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Multinational Joint Task Force
Multinational Joint Task Force
Multinational Joint Task Force
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Multinational Joint Task Force
Badge
Active1994–present
Countries
TypeMultinational force
RoleCombined operations
Size7,500–10,000
HeadquartersN'Djamena, Chad
Engagements
Website[1]
Commanders
Current
commander		Major General Ibrahim Ali
Notable
commanders

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is a combined multinational formation, comprising units, mostly military, from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria. It is headquartered in N'Djamena and is mandated to bring an end to the Boko Haram insurgency. Niger was a member until it's withdrawal in 2025.

History

[edit]

The task force was first organized as a solely Nigerian force in 1994, during the administration of Sani Abacha, to "checkmate banditry activities and to facilitate free movement" along its northern border.[1][2] In 1998 it was expanded to include units from neighboring Chad and Niger with the purpose of dealing with common cross-border security issues in the Lake Chad region, with its headquarters in the town of Baga, Borno State.[2]

Islamist groups grew and expanded their operations during the 2000s and early 2010s. Boko Haram's insurgency began in 2009, and security forces across the region were increasingly directly challenged by jihadist militant groups. Boko Haram and Ansaru were the most active and well known. In April 2012, the MNJTF's mandate was expanded to encompass counter-terrorism operations.[2]

Brig. Gen. Enitan Ransome-Kuti, son of Beko Ransome-Kuti and nephew of the musician Fela Kuti was a previous commander of the force.[1]

Development

[edit]

In January 2015 the MNJTF headquarters in Baga, Nigeria, was overrun by militants of Boko Haram, who then proceeded to massacre local residents[2][3] and destroy the town, displacing many citizens.[4] At the time, only Nigerian soldiers were present in the HQ. There were reports that they fled the attackers.[5] It was an ignominious moment for the MNJTF, and indeed the contributing nations. The political process of expanding the MNJTF was given new strength and energy which led to swifter progress, including the expansion of troop numbers and mandate, and relocation of the HQ to N'Djamena, Chad.[6][7]

The most significant structural changes for the MNJTF that emerged from the meetings in 2015 were a rise in numbers, the creation of a new Concept of Operations under the supervision of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and the move of the HQ to N'Djamena. It was agreed that a Nigerian officer would be the Force Commander for the duration of the mission against Boko Haram, with a Cameroonian as Deputy Commander and Chadian Chief of Staff. Major-General Tukur Yusuf Buratai (Nigerian) was appointed first Commander of the rejuvenated MNJTF in May 2015.[8] However, his command was short lived as in July 2015 he was appointed Nigeria's Chief of Army Staff and handed command to Major-General Iliya Abbah (Nigerian) on 31 July 2015.[9] Nigerian Major-General Lamidi Adeosun, was appointed MNJTF Commander in January 2016.[10] Adeosun was in turn replaced as commander by Major-General Lucky Irabor in May 2017.[11] In August 2018, Irabor was replaced by Major-General C.O. Ude.[12] Maj Gen I.M.Yusuf took over from Ude, while Maj Gen J.J Ogunlade took over from Yusuf who handed over to Maj Gen Abdul Khalifah Ibrahim in August 2021. Thereafter, Maj Gen Gold Chibuisi took over command in 19 April 2023.[13][14] The current Force Commander is Maj Gen Ibrahim Sallau Ali who took over on 14 July 2023 as the tenth Force Commander.[15][16]

The Force is structured in four national sectors: Sector 1 (Cameroon) headquartered at Mora; Sector 2 (Chad) headquartered at Baga-Sola; Sector 3 (Nigeria) based in Monguno; and Sector 4 (Niger), based in the town of Diffa.[17]

There is still considerable skepticism in the international community that the new force can deliver results,[18] and its success or otherwise as a multinational endeavor will be closely monitored.[19] Discontent has been voiced within coalition by Chadian president Idris Deby for shouldering disproportionate burden of fighting armed groups and announced confining its military operations to its boundaries.[20][21]

