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Radicalization
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Radicalization (or radicalisation), also known as extremization (or extremisation) is the process by which an individual or a group comes to adopt increasingly radical views in opposition to a political, social, or religious status quo. The ideas of society at large shape the outcomes of radicalization. Radicalization can result in both violent and nonviolent action – academic literature focuses on radicalization into violent extremism (RVE) or radicalisation leading to acts of terrorism.[1][2][3] Multiple separate pathways can promote the process of radicalization, which can be independent but are usually mutually reinforcing.[4][5]
Radicalization that occurs across multiple reinforcing pathways greatly increases a group's resilience and lethality. Furthermore, by compromising a group's ability to blend in with non-radical society and to participate in a modern, national or international economy, radicalization serves as a kind of sociological trap that gives individuals no other place to go to satisfy their material and spiritual needs.[6]
Definitions
[edit]There is no universally accepted definition of radicalization. One of the difficulties with defining radicalization appears to be the importance of the context to determine what is perceived as radicalization. Therefore, radicalization can mean different things to different people.[3] Presented below is a list of definitions used by different governments.
European Union
[edit]The European Commission defined the term "radicalization" in the year 2005 as follows: "Violent radicalisation" is the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism as defined in Article 1 of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism. The term "violent radicalisation" originated in EU policy circles and was coined after the Madrid bombing of 11 March 2004. It was not widely used in social science as a concept but it obviously refers to a process of socialisation leading to the use of violence.[7][8] In an initiating report of the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation – based on four deepening studies – the research paradigm has been opened for further scientific research, also flanked by research grants and funding via different security research programs.[1]
United Kingdom
[edit]The UK Home Office, MI5's parent agency, defines radicalisation as "The process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then join terrorist groups." The MI5 report closes by saying that no single measure will reduce radicalisation in the UK and that the only way to combat it is by targeting the at-risk vulnerable groups and trying to assimilate them into society. This may include helping young people find jobs, better integrating immigrant populations into the local culture, and effectively reintegrating ex-prisoners into society.[9]
Canada
[edit]The Royal Canadian Mounted Police defines radicalization as "the process by which individuals—usually young people—are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views." While radical thinking is by no means problematic in itself, it becomes a threat to national security when Canadian citizens or residents espouse or engage in violence or direct action as a means of promoting political, ideological or religious extremism. Sometimes referred to as "homegrown terrorism", this process of radicalization is more correctly referred to as domestic radicalization leading to terrorist violence.[10]
Denmark
[edit]The Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) defines radicalization as "A process by which a person to an increasing extent accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism, in an attempt to reach a specific political/ideological objective."[11]
UNESCO
[edit]In a UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) research report on the impact of the Internet and social media on youth and violent extremism, the difficulty of defining radicalization is discussed.[12] A distinction is drawn "between a process of radicalization, a process of violent radicalization (legitimizing the adoption of violence), and acts of violence."[12] For the purposes of the UNESCO report, radicalization is defined by these three points:
- "The individual person's search for fundamental meaning, origin and return to a root ideology;
- "The individual as part of a group's adoption of a violent form of expansion of root ideologies and related oppositionist objectives;
- "The polarization of the social space and the collective construction of a threatened ideal 'us' against 'them,' where the others are dehumanized by a process of scapegoating."[12]
Varieties and commonalities
[edit]Despite being composed of multifarious pathways that lead to different outcomes and sometimes diametrically opposed ideological purposes, radicalization can be traced to a common set of pathways that translate real or perceived grievances into increasingly extreme ideas and readiness to participate in political action beyond the status quo. Shira Fishman, a researcher at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, wrote "Radicalization is a dynamic process that varies for each individual, but shares some underlying commonalities that can be explored."[13] Though there are many end products of the process of radicalization, to include all manner of extremist groups both violent and nonviolent, a common series of dynamics have been consistently demonstrated in the course of academic inquiry.
Islamic
[edit]Jihadis have a "tried and tested model" of contact with different vulnerable, and extremist individuals through online messaging services or social media platforms, and then rapidly manipulating them towards participating in violent action in their name.[14] It was reported that Raffia Hayat of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Association warned that jailed extremists attempt to recruit violent criminals into radical groups so they carry out attacks on the public once released.[15][better source needed] There have been several notable criticisms of radicalization theories for focusing disproportionately on Islam.[16] [17] There have been concerns that converts to Islam are more susceptible to violent radicalization than individuals born into the faith.[18][19][20] Dr. Abdul Haqq Baker developed the Convert's Cognitive Development Framework that describes how new converts conceptualize Islam and the stages where they are most vulnerable to radicalization.[21][22]
Right-wing
[edit]Radical right-wing terrorism is motivated by a variety of different right-wing/far-right ideologies, most prominently neo-fascism, neo-Nazism, white nationalism and to a lesser extent "Patriot"/Sovereign citizen beliefs and anti-abortion sentiment.[23] Modern radical right-wing terrorism appeared in Western Europe, Central Europe and the United States in the 1970s, and Eastern Europe following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Groups associated with right-wing radicals include white power skinhead gangs, right-wing/far-right hooligans, and sympathizers.[24]
Examples of right-wing/far-right radical organizations and individuals include Aryan Nations, Aryan Republican Army (ARA), Atomwaffen Division (AWD), Army of God (AOG), Anders Behring Breivik, Alexandre Bissonnette, Brenton Harrison Tarrant, Cesar Sayoc, Cliven Bundy, Dylann Roof, David Koresh, David Lane, Eric Robert Rudolph, Frazier Glenn Miller, James Mason, James Alex Fields, John T. Earnest, Jim David Adkisson, Ku Klux Klan (KKK), National Action (NA), National Socialist Underground (NSU), Timothy McVeigh, Robert Bowers, Thomas Mair, The Order and Wade Michael Page. From 2008 to 2016, there were more right-wing terror attacks both attempted and accomplished in the US than Islamist and left-wing attacks combined.[25]
Right-wing populism by those who support ethnocentrism (usually white nationalism) and oppose immigration creates a climate of "us versus them" leading to radicalization.[26][27] The growth of white nationalism in a political climate of polarization has provided an opportunity for both on- and offline radicalization and recruitment as an alternative to increasingly distrusted traditional mainstream choices.[28][29] In 2009, the United States Department of Homeland Security identified economic and political conditions as leading to a rise in right-wing radicalization and recruitment.[30]
The Anti-Defamation League reports that white supremacist propaganda and recruitment efforts on and around college campuses have been increasing sharply, with 1,187 incidents in 2018 compared to 421 in 2017, far exceeding any previous year.[31] Far-right terrorists rely on a variety of strategies such as leafleting, violent rituals, and house parties to recruit, targeting angry and marginalized youth looking for solutions to their problems. But their most effective recruitment tool is extremist music, which avoids monitoring by moderating parties such as parents and school authorities. Risk factors for recruitment include exposure to racism during childhood, dysfunctional families such as divorced parents, physical, emotional, and sexual abuse, neglect, and disillusionment.[32]
In 2018, researchers from the Data & Society think tank identified the YouTube recommendation system as promoting a range of political positions from mainstream libertarianism and conservatism to overt white nationalism.[33][34] Many other online discussion groups and forums are used for online right-wing radicalization.[35][36][37] Facebook was found to be offering advertisements targeted to 168,000 users in a white genocide conspiracy theory category, which they removed shortly after being contacted by journalists in the wake of the 2018 Pittsburgh synagogue shooting.[38] After the Christchurch mosque shootings on March 15, 2019, Facebook announced that they have banned white nationalist and white separatist content along with white supremacy.[39]
Left-wing
[edit]Left-wing terrorism is terrorism committed with the aim of overthrowing current capitalist systems and replacing them with Marxist–Leninist or socialist societies. Left-wing terrorism can also occur within already socialist states as criminal action against the current ruling government.[40][41] Most left-wing terrorist groups that had operated in the 1970s and 1980s disappeared by the mid-1990s. One exception was the Greek Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N), which lasted until 2002. Since then, left-wing terrorism has been relatively minor in the Western world in comparison with other forms, and is now mostly carried out by insurgent groups in the developing world.[42]
According to Sarah Brockhoff, Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks, while left-wing terrorism is ideologically motivated, nationalist-separatist terrorism is ethnically motivated.[43] They argue that the revolutionary goal of left-wing terrorism is non-negotiable whereas nationalist terrorists are willing to make concessions.[44] They suggest that rigidity of the demands of left-wing terrorists may explain their lack of support relative to nationalist groups.[45] Nevertheless, many on the revolutionary left have shown solidarity for national liberation groups employing terrorism, such as Irish nationalists, the Palestine Liberation Organization and the South American Tupamaros, seeing them as engaged in a global struggle against capitalism.[45] Since the nationalist sentiment is fueled by socio-economic conditions, some separatist movements, including the Basque ETA, the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Irish National Liberation Army, incorporated communist and socialist ideology into their policies.[46]
