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Human security
Human security
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Human security is a paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities whose proponents challenge the traditional notion of national security through military security by arguing that the proper referent for security should be at the human rather than the national level, and that a people- centered view of security is necessary for national, regional and global stability. The concept emerged from a multi-disciplinary understanding of security which involves a number of research fields, including development studies, international relations, strategic studies, and human rights. The United Nations Development Programme's 1994 Human Development Report is considered a milestone publication in the field of human security, with its argument that ensuring "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear" for all persons is the best path to tackle the problem of global insecurity.[1][2]

Critics of the concept argue that its vagueness undermines its effectiveness, that it has become little more than a vehicle for activists wishing to promote certain causes, and that it does not help the research community understand what security means or help decision-makers to formulate good policies.[3][4] Alternatively, other scholars have argued that the concept of human security should be broadened to encompass military security: 'In other words, if this thing called 'human security' has the concept of 'the human' embedded at the heart of it, then let us address the question of the human condition directly. Thus understood, human security would no longer be the vague amorphous add-on to harder-edged areas of security such as military security or state security.'[5]

In order for human security to challenge global inequalities, there has to be cooperation between a country's foreign policy and its approach to global health. However, the interest of the state has continued to overshadow the interest of the people. For instance, Canada's foreign policy, "three Ds", has been criticized for emphasizing defense more than development.[6]

Origins

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The emergence of the human security discourse was the product of a convergence of factors at the end of the Cold War. These challenged the dominance of the neorealist paradigm's focus on states, "mutually assured destruction" and military security and briefly enabled a broader concept of security to emerge. The increasingly rapid pace of globalization; the failure of liberal state-building through the instruments of the Washington Consensus; the reduced threat of nuclear war between the superpowers, and the exponential rise in the spread and consolidation of democratization and international human rights norms opened a space in which both 'development' and concepts of 'security' could be reconsidered.

At the same time, the increasing number of internal violent conflicts in Africa, Asia and Europe (Balkans) resulted in concepts of national and international security failing to reflect the challenges of the post Cold War security environment whilst the failure of neoliberal development models to generate growth, particularly in Africa, or to deal with the consequences of complex new threats (such as HIV and climate change) reinforced the sense that international institutions and states were not organized to address such problems in an integrated way.

The principal possible indicators of movement toward an individualized conception of security lie in the first place in the evolution of international society's consideration of rights of individuals in the face of potential threats from states. The most obvious foci of analysis here are the UN Charter, the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and its associated covenants (1966), and conventions related to particular crimes (e.g., genocide) and the rights of particular groups (e.g., women, racial groups, and refugees).[7]

Concept

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UNDP's 1994 definition

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Mahbub ul Haq first drew global attention to the concept of human security in the United Nations Development Programme's 1994 Human Development Report and sought to influence the UN's 1995 World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen. The UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report's definition of human security argues that the scope of global security should be expanded to include threats in seven areas:

Coloured world map indicating Human Development Index (as of 2008). Countries coloured green exhibit high human development, those coloured yellow/orange exhibit medium human development, and those coloured red exhibit low human development.
The 2003 map
  • Economic securityEconomic security requires an assured basic income for individuals, usually from productive and remunerative work or, as a last resort, from a publicly financed safety net. In this sense, only about a quarter of the world's people are presently economically secure. While the economic security problem may be more serious in developing countries, concern also arises in developed countries as well. Unemployment problems constitute an important factor underlying political tensions and ethnic violence.
  • Food securityFood security requires that all people at all times have both physical and economic access to basic food. According to the United Nations, the overall availability of food is not a problem, rather the problem often is the poor distribution of food and a lack of purchasing power. In the past, food security problems have been dealt with at both national and global levels. However, their impacts are limited. According to the UN, the key is to tackle the problems relating to access to assets, work and assured income (related to economic security).
  • Health securityHealth security aims to guarantee a minimum protection from diseases and unhealthy lifestyles. In developing countries, the major causes of death traditionally were infectious and parasitic diseases, whereas in industrialized countries, the major killers were diseases of the circulatory system. Today, lifestyle-related chronic diseases are leading killers worldwide, with 80 percent of deaths from chronic diseases occurring in low- and middle-income countries.[8] According to the United Nations, in both developing and industrial countries, threats to health security are usually greater for poor people in rural areas, particularly children. This is due to malnutrition and insufficient access to health services, clean water and other basic necessities.
  • Environmental securityEnvironmental security aims to protect people from the short- and long-term ravages of nature, man-made threats in nature, and deterioration of the natural environment. In developing countries, lack of access to clean water resources is one of the greatest environmental threats. In industrial countries, one of the major threats is air pollution. Global warming, caused by the emission of greenhouse gases, is another environmental security issue.
  • Personal securityPersonal security aims to protect people from physical violence, whether from the state or external states, from violent individuals and sub-state actors, from domestic abuse, or from predatory adults. For many people, the greatest source of anxiety is crime, particularly violent crime.
  • Community securityCommunity security aims to protect people from the loss of traditional relationships and values and from sectarian and ethnic violence. Traditional communities, particularly minority ethnic groups are often threatened. About half of the world's states have experienced some inter-ethnic strife. The United Nations declared 1993 the Year of Indigenous People to highlight the continuing vulnerability of the 300 million Aboriginal people in 70 countries as they face a widening spiral of violence.
  • Political securityPolitical security is concerned with whether people live in a society that honors their basic human rights. According to a survey conducted by Amnesty International, political repression, systematic torture, ill-treatment, or disappearance was still practised in 110 countries. Human rights violations are most frequent during periods of political unrest. Along with repressing individuals and groups, governments may try to exercise control over ideas and information.[9]

Since then, human security has been receiving more attention from key global development institutions, such as the World Bank. Tadjbakhsh, among others, traces the evolution of human security in international organizations, concluding that the concept has been manipulated and transformed considerably since 1994 to fit organizational interests.[10]

Freedom from Fear vs Freedom from Want and beyond

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In an ideal world, each of the UNDP's seven categories of threats (and perhaps others as a broader discussion might prioritize) would receive adequate global attention and resources. Yet attempts to implement this human security agenda have led to the emergence of two major schools of thought on how to best practice human security – '"Freedom from Fear"' and '"Freedom from Want"'. While the UNDP 1994 report originally argued that human security requires attention to both freedom from fear and freedom from want, divisions have gradually emerged over the proper scope of that protection (e.g. over what threats individuals should be protected from) and over the appropriate mechanisms for responding to these threats.

  • Freedom from Fear – This school seeks to limit the practice of Human Security to protecting individuals from violent conflicts while recognizing that these violent threats are strongly associated with poverty, lack of state capacity and other forms of inequities. This approach argues that limiting the focus to violence is a realistic and manageable approach towards Human Security. Emergency assistance, conflict prevention and resolution, and peace-building are the main concerns of this approach. Canada, for example, was a critical player in the efforts to ban landmines and has incorporated the "Freedom from Fear" agenda as a primary component in its own foreign policy. However, whether such a “narrow” approach can truly serve its purpose in guaranteeing more fruitful results remains to be an issue. For instance, the conflicts in Darfur are often used in questioning the effectiveness of the "Responsibility to Protect”, a key component of the Freedom from Fear agenda.
  • Freedom from Want – The school advocates a holistic approach in achieving human security and argues that the threat agenda should be broadened to include hunger, disease and natural disasters because they are inseparable concepts in addressing the root of human insecurity[2] and they kill far more people than war, genocide and terrorism combined.[11] Different from "Freedom from Fear", it expands the focus beyond violence with emphasis on development and security goals.

Despite their differences, these two approaches to human security can be considered complementary rather than contradictory.[11] Expressions to this effect include:

  • Franklin D. Roosevelt's famous Four Freedoms speech of 1941, in which "Freedom from Want" is characterized as the third and "Freedom from Fear" is the fourth such fundamental, universal, freedom.
  • The Government of Japan considers Freedom from Fear and Freedom from Want to be equal in developing Japan's foreign policy. Moreover, the UNDP 1994 called for the world's attention to both agendas.
  • Surin Pitsuwan, the Secretary-General of ASEAN in 2008-2012 cites theorists such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Hume to conclude that "human security is the primary purpose of organizing a state in the beginning.".[12] He goes on to observe that the 1994 Human Development Report states that it is "reviving this concept" and suggests that the authors of the 1994 HDR may be alluding to Franklin Roosevelt's Four Freedoms speech without literally citing that presentation.

Although "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" are the most commonly referred to categories of human security practice, an increasing number of alternative ideas continue to emerge on how to best practice human security. Among them:

  • Paul James.[13] James asks two apparently simple questions: Firstly, why, if 'the human’ as a category by definition encompasses all considerations of governance, the state and the military, does military security continue to be treated as prior, more significant, or even equal to human security. By contrast, "when children play ‘category’ games", he says, "they implicitly understand such issues of ordering". Secondly, why does human security get narrowly defined in terms of liberal notions of 'freedom': freedom from want and freedom from fear? In response to these two questions, he provides the following alternative definition, with human security encompassing military security:
Human security can be defined as one of the foundational conditions of being human, including both (1) the sustainable protection and provision of the material conditions for meeting the embodied needs of people, and (2) the protection of the variable existential conditions for maintaining a dignified life. Within this definition, it then makes sense that the core focus of human-security endeavours should be on the most vulnerable. It makes sense that risk management should be most responsive to immediate events or processes that have both an extensive and intensive impact in producing material and existential vulnerabilities of people in general or a category of persons across a particular locale.[13]: 87 
  • G. King and C. Murray.[14] King and Murray try to narrow down the human security definition to one's "expectation of years of life without experiencing the state of generalized poverty". In their definition, the "generalized poverty" means "falling below critical thresholds in any domain of well-being"; and it is in the same article, they give a brief review and categories of "Domains of Well-being". This set of definitions is similar to "freedom from want" but more concretely focused on some value system.
  • Caroline Thomas.[15][16] She regards human security as describing "a condition of existence" which entails basic material needs, human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, and an active and substantive notion of democracy from the local to the global.
  • Roland Paris.[4] He argues that many ways to define "human security" are related to a certain set of values and lose the neutral position. So he suggests to take human security as a category of research. As such, he gives a 2*2 matrix to illustrate the security studies field.
Security for Whom? What is the Source of the Security Threat?
Military Military, Non-military, or Both
States National security

(conventional realist approach to security studies)

Redefined security

(e.g., environmental and economic [cooperative or comprehensive] security)

Societies, Groups, and Individuals Intrastate security

(e.g., civil war, ethnic conflict, and democide)

Human security

(e.g., environmental and economic threats to the survival of societies, groups, and individuals)

  • Sabina Alkire.[17] Different with those approaches seek to narrow down and specify the objective of human security, Sabina Alkire pushes the idea a step further as "to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, without impeding long-term human fulfilment". In a concept as such, she suggests the "vital core" cover a minimal or basic or fundamental set of functions related to survival, livelihood and dignity; and all institutions should at least and necessarily protect the core from any intervention.
  • Lyal S. Sunga.[18] In 2009, Professor Sunga argued that a concept of human security that is fully informed by international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law and international refugee law, and which takes into account the relevant international legal norms prohibiting the use of force in international relations, will likely prove more valuable to international legal theory and practice over the longer term, than a concept of human security which does not meet these conditions because these fields of law represent the objectified political will of States rather than the more subjective biases of scholars.

