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Negotiation
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Negotiation is a dialogue between two or more parties to resolve points of difference, gain an advantage for an individual or collective, or craft outcomes to satisfy various interests. The parties aspire to agree on matters of mutual interest.[1] The agreement can be beneficial for all or some of the parties involved. The negotiators should establish their own needs and wants while also seeking to understand the wants and needs of others involved to increase their chances of closing deals, avoiding conflicts, forming relationships with other parties, or maximizing mutual gains.[1] Distributive negotiations, or compromises, are conducted by putting forward a position and making concessions to achieve an agreement. The degree to which the negotiating parties trust each other to implement the negotiated solution is a major factor in determining the success of a negotiation.
People negotiate daily, often without considering it a negotiation.[2][3] Negotiations may occur in organizations, including businesses, non-profits, and governments, as well as in sales and legal proceedings, and personal situations such as marriage, divorce, parenting, friendship, etc. Professional negotiators are often specialized. Examples of professional negotiators include union negotiators, leverage buyout negotiators, peace negotiators, and hostage negotiators. They may also work under other titles, such as diplomats, legislators, or arbitrators. Negotiations may also be conducted by algorithms or machines in what is known as automated negotiation.[4][1][5] In automated negotiation, the participants and process have to be modeled correctly.[6] Recent negotiation embraces complexity.[7]
Types
[edit]
Negotiation can take a variety of forms in different contexts. These may include conferences between members of the United Nations to establish international norms, meetings between combatants to end a military conflict, meetings between representatives of businesses to bring about a transaction, and conversations between parents about how to manage childcare.[8] Mediation is a form of negotiation where a third party helps the conflicting parties negotiate, usually when they are unable to do so by themselves. Mediated negotiation can be contrasted with arbitration, where conflicting parties commit to accepting the decision of a third party. Negotiations in the workplace can impact the entire organization's performance.[9]
Negotiation theorists generally distinguish between two primary types of negotiation: distributive negotiation and integrative negotiation.[10] The type of negotiation that takes place is dependent on the mindset of the negotiators and the situation of the negotiation. For example, one-off encounters where lasting relationships do not occur are more likely to produce distributive negotiations whereas lasting relationships are more likely to require integrative negotiating.[11] Theorists vary in their labeling and definition of these two fundamental types.
Distributive negotiation
[edit]Distributive negotiation (also known as Win-lose game), compromise, positional negotiation, or hard-bargaining negotiation attempts to distribute a "fixed pie" of benefits. Distributive negotiation operates under zero-sum conditions, where it is assumed that any gain made by one party will be at the expense of the other. Haggling over prices on an open market, as in the purchase of a car or home, is an example of distributive negotiation.
In a distributive negotiation, each side often adopts an extreme or fixed position that they know will not be accepted, and then seeks to cede as little as possible before reaching a deal. Distributive bargainers conceive of negotiation as a process of distributing a fixed amount of value. A distributive negotiation often involves people who have never had a previous interactive relationship with each other and are unlikely to do so again shortly, although all negotiations usually have some distributive element.[12] Since prospect theory indicates that people tend to prioritize the minimization of losses over the maximization of gains, this form of negotiation is likely to be more acrimonious and less productive in agreement.[13]
Integrative negotiation
[edit]Integrative negotiation is also called interest-based, merit-based, win-win, or principled negotiation. It is a set of techniques that attempts to improve the quality and likelihood of negotiated agreement by taking advantage of the fact that different parties often value various outcomes differently.[14] While distributive negotiation assumes there is a fixed amount of value (a "fixed pie") to be divided between the parties, integrative negotiation attempts to create value in the course of the negotiation ("expand the pie") by either "compensating" the loss of one item with gains from another ("trade-offs" or logrolling), or by constructing or reframing the issues of the conflict in such a way that both parties benefit ("win-win" negotiation).[15]
However, even integrative negotiation is likely to have some distributive elements, especially when the different parties value some items to the same degree or when details are left to be allocated at the end of the negotiation. While concession by at least one party is always necessary for negotiations,[16] research shows that people who concede more quickly are less likely to explore all integrative and mutually beneficial solutions. Therefore, early concession reduces the chance of an integrative negotiation.[17]
Integrative negotiation often involves a higher degree of trust and the formation of a relationship, although INSEAD professor Horacio Falcao has stated that, counter-intuitively, trust is a helpful aid to successful win-win negotiation but not a necessary requirement: he argues that promotion of interdependence is a more effective strategy that development of trust.[18] Integrative negotiation can also involve creative problem-solving in the pursuit of mutual gains. It sees a good agreement as one that provides optimal gain for both parties, rather than maximum individual gain. Each party seeks to allow the other party sufficient benefit that both will hold to the agreement.