Role of the Internet and social media
[edit]UNESCO explored the role of the Internet and social media on the development of radicalization among youth in a 2017 research report, Youth and violent extremism on social media: mapping the research.[12] The report explores violent extremism in the countries within Europe, North America, Latin America, and the Caribbean; violent radicalization in the Arab world and Africa; and, violent radicalization in Asia. At this time, more research is available on this issue within Europe, North America, Latin America, and the Caribbean than is available in the Arab world, Africa, and Asia.[12] The report expresses a need for continued research on this topic overall as there are multiple types of radicalization (political, religious, psychosocial) that can be explored in relation to youth and the role the Internet and social media play.[12] One key conclusion of the report is that "social media constitutes a facilitating environment rather than a driving force for violent radicalization or the actual commission of violence."[12]
As stated before the authors of the 2017 UNESCO report repeatedly call for the support of more research into the study of online violent radicalization. Especially as it relates to young people and women as available research has been gendered. Gaps in research also apply to specific areas of the world. There is a notable absence of research on this topic when it comes to the Arab world, Africa, and Asia.[12] So much so, that the authors of this report had difficulty developing specific conclusions about the connections between the Internet and social media, radicalization, and youth in these three areas of the world. The authors see these multiple gaps in research as opportunities for future studies, but also admit that there are specific challenges in carrying out research in this area successfully.[12] They discuss empirical, methodological, and ethical challenges. For example, if youth and the influence of the Internet and social media on radicalizing them are to be studied, there are ethical concerns when it comes to the age of the youth being studied as well as the privacy and safety of these youth. The authors conclude their report with general recommendations as well as recommendations for government entities, the private sector, and civil society.[12]
Mutual aid
[edit]Eli Berman's 2009 book Radical, Religious, and Violent: the New Economics of Terrorism applies a rational choice model to the process of radicalization, demonstrating that the presence of mutual aid networks increase the resilience of radical groups. When those groups decide to use violence, they also enjoy a heightened level of lethality and are protected from defection and other forms of intervention by states and outside groups.[47]
All organizations insofar as they include the possibility of free riders by extension experience defection constraints. Within the context of a violent extremist organization, defection means either defection to a counterintelligence or security apparatus, or defection to a non-radical criminal apparatus. Both of these outcomes spoil specific plans to exercise violence in the name of the group at large. The "defection constraint" is similar to a threshold price-point in that it denotes what rewards would justify the defection of any one individual within the context of an organization. Berman uses the example of a Taliban protection racket for convoys of consumer goods moving through Afghanistan: checkpoints are set up at several points along a trade route, and each checkpoint's team is given a small percentage of the convoy's total value if it arrives safely at its destination. The incentive for any one checkpoint's team deciding to simply hijack a convoy as it passes through, sell the goods off, and escape, increases as the value of the convoy increases. The same dynamic applies to attacks; while an individual in a terrorist group may not feel drawn by the reward of alerting the police to an impending low level crime, the reward for alerting the police to an impending high-profile attack, such as a mass bombing, becomes more attractive. While non-radicalized and criminal organizations can only rely on organizational cohesion through a calculus of greed, fear, and perhaps familial loyalty, Berman argues that religious radicalization greatly increases the defection constraints of radical terrorist organizations by requiring outsized demonstrations of commitment to the cause prior to recruiting operatives.
Mutual aid is the voluntary and reciprocal exchange of goods within an organization. Examples in various religious antecedents include Judaic Tzedakah, Islamic Zakat, and various Christian institutions of charity, as described in the Acts of the Apostles. Berman argues that religious organizations experience economic risks by extending mutual aid to all alleged believers—theological assent is cheap, action can be costly. By imposing a series of outwardly visible social rules, such as restrictions (or prescriptions) on dress, diet, language, and social interactions, groups impose a cost on entering into a mutual aid partnership, diminishing the occurrence of free riding.
These restrictions have a dual effect in radical groups. Not only do they ensure that an individual is committed to the cause, but they also diminish individual's access to consumption opportunities and social interaction that might persuade them to distance themselves from the cause. As individuals become more involved with radical activities, their social circles become more constrained, which diminishes contact with non-radicalized persons and further entrenches radicalized thinking. For example, when a young man spends several years in a Yeshiva in order to establish himself within a Haredi community, he foregoes future earnings that would be accessible should he choose a secular education. To quote Berman "As consumption opportunities are limited, work for pay becomes less appealing, freeing up even more time for community activities." This sunk cost figures into future calculations, and raises the defection constraint in a way that non-radicalized group dynamics cannot. Going back to the Taliban convoy example, not only have the two footsoldiers in question have been vetted by demonstrating commitment to the cause, they also have had their exterior options limited such that it would be difficult to blend into a new environment for lack of skills and cultural understanding. As such, the threshold price point to defect, as represented by the value of the convoy, increases to include both the price of losing their existing support network and non-quantifiable factors such as friends, family, safety, and other goods over the course of their lives.
Leading theories
[edit]While the overall arch of radicalization usually involves multiple reinforcing processes, scholars have identified a series of individual pathways to radicalization.
McCauley and Mosalenko
[edit]Clark McCauley and Sofia Mosalenko's 2009 book Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us identifies 12 following sociological and psychodynamic pathways:
Individual-level factors
[edit]Personal grievance
[edit]This pathway emphasizes revenge for real or perceived harm inflicted upon oneself by an outside party. This initial offense triggers other psychodynamic mechanisms, such as thinking in more stark in-group and out-group terms, lowered inhibitions to violence, and lessened incentives to avoid violence. Chechen "Shahidka" also known as Black Widows, women who have lost husbands, children, or other close family members in conflict with Russian forces are a good example.
Group grievance
[edit]"Group grievance" radicalization dynamics are similar to those that are primed by personal grievances; the difference is that the subject perceives harm inflicted on a group that she belongs to or has sympathy for. This pathway accounts for the larger portion of political and ethnic radical violence, in which action is taken on behalf of the group at large rather than as an act of personal revenge. Radicalization out of sympathy for an outgroup is rarer, but can be observed in the Weather Underground's attempted alignment with the Black Panthers and Viet Cong. The tie between radicalization into violent extremism through group grievance and suicide bombing has also been quantifiably demonstrated: perceived threats to proximal identity such as the presence of foreign troops or invasion accounts for the majority of suicide bombings.[48]
Some commentators believe that the anger and suspicion directed toward innocent Muslims living in Western countries after the September 11 attacks and the indignities inflicted upon them by security forces and the general public contributes to radicalization of new recruits.[49] Such "us vs. them" hostility cited by commentators includes political positions such as the Trump travel ban which Donald Trump initially campaigned for as "a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States", or ironically Senator Ted Cruz's call to "patrol and secure Muslim neighborhoods before they become radicalized".[50]
Slippery slope
[edit]The "Slippery slope" represents gradual radicalization through activities that incrementally narrow the individual's social circle, narrow their mindset, and in some cases desensitize them to violence. This has also been called the "True Believer" syndrome, as a product of which one becomes increasingly serious about their political, social, and religious beliefs as a product of "taking the next step". One can begin by participating in nonviolent activities such as mutual aid, wherein the best way to raise one's in-group social status is to demonstrate seriousness about the cause and increase the level of commitment in terms of beliefs and activities. As an individual commits act after act, sunk costs are developed. Even if activity is initially only ideological or only criminal, the process of radicalization equates the two such that criminal acts are justified for intellectually radical purposes, and radical purposes are invoked to justify what are ultimately criminal acts.[51]
Love
[edit]Romantic and familial entanglement is often an overlooked factor in radicalization. Several violent extremist organizations, especially at their origin, owe their structure to a tight-knit group of friends who share religious, economic, social, and sexual bonds. While this example is evident in more extreme cases, such as those of Charles Manson's "Family" and other radical cults, it also applies to radicalization in secular and orthodox religious environments. Love can serve as a connection between influential figures, connecting their networks of followers through a combination of attraction and loyalty.[52] This particular force was especially notable in New Left radical groups, such as the American Weather Underground and the German Red Army Faction. The connections between Bill Ayers and Bernardine Dohrn, or between Gudrun Ensslin and Andreas Baader served as the organizational and intellectual nucleus of these groups.