The first university textbook of human security, edited by Alexander Lautensach and Sabina Lautensach,[19] appeared in open access form in 2020. According to their Four Pillar Model, human security rests on the four pillars of sociopolitical security, economic security, environmental security and health security. Because of its focus on the long term as well as on immediate needs, the environmental pillar of human security assumes prime significance. It necessitates our attention to the utter dependence of human welfare on the integrity of ecological support structures.

Relationship with traditional security

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Coined in the early 1990s, the term human security has been used by thinkers who have sought to shift the discourse on security away from its traditional state-centered orientation to the protection and advancement of individuals within societies.[7][20] Human security emerged as a challenge to ideas of traditional security, but human and traditional or national security are not mutually exclusive concepts. It has been argued that, without human security, traditional state security cannot be attained and vice versa.[11]

Europe after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648

Traditional security is about a state's ability to defend itself against external threats. Traditional security (often referred to as national security or state security) describes the philosophy of international security predominance since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the rise of the nation-states. While international relations theory includes many variants of traditional security, from realism to liberalism, the fundamental trait that these schools share is their focus on the primacy of the nation-state.

The following table contrasts four differences between the two perspectives:

Traditional Security Human Security
Referent Traditional security policies are designed to promote demands ascribed to the state. Other interests are subordinated to those of the state. Traditional security protects a state's boundaries, people, institutions and values. Human security is people-centered. Its focus shifts to protecting individuals. The important dimensions are to entail the well-being of individuals and respond to ordinary people's needs in dealing with sources of threats.
Scope Traditional security seeks to defend states from external aggression. Walter Lippmann explained that state security is about a state's ability to deter or defeat an attack.[21] It makes use of deterrence strategies to maintain the integrity of the state and protect the territory from external threats. In addition to protecting the state from external aggression, human security would expand the scope of protection to include a broader range of threats, including environmental pollution, infectious diseases, and economic deprivation.
Actor(s) The state is the sole actor. Decision-making power is centralized in the government. Traditional security assumes that a sovereign state is operating in an anarchical international environment, in which there is no world governing body to enforce international rules of conduct. The realization of human security involves not only governments, but a broader participation of different actors,[22] viz. regional and international organizations, non-governmental organizations and local communities.
Means Traditional security relies upon building up national power and military defense. The common forms it takes are armament races, alliances, strategic boundaries, etc. Human security not only protects but also empowers people and societies as a means of security. People contribute by identifying and implementing solutions to insecurity.

Relationship with development

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Human security also challenged and drew from the practice of international development.

Traditionally, embracing liberal market economics was considered to be the universal path for economic growth, and thus development for all humanity.[15] Yet, continuing conflict and human rights abuses following the end of the Cold War and the fact that two-thirds of the global population seemed to have gained little from the economic gains of globalization,[23] led to fundamental questions about the way development was practiced. Accordingly, human development has emerged in the 1990s to challenge the dominant paradigm of liberal economy in the development community. Human development proponents argue that economic growth is insufficient to expand people's choices or capabilities, areas such as health, education, technology, the environment, and employment should not be neglected.

Human security could be said to further enlarge the scope for examining the causes and consequences of underdevelopment, by seeking to bridge the divide between development and security. Too often, militaries didn't address or factor in the underlying causes of violence and insecurity while development workers often underplayed the vulnerability of development models to violent conflict. Human security springs from a growing consensus that these two fields need to be more fully integrated in order to enhance security for all.

The paper "Development and Security" by Frances Stewart argues that security and development are deeply interconnected.[24]

  • Human security forms an important part of people’s well-being, and is therefore an objective of development.
    An objective of development is “the enlargement of human choices”. Insecurity cuts life short and thwarts the use of human potential, thereby affecting the reaching of this objective.
  • Lack of human security has adverse consequences on economic growth, and therefore development.
    Some development costs are obvious. For example, in wars, people who join the army or flee can no longer work productively. Also, destroying infrastructure reduces the productive capacity of the economy.
  • Imbalanced development that involves horizontal inequalities is an important source of conflict.
    Therefore, vicious cycles of lack of development which leads to conflict, then to lack of development, can readily emerge. Likewise, virtuous cycles are possible, with high levels of security leading to development, which further promotes security in return.

Further, it could also be said that the practice of human development and human security share three fundamental elements:[17]

  • First, human security and human development are both people-centered. They challenge the orthodox approach to security and development i.e. state security and liberal economic growth respectively. Both emphasize people are to be the ultimate ends but not means. Both treat humans as agents and should be empowered to participate in the course.
  • Second, both perspectives are multidimensional. Both address people's dignity as well as their material and physical concerns.
  • Third, both schools of thought consider poverty and inequality as the root causes of individual vulnerability.

Despite these similarities, the relationship with development is one of the most contested areas of human security. "Freedom from fear" advocates, such as Andrew Mack, argue that human security should focus on the achievable goals of decreasing individual vulnerability to violent conflict, rather than broadly defined goals of economic and social development. Others, such as Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, argue that human development and human security are inextricably linked since progress in one enhances the chances of progress in another while failure in one increases the risk of failure of another.[25]

The following table is adopted from Tadjbakhsh[26] to help clarify the relationship between these two concepts.

Variables Human Development Human Security
Values Well-being. Security, stability, sustainability of development gains
Orientation Moves forward, is progressive and aggregate: “Together we rise” Looks at who was left behind at the individual level: “Divided we fall”
Time Frame Long term Combines short-term measures to deal with risks with long-term prevention efforts.
General objectives Growth with equity. Expanding the choices and opportunities of people to lead lives they value. “Insuring” downturns with security. Identification of risks, prevention to avoid them through dealing with root causes, preparation to mitigate them, and cushioning when disaster strikes.
Policy goals Empowerment, sustainability, equity and productivity. Protection and promotion of human survival (freedom from fear), daily life (freedom from want), and the avoidance of indignities (life of dignity).

Relationship with human rights

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Human security is indebted to the human rights tradition (the ideas of natural law and natural rights). The development of the human security model can be seen to have drawn upon ideas and concepts fundamental to the human rights tradition. Both approaches use the individual as the main referent and both argue that a wide range of issues (i.e. civil rights, cultural identity, access to education and healthcare) are fundamental to human dignity. A major difference between the two models is in their approach to addressing threats to human dignity and survival. Whilst the human rights framework takes a legalistic approach, the human security framework, by utilizing a diverse range of actors, adopts flexible and issue-specific approaches, which can operate at local, national or international levels.

The nature of the relationship between human security and human rights is contested among human security advocates. Some human security advocates argue that the goal of human security should be to build upon and strengthen the existing global human rights legal framework.[27] However, other advocates view the human rights legal framework as part of the global insecurity problem and believe that a human security approach should propel us to move above and beyond this legalistic approach to get at the underlying sources of inequality and violence which are the root causes of insecurity in today's world.[15]

Relationship with non-governmental organizations

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See also: Non-governmental organization

The term NGO (Non-Government Organisation) cannot be simply defined due to complexities surrounding its structure, environment and complex relations it shares with its internal factions; being its organisational mission, membership and sources of funding, and external factors such as the relationship it shares with actors; detailing the economic, political and societal constructs they may be bound by. A generic understanding of the term may refer to the actions taken in the interests of independent, voluntary contributors which exist independently from governments and corporations, designed to represent and provide a collective voice to individuals regarding issues. These issues cover contributions to the fields and industries of human development, health and nutrition, human rights and education, and environmental concerns; all of which influence and affect human security.

The traditional roles of NGOs may be classified into three components, in accordance with Lewis:[28]

- Implementer: refers to the mobilisation of resources in order to aid the provision of goods and services, such as the act of service delivery.

- Catalyst: refers to the emotional and psychological aspect of the NGOs ability to inspire, facilitate or contribute to spur action or thinking.

- Partner: refers to the NGOs relationships shared with external actors such as governments, donors or the private sector players through joint activities, or projects with communities, with the purpose to strengthen the relationship between the NGOs and these partners in a mutually beneficial fashion.

The expansion of these roles have culminated in assisting the creation of a society where NGOs serve as important players in the global arena in regards to maintaining human security. Due to this increasing influence and the emergence of growing natural and man-made disasters, NGOs now are contracted by governments in order to adequately respond to crises, as well as assist individual or collectivised groups of citizens in lobbying their interests; thus culminating in the ability to enact, influence and change government agendas. However, NGOs are still largely dependent on certain levels of government funding, hence critics may argue that NGOs pose the ability to potentially damage issues of human security due to this financial dependence. Despite these critiques, the focus, expertise and infrastructure developed by NGOs through their activities linked with human development and human rights allow them to make unique contributions to human security provision.[29]

Relationship with the environment

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Comprehensive human security attempts to unify environmental security together with social (societal) security. A great number of intertwined environmental and social components together create the framework for comprehensive human security under the assumption that neither of those two categories is attainable in the long run without synergy between the two.[30] That is to say that the trends in environmental, resource, and population stresses are intensifying and will increasingly determine the quality of human life on our planet and as such are a large determining factor of our social security.[31]

Arthur H. Westing posits that the two interdependent branches of comprehensive human security can be broken down into a series of subcomponents to better achieve optimal environmental and social security. Environmental security is composed of two subcomponents: (a) Rational resource utilization, that is resource use that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”[32] Social security can be simplified to components of (a) Established political safeguards, (b) Economic safeguards, (c) Personal safeguards, and (d) Military safeguards.[30]

The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) states that a major goal of comprehensive human security is to “transmit practical recommendations to policy-makers on how to strengthen human security through better environmental management and more effective natural resource governance.”[33] The overreaching goal being a pervasive global mindset that recognizes the interdependent natures of the natural environment and our collective social security.