Productive negotiation focuses on the underlying interests of both parties rather than their starting positions and approaches negotiation as a shared problem-solving exercise rather than an individualized battle. Adherence to objective and principled criteria is the basis for productive negotiation and agreement.[19]
Text-based negotiation
[edit]Text-based negotiation refers to the process of working up the text of an agreement that all parties are willing to accept and sign. Negotiating parties may begin with a draft text, consider new textual suggestions, and work to find the middle ground among various differing positions.[20]
Common examples of text-based negotiation include the redaction of a constitution, law or sentence by a constitutional assembly, legislature or court respectively. Other more specific examples are United Nations' negotiation regarding the reform of the UN Security Council[21] and the formation of the international agreement underpinning the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in the Asia-Pacific Region,[22] where the parties involved failed in 2019 to agree on a text which would suit India.[23]
Such negotiations are often founded on the principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed". For example, this principle, also known as the single undertaking approach, is often used in World Trade Organization negotiations,[24] although some negotiations relax this requirement.[25] The principle formed part of the British negotiating approach for the Brexit deal following the UK's withdrawal from the European Union.[26]
Integrated negotiation
[edit]Integrated negotiation is a strategic attempt to maximize value in any single negotiation through the astute linking and sequencing of other negotiations and decisions related to one's operating activities.
This approach in complex settings is executed by mapping out all potentially relevant negotiations, conflicts, and operating decisions to integrate helpful connections among them while minimizing any potentially harmful connections (see examples below).
Integrated negotiation is not to be confused with integrative negotiation, a different concept (as outlined above) related to a non-zero-sum approach to creating value in negotiations.
Integrated negotiation was first identified and labeled by the international negotiator and author Peter Johnston in his book Negotiating with Giants.[27]
One of the examples cited in Johnston's book is that of J. D. Rockefeller deciding where to build his first major oil refinery. Instead of taking the easier, cheaper route from the oil fields to refine his petroleum in Pittsburgh, Rockefeller chose to build his refinery in Cleveland, because he recognized that he would have to negotiate with the rail companies transporting his refined oil to market. Pittsburgh had just one major railroad, which would therefore be able to dictate prices in negotiations, while Cleveland had three railroads that Rockefeller knew would compete for his business, potentially reducing his costs significantly. The leverage gained in these rail negotiations more than offset the additional operating costs of sending his oil to Cleveland for refining, helping establish Rockefeller's empire, while undermining his competitors who failed to integrate their core operating decisions with their negotiation strategies.[28]
Other examples of integrated negotiation include the following:
- In sports, athletes in the final year of their contracts will ideally hit peak performance so they can negotiate robust, long-term contracts in their favor.[29]
- A union needs to negotiate and resolve any significant internal conflicts to maximize its collective clout before going to the table to negotiate a new contract with management.
- If purchases for similar goods or services are occurring independently of one another across different government departments, recognizing this and consolidating orders into one large volume purchase can help create buying leverage and cost savings in negotiations with suppliers.
- A tech start-up looking to negotiate being bought out by a larger industry player in the future can improve its odds of that happening by ensuring, wherever possible, that its systems, technology, competencies, and culture are as compatible as possible with those of its most likely buyer.[30]
- A politician negotiating support for a presidential run may want to avoid bringing on board any high-profile supporters who risk alienating other important potential supporters while avoiding any unexpected new policies that could also limit the size of their growing coalition.[31]
Bad faith
[edit]When a party pretends to negotiate but secretly has no intention of compromising, the party is negotiating in bad faith; for example, when a political party sees political benefit in appearing to negotiate without having any intention of making the compromises necessary to settle.[32][33]
Bad faith negotiations are often used in political science and political psychology to refer to negotiating strategies in which there is no real intention to reach compromise or a model of information processing.[34] The "inherent bad faith model" of information processing is a theory in political psychology that was first put forth by Ole Holsti to explain the relationship between John Foster Dulles' beliefs and his model of information processing.[35] It is the most widely studied model of one's opponent:[36] A state is presumed implacably hostile, and contra-indicators of this are ignored. They are dismissed as propaganda ploys or signs of weakness. Examples are John Foster Dulles' position regarding the Soviet Union.[36][neutrality is disputed]
Negotiation pie
[edit]The total of advantages and disadvantages to be distributed in a negotiation is illustrated with the term negotiation pie.[37] The course of the negotiation can either lead to an increase, shrinking, or stagnation of these values. If the negotiating parties can expand the total pie, a win-win situation is possible, assuming that both parties profit from the expansion of the pie. In practice, however, this maximization approach is oftentimes impeded by the so-called small pie bias, i.e. the psychological underestimation of the negotiation pie's size. Likewise, the possibility to increase the pie may be underestimated due to the so-called incompatibility bias.[38] Contrary to enlarging the pie, the pie may also shrink during negotiations e.g. due to (excessive) negotiation costs.[38]
International negotiation
[edit]Due to different cultural lenses negotiation style differ worldwide.[39][40] These differences comprise among others how the parties exchange information, the use of different strategies, conceptions of the nature of negotiation, the use of power, the use of options. Negotiations as they are often taught and used by practitioners in "Western" countries may not be effective or may even be counterproductive in "non-Western" countries – such as Asian countries.[41][42] These cultural differences can lead to misunderstandings, misinterpretations, and conflicts that hinder effective deal-making. Overcoming these barriers requires cultural awareness, adaptability, and strategic communication.[43]
Strategies
[edit]There are many different ways to categorize the essential elements of negotiation.