On 30 March 2025, Niger announced its withdrawal from the Force.[22]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Multinational Joint Task Force

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from Grokipedia
The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is a regional comprising , , , , and , headquartered in , , and mandated to eradicate the and other terrorist threats in the Basin through joint operations, stabilization efforts, and humanitarian facilitation. Originally formed in 1994 by to address trans-border banditry, the force expanded to include and in 1998 before suffering a major setback in 2015 when its headquarters in Baga, , was overrun by militants. In response, the African Union authorized its restructuring as a formal regional mechanism under the Lake Commission, deploying approximately 10,000 troops across four sectors covering affected border areas in the member states. The MNJTF operates under a mandate emphasizing compliance with , coordinated civil-military activities to build local support, and collaboration with national forces to restore state authority and enable the return of displaced populations. Since its reactivation, the MNJTF has conducted cross-border offensives that have reclaimed territories from control, neutralized thousands of insurgents, and facilitated humanitarian access amid ongoing violence that has displaced millions and caused tens of thousands of deaths. Despite these advances, the force contends with persistent insurgent resilience, funding shortfalls, logistical constraints, and internal coordination challenges, limiting its ability to fully eliminate the threat and highlighting the need for integrated non-military approaches to address root causes like and governance failures in the region.

Background and Formation

Historical Context of Insurgency

The began in northeastern around 2002, when Mohammed Yusuf established the group in , , as a Salafi jihadist movement advocating against Western education and secular governance while promoting strict implementation. The group's activities initially involved localized protests and clashes with authorities, but escalated dramatically after Nigerian security forces killed Yusuf in July 2009 during a crackdown on its base, prompting his successor to declare open warfare on the state. Under Shekau, Boko Haram adopted tactics including bombings, targeted assassinations of officials and clerics, and attacks on police and military installations, resulting in thousands of deaths and the group's consolidation of influence across Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states by 2011. By 2013, Boko Haram's operations had spilled across borders into Cameroon, with initial cross-border raids targeting villages in the Far North region, including a November 2013 kidnapping operation that demonstrated the group's intent to exploit porous frontiers for safe havens and logistics. This expansion intensified in 2014, as militants seized rural territories in Cameroon's Mayo-Sava division, conducted mass abductions such as those of foreign nationals and locals, and launched incursions into Chad's Lac province and Niger's Diffa region, where they established temporary control over islands and border enclaves in Lake Chad. These actions, often involving forced recruitment, extortion, and displacement of communities, transformed the conflict into a regional threat, with Boko Haram leveraging the basin's geography for mobility and evasion. National responses remained fragmented and ineffective; Nigeria's military campaigns from 2009 to suffered repeated defeats, including the overrunning of bases and loss of territory covering approximately 20,000 square kilometers by mid-, amid allegations of corruption, poor equipment, and low morale that allowed to inflict over 10,000 fatalities in that period alone. Similar unilateral efforts in , , and yielded limited success against cross-border tactics, exacerbating a with an estimated 1.5 million internally displaced persons in by late and tens of thousands of refugees fleeing into neighboring states, overwhelming local capacities. These failures highlighted the insurgency's transnational causality—rooted in shared ecological vulnerabilities and weak border controls—necessitating coordinated action through the Basin Commission (), founded in 1964 by , , , and primarily for water resource management but repurposed in the early to address security interdependencies via joint intelligence and patrols.

Establishment and Authorization

The (AU) Peace and Security Council authorized the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) on 29 2015 during its 484th meeting, designating it as a regional security arrangement under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) to combat and other terrorist threats in the Basin region. This decision built on prior LCBC commitments to operationalize a joint force framework dating back to pledges in 2012, amid escalating cross-border insurgency activities necessitating coordinated military response. The authorization was followed by the LCBC Heads of State and Government Summit in , , on 16 February , where leaders from , , , and formalized the MNJTF's revival and committed initial troop contributions totaling 8,700 personnel, including soldiers, gendarmes, and police. subsequently joined as a fifth contributing in early , expanding the force's composition to reflect the affected border regions. The MNJTF's initial headquarters was established in , , to facilitate command and coordination among the participating nations. Funding was primarily allocated from AU resources and direct contributions by member states, supplemented by pledges of logistical, financial, and technical support from Western donors including the and the , as endorsed in the AU's foundational communiqué.