Gender and human security

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Human security focuses on the serious neglect of gender concerns under the traditional security model. Traditional security's focus on external military threats to the state has meant that the majority of threats women face have been overlooked. It has recently been argued that these forms of violence are often overlooked because expressions of masculinity in contexts of war have become the norm.[34] By focusing on the individual, the human security model aims to address the security concerns of both women and men equally. However, as of recent conflicts, it is believed that the majority of war casualties are civilians and that "such a conclusion has sometimes led to the assumptions that women are victimized by war to a greater extent than men, because the majority of adult civilians are women, and when the populations of civilian women and children are added together, they outnumber male combatants. Furthermore, in the post-war context women survivors generally outnumber men and so it is often said that women as a group bear a greater burden for post-war recovery".[35] Women are often victims of violence and conflict: they form the majority of civilian deaths; the majority of refugees; and, are often the victims of cruel and degrading practices, such as rape.[36]: 96  Women's security is also threatened by unequal access to resources, services and opportunities.[36]: 97–100  The UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, as of 1995, suggested that the problem is not just a social one, but requires evaluation of the political institutions which uphold the unequal system of domination.[37] Women's rights are neglected especially in the Middle East and Southeast Asian regions where customary practices are still prevalent. Although there are different opinions on the issue of customary practices, it infringes upon human security's notion that women and men are innated with equal human rights. Attempts to eradicate such violent customary practices require political and legal approaches where human security in relation to gender should be brought up as the main source of assertion. Such cruel customary practices as honor killing, burning brides and widows, child marriage are still in existence because of women's vulnerability in economic independence and security. Human security in relationship to gender tries to overthrow such traditional practices that are incompatible to the rights of women. Also, human security seeks to empower women, through education, participation and access, as gender equality is seen as a necessary precondition for peace, security and a prosperous society.[36]: 105–107 

Feminist critiques of human security

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Rape as a weapon of war theory

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During times of conflict, certain varieties of masculinity come to be celebrated by the State, and these varieties of behaviors can influence how a population's combatants come to behave, or are expected to behave during crises. These behaviors range from acting aggressively and exemplifying hyper-masculine behaviors, to playing upon the rise of "nationalist or ethnic consciousness" to secure "political support for the cause and to undermine "the Other".[35] Overtly militaristic societies have utilized rape and other sexually violent acts to further their gains within the context of war, but also by using such practices of violence as rewards to the (often male) combatants. This tactic undermines the enemy's morale, as they are seen as "unable to protect their women".[35]

The category of human

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Recent feminist critiques of Human Security often find difficulties with the concept and categorization of "Human". This categorization is made under the influence of certain value systems which are inherently exclusive by their nature. For instance, the liberal definition of "human" is: someone that is independent and capable of making decisions for themselves.[38] This definition is problematic because it excludes persons who are not independent, such as persons with disabilities, from human security rights. If Human Security was to be entirely inclusive it would need to challenge the current definition of "human" on which it operates and acknowledge that different abilities also require rights.[39]

Eurocentrism

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The concept of human security has developed out of the precepts put forth by the United Nations, wherein there has been a critique of Human Security's focus on what is deemed acceptable behaviors.[40] Human security perspectives view practices such as child marriage and female genital mutilation as a threat to human (more specifically female) security and well-being in the Global North, while it is more common that these events occur predominately in the Global Southern states. Thus it is seen by states with a traditional human security outlook, to see it as their duty to intervene and perpetuate this eurocentric ideal of what human security looks like, and what is best to protect the familiar concept of women.[40] This can be seen as an infringement on the traditional practices found within some sovereign states of the Global South, and a threat to ways of life and processes of development.


Prevent, react, and rebuild

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Human security seeks to address underlying causes and long-term implications of conflicts instead of simply reacting to problems, as the traditional security approach is often accused of doing. "The basic point of preventive efforts is, of course, to reduce, and hopefully eliminate, the need for intervention altogether,"[41]: 19  while an investment in rehabilitation or rebuilding seeks to ensure that former conflicts do not breed future violence. The concepts of prevention and rebuilding are clearly embraced as the “responsibility to prevent” and well elaborated in "The Responsibility to protect report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty."

Relationship with humanitarian action

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In several senses there is a natural fit between human security concepts and humanitarian principles. The concern with the protection of people or individuals is a core humanitarian value as well as of human security. In this sense it shares human security's merging of development and security and the casting of the protection of life as the referent object.

Human security and humanitarian action also shared a similar process of evolution. The rise of the human security discourse in the 1990s paralleled an equally rapid expansion in humanitarian roles and a broadening in the objectives of humanitarianism that was labeled the ‘new humanitarianism’. Humanitarian assistance, once encompassing a narrow set of emergency-based life-saving interventions conducted by a small group of relatively independent actors, became ‘an organising principle for intervention in internal conflicts, a tool for peacebuilding and the starting point for addressing poverty, as well as a palliative in times of conflict and crisis.’ It also merged with development concerns such as the promotion of social justice and societal cohesion.

The human security discourse was also used as a tool to resist aid policies becoming hijacked by narrow security concerns. States, such as the Republic of Ireland, promoted the Human Security concept as a way to ensure a more balanced approach to security and development issues both nationally and within the EU.

Despite the sense of a natural fit between human security concepts and humanitarian principles, they have enjoyed a difficult relationship. Human security perspectives have the potential to interfere with the traditionally apolitical nature of humanitarianism in conflict situations, leading to a blurring of the boundaries between politico-military interventions and those designed primarily to reduce suffering.[42] In another sense the emphasis on human security has legitimised the idea of armed international intervention as a "moral duty" if states are deemed incapable or unwilling to protect their citizens. Similarly, the adoption of 'holistic' security and development strategies within UN Integrated peacekeeping missions is viewed by some as having the potential to compromise humanitarian principles.

Authors such as White and Cliffe drew attention to the way in which the 'broadening of aid objectives from pure survival support towards rehabilitation, development and/ or peace-building' led to the 'dilution of commitment to core humanitarian principles'. Furthermore, many humanitarian organisations have sought to develop rights-based approaches to assistance strategies which challenge the apolitical approach of traditional humanitarianism. Rights-based approaches view poverty and vulnerability as rooted in power relations – specifically, the denial of power, which is itself related to the denial of human rights. Hence rights-based approaches to humanitarian action relate the achievement of security for marginalized people to the realization of their human rights and often to broader social change. Multimandate humanitarian organisations that seek more inclusive and participatory forms of citizenship and governance and the achievement of broader social rights outcomes, therefore, risk enmeshing apolitical humanitarian responses in advocacy programmes that push for broader social changes.

Practice

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While there are numerous examples of the human security approach in action, two notable global political events with direct ties to the human security agenda include the development of Responsibility to Protect (R3P) principles guiding humanitarian intervention and the passage of the Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel landmines.

Humanitarian intervention

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The application of human security is highly relevant within the area of humanitarian intervention, as it focuses on addressing the deep-rooted and multi-factorial problems inherent in humanitarian crises, and offers more long-term resolutions. In general, the term humanitarian intervention generally applies to when a state uses force against another state in order to alleviate suffering in the latter state (See, humanitarian intervention).

Under the traditional security paradigm, humanitarian intervention is contentious. As discussed above, the traditional security paradigm places emphasis on the notion of states. Hence, the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention that are paramount in the traditional security paradigm make it difficult to justify the intervention of other states in internal disputes. Through the development of clear principles based on the human security concept, there has been a step forward in the development of clear rules of when humanitarian intervention can occur and the obligations of states that intervene in the internal disputes of a state.

These principles on humanitarian intervention are the product of a debate pushed by United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan. He posed a challenge to the international community to find a new approach to humanitarian intervention that responded to its inherent problems.[41] In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) produced the "Responsibility to protect", a comprehensive report detailing how the “right of humanitarian intervention” could be exercised. It was considered a triumph for the human security approach as it emphasized and gathered much needed attention to some of its main principles:

  • The protection of individual welfare is more important than the state. If the security of individuals is threatened internally by the state or externally by other states, state authority can be overridden.
  • Addressing the root causes of humanitarian crises (e.g. economic, political or social instability) is a more effective way to solve problems and protect the long-term security of individuals.
  • Prevention is the best solution. A collective understanding of the deeper social issues along with a desire to work together is necessary to prevent humanitarian crises, thereby preventing a widespread absence of human security within a population (which may mean investing more in development projects).

The report illustrates the usefulness of the human security approach, particularly its ability to examine the cause of conflicts that explain and justify humanitarian intervention. In addition, it could also act as a paradigm for identifying, prioritizing and resolving large transnational problems, one of the fundamental factors that act as a stimulus for humanitarian intervention in the first place. However, human security still faces difficulties concerning the scope of its applicability, as large problems requiring humanitarian intervention usually are built up from an array of socio-political, cultural and economic problems that may be beyond the limitations of humanitarian projects.[43] On the other hand, successful examples of the use of human security principles within interventions can be found.

The success of humanitarian intervention in international affairs is varied. As discussed above, humanitarian intervention is a contentious issue. Examples of humanitarian intervention illustrate, that in some cases intervention can lead to disastrous results, as in Srebrenica and Somalia. In other cases, a lack of clarity as to the rules of when intervention can occur has resulted in tragic inaction, as was witnessed during the Rwandan genocide. One example of a successful humanitarian intervention and also of humanitarian principles being applied is East Timor which, prior to its independence, was plagued with massive human rights abuses by pro-Indonesian militias and an insurgency war led by indigenous East Timorese against Indonesian forces. A peacekeeping mission was deployed to safeguard the move to independence and the UN established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). This not only dealt with traditional security priorities, but also helped in nation-building projects, coordinated humanitarian aid and civil rehabilitation, illustrating not only a successful humanitarian intervention but also an effective application of human security principles.

Anti-personnel landmines

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  State Parties to the Ottawa Treaty

In contrast to the traditional security discourse which sees security as focused on protecting state interests, human security proponents believe that Anti-personnel mines could not be viable weapons of war due to the massive collateral damage they cause, their indiscriminate nature and persistence after conflict. In particular, they argue that anti-personnel mines differ from most weapons, which have to be aimed and fired since they have the potential to kill and maim long after the warring parties have ceased fighting. The United Nations has reckoned that landmines are at least ten times more likely to kill or injure a civilian after a conflict than a combatant during hostilities.[44] The effects are also long-lasting. The ICBL estimates that anti-personnel mines were the cause of 5,751 casualties in 2006.[45] Whereas traditionally, states would justify these negative impacts of mines due to the advantage they give on the battlefield, under the human security lens, this is untenable as the wide-ranging post-conflict impact on the day-to-day experience of individuals outweighs the military advantage.

The Ottawa Convention, which led to the banning of anti-personnel landmines, is seen as a victory for the Human Security agenda. The Ottawa Convention has proved to be a huge step forward in the 'Freedom from Fear' approach. In Ottawa, the negotiations were moved outside traditional disarmament forums, thus avoiding the entrenched logic of traditional arms control measures.[46]: 36  According to Don Hubert, an advocate of Human Security from the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, the main reason for its success was a multilateral focus. While INGO's like the UN and the ICRC remain the key players along with middle power states like Norway and Canada, its actual power and push comes from the involvement of a host of civil society actors (NGOs) and the general public.[46] Human Security proponents believe that this treaty has set new standards in humanitarian advocacy and has acted as a landmark in international lawmaking for a more secure world.

Critics of the treaty, however, caution against complacency on its success. Many states, they point out, have neither signed nor ratified this convention. They include China, Russia and the United States who are major contributors to the global weapons trade.[47] Second, even though there were a diverse group of civil society actors, the real influence on the treaty came from the ones in the 'global north'. Third, cynics may argue that the success of this campaign stems from the fact that these weapons were outdated and of limited military value and this treaty just helped to accelerate a process that would have happened anyway.[48]

Criticism

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In making an assessment of the pros and cons of the human security concept, Walter Dorn includes several additional criticisms.[49] In particular, he asks whether it is in fact as radical a departure in foreign policy terms as is sometimes claimed. Dorn argues that the international community has been concerned with issues of human safety since at least the time of the establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross in the 1860s. Stuart Gordon argues that Canada, one of its principal adherents, has in many ways simply recast its traditional Pearsonian foreign policy in the language of human security. Dorn also questioned whether the concept was really necessary ‘since all the initiatives in the human security agenda were already advancing before the advent of the concept.’ Finally, he suggests ways that the concept may be counterproductive. In their effort to fortify against ‘virtually limitless UN interventionism’ governments may repress ‘their populations into servility." Still, he sees an important role for the concept.