Risk and status
[edit]Within a radical group, high-risk behavior, if successful, offers a pathway to status insofar as it becomes re-construed as bravery and commitment to the cause. As such, violence or other radical activity provides a pathway to success, social acceptance, and physical rewards that might otherwise be out of reach.
Disproportionate involvement in risk taking and status seeking is particularly true of those young men who come from disadvantaged family backgrounds, have lower IQ levels, are of lower socioeconomic status, and who therefore have less opportunity to succeed in society along a traditional career path. These young men are more likely to be involved in gang activity, violent crime, and other high-risk behavior.[53]
James Pugel conducted a study in which Liberian ex-combatants indicated that their radicalization was motivated by the opportunity to increase their economic and social status within their community. There was a belief that radicalized individuals lived better than non-radicalized individuals. Specifically, extremists groups offered compensatory employment, which provided the means for basic needs to be met such as food and housing. In addition, radicalization provided protection and safety from local violence (i.e. abductions) for their entire family.[54] Other researchers such as Alpaslan Ozerdem and Sukanya Podder contend that radicalization "can become the only route to survival, offering protection from torture, abuse, and politically instigated killing."[55] Furthermore, individuals that do not join radical groups may be subjected to an indefinite "insufferable social burden that included demeaning names and labels".[56]
Unfreezing
[edit]Loss of social connection can open an individual to new ideas and a new identity that may include political radicalization. Isolated from friends, family, or other basic needs, individuals may begin to associate with unlike parties, to include political, religious, or cultural radicals. This is especially noted in prison radicalization, where individuals bind together over racial, religious, and gang identity to a greater degree than in the outside world and often bring their newfound radical identity beyond prison to connect with radical organizations in the populace at large.[57]
Group-level factors
[edit]Insofar as a group is a dynamic system with a common goal or set of values it is possible that the group's mindset as a whole can affect individuals such that those individuals become more radical.
Polarization
[edit]Discussion, interaction, and experience within a radical group can result in an aggregate increase in commitment to the cause, and in some cases can contribute to the formation of divergent conceptions of the group's purpose and preferred tactics. Within a radical group, internal dynamics can contribute to the formation of different factions as a result of internal disillusionment (or, conversely, ambitions) with the group's activities as a whole, especially when it comes to a choice between violent terrorism and nonviolent activism. The Weather Underground's split with Students for a Democratic Society is one of many examples. The dynamics of group polarization imply that members of this larger group must either commit to one faction and demonstrate their loyalty through further radicalization, or leave the group entirely.
Isolation
[edit]Isolation reinforces the influence of radical thinking by allowing serious and or persuasive members of the group to disproportionately define the body's agenda. When an individual only has access to one in-group social environment, that group gains a totalizing influence over the individual—disapproval would be tantamount to social death, personal isolation, and often a lack of access to the basic services that mutual aid communities fulfill. As an isolated minority, Islamic groups in the West are especially vulnerable to this form of radicalization. Being cut off from society at large through language barriers, cultural difference, and occasionally discriminatory treatment, Muslim communities become more vulnerable to additional pathways of radicalization.[58]
One such additional pathway of radicalization of individuals that feel isolated is the Internet. Utilizing data compiled by the Internet World Stats, Robin Thompson contends that the rate of Middle East and North African Internet usage is "above average" in comparison to other countries, yet in countries where Internet availability is more widespread, individuals are "more likely to be recruited and radicalized via the Internet." Hence, the Internet, specifically social media sites such as extremists' chat rooms and blogs, "lures its users with a promise of friendship, acceptance, or a sense of purpose."[59]
Competition
[edit]Groups can become radicalized vis-a-vis other groups as they compete for legitimacy and prestige with the general populace. This pathway emphasizes increased radicalization in an effort to outdo other groups, whether that increase is in violence, time spent in religious ritual, economic and physical hardship endured, or all four. Religious movements and the terrorist elements that form in their name display this characteristic. [citation needed] While in some cases there may be doctrinal or ethnic differences that motivate this kind of competition, its greatest outward sign is an increased demand by the group for commitment to radical actions. [citation needed]
Mass radicalization
[edit]
Jiujitsu politics
[edit]Also called "the logic of political violence", Jiujitsu politics is a form of asymmetrical political warfare in which radical groups act to provoke governments to crack down on the populace at large and produce domestic blowback that legitimates further violent action.[60] The primary purpose of a radical group using this tactic is not to destroy the enemy outright, but to make the enemy strike at political and ideological moderates, such that the existing political order loses its claim on legitimacy while the radical group gains legitimacy.[61] By destroying moderates, radical groups encourage a bifurcated society and use state's reactions to violence as a justification for further violence.[62]
Al-Qaeda's strategy of luring the West, specifically the United States, into ground wars in Islamic states that polarize the Ummah against the West while avoiding engagements that would allow the American military to draw on its technical superiority is an example of jiujitsu politics. David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency advisor to David Petraeus during the Iraq Surge, has called this the "accidental guerrilla syndrome".[63] This tactic is also pillar of Maoist insurgency and serves both the purposes of tactical and ideological advantage.
Hatred
[edit]In protracted conflicts the enemy is increasingly seen as less human,[64] such that their common humanity does not readily trigger natural inhibitions against violence. This involves "essentializing" both the self and enemies as respectively good and evil entities. The Islamist use of Takfirism, or (apostasy), to justify the murder of non-radical Muslims and nonbelievers (kafir: "pagans") is an example of this. Hannah Arendt, in The Origins of Totalitarianism outlines a similar dynamic that contributed to the ideologies of pan-slavism, Nazism, and antisemitism, where an in-group constructs an exalted self identity for political purposes and mobilizes against out-groups in order to solidify that identity.[65] This dynamic of hatred is not unique to rightist groups. The Weather Underground Organization and Red Army Faction often characterized police officers and government officials as "pigs" worthy of death and subhuman treatment.
Martyrdom
[edit]Martyrdom implies that the person in question died for a cause or is willing to die for a cause. The symbolic impact of martyrdom varies across cultures, but within the field of radicalization the act or pursuit of martyrdom denotes the absolute value of a radical's way of life.
Barrett
[edit]Robert Barrett is one of the leading researchers in field research with Nigerian terrorist groups. Barrett contributes a unique perspective to this type of research because his studies are conducted with current, not former, members of insurgent groups. Barrett's 2008 field research study revealed unique typologies and motivations for radicalization as reported by insurgent groups. For instance, individuals that were radicalized expressed sentiments of volunteerism, yet extremist recruiters conveyed that their objective was to make "coercion feel like volunteerism." Barrett asserted that the motivations to become radicalized can be characterized as: ideologue, combatant, criminals, pragmatist, soldier, and follower.[56]
Ideologues
[edit]Ideologues uphold a belief that ethnic supremacy is necessary and violence was the means to achieve this truth. Ideologues maintain a "readiness to die for the ethnic group if necessary; survival and preservation of the group or community is more important than survival or preservation of oneself".
Combatants
[edit]Combatants' express concerns that their basic survival depends on joining extremist groups. Hence, combatants are not motivated by ideologies and their primary objective is self-preservation.
Criminals
[edit]Criminals are predominantly motivated by their "freedom to carry out activities that would otherwise be deemed illegal". As such, criminals thrive on instant self-gratification of engaging in violent acts against their enemies. Criminals thrive on conflict and in a sense believe their actions are heroic.
Pragmatists
[edit]Pragmatists are interested in the benefits of economic and social status mobility. Their goals are in "preserving the structures and environment conducive to either continued success or to newfound success" in wealth, land ownership, and/or mining rights.
Soldiers
[edit]Soldiers believe "injustice and insecurity" are mitigating factors for radicalization. Prominent feelings that they have a duty to fight against injustices. Soldiers are motivated by a sense that they can instrumentally affect positive change. Followers desire a sense of group dependence and attachment to overcome feelings of being an outsider. They are overwhelmingly concerned with social perception. "Ensuring one's acceptance and preserving or enhancing one's social status within the community was the most important factor promoting membership".