One view of negotiation involves three basic elements: process, behavior, and substance. The process refers to how the parties negotiate: the context of the negotiations, the parties to the negotiations, the tactics used by the parties, and the sequence and stages in which all of these play out. Behavior refers to the relationships among these parties, the communication between them, and the styles they adopt. The substance refers to what the parties negotiate over: the agenda, the issues (positions and – more helpfully – interests), the options, and the agreement(s) reached at the end.[44]
Another view of negotiation comprises four elements: strategy, process, tools, and tactics. The Strategy comprises top-level goals. Which typically include the relationship and the outcome. Processes and tools include the steps to follow and roles to take in preparing for and negotiating with the other parties. Tactics include more detailed statements and actions and responses to others' statements and actions. Some add to this persuasion and influence, asserting that these have become integral to modern-day negotiation success, and so should not be omitted.[44]
Strategic approaches to concession-making include consideration of the optimum time to make a concession, making concessions in installments, not all at once, and ensuring that the opponent is aware that a concession has been made, rather than a re-expression of a position already outlined, and aware of the cost incurred in making the concession, especially where the other party is generally less aware of the nature of the business or the product being negotiated.[45]
Stages in the negotiation process
[edit]Negotiators do not need to sacrifice effective negotiation in favor of a positive relationship between parties. Rather than conceding, each side can appreciate that the other has emotions and motivations of their own and use this to their advantage in discussing the issue. Understanding perspectives can help move parties toward a more integrative solution. Fisher et al. illustrate a few techniques that effectively improve perspective-taking in the book Getting to Yes, and through the following, negotiators can separate people from the problem itself:
- Put yourself in their shoes – People tend to search for information that confirms their own beliefs and often ignore information that contradicts prior beliefs. To negotiate effectively, it is important to empathize with the other party's point of view. One should be open to other views and attempt to approach an issue from the perspective of the other.
- Discuss each other's perceptions – A more direct approach to understanding the other party is to explicitly discuss each other's perceptions. Each individual should openly and honestly share their perceptions without assigning blame or judgment to the other.
- Find opportunities to act inconsistently with their views – The other party may have prior perceptions and expectations about the other side. The other side can act in a way that directly contradicts those preconceptions, effectively conveying that the party is interested in an integrative negotiation.
- Face-saving – This approach justifies a stance based on one's previously expressed principles and values in a negotiation. This approach to an issue is less arbitrary, and thus, it is more understandable from the opposing party's perspective.[46]
Additionally, negotiators can use specific communication techniques to build stronger relationships and develop more meaningful negotiation solutions.
- Active listening – Listening is more than just hearing what the other side says. Active listening involves paying close attention to what is being said verbally and nonverbally. It involves periodically seeking further clarification from the person. By asking the person exactly what they mean, they may realize the negotiator takes them seriously and is not simply walking through a routine. The Australian Mosaic Project Services business commends "proactive" rather than just "active" listening, in which more emphasis is placed on the asking of questions as well as listening actively to the answers given.[47]
- Speak for a purpose – Too much information can be as harmful as too little. Before discussing an important point, determine exactly what to communicate to the other party. Determine the exact purpose that this shared information will serve.[46]
Employing an advocate
[edit]A skilled negotiator may serve as an advocate for one party to the negotiation. The advocate attempts to obtain the most favorable outcomes possible for that party. In this process, the negotiator attempts to determine the minimum outcome(s) the other party is (or parties are) willing to accept, then adjusts their demands accordingly. A "successful" negotiation in the advocacy approach is when the negotiator can obtain all or most of the outcomes their party desires, but without driving the other party to permanently break off negotiations.