Richard Jolly and Deepayan Basu Ray, in their UNDP report, suggest that the key criticisms of human security include: Human security does not have any definite boundaries, therefore anything and everything could be considered a risk to security. This makes the task of policy formulation nearly impossible; Human security, when broadened to include issues like climate change and health, complicates the international machinery for reaching decisions or taking action on the threats identified; Human security risks engaging the military in issues best tackled through non-military means; Human security under the UN risks raising hopes about the UN's capacity, which it cannot fulfil.

Other authors, such as Roland Paris, argue that human security is not such a fundamental recasting of the security debate in terms of a central struggle ‘between Realist, traditional, state-based, interest-based, approaches and new, Liberal cosmopolitan, de-territorialised, values-based approaches, which focus on individual human needs. ‘ Rather, he suggests that the talk of two radically different ‘paradigms’ has been much exaggerated.

Formulation of a Human Security Index and an environment for discussing same

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As if to answer the points above, a Human Security Index[50] was prototyped and released in 2008. Project coordinator D. A. Hastings notes that "if one were challenged to create an index on the condition of people-centric Human Security, such as the authors of the Human Development Index faced in 1990 and expanded qualitatively in 1994, one could now begin to do so – at least for the sake of discussion and resultant improvements." The release document and a United Nations Bangkok Working Paper[51] publish and discuss the original approach, which is based partly on:

  • The original Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Programme, made more geographically complete (to 230+ countries) as described in a report issued by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.[52]
  • The essay on Human Security in the 1994 Human Development Report.
  • An Equitability/Inclusiveness Enhanced Human Development Index – in which each of the components of the HDI (education, health, and income) are modified by an indicator of equitability in an attempt to adjust, for example, for the gap between the indicator of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita (adjusted for purchasing power parity) and the desired measure of financial resources "in the pocket" of a typical person in a country. In that index some countries with relatively equitable ratings compared to their Human Development Index (such as Iceland, the Slovak Republic, and Estonia) do relatively well, whereas some countries with relatively inequitable ratings compared to their HDI (such as Ireland, Greece, and the USA) do less well.
  • A Social Fabric Index which enumerates human security with respect to the environment, diversity, peacefulness, freedom from corruption, and info empowerment. This was blended with the Human Development Index to form the prototype Human Security Index.

A 2010 enhancement to the HSI recast the composite index around a trinity of Economic, Environmental, and Social Fabric Indices.[53] The result is thus conceptually similar to the Triple Bottom Line of Corporate Social Responsibility as described by John Elkington, as well as to the stated goals of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress.[54] The release note of HSI Version 2 also notes efforts to balance local and global context, individual and society concerns, left-right political issues, east-west and north-south cultural and social issues. Current Version 2 of the HSI ingests about 30 datasets and composite indicators, and covers 232 countries and dependencies. It is released at HumanSecurityIndex.org.

Considerable differences in national ratings and standings have been noted between the HSI and indicators such as GDP per capita or the Human Development Index. Several small island countries plus Bhutan, Botswana, and some central-eastern European countries do considerably better in the HSI than they do in GDP per capita or HDI. Conversely, Greece and some Eurozone peers such as Ireland and Spain, several countries in the Gulf, Israel, Equatorial Guinea, the US and Venezuela do worse in the HSI than in GDP per capita or HDI. Influential factors vary (as is viewed in the data and discussions on the HumanSecurityIndex.org Website), but include diversity and income equality, peacefulness, and governance.

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Human security refers to a in international policy and that prioritizes the protection of individuals and communities from pervasive threats to their survival, livelihood, and dignity, rather than solely focusing on state sovereignty and military defense. Introduced in the Development Programme's 1994 , it encompasses ""—protection against violence and conflict—and ""—safeguarding against economic deprivation, hunger, disease, and environmental hazards. The framework identifies seven interconnected categories of security: to ensure access to resources and employment; to prevent hunger; health security against disease and malnutrition; from natural disasters and degradation; personal security from physical violence, including crime and abuse; community security amid ethnic tensions or social conflicts; and political security protecting against repression and violations. These elements underscore an interdependent, people-centered approach that emphasizes prevention over reaction and universal applicability across contexts. Adopted in UN resolutions and national human development reports, human security has influenced initiatives like the Commission on Human Security led by and , which advocated integrated policies addressing root causes of vulnerability. However, the concept has drawn academic criticism for its breadth, which can render it conceptually vague and difficult to operationalize into measurable policies or prioritize threats effectively. Empirical studies on interventions framed under human security, such as those by international NGOs, show mixed results in enhancing outcomes like reduced or improved livelihoods, often limited by challenges in causal attribution and implementation amid complex local dynamics. Critics argue it risks diluting focus on acute threats or enabling expansive interpretations that justify interventions without clear security gains.

Definition and Core Principles

UNDP's Foundational Framework

The United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) 1994 introduced human security as a toward protecting individuals rather than territories, prioritizing development over armament. This framework defined human security as comprising "safety from chronic threats such as , and repression" alongside "protection from sudden and hurtful disruption in the patterns of daily life," whether in rich or poor nations. The report emphasized a people-centered approach, recognizing as universal in scope, interdependent across threats, and oriented toward prevention rather than reaction. Central to this framework were seven interconnected categories of security: (stable income and employment); (access to nutritious sustenance); health security (protection from diseases and preventable mortality); (sustainable ); personal security (safety from physical ); community security (preservation of traditional identities and social bonds); and political security (guarantees of ). These dimensions underscored the interdependence of threats, arguing that vulnerabilities in one area—such as economic —could cascade into others, like food shortages or social unrest, necessitating holistic strategies over isolated interventions. Published amid post-Cold War transitions, the report advocated redirecting resources from arms races to human-centered development, reflecting optimism for global cooperation in addressing non-military risks like and . It positioned human security as integral to sustainable human development, widening choices for individuals to live freely without fear, while critiquing state-centric models for neglecting subnational and transnational perils. This foundational articulation influenced subsequent UNDP national reports, embedding human security analyses in country-specific vulnerability assessments.

Categories of Threats and Freedoms

The Development Programme's (UNDP) 1994 delineates human security through seven interconnected categories of threats, emphasizing protection for individuals rather than states. These categories bifurcate into "," which targets violence and , and "," which addresses chronic deprivations. includes personal security against physical harm from crime, abuse, or warfare; community security against intergroup violence driven by ethnic or religious divides; and political security against state repression or abuses. encompasses from and ; food security from and ; health security from and inadequate medical access; and from or resource degradation. Debates persist over the relative emphasis on these pillars, with proponents of a narrow interpretation prioritizing for its direct link to survival threats like armed conflict, arguing it enables concrete policy responses such as . Critics of broadening to contend that socio-economic threats introduce vagueness, potentially conflating security with general development goals and diluting focus on acute dangers. Conversely, advocates for integration highlight that want-based vulnerabilities often precipitate fear-based ones, as economic despair can fuel into insurgencies or heighten susceptibility to . Empirical evidence underscores these interconnections: horizontal inequalities in resource access correlate with elevated civil conflict risks, with data from 1960–2000 showing that groups facing are twice as likely to engage in . Poverty traps, where low income limits and investments, perpetuate cycles amplifying both want and ; for instance, analyses of sub-Saharan African cases reveal that GDP below $600 annually triples conflict onset probability compared to higher thresholds. Such causal links necessitate holistic approaches, though operational challenges arise from prioritizing measurable threats over diffuse want factors.

Distinction from Broader Security Paradigms

Human security diverges from traditional paradigms by prioritizing the protection of individuals from a broad spectrum of threats—such as economic deprivation, , and environmental hazards—over the defense of state territories and . Whereas emphasizes military deterrence and response to external , human security adopts a people-centered framework that addresses both chronic vulnerabilities and sudden disruptions to human well-being. This shift recognizes that true security emerges from safeguarding personal freedoms and capabilities, rather than solely preserving institutional borders. In contrast to the reactive posture of conventional security, which often mobilizes after threats materialize, human security advocates proactive measures like early prevention to mitigate interdependent risks before they escalate. Its holistic scope integrates dimensions including , , and community stability, fostering resilience through addressing root causes like inequality and resource scarcity, as opposed to the narrower focus on armed conflict resolution. Empirical assessments, such as those evaluating post-conflict recovery, indicate that such preventive strategies enhance individual agency and reduce vulnerability cycles more effectively than isolated military interventions. Implementation of human security further distinguishes it by empowering non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local communities as key actors, enabling bottom-up responses tailored to specific contexts, unlike the top-down, state-dominated mechanisms of traditional security. For instance, NGOs often facilitate community-level threat assessments and capacity-building in fragile settings, leveraging proximity to populations for more adaptive interventions than centralized state apparatuses. This approach underscores that enduring security stems from localized resilience and participation, bypassing bureaucratic rigidities inherent in state-centric models.

Historical Development

Intellectual and Post-Cold War Origins

, a Pakistani economist serving as UNDP's special advisor from 1989, pioneered the human development paradigm in the late as a critique of GDP-focused metrics, advocating instead for assessments of people's expanded choices in , and income. This approach drew from Amartya Sen's capabilities framework, developed in the , which prioritized substantive freedoms enabling individuals to achieve valued functionings over resource distribution alone. Haq's emphasis on holistic well-being challenged realist theories dominant since the mid-20th century, which centered security on state survival amid interstate military rivalries, arguing that such paradigms overlooked chronic vulnerabilities like and . The end of the in December 1991, marked by the Soviet Union's dissolution, diminished existential interstate threats like nuclear confrontation, redirecting focus to intrastate and transnational risks. In , the Yugoslav federation's breakup triggered wars starting in June 1991, with ethnic violence in , , and Bosnia displacing over 2 million people by 1993 and killing approximately 140,000, exposing failures of state-centric deterrence against civil fragmentation. Parallel dynamics in , including Burundi's ethnic massacres in October 1993 that killed 50,000 and presaged Rwanda's April 1994 claiming 800,000 lives, highlighted how internal power vacuums post-bipolar stability amplified non-military threats such as and displacement. These crises revealed empirical shortcomings in traditional security models, which prioritized over individual protections from identity-based violence and , fostering calls for paradigms addressing root causes of human vulnerability.

Evolution Through UN and Policy Milestones

The Human Security Network was established in May 1998 through a bilateral initiative between and , marking an early multilateral effort to prioritize individual protection from violence and promote norms like the on anti-personnel landmines. This network, later expanding to include countries such as , , and , reflected 's foreign policy under Foreign Minister , which emphasized "" in response to post-Cold War conflicts where state-centric interventions, such as the 1993 UN operation in , failed to prevent widespread civilian casualties and despite military deployments exceeding 25,000 troops. In March 1999, proposed the creation of the Trust Fund for Human Security, which was established to finance projects addressing threats to individuals rather than states, with initial contributions focusing on conflict prevention and poverty alleviation in regions like . The fund's in the early 2000s supported over 200 projects by 2010, integrating human security into UN programming by emphasizing empirical assessments of vulnerabilities exposed in 1990s crises, including Somalia's that displaced over 1 million people and caused an estimated 300,000 deaths from violence and starvation. The adoption of the (MDGs) in September 2000 at the UN provided a framework where human security principles indirectly informed targets on and , though explicit integration was limited; for instance, MDG 1 aimed to halve rates by 2015, aligning with human security's focus on economic threats but without dedicated security metrics. Building on this, the Commission on Human Security, launched in January 2001 and co-chaired by and , produced the 2003 report "Human Security Now," which advocated for protection and empowerment strategies tailored to local contexts, influencing UN policies by recommending multi-stakeholder approaches to address interconnected threats like those in failed states. Japan's sustained advocacy, including funding the Trust Fund with over $500 million by the mid-2000s, positioned it as a key proponent in , where human security was applied to regional challenges such as flows and natural disasters, formalizing the paradigm through UN discussions that bridged development and security agendas. These milestones collectively shifted global discourse from territorial defense to individual resilience, evidenced by the Trust Fund's support for initiatives that reduced in post-conflict settings, though critics noted implementation gaps due to reliance on voluntary contributions rather than binding resolutions.