Misconceptions
[edit]Poverty
[edit]The association between radicalization and poverty is a myth. Many terrorists come from middle-class backgrounds and have university-level educations, particularly in the technical sciences and engineering.[66] There is no statistical association between poverty and militant radicalization.[67] As outlined above, poverty and disadvantage may incentivize joining a mutual aid organization with radical tendencies, but this does not mean that poverty proper is responsible for radicalization.
Mental illness
[edit]Though personal psychology does play a significant part in radicalization, mental illness is not a root cause of terrorism specifically or ideological radicalization broadly. Even in the case of suicide terrorism, psychological pathologies, such as depression and schizophrenia are largely absent.[68][69] In the case of lone wolf terrorism rather than group terrorism, the case is less clear.[70][71] Compared to the general population, lone wolf terrorists are significantly more likely to have been diagnosed with a mental illness, although it is not an accurate profiler.[71][72] Studies have found that roughly a third of lone wolf terrorists have been diagnosed at some point in their life with a mental illness.[72] This puts lone wolves as being 13.5 times more likely to suffer from a mental illness than a member of an organized terrorist group, such as al-Qaeda or ISIS.[73]
Prevention and de-radicalization
[edit]See also
[edit]- Algorithmic radicalization
- Clandestine cell system
- Cumulative radicalization
- Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States
- Flanderization
- International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence
- Islamic extremism in the United States
- Martyrdom video
- Memory erasure
- Moderation theory
- Nonviolent extremism
- Online youth radicalization
- Radical politics
- Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007
Notes
[edit]- ^ a b Rogelio Alonso; Tore Bjørgo; Donatella della Porta; Rik Coolsaet; Farhad Khosrokhavar; Rüdiger Lohlkar; Magnus Ranstorp; Fernando Reinares; Alex P. Schmid; Andrew Silke; Michael Taarnby; Gijs de Vries (25 April 2006). "Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism. A concise Report prepared by the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation. Brussels" (PDF). Official Journal of the European Union 111/9. L. Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael.
- ^ Borum, Randy. Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories. Journal of Strategic Security. Vol. 4 Issue 4. (2011) pp. 7–36
- ^ a b Schmid, A. P. (2013-03-27). "Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review". The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT). Archived from the original on 2019-12-07. Retrieved 2016-08-31.
{{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires|journal=(help) - ^ McCauley, C., Mosalenko, S. "Mechanisms of political radicalization: Pathways towards terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence (2008). 416
- ^ Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Radicalization: A Guide for the Perplexed. National Security Criminal Investigations. June 2009.
- ^
Berman, Eli (2009). "Why are religious terrorists so lethal?". Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism. MIT Press (published 2011). p. 19. ISBN 9780262258005. Retrieved 18 September 2020.
An objective examination of numerous successful communities of faith reveals that they often stand on two pillars. The first is their ability to meet the spiritual needs of their members [...]. The second pillar is an ability to provide more tangible services, social and economic [...].
- ^ 2006/299/EC: Commission Decision of 19 April 2006 setting up a group of experts to provide policy advice to the Commission on fighting violent radicalisation
- ^ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council concerning terrorist recruitment – Addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation
- ^ Behavioural Science Operational Briefing Note: Understanding radicalisation and violent extremism in the UK. Report BSU 02/2008. Retrieved at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism1
- ^ Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Radicalization: A Guide for the Perplexed (PDF). Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: National Security System (NSS), Public Safety Canada. June 2009. p. 1. Retrieved 29 June 2023.
- ^ PET, “Radikalisering og terror” Center for Terroranalyse (Denmark) October 2009. Available at http://www.pet.dk/upload/radikalisering[permanent dead link] og terror.pdf”
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Alava, Séraphin, Divina Frau-Meigs, and Ghayada Hassan (2017). "Youth and violent extremism on social media: mapping the research". unesdoc.unesco.org. pp. 1–161. Retrieved 2019-05-12.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ Fishman, Shira., et al. UMD START: Community-Level Indicators of Radicalization: A Data and Methods Task Force. 16 February 2010
- ^ Jones, Sam; Wright, Robert (March 23, 2017). "Police probe how family man Khalid Masood became a violent zealot". Financial Times. Retrieved March 24, 2017.
- ^ Wood, Vincent (March 25, 2017). "British Muslim leader says May MUST crack down on prison radicalisation to beat terror". Sunday Express. Retrieved March 26, 2017.
- ^ Kundnani, Arun (2012). "Radicalization: the journey of a concept". Race & Class. 54 (2): 3–25. doi:10.1177/0306396812454984. S2CID 147421959.
- ^ Silva, Derek (2018). "Radicalization: the journey of a concept, revisited". Race & Class. 59 (4): 34–53. doi:10.1177/0306396817750778. S2CID 149001177.
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- ^ "Muslim converts 'vulnerable to Isis radicalisation', research finds". The Independent. Retrieved 2018-06-03.
- ^ "Converts to Islam are likelier to radicalise than native Muslims". The Economist. April 2017. Retrieved 2018-06-03.
- ^ Baker, Abdul Haqq (2011). Extremists in our midst : confronting terror. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 12. ISBN 9780230296541. OCLC 709890472.
- ^ Matenia Sirseloudi, 2012 The Meaning of Religion and Identity for the Violent Radicalisation of the Turkish Diaspora in Germany. Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume 24, 2012 – Issue 5 [1].
- ^ Aubrey, Stefan M. (2004). The New Dimension of International Terrorism. vdf Hochschulverlag AG. p. 45. ISBN 978-3-7281-2949-9.
- ^ Moghadam, Assaf; Eubank, William Lee (2006). The Roots of Terrorism. Infobase Publishing. p. 57. ISBN 978-0-7910-8307-9.
- ^ Lopez, German (18 August 2017). "The radicalization of white Americans". Vox. Retrieved 26 March 2019.
- ^ Greven, Thomas (May 2016), The Rise of Right-wing Populism in Europe and the United States: A Comparative Perspective, Germany: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, p. 9
- ^ Jipson, Art; Becker, Paul J. (20 March 2019). "White nationalism, born in the USA, is now a global terror threat". The Conversation. Retrieved 22 March 2019.
- ^ Weill, Kelly (17 December 2018). "How YouTube Built a Radicalization Machine for the Far-Right". Retrieved 26 March 2019.
- ^ Marwick, Alice; Lewis, Becca (May 18, 2017). "The Online Radicalization We're Not Talking About". Intelligencer. New York Magazine. Retrieved 26 March 2019.
- ^ Extremism and Radicalization Branch, Homeland Environment Threat Analysis Division and the FBI. (7 April 2009). Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment (PDF). Washington, D.C.: US Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Retrieved 26 March 2019.
- ^ "White Supremacists Step Up Off-Campus Propaganda Efforts in 2018". Anti-Defamation League. Retrieved 26 March 2019.
- ^ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (November 2016). Recruitment and Radicalization among US Far-Right Terrorists (PDF). U.S. Department of Homeland Security. pp. 1–4. Retrieved 26 March 2019.
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- ^ Todd, Andrew; Morton, Frances (21 March 2019). "NZ Authorities Have Been Ignoring Online Right-Wing Radicalisation For Years". Vice. Retrieved 26 March 2019.
- ^ Ward, Justin (April 19, 2018). "Day of the trope: White nationalist memes thrive on Reddit's r/The_Donald". Hatewatch. Southern Poverty Law Center. Retrieved 24 March 2019.
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- ^ Cox, Joseph; Koebler, Jason (27 March 2019). "Facebook Bans White Nationalism and White Separatism". Motherboard. Retrieved 27 March 2019.
- ^ Aubrey, pp. 44–45
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During the last two decades, left-wing terrorism has commonly been perceived as a relatively minor phenomenon even if at times predictions have been made about its return. ... During the last two decades left-wing terrorism has been a relatively minor phenomenon in the whole spectrum of terrorism.
- ^ Brockhoff, Krieger, and Meierrieks
- ^ Brockhoff, Krieger and Meierrieks, p. 3
- ^ a b Brockhoff, Krieger and Meierrieks, p. 17
- ^ Brockhoff, Krieger and Meierrieks, p. 18
- ^ Radical, Religious and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism (MIT Press 2009)
- ^ Pape, Robert., Feldman, James. Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It. University of Chicago Press, 2010.