Mandate and Organizational Structure

Core Objectives and Mandate

The primary mandate of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), as authorized by the African Union Peace and Security Council on 29 January 2015, centers on restoring security in the Lake Chad Basin by conducting coordinated military operations to neutralize Boko Haram and affiliated terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), through joint offensives, intelligence collaboration, and fortified border controls. This counter-insurgency focus aims to dismantle militant networks exploiting porous frontiers and ungoverned spaces in the region encompassing Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Secondary objectives, outlined in the MNJTF's 2015 Concept of Operations developed under Basin Commission () auspices, include facilitating delivery to displaced populations, fostering post-conflict stabilization, and implementing measures to curb and in vulnerable border communities. These goals support broader efforts to rebuild state authority and enable , with operations coordinated via frameworks and oversight to ensure alignment with regional stability priorities. Rules of engagement for MNJTF forces emphasize precision targeting of verified combatants, adherence to principles of distinction and proportionality, and minimization of civilian casualties through intelligence-driven strikes and cross-border verification protocols. Harmonized documents, elaborated in early 2015 by member states, require prior authorization for cross-border actions and mandate reporting mechanisms to mitigate collateral risks in multinational settings.

Member States and Composition

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) comprises military contingents primarily from five Lake Chad Basin states: , , , , and . These countries form the core of the force, established under the Lake Chad Basin Commission framework to address cross-border threats. Benin joined as the fifth member in 2015, contributing forces focused on its border regions, while the original quartet—Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria—provides the foundational structure. The force's authorized strength totals up to 8,700 military and other personnel, as pledged by member states during the February 2015 meeting of experts and subsequently endorsed by the on March 6, 2015. This composition encompasses units for ground operations, specialized elements such as and rapid response teams, and support for sustainment, though actual deployed numbers have varied due to national rotations, equipment availability, and operational demands—often falling short of the full pledge. maintains the largest contingent, typically accounting for the majority of ground troops given the insurgency's epicenter in its territory, while emphasizes air assets and mobile strike capabilities leveraging its resources. , , and contribute sector-specific and border patrol units, tailored to their proximity to affected areas. The MNJTF's sectoral division reflects national contributions: Sector 1 covers Cameroonian border zones, Sector 2 Chad's islands and approaches, Sector 3 Nigerian northeast territories, and Sector 4 Niger's , with Benin's forces integrated into adjacent operations. This arrangement ensures multinational coverage of the approximately 8,700-square-kilometer spanning the four primary states, promoting coordinated patrols and resource sharing without fixed quotas per sector. Variations in force levels persist, influenced by domestic security priorities in each state, such as Nigeria's parallel national campaigns or Chad's commitments.

Command Structure and Headquarters

The of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is situated in , , at Camp 27 in the Farcha district, operational since its inauguration in May 2015 following authorization by the . The facility serves as the central operational hub, housing approximately 100 military and civilian personnel contributed by Lake Chad Basin Commission member states, including liaison elements for cross-border coordination. Overall command is vested in a Force Commander, who directs and operations from the ' Office of the Force Commander, supported by specialized directorates for , , and . Nigeria has predominantly provided Force Commanders, underscoring its foundational and leading role in the MNJTF's revival, with Godwin Mutkut assuming the position on January 23, 2025. This unified structure facilitates decision-making through joint operational planning, integrating inputs from national contingents while maintaining strategic oversight. The MNJTF divides its area of responsibility into four sectors aligned with member states' territories to enhance localized control and rapid response: Sector 1 headquartered in Mora, ; Sector 2 in Bagasola, ; Sector 3 in Diffa, ; and Sector 4 in Baga, , incorporating contributions. Each sector operates under national command but reports to the Force Commander, enabling synchronized multinational maneuvers via headquarters-directed fusion of and . Coordination mechanisms at address multinational challenges, including doctrinal differences and variations—such as Soviet-era systems in some forces versus Western standards in others—through harmonized procedures mandated by guidelines and supported by a dedicated Mission Support Team for planning and enhancement.

