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Permanent Structured Cooperation
Permanent Structured Cooperation
Permanent Structured Cooperation
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The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is the part of the European Union (EU) its security and defence policy (CSDP) in which 26 of the 27 national armed forces pursue structural integration (the exception being Malta). Based on Article 42(6) and Protocol 10 of the Treaty on the European Union, introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, PESCO was initiated in 2017.[1] The integration into PESCO is through projects which launched in 2018.[2]

Key Information

Together with the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the European Defence Fund and the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) it forms a comprehensive defence package for the EU.[1]

PESCO is similar to enhanced co-operation in other policy areas, in the sense that integration does not require participation of all EU member states.

History

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Pre-activation

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In 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon (signing depicted) entered into force, enabling permanent structured cooperation in defence between a subset of willing member states.

PESCO was first written into the European Constitution under Article III-312, which failed ratification, and then into the Treaty of Lisbon of 2009. It added the possibility for those members whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) within the EU framework. PESCO was seen as the way to enable the common defence foreseen in Article 42, but the scepticism towards further integration that had arisen around the rejection of the European Constitution meant its activation was unlikely. It was termed, by President Jean-Claude Juncker, the Lisbon Treaty's "sleeping beauty".[3][4]

In the 2010s, the geopolitical landscape around the EU began to change, triggering a series of crises. The Libyan Civil War, the Syrian Civil War and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant caused the European migrant crisis. Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, annexing Crimea and triggering an ongoing conflict in the country over the Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement. In 2016, Donald Trump, who was elected as President of the United States, was critical of NATO allies, even refusing on several occasions to back the mutual defence clause; and the United Kingdom, one of the EU's two largest military powers, voted in a referendum to withdraw from the EU.[4][5]

This new environment, while very different from the one PESCO was designed for, gave new impetus to European defence cooperation. The withdrawal of the UK, historically an opponent of that cooperation, gave further hope of success. At a rally in Bavaria, Angela Merkel argued that: “The times in which we could completely depend on others are, to a certain extent, over ... I’ve experienced that in the last few days. We Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands.” In late 2016, the EU put defence co-operation on its post-Brexit Bratislava and Rome declarations.[4][5]

There was some disagreement between France and Germany about the nature of PESCO. France foresaw a small but ambitious group with serious capabilities making major practical leaps forward; while Germany, weary of further divisions in the EU, wanted a more inclusive approach that could potentially include all states, regardless of their military capability or willingness to integrate. Further, for Germany, it was about building capabilities and giving a post-Brexit signal of unity, whereas France was focused on operations and looking for help for its overstretched African deployments. Their compromise was to re-imagine PESCO as a process. PESCO would be inclusive, but not all states had to take part in all projects and progress would be phased allowing the development of new, common capabilities without having to resolve larger differences on end-goals first. Further, states would not need to already have capabilities, but merely pledge to work towards them. This allowed France's idea of improving military capabilities without shutting out states who did not already attain the threshold.[6][7]

Activation

[edit]
On 13 November 2017, Foreign and Defence Ministers from 23 EU states signed the Joint notification on setting up PESCO in a Foreign Affairs Council chaired by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Federica Mogherini.

On 7 September 2017, an agreement was made between EU foreign affairs ministers to move forward with PESCO with 10 initial projects.[8][9][1][10] The agreement was signed on 13 November by 23 of the 28 member states. Ireland and Portugal notified the High Representative and the Council of the European Union of their desire to join PESCO on 7 December 2017[11] and PESCO was activated by the 25 states on 11 December 2017 with the approval of a Council Decision.[12][13] Denmark did not participate as (prior to its abolition in July 2022) it had an opt-out from the Common Security and Defence Policy, nor did the United Kingdom, which withdrew from the EU in 2020.[14][15] Malta opted out as well, due to concerns it might conflict with its neutrality.[16][17] As per Article 46 of the TEU, non-participating EU member states can request to join by notifying the Council, which will approve based on a qualified majority of participating member states.

Principles

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Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article 46. It shall not affect the provisions of Article 43.

— Article 42.6 of Treaty on European Union

Those states shall notify their intention to the Council and to the High Representative. The Council then adopts, by qualified majority a decision establishing PESCO and determining the list of participating Member States. Any other member state that fulfills the criteria and wishes to participate can join the PESCO following the same procedure, but in the voting for the decision only the states already part of the PESCO will participate. If a participating state no longer fulfills the criteria a decision suspending its participation is taken by the same procedure as for accepting new participants, but excluding the concerned state from the voting procedure. If a participating state wishes to withdraw from PESCO it just notifies the Council to remove it from the list of participants. All other decisions and recommendations of the Council concerning PESCO issues unrelated to the list of participants require a unanimous vote of the participating states.[3]

The criteria established in the PESCO Protocol are the following:[3]

Participating armed forces

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The following member states have announced their intention of participating in PESCO:

As per Article 46 of the TEU, the following non-participating EU member states can request to join by notifying the Council, which will approve based on a qualified majority of participating member states:

Denmark

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Denmark Denmark originally had an opt-out from participating in the common defence policy. However, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Danish parliament adopted a proposal in favour of the country participating in the Common Security and Defence Policy, including the European Defence Agency and PESCO, on 8 April 2022.[19] Danish voters approved ending the opt-out in a 1 June 2022 referendum,[20] which became effective 1 July.[21] Subsequently the country proceeded to consider participating in PESCO,[22] which was approved by Parliament in March 2023.[23][24] The Council of the EU approved Denmark joining PESCO on 23 May 2023.[25][26][27]

Non-EU participants

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Since November 2020, third countries can also participate in PESCO.