- ^ The Psychology Of Terrorism, audio interview summarizing Special Report: The Psychology of Terrorism
- ^ Ted Cruz: Police need to 'patrol and secure' Muslim neighborhoods
- ^ Post, Jerrold. "Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behavior," in Terrorism: An International Journal Vol. 7 No. 3. 1984
- ^ Della Porta, D. Social movements, political violence, and the state: A comparative analysis of Italy and Germany. Cambridge University Press. 1995
- ^ McCauley, C. Mosalenko, S. Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us. Oxford University press 2009. pp. 62–63
- ^ Pugel, James. "What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-combatants in Liberia: February – March 2006". United Nations Development Programme, 2007.
- ^ Ozerdem, Alpaslan and Sukanya Podder. "Youth Radicalization and Violent Extremism". Journal of Strategic Security, 2011.
- ^ a b Barrett, Robert. "Interviews with Killers: Six Types of Combatants and Their Motivations for Joining Deadly Groups". Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2011
- ^ Fighel, John. "The Radicalization Process in Prisons", International Institute for Counterterrorism. presented at NATO workshop, Eliat, 25 December 2007.
- ^ Vidino, Lorenzo. Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe. United States institute of Peace Special Report, Nov. 2010.
- ^ Thompson, Robin L. "Radicalization and the Use of Social Media". Journal of Strategic Security, 2011.
- ^ McCauley, C. Jiutitsu Politics: Terrorism and response to terrorism. In P.R. Kimmel & Chris Stout (Eds.), Collateral Damage: The psychological consequences of America's War on Terrorism
- ^ Rosebraugh, Craig. The Logic of Political Violence. PW Press. Portland, OR. 2004
- ^ Marighella, C. Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla. J. Butt and R. Sheed (trans.) Havana, Transcontinental Press.
- ^ KilCullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. Oxford University Press. 2008
- ^ Royzman, E.E., McCauley, C., Rozin, P. From Plato to Putnam: Four ways of thinking about hate. In R.J. Sternberg (ed.) The Psychology of Hate pp. 3–35. (2005)
- ^ Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. Schocken Books. 1951.
- ^ "Exploding misconceptions". The Economist. 16 December 2010. Retrieved 7 October 2015.
- ^ Baylouni, A.M. Emotion, Poverty, or Politics? Misconceptions About radical Islamist Movements. Connections III, No. 1, Vol. 4. pp. 41–47 Available at: http://faculty.nps.edu/ambaylou/baylouny%20emotions%20poverty%20politics.PDF
- ^ Pape, Robert. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. Random House. 2005. https://www.amazon.com/Dying-Win-Strategic-Suicide-Terrorism/dp/1400063175
- ^ Pape, Robert A.; Feldman, James K. (2010-10-07). Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 9780226645643.
- ^ Bouhana et al. 2018, p. 114.
- ^ a b Selfert, Kathryn (2015-01-20). "Lone-Wolf Terrorists and Mental Illness". Psychology Today. Retrieved 2021-04-07.
- ^ a b Bouhana, Noémie; Malthaner, Stefan; Schuurman, Bart; Lindekilde, Lasse; Thornton, Amy; Gill, Paul (2018). "Lone-Actor Terrorism: Radicalisation, attack planning and execution". In Silke, Andrew (ed.). Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counterterrorism. New York: Routledge. pp. 112–124. doi:10.4324/9781315744636. ISBN 978-1-315-74463-6.
- ^ Corner, Emily; Gill, Paul (2015). "A False Dichotomy? Mental Illness and Lone-Actor Terrorism". Law and Human Behavior. 39 (1): 23–34. doi:10.1037/lhb0000102. ISSN 0147-7307. PMID 25133916.
Sources
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This article incorporates text from a free content work. Licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 IGO. Text taken from Youth and violent extremism on social media: mapping the research, 1–167, Alava, Séraphin, Divina Frau-Meigs, and Ghayada Hassan, UNESCO. UNESCO Digital Library.
Further reading
[edit]- Alex P. Schmid, Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, 2014) Archived 2019-12-07 at the Wayback Machine
- Bibi van Ginkel, Incitement to Terrorism: A Matter of Prevention or Repression? (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, 2011) Archived 2022-12-07 at the Wayback Machine
- Alava, Séraphin, Divina Frau-Meigs, Ghayda Hassan, Youth and Violent Extremism on Social Media: Mapping the Research (UNESCO Digital Library), 2017.
- Christmann, K. "Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: A Systematic Review of the Research Evidence". Youth Justice Board, UK (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/396030/preventing-violent-extremism-systematic-review.pdf )
Radicalization
View on GrokipediaConceptual Foundations
Definitions and Variations
Radicalization denotes the psychological and social processes through which individuals or groups develop and internalize beliefs, emotions, and behaviors that fundamentally oppose established societal norms, democratic values, and human rights, often asserting the supremacy of a particular racial, religious, political, or ideological group.[1] This conceptualization emphasizes a progression toward extremism, where adherents may justify intergroup violence as a means to address perceived injustices or achieve transformative goals.[1] In counter-terrorism contexts, radicalization is more narrowly framed as the adoption of ideologies that endorse or facilitate violence, including terrorism, for political, ideological, or religious ends, though not all instances culminate in violent acts.[11] Definitional challenges persist across disciplines, with no unified consensus due to conflations between radical beliefs and terrorism; empirical evidence indicates that the vast majority of individuals harboring radical views do not proceed to violent extremism, underscoring that radicalization involves diverse, context-dependent pathways rather than deterministic progression.[5] Scholars critique overly ideological foci in definitions, which may overlook non-ideological drivers such as personal grievances or thrill-seeking, and highlight variability across individuals, groups, and historical settings.[5] Distinctions are drawn between radicalization as a dynamic process and static extremism (mere possession of extreme views without endorsement of violence) or terrorism (actual organized violent acts), with radicalization potentially halting at cognitive shifts without behavioral manifestation.[11][1] Variations in radicalization encompass both typological and processual differences. Typologically, it includes individual-level changes, such as personal disillusionment leading to renunciation of dialogue and embrace of coercion, versus group-based dynamics involving mobilization and frame alignment with extremist networks.[1][5] Processually, models diverge between staged, linear sequences (e.g., cognitive opening via crisis, followed by ideological immersion and action commitment) and non-linear, multifaceted trajectories influenced by factors like perceived injustice, identity uncertainty, or social polarization, with no singular pathway applicable universally.[1][11][5] These variations manifest across ideological domains, such as religious fundamentalism emphasizing divine mandates or political ideologies prioritizing revolutionary upheaval, though empirical studies stress individualized motivations like revenge or status-seeking over uniform ideological determinism.[5]Core Processes and Distinctions from Extremism
Radicalization refers to the dynamic process through which individuals or groups progressively adopt beliefs and commitments that challenge established norms, often involving a shift toward views justifying significant societal or political change, including potentially violence against perceived outgroups.[5] This process is typically modeled in stages, such as Fathali Moghaddam's "staircase to terrorism," which outlines a progression from perceived personal grievances and relative deprivation at the base, through moral disengagement and categorical thinking in middle floors, to moral justification of violence at the top, though empirical validation remains limited due to reliance on case studies rather than large-scale longitudinal data.[4] Other frameworks, like the significance quest theory, emphasize motivational drivers such as the pursuit of personal meaning or identity following life disruptions, leading to ideological immersion that reframes the world in us-versus-them terms and elevates group-based significance over individual autonomy.[8] Empirical reviews indicate that cognitive shifts—such as black-and-white thinking and dehumanization of opponents—correlate with behavioral escalation, but causal pathways vary widely, with no universal predictors identified across datasets from Western contexts.[12] Key processes include social learning via networks, where exposure to radical narratives reinforces echo chambers and normalizes deviance, as seen in analyses of online and offline recruitment patterns among jihadist and far-right groups.[13] Grievance amplification plays a central role, transforming diffuse discontent (e.g., economic marginalization or cultural alienation) into targeted ideological blame, though meta-analyses of risk factors in juveniles reveal weak effect sizes for socioeconomic variables alone, underscoring the necessity of ideological fit and personal agency.[9] Behavioral markers emerge as individuals engage in preparatory acts, such as consuming propaganda or joining affinity groups, but longitudinal studies highlight reversibility at early stages, with deradicalization often occurring through disillusionment or competing significance sources rather than external intervention.[14] These processes are not linear; empirical evidence from U.S. cases post-9/11 shows abrupt shifts in some instances, driven by charismatic influencers or trigger events, rather than gradual escalation.[15] Distinctions from extremism lie in radicalization's emphasis on transformation over static ideology: while extremism denotes entrenched adherence to views advocating fundamental upheaval, often with implicit sanction of coercive methods, radicalization describes the trajectory toward such positions without presupposing violence.[16] Academic sources differentiate non-violent radicalism—challenging status quo through protest or discourse—from extremism's frequent endorsement of intergroup harm, as evidenced by comparative studies where only a minority of radicalized individuals (estimated at 1-5% in Islamist samples) progress to violent acts.[3] This separation critiques deterministic models equating radical beliefs with inevitable extremism, as data from deradicalization programs indicate that ideological extremism can persist post-violence disavowal, prioritizing causal realism in interventions over blanket de-radicalization.[8] Sources attributing radicalization primarily to systemic oppression often overlook empirical counterexamples, such as affluent or integrated individuals radicalizing via ideological appeal, revealing biases in academia toward environmental determinism over volitional choice.[17]Historical Development