Military Operations and Tactics

Initial Deployment and Early Operations (2015–2016)

The authorized the deployment of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) on January 29, 2015, for an initial 12-month period, enabling rapid mobilization of approximately 8,700 troops from , , , and to counter in the Basin. The force's headquarters in , , was inaugurated on May 25, 2015, establishing four operational sectors: Sector 1 in Mora, ; Sector 2 in Baga-Sol, ; Sector 3 in Baga, ; and Sector 4 in Diffa, . Logistics emphasized cross-border coordination, with troop contributions including 3,000 from and initial Nigerian forces focusing on border stabilization, though full integration faced delays due to varying national capacities. Early operations prioritized clearing Boko Haram enclaves along porous borders, with Chadian forces leading cross-border pursuits into starting in early February 2015. On February 4, 2015, Chadian troops, supported by air strikes and artillery, recaptured the strategic border town of Gamboru Ngala from control, killing over 200 militants in the process and disrupting insurgent supply routes from . This action, coordinated informally with Nigerian and Cameroonian units, marked one of the first multinational efforts to reclaim Nigerian territory, enabling temporary civilian returns and severing 's access to cross-border networks. Similar pursuits targeted adjacent areas like Dikwa and Damasak, where Chadian offensives in February-March 2015 neutralized fighters and cleared forested border zones used for logistics. By mid-2015, joint tactics evolved to include rights up to 25 kilometers across borders, facilitating operations that dismantled insurgent camps and supply lines in the Sambisa Forest fringes and islands. Chad's pivotal role persisted, with its forces conducting aggressive sweeps that complemented Nigerian redeployments, though operations remained largely bilateral until the formal MNJTF relaunch in October 2015. In September 2015, Nigerian troops, building on prior regional gains, resecured Gamboru Ngala after a resurgence, underscoring the challenges of sustaining early territorial control without sustained multinational logistics. These initial actions established a forward presence but highlighted dependencies on Chad's initiative amid uneven contributions from other members.

Major Campaigns and Engagements (2017–2022)

In response to the fragmentation of and the rise of the (ISWAP) following the 2016 split, the MNJTF shifted focus toward sustained cross-border engagements targeting asymmetric threats, including ambushes and suicide bombings prevalent in 2018–2019. Joint operations emphasized intelligence-sharing to dismantle training camps and logistics nodes along porous borders, particularly in response to ISWAP's adaptation of guerrilla tactics that exploited Lake Chad's islands and remote areas for staging attacks. These efforts involved coordinated patrols across sectors, with notable activity in Niger's —where Sector 4 repelled incursions—and Cameroon's Far North, countering spillover from Nigerian territories. Key engagements included raids that neutralized militants and recovered arms caches, contributing to incremental territorial control amid ongoing insurgent resilience. By 2021, Operation Sharan Fage cleared over 20 towns and villages, neutralizing 22 /ISWAP fighters and destroying associated infrastructure and equipment. In 2022, Operation Lake Sanity targeted entrenched strongholds in the basin, resulting in the elimination of senior commander Abubakar Dan Buduma and the liberation of approximately 4,000 civilians from captivity. These campaigns correlated with broader metrics of pressure on insurgents, including a reported decline in fatalities from terrorist attacks—from peaks exceeding 8,000 annually pre-2017 to 1,894 in 2021—and surges in surrenders, with 1,711 terrorists yielding in 2021 alone and 2,225 in 2022, often facilitated by MNJTF amnesty-linked operations. However, ISWAP's persistence in underscored the challenges of fully eradicating dispersed cells reliant on local grievances and smuggling routes.