Canada, Norway and the United States

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Canada, Norway, and the United States participate in the project to improve military mobility in Europe.[28]

Turkey

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In May 2021, Turkey applied to participate in the military mobility project, but this was opposed by Austria in addition to the existing tensions with Greece and Cyprus.[29][30] In June 2022, Finland and Sweden committed to "support the fullest possible involvement of Turkey and other non-EU Allies in the existing and prospective initiatives of the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy, including Turkey's participation in the PESCO Project on Military Mobility" in a trilateral memorandum agreed to at the 2022 Madrid summit to facilitate Turkey's ratification of Finland and Sweden's NATO membership application.[31][32]

United Kingdom

[edit]

On 6 October 2022, at the 1st European Political Community Summit, British Prime Minister Liz Truss committed the United Kingdom to joining PESCO and its military mobility project.[33][34][35] On 15 November 2022, the Council of the EU invited the UK to participate in the Military Mobility project.[36]

Switzerland

[edit]

In 2025, Council of the EU invited invited Switzerland to join the military mobility project.[37] An opinion poll conducted two months after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine showed support for the country joining PESCO.[38]

Neutral states

[edit]

PESCO includes two of the three EU states that describe themselves as neutral (Austria and Ireland), and is designed to be as inclusive as possible by allowing states to opt in or out as their unique foreign policies allow. Some members of the Irish Parliament considered Ireland joining PESCO as an abandonment of neutrality. The measure was passed, with the government arguing that its opt-in nature allowed Ireland to "join elements of PESCO that were beneficial such as counter-terrorism, cyber security and peace keeping ... what we are not going to be doing is buying aircraft carriers and fighter jets."[39] While critics of Ireland's participation point to the commitment to increase defence spending, the government has made clear that the 2% commitment is collective, and not for each state individually. The Irish government has made clear that any defence spending increase by Ireland would be minor.[40] Malta, the only neutral state not to participate, argued that it was going to wait and see how PESCO develops, in order to see whether it would compromise Maltese neutrality.[18]

NATO

[edit]

While PESCO was formed in part due to doubts over the United States' commitment to NATO,[3] officials stress that PESCO will be complementary to NATO security rather than in competition with it. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg also highlighted how Military Mobility is a key example of NATO and EU co-operation.[41][42]

Criticism and lobbying by the United States

[edit]

The United States has voiced concerns and published 'warnings' about PESCO several times, which many analysts believe to be a sign that the United States fears a loss of influence in Europe, as a militarily self-sufficient EU would make NATO increasingly irrelevant.[43][44][45][46] Alongside better military cooperation, PESCO also seeks to enhance the defence industry of member states and create jobs within the EU, which several US politicians have criticised over fears of losing revenue from EU states (on average, the United States sells over €1 billion in weapons to EU countries per year).[47][44][48] According to Françoise Grossetête, a member of the European Parliament from 1994 to 2019, the US is lobbying strongly against increased military cooperation between EU member states, going as far as to directly invite MEPs to 'private dinners' to try to convince them to vote against any directives or laws that would seek to strengthen military cooperation within the EU.[49]

Despite opposition to PESCO, the United States expressed its desire to participate in the Military Mobility project in 2021.[50] European analysts[who?] have suggested that this might pose an attempt to undermine an independent European defence policy from within.[51][52]

In 2025, Hungary has expressed skepticism toward PESCO initiatives, favoring bilateral defense procurements and national industrial development.[53] The Hungarian government's 2025 strategy emphasized maintaining autonomous defense capabilities through programs such as Zrínyi 2026,[54] which aims to reduce reliance on supranational EU military structures.

Governance

[edit]

The European Defence Agency and European External Action Service act as PESCO's secretariat.[55] The projects are incentivised by the European Commission’s European Defence Fund. There is a two-layer governance structure:

Council level
Responsible for the overall policy direction and decision-making including as regards the assessment mechanism to determine if Member States are fulfilling their commitments. Only PESCO members are voting, decisions are taken by unanimity (except decisions regarding the suspension of membership and entry of new members which are taken by qualified majority).
Projects level
Each project will be managed by those member states that contribute to it, in line with general rules for project management to be developed at overarching level.

List of projects

[edit]

The first PESCO projects started with a list of 50 ideas and was whittled down to provide a short list of small-scale projects. Major armament projects are intended in the future (EU forces use 178 different weapon systems compared to 30 in the US), but initially PESCO is to be focused on smaller operations to lay groundwork.[7]

PESCO projects as of February, 2021 and participating countries by category:[56][57]

Air - Systems

[edit]
Project Name Abbr Coordinator Project members Project observer
European MALE RPAS EURODRONE Germany Germany
European attack helicopter TIGER MARK III  France
Counter Unmanned Aerial System C-UAS  Italy
Airborne Electronic Attack AEA  Spain
Integrated Multi-layer Air and Missile Defense System IMLAMD  Italy
Future Short-Range air-to-air Missile FSRM  Germany
Next Generation Medium Helicopter NGMH  France

Cyber - C4ISR

[edit]
Project name Abbr. Coordinator Project members Project observer
European Secure Software-defined Radio ESSOR  France
Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform CTIRISP  Greece
Cyber Rapid Response Teams CRRT  Lithuania
The Strategic Command and Control System for CSDP Missions ESC2  Spain
European High Atmosphere Airship Platform - ISR Capability EHAAP  Italy
SOCC for Small Joint Operations with Special Operations Forces Tactical Command and

Control capabilities

SOCC FOR SJO  Greece
Electronic Warfare Capability/Interoperability Programmer for future ISR JISR  Czech Republic
Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Center CIDCC  Germany

Enabling - Joint

[edit]
Project name Abbr. Coordinator Project members Project observer
European Medical Command EMC  Germany
Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and support to operations NetLogHubs  Germany
Military Mobility MM  Netherlands
Energy Operation Function EOF  France
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Surveillance as a Service CBRN SaaS  Austria
Geo-Meteorological and Oceanographic Support Coordination Element GEOMETOC

GMSCE

 Germany
Timely Warning and Interception with Space-based Theater Surveillance TWISTER  France
Materials and Components for Technological EU Competitiveness MAC-EU  France
EU Collaborative Warfare Capabilities ECOWAR  France
European Global RPAS Insertion Architecture System GLORIA  Italy
Robust Communication Infrastructure and Networks ROCOMIN  Sweden
Arctic Command & Control Effector And Sensor System ACCESS  Finland
Counter Battery Sensors COBAS  France
Role 2F  Spain

Land - Formations - Systems

[edit]
Project name Abbr. Coordinator Project members Project observer
Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package DM-DRCP  Italy
Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle / Amphibious Assault Vehicle / Light Armoured Vehicle AIFV/AAV/LAV  Italy
Crisis Response Operation Core EUFOR CROC  Germany
Integrated Unmanned Ground System UGS  Estonia
Integrated Unmanned Ground Systems 2 IUGS2  Estonia
EU Beyond Line of Sight Land Battlefield Missile Systems EU BLOS  France
European Defense Airlift Training Academy EDA-TA  France

Maritime

[edit]
Project name Abbr. Coordinator Project member Project observer
Maritime Semi-Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures MAS MCM  Belgium
Harbour & Maritime Surveillance and Protection HARMSPRO  Italy
Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance UMS  Greece
Deployable Modular Underwater Intervention Capability Package DIVEPACK  Bulgaria
Maritime Unmanned Anti-Submarine System MUSAS  Portugal
European Patrol Corvette EPC  Italy
Anti-torpedo torpedo ATT  Germany
Critical Seabed Infrastructure Protection CSIP  Italy

