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Radical Change
Radical Change
Radical Change
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Radical Change (Spanish: Cambio Radical, CR, stylised as CЯ, with a backwards "R") is a conservative liberal political party in Colombia.

Key Information

After the elections on 12 March 2006, the party became one of the most important in the new Congress, receiving 20 seats in the lower house and 15 in the upper house. Along with the Social Party of National Unity, or "Party of the U" (the largest party in the lower house and the second-largest in the upper house) and the Conservative Party, it was president Álvaro Uribe's main ally in Congress and formed part of his majority.

It is currently in opposition to the left-wing government of Gustavo Petro.[5]

History

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Origin

[edit]

After the tenure of president Ernesto Samper (1994-1998), a faction of the Liberal Party was not happy with the new social democratic route the party was moving towards. As such, a more right-wing faction of the party split away and formed Radical Change. However, it did not run for either parliamentary or presidential elections during the 1990s. It took on its current name on July 5, 2000.

Uribe government

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In the 2002 elections, the party won two seats in the Senate and seven in the chamber of representatives. The party joined a coalition with the government of Álvaro Uribe, and voted in favor of the re-electionist project; this involved changing sections of the constitution that prevent a president from running for a second term. The 2006 election was their best electoral year. They became the 4th largest political group in Congress with 15 senators and 18 representatives. They remained in coalition with the Uribe administration and supported his candidacy for re-election. German Vargas Lleras, then leader of the party and senator, became one of the Senate's most active voices.

Breakup

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The biggest party in Congress (and Uribe's new U Party) proposed to change the constitution, yet again, to allow the president to run for a third term. The party was divided between those who wanted a second direct re-election for a third term and those who were against it. Vargas Lleras was among those opposed.

Although a third term was deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, the damage was done and those who still supported Uribe quit the party to run for Congress in the 2010 parliamentary elections with the newly-formed U party.

The party suffered big blows in 2010, losing votes and members in both chambers: seven Senators and two Representatives. Vargas Lleras then ran as the candidate in the 2010 presidential election, finishing in third place in the first round. The party then joined the first-round winner, Juan Manuel Santos, along with the Liberal Party and the Conservative party to form the "National Unity Pact" that would work together for the next four years.

National Unity Pact

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The party assisted the government with most of their agenda in Congress.

When the peace talks with the FARC began, the party offered their approval and criticized then ex-President Álvaro Uribe for opposing dialogue.

In 2014, the party participated in the parliamentary elections and joined in a coalition with Santos for his reelection. Vargas Lleras was named the vice-presidential candidate. Although the party received fewer votes than in 2010, they added one senator, but lost one seat in the lower chamber. Santos won the second round of the presidential elections that year, making the vice-presidential position the highest the party had ever achieved.

Electoral history

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Presidential elections

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Election Year Candidate Running mate First Round Second Round Result
Votes Percentage Votes Percentage
2006 Álvaro Uribe Francisco Santos 7,397,835 62,5 % (#1) Won
2010 Germán Vargas Elsa Noguera 1,473,627 10,1 % (#3) Lost
2014 Juan Manuel Santos Germán Vargas 3,310,794 25,7 % (#2) 7,839,342 50,9 % (#1) Won
2018 Germán Vargas Juan Carlos Pinzón 1,412,392 7,3 % (#4) Lost
2022 Federico Gutiérrez Rodrigo Lara 5,069,448 23,9 % (#3) Lost

Legislative elections

[edit]
Election Year House of Representatives Senate
Votes Percentage Seats Votes Percentage Seats
2002 352,547 3,40 (#3)
7 / 166
 118,003 2,16 (#8)
2 / 102
2006 932,207 10,7 (#4)
21 / 166
 1,211,457 14,7 (#4)
15 / 102
2010 723,295 7,6 (#4)
16 / 166
 861,816 7,5 (#5)
8 / 102
2014 1,108,502 7,7 (#5)
15 / 166
 996,872 8,1 (#5)
9 / 102
2018 2,140,464 14,4 (#3)
30 / 172
 2,155,487 14,0 (#2)
16 / 108
2022 1,391,339 8,5 (#5)
16 / 188
 1,610,651 10,2 (#6)
11 / 108

References

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Radical Change

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from Grokipedia

(Spanish: Cambio Radical) is a conservative liberal political party in founded on January 15, 1998, by politicians who defected from the Liberal Party in protest against its alleged links to drug trafficking. The party was officially registered under its current name on July 5, 2000, and has positioned itself as centrist to center-right, emphasizing and serving as a coalition partner across administrations. Key figures include Germán Vargas Lleras, a former leader who served as Vice President from 2010 to 2017 under President and ran unsuccessfully for the presidency in 2014. The party achieved electoral success by supporting Álvaro Uribe's 2002 presidential campaign, securing five seats and ten seats, and later expanding to 15 and 21 seats in 2006. It participated in the of National Unity under Santos, backing his 2014 re-election and the 2012 FARC peace negotiations, though it later experienced seat losses and internal divisions. Controversies have included the 2006 arrest of eight congressmen for alleged ties to groups during the "parapolitics" , as well as investigations into Vargas Lleras for connections, from which he was cleared by the in 2013. As of 2025, the party faces internal rebellions amid opposition to President Petro's government and efforts to unify center-right forces for the 2026 elections.