Evolving Strategies and Tactics

Following initial large-scale offensives in 2015–2016, the MNJTF adapted its approach to prioritize intelligence-driven over sustained conventional assaults, constrained by funding limitations that hindered prolonged joint maneuvers. This shift emphasized targeted raids informed by and real-time to disrupt Boko Haram's asymmetric networks, reducing reliance on resource-intensive territorial sweeps that exposed vulnerabilities to guerrilla counterattacks. Non-kinetic elements gained prominence, including collaborations with local vigilante groups such as Nigeria's (CJTF), which provided community-sourced intelligence and augmented patrols in border areas where formal troops faced access challenges. initiatives, often integrated into operations like psychological outreach campaigns, encouraged defections by offering pathways, leveraging insights from captured insurgents to undermine and ideological cohesion without direct . Technological enhancements supported hybrid tactics against elusive threats, with donor-provided drone surveillance enabling persistent monitoring of cross-border movements and supply routes, complementing multinational joint patrols that interdicted fighters and logistics. These methods addressed Boko Haram's adaptability, blending kinetic precision strikes with disruption of funding and propaganda networks to erode operational resilience.

Achievements and Effectiveness

Territorial and Strategic Gains

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has facilitated the recapture of territories in the Basin previously controlled by , particularly through coordinated cross-border operations involving troops from , , , , and . These efforts, commencing after the force's full operationalization in 2016, focused on border enclaves and peripheral areas, enabling the liberation of communities in Nigeria's and adjacent regions in and . By September 2017, assessments highlighted MNJTF contributions to clearing insurgent-held zones, restoring state presence in areas that had served as launchpads for attacks. Strategically, MNJTF operations have encircled and constricted Boko Haram's access to islands, which had functioned as remote safe havens for , , and cross-border raids. naval and ground patrols have progressively limited insurgent mobility across the lake's fragmented , with operations targeting these waterways to prevent resupply and evasion. This has degraded the group's capacity to exploit the lake's inaccessibility, as evidenced by sustained clearance actions that prioritize control over archipelagic redoubts. The task force's emphasis on joint border surveillance has disrupted Boko Haram's cross-border operational patterns, reducing the frequency of coordinated incursions into core Basin territories. Through intelligence-sharing mechanisms and synchronized patrols, MNJTF has curtailed the insurgents' ability to relocate fighters and resources fluidly across national boundaries, fostering a more contained threat profile in stabilized zones. and regional analyses attribute this to enhanced interoperability among member states' forces, though sustained patrolling remains essential to prevent resurgence.

Counter-Terrorism Outcomes

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has facilitated the neutralization of key insurgent figures by exerting coordinated military pressure that intensified factional rivalries within , prompting internal violence that eliminated high-value targets. In May 2021, leader died during a confrontation with the rival (ISWAP), a clash precipitated by territorial competition and operational strains from ongoing MNJTF and national counter-insurgency campaigns that fragmented the group's command structure. This outcome weakened 's cohesion, as ISWAP's assault on Shekau's faction exploited vulnerabilities exposed by cross-border pursuits and joint patrols. MNJTF operations have resulted in numerous arrests of operatives and collaborators, disrupting recruitment and logistical networks through cross-border interdictions. Joint intelligence mechanisms have enabled the seizure of arms caches and the apprehension of arms traffickers, curtailing insurgents' capacity to sustain prolonged engagements. Enhanced information sharing among member states has preempted multiple attack plots, including suicide bombings and raids, by allowing rapid response to emerging threats in border areas. These efforts have contributed to a decline in high-profile mass kidnappings by , which peaked between 2014 and 2015 with incidents like the Chibok abductions of 276 schoolgirls, shifting toward less ambitious, smaller-scale operations amid sustained pressure. While abductions persist, the reduced frequency of large-scale events reflects insurgents' diminished ability to hold territory and coordinate complex assaults, attributable in part to MNJTF's role in sealing escape routes and intelligence-driven disruptions.