Space

[edit]
Project name Abbr. Coordinator Project members Project observer
EU Radio Navigation Solution EURAS  France
European Military Space Surveillance Awareness Network EU-SSA-N  Italy

Training - Facilities

[edit]
Project name Abbr. Coordinator Project members Project observer
European Training Certification Centre for European Armies ETCCEA  Italy
Helicopter Hot and High Training H3 TRAINING  Greece
Joint EU Intelligence School JEIS  Greece
Integrated European Joint Training and Simulation Centre EUROSIM  Hungary
EU Cyber Academia and Innovation Hub EU CAIH  Portugal
Special Operations Forces Medical Training Centre SMTC  Poland
CBRN Defence Training Range CBRNDTR  Romania
EU Network of Diving Centres EUNDC  Romania

Potential

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Further information: Military of the European Union § Intergovernmental cooperation

Potential future PESCO projects include the following existing intergovernmental cooperations between member states' militaries, presently outside the CSDP framework:[citation needed]

Forces and command centres:

Bodies fostering integration:

See also

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Other initiatives of the Common Security and Defence Policy established after the introduction of the European Union Global Strategy

Other 'European' defence organisations that are currently not part of the CSDP but could potentially become PESCO projects

References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Permanent Structured Cooperation

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Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is a treaty-based framework within the European Union's that enables participating member states to voluntarily collaborate on the joint planning, development, investment, and deployment of defence capabilities, with the aim of enhancing operational readiness and addressing capability shortfalls. Envisioned in the 2009 under Articles 42(6) and 46 of the , PESCO was formally established on 11 December 2017 by Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315, initially involving 25 member states following the European Council's agreement in June 2017 amid post-2014 security threats including Russia's annexation of . As of May 2025, 26 of the 27 EU member states participate in PESCO—Denmark having joined in 2023—coordinating over 75 collaborative projects across domains such as military mobility, cyber rapid response teams, and networked logistics, which are reviewed annually and complemented by funding from the European Defence Fund and alignment via the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence. These initiatives have delivered tangible outputs, including prototypes for unmanned ground systems and enhanced training programs, contributing to a more coherent full spectrum of defence capabilities despite varying national commitments. PESCO's defining characteristics include its binding national implementation plans and emphasis on concrete deliverables over mere declarations, yet it has sparked controversies, particularly from NATO allies including the , who warn of risks such as resource diversion from alliance priorities, potential duplication of NATO structures, and discriminatory practices against non-EU partners that could erode transatlantic . Eastern European states like have similarly expressed apprehensions that PESCO might dilute focus on collective defence under Article 5, prioritizing instead an illusory that overlooks empirical dependencies on U.S.-led capabilities. While proponents highlight its role in filling gaps unaddressed by —such as intra-EU mobility—critics argue that historical patterns of fragmented implementation undermine causal efficacy in building deployable forces, as evidenced by persistent underinvestment and challenges persisting into the 2020s.

Treaty Basis in the Lisbon Treaty

The Treaty of Lisbon, entering into force on 1 December 2009, established the legal foundation for Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) within the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy through amendments to the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Article 42(6) TEU enables member states whose military capabilities meet higher criteria and which commit to doing so to establish PESCO, permitting a coalition of willing states to pursue enhanced defence cooperation without necessitating unanimity across all EU members. This provision facilitates qualified majority voting among participants for decisions on capability development and operational commitments, as detailed in Article 46 TEU and Protocol No. 10 annexed to the TEU. PESCO's treaty basis originated from assessments of capability deficiencies exposed in earlier EU defence initiatives, including the EU Battlegroups, which attained full operational capability in 2007 yet remained undeployed due to persistent shortfalls in readiness, financing, and national contributions. These gaps traced back to post-2003 capability reviews, such as the EU Headline Goal 2010, which empirically demonstrated Europe's inability to sustain rapid reaction forces amid fragmented national efforts and operational failures in CSDP missions like those in the Democratic Republic of Congo and . The mechanism was designed to enforce stricter criteria for participation, compelling committed states to align investments and harmonize forces to rectify such empirically observed inadequacies. Underlying this framework was a recognition of causal factors in Europe's defence posture, particularly chronic underinvestment, with non-U.S. European allies averaging 1.4% of GDP on defence spending by —substantially below the 2% guideline endorsed at the Summit that year—and most EU states similarly deficient, resulting in mismatched capabilities and over-reliance on individual member contributions. PESCO thus embodied a first-principles approach to incentivize selective, high-commitment integration, bypassing veto-prone consensus to foster verifiable improvements in collective defence efficacy without imposing uniform obligations on less inclined states.

Pre-2017 Developments and Motivations

Russia's annexation of in March 2014, following its military intervention in , heightened security concerns across and revealed the European Union's heavy reliance on —predominantly U.S.-led—for defense capabilities, as the EU lacked independent rapid-response forces sufficient to deter or respond to such aggression without transatlantic support. This event underscored the limitations of prior EU defense efforts, including the 2004 Headline Goal, which aimed to enable the deployment of up to 50,000-60,000 troops with support elements within 60 days but fell short due to persistent capability gaps in strategic enablers like , , and , with many targets unmet even after revisions toward smaller battlegroups. Compounding these vulnerabilities were chronic underinvestment in defense, with EU member states' average military spending hovering at approximately 1.3% of GDP in 2016, well below the NATO 2% guideline, leading to fragmented national forces and duplicated procurement that hindered interoperability. U.S. leaders, including President Obama, publicly rebuked European allies as "free riders" for expecting American security guarantees while skimping on their own contributions, as evidenced by Obama's 2016 remarks expressing frustration over Europe's inadequate burden-sharing in crises like Libya, where allies failed to follow through despite initial enthusiasm. These criticisms amplified internal EU debates on achieving greater "strategic autonomy," defined as the capacity to act independently in security matters without perpetual dependence on external powers, driven by fears of diminishing U.S. commitment amid shifting American priorities toward Asia. In response, High Representative presented the EU Global Strategy in June 2016, which identified hybrid threats—blending conventional, irregular, informational, and cyber elements—as a core challenge requiring enhanced capabilities, resilience, and cooperative defense mechanisms to address without overstating prospects for seamless EU unity amid divergent national interests. This document motivated subsequent pushes for structured cooperation by emphasizing the need to pool resources against immediate risks from state actors like , while acknowledging the causal link between underinvestment and vulnerability, setting the stage for operationalizing dormant treaty provisions on defense integration.