Recent Applications and Adaptations (2020s)

The provided a pivotal application of human security frameworks, underscoring interconnected vulnerabilities in , , and social cohesion. The UNDP's 2022 Special Report on Human Security analyzed how the crisis amplified existing inequalities, with global disruptions affecting over 1.8 billion workers and reversing human development gains equivalent to five years in mere months. This lens revealed structural fragilities, prompting calls for enhanced solidarity to mitigate cascading effects across dimensions of . In parallel, adaptations integrated Anthropocene-scale threats, particularly , into human security paradigms. The same UNDP report framed the —defined by human-driven planetary alterations—as amplifying risks like and , projecting up to 40 million deaths from temperature shifts by 2100 under moderate mitigation scenarios. These evolutions emphasized preventive, people-centered responses over reactive measures, linking to direct threats against individual freedoms and livelihoods. The 2020s also saw expanded focus on hybrid threats, including cyberattacks and weaponized migration, within Euro-Atlantic human security discourses. Analyses highlighted how such tactics erode civilian protections by blending digital disruptions with physical incursions, as seen in coordinated operations targeting and movements. Critiques in these contexts argued for recalibrating state-individual balances, warning that overemphasis on sovereignty could dilute protections against non-traditional aggressions like cyber-enabled . Amid rising multipolar tensions, major powers exhibited verifiable shifts toward resurgence, diminishing relative priority for human security. The U.S. 2022 National Security Strategy positioned as a systemic rival, prioritizing and economic deterrence frameworks that sidelined individual-centric approaches. 's July 2025 white paper on similarly adopted a comprehensive state-led model spanning political, technological, and territorial domains, reflecting a pivot from global human security norms to domestic stability amid great-power competition. These adaptations underscore tensions between expansive threat definitions and resource allocation favoring territorial defense.

Comparison with Traditional Security

State-Centric vs. Individual-Centric Approaches

Traditional state-centric security paradigms, originating from realist theories of international relations, position the state as the principal referent object of security, focusing on safeguarding territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence primarily against external military aggression. This approach employs mechanisms such as nuclear deterrence, military alliances, and balance-of-power strategies to prevent conquest or coercion by rival powers, as exemplified by the U.S.-led containment policy during the Cold War, which successfully limited Soviet expansion without direct superpower conflict and contributed to the eventual dissolution of the USSR in 1991. In contrast, human security adopts an individual-centric lens, elevating people as the core referent, addressing pervasive threats to personal survival and dignity including chronic poverty, hunger, disease, and environmental degradation alongside violence. Philosophically, state-centric models derive from first-principles assumptions of in the international system, where states act as rational, self-interested actors prioritizing collective survival over individual welfare, often viewing internal human vulnerabilities as secondary to external perils. Human security, however, posits a causal chain where individual freedoms from fear and want form the bedrock of stable societies, challenging by emphasizing bottom-up resilience and rights-based protections that transcend borders. Practically, this divergence manifests in policy priorities: state-centric efforts allocate resources to defense budgets and armaments—such as the framework established in 1949 to counter perceived threats—while human security advocates redirect focus toward social investments like health infrastructure and poverty alleviation to mitigate daily existential risks. Empirical illustrations underscore these tensions; the Cold War's successes preserved state sovereignty across Western alliances, enabling economic booms that indirectly bolstered individual livelihoods, yet in contexts of state fragility like , where governance collapse since the 2010 earthquake has perpetuated gang dominance and over 5,600 homicides in 2023 alone, individual-centric threats such as displacement and food insecurity persist amid failed interventions prioritizing symptoms over state rebuilding. Causally, robust state institutions provide the enabling environment for human security by enforcing and resource distribution, as weak states amplify vulnerabilities to non-military hazards, suggesting that individual protections often necessitate prior or concurrent state stabilization rather than isolated pursuit. Overemphasizing individuals without fortifying risks undermining collective defense, potentially exposing populations to unchecked external incursions that erode personal securities en masse.

Empirical Evidence on Effectiveness

Empirical assessments of human security approaches reveal mixed outcomes, with targeted interventions demonstrating reductions in specific threats but broader applications showing weaker causal links to overall conflict mitigation compared to state-centric strategies. The 1997 on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines, embodying human security's emphasis on through , has correlated with a sharp decline in annual landmine casualties from approximately 25,000 in 1999 to fewer than 5,000 by the early 2020s among ratifying states, predominantly affecting civilians who comprised 85% of victims in 2023. This reduction underscores complementary effects in post-conflict zones integrating development and efforts, yet persistent violations in non-signatory or rights-abusing regimes, such as those deploying mines despite treaties, highlight failures where individual protections lack state enforcement. Metrics linking human security investments—such as poverty alleviation and health programs—to (HDI) gains exist, with panel data analyses indicating positive correlations between development expenditures and HDI improvements in regions prioritizing multidimensional threats over purely military ones. However, these associations often conflate human development with , showing limited independent impact on reduction; for instance, HDI rises in stable economies frequently align more closely with robust national defense enabling and deterrence, as evidenced by higher GDP stability in members versus fragile states. Studies contrasting paradigms find national security's role in deterrence yields verifiable stability outcomes, such as reduced interstate conflicts during periods of strong military postures, while human security's diffuse focus competes less effectively in high-threat environments without complementary . Rigorous evaluation faces inherent constraints, with few randomized controlled trials (RCTs) feasible for security interventions due to ethical and logistical barriers, rendering much human evidence observational or anecdotal rather than causally robust. Peer-reviewed critiques note that while human security frameworks highlight vulnerabilities, empirical support for their superiority in conflict outcomes remains tentative, often favoring national approaches' deterrence impacts—such as Cold War-era stability—where quantifiable data on prevented escalations predominates over correlational human-centered metrics. This disparity underscores a reliance on verifiable state-level deterrence for foundational stability, with human security enhancements proving additive only in supported contexts.

Risks of Conceptual Overlap and Dilution

The expansive scope of human security, encompassing threats from , , and alongside , risks conflating disparate challenges and thereby obscuring the prioritization of acute, existential dangers such as military invasion or large-scale . Realist scholars argue that this conceptual breadth dilutes analytical clarity and policy focus, as states must allocate finite resources across non-comparable domains rather than concentrating on core defense imperatives; for instance, diverting budgets toward socio-economic programs can undermine deterrence against aggressive adversaries who exploit such reallocations. Empirical analyses of state failures, such as in during the 1990s or Yugoslavia's disintegration in the early 1990s, demonstrate that institutional collapse at the state level—marked by loss of and territorial control—precedes and amplifies individual-level insecurities, including and ethnic violence, underscoring that human vulnerabilities intensify without a functional sovereign authority to enforce order. Critics from a realist perspective contend that elevating individual-centric protections over state survival invites strategic exploitation by rivals, who can undermine weakened polities through hybrid tactics while proponents of human security advocate diffuse interventions that fail to address root power asymmetries. This overlap fosters ambiguity, as seen in NATO's incorporation of human security doctrines, which has blurred distinctions between operations and policing, complicating command structures and operational effectiveness in conflict zones like post-2001. The paradigm's polysemous nature further hampers cumulative knowledge and evidence-based decision-making, as varying interpretations—from narrow "" to broad ""—impede consistent threat assessment and resource prioritization. A pivotal illustration of these risks emerged in the policy recalibration following the , 2001, attacks, which prompted a decisive pivot toward traditional frameworks emphasizing military preemption, intelligence dominance, and border fortifications over the human security emphases prominent in UN discourse. The U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002 explicitly prioritized defeating terrorist networks and rogue states through , reflecting perceived inadequacies in broader human-centered approaches that had not forestalled the coordination of the attacks despite prior socio-economic aid efforts in regions like the . This shift validated realist warnings that neglecting state-level defenses in favor of individualized threat mitigation leaves populations exposed to cascading failures, as evidenced by heightened global terrorism fatalities—peaking at over 44,000 in 2014—amid protracted interventions blending security and development without resolving underlying state fragility.

Interconnections with Allied Concepts

Ties to Economic Development

Human security frameworks emphasize economic dimensions as integral to achieving "freedom from want," positing poverty not merely as a deprivation but as an amplifier of broader threats such as conflict, , and . fosters environments conducive to violence and undermines resilience, as evidenced by World Bank analyses linking low-income conditions to protracted "conflict debts" that hinder recovery and perpetuate cycles. In this view, economic causally precedes and intensifies human insecurities, making sustained growth a prerequisite for mitigating these risks rather than a coincidental parallel outcome. Empirical data from the World Bank underscore how rising GDP correlates with reduced poverty headcounts, directly alleviating "" pressures. Countries achieving rapid growth, such as and , eliminated (defined as under $1.90 daily) by 2015 through market-oriented reforms that boosted incomes and access to essentials. Similarly, India's GDP expansion contributed to slashing its rate from 16.2% in 2011-12 to 2.3% by 2022-23, lifting 171 million people above the threshold and enhancing household buffers against shocks. These patterns indicate that —via gains and —builds the material foundations for , enabling individuals to withstand threats that overwhelm subsistence-level economies. Critiques of foreign as a primary development tool highlight its frequent failure to deliver causal benefits, often entrenching dependency and instead. Studies reveal aid inflows can distort local incentives, foster overvalued currencies, and sustain without spurring growth, as seen in sub-Saharan cases where dependency ratios exceeded 10% of GDP yet persisted. Empirical audits confirm siphons aid resources, with recipient states scoring low on transparency indices experiencing embezzlement rates up to 20-30% of inflows, undermining intended human security gains. Redistributive policies, while politically appealing, risk by discouraging self-reliance, contrasting with evidence that secure property rights and market mechanisms better enable organic development. From causal reasoning grounded in economic principles, serve as the bedrock for human security by securing assets against expropriation, thereby incentivizing investment and over aid-fueled stagnation. Formalizing extralegal property claims, as in de Soto-inspired reforms, has unlocked capital in informal economies, with Peru's titling program increasing household incomes by 25-30% through collateralized lending. Free markets, by allocating resources via signals rather than redistribution, generate the sustained accumulation essential for resilience, as competitive enforcement of minimizes externalities and maximizes in threat-prone settings. Policies prioritizing these institutions over demonstrate superior outcomes in reducing vulnerability, affirming economic liberty as the engine of human security.