History

Origins in Liberal Party Dissidence

Cambio Radical emerged from internal dissidence within the Partido Liberal Colombiano in 1997, driven by frustration over the party's entrenched , lack of internal democracy, and perceived infiltration by narcotraffickers. This split was precipitated by the scandals surrounding President Ernesto Samper's 1994 election, which involved documented contributions from the totaling millions of dollars, eroding public trust in the Liberal establishment. Dissidents, many identifying as heirs to the anti- stance of assassinated Liberal leader , criticized the party's nomination of Horacio Serpa as its 1998 presidential candidate without broader consultation, viewing it as a continuation of opaque practices. A pivotal convention occurred in 1997 at the Teatro Libre in , attended by over 1,200 participants who adopted a platform calling for ethical renewal, rejection of narcotrafficking influences, and revival of liberal principles untainted by . The event was presided over by Paulina de Castro Monsalvo, with Ernesto Rojas Morales serving as secretary general and Antonio Álvarez Lleras as general coordinator; these figures represented a of mid-level Liberal operatives disillusioned with the party's national directorate. The dissidence also stemmed from unfulfilled pacts with reformist factions like Nuevo Liberalismo, highlighting systemic failures in honoring ideological commitments. On January 15, 1998, formal steps were taken to organize as a distinct movement, initially backing Alfonso Valdivieso's presidential campaign under the banner Movimiento Valdivieso 98, which emphasized prosecutorial integrity given his prior role as fiscal general. Valdivieso, a prominent and former Liberal, positioned the group against the Samper-era scandals, but the movement pivoted to support Andrés Pastrana's successful bid later that year. In the March 1998 congressional elections, the coalition secured 5 Senate seats and 9 seats, validating its breakaway viability and paving the way for recognition by the National Electoral Council. This foundation reflected a broader push among Colombian liberals for autonomy from a party weakened by over a century of dominance marred by recent ethical lapses.

Formation and Early Organization

Cambio Radical emerged in 1997 as a dissident faction within the , driven by widespread frustration over entrenched corruption and perceived connections between party elites and drug cartels. During the turbulent 1998 presidential campaign, a convention at the Teatro Libre in , attended by over 1,200 participants and led by Paulina de Castro Monsalvo, formalized the breakaway movement, seeking to establish a reformed liberal alternative focused on ethical renewal and opposition to narcotrafficking influences. The group initially operated as an independent movement, endorsing Alfonso Valdivieso's presidential bid under Movimiento Valdivieso 98 before shifting support to Andrés Pastrana of the Conservative Party. In the 1998 congressional elections, it secured 5 seats and 9 seats, achieving legal electoral recognition and establishing a foothold in national politics. By July 5, 2000, the movement adopted the name Cambio Radical, reflecting its commitment to systemic political overhaul. Early organizational structure included a Secretary General (Ernesto Rojas Morales), Coordinator General (Antonio Álvarez Lleras), and an Executive Committee, alongside bodies like a Tribunal of Honor for internal discipline. Key figures such as Germán Vargas Lleras and Alfonso Valdivieso provided leadership, emphasizing anti-corruption platforms. An August 2001 internal consultation endorsed Álvaro Uribe Vélez's presidential candidacy, marking a pivot toward security-focused alliances; in 2002 elections, Cambio Radical won 5 senators and 10 representatives while backing Uribe's victory. Official party status was granted on February 3, 2003, by electoral authorities, enabling broader participation. In that year's regional elections, it captured 2 governorships, over 95 mayoral positions, 11 departmental assembly seats, and 358 council seats, solidifying organization amid Colombia's post-1991 constitutional multiparty landscape.

Participation in Uribe Administration

Cambio Radical, emerging from dissident factions of the Liberal Party, extended formal support to President Vélez shortly after his 2002 election victory. Key party figures, including Antonio Álvarez Lleras, Claudia Blum, and Ernesto Rojas Morales, hosted Uribe at Álvarez Lleras's residence to pledge backing for his administration's priorities, particularly the aimed at combating and restoring public order. The party contributed personnel to Uribe's cabinet, reflecting its integration into the governing coalition. Oscar Iván Zuluaga served as Minister of Finance and Public Credit from February 16, 2007, to August 7, 2010, overseeing fiscal reforms and economic stabilization efforts amid ongoing security challenges. María del Rosario Guerra held the position of Minister of Information Technology and Communications from July 19, 2006, to January 31, 2010, focusing on telecommunications infrastructure and digital connectivity initiatives. In , Cambio Radical's legislators formed part of the pro-Uribe majority, providing crucial votes for legislative measures such as the 2003 state of internal commotion declaration and statutes. This support helped secure passage of reforms central to Uribe's agenda, including funding increases and judicial efficiencies, with the party's bloc holding significant sway in both chambers until fractures emerged. Tensions culminated in 2009, when Cambio Radical withdrew from the coalition amid disagreements over Uribe's push for a constitutional enabling a third presidential term. Party leader Germán Vargas Lleras publicly opposed the reelection bid on January 17, 2009, citing risks to institutional stability, prompting retaliatory calls from Uribe's Partido de la U (the U Party) to expel the party from allied pacts by July. The split highlighted internal coalition strains exacerbated by scandals like parapolitics, though Cambio Radical had previously aligned on core security and economic policies.