Activation and Early Implementation

Notification and Launch in 2017

On 13 November 2017, defense ministers from 23 member states signed a joint notification addressed to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Council, expressing their intention to establish permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) under Article 46 of the . The notification highlighted the European Council's June 2017 agreement on launching PESCO to enhance defense capabilities amid external threats, including Russia's actions in and uncertainties following the 's referendum. The participating states committed to fulfilling the general implementing arrangements for PESCO and undertaking more binding commitments to improve military readiness and . opted out due to its treaty-based defense exemptions, declined participation citing neutrality concerns, and initially abstained but signaled potential future involvement, and the was excluded as it prepared for . The notification occurred against a backdrop of U.S. President Donald Trump's post-election emphasis on European allies increasing defense contributions to , following his November 2016 victory, which amplified calls for greater EU given fragmented —EU states maintained over 170 types of weapon systems compared to about 30 in the U.S.—despite collective defense spending reaching approximately €236 billion in 2017. This uneven commitment reflected voluntary participation, with larger states like and leading the push while smaller or neutral members showed varying enthusiasm. On 11 December 2017, the adopted Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315, formally establishing PESCO and listing 25 participating member states, as and acceded shortly after the notification. The decision incorporated the 20 binding commitments from the notification, including progressively increasing national defense investment to allocate at least 20% to major equipment and prioritizing collaborative capability development within the framework. These commitments aimed to address capability shortfalls identified in prior EU defense reviews, such as insufficient strategic enablers, while maintaining flexibility for non-participants to join later. The launch underscored PESCO's procedural activation as a mechanism for deepened but selective cooperation, without immediate project approvals, which followed in subsequent waves.

Initial Binding Commitments

Upon activation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) on 11 December 2017, 25 member states adopted 20 binding commitments aimed at enhancing collective defense capabilities. These included pledges to regularly increase national defense spending, allocate at least 20% of defense budgets to equipment and research over the subsequent four years, and prioritize joint capability development to address identified shortfalls. Additional commitments mandated the establishment of national implementation plans, regular readiness assessments, and enhanced through collaborative training and . Empirical data reveals limited causal impact from these initial pledges on national defense policies. For instance, while PESCO commitments encouraged alignment with NATO's 2% GDP defense spending guideline, only seven participating states—, , , , , , and one other—achieved this threshold by 2023, with the average remaining at 1.6% of GDP. Joint capability projects, such as the initial 17 defense initiatives launched in March 2018, showed progress in areas like cyber defense but faced delays due to varying national priorities and funding shortfalls. Early compliance issues stemmed from divergent interpretations of commitments, resulting in minimal gains in . Annual assessments by the High Representative highlighted uneven , with some states submitting robust national plans while others provided vague outlines lacking enforceable timelines. Absent mechanisms for sanctions or expulsion, these pledges functioned primarily as signaling devices to demonstrate political intent rather than drivers of substantive capability enhancements, as evidenced by persistent fragmentation in European defense and equipment standardization. This structural weakness underscored that external geopolitical pressures, such as Russia's 2022 invasion of , exerted greater influence on spending increases than PESCO's internal dynamics.

Objectives and Guiding Principles

Core Strategic Goals

PESCO's core strategic goals emphasize deepening defense cooperation among participating member states to enhance the bloc's overall security posture, as established under Article 46 of the and aligned with the 2016 Global Strategy. These objectives focus on increasing investment in capabilities, promoting joint development and of defense equipment, and improving operational readiness through harmonized planning and . By fostering and specialization, PESCO aims to enable more effective and rapid response to threats, including in hybrid, cyber, , and high-intensity warfare domains, thereby addressing collective vulnerabilities that individual states cannot resolve unilaterally. A key aim is to rectify capability shortfalls outlined in the European Defence Agency's 2018 Capability Development revision, which identifies priorities such as strategic enablers, force multipliers, and protection systems based on lessons from EU missions and foresight analysis of evolving threats. This plan underscores the need for EU-specific assessments of risks—like regional and technological disruptions—while ensuring complementarity with , prioritizing gaps in areas like and that exceed national resources. Through binding commitments, PESCO seeks to reduce inefficiencies from fragmented national approaches, where diverse equipment standards, such as multiple incompatible tank variants across member states, drive up lifecycle costs estimated in billions of euros annually due to limited scale and challenges. These goals reflect a pragmatic recognition of causal dependencies in defense economics and operations: without coordinated investment, duplication persists, as evidenced by Europe's maintenance of over 15 distinct types compared to more unified standardization, inflating procurement by up to 20-30% per unit according to industry analyses. Yet, the framework's reliance on consensus-based decisions introduces inherent limits, as national opt-outs or vetoes can dilute collective momentum, potentially perpetuating the very fragmentation PESCO targets despite from prior initiatives showing modest gains in joint capabilities.

National Implementation Requirements

Participating Member States in Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) are required to fulfill 20 binding commitments outlined in the Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1102, which harmonize national contributions to defense capabilities and aim to address fragmentation in spending and . These commitments mandate progressive alignment of national defense with EU-level priorities, including the development of multi-year capability roadmaps that specify s in priority domains such as mobility, , and capabilities. To ensure accountability, each participating submits an annual National Implementation Plan (NIP) detailing concrete measures to meet these obligations, including timelines, resource allocations, and progress metrics on levels and capability delivery. The framework requires annual progress reports from the High Representative, assessing compliance against indicators such as defense expenditure shares devoted to (targeting a 20% benchmark), output in terms of deployable forces, and impact on identified shortfalls. Peer reviews, facilitated by the (EDA), evaluate these plans biennially, incorporating empirical audits that highlight persistent gaps; for instance, EDA assessments have consistently noted deficiencies in strategic airlift capacity, with only limited progress in pooling transport assets despite commitments to enhance . Similarly, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities remain underdeveloped, as evidenced by EDA-coordinated studies revealing shortfalls in persistent aerial and electronic warfare platforms needed for joint operations. These mechanisms serve as safeguards against free-riding by enforcing verifiable contributions, yet empirical data on defense spending post-PESCO activation in indicates only gradual aggregate growth, with EU-level expenditures rising from approximately €200 billion in to €214 billion by 2021—a 6% increase—before sharper upticks following the 2022 invasion. While commitments have prompted some reallocation toward collaborative , EDA reviews show that national implementations have yielded marginal improvements in addressing capability voids, underscoring the causal link between uneven and sustained disparities in burden-sharing. Full compliance is targeted for 2025, with recommendations periodically urging laggards to accelerate investments.