Pre-20th Century Precursors
The concept of radicalization, involving the progressive adoption of extreme beliefs that justify violence against perceived enemies, finds precursors in ancient and medieval movements where ideological fervor, often religious, intensified grievances into organized extremism. These historical cases illustrate causal mechanisms such as apocalyptic expectations, purity doctrines, and targeted violence against collaborators or rulers, predating modern terrorism by centuries.[18] In the 1st century CE, the Sicarii, a radical faction of Jewish Zealots, exemplified early radicalization through stealth assassinations of Roman officials and Jewish collaborators deemed insufficiently zealous against occupation. Emerging amid escalating Roman taxation and cultural impositions after 6 CE, the Sicarii used short daggers (sicae) for public stabbings during festivals, sowing terror to enforce ideological conformity and spark revolt. This process escalated into the First Jewish-Roman War (66–73 CE), culminating in the siege of Jerusalem and the mass suicide at Masada in 73 CE, where nearly 1,000 Sicarii chose death over surrender. Their actions stemmed from a theocratic commitment to divine sovereignty over human rule, rejecting compromise as apostasy.[19][20][18] Medieval Islamic sects like the Kharijites in the 7th century CE and the Nizari Ismaili Assassins (Hashashin) from the 11th to 13th centuries further demonstrate precursor dynamics. The Kharijites, originating from a 657 CE schism over caliphal succession, radicalized by declaring major Muslim leaders apostates for tolerating sin, leading to the assassination of Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib and waves of puritanical killings. Their doctrine of takfir—excommunicating and executing perceived hypocrites—fueled guerrilla warfare until their near-eradication by 700 CE. Similarly, under Hasan-i Sabbah from 1090 CE, the Hashashin established fortified enclaves in Persia and Syria, dispatching fida'is (devoted agents) for precise assassinations of Sunni leaders like Nizam al-Mulk in 1092 CE, aiming to destabilize rivals through psychological fear rather than conquest. Recruits underwent intense indoctrination, often involving isolation and promises of paradise, mirroring later radical commitment tactics. These groups persisted until Mongol invasions dismantled their strongholds by 1275 CE.[18][21][22] During the Protestant Reformation, Anabaptist radicals in Münster, Germany, underwent rapid ideological escalation in 1534–1535 CE, transforming pacifist beliefs into violent millenarianism. Influenced by apocalyptic prophecies of Melchior Hoffman, who predicted Christ's return in 1533, followers seized the city, expelled non-believers, abolished money, and instituted communal property under prophet Jan van Leiden, who declared himself king and enforced polygamy as divine mandate. Radicalization involved mass baptisms, prophetic visions, and armed defense against sieges, resulting in over 2,000 deaths when forces recaptured Münster in June 1535, executing leaders publicly. This episode highlights group reinforcement of extremism, where initial dissent against Catholic and Lutheran authorities evolved into coercive theocracy, discrediting broader Anabaptism.[23][24][25]Emergence in Modern Counter-Terrorism Discourse
The concept of radicalization entered modern counter-terrorism discourse in the early 2000s, primarily as a framework to explain the emergence of homegrown jihadist terrorism in Western countries following the September 11, 2001 attacks. Prior to this, terrorism analyses emphasized state sponsorship, organizational recruitment, or psychological pathologies among perpetrators, with less focus on individual ideological transformation processes. The shift was driven by incidents such as the 2004 Madrid train bombings and the 2005 London bombings, which highlighted perpetrators radicalized within Europe rather than trained abroad, prompting security agencies to conceptualize radicalization as a dynamic pathway from grievance to violent extremism.[26][27] In the Netherlands, Dutch intelligence services produced some of the earliest post-9/11 reports framing radicalization as a process among Muslim diaspora communities, linking personal disillusionment, ideological indoctrination, and group reinforcement to potential jihadist mobilization. This approach influenced European policy, culminating in the European Commission's 2008 report by the Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, which defined radicalization as processes leading to terrorism and advocated multifaceted prevention strategies. Concurrently, in the United States, the New York Police Department's 2007 report, "Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat," formalized a staged model—pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, and jihadization—based on case studies of Western jihadist plots, emphasizing Salafi-jihadist ideology as the core driver.[28][26][29] The United Kingdom's Prevent strategy, initially launched in 2003 as part of the broader counter-terrorism framework, evolved by 2006-2007 to incorporate radicalization explicitly, funding community interventions to disrupt ideological pathways among at-risk youth, with over £80 million allocated from 2005 to 2011 for jihadist prevention projects. This period marked radicalization's integration into official doctrines, influencing NATO and UN frameworks by the late 2000s, though critiques later emerged questioning the models' linearity and overemphasis on ideology versus empirical predictors of violence. Despite such debates, the discourse prioritized causal processes like ideological appeal and social networks over deterministic socio-economic factors, reflecting a pragmatic response to rising homegrown threats.[30][11][31]Causal Mechanisms
Ideological Drivers and First-Principles Appeal
Ideological drivers of radicalization center on the adoption of belief systems that frame societal or personal grievances as manifestations of profound moral or existential threats, necessitating transformative action. These ideologies gain traction by offering narratives that simplify complex realities into causal chains rooted in perceived betrayals of core human imperatives, such as survival, dignity, and reciprocity. Empirical analyses identify "pull factors" like the allure of agency and purpose, where individuals perceive mainstream institutions as failing to address root causes like inequality or cultural erosion, thus elevating extremist doctrines as logically superior alternatives.[32][33] From foundational human tendencies—tribalism, status-seeking, and aversion to uncertainty—these ideologies appeal by positing hierarchical or utopian orders that restore perceived natural equilibria. For instance, doctrines emphasizing ingroup supremacy or divine mandates resonate because they align with innate preferences for clear authority structures amid anomie, as evidenced in studies of significance loss, where existential voids prompt adherence to rigid worldviews promising heroism and transcendence.[34] Psychological mechanisms, including identity fusion with the group and moral disengagement from conventional norms, amplify this draw by framing violence as a principled defense of sacred values, overriding utilitarian calculations.[33] Such appeals are not uniform but exploit universal drivers like retaliation against perceived oppressors, with data from offender biographies showing consistent patterns across ideologies in deriving legitimacy from first-order claims of justice or purity.[35] Causal realism underscores that ideological radicalization thrives where doctrines accurately diagnose certain empirical realities—such as power imbalances or demographic shifts—while prescribing disproportionate remedies, thereby attracting those disillusioned by incrementalism. Research on pathways to extremism highlights emotional mechanisms like outrage amplification, where ideologies provide causal narratives attributing woes to conspiratorial outgroups, fostering a sense of enlightened realism over pluralistic ambiguity.[36] This first-principles logic, grounded in reciprocity and threat response, explains persistence despite counter-evidence, as believers interpret setbacks as validations of their worldview's adversarial purity. Peer-reviewed reviews confirm that while not all radical beliefs lead to violence, the ideological core lies in their capacity to reframe self-interest as cosmic duty, drawing in individuals via cognitive shortcuts that prioritize coherence over empirical falsification.[5][12]Individual Agency and Psychological Motivations