Coalition Shifts and Internal Fractures

During the late stages of Álvaro Uribe's presidency, Cambio Radical began experiencing coalition tensions, particularly over Uribe's push for a constitutional to enable a second re-election. While the party had been a key supporter in Uribe's legislative majorities since 2002, internal debates emerged on whether to fully endorse the referendum, with some leaders favoring distance to preserve independent electoral prospects amid growing scandals and judicial scrutiny of Uribe's allies. By early 2010, ahead of congressional and presidential elections, Cambio Radical explicitly shifted away from the core Uribe alliance, as evidenced by its reluctance to back Uribe's preferred successor, , in the initial presidential primary stages. This distancing was driven by pragmatic calculations, including Germán Vargas Lleras' ambition to position the party as a centrist alternative rather than a satellite of uribismo. The 2010 presidential race marked a pivotal realignment, with Vargas Lleras initially launching Cambio Radical's candidacy but withdrawing after Santos' first-round victory to become his vice-presidential , forging a new that included Cambio Radical alongside Santos' Partido de la U. This move secured the party's role in the incoming government, contrasting with the formation of a more hardline uribista opposition. The alliance endured into Santos' first term, with Cambio Radical providing legislative support for and policies, though strains appeared as Santos pivoted toward FARC peace negotiations in 2012, diverging from Uribe's anti-insurgency orthodoxy—a shift that some Cambio Radical members viewed as a betrayal of the party's founding emphasis. For Santos' 2014 re-election, Vargas Lleras was retained as VP candidate, consolidating the coalition's centrist orientation and yielding Cambio Radical eight seats and 20 seats in concurrent legislative polls. Internal fractures intensified post-2010, rooted in factional divides between a pro-uribista wing loyal to Uribe's democratic security model and Vargas Lleras' dominant, personality-driven leadership favoring pragmatic governance alliances. These tensions manifested in defections, such as Rafael Pardo's 2005 exit to the Liberal Party over policy alignments, and broader party debates on autonomy versus satellite status. By 2017, Vargas Lleras' resignation as VP to pursue the 2018 presidency fractured government cohesion, prompting Cambio Radical's withdrawal from Santos' coalition and exposing regional clan rivalries that fragmented candidate slates. The 2018 campaign amplified these rifts, as Vargas Lleras' independent bid garnered only 7.8% of votes, leading to post-election leadership contests and partial endorsements of , with uribista-leaning members rejoining Centro Democrático alliances while others pursued opportunistic pacts. This pattern of internal power struggles, often tied to Vargas Lleras' waning influence after 2018, has perpetuated a fragmented structure reliant on regional bosses rather than unified .

Post-Uribe Evolution and Alliances

Following Álvaro Uribe's presidency, Cambio Radical maintained significant congressional representation in the March 2010 elections, securing 8 seats and 28 seats as part of the pro-Uribe legislative majority. In the presidential race that year, party leader Germán Vargas Lleras received 1,473,627 votes (approximately 10% of the first-round total) before endorsing in the runoff, marking an initial alignment with Uribe's designated successor despite emerging tensions within the broader uribista coalition. This support facilitated Cambio Radical's integration into the National Unity Pact government under Santos, reflecting a pragmatic evolution from strict uribista loyalty toward coalition governance amid Colombia's . During Santos's second term (2014–2018), Cambio Radical deepened its governmental role, with Vargas Lleras serving as from 2014 until his resignation in 2017 to pursue the . The party held 9 and 16 seats in the 2014–2018 and occupied key positions, including the Ministry of the and two additional ministries, positioning it as a centrist pillar in the administration's push for the 2016 FARC peace accord—a policy that fractured relations with Uribe's emerging Centro Democrático party. This phase highlighted Cambio Radical's shift toward , prioritizing institutional stability and implementation over hardline anti-insurgency rhetoric, though internal parapolitics scandals involving some legislators tested its cohesion. In the 2018 elections, Vargas Lleras's presidential candidacy garnered limited support, leading to his third-place finish and the party's focus on legislative gains: 16 and 30 seats for the 2018–2022 term. Absent a formal endorsement in the Duque-Petro runoff, Cambio Radical positioned itself as an independent force, distancing further from uribismo while critiquing both extremes. Local successes in 2019, including 16 governorships and 287 mayoralities, underscored its regional strength, sustained through flexible alliances rather than ideological rigidity. By the 2020s, amid Gustavo Petro's left-wing presidency, Cambio Radical evolved into a core opposition element, advocating coalitions against perceived policy failures in security and economics. In 2023–2025, Vargas Lleras emerged as a unifying figure for anti-Petro forces, fostering dialogues with uribista leaders like Uribe for potential 2026 electoral pacts, signaling a tactical re-convergence on the right while retaining the party's centrist-liberal identity. This adaptability has preserved its viability in Colombia's volatile party system, though reliance on alliances has invited criticism for opportunism.

Ideology and Political Positions

Core Principles and Evolution

Cambio Radical emerged as a emphasizing democratic renewal and ethical , positioning itself as an alternative to entrenched corruption and traditional party practices in . Its foundational principles, articulated in its statutes and platform, center on fostering through efficient , poverty alleviation, and the promotion of alongside robust measures. The party advocates for a "Estado Comunitario" model, which integrates participation in public functions to enhance social welfare and local , while upholding the state's monopoly on legitimate force to ensure . Key objectives include eradicating and hunger, achieving universal quality from to secondary levels, advancing equity and reducing family violence, and improving health outcomes such as rates and reproductive health access. These commitments reflect a pragmatic , blending liberal emphases on individual rights and equity with calls for territorial reorganization to optimize and environmental . The party's platform also prioritizes , equity, and global partnerships for development, aiming to overcome systemic issues like immorality and inefficiency in . Anti-corruption stands as a , born from its origins in combating narcotrafficking infiltration and corrupt political customs, with a focus on transparent and to reduce . In policy terms, this manifests in support for expansion, housing provision for low-income families, and expanded access to basic services like 24-hour in municipalities—achievements highlighted in the party's self-assessment. While maintaining a commitment to , the principles underscore citizen as foundational, aligning with empirical needs in a context of historical violence, though without endorsing ideological extremes. Ideologically, Cambio Radical's principles have evolved from its 1997 roots as a faction within the Liberal Party, initially driven by a rejection of traditional and support for conservative-leaning candidates like Alfonso Valdivieso in 1998. By 2000, upon formalizing as Cambio Radical, it shifted toward backing Álvaro Uribe's 2002 presidential bid, embracing his "Democratic Security" agenda that prioritized anti-insurgency efforts and state strengthening against armed groups—a causal pivot toward security realism amid Colombia's internal conflict. This alignment propelled electoral gains, with the party securing 5 senators and 10 representatives in 2002, expanding to 15 senators and 21 representatives by 2006. Post-2009, following its exit from Uribe's amid parapolitics scandals implicating some members, the party's reflected a broadening toward social and developmental priorities under leaders like Germán Vargas Lleras, who assumed presidency in 2004. It absorbed movements like Nuevo Liberalismo by 2007, endorsing in 2010's runoff and gaining 8 senators and 28 representatives, while holding vice-presidential roles under Santos' administration focused on peace negotiations with FARC. This period marked a nuanced shift: retaining security emphases but incorporating welfare-oriented goals, such as and , evident in 2018's peak of 16 senators and 30 representatives. By 2022, with 30 curules in , the party positioned itself as a centrist force critiquing polarization, prioritizing competence over rigid . Such adaptations stem from pragmatic alliances and electoral imperatives, maintaining core and efficiency tenets while responding to Colombia's evolving challenges like post-conflict and inequality.