Membership and Third-Country Involvement

Participating EU Member States

As of 2025, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) encompasses 26 of the European Union's 27 member states, excluding Malta, which has consistently declined participation citing its constitutional commitment to neutrality and non-alignment in military alliances. Malta's position stems from a policy of observing PESCO's development without compromising its non-militaristic stance, as articulated in national debates and EU notifications. Denmark became the 26th participant on May 23, 2023, via Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1015, following a June 2022 where 66.9% of voters approved amending its longstanding defense opt-out under the . This shift enabled Denmark's alignment with PESCO's binding commitments on capability development, while initially limiting its role to in select projects before full integration. Participation remains strictly voluntary, with no mechanisms for coerced inclusion, thereby upholding national sovereignty over defense decisions as enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty's provisions for . Empirical data reveal uneven engagement levels among participants: leads with involvement in 52 projects, followed closely by at 51, reflecting their larger defense budgets and industrial capacities. In contrast, smaller southern states like and exhibit lower participation rates, often limited to fewer than 20 projects each, while —, , and —show proportionally higher involvement, coordinating multiple initiatives amid regional security pressures from Russia's actions in . These disparities underscore PESCO's flexible structure, where states select projects aligning with national priorities rather than uniform obligations.

Non-EU and Third-Country Participation

In November 2020, the adopted Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, establishing the general conditions for exceptional participation by third countries in individual PESCO projects. This framework requires invitees to demonstrate substantial , such as unique technological expertise, operational capabilities, or resources that directly advance project goals without undermining ; participation is assessed case-by-case, limited to specific projects, and excludes decision-making influence in PESCO's core governance. Canada, Norway, and the United States were the first third countries invited to join the Military Mobility project in May 2021, with formal participation starting in December 2021. This initiative focuses on streamlining cross-border troop and equipment movements, where the US provides specialized logistics and infrastructure knowledge to address EU deficiencies in rapid deployment, compensating for limited indigenous capabilities in heavy transport and regulatory harmonization. Despite occasional concerns over data-sharing protocols and intellectual property constraints in transatlantic defense collaborations, US involvement has enabled practical advancements, such as standardized permitting processes tested in multinational exercises. The was invited to participate in the Cyber Rapid Response Teams project, leveraging its cybersecurity assets for rapid incident response and threat intelligence sharing, though full integration depends on alignment with export controls post-Brexit. Switzerland, maintaining its neutrality policy, received invitations for both the Military Mobility project—approved by its Federal Council on August 21, 2024—and the Cyber Ranges Federation project on May 20, 2025, contributing advanced simulation technologies to federate national cyber training networks for realistic scenario-based exercises. Turkey has sought involvement, citing its NATO interoperability and regional operational experience, but as of October 2025, no formal project participations have been confirmed, reflecting ongoing evaluations of value addition amid geopolitical tensions. These inclusions underscore PESCO's pragmatic approach, acknowledging that EU member states' defense shortfalls in areas like cyber infrastructure and mobility necessitate external partnerships to achieve viable capability enhancements, rather than pursuing insular development that risks inefficacy.

Neutrality and Opt-Out Considerations

, , and , as EU member states maintaining policies of military neutrality or non-alignment, participate in PESCO but impose self-selected restrictions aligned with their constitutional or traditional stances against military alliances. These states prioritize involvement in non-offensive capability projects, such as cyber security, , maritime upgrades, and military mobility enhancements, while avoiding commitments that could imply collective combat operations or automatic defense obligations. For instance, focuses on collaborative efforts like cyber training with and , reflecting its constitutional prohibition on participation in military alliances and its limited combat-ready forces. Similarly, engages as a lead or observer in projects emphasizing and cyber threats, subject to its "triple lock" mechanism requiring UN, government, and parliamentary approval for any overseas deployments, which precludes funding or support for lethal force initiatives. , having shifted to a policy of non-alignment in , contributes to six projects and observes eleven others, but maintains reservations against mechanisms implying detached from transatlantic ties. Malta stands as the sole member state with a full from PESCO, invoking Article 1(3) of its 1974 , which enshrines perpetual neutrality and non-alignment in military alliances. This provision, reinforced in Malta's accession treaty, permits selective engagement in non-military (CSDP) missions but bars structured defense integration that could compromise impartiality. Denmark previously held an exemption under the 1992 Edinburgh Agreement, which excluded it from defense decisions and actions, preventing initial PESCO participation until a June 1, 2022, approved revocation of the , enabling formal accession as the 26th member on May 23, 2023. These neutrality policies and opt-outs impose causal constraints on PESCO's operational coherence, as participating neutral states' aversion to combat-oriented capabilities—such as integrated battlegroups or offensive enablers—limits the framework's ability to achieve uniform high-end across all members. Empirical assessments indicate that such selective engagement fragments mutual defense solidarity under Article 42.7 of the , with neutral states' minimal combat contributions potentially undermining collective readiness in scenarios requiring rapid, alliance-like responses. This dynamic highlights inherent tensions between inclusive voluntary frameworks and the binding commitments intended to address capability gaps, as evidenced by the exclusion of and Denmark's delayed entry reducing initial project momentum.

Governance and Operational Mechanisms

Decision-Making and Council Role

The acts as the primary institutional body overseeing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), with the establishment of PESCO itself adopted via qualified majority voting under Article 46 of the to facilitate initiation among willing member states without requiring full consensus across all members. Once established, however, key operational decisions, including the approval of specific capability projects, are taken by unanimity among the participating member states only, excluding non-participants from power but still necessitating agreement within the involved group to advance initiatives. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy plays a central coordinating role, supported by the (EDA), which contributes to assessments of national implementation plans and acts as a secretariat alongside the for monitoring compliance with binding commitments. Annually, the High Representative submits a report to the evaluating progress, including whether participating states fulfill their national plans, enabling the Council to conduct reviews and potentially recommend adjustments or reinforcements to commitments. This framework prioritizes flexibility by confining decision-making to subsets of member states, theoretically reducing paralysis from broader EU vetoes, yet indicates that the persistent requirement among participants has contributed to delays in project initiation and scaling, as consensus-building amid divergent national priorities—such as varying defense budgets and strategic outlooks—has empirically constrained operational tempo.