Overlaps with Human Rights Regimes

Human security frameworks intersect with human rights regimes by conceptualizing severe rights violations, such as and mass atrocities, as direct threats to individual and communal stability, necessitating protective responses that extend beyond judicial remedies. The ' human security paradigm, articulated in reports since the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, aligns with by emphasizing , where systematic abuses like undermine personal safety and societal cohesion. Empirical analyses indicate that atrocity crimes, including , are often preceded by escalating patterns of and , framing such violations not merely as legal infractions but as existential security risks that demand preventive intervention. A key synergy emerges through the (R2P) doctrine, endorsed by the UN at the 2005 World Summit, which reframes state sovereignty as contingent on safeguarding populations from , war crimes, , and —core human rights breaches that human security identifies as threats to human dignity and survival. R2P operationalizes this overlap by authorizing international action when states manifestly fail to protect, integrating human rights obligations into security responses and clarifying the scope of human security by prioritizing verifiable threats over vague aspirations. This linkage has influenced UN Security resolutions, where human rights monitoring informs determinations of threats to international peace, though enforcement remains politically constrained. Tensions arise from human rights regimes' emphasis on legalistic enforcement through treaties and courts, which contrasts with human security's pragmatic orientation toward multifaceted threats requiring adaptive, sometimes coercive measures. Human rights instruments, while binding in theory, often prove ineffective without complementary security mechanisms, as judicial processes alone cannot halt ongoing violence; for instance, the International Criminal Court's indictments have limited deterrent impact absent military stabilization. The 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, invoked under R2P to avert civilian massacres amid Gaddafi's crackdown, initially protected rights by halting advances on Benghazi but devolved into prolonged instability due to insufficient post-conflict military and governance support, resulting in factional warfare, open slave markets, and over 500,000 displacements by 2016. President Obama later cited the absence of follow-through as his administration's gravest error, underscoring how rights-focused legalism falters without sustained pragmatic security commitments. These overlaps highlight a realist constraint: universal human rights claims frequently overlook state sovereignty's role in enabling verifiable protections, as expansive interpretations invite selective enforcement that dilutes focus on core threats. Human security's broader lens risks undermining rights regimes by prioritizing aspirational outcomes over enforceable legal standards, potentially eroding accountability in favor of vague interventions. Prioritizing empirical protections—such as bolstering state capacity against atrocities—over ideological universality better aligns both paradigms with causal realities of threat mitigation, avoiding dilutions from cultural or relativist caveats that obscure sovereignty's foundational limits.

Environmental and Resource Dimensions

Environmental resource poses risks to human security by undermining livelihoods, exacerbating displacement, and fueling localized conflicts, particularly in vulnerable regions where populations depend on and natural resources for survival. The (IPCC) identifies established causal pathways from climate variability to increased stress and , which can destabilize food systems and heighten individual vulnerabilities to and . Empirical studies confirm that declines in water mass correlate with elevated probabilities of local violent conflicts, driven by over diminishing supplies rather than interstate wars. Climate-induced migration represents a key dimension, with recent analyses estimating millions displaced annually in the Global South due to stressors like droughts and floods, often resulting in internal movements that strain urban infrastructures and social cohesion. For instance, households exposed to rainfall shocks exhibit a 6 higher likelihood of sending migrants, reflecting adaptive responses to threats but also amplifying exposure to urban insecurities. In arid zones such as the , water conflicts empirically link to deficits compounded by , where intensifies inter-communal tensions over pastoral and farming resources. The conflict in illustrates these dynamics, where prolonged droughts from the 1980s onward, coupled with , reduced and water availability, sparking between nomadic herders and sedentary farmers that escalated into widespread displacing over 2 million by 2008. Scholarly assessments attribute a significant portion of the displacement to rather than solely ethnic or political factors, with rainfall reductions exacerbating scarcity in a already facing land pressure from . While these threats warrant attention, framing environmental issues through a securitization lens risks policy overreach by prioritizing top-down interventions that overlook local adaptive capacities, as evidenced by historical patterns in non-Western societies where communities endured resource shocks through decentralized innovations like crop diversification and communal resource management. Causal analysis favors market-driven adaptations, such as technological advancements in irrigation and drought-resistant crops, which have demonstrated higher efficacy in enhancing resilience compared to multilateral pacts that often suffer from enforcement gaps and inefficient resource allocation. Non-Western historical precedents, including persistence amid Late Bronze Age climatic shifts in regions like the Peloponnese, underscore inherent societal flexibilities that global securitized frameworks may undermine by centralizing control.

Health Threats and Pandemic Responses

Health threats constitute a core pillar of human security, emphasizing vulnerabilities at the individual and community levels rather than solely state-level defenses. Prior to 2020, the epidemic served as a paradigmatic case, with the 1308 in 2000 declaring it a threat to international peace and security in due to its destabilizing effects on populations, economies, and military capacities. The pandemic's indirect impacts, including orphaning millions and exacerbating , underscored how infectious diseases erode human security by impairing access to food, shelter, and livelihoods, prompting calls for integrated responses beyond traditional . The in the 2020s amplified these dynamics, revealing acute global frailties in medical products like and ventilators, which were concentrated in few countries and disrupted by export restrictions and factory shutdowns. measures, implemented variably from March 2020 onward, imposed substantial human costs, including excess non-COVID mortality from delayed care, deterioration, and educational disruptions affecting over 1.5 billion students globally, while empirical meta-analyses indicate they reduced mortality by only 0.2% on average in early 2020 implementations. These trade-offs highlight causal trade-offs in human security, where short-term contagion controls clashed with broader welfare erosion, particularly in low-income settings reliant on informal economies. National-level strategies, such as stockpiles and targeted quarantines, demonstrated superior efficacy compared to diffuse international aid mechanisms during COVID-19. The U.S. enabled rapid distribution of limited inventories like ventilators in , though inadequacies exposed gaps in pre-pandemic planning, while regional quarantines in reduced transmission by up to 40% in high-risk areas through enforced isolation. In contrast, global aid frameworks faltered, with insufficient multinational stockpiles failing to meet surging demands, as seen in shortages persisting into 2021 despite WHO-coordinated efforts. Critiques of the WHO's emphasis on human security framing argue it prioritized broad equity narratives over pragmatic, sovereignty-based interventions, potentially delaying decisive border controls and domestic production ramps that proved more effective in containing outbreaks. Looking forward, bolstering health security through biotechnology and national sovereignty offers a more resilient path than universal access paradigms, which risk over-reliance on fragile global networks. Advances in synthetic biology and AI-driven surveillance could enable rapid vaccine platforms and pathogen detection within days, as demonstrated by mRNA technologies accelerating COVID responses, but require sovereign investments to mitigate dual-use risks and supply dependencies. Empirical lessons from COVID-19 affirm that self-reliant stockpiling and biotech infrastructure outperform aid-dependent models in preserving individual freedoms and minimizing cascading vulnerabilities.

Gender and Cultural Considerations

Incorporation of Gender-Specific Vulnerabilities

Women and girls constitute approximately 49 percent of the world's refugees and asylum seekers as of the end of 2023, facing elevated risks of gender-based (GBV) during displacement due to factors such as limited access to resources and heightened exposure in transit and camp settings. Over 60 million forcibly displaced or stateless women and girls worldwide encounter high GBV risks, exacerbated by conflict dynamics that include incidents where 70 to 90 percent involve weapons. In 2022, around 600 million women lived within 50 kilometers of active armed conflicts, amplifying vulnerabilities like arbitrary killings, , and compared to men, who may face combat-related risks but benefit from greater mobility and roles in many cultural contexts. Human security frameworks address these disparities through targeted protections, notably via 1325 (UNSCR 1325), adopted in 2000, which mandates the integration of women's protection and participation in conflict prevention, resolution, and recovery. Empirical analyses indicate that including female delegates in peace negotiations correlates with more durable agreements, raising the likelihood of beyond two years by 20 percent and longer-term stability by 35 percent. Local enforcement mechanisms inspired by UNSCR 1325, such as community-based monitoring in post-conflict zones, have demonstrably reduced incidents targeting women by enhancing early warning systems and survivor support, though outcomes vary by implementation rigor. However, incorporating -specific measures requires sensitivity to cultural and societal contexts, as universal impositions like rigid quotas in conservative environments can trigger backlash, including heightened conservative and resistance that undermines gains. Studies in such settings reveal that quota-induced female representation often provokes or reinforcement of traditional norms, leading to soft repression tactics like ethical mobilization against reforms, particularly for private-sphere over public ones. Effective human security thus prioritizes context-adapted interventions, such as voluntary local leadership programs, over top-down mandates to mitigate these risks and sustain protections.

Feminist Theoretical Engagements

Feminist scholars have expanded human security frameworks to incorporate gender-specific vulnerabilities, arguing that traditional conceptions overlook structural gender inequalities and everyday violence against women, such as domestic abuse and sexual assault in conflicts. This approach securitizes domestic violence by framing it as a threat to individual freedom from fear, with long-term effects on victims' health, family structures, and economic stability, as evidenced by higher rates of children born to abused women and intergenerational trauma patterns. Similarly, feminists highlight "rape as a weapon of war," positing it as a deliberate tactic to terrorize populations, though empirical accountability remains limited; in Bosnia's 1992-1995 conflict, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) secured convictions for nearly 30 perpetrators of wartime sexual violence by 2011, including the landmark 2001 Foča case establishing rape as a crime against humanity. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where armed groups have perpetrated mass rapes since the late 1990s, feminist analyses emphasize systemic gender-based targeting, yet conviction rates underscore prosecutorial challenges; a 2014 trial of 39 soldiers for Minova rapes in 2012 resulted in only two convictions, with most acquitted due to evidentiary issues and witness intimidation. Mainstream feminist engagements integrate these issues into human security by advocating for women's inclusion in policy, such as UN resolutions on women, peace, and security, which have heightened survivor support services and reparations claims. Critical feminism, however, critiques the "human" in human security as an exclusionary, gendered construct that reproduces power imbalances, urging deconstruction of state-centric norms and attention to intersecting identities like race and class in . These theoretical advancements have achieved greater institutional focus on gender violence survivors, including expanded humanitarian protocols for and psychological aid in conflict zones, as seen in post-Bosnian reforms aiding over registered victims. Nonetheless, critics argue that overemphasizing gender-specific threats risks diverting resources from universal risks, where data from multiple conflicts indicate men comprise the majority of direct casualties—1.3 to 8.9 times more likely to be killed than women—due to roles and targeting of perceived threats, challenging narratives that frame women as primary victims without equivalent empirical scrutiny of male vulnerabilities. Feminist , often rooted in institutions with documented ideological biases toward emphasizing female agency deficits, may thus underrepresent these disparities, prioritizing structural critiques over aggregate mortality data from sources like the .