Security and Anti-Insurgency Stance

Cambio Radical's security and anti-insurgency stance emphasizes robust military engagement and territorial state presence to combat guerrilla groups such as the ELN and , drawing from the Democratic Security policy initiated under President Vélez in . The party, which allied with Uribe's administration from its early years, endorsed the expansion of from approximately 320,000 personnel in to over 450,000 by , alongside increased funding that rose from 3.4% to 4.3% of GDP, enabling operations that reduced homicide rates by 52% (from 70.2 to 33.4 per 100,000 inhabitants) and kidnappings by 91% (from 2,986 to 282 cases annually) over the period. This approach prioritized offensive actions against insurgent strongholds, including the rescue of high-profile hostages and the neutralization of over 20,000 FARC combatants through combat or defection, which Cambio Radical leaders attributed to restoring investor confidence and civilian control in previously ungoverned areas. The party's position rejects or unconditional negotiations with active insurgent factions, viewing them as extensions of Marxist-Leninist ideologies intent on territorial dominance rather than genuine peace. During Uribe's tenure, Cambio Radical supported the Justice and Peace Law of 2005, which facilitated the demobilization of over 30,000 fighters while imposing conditional penalties tied to truth-telling and reparations, distinguishing it from prior failed talks under President Andrés Pastrana that yielded territorial concessions without disarmament. Party founder and former leader Germán Vargas Lleras publicly affirmed in 2010 that Democratic Security must endure beyond Uribe's government, underscoring a commitment to sustained over cyclical policy shifts. In opposition to subsequent administrations, particularly Gustavo Petro's "total peace" initiative since 2022, Cambio Radical has advocated resuming military pressure on the ELN and , which control up to 40% of rural territory and perpetrate over 70% of recent massacres per official data. In June 2023, spokespersons condemned Petro's ELN talks as opaque, asserting that negotiators lacked defined parameters for cessation of hostilities amid ongoing attacks, such as the group's January 2023 border incursion killing five soldiers. This stance aligns with critiques of outcomes, noting the 2016 FARC accord's failure to prevent splinter groups from rearming and expanding cultivation to 230,000 hectares by 2022, exceeding pre-accord levels. Cambio Radical has also highlighted ELN financing through and , estimated at $100 million annually, as evidence requiring eradication over dialogue. Despite internal variations, the party's congressional bloc has pushed for legislative measures strengthening and , including proposals in 2025 to enhance troop deployments in Catatumbo and Cauca regions where ELN-FARC clashes displaced 50,000 civilians. This hardline posture, rooted in empirical gains from prior military-focused eras, contrasts with left-leaning sources' portrayals of such policies as exacerbating issues, though independent analyses credit them with verifiable violence declines absent in negotiation-dominant phases.

Economic and Social Policies

Cambio Radical has historically advocated for market-oriented economic policies emphasizing reductions, fiscal discipline, and investment to foster competitiveness and growth. In its presidential campaign led by Germán Vargas Lleras, the party proposed slashing the rate from 71% to 30% to halt , which it quantified at $15 billion by over 7,000 nationals amid low growth below 1%, and to address urban-rural disparities through reoriented public spending toward productivity-enhancing measures. This approach aligns with structural reforms aimed at boosting confidence, continuing large-scale projects, and linking to social investments like expanded access to potable water and programs, which the party credited for achieving near-universal coverage in targeted areas during prior administrations. More recently, Cambio Radical has positioned itself against expansive , rejecting President Gustavo Petro's 2026 national proposal for insufficient fiscal prudence and critiquing claims of economic success under his tenure as overstated, arguing instead for policies that prioritize private investment over state intervention to avoid recessionary pressures. The party's center-right orientation, as classified in analyses of Colombian political spectra, supports free enterprise while cautioning against unchecked public expenditure that could exacerbate debt and deter . On social policies, Cambio Radical emphasizes practical improvements in public services through efficiency and private sector involvement rather than centralized state control. In health care, the party has proposed alternative reforms to the 1993 system, including the creation of a Fondo de Garantías to ensure service delivery without "estatización" (state takeover), comprising 43 articles focused on enhancing access and quality via a supply-driven model opposed to government-led demand-side overhauls. These initiatives, presented in 2023 and 2024, aim to address service gaps by strengthening EPS (health promotion entities) and regulatory oversight, contrasting with Petro's reforms by preserving competition to avoid monopolistic inefficiencies. In broader social domains, the party highlights past successes in housing and utilities expansion as models for equity, tying welfare gains to economic stability rather than redistributive mandates.