Skilled negotiators may use a variety of tactics ranging from negotiation hypnosis to a straightforward presentation of demands or setting of preconditions, to more deceptive approaches such as cherry picking. Intimidation and salami tactics may also play a part in swaying the outcome of negotiations.[48]
Another negotiation tactic is the bad guy/good guy. Bad guy/good guy is when one negotiator acts as a bad guy by using anger and threats. The other negotiator acts as a good guy by being considerate and understanding. The good guy blames the bad guy for all the difficulties while soliciting concessions and agreement from the opponent.[49]
BATNA
[edit]The best alternative to a negotiated agreement, or BATNA, is the most advantageous alternative course of action a negotiator can take should the current negotiation end without reaching an agreement. The quality of a BATNA has the potential to improve a party's negotiation outcome. Understanding one's BATNA can empower an individual and allow him or her to set higher goals when moving forward.[50] Alternatives need to be actual and actionable to be of value.[51] Negotiators may also consider the other party's BATNA and how it compares to what they are offering during the negotiation.[52]
Conflict styles
[edit]Kenneth W. Thomas identified five styles or responses to negotiation.[53][54] These five strategies have been frequently described in the literature and are based on the dual-concern model.[55] The dual-concern model of conflict resolution is a perspective that assumes individuals' preferred method of dealing with conflict is based on two themes or dimensions:[56]
- A concern for self (i.e., assertiveness), and
- A concern for others (i.e., empathy).
Based on this model, individuals balance their concern for personal needs and interests with the needs and interests of others. The following five styles can be used based on individuals' preferences, depending on their pro-self or pro-social goals. These styles can change over time, and individuals can have strong dispositions toward numerous styles.
- Accommodating
- Individuals who enjoy solving the other party's problems and preserving personal relationships. Accommodators are sensitive to the emotional states, body language, and verbal signals of the other parties. They can, however, feel taken advantage of in situations when the other party places little emphasis on the relationship. Accommodation is a passive but prosocial approach to conflict. People solve both large and small conflicts by giving in to the demands of others. Sometimes, they yield because they realize that their position is in error, so they agree with the viewpoint adopted by others. In other cases, however, they may withdraw their demands without really being convinced that the other side is correct, but for the sake of group unity or in the interest of time—they withdraw all complaints. Thus, yielding can reflect either genuine conversion or superficial compliance.
- Avoiding
- Individuals who do not like to negotiate and do not do it unless warranted. When negotiating, avoiders tend to defer and dodge the confrontational aspects of negotiating; however, they may be perceived as tactful and diplomatic. Inaction is a passive means of dealing with disputes. Those who avoid conflicts adopt a "wait and see" attitude, hoping that problems will solve themselves. Avoiders often tolerate conflicts, allowing them to simmer without doing anything to minimize them. Rather than openly discussing disagreements, people who rely on avoidance change the subject, skip meetings, or even leave the group altogether (Bayazit & Mannix, 2003). Sometimes they simply agree to disagree (a modus vivendi).
- Collaborating
- Individuals who enjoy negotiations that involve solving tough problems in creative ways. Collaborators are good at using negotiations to understand the concerns and interests of the other parties. Collaborating is an active, pro-social, and pro-self approach to conflict resolution.It is a cooperative approach. Collaborating people identify the issues underlying the dispute and then work together to identify a solution that is satisfying to both sides.Here,goals are important, but so is maintaining positive relationships.[57] This orientation, which is also described as collaboration, problem solving, or a win-win orientation entreats both sides in the dispute to consider their opponent's outcomes as well as their own[58]
- Competing
- Individuals who enjoy negotiations because they present an opportunity to win something. Competitive negotiators have strong instincts for all aspects of negotiating and are often strategic. Because their style can dominate the bargaining process, competitive negotiators often neglect the importance of relationships. Competing is an active, pro-self means of dealing with conflict that involves forcing others to accept one's view. Those who use this strategy tend to see conflict as a win-lose situation and so use competitive, powerful tactics to intimidate others. Fighting (forcing, dominating, or contending) can take many forms, including authoritative mandate, challenges, arguing, insults, accusations, complaining, vengeance, and even physical violence (Morrill, 1995). These conflict resolution methods are all contentious ones because they involve imposing one's solution on the other party.
- Compromising
- Individuals who are eager to close the deal by doing what is fair and equal for all parties involved in the negotiation. Compromisers can be useful when there is limited time to complete the deal; however, compromisers often unnecessarily rush the negotiation process and make concessions too quickly.
Types of negotiators
[edit]Three basic kinds of negotiators have been identified by researchers involved in The Harvard Negotiation Project. These types of negotiators are soft bargainers, hard bargainers, and principled bargainers.
- Soft
- These people see negotiation as too close to competition, so they choose a gentle style of bargaining. The offers they make are not in their best interests, they yield to others' demands, avoid confrontation, and they maintain good relations with fellow negotiators. Their perception of others is one of friendship, and their goal is agreement. They do not separate the people from the problem but are soft on both. They avoid contests of wills and insist on the agreement, offering solutions and easily trusting others and changing their opinions.
- Hard
- These people use contentious strategies to influence, utilizing phrases such as "this is my final offer" and "take it or leave it". They make threats, are distrustful of others, insist on their position, and apply pressure to negotiate. They see others as adversaries and their ultimate goal is victory. Additionally, they search for one single answer and insist you agree with it. They do not separate the people from the problem (as with soft bargainers), but they are hard on both the people involved and the problem.