Funding, Oversight, and Accountability

Funding for Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) derives primarily from national defence budgets of participating member states, which bear the core responsibility for implementing projects and fulfilling binding commitments, including pledges to allocate at least 20% of defence expenditures to equipment and by 2020, with ongoing targets for 2% of GDP in overall defence spending. No dedicated budget exists exclusively for PESCO; instead, supplementary resources come from broader instruments, notably the European Defence Fund (EDF), which provides €7.953 billion in grants from 2021 to 2027 for defence and capabilities, with co-financing rates up to 100% for eligible activities and bonuses of up to 20% for PESCO-linked projects to incentivize collaboration. This reliance on national funding, augmented by EDF incentives, reflects PESCO's intergovernmental nature but exposes implementation to disparities in member states' fiscal priorities and capacities. Oversight of PESCO operates through the Council of the , which conducts annual assessments of progress on the 20 initial binding commitments via scorecard methodologies established in 2018, evaluating national implementation plans (NIPs) submitted by participating states on criteria such as capability development, spending targets, and enhancements. These scorecards, produced by the PESCO Secretariat and High Representative, track compliance qualitatively and quantitatively but impose no formal penalties for shortfalls, such as project termination or participant exclusion, limiting enforcement to political recommendations and peer pressure. Accountability mechanisms thus remain soft, correlating with empirical evidence of incomplete delivery: by late 2023, of the 68 active PESCO projects across multiple waves, the majority lingered in or development phases due to shortfalls, coordination , and uneven national contributions, with only a fraction achieving operational readiness. This pattern persists into 2025, where just 7 of over 66 projects have reached completion despite launches since 2018, underscoring how the absence of binding sanctions fosters selective engagement and perpetuates capability gaps over rigorous fulfillment. Such outcomes align with causal dynamics where voluntary frameworks without coercive yield suboptimal , as states prioritize domestic needs absent tangible repercussions for underperformance.

Collaborative Projects and Capability Development

Project Waves and Categorization

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects have been introduced in successive waves since its operational launch in 2018, with the first wave comprising 17 initiatives approved by the on 6 March 2018. These early projects primarily targeted foundational enablers, such as military mobility and , to address immediate shortfalls among participating member states. Subsequent waves expanded the portfolio: the second wave added 17 projects in 2019, the third introduced 19 in 2020, the fourth launched 14 in 2021, and the fifth approved 11 in 2023, cumulatively building toward enhanced capability development across multiple domains. The sixth and final wave of the initial phase, endorsed on 27 May 2025, incorporated 11 additional projects, elevating the overall total to 83 collaborative efforts spanning land, maritime, air, space, cyber, training, and joint enabling categories. Project categorization aligns with seven primary military domains—air systems, cyber and C4ISR, enabling and joint, land formations and systems, maritime, , and facilities—to ensure comprehensive coverage of operational needs and promote cross-domain synergies. Approval hinges on rigorous criteria, including demonstrable alignment with EU-level capability gap assessments derived from strategic reviews like the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), emphasis on multi-domain applicability, involvement of multiple participating member states (typically at least four to seven), and potential for scalability and gains, as evaluated by the PESCO Secretariat and recommended by the High Representative to the for unanimous endorsement among participants. The chronological progression reflects adaptive prioritization: initial waves (2018–2019) concentrated on low-to-medium intensity enablers like strategic transport and medical support to build foundational cohesion, whereas later iterations from 2021 onward increasingly incorporated high-end warfighting elements, such as electronic warfare convergence and systems, partly in response to heightened threat perceptions following Russia's 2022 invasion of . By mid-2025, more than 60 projects remained actively operational, with timelines varying by initiative to achieve milestones like initial operational capability.

Key Domains and Selected Initiatives

PESCO projects span multiple military domains, including land, maritime, air, space, cyber, and enabling capabilities such as and , with the aim of addressing identified gaps through collaborative development and enhanced among participating member states (pMS). As of 2024, over 80 projects have been initiated across these areas, focusing on critical enablers like , , and advanced technologies, though implementation varies with many still in development phases due to coordination challenges and resource allocation differences among pMS. While proponents highlight synergies in capability building, such as shared standards for rapid deployment, empirical progress reports indicate bottlenecks, including delays in achieving full operational capability (FOC), with only two projects—EUFOR Response Operation Core and European Medical Command—confirmed at FOC by late 2024 amid a portfolio exceeding 80 initiatives. Military Mobility, launched in 2018 and led by the with 24 EU states plus third-country participants including the , , , and , facilitates swift cross-border troop and equipment movement by harmonizing , regulations, and procedures, directly supporting interoperability goals. This enabling project addresses logistical gaps exposed in exercises, enabling faster reinforcement in high-threat scenarios, though full implementation requires ongoing national adaptations like upgrades, with progress tied to the EU's on Military Mobility extended to 2026. In the cyber domain, the Cyber Rapid Response Teams (CRRT) project, initiated in 2018 under Lithuanian leadership with 12 pMS by November 2024, deploys multidisciplinary teams to assist in incident response, vulnerability assessments, and resilience enhancement for partners and missions, as demonstrated in supporting Moldova's 2024 elections against cyber threats. The initiative fosters mutual assistance protocols and tool-sharing, aiming to build a collective cyber defense posture, yet faces challenges in standardizing response doctrines across diverse national capabilities. The European Medical Command (EMC), a Germany-led effort launched in 2018 involving 18 pMS, achieved FOC status, providing a centralized hub to coordinate multinational medical support, including common operational pictures and resource allocation for missions or crises like pandemics. This joint enabling enhances deployable medical assets' , with applications in both and humanitarian contexts, though scalability depends on sustained contributions from smaller pMS. Emerging domains in the 2025 sixth wave include electronic warfare (EW) and quantum technologies; the Joint European Electromagnetic Warfare Convergence Initiative (JEEWCI) seeks to align EW doctrines and systems for spectrum dominance, while Finland-led quantum projects target defense applications in positioning, surveillance, and , reflecting ambitions to integrate cutting-edge tech amid capability shortfalls. These initiatives promise force multipliers but encounter hurdles in technological maturity and equitable burden-sharing, with progress reports noting reliance on further R&D investment.