Metrics of Success and Empirical Assessments

Empirical data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) indicate a substantial decline in Boko Haram's lethality in northeast , with reported fatalities dropping from over 11,500 in 2015 to approximately 2,700 in 2018—a reduction exceeding 75%—alongside a decrease in average fatalities per attack from nearly 19 to under 5. This trend correlates with the intensification of multinational operations post-2015, as joint efforts disrupted insurgent logistics and territorial control in border zones. Assessments by the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) further quantify regional impacts, documenting a fall in terrorist attacks and fatalities from 8,119 in 2015 to 1,894 in 2021 across the Basin, directly linking these outcomes to MNJTF campaigns such as Operation Lake Sanity II, which eliminated high-value targets and freed over 4,000 civilians. Surrenders provide additional metrics, with 1,711 /ISWAP fighters defecting in 2021 alone, reflecting diminished operational capacity amid sustained pressure from coordinated forces. Comparative evaluations reveal greater stability in MNJTF-patrolled sectors, where violence event rates fell more sharply than in unilaterally managed areas, enabling the return of over 200,000 internally displaced persons and refugees from September 2021 to April 2022 and facilitating humanitarian access. ACCORD's 2023 analysis concludes that the has effectively attained key mandate priorities to a degree, fostering causal improvements in through cross-border intelligence and rapid response, though full eradication of threats persists as a challenge.

Challenges, Criticisms, and Controversies

Operational and Logistical Hurdles

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has faced persistent challenges arising from disparities in military equipment, training levels, and operational doctrines among its troop-contributing countries—, , , , and . By July 2015, the force comprised approximately 11,000 personnel operating across five sectors, each led by a different nation, but inconsistencies in capabilities hindered seamless integration during joint maneuvers. Language barriers further complicated communication in multinational settings, contributing to coordination lapses that delayed tactical responses to insurgent movements. Logistical operations have been severely constrained by the Basin's challenging environment, including vast water expanses, porous borders, and remote islands that complicate supply transport and resupply efforts. The absence of sufficient amphibious vehicles and counter-improvised explosive device (IED) tools has limited mobility and exposed convoys to vulnerabilities, forcing reliance on national-level sustainment that varies in reliability across sectors. These factors have amplified risks during patrols and clearance operations, as insurgents exploit terrain advantages for . Troop rotations and exposure to ambushes have compounded attrition rates, with and fighters repeatedly targeting MNJTF positions in sectors along the lake's fringes, as seen in sustained threats during operations like Gama Aiki (2016–2017). By July 2019, force strength had adjusted to around 10,250 amid such pressures, underscoring the toll of environmental and tactical hazards on operational continuity.

Human Rights Allegations and Abuses

Reports from organizations have documented allegations of misconduct by national forces operating within the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) sectors, particularly in and during early operations from 2015 to 2017. In 's Far North region, reported that security forces, including those combating affiliates, subjected at least 101 individuals to incommunicado detention, , and other ill-treatment between March 2013 and March 2017, with some deaths in custody attributed to these practices; these violations occurred amid counter-terrorism efforts that aligned with MNJTF deployments post-2015 reactivation. In 's sector, civilian auxiliaries such as the (CJTF), integrated into MNJTF structures for intelligence and support roles, faced accusations of extrajudicial killings, , and revenge attacks against suspected insurgents or communities, though formal military units were less frequently implicated in verified cases. These incidents, while serious, represent isolated or targeted abuses against suspects rather than the indiscriminate civilian targeting characteristic of and its factions, which have committed systematic atrocities including mass killings, abductions, and enslavement amounting to war crimes and . For instance, 's attacks have resulted in thousands of civilian deaths annually in the Basin, far exceeding documented MNJTF-related casualties, with the group responsible for over 2,000 abductions in a single 2014 Chibok incident alone and ongoing hostilities displacing millions. MNJTF protocols include vetting processes for auxiliaries to mitigate such risks, distinguishing operations from insurgent tactics that prioritize civilian victimization as a strategy. In response, the (AU) mandate for the MNJTF emphasizes compliance with international and humanitarian law, mandating training to prevent abuses and requiring investigations into violations. Recent initiatives, including UN-supported AU training in April 2023 on and a August 2024 joint steering committee meeting reinforcing compliance mechanisms, aim to address these issues, though enforcement remains constrained by national command structures where troops retain primary accountability to home governments rather than the multinational framework. Limited prosecutions and oversight have perpetuated concerns, but empirical assessments indicate abuses have declined relative to peak insurgency violence, with MNJTF focusing on professionalization to enhance legitimacy.