Organizational Structure

Leadership and Key Figures

Cambio Radical originated from a dissident faction within the , with its foundational convention held on December 13, 1997, at the Teatro Libre in , presided over by Paulina de Castro Monsalvo. Ernesto Rojas Morales served as the initial secretary general, while Antonio Álvarez Lleras acted as coordinator general, playing a pivotal role in aligning the movement with Álvaro Uribe's 2002 presidential campaign. These early leaders emphasized a shift toward pragmatic , securing the party's legal recognition as Cambio Radical on July 5, 2000, after electing five senators and nine representatives in the 1998 legislative elections. Germán Vargas Lleras ascended to the party presidency in June 2004 during a national assembly at the in , a position he has held continuously, transforming Cambio Radical into a major centrist force. As the party's preeminent figure, Vargas Lleras ran as its presidential candidate in 2014, garnering approximately 15% of the national vote, and served as from 2010 to 2017 under President , overseeing infrastructure and social policy initiatives. His leadership has been marked by strategic alliances, including initial support for Uribe's security agenda and later opposition coalitions, though internal tensions arose over his independent maneuvers, such as endorsing Santos in 2010. Recent party conventions in 2025 have urged Vargas Lleras to seek the presidency again in 2026, underscoring his enduring influence despite his formal withdrawal from active candidacy in 2018. Other notable figures include Claudia Blum, who presided over the Senate as a Cambio Radical member from 2005 to 2006, and Nancy Patricia Gutiérrez, who held the same role from 2007 to 2008, both advancing legislative priorities on security and economic reform. In contemporary , David Luna serves as national director and senator, coordinating party strategy and congressional operations. Senators such as Carlos Fernando Motoa and Didier Lobo Chinchilla represent the party's bench, focusing on and measures, while the broader cadre includes governors and mayors emphasizing decentralized . This structure reflects Cambio Radical's evolution from a group to a disciplined reliant on Vargas Lleras' , though factional disputes have occasionally challenged centralized control.

Internal Governance and Membership

Cambio Radical's internal operates on democratic and pluralistic principles, emphasizing participatory mechanisms while rejecting , , or imposition in decision-making processes. The party's statutes mandate that affiliates influence key decisions, including the election of officials and candidates, through structured assemblies such as the Convención Nacional, which convenes every two years to elect the Director Nacional and address major programmatic issues. Internal disputes are resolved via , with the Consejo de Control Ético handling sanctions for misconduct, subject to appeals to the Comité Central within five days. The primary organs of direction and government include the Director Nacional, elected by the Convención Nacional to represent the party domestically and internationally and preside over major meetings; the Comité Central, consisting of seven members responsible for approving statutes, budgets, and candidate endorsements (avales); and the Comisión Política Nacional, composed of the party's senators and representatives, which establishes political orientations requiring a 75% for formal declarations. Administrative functions fall under the Secretario General, who serves as the legal representative and oversees finances and operations, while bancada coordinators in legislative bodies are elected for six-month terms to manage group decisions by vote or consensus, documented in official actas. Membership is open to Colombian citizens who endorse the party's principles and accept its statutes and code of ethics, with admission processed through local directorios subject to review by the Comité Central, which may reject applicants due to prior legal convictions or ethical violations. Members hold rights to participate in party programs, aspire to candidacies, utilize party symbols, access information, and express without , balanced by duties to promote objectives, adhere to internal rules, and abide by collective decisions. The party encourages affiliation as a means to foster , though specific enrollment figures are not publicly detailed in official documents.

Electoral Performance

Presidential Elections

Cambio Radical, initially formed as a political movement in 1998, provided early support to presidential candidates aligned with its reformist agenda. In the 1998 election, the party backed Alfonso Valdivieso before shifting endorsement to Andrés Pastrana, who won the presidency. In 2002, it conducted an internal consultation to support Álvaro Uribe Vélez, who secured victory in the first round with 53.0% of the vote amid widespread backing from Uribe's anti-insurgency platform. The party's most direct presidential candidacy came in 2010, nominating Germán Vargas Lleras, its prominent leader and former . Vargas Lleras obtained 1,473,627 votes (7.7% of valid votes) in the first round on May 30, placing fourth behind , , and . Following this, Cambio Radical endorsed Santos in the June 20 runoff, contributing to his win with 69.0% of the vote and securing Vargas Lleras the vice presidency (2010–2014). In 2014, Cambio Radical integrated into the National Unity coalition, nominating Vargas Lleras as the vice presidential running mate for incumbent President . The Santos–Vargas ticket advanced to the runoff after the June 15 first round (Santos at 25.7%) and prevailed on June 15 with 50.95% against Óscar Iván Zuluaga, reflecting the party's leverage in centrist alliances. For the 2018 election, Cambio Radical again fielded Vargas Lleras as its presidential candidate, positioning him as a continuity option with emphasis on and . He garnered minimal support, receiving approximately 0.6% of votes in the May 27 first round, failing to advance amid voter fragmentation favoring and . The party subsequently endorsed Duque of the Democratic Center in the June 17 runoff, aiding his 53.98% victory as part of a broader right-center coalition. Cambio Radical's influence waned in the 2022 presidential race, where it did not nominate a candidate but aligned with opposition coalitions against leftist frontrunner . Elements of the party supported centrist coalitions like Team for Colombia (backing ), though internal divisions limited unified impact; Petro won the June 19 runoff with 50.44%. Looking to 2026, party leaders in September 2025 urged Vargas Lleras to run again, advocating a unified right-wing front to consolidate votes against the Petro administration, with internal consultations planned to select candidates. This reflects ongoing efforts to revive electoral relevance through strategic alliances rather than standalone bids.

Legislative Elections

Cambio Radical achieved its peak legislative representation in the elections held on March 12, 2006, securing 15 seats in the 102-member and 21 seats in the 166-member Chamber of Representatives, primarily through its alignment with President Vélez's pro-security coalition. This success positioned the party as a key supporter of Uribe's legislative agenda on security reforms and . The 2010 legislative elections marked a downturn, with the party losing seats from its 2006 totals amid the nationwide parapolítica scandal, which investigated ties between congress members and groups, implicating several Cambio Radical figures and eroding voter confidence. Despite remaining in the governing coalition, the party's reduced presence—fewer than the prior 36 total seats—highlighted vulnerabilities to allegations and shifting alliances post-Uribe. In the March 9, 2014, elections, Cambio Radical recovered somewhat by endorsing 's reelection and serving as the vice-presidential vehicle for Germán Vargas Lleras, maintaining a viable bloc in both chambers through the National Front coalition framework. The party contributed to Santos's legislative majorities on peace negotiations and fiscal policies, though internal tensions over deal terms foreshadowed future fractures. The March 11, 2018, vote saw Cambio Radical retain influence as an opposition force to the incoming administration, leveraging Vargas Lleras's candidacy remnants to hold competitive positions, including multiple and House seats amid fragmented center-right votes. However, by the March 13, 2022, elections, the party suffered a sharp collapse to just 11 total curules across the (108 seats post-peace accord expansions) and Chamber (188 seats including special districts), failing to meet expectations despite anti-left positioning against Petro's rise. This outcome stemmed from leadership vacuums after Vargas Lleras's 2018 exit, vote fragmentation, and perceptions of without policy renewal.