Individual agency plays a central role in radicalization, as individuals actively interpret personal experiences, evaluate ideological narratives, and choose pathways toward extremism rather than being passively determined by external forces. Empirical analyses of terrorist biographies reveal that radicalization trajectories involve deliberate engagement with radical content, often triggered by self-perceived humiliations or status losses, where actors exercise choice in aligning with groups offering restorative significance.[35][37] This contrasts with deterministic models emphasizing solely socioeconomic or social pressures, as most individuals facing similar conditions do not radicalize, underscoring the primacy of personal volition.[33] A key psychological motivation is the "quest for significance," wherein individuals seek to affirm personal value and purpose amid perceived threats to self-esteem, such as failure, exclusion, or moral injury. Arie Kruglanski's model posits that radical ideologies provide a narrative of heroic struggle and collective glory, motivating action when mainstream avenues fail to deliver meaning; empirical tests on domestic radicals, including case studies of U.S. offenders, confirm that this quest correlates with violent extremism, independent of ideology.[37][38] Supporting evidence from interviews and profiles shows radicals often exhibit high needs for cognitive closure and certainty, driving rejection of nuanced worldviews in favor of binary, absolutist framings that justify violence as righteous.[33][39] Personality factors further highlight agency, with traits like dogmatism, authoritarian submission, and sensation-seeking amplifying susceptibility, though no singular profile predicts radicalization. Meta-reviews of risk factors indicate that while social exclusion or grievances can initiate quests for identity, individual differences in resilience and moral disengagement determine progression to extremism; for instance, studies of jihadist offenders find normal psychological functioning in most, rejecting pathology as causal.[9][39] Thrill-seeking and moral outrage also motivate, as radicals frame actions as existential necessities, exercising agency in escalating from belief to behavior.[12] This process unfolds in stages—pre-radical thinking, self-identification, and indoctrination—each requiring active commitment, as seen in longitudinal data on homegrown terrorists.[35][40] Critiques of overemphasizing group or environmental determinism arise from evidence that individual narratives often precede network involvement, with agency evident in disengagement when personal costs outweigh perceived gains. Peer-reviewed syntheses caution against conflating correlation with causation in factors like trauma, noting that resilient individuals resist radical appeals through self-directed reevaluation.[5][33] Thus, psychological models prioritizing agency, such as the 3N framework (need, narrative, network), empirically outperform those ignoring volition, as validated in datasets of over 100 radicalized actors.[41][37]Group Dynamics and Social Influences
Radicalization processes are markedly shaped by social networks, which facilitate the transmission of extremist ideologies through personal ties rather than isolated ideation. Empirical analyses of U.S. cases reveal that 47% of 135 al-Qa'ida-inspired offenders followed a pathway involving pre-radicalization detachment, immersion in offline peer groups, and subsequent pursuit of violent action, underscoring peer networks as a pivotal mechanism for ideological reinforcement.[15] Similarly, 42% of extremists across ideologies radicalized via cliques, where friends exerted greater influence than family or romantic partners in endorsing violent norms.[15] Marc Sageman's examination of 172 global Salafi jihadists emphasizes that social bonds among acquaintances—often formed in diaspora settings—propel ordinary individuals toward militancy, independent of socioeconomic deprivation or psychological deviance.[42] Group dynamics amplify these influences through mechanisms of conformity and in-group cohesion, where members align behaviors to maintain status and solidarity. Studies of domestic extremism indicate that immersion in small, ideologically homogeneous networks fosters echo-like reinforcement, with group meetings correlating positively with terrorist incidents and legal charges due to crystallized frames justifying violence.[15] Peer pressure manifests in reluctance to dissent, as observed in jihadist clusters where shared grievances evolve into collective commitment; for instance, cliques provide emotional support that overrides external deterrents, heightening the appeal of action-oriented roles.[15] Social identity theory elucidates this, positing that extremist groups exploit needs for belonging by framing out-groups as existential threats, thereby elevating in-group loyalty—evident in analyses of both jihadist and far-right formations where conformity sustains participation despite personal costs.[43][44] Social isolation from non-extremist circles further entrenches these dynamics, as detachment reduces countervailing influences and intensifies immersion. National Institute of Justice research across ideologies shows that unemployment, criminal histories, or familial non-intervention compound this isolation, with small extremist networks (versus larger ones) associating with elevated violence probabilities due to unchecked escalation and lack of internal specialization.[2] Even purported "lone actors" exhibit latent social underpinnings, with 67% of post-9/11 cases enabled by indirect network support, challenging notions of pure autonomy.[15] However, peers also enable disengagement in roughly one-third of cases, particularly when personal ties introduce doubt, highlighting the bidirectional nature of social leverage—though full deradicalization remains rare, occurring in under 33% of documented trajectories.[2] These patterns hold variably by ideology, with jihadist pathways leaning on kinship-like bonds and right-wing ones blending offline cells with virtual affinity, yet consistently prioritizing relational over doctrinal drivers in initial mobilization.[2][15]Empirical Rejections of Deterministic Factors
Empirical analyses of terrorist perpetrators consistently demonstrate that socioeconomic deprivation, such as poverty or unemployment, does not deterministically predict radicalization or participation in violence. A seminal study by economists Alan Krueger and Jitka Malečková examined data on Hezbollah militants and Palestinian suicide bombers, finding no evidence that lower income or education levels increased the likelihood of involvement; instead, attackers often possessed above-average education compared to their peers, suggesting that opportunity costs and personal agency, rather than desperation, play larger roles.[45] Similarly, cross-national datasets on global terrorism incidents reveal that poverty levels explain little variance in attack frequency, as high-poverty regions do not proportionally produce more terrorists relative to lower-poverty ones.[46] Data from jihadist groups further undermine deterministic socioeconomic models. An analysis of over 3,000 leaked Islamic State recruitment records showed that foreign fighters were disproportionately from middle- or upper-income backgrounds, with many holding college degrees or professional jobs; low education or unemployment was not a distinguishing factor compared to non-recruited populations in the same countries. European jihadist networks exhibit comparable patterns, where recruits often come from stable families rather than marginalized underclasses, challenging narratives that attribute radicalization primarily to economic exclusion.[47] Personal trauma or adverse childhood experiences also fail as deterministic predictors, as their prevalence among radicals mirrors or undercuts general population rates without compelling causation. Psychological profiles of convicted terrorists indicate no elevated incidence of post-traumatic stress disorder or severe mental illness sufficient to explain violent acts; for instance, assessments of lone-actor extremists reveal that while some report trauma, the majority function normally absent ideological commitment, and vast numbers of trauma survivors never radicalize.[48] Longitudinal studies of at-risk youth confirm that trauma correlates weakly with radical outcomes when controlling for ideological exposure and social networks, underscoring that such factors amplify but do not inexorably drive radicalization.[9] These findings extend beyond Islamist cases to other ideologies, where right-wing radicals, for example, frequently emerge from educated, employed demographics rather than uniformly deprived ones, rejecting blanket deterministic causal chains.[5] Overall, the empirical record highlights radicalization's contingency on volitional elements like belief adoption, rendering deterministic framings—prevalent in some policy discourses despite contrary data—inadequate for explaining why only a minuscule fraction of those facing hardships radicalize.[49]Forms and Manifestations
Islamist Radicalization Pathways