Critiques of Western Bias and Universality

Critics, particularly from non-Western perspectives, have argued that the human security paradigm embodies Western liberal individualism, prioritizing personal freedoms and interventions that undermine state sovereignty and cultural collectivism. This view posits the concept as a tool for imposing Eurocentric norms, incompatible with Asian emphases on territorial integrity and non-interference, as articulated in debates contrasting "freedom from fear" (often Western-associated) with broader developmental security needs. Such critiques often draw on relativist frameworks, suggesting universality claims mask power imbalances favoring liberal democracies. Empirical assessments, however, challenge this dismissal by demonstrating the paradigm's applicability across cultural contexts, with outcomes tied more to institutional adherence than inherent bias. Scholar refutes a strict East-West binary, highlighting Asian intellectual contributions to human security—such as Japan's "human-centered" —and internal divergences within regions, where absolutism correlates with persistent insecurities rather than cultural authenticity. In non-Western settings like Timor-Leste (East Timor), the framework underpinned post-1999 UN-led interventions, facilitating a transition from Indonesian occupation to relative stability; by 2024, the nation had achieved sustained peace, contributing to regional and registering improved human development metrics, including reduced conflict-related mortality from over 1,000 deaths in 1999 to near-zero in subsequent years. These gains stemmed from addressing individual threats like displacement and militia , not despite local norms but by aligning with universal needs for physical safety amid state failure. Cross-national data further underscores universality: regimes incorporating human security elements—such as rights-respecting democracies—exhibit higher individual security levels, with bureaucratic democracies scoring markedly better on metrics like , , and conflict avoidance compared to patronage autocracies, where centralized control exacerbates vulnerabilities. For instance, quantitative analyses of 150+ countries from 1990–2020 reveal that authoritarian hybrids with weak experience 20–30% higher rates of civil unrest and human insecurity indicators (e.g., , displacement) than counterparts emphasizing individual protections, independent of cultural zone. Failures in application, such as incomplete security sector reforms in Timor-Leste during the 2006 crisis, trace to execution gaps—like inadequate local —rather than conceptual mismatch with non-Western values. This evidence prioritizes causal links between threat mitigation and outcomes over narrative relativism, affirming human security's grounding in empirically verifiable human necessities like and , which transcend ideological divides.

Practical Applications

Policy Instruments and Interventions

The Human Security Unit, operationalized following the 2003 Commission on Human Security , coordinates system-wide efforts to mainstream human security through practical tools including guidance notes, frameworks, and handbooks tailored for settings. These instruments emphasize integrating "" and "" into policy responses, facilitating partnerships between UN agencies, states, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for threat assessment and mitigation. A prominent global framework is the (R2P), unanimously endorsed by UN member states at the 2005 World Summit, which structures interventions around three pillars: a state's primary duty to protect populations from , war crimes, , and ; international assistance for prevention; and collective action for timely response if states fail. R2P delineates non-coercive measures such as capacity-building and early warning alongside coercive options like sanctions or military intervention as last resorts, operationalized through UN Security Council resolutions. Regional policies adapt these principles; for instance, the European Union's integrated approach to external conflicts and crises, formalized in its 2016 Global Strategy, combines diplomatic, developmental, and security instruments to address interconnected threats like and resource scarcity, with mechanisms for joint programming across institutions and member states. Humanitarian interventions prioritize non-coercive aid delivery and protection mandates, often via UN or NGO-led operations, while coercive variants involve targeted under frameworks like R2P to halt immediate violence. The 1997 Ottawa Process, driven by a coalition of states, NGOs such as the , and UN entities, produced the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, banning production, stockpiling, and use of anti-personnel mines to safeguard civilians from persistent post-conflict hazards. Operationally, human security employs a prevent-react-rebuild sequence: prevention through early and root-cause addressing; reaction via rapid and ; and rebuilding focused on institutional recovery, with state authorities coordinating alongside NGOs for localized implementation. This cycle underscores multi-actor collaboration, where NGOs provide on-ground expertise in vulnerability mapping and states ensure alignment with international norms.

Success Cases and Verifiable Outcomes

The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, also known as the , represents a verifiable success in mitigating human security threats posed by antipersonnel landmines, which indiscriminately endanger civilians and impede development. Since entering into force in 1999, 164 states parties have collectively destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, eliminating the vast majority of declared holdings under the treaty's obligations. This destruction, verified through international monitoring by organizations like the (ICBL), has directly reduced the proliferation of these weapons, with 94 states parties completing full stockpile elimination by 2024. Empirical data from the ICBL's Landmine Monitor reports causal links between treaty compliance and decreased casualties, with global annual deaths and injuries from antipersonnel mines dropping from approximately 25,000 in the late 1990s to under 5,000 by the early 2020s, attributed to destruction, use prohibitions, and clearance efforts. Mine action programs, aligned with human security principles by prioritizing civilian protection over military utility, have released over 4,000 square kilometers of land for productive use since 1999, enhancing and economic stability in affected regions like and . These outcomes depended on state enforcement of provisions, including national legislation and cooperation with NGOs, demonstrating that human security gains require robust governmental alongside . In economic dimensions of human security, initiatives have shown measurable reductions in vulnerabilities, correlating with improved community stability in high-risk zones. For instance, programs like Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia (AIM) increased participant household incomes by facilitating access to , with empirical studies documenting sustained alleviation after three years of engagement. Similar evidence from vector error correction models in other developing contexts indicates contributes to higher consumption and asset accumulation, indirectly bolstering resilience against want-induced instability, though effects are moderated by institutional stability and borrower selection. These interventions succeed when integrated with state-supported financial regulations, underscoring the necessity of complementary policy frameworks for scalable human security benefits.

Failures, Interventions, and Unintended Consequences

The 2011 NATO-led military intervention in , authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1973 and framed in part as a response to threats against civilians under (R2P) norms aligned with human security objectives, ultimately fragmented the state apparatus after the overthrow of on , 2011. This led to a decade of degraded , proliferation of militias, and territorial control by terrorist groups, including the (IS), which seized in early 2015 and held it until U.S.-backed operations dislodged them in December 2016. 's descent into rival governments and ongoing from 2014 onward exacerbated human insecurity, with UN reports documenting widespread arms proliferation that armed non-state actors and fueled regional instability. Post-intervention, Libya emerged as a primary transit hub for irregular migration to Europe, with over 700,000 sea arrivals recorded from North Africa between 2014 and 2017, many transiting through Libyan smuggling networks empowered by the security vacuum. Terrorism incidents surged, with groups like Ansar al-Sharia and IS affiliates conducting attacks that killed hundreds, including the 2012 Benghazi consulate assault claiming 4 American lives on September 11, 2012, and enabling cross-border threats to neighbors like Mali and Tunisia. Empirical assessments indicate that the intervention's failure to establish stabilizing governance structures contributed to a net increase in violent deaths and displacement, with Libya's Fragile States Index score deteriorating from 70.2 in 2011 to 88.6 by 2021 on a scale where higher values denote greater fragility. In Somalia, humanitarian aid efforts in the 1990s, including UN operations like UNOSOM II from March 1993 to March 1995 aimed at addressing famine and clan-based violence under human security rationales, inadvertently prolonged warlord dominance by providing resources that factions taxed and controlled. Warlords such as Mohamed Farrah Aidid diverted aid convoys, using proceeds to fund militias and sustain territorial control, with empirical analyses showing that aid inflows exceeding $1 billion annually in the early 1990s correlated with extended conflict durations rather than state reconstruction. This dynamic entrenched clan-based power structures post-1991 state collapse, delaying central authority restoration until partial gains via the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) from 2007, though warlordism persisted amid recurring aid dependencies. Broader patterns in such interventions reveal how rapid sovereignty erosions—often through external regime change or aid without robust local buy-in—generate power vacuums that empirically amplify threats. In Libya, the absence of post-conflict security sector reform allowed militias to capture state institutions, leading to a 300% rise in small arms circulation documented by UN sanctions panels from 2011 to 2015. Similarly, Somalia's aid-fueled warlordism contributed to the emergence of al-Shabaab by 2006, with the group exploiting ungoverned spaces to conduct attacks killing over 3,000 civilians annually at peak in 2017. These cases underscore causal links where interventions prioritizing short-term threat mitigation over sustainable governance foster environments conducive to terrorism, migration surges, and chronic instability, as evidenced by comparative studies of post-intervention fragility metrics.

Measurement Challenges

Development of Indices and Metrics

The concept of human security, as articulated in the United Nations Development Programme's 1994 , prompted subsequent efforts to quantify its dimensions through composite indices that extend beyond traditional state-centric security metrics. These initiatives aimed to integrate elements from the (HDI), such as and , with vulnerability assessments incorporating threats like economic instability and . Early proposals in the , including those by scholars like Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, emphasized blending quantitative indicators of chronic threats—such as and prevalence—with sudden disruptions like , to create actionable frameworks for policy analysis. A notable development was the Human Security Index (HSI), first released in 2008 by researchers affiliated with the Human Security Report Project. This index combined sub-indices focused on economic fabric (e.g., GDP , rates), environmental fabric (e.g., access to improved sources, rates), and social fabric (e.g., rates, political incidence), aggregating data from over 100 countries to rank human security levels. An updated version in the early 2010s refined these components by incorporating conflict-related deaths and rates as proxies for personal and health security threats, drawing on datasets from sources like the World Bank and . Similarly, proposals by Taylor Owen sought to balance quantitative metrics, such as annual conflict fatalities , with qualitative elements like perceived vulnerabilities, though the latter proved challenging to standardize across contexts. In parallel, academic efforts like those outlined by Gary King proposed rethinking human security measurement by prioritizing outcome-based indicators over inputs, such as rates from preventable diseases and exposure to , to align with first articulated freedoms from and want. These indices often hybridized HDI components with insecurity scores, for instance weighting (under 5 years) at around 5% of global datasets to capture health threats. By the late 2000s, variations emerged, including insecurity-focused indices that inverted security scores to highlight deprivations in food access and community cohesion. Discussions in forums, particularly through the Commission on Human Security established in 2001, advanced calls for standardized metrics by advocating integration of human security into broader development reporting. The 2003 final report urged aggregation of indicators like displacement due to conflict (e.g., over 35 million internally displaced persons tracked globally in early ) with economic scores, influencing subsequent UNDP efforts to prototype composite tools. However, no universally adopted UN index materialized by the , with ongoing deliberations emphasizing cross-country comparability through harmonized from agencies like WHO and UNHCR. Recent projects, such as the Cross-Country Metrics initiative, build on these foundations by refining components for empirical tracking.

Methodological Limitations and Data Issues

Efforts to quantify human security through composite indices often introduce subjectivity in the weighting of diverse categories such as , , and environmental risks, as there is no consensus on relative priorities among these dimensions. This arbitrariness stems from the lack of empirically grounded criteria for assigning weights, leading to variations across methodologies that reflect analysts' assumptions rather than objective causal relationships. For instance, some approaches emphasize economic indicators like , while others prioritize political freedoms, but integrating these without validated trade-offs undermines the indices' reliability. Aggregation of heterogeneous indicators into singular scores exacerbates these issues by relying on unverifiable assumptions about how threats interact, often oversimplifying causal dynamics and masking subnational disparities. Data limitations are particularly acute in measuring threats from non-state actors, such as armed groups, where informal operations and underreporting in unstable regions result in incomplete datasets; for example, vulnerability assessments in conflict-affected areas like highlight the challenges of obtaining representative statistics on localized . Reliable individual-level data across domains like and political remain scarce, forcing reliance on ecological inferences or aggregates that fail to capture personal exposure to risks. Empirically, these indices frequently correlate poorly with tangible outcomes, as aggregate scores can obscure individual-level insecurities; in as of 1997, national exceeded $3,000, yet over 200 million people lived below thresholds indicative of heightened vulnerability, demonstrating how averages mask persistent threats. Such discrepancies underscore the superiority of hard metrics, like expected years of free from severe deprivation or , over softer perceptual indicators, which are prone to biases in where individuals overweight minor hazards while underestimating systemic ones. Prioritizing verifiable rates and mortality data from sources like WHO statistics provides a more causally robust foundation, avoiding the dilution inherent in broad aggregations.