Regional and Local Results

In the 2023 territorial elections conducted on October 29, Cambio Radical secured 5 governorships out of 32 departments, reflecting a targeted presence in regions such as Atlántico and Bolívar where its candidates prevailed amid competition from traditional parties like the Conservatives and Liberals. The party also elected 237 municipal mayors across Colombia's 1,102 municipalities, contributing to its foothold in smaller locales often influenced by clientelist networks and local alliances, though many victories involved coalitions with parties like Partido de la U. Additionally, it won 9 mayorships in departmental capital cities, including key urban centers, underscoring a blend of independent and joint candidacies that capitalized on voter priorities like and . Historical performance in prior cycles shows variability tied to national alignments. In the 2019 elections on October 27, Cambio Radical maintained relevance through endorsements and coalitions, electing several governors and hundreds of local officials, though exact tallies were diluted by multiparty pacts that favored broader conservative-leaning blocs over standalone wins. Earlier, during the 2015 territorial vote, the party, often leading Uribista coalitions, contributed to securing 13 governorships and 312 municipalities collectively, leveraging anti-guerrilla security narratives in conflict-affected areas like Antioquia and . This era marked peak local influence, with Cambio Radical's emphasis on pragmatic governance aiding mayoral gains in over 300 locales via allied slates. At the sub-municipal level, Cambio Radical has consistently captured seats in departmental assemblies and municipal councils, with 47 deputies and 1,165 councilors in 2023 alone, enabling oversight of regional budgets and policy execution. These outcomes highlight the party's adaptation to Colombia's fragmented local politics, where single-party dominance is rare and success hinges on endorsements from figures like former president , despite internal shifts post-2010. Declines in standalone governorships from earlier highs—down from coalition-led peaks—reflect challenges from rising independents and left-leaning surges in urban peripheries, yet sustained mayoral holdings affirm resilience in rural and mid-sized departments.

Policy Impacts and Achievements

Contributions to Security Reforms

Cambio Radical has endorsed Colombia's Democratic Security Policy, initiated under President Vélez in 2002, as a foundational for territorial control, sovereignty defense, and citizen participation against . The party's legislative members provided support for this framework, which prioritized military strengthening and expanded state presence, contributing to a halving of the national rate from 67.5 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2002 to 32.6 in 2010, alongside reductions in kidnappings from 2,986 cases in 2002 to 213 in 2010. Through key figures like Germán Vargas Lleras, who served as Minister of Interior and Justice from February 2007 to August 2008, the party advanced complementary justice reforms to bolster anti-insurgency efforts, including enhancements to the penal code and extradition processes that facilitated prosecutions of paramilitary leaders and guerrillas under the 2005 Justice and Peace Law. Vargas Lleras emphasized continuity of these security gains in his 2010 presidential campaign, proposing further police modernization and rural security investments to sustain territorial recovery from groups like the FARC. In subsequent coalitions, such as under President (2018–2022), Cambio Radical lawmakers backed extensions of security protocols, including increased funding for the National Police and military operations that dismantled dissident FARC fronts, reducing active guerrilla combatants from over 7,000 in 2016 to approximately 2,000 by 2022. The party has also advocated for targeted reforms, such as stricter penalties for , exemplified by unanimous approval in recent sessions for laws eliminating judicial benefits for feminicide convicts linked to criminal networks. These efforts reflect a consistent emphasis on empirical metrics of violence reduction over negotiation-centric approaches, prioritizing state coercive capacity to deter insurgency resurgence.

Economic and Institutional Reforms

Cambio Radical has emphasized investment as a key driver of , particularly through public-private partnerships (PPPs). During Germán Vargas Lleras's tenure as from 2010 to 2017, the party supported and advanced the national agenda under President , including the launch of the fourth-generation () highway concessions. By 2016, this program had secured commitments for over $30 billion in investments, targeting improvements in roads, ports, and rail to lower logistics costs, which averaged 13-15% of GDP, and facilitate regional trade integration. The party's economic stance has consistently favored fiscal prudence over expansive taxation, as evidenced by its rejection of President Gustavo Petro's 2023-2025 proposals, which sought to raise up to 26 pesos (approximately $6 billion) through measures like a 10% on high incomes and pension levies. Cambio Radical argued these would stifle investment and growth, instead proposing alternatives focused on efficient spending and targeted incentives for sectors like housing and employment generation, drawing from Vargas Lleras's earlier advocacy for elevating spending to 3.5% of GDP to create jobs and stimulate demand. Institutionally, Cambio Radical originated in 1998 as a breakaway from the Liberal Party amid scandals linking politicians to drug cartels, positioning itself as a force for cleaner governance and reduced . The party has sponsored legislation, including a 2023 bill mandating stricter oversight of contracts, such as mandatory performance bonds and digital transparency platforms to prevent embezzlement, building on its historical support for judicial modernization under Uribe's administration, where it backed the 2004 shift to an accusatory penal system that expedited trials and improved conviction rates from under 5% to over 70% in subsequent years. In health and administrative reforms, Cambio Radical has countered Petro's 2023 overhaul by proposing statutory amendments to preserve among insurers while enhancing regulatory enforcement, arguing that dismantling the contributory regime—covering 50 million affiliates—risks service disruptions without proven efficiency gains. These efforts reflect the party's broader commitment to incremental institutional strengthening, including eight legislative initiatives in 2023 targeting social, economic, and governance efficiencies amid opposition to perceived executive overreach.