Assessed Outcomes and Capability Gaps

The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) has generated over 80 projects since 2017, yet assessments indicate limited transformative impact on EU defense capabilities, with persistent fragmentation due to national priorities overriding collaborative efficiencies. The 2025 progress report notes that of 66 active projects, nearly half have entered execution phases, but overall delivery remains incremental, with only select initiatives approaching full operational capability by late 2025. Independent analyses highlight that this progress has not yielded significant effects, as gains are constrained by disparate national cycles and reluctance to pool sovereign assets. Capability gaps endure in critical strategic enablers, such as air-to-air refueling and strategic , where European reliance on non-EU partners persists despite PESCO efforts. The 2023 EU Capability Development Priorities identified 22 areas requiring enhancement, including eight under strategic enablers, underscoring shortfalls in networked logistics and sustainment that individual member states cannot address unilaterally. Russia's invasion of in 2022 prompted acceleration in niche areas like munitions production through aligned initiatives, but it simultaneously exposed high-end deficiencies, including insufficient enablers for sustained peer-level operations, as EU forces demonstrated dependency on external air and support. The November 2023-launched strategic review, concluded in 2024, emphasized adapting PESCO beyond 2025 to prioritize gap-closing, yet empirical outcomes reveal that national silos—evident in uneven project participation and funding commitments—hinder scalable capabilities, falling short of initial ambitions for autonomous EU-level force projection. This assessment aligns with critiques that while PESCO fosters dialogue, it has not overcome entrenched barriers to joint acquisition, resulting in marginal rather than multiplicative enhancements to collective defense posture.

Interoperability with NATO and Transatlantic Alliances

Complementary Framework Claims

Official EU documentation establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) explicitly frames it as complementary to , envisioning a "coherent full spectrum force package" that aligns with but does not duplicate structures. This positioning draws from broader - declarations emphasizing mutually reinforcing roles, particularly in areas beyond NATO's Article 5 collective defense, such as and stabilization operations. Following the 2016 Warsaw Summit, where identified priorities like hybrid threats and cyber defense—predominantly non-Article 5 domains—EU initiatives like PESCO were presented as enhancing these through capability-building that "supports" without supplanting it. PESCO projects are officially aligned with NATO's Defence Planning Process, with reports indicating that 38 of 46 initiatives as of recent assessments directly correspond to Alliance priorities, including countermeasures and rapid deployment . For instance, PESCO efforts on hybrid threats, such as information-sharing platforms and resilience training, mirror NATO's focus on multi-domain challenges, with joint exercises cited as evidence of synergy. EU-NATO joint declarations reinforce this narrative, highlighting coordinated progress in hybrid domains since 2016, where PESCO contributes specialized EU assets to bolster NATO's southern and eastern flank stability projections. Yet, empirical analysis of institutional outputs reveals parallel structures that challenge the exclusivity of supportive complementarity. In cyber defense, NATO maintains the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) for doctrinal development and exercises, while the EU operates distinct entities like the (ENISA) and dedicated PESCO cyber projects, resulting in overlapping training modules and threat assessment frameworks without full integration. These duplications, observed in areas like hybrid threat vector analysis, suggest that while official rhetoric prioritizes augmentation, PESCO's expansion fosters autonomous EU capacities, potentially diverting resources from Alliance-specific enhancements. Such developments align with EU strategic autonomy goals articulated in foundational texts, raising questions about the causal primacy of complementarity over independent operational .

Actual Overlaps and Duplication Risks

PESCO initiatives in capability development, such as those in land systems and formations under its second wave of projects launched in 2019, exhibit overlaps with NATO's Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), which focuses on accelerating dual-use technologies including ground-based systems for enhanced mobility and . These parallel efforts risk diverting resources from unified standards, as both frameworks pursue in contested environments without fully integrated pipelines. Pre-PESCO fragmentation in EU defense procurement already imposed annual costs estimated at €25-100 billion due to duplicated national programs and incompatible equipment, undermining that NATO's collective frameworks partially mitigate through standardized acquisition. While PESCO aims to consolidate such efforts via joint projects, its selective participation model—excluding non-EU NATO members like the and —creates redundant R&D streams, as evidenced by overlapping priorities in cyber defense and enabling technologies where PESCO projects mirror 's innovation hubs without subsuming them. Minor synergies exist, such as PESCO's Military Mobility project facilitating troop deployments, yet net duplication persists in capability gaps like high-readiness forces, where parallel EU mechanisms add bureaucratic layers without proportional gains. In the context of post-2022 support, achieved high readiness for over 300,000 troops by June through streamlined allied commitments, contrasting with PESCO's marginal role limited to long-term enablers like and prototypes rather than direct surge capacity. multilateral channels, including those aligned with PESCO goals, demonstrated slower compared to 's rapid activation of enhanced forward presence battlegroups, highlighting inefficiencies from divided command structures and procurement delays in delivering timely matériel. Defense economics analyses underscore that such redundancies exacerbate opportunity costs, as fragmented spending dilutes the focus on 's proven deterrence architecture despite rhetorical complementarity.

Criticisms, Challenges, and Empirical Shortfalls

Strategic and Operational Ineffectiveness

PESCO's strategic objectives, including enhanced capability development and rapid response mechanisms, have been undermined by persistent failures to meet quantitative targets and operational timelines, with no effective provisions. Although member states' aggregate defence expenditure rose to 1.9% of GDP in 2024 from 1.6% in 2023, projections for 2025 indicate only 2.1%, reflecting uneven national commitments rather than uniform achievement of the 2% benchmark emphasized in related frameworks. Individual states such as plan to reach 2% only by 2030, while others like maintain minimal allocations, highlighting the absence of sanctions or penalties within PESCO for non-compliance, which dilutes binding commitments under Article 46 of the . Operational ineffectiveness is evident in project implementation delays, driven by inadequate funding and fragmented industrial participation across waves of initiatives. As of 2025, many PESCO projects exhibit shortfalls rooted in member states' inconsistent , resulting in postponed milestones for capabilities like and cyber defence systems, despite initial operational targets set for earlier delivery. These delays stem from structural reliance on voluntary contributions without mandatory surge provisions, rendering a significant portion of outputs non-deployable in high-intensity scenarios, as assessments reveal gaps in full-spectrum readiness for peer conflicts. The served as a practical test of PESCO's operational viability, where contributions were limited to auxiliary rather than scalable enablers. While select projects supported corridors and materiel coordination, broader audits underscore failures in delivering expeditionary surge capacities, such as integrated air defence or rapid reinforcement modules, amid persistent and mobility bottlenecks exposed by frontline demands. Proponents maintain that PESCO fosters deepened and shared R&D ties among participants, incrementally building resilience against hybrid threats. Critics, however, contend that its bureaucratic layering—encompassing extensive coordination without streamlined decision-making—yields marginal deterrence enhancements relative to standalone national efforts, as most initiatives would likely proceed independently absent the framework's overhead.