Political Tensions and Funding Shortfalls

initially resisted full participation in the MNJTF upon its reactivation in , citing concerns over foreign troops operating on its soil and preferring unilateral control over counter-Boko Haram efforts, which delayed coordinated deployments across s. Interstate frictions, including mutual accusations of inadequate and resource sharing, further impeded joint operations, as national militaries prioritized domestic threats over collective mandates. Chad's preference for autonomous offensives exemplified divergences from the MNJTF's consensus-based framework, with Chadian forces conducting independent incursions into Nigerian and Cameroonian territories as early as 2015, bypassing command structures and straining alliances. President repeatedly threatened troop withdrawals—such as in 2018—to pressure for greater international backing, highlighting how unilateral national strategies undermined the force's integrated approach and exposed operational vulnerabilities. Funding shortfalls have compounded these political rifts, with member states providing inconsistent national contributions amid competing domestic priorities like economic instability and internal insurgencies. The and have offered pledges through mechanisms like the AU Support Programme, but disbursements remain erratic and insufficient to cover , , and sustainment needs, forcing reliance on donor aid that ties operations to external timelines. These constraints have directly limited troop rotations, intelligence sharing, and cross-border pursuits, enabling factions to regroup in ungoverned spaces.

Recent Developments and Regional Impact

Activities from 2023 Onward

In response to the resurgence of the (ISWAP), the MNJTF intensified counter-insurgency operations across the Basin in 2023 and 2024, focusing on disrupting coordinated attacks in northeastern Nigeria's and Niger's . These efforts included joint patrols and clearance missions amid broader instability exacerbated by jihadist infighting between ISWAP and Jama'at Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da'wa wa al-Jihad (JAS). A notable operation, Lake Sanity 2, concluded by August 2024, resulted in the degradation of splinter groups through targeted strikes and arrests in the basin area. The July 2023 coup in initially disrupted MNJTF coordination, halting some cross-border law enforcement and intelligence exchanges, though operations persisted with contributions from , , , and . By early 2024, the task force adapted by enhancing regional collaboration under the Lake Chad Basin Commission (), despite these setbacks. In March 2025, formally withdrew from the MNJTF, further compromising joint intelligence sharing and creating potential security gaps exploited by insurgents. Throughout 2025, the MNJTF sustained patrols and amid ISWAP's escalation, including at least twelve coordinated assaults since January and the of weaponized drones by militants, which altered tactical dynamics in the basin. The responded by unveiling an adjusted Regional Strategy for Stabilization, Recovery, and Resilience (RS-SRR 2.0) in 2025, extending through 2030 to bolster counter-terrorism alongside humanitarian stabilization efforts in crisis-affected zones. The African Union reaffirmed support for the MNJTF in January 2025, emphasizing its role until threats are eliminated.

