarceration as commoners might. Verifiable 19th-century instances include the imprisonment of Thomas Cochrane, 10th Earl of Dundonald, in 1814 following conviction for fraud, and commitments for or parliamentary orders, as in cases involving breaches of judicial directives that overrode privilege claims. These examples illustrate the privileges' role in facilitating orderly within merit-based hierarchies, rather than enabling —a distortion often propagated by envy-fueled critiques that overlooked their function in maintaining institutional stability amid power imbalances. By the , further erosion, such as the 1948 abolition of trial by peers via the Criminal Justice Act, reinforced that no absolute judicial fortress ever existed.

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  94. https://seekingalpha.com/article/4542100-what-the-british-aristocracy-can-teach-us-about-staying-rich
  95. https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/aug/11/inheritance-tax-why-the-new-duke-of-westminster-will-not-pay-billions
  96. https://altorwealth.com/2025/08/26/inheritance-tax-loophole-for-the-aristocracy/
  97. https://georgianjunkie.wordpress.com/2010/11/28/a-peers-privilege/
  98. https://www.britainexpress.com/History/tudor/attainder.htm
  99. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt199899/jtselect/jtpriv/43/43ap41.htm
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