Controversies and Criticisms

Allegations of Paramilitary Ties

In the context of Colombia's parapolítica scandal, which emerged in 2006 following confessions from demobilized leaders of the (AUC), numerous politicians across parties faced investigations for alleged alliances with groups to secure electoral support through intimidation, financing, and vote-rigging. Cambio Radical, despite its founding in 1998 as a reformist alternative to traditional parties tainted by corruption, endorsed or affiliated with several figures later implicated in these ties. The of Justice's investigations led to convictions of multiple Cambio Radical-backed officials for paramilitary collaboration. For instance, Miguel Ángel , governor of Casanare elected in 2003 with party support, was condemned in 2005 for conspiracy to commit aggravated homicide and illicit enrichment, with evidence linking him to AUC blocs in the region. Similarly, Edilberto Castro Rincón, Meta's governor in 2003 under Cambio Radical endorsement, received a 2007 conviction for the homicide of legislator Orley Rodríguez and candidate Néstor Humberto Bejarano, tied to paramilitary operations in the Eastern Plains. Senator Javier Cáceres, a party member, was also convicted for paramilitary financing and electoral pacts, resulting in the "empty chair" mechanism vacating his seat in 2012. Several politicians from Cambio Radical, including Estanislao Ortiz Lara from Antioquia linked to the Elmer Cárdenas Bloc, were investigated or implicated in ties to paramilitary groups via the parapolítica scandal involving alliances with the AUC. At least four congressmen from the party were re-elected while under Supreme Court investigation for such ties. By 2017, Cambio Radical had the highest number of congressmen condemned in parapolítica cases among major parties, with reports citing at least 19 such convictions, often involving AUC fronts like the Northern Bloc under Rodrigo Tovar Pupo ("Jorge 40"). Ongoing probes into serving legislators, such as Senator Daira de Jesús Galvis Méndez (re-elected in 2014) for ties to paramilitary financier Enilse López ("La Gata"), and Representative Luis Eduardo Díazgranados (also re-elected 2014) for links to Jorge 40's network, highlighted persistent allegations despite party disavowals. These cases stemmed from paramilitary testimonies and financial records, though critics from right-leaning sectors argued some prosecutions reflected judicial overreach amid post-Uribe political rivalries. No direct involvement has been proven against top leaders like Germán Vargas Lleras, but the endorsements fueled claims of systemic infiltration.

Corruption Scandals and Clientelism

Cambio Radical has been implicated in multiple high-profile corruption cases, primarily involving bribery, embezzlement, and irregularities in public contracting. In the Odebrecht scandal, former senator Bernardo Elías Cano, who served under the party's banner until 2018, was convicted in March 2022 of receiving $133,000 in bribes to influence congressional approval of contracts for the Brazilian firm's infrastructure projects, including the Ruta del Sol highway; he received a 136-month prison sentence and a fine equivalent to 1,000 minimum wages. Similarly, in January 2023, the party's national director, Fabio Andrés Valencia Cossio, faced formal charges from the Attorney General's Office for alleged irregularities in the adjudication of the Ruta del Sol II contract during his prior role at the National Infrastructure Agency (ANI), including failure to enforce penalties on contractors. The party has endorsed numerous regional officials later investigated or convicted for , contributing to perceptions of lax vetting in its alliance-building strategy. A identified Cambio Radical as having backed the majority of Colombia's then-investigated governors, including Luis Alberto Monsalvo Gnecco of Cesar, who was detained in 2019 by the on charges of concerting crimes, , and tied to pre-election pacts involving illicit funds exceeding 6 billion pesos. Other cases include Oneida Pinto, supported for La Guajira governorship in 2011, who was sentenced in 2017 to 11 years for of over 1.2 billion pesos in departmental funds. By 2024, congressional debates highlighted Cambio Radical as holding the record for most members convicted of and parapolitics-related offenses among major parties, with at least a dozen senators and representatives facing sanctions since 2010. Clientelism within Cambio Radical manifests through vote-buying allegations and the strategic distribution of public resources to build loyalty networks, exacerbating Colombia's entrenched systems. The party's expansion since relied on endorsements to local bosses (caciques) who traded avales for electoral support, often involving cash incentives or pork-barrel projects; for example, 2011 Bogota mayoral candidate scandals led to the replacement of party director Germán Varón amid claims of candidate-linked graft. Investigations into regional campaigns, such as those in Arauca and Cesar, have uncovered patterns where party-backed aspirants allegedly exchanged state contracts for votes, with Transparency for Colombia reporting over 20% of 2018-2022 legislative candidates from Cambio Radical linked to such practices. Critics, including academic analyses of broker , attribute this to the party's shift from programmatic appeals to transactional alliances, undermining institutional as resources are funneled to secure legislative majorities rather than public goods. While party leaders deny systemic involvement, attributing issues to individual actors, the recurrence across administrations underscores causal links between rapid endorsement growth and vulnerability to clientelist capture.