Broader Security and Humanitarian Effects

The operations of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) have contributed to the stabilization of certain rural and border zones in the Basin, enabling limited returns of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and improving humanitarian access in those areas. As of December 2024, the region hosted approximately 3.1 million IDPs, with 2.3 million in alone, reflecting the persistent scale of displacement driven by and its splinter groups despite military efforts. In 2024, MNJTF activities reportedly facilitated the return of over 3,800 IDPs and 2,306 refugees, primarily through securing villages and supply routes that allowed civilians to resettle and receive convoys, though these figures represent a fraction of the overall displaced population. By concentrating insurgent pressure in remote islands and peripheral territories, MNJTF patrols and offensives have helped contain Boko Haram's expansion into major urban centers like and , averting broader spillover that could overwhelm city infrastructure and economies. This containment has preserved urban hubs as relative safe zones for trade and services, indirectly supporting poverty alleviation for non-displaced populations. However, low-level violence—such as ambushes and IED attacks—persists in unsecured fringes, reinforcing cycles of fear, disrupted farming, and that hinder long-term development and sustain dependency on . MNJTF efforts intersect with local non-state initiatives, including Nigeria's (CJTF), which provides intelligence and community patrols complementary to formal operations, enhancing early warning against infiltrations in communities. These partnerships have bolstered in hybrid models, though they risk inconsistencies due to varying training and oversight across member states. Overall, while MNJTF has mitigated some humanitarian fallout by enabling targeted returns and access, the incomplete neutralization of insurgent networks limits broader stability gains, as evidenced by ongoing displacement tracking showing minimal net reduction in affected populations.

Future Prospects and Reforms

Proposals for reforming the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) include equipping it with specialized capabilities such as anti-drone technology, jamming systems, anti-IED equipment, and amphibious platforms to address evolving terrorist tactics in the Lake Chad Basin. These enhancements aim to bolster operational effectiveness against groups like and the (ISWAP). The revised Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery, and Resilience (RS-SRR) for 2025–2030 advocates expanding the MNJTF's supporting role to encompass socio-economic development, shifting from initial stabilization to sustained stability through infrastructure, education, and livelihood programs for displaced populations. Alternative funding mechanisms, such as a proposed Peace and Stability Tax, have been suggested to provide consistent resources beyond unpredictable troop-contributing country contributions and donor pledges. Intelligence-sharing reforms are urged to counter the erosion of multilateral platforms following military coups and shifts toward bilateral partnerships with , which have fragmented regional cooperation since 2023 and sidelined frameworks like the MNJTF. Recommendations emphasize investing in , liaison networks, and to restore early-warning capabilities and adapt to sovereignty-focused models. The MNJTF's long-term viability depends on sustained political will from member states, including consistent funding and coordination with the , as resource shortfalls enable insurgents to adapt, reclaim territories, and exploit gaps in post-operation policing. Niger's recent withdrawal, tied to suspended donor support, underscores risks to regional momentum, prompting calls for assessments and mobilization of additional backing.

References

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  19. https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/experts-meeting-on-the-elaboration-of-operational-documents-for-the-multinational-joint-task-force-mnjtf-of-the-member-states-of-the-lake-chad-basin-commission-and-benin-against-the-boko-haram-terrorist-group
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  24. https://apcz.umk.pl/CJPS/article/download/36528/30786/86925
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  26. https://mnjtffmm.org/leadership/
  27. https://www.france24.com/en/20150611-nigeria-regional-force-boko-haram-mnjtf
  28. https://zagazola.org/index.php/breaking-news/major-general-godwin-mutkut-assumes-command-as-the-new-force-commander-mnjtf
  29. https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/projects-activities/multinational-joint-task-force-mnjtf-against-boko-haram_en
  30. https://brill.com/view/journals/joup/26/4/article-p330_005.xml?language=en
  31. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/2/4/chad-military-claims-killing-boko-haram-fighters
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  37. https://mnjtffmm.org/mnjtf-enhances-surveillance-capability-to-achieve-mandate-force-commander/
  38. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/394086096_Drone_Technology_in_Nigeria%27s_Space_An_Advance_Warfare_against_National_Insecurity
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