Major Criticisms and Counterarguments

Vagueness and Definitional Problems

The of human security, as articulated in the 1994 United Nations Development Programme , encompasses seven interconnected dimensions—economic, food, , environmental, personal, community, and political security—aiming to shift focus from state-centric threats to vulnerabilities. This expansive framework, however, has drawn for its definitional , with scholars arguing that it lacks precise boundaries, rendering the term susceptible to indefinite broadening. Roland Paris, in a 2001 , contended that human security is "too broad and vague a concept to be an effective mobilizer of international action," as its inclusivity risks diluting analytical utility by equating diverse risks without hierarchical prioritization. A core problem lies in the "everything is a threat" tendency, where the framework extends to everyday hazards far removed from traditional . For instance, some applications frame road traffic accidents as human security threats, citing their annual global toll of approximately 1.3 million deaths—exceeding war-related fatalities—and linking them to broader vulnerabilities like inadequate or . Similarly, is subsumed under , portraying disparities in as existential risks akin to armed conflict, despite causal distinctions between structural inequities and acute perils. Such expansions, critics note, erode the concept's distinctiveness, merging it indistinguishably with general development or welfare agendas. These definitional issues contribute to policy paralysis, as the absence of clear thresholds impedes and threat assessment. Empirical critiques highlight that overly diffuse paradigms correlate with ineffective prioritization; for example, broad threat inventories in international documents often fail to translate into targeted interventions, as evidenced by stalled progress on multidimensional agendas in post-conflict settings where competing definitions fragment consensus. Data from evaluations, such as those reviewing UN human security initiatives, show that vague metrics lead to misallocated efforts, with resources spread thinly across low-impact areas rather than concentrated on verifiable high-risk factors. Proponents counter that definitional flexibility is essential for addressing interconnected, non-traditional threats in a globalized , allowing adaptive responses to evolving risks like pandemics or impacts. Yet, this defense lacks robust empirical backing, as studies of human security applications reveal minimal causal links between conceptual breadth and measurable outcomes, such as reduced vulnerability indices in adopting states. Critics maintain that without tighter boundaries—potentially favoring "narrow" freedom-from-fear interpretations focused on —the concept risks perpetual theoretical over practical .

Instrumentalization for Political Agendas

The concept of human security has been critiqued for enabling selective military and political interventions, particularly by Western powers, under the guise of protecting individuals from threats like violence or deprivation, often aligning with geopolitical interests rather than universal application. Following the 2001 report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which linked human security to the emerging Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, the framework was invoked to justify actions such as the 2011 NATO-led intervention in Libya via UN Security Council Resolution 1973, ostensibly to avert mass atrocities but resulting in regime change against Muammar Gaddafi. Critics argue this represented co-optation for democracy promotion and Western value imposition, as subsequent instability in Libya— including over 20,000 civilian deaths by 2016 from ensuing conflict—highlighted causal disconnects between intervention rhetoric and outcomes, with human security metrics selectively emphasized to legitimize force against disfavored regimes. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have amplified this instrumentalization by blending human security advocacy with campaigns for regime accountability, often prioritizing threats in ideologically opposed states while downplaying those in aligned ones. Groups like and have framed civil unrest or authoritarian practices as human security crises warranting external pressure or intervention, as seen in their post-2001 reports urging action in and but muted responses to similar abuses in or during the 2011 Arab Spring, where Western allies intervened to suppress protests. This blurring of security analysis with activism fosters a that normalizes interventions against non-Western governments, with empirical data showing NGOs' funding ties—over 80% from Western donors in 2010—correlating with focus on adversaries rather than comprehensive threat assessment. Evidence of non-neutrality appears in United Nations patterns, where human security-related resolutions exhibit selective enforcement mirroring alliance structures, such as stronger Security Council responses to crises in Africa and the Middle East (e.g., 12 interventions authorized from 1990-2010) versus inaction on comparable threats in ally-backed contexts like Yemen's Saudi-led campaign, which displaced 4 million by 2019 without R2P invocation. Voting analyses reveal systemic bias, with UN General Assembly resolutions on human rights—often invoking security framings—passing disproportionately against states like Israel (over 140 since 2006) while sparing major powers' violations, reflecting elite interests over empirical universality. Such patterns underscore causal realism: human security's vagueness permits its deployment as a rhetorical tool for advancing intervener agendas, eroding credibility when outcomes favor political elites over verifiable threat reduction.

Tension with National Sovereignty Priorities

The human security framework, by prioritizing individual vulnerabilities over state-centric stability, has fostered doctrines like the (R2P), which permit international interventions ostensibly to avert atrocities, thereby challenging traditional non-intervention norms enshrined in the UN Charter. Such approaches erode sovereignty by enabling actions without full UN Security Council consensus, as exemplified by NATO's 1999 intervention, where military force was deployed absent explicit authorization to address humanitarian concerns. This tension manifests when failed or weakened states, resulting from interventions or neglect of sovereignty, export transnational threats; for instance, post-2011 Libya's collapse after NATO-backed facilitated arms proliferation, jihadist networks, and mass irregular migration destabilizing and beyond. Similarly, ungoverned spaces in have sustained and al-Shabaab , underscoring how state fragility amplifies risks to human security in neighboring and distant regions rather than mitigating them through external impositions. Empirical outcomes in sovereign states prioritizing national cohesion and control demonstrate superior human security metrics compared to interventionist or globalist models. Singapore, since independence in 1965, leveraged strict sovereignty, centralized governance, and a "Total Defence" doctrine—encompassing military, economic, social, and psychological resilience—to eradicate poverty, achieve a Human Development Index ranking among the world's top five by 2023, and maintain homicide rates below 0.3 per 100,000 inhabitants annually. This contrasts with diffuse human security emphases, where causal primacy lies in national unity enabling individual protections; studies link high social cohesion—fostered by cultural homogeneity and shared norms—to elevated trust, reduced crime, and effective welfare delivery, preconditions absent in fragmented societies. Globalist migration policies, often aligned with human security's borderless ethos, have exacerbated insecurities by undermining and cohesion, as evidenced in Europe's 2015-2016 involving over 1.3 million asylum seekers, correlating with spikes in in high-inflow areas like (e.g., 10% rise in non-German suspects for certain offenses per federal data) and fueling populist backlashes. These dynamics reveal how prioritizing individual mobility over state controls erodes the very foundations of protection, with empirical analyses indicating that rapid demographic shifts diminish and amplify perceived threats, prioritizing collective national integrity as antecedent to sustained human flourishing.

Global Impact and Prospects

Adoption in International Frameworks

The concept of human security gained initial traction within United Nations frameworks following its articulation in the 1994 United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report, which framed it as a people-centered approach encompassing freedom from fear and want. The UN formalized this integration through the establishment of the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security in 1999, funded primarily by Japan, to support projects addressing threats to individuals and communities. By 2004, the UN Secretariat created a dedicated Human Security Unit to coordinate inter-agency efforts, emphasizing preventive responses to cross-cutting challenges like poverty and conflict. UNESCO advanced the framework's adoption by forming the Intersectoral Group on Human Security in 2006, which produced analytical publications linking human security to , , and ethical . In 2025, UNESCO launched initiatives applying human security to in regions like , focusing on ethical AI and technological risks. Regional bodies have adapted the concept variably; in the , UN programs integrate human security into efforts, such as addressing climate mobility and , often through localized partnerships. Adoption manifests in high-level rhetorical commitments, including UN General Assembly Resolution 66/290 in 2012, which recognized human security as a complementary approach to state without creating binding obligations. Treaty analyses indicate low incorporation into enforceable , with human security influencing soft instruments like the 2003 Commission on Human Security report rather than core conventions. Implementation remains uneven, with Western states and organizations like embedding it in policy doctrines for legitimacy and mission planning since the early 2000s. In contrast, Global South perspectives reveal selective uptake, with origins tracing to both Western and inputs but tempered by emphasis on in forums like , prioritizing state-centric adaptations over universal application.

Empirical Assessments of Influence

Empirical assessments of human security frameworks indicate targeted achievements in specific domains, such as , but demonstrate limited causal influence on broader outcomes like and conflict mitigation. The of 1997, embodying human security's focus on protecting civilians from weapons causing indiscriminate harm, correlates with a sharp decline in reported landmine casualties, dropping from approximately 25,000 annually in 1999 to under 5,000 by 2023, accompanied by the destruction of over 55 million stockpiled anti-personnel mines across signatory states. Compliance monitoring by organizations like the has documented widespread adherence among parties, contributing to clearance of vast contaminated areas and reduced production from over 50 countries pre-treaty to fewer than 10 today. In contrast, econometric analyses of human security-oriented policies in adopter states reveal weak for reductions in or conflict incidence, with observed correlations frequently attributable to variables such as , foreign inflows, or parallel institutional reforms rather than the framework itself. Studies attempting to isolate human security's effects encounter methodological hurdles, including endogeneity and , leading to inconclusive of transformative impacts beyond rhetorical or marginal shifts in development indicators. Persistent insecurities in regions emphasizing human security rhetoric, such as parts of and , underscore failures to address root causal drivers like failures and resource scarcity, despite policy adoption. Comprehensive reviews highlight that traditional measures—encompassing deterrence and state capacity-building—account for substantially more variance in empirical stability metrics, such as conflict recurrence rates and human development trajectories, than diffuse human security interventions. This disparity reflects the framework's challenges in operationalizing causal realism amid complex, multi-factorial threats, yielding net influence that remains marginal relative to established security paradigms.

Future Relevance in Geopolitical Shifts

The intensifying U.S.-China rivalry and structural multipolarity of the 2020s have elevated state-centric threats—such as territorial incursions, military buildups, and economic coercion—above individual vulnerabilities emphasized in human security frameworks. Realist perspectives contend that great powers, operating in an anarchic system, rationally prioritize survival and relative power gains, viewing human security initiatives as resource diversions that suboptimalize national interests unless directly serving egoistic goals like regime stability or alliance leverage. For instance, U.S. national security strategies since 2018 have framed competition with China and Russia as existential challenges to sovereignty, sidelining broader human-centric concerns in favor of containment and deterrence measures. Amid rising nationalism—manifest in policies under leaders like (U.S., 2017–2021 and post-2024) and (Italy, since 2022)—human security's prospects appear confined to niche roles in , where it bolsters through targeted interventions in and without imposing universal norms. U.S. aid, totaling over $50 billion annually in recent fiscal years, contrasts China's $462 billion in official from 2008–2019 by emphasizing transparency and private-sector growth to counter influence operations, yet this integration remains secondary to hard-power priorities. Persistent definitional ambiguities, however, heighten risks of irrelevance, as states revert to sovereignty-focused agendas that marginalize supranational human security paradigms during crises like the 2022 conflict or tensions. To enhance viability, human security must adapt via subordination to realist national priorities, incorporating measurable indicators like social cohesion metrics to yield empirical gains in stability and deterrence resilience, as seen in Australia's evolving strategies addressing and youth disengagement since 2020. Over-reliance on global institutions, critiqued by realists for failing to mitigate inherent dilemmas among competitors, should yield to bilateral or domestically aligned applications that align altruistic ends with power-political imperatives, avoiding the opportunity costs of idealistic overreach.

References

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