Islamist radicalization pathways typically involve a progression from initial exposure to Salafi-jihadist ideology to the acceptance of violence as a religious duty, often observed in empirical analyses of convicted homegrown jihadists in Western contexts.[35] Studies of American offenders since 2001, drawn from 135 biographies, identify a common sequence: a pre-radicalization phase of relative normalcy, followed by cognitive openings triggered by personal crises or disillusionment, leading to self-identification with extremist interpretations of Islam.[35] In 42.2% of cases, disillusionment with mainstream society or personal life served as an initial trigger, while 27.4% involved acute crises, though these do not deterministically cause radicalization, as similar experiences affect millions without leading to extremism.[35][50] A key pathway is ideological seeking, where individuals actively pursue Salafi-jihadist narratives that frame global conflicts as a cosmic struggle requiring defensive jihad. This often begins with online exposure to preachers like Anwar al-Awlaki or materials from al-Qaeda, accelerating post-2010 with ISIS propaganda, reducing median radicalization time from 15 months pre-2010 to 6.25 months afterward in U.S. cases.[35] Empirical syntheses of European and U.S. data emphasize ideology's causal role in justifying violence, with 93% of 83 U.S. jihadist cases involving social ties for ideological absorption rather than isolated self-radicalization.[50] Networks—preexisting friendships, family, or prison contacts—facilitate this, with peer immersion appearing in 97% of American trajectories, often preceding expressions of intent to act (96.5%).[35] Converts and women radicalize faster, averaging 4 months, highlighting variability but a consistent pattern of group reinforcement over solitary paths.[35] Further progression occurs through indoctrination, where small clusters withdraw from mainstream mosques to study jihadist texts, politicizing faith into calls for takfir (declaring Muslims apostates) and violence against perceived enemies. Case studies of plots like the 2005 London bombings and 2004 Madrid attacks illustrate this: bombers transitioned from ordinary lives to Salafi study circles, adopting beards, traditional attire, and anti-Western views before operational planning.[29] Enabling environments, such as the internet or travel to training camps, support this phase, but data reject socioeconomic determinism—most Western jihadists are middle-class, educated second-generation immigrants or converts, not marginalized poor.[50][29] The final pathway to action, termed jihadization, involves operational commitment, including domestic training (46% of U.S. cases) or travel abroad, with groups coalescing around shared duty to violence. Overall timelines average 38 months, underscoring deliberate agency rather than impulsive response, though post-ISIS online dynamics shortened this for some.[35] Critiques of grievance-only models note their failure to explain why only a minuscule fraction (thousands out of 15-20 million European Muslims) radicalize, privileging ideology's appeal in providing purpose and moral clarity.[50] Pathways vary by context—prisons for some, universities for others—but consistently hinge on interpreting Islam through a lens that sanctifies terrorism as fard ayn (individual obligation).[29]Right-Wing Radicalization Characteristics
Right-wing radicalization typically centers on ideologies that emphasize ethno-nationalism, racial hierarchy, and opposition to perceived threats from immigration, multiculturalism, and progressive social changes. Core beliefs often include the notion of white demographic replacement or cultural erosion, framed as existential dangers justifying defensive violence, as seen in manifestos from perpetrators like the 2019 Christchurch shooter who cited "great replacement" theory.[51] These ideologies draw from historical narratives of national purity and anti-globalism, with subvariants such as neo-Nazism promoting Aryan supremacy and accelerationism seeking to hasten societal breakdown for ethno-state formation. Empirical analyses of U.S. cases indicate that such views radicalize individuals through a combination of personal grievances and reinforcing propaganda, rather than strict doctrinal adherence typical in religious extremisms.[52][53] Demographic profiles of right-wing radicals, drawn from datasets like the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS), show a predominance of white males, with over 90% identifying as such in violent cohorts. Perpetrators average around 36 years old at the time of radicalization or attack, younger than Islamist counterparts (mean 39) but older than left-wing extremists (mean 29), and are overwhelmingly U.S.-born (94% in sampled cases). Many exhibit prior non-ideological criminal involvement or mental health challenges, though these are not deterministic; stable employment and education levels vary widely, countering narratives of uniform socioeconomic deprivation. Military or law enforcement backgrounds appear in approximately 20-25% of mass-casualty right-wing offenders, providing tactical skills that enhance attack lethality.[51][54][55] Operationally, right-wing radicalization manifests in decentralized structures, favoring lone actors or small, leaderless cells over hierarchical groups, which enables quick escalation but constrains coordinated large-scale operations. From 1994 to 2020, right-wing incidents accounted for 57% of U.S. terrorist attacks and plots, often involving low-tech methods like firearms or vehicles targeting individuals or symbols of authority, with fatalities concentrated in sporadic high-impact events rather than sustained campaigns. Unlike Islamist pathways, radicalization accelerates via online echo chambers and personal networks, with empirical rejection of over-reliance on deterministic triggers like poverty; instead, agency-driven identity affirmation amid perceived status loss plays a causal role. Studies note higher violence propensity among right-wing radicals compared to left-wing (with attack rates 0.33 vs. 0.62 planning-to-attack ratio), though mainstream academic emphases may inflate threats relative to understudied alternatives due to institutional biases.[52][51][56]Left-Wing Radicalization Patterns
Left-wing radicalization pathways frequently originate in environments emphasizing systemic critiques of capitalism, hierarchy, and authority, evolving from non-violent activism into endorsement of disruptive tactics justified as necessary for societal transformation. Empirical data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) highlight that left-wing incidents since 2000 predominantly involve property damage, vandalism, and assaults on symbols of power, such as police stations or corporate targets, rather than indiscriminate mass killings.[57] For instance, anarchist and anti-fascist groups like those associated with Antifa have engaged in sustained urban confrontations, including the 2020 protests where over 2,000 officers reported injuries and damages exceeded $1-2 billion across U.S. cities, per Department of Justice assessments.[58] Demographic patterns reveal a skew toward younger, urban, and often college-educated individuals, with radicalization accelerating through campus networks and mutual aid collectives that frame violence as defensive against perceived fascism or inequality. A George Washington University Program on Extremism analysis of anarchist-left-wing violent extremism notes decentralized structures enabling "leaderless resistance," where small affinity groups coordinate via encrypted apps for actions like arson against infrastructure, as seen in Earth Liberation Front (ELF) campaigns from 1995-2001 that caused $43 million in damages without fatalities.[59] Psychological research indicates left-wing extremists exhibit elevated negative emotions, moral certainty in egalitarian narratives, and lower positive affect compared to moderates, with language analyses of online discourse showing heightened anxiety tied to anti-hierarchical ideologies.[60][61] Trends from 2016-2025 show a resurgence, with CSIS reporting 25 left-wing attacks in 2020 alone—surpassing right-wing figures that year—often linked to anti-police or anti-capitalist mobilizations, though lethality remains low (fewer than 1% fatal versus 20-30% for Islamist cases).[58] This contrasts with historical 1970s New Left groups like the Weather Underground, whose 25 bombings targeted government sites but avoided casualties through warnings, reflecting a pattern of "propaganda of the deed" prioritizing ideological demonstration over body counts.[62] Institutional underreporting in media and academia, which have historically minimized left-wing threats relative to others, may obscure these patterns, as evidenced by FBI shifts post-9/11 prioritizing Islamist over domestic leftist risks until recent reassessments.[63]Comparative Data on Violence Outcomes
In the United States from 1994 to May 2020, data from 893 terrorist attacks and plots indicate that right-wing extremism accounted for 57% of incidents and 335 fatalities, left-wing extremism for 25% of incidents and 22 fatalities, and religious extremism (predominantly Salafi-jihadist, associated with Islamist radicalization) for 15% of incidents but 3,086 fatalities, largely driven by the September 11, 2001, attacks.[52] Excluding the 9/11 outlier, jihadist fatalities drop significantly, with right-wing attacks causing deaths in 14 of 21 years featuring fatalities, often through targeted shootings against individuals or minorities.[52] A separate analysis of 1,563 extremists from 1948 to 2018 found left-wing individuals 68% less likely to commit violent acts (probability 0.33) compared to right-wing (0.61) or Islamist (0.62) counterparts, with no significant difference in violence propensity between the latter two in the U.S. context.[61] Globally, using the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) for 71,979 attacks from 1970 to 2017, Islamist attacks showed a 131% higher odds of producing fatalities (probability 0.55) than right-wing attacks (0.35), while left-wing attacks had 45% lower odds (probability 0.23).[61] The 2024 Global Terrorism Index reported Islamic State affiliates responsible for 1,805 deaths across 22 countries, comprising a substantial share of the 6,701 total terrorism deaths worldwide, with far-right and far-left ideologies contributing negligibly to global tallies in recent years.[64] These patterns suggest Islamist radicalization correlates with higher per-incident lethality, particularly through coordinated or suicide operations, whereas right-wing violence in Western settings often involves lone-actor shootings with moderate casualty counts, and left-wing actions prioritize property damage over human targets.[61][52]| Ideology | U.S. Incidents Share (1994–2020) | U.S. Fatalities (1994–2020) | Global Fatality Probability (1970–2017) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Left-Wing | 25% | 22 | 0.23 |
| Right-Wing | 57% | 335 | 0.35 |
| Islamist | 15% (religious total) | 3,086 (incl. 9/11) | 0.55 |