- Principled
- Individuals who bargain this way seek integrative solutions and do so by sidestepping commitment to specific positions. They focus on the problem rather than the intentions, motives, and needs of the people involved. They separate the people from the problem, explore interests, avoid bottom lines, and reach results based on standards independent of personal will. They base their choices on objective criteria rather than power, pressure, self-interest, or an arbitrary decisional procedure. These criteria may be drawn from moral standards, principles of fairness, professional standards, and tradition.
Researchers from The Harvard Negotiation Project recommend that negotiators explore several tactics to reach the best solution for their problems, but this is often not the case (as when you may be dealing with an individual using soft or hard-bargaining tactics) (Forsyth, 2010).
Tactics
[edit]Tactics are always an important part of the negotiating process. More often than not they are subtle, difficult to identify, and used for multiple purposes. Tactics are more frequently used in distributive negotiations and when the focus is on taking as much value off the table as possible.[59] Many negotiation tactics exist. Below are a few commonly used tactics.
- Auction: The bidding process is designed to create competition.[60] When multiple parties want the same thing, pit them against one another. When people know that they may lose out on something, they want it even more. Not only do they want the thing that is being bid on, but they also want to win, just to win. Taking advantage of someone's competitive nature can drive up the price.
- Brinkmanship: One party aggressively pursues a set of terms to the point where the other negotiating party must either agree or walk away. Brinkmanship is a type of "hard nut" approach to bargaining in which one party pushes the other party to the "brink" or edge of what that party is willing to accommodate. Successful brinkmanship convinces the other party they have no choice but to accept the offer and there is no acceptable alternative to the proposed agreement.[61]
- Bogey: Negotiators use the bogey tactic to pretend that an issue of little or no importance is very important.[62] Then, later in the negotiation, the issue can be traded for a major concession of actual importance.
- Calling a higher authority: To mitigate too far-reaching concessions, deescalate, or overcome a deadlock situation, one party makes the further negotiation process dependent on the decision of a decision maker, not present at the negotiation table.[63]
- Chicken: Negotiators propose extreme measures often in the form of bluffs to force the other party to chicken out and give them what they want. This tactic can be dangerous when parties are unwilling to back down and go through with the extreme measure.
- Concession: One party offers up something with hope reaching or coming closer to an agreement.[64]
- Defense in Depth: Several layers of decision-making authority is used to allow further concessions each time the agreement goes through a different level of authority.[65] In other words, each time the offer goes to a decision-maker, that decision maker asks to add another concession to close the deal.
- Deadlines: Give the other party a deadline, forcing them to make a decision. This method uses time to apply pressure on the other party. Deadlines given can be actual or artificial.
- Flinch: Flinching is showing a strong negative physical reaction to a proposal. Common examples of flinching are gasping for air or a visible expression of surprise or shock. The flinch can be done consciously or unconsciously.[66] The flinch signals to the opposite party that you think the offer or proposal is absurd in hopes the other party will lower their aspirations.[67] Seeing a physical reaction is more believable than hearing someone saying, "I'm shocked".
- Good Guy/Bad Guy: Within the tactic of good guy/bad guy (synonyms are good cop/bad cop or black hat/white hat) oftentimes positive and unpleasant tasks are divided between two negotiators on the same negotiation side or unpleasant tasks or decisions are allocated to a (real or fictitious) outsider. The good guy supports the conclusion of the contract and emphasizes positive aspects of the negotiation (mutual interests). The bad guy criticizes negative aspects (opposing interests). The division of the two roles allows for more consistent behavior and credibility of the individual negotiators. As the good guy promotes the contract, he/she can build trust with the other side.[68]
- Holding out for concession: Negotiators can choose avoiding giving concessions and hold out in the hope that the other side will concede before they do. This tough bargaining position can maximize the negotiators ex-post (actual) outcome.[16]
- Highball/Low-ball or Ambit claim: Depending on whether selling or buying, sellers or buyers use a ridiculously high, or ridiculously low opening offer that is not achievable. The theory is that the extreme offer makes the other party reevaluate their opening offer and move close to the resistance point (as far as you are willing to go to reach an agreement).[69] Another advantage is that the party giving the extreme demand appears more flexible when they make concessions toward a more reasonable outcome. A danger of this tactic is that the opposite party may think negotiating is a waste of time.
- The Nibble: Also known under the salami tactic or quivering quill, nibbling is the demand for proportionally small concessions that have not been discussed previously just before closing the deal.[62] This method takes advantage of the other party's desire to close by adding "just one more thing".
- Snow Job: Negotiators overwhelm the other party with so much information that they have difficulty determining what information is important, and what is a diversion.[70] Negotiators may also use technical language or jargon to mask a simple answer to a question asked by a non-expert.