Internal Divisions and Electoral Declines

Internal divisions within Cambio Radical intensified following the 2022 legislative elections, marked by frequent rebellions among congressmen who defied party leadership directives on key votes. In May 2025, the party announced investigations into several senators who failed to vote against President Gustavo Petro's proposed popular consultation, despite official party instructions, highlighting ongoing struggles with disciplinary enforcement. Similarly, in 2025, internal conflicts arose over efforts to prevent certain senators from aligning with government-backed initiatives, reflecting broader factional tensions between loyalists and those seeking pragmatic alliances. These episodes contributed to a reorganization process announced in July 2025, aimed at addressing leadership fragmentation and the exit of historical figures ahead of the 2026 elections. Such divisions have eroded party cohesion, with congressmen from Cambio Radical, alongside those from other center-right parties, openly challenging directives from national leaders, as reported in analyses of pre-2026 electoral dynamics. This lack of unity stems partly from the post-2018 leadership transition after founder Germán Vargas Lleras reduced his involvement, leading to disputes over strategic positioning between opposition hardliners and moderates open to cross-aisle cooperation. The party's formal opposition stance against Petro's administration has been undermined by these defections, prompting calls for stricter internal controls and potential leadership changes. Electorally, these internal fractures have coincided with a marked decline in Cambio Radical's representation. In the March 2022 legislative elections, the party suffered significant losses, forfeiting multiple seats in both the and compared to the 2018-2022 term, prompting it to form a joint congressional bloc with the Partido de la U to consolidate its diminished influence. This downturn reflects broader deinstitutionalization in Colombia's , exacerbated by high volatility and the rise of newer coalitions, reducing Cambio Radical's share from a peak in the early to marginal gains in subsequent cycles. Regional elections in October 2023 further highlighted the erosion, with weakened local strongholds contributing to the party's ongoing reorganization efforts by mid-2025. Analysts attribute part of this decline to internal disarray, which has diluted voter confidence and hindered effective campaigning against left-leaning surges under Petro.

Recent Developments

Response to Petro Government

Cambio Radical formally declared itself in opposition to President Gustavo Petro's government in September 2022, invoking the opposition statute to modify its political stance during the presidential term. This positioned the party as a key critic of Petro's agenda, emphasizing opposition to reforms perceived as detrimental to and institutional integrity. The party has articulated its independence from the executive since early in Petro's term, rejecting alliances with pro-government factions ahead of the 2026 elections. The party has mounted sustained opposition to Petro's legislative priorities, particularly , , and reforms. In February 2023, Cambio Radical highlighted seven flaws in the reform proposal, including excessive and risks to service delivery. Lawmakers from the party withdrew from reform debates in , citing concerns over fiscal irresponsibility. By March 2025, the rejected support for Petro's proposed popular consultation on reforms, and in September 2025, endorsed archiving the revised reform (Health Reform 2.0) due to its potential to undermine existing systems. Cambio Radical's rhetoric has intensified, portraying Petro's governance as marked by crisis and unfulfilled promises. On the third anniversary of Petro's administration in August 2025, the party issued a statement decrying "crisis, setback, and disappointment" in , , and , accusing the government of systemic failures. In 2025, spokespersons claimed Petro had "lost control of the country," responding to executive statements on and governance. Further critiques targeted Petro for claiming undue credit for prior achievements and engaging in "show of whims" amid controversies, as satirized in September 2025 social media posts. The party has coordinated with other opposition groups, such as Centro Democrático, to demand accountability on issues like and policy reversals, including a October 2025 call to halt "political hatred" following the of opposition senator Miguel Uribe. This stance reflects Cambio Radical's broader strategy to differentiate from Petro's left-wing policies, prioritizing market-oriented reforms and institutional checks amid declining approval for the administration.

2022 Elections and Beyond

In the legislative elections of March 13, 2022, Cambio Radical obtained 18 seats in the Chamber of Representatives, maintaining a presence amid a fragmented opposition landscape where left-wing Pacto Histórico emerged strongest with 30 seats. The party did not advance a unified presidential candidate in the concurrent consultations, with internal divisions leading to endorsements split across center-right figures like Federico Gutiérrez of the Equipo por Colombia coalition, though without formal party backing in the May 29 first round or June 19 runoff, where Gustavo Petro defeated Rodolfo Hernández. Following Petro's inauguration on , , Cambio Radical initially adopted a conditional stance toward the new left-wing government but shifted decisively to opposition by March 10, 2023, when its national council unanimously declared the party in outright opposition, citing policy divergences on , , and institutional reforms. This positioned the party as a critic of Petro's agenda, including reforms to health, pensions, and labor, which it argued lacked fiscal sustainability and exacerbated instability. From 2023 to 2025, Cambio Radical intensified scrutiny of the Petro administration, highlighting low execution rates in public investment—such as only 40% in some sectors by early 2025—and accusing it of delivering ", retroceso, and decepción" after three years, particularly in where rates rose in certain regions despite promises of "total peace." On July 17, 2025, the party labeled the government one of "total improvisation," pointing to unmet campaign pledges and failures amid with GDP growth projected below 2% for 2025. Internally, the party faced challenges, including rebellions among congressmen defying leadership ahead of 2026 elections and loss of the Chamber presidency in February 2025 to a government-aligned of Pacto Histórico, Liberals, and La U, reducing its institutional leverage. In September 2025, Cambio Radical ruled out alliances with parties supporting Petro for the 2026 presidential race, emphasizing a commitment to center-right opposition unity against perceived radical policies.

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  101. https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2025/09/20/cambio-radical-lanzo-critica-satirica-contra-petro-por-recientes-polemicas-brayan-gustavo-colombia-no-necesita-un-show-de-ocurrencias/
  102. https://es-us.noticias.yahoo.com/principales-partidos-oposici%25C3%25B3n-colombiana-exigen-154043206.html
  103. https://www.facebook.com/BurbujadeCordoba/posts/pol%25C3%25ADtica-la-oposici%25C3%25B3n-se-articula-cambio-radical-y-centro-democr%25C3%25A1tico-preparan-u/1100687478910866/
  104. https://www.partidocambioradical.org/al-huila-volvieron-las-masacres-que-habiamos-abandonado-representante-triana-2/
  105. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Colombia_Chamber_of_Representatives_2022.svg
  106. https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2079269/Final%2BReport%2BEU%2BEOM%2BColombia%2B2022.pdf
  107. https://www.wradio.com.co/2023/03/11/cambio-radical-es-ahora-partido-de-oposicion-al-gobierno-petro/
  108. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S_V0kHXHWMk
  109. https://www.partidocambioradical.org/el-gobierno-del-cambio-ha-sido-de-total-improvisacion-cambio-radical/
  110. https://www.lasillavacia.com/silla-nacional/golpe-a-cambio-radical-peligra-su-presidencia-en-la-camara/
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