Economic Burdens and Free-Riding Incentives

Despite post-2022 increases driven by the conflict, the European Union's average defense expenditure reached approximately 1.5% of GDP in 2024, with projections for modest growth to around 1.7% in 2025 amid uneven national commitments. Variations persist, with eastern members like Poland and the exceeding 2.5-3% of GDP, while larger economies such as approached 2% only after 2024 fiscal exemptions, and southern states like and remained below 1.5%. PESCO's funding mechanism relies predominantly on national budgets, with joint European contributions limited to instruments like the European Defence Fund (EDF), totaling €7.95 billion for 2021-2027—a negligible share relative to aggregate EU defense outlays exceeding €350 billion annually. This minimal pooling sustains free-riding dynamics, as lower-spending participants access alliance-wide benefits, including interoperability, without equivalent fiscal burdens, effectively leveraging higher contributors and U.S. defense expenditures that constitute over 60% of 's total. Economic analyses highlight how such incentives discourage proportional investment, fostering dependency on external guarantors and eroding collective capability development. Preferential procurement policies under PESCO and related frameworks prioritize intra-EU suppliers, erecting barriers to non-European firms and exacerbating costs through market fragmentation and reduced . Studies estimate these preferences impose premiums of 20-30% for select , attributable to duplicated production lines, small-batch manufacturing, and shielded inefficiencies in national industries. By rewarding over open , this approach amplifies fiscal strains on contributor states, perpetuating a cycle where low-effort members underwrite minimal shares while benefiting from subsidized access to enhanced capabilities.

Political Debates on EU Autonomy vs. NATO Reliance

The political debates surrounding Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) center on tensions between advocates of enhanced strategic autonomy and those prioritizing reliance on 's transatlantic framework. Proponents, particularly in , argue that PESCO enables the EU to develop independent capabilities, reducing dependence on external powers amid perceived unreliability. French President has repeatedly framed strategic autonomy as essential for Europe's survival, positioning PESCO as a mechanism to foster a common European defense identity separate from dominance. This view emphasizes supranational integration to address gaps in crisis response, such as non-Article 5 operations, where EU tools could complement rather than duplicate . Opposition, led by Eastern European states like Poland and the Baltic countries, stresses NATO's primacy for collective defense against immediate threats, particularly from , viewing PESCO autonomy rhetoric as a risk to alliance cohesion. Polish discourse on remains marginal, with focus instead on bolstering NATO's eastern flank through increased US engagement. These nations advocate inclusive PESCO projects that align with NATO standards to avoid fragmentation, cautioning that EU-centric efforts could undermine the Article 5 guarantee reliant on US contributions. US officials have echoed these concerns, warning in 2018 that PESCO and related funds risked decoupling from by fostering duplication rather than burden-sharing. Empirical data underscores the causal realities of this dependence: US defense spending reached approximately $916 billion in 2023, exceeding the combined expenditures of all European NATO allies by a factor of about three, including critical enablers like nuclear deterrence and global intelligence that no framework currently replicates. European public opinion largely aligns with NATO primacy, with surveys showing favorable views of the alliance at 81% across member states in 2025 and majorities in polled nations preferring preservation of NATO amid any European responsibility for defense. In , support for NATO membership dips to 55%, reflecting autonomy preferences, while Eastern Europeans exhibit near-universal endorsement, highlighting intra-EU divides. Autonomy advocates often overlook these asymmetries, as EU initiatives like PESCO have yet to demonstrate scalable capabilities independent of transatlantic assets.

Recent Developments Post-Ukraine Invasion

Strategic Reviews and Adjustments (2023-2025)

In November 2023, the launched a strategic review of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to assess its progress, enhance its effectiveness, and adapt to the evolving geopolitical context, including lessons from Russia's against . The review aimed to align PESCO more closely with the EU Strategic Compass and broader defence initiatives, emphasizing the need for deeper cooperation amid high-intensity threats demonstrated by the conflict. On 19 November 2024, the approved conclusions from the , reaffirming PESCO's central role in fostering defence collaboration among participating member states and recommending updates to its 20 binding commitments. These updates prioritize increased defence spending, targeted capability development, and enhanced armament cooperation to address strategic gaps, including those pertinent to high-intensity warfare. The conclusions also stress integrating into EU defence efforts, in line with security commitments established on 27 June 2024, to bolster resilience against ongoing threats. Adjustments post-review have included a pivot toward joint production and mechanisms to support deterrence and peer-level capabilities, with several PESCO projects—such as the European Secure and the Counter Battery System—incorporating Ukraine-derived insights on and systems for scalable wartime application. However, implementation has proceeded slowly due to bureaucratic validation processes averaging nine months from proposal to approval, inadequate financial planning, and practical timeline shortfalls, resulting in delays across multiple initiatives despite calls for stricter deadlines. By early 2025, while seven projects had reached completion and others neared closure, varying progress and unresolved commitment revisions underscored persistent challenges in translating review recommendations into operational tempo commensurate with high-threat environments.

Expanded Projects and Third-Country Engagements

In May 2025, the approved the sixth and final wave of the initial phase of PESCO projects, adding 11 new collaborative initiatives focused on critical capabilities such as air and systems, electronic warfare doctrines, quantum technologies for secure communications, and other enablers like training facilities. These projects, spanning domains including land, air, maritime, and cyber, aim to address gaps exposed by ongoing geopolitical tensions, particularly Russia's invasion of , by enhancing and rapid deployment. However, has encountered persistent integration challenges, including varying national commitments and technical issues, limiting their immediate operational transformation as noted in contemporaneous assessments. Switzerland's participation expanded in 2025 with approval on May 20 to join the Cyber Ranges Federations project, which develops federated platforms for advanced cyber training and simulation across participating states. This builds on Switzerland's earlier entry into the Military Mobility project, approved by its Federal Council in August 2024 and formalized in January 2025, which standardizes cross-border troop and equipment movements. These additions reflect selective third-country involvement to bolster enablers without full EU membership, yet they underscore hurdles in aligning neutral states' policies with PESCO's collective goals. Third-country engagements remained anchored in key enabler projects, with the , Norway, and Canada maintaining sustained participation in Military Mobility since their invitations in 2021, contributing expertise in and . By late 2025, PESCO encompassed a total of 83 projects across operational domains, demonstrating incremental growth in response to imperatives but facing empirical constraints in delivering unified capabilities due to fragmented implementation and dependency on national funding.

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