- Mirroring: When people get on well, the outcome of a negotiation is likely to be more positive. To create trust and rapport, a negotiator may mimic or mirror the opponent's behavior and repeat what they say. Mirroring refers to a person repeating the core content of what another person just said, or repeating a certain expression. It indicates attention to the subject of negotiation and acknowledges the other party's point or statement.[71] Mirroring can help create trust and establish a relationship.
- Anchoring: Anchoring is the process of establishing a reference point first to guide the other person closer to your suggested price. It is often presented at the beginning of a negotiation to influence the rest of the negotiation. As an example, say you want to sell a car for 50,000 dollars. Now a customer walks in saying they want to buy a car. You say that you can sell the car for 65,000 dollars. Their counteroffer would probably be 50,000–55,000 dollars. This also works and vice versa for buying something. The idea here is that we are narrowing the other parties' expectations down or up.[72] To counter-anchoring, you should point out the fact that they are anchoring and say that they need to drive it down to an acceptable price.
Nonverbal communication
[edit]Communication is a key element of negotiation. Effective negotiation requires that participants effectively convey and interpret information. Participants in a negotiation communicate information not only verbally but non-verbally through body language and gestures. By understanding how nonverbal communication works, a negotiator is better equipped to interpret the information other participants are leaking non-verbally while keeping secret those things that would inhibit his/her ability to negotiate.[73]
Examples
[edit]Non-verbal "anchoring"
[edit]In a negotiation, a person can gain the advantage by verbally expressing a position first. By anchoring one's position, one establishes the position from which the negotiation proceeds. Similarly, one can "anchor" and gain an advantage with nonverbal (body language) cues.
- Personal space: The person at the head of the table is the apparent symbol of power. Negotiators can negate this strategic advantage by positioning allies in the room to surround that individual.
- First impression: Begin the negotiation with positive gestures and enthusiasm. Look the person in the eye with sincerity. If you cannot maintain eye contact, the other person might think you are hiding something or that you are insincere. Give a solid handshake.[74][page needed]
Reading non-verbal communication
[edit]Being able to read the non-verbal communication of another person can significantly aid in the communication process. By being aware of inconsistencies between a person's verbal and non-verbal communication and reconciling them, negotiators can come to better resolutions. Examples of incongruity in body language include:
- Nervous Laugh: A laugh not matching the situation. This could be a sign of nervousness or discomfort. When this happens, it may be good to probe with questions to discover the person's true feelings.
- Positive words but negative body language: If someone asks their negotiation partner if they are annoyed and the person pounds their fist and responds sharply, "what makes you think anything is bothering me?"[75]
- Hands raised in a clenched position: The person raising his/her hands in this position reveals frustration even when he/she is smiling. This is a signal that the person doing it may be holding back a negative attitude.[76]
- If possible, it may be helpful for negotiation partners to spend time together in a comfortable setting outside of the negotiation room. Knowing how each partner non-verbally communicates outside of the negotiation setting helps negotiation partners sense the incongruity between verbal and non-verbal communication.
Conveying receptivity
[edit]The way negotiation partners position their bodies relative to each other may influence how receptive each is to the other person's message and ideas.
- Face and eyes: Receptive negotiators smile, and make plenty of eye contact. This conveys the idea that there is more interest in the person than in what is being said. On the other hand, non-receptive negotiators make little to no eye contact. Their eyes may be squinted, jaw muscles clenched and head turned slightly away from the speaker
- Arms and hands: To show receptivity, negotiators should spread their arms and open a hands-on table or relax on their lap. Negotiators show poor receptivity when their hands are clenched, crossed, positioned in front of their mouth, or rubbing the back of their neck.
- Legs and Feet: Receptive negotiators sit with legs together or one leg slightly in front of the other. When standing, they distribute weight evenly and place their hands on their hips with their body tilted toward the speaker. Non-receptive negotiators stand with their legs crossed, pointing away from the speaker.
- Torso: Receptive negotiators sit on the edge of their chairs, unbuttoning their suit coats with their bodies tilted toward the speaker. Non-receptive negotiators may lean back in their chairs and keep their suit coats buttoned.
Receptive negotiators tend to appear relaxed with their hands open and palms visibly displayed.[77][page needed]
Barriers
[edit]- Die-hard bargainers
- Lack of trust
- Informational vacuums and negotiator's dilemma
- Structural impediments
- Spoilers
- Cultural and gender differences
- Communication problems
- The power of dialogue[78][page needed]
Emotion
[edit]Emotions play an important part in the negotiation process, although it is only in recent years that their effect is being studied. Emotions have the potential to play either a positive or negative role in negotiation. During negotiations, the decision as to whether or not to settle rests in part on emotional factors. Negative emotions can cause intense and even irrational behavior and can cause conflicts to escalate and negotiations to break down, but may be instrumental in attaining concessions. On the other hand, positive emotions often facilitate reaching an agreement and help to maximize joint gains, but can also be instrumental in attaining concessions. Positive and negative discrete emotions can be strategically displayed to influence task and relational outcomes[79] and may play out differently across cultural boundaries.[80]
Affect effect
[edit]Dispositions for effects affect various stages of negotiation: which strategies to use, which strategies are chosen,[81] the way the other party and their intentions are perceived,[82] their willingness to reach an agreement, and the final negotiated outcomes.[83] Positive affectivity (PA) and negative affectivity (NA) of one or more of the negotiating sides can lead to very different outcomes.
Positive affect
[edit]Even before the negotiation process starts, people in a positive mood have more confidence,[84] and higher tendencies to plan to use a cooperative strategy.[81] During the negotiation, negotiators who are in a positive mood tend to enjoy the interaction more, show less contentious behavior, use less aggressive tactics,[85] and more cooperative strategies.[81] This, in turn, increases the likelihood that parties will reach their instrumental goals, and enhance the ability to find integrative gains.[86] Indeed, compared with negotiators with negative or natural affectivity, negotiators with positive affectivity reached more agreements and tended to honor those agreements more.[81] Those favorable outcomes are due to better decision-making processes, such as flexible thinking, creative problem-solving, respect for others' perspectives, willingness to take risks, and higher confidence.[87] The post-negotiation positive effect has beneficial consequences as well. It increases satisfaction with the achieved outcome and influences one's desire for future interactions.[87] The PA aroused by reaching an agreement facilitates the dyadic relationship, which brings commitment that sets the stage for subsequent interactions.[87]
PA also has its drawbacks: it distorts the perception of self-performance, such that performance is judged to be relatively better than it is.[84] Thus, studies involving self-reports on achieved outcomes might be biased.
Negative affect
[edit]Negative affect has detrimental effects on various stages in the negotiation process. Although various negative emotions affect negotiation outcomes, by far the most researched is anger. Angry negotiators plan to use more competitive strategies and cooperate less, even before the negotiation starts.[81] These competitive strategies are related to reduced joint outcomes. During negotiations, anger disrupts the process by reducing the level of trust, clouding parties' judgment, narrowing parties' focus of attention, and changing their central goal from reaching an agreement to retaliating against the other side.[85] Angry negotiators pay less attention to the opponent's interests and are less accurate in judging their interests, thus achieving lower joint gains.[88] Moreover, because anger makes negotiators more self-centered in their preferences, it increases the likelihood that they will reject profitable offers.[85] Opponents who get angry (or cry, or otherwise lose control) are more likely to make errors.[49] Anger does not help achieve negotiation goals either: it reduces joint gains[81] and does not boost personal gains, as angry negotiators do not succeed.[88] Moreover, negative emotions lead to acceptance of settlements that are not in a positive utility function but rather have a negative utility.[89] However, the expression of negative emotions during negotiation can sometimes be beneficial: legitimately expressed anger can be an effective way to show one's commitment, sincerity, and needs.[85] Moreover, although NA reduces gains in integrative tasks, it is a better strategy than PA in distributive tasks (such as zero-sum).[87] In his work on negative affect arousal and white noise, Seidner found support for the existence of a negative affect arousal mechanism through observations regarding the devaluation of speakers from other ethnic origins. Negotiation may be negatively affected, in turn, by submerged hostility toward an ethnic or gender group.[90]
Conditions for emotion affect
[edit]Research indicates that a negotiator's emotions do not necessarily affect the negotiation process. Albarracın et al. (2003) suggested that there are two conditions for emotional affect, both related to the ability (presence of environmental or cognitive disturbances) and the motivation:
- Identification of the effect: requires high motivation, high ability, or both.
- The determination that the effect is relevant and important for the judgment: requires that either the motivation, the ability, or both are low.
According to this model, emotions affect negotiations only when one is high and the other is low. When both ability and motivation are low, the effect is identified, and when both are high the effect is identified but discounted as irrelevant to judgment.[91] A possible implication of this model is, for example, that the positive effects of PA have on negotiations (as described above) are seen only when either motivation or ability is low.
Effect of partner's emotions
[edit]Most studies on emotion in negotiations focus on the effect of the negotiator's own emotions on the process. However, what the other party feels might be just as important, as group emotions are known to affect processes both at the group and the personal levels.
When it comes to negotiations, trust in the other party is a necessary condition for its emotion to effect,[82] and visibility enhances the effect.[86]
Emotions contribute to negotiation processes by signaling what one feels and thinks and can thus prevent the other party from engaging in destructive behaviors and indicate what steps should be taken next: PA signals to keep in the same way, while NA points out that mental or behavioral adjustments are needed.[87]
Partner's emotions can have two basic effects on the negotiator's emotions and behavior: mimetic/ reciprocal or complementary.[83] For example, disappointment or sadness might lead to compassion and more cooperation.[87] In a study by Butt et al. (2005) that simulated real multi-phase negotiation, most people reacted to the partner's emotions in a reciprocal, rather than complementary, manner. Specific emotions were found to have different effects on the opponent's feelings and are strategies chosen:
- Anger caused the opponents to place lower demands and to concede more in a zero-sum negotiation, but also to evaluate the negotiation less favorably.[92] It provoked both dominating and yielding behaviors of the opponent.[83]
- Pride led to more integrative and compromise strategies by the partner.[83]
- Guilt or regret expressed by the negotiator led to a better impression of him by the opponent, however, it also led the opponent to place higher demands.[82] On the other hand, personal guilt was related to more satisfaction with what one achieved.[87]
- Worry or disappointment left a bad impression on the opponent but led to relatively lower demands by the opponent.[82]
Dealing with emotions
[edit]- Make emotions explicit and validate – Taking a more proactive approach in discussing one's emotions can allow for a negotiation to focus on the problem itself, rather than any unexpressed feelings. It is important to allow both parties to share their emotions.
- Allow time to let off steam – It is possible that one party may feel angry or frustrated at some point during the negotiation. Rather than try to avoid discussing those feelings, allow the individual to talk it out. Sitting and listening, without providing too much feedback on the substance itself, can offer enough support for the person to feel better. Once the grievances are released, it may become easier to negotiate.
- Symbolic gestures – Consider that an apology, or any other simple act, may be one of the most effective and low-cost means to reduce any negative emotions between parties.[46]
- Empathy – In every negotiation, emotions will play a major role in determining what is said. It is possible to overreact and misinterpret what the other party says by projecting assumptions. To avoid miscommunication and build a collaborative environment, it is important to shift the focus to the other party and be fully present with them, listening without judgment instead of acting in self-interest and focusing on one's own needs and fears. To increase one's chances of reaching a deal that works for both parties, one needs to be focused on the other party, their emotions, their interests, and their worries in order to give them what they want. When the other party feels heard and acknowledged, barriers to communication fall, and reaching a consensus is much more likely to happen.
Problems with laboratory studies
[edit]Negotiation is a complex interaction. Capturing all its complexity is a very difficult task, let alone isolating and controlling only certain aspects of it. For this reason, most negotiation studies are done under laboratory conditions and focus only on some aspects. Although such studies have their advantages, they do have major drawbacks when studying emotions:
- Emotions in laboratory studies are usually manipulated and are therefore relatively 'cold' (not intense). Although those 'cold' emotions might be enough to show effects, they are qualitatively different from the 'hot' emotions often experienced during negotiations.[93]
- In real life, people select which negotiations to enter, which affects emotional commitment, motivation, and interests, but this is not the case in lab studies.[87]
- Laboratory studies tend to focus on relatively few well-defined emotions. Real-life scenarios provoke a much wider scale of emotions.[87]
- Coding the emotions has a double catch: if done by a third side, some emotions might not be detected as the negotiator sublimates them for strategic reasons. Self-report measures might overcome this, but they are usually filled only before or after the process, and if filled during the process might interfere with it.[87]
Group composition
[edit]Multi-party
[edit]While negotiations involving more than two parties are less often researched, some results from two-party negotiations still apply to more than two parties. One such result is that in negotiations it is common to see language similarity arise between the two negotiating parties. In three-party negotiations, language similarity still arose, and results were particularly efficient when the party with the most to gain from the negotiation adopted language similarities from the other parties.[94]
Team
[edit]Due to globalization and growing business trends, negotiation in the form of teams is becoming widely adopted. Teams can effectively collaborate to break down a complex negotiation. There is more knowledge and wisdom dispersed in a team than in a single mind. Writing, listening, and talking, are specific roles team members must satisfy. The capacity base of a team reduces the number of blunders and increases familiarity in a negotiation.[95]
However, unless a team can appropriately utilize the full capacity of its potential, effectiveness can suffer. One factor in the effectiveness of team negotiation is a problem that occurs through solidarity behavior. Solidarity behavior occurs when one team member reduces his or her utility (benefit) to increase the benefits of other team members. This behavior is likely to occur when interest conflicts rise. When the utility/needs of the negotiation opponent do not align with every team member's interests, team members begin to make concessions and balance the benefits gained among the team.[96]
Intuitively, this may feel like a cooperative approach. However, though a team may aim to negotiate in a cooperative or collaborative nature, the outcome may be less successful than is possible, especially when integration is possible. The integrative potential is possible when different negotiation issues are of different importance to each team member. The integrative potential is often missed due to the lack of awareness of each member's interests and preferences. Ultimately, this leads to a poorer negotiation result.
Thus, a team can perform more effectively if each member discloses his or her preferences before the negotiation. This step will allow the team to recognize and organize the team's joint priorities, which they can take into consideration when engaging with the opposing negotiation party. Because a team is more likely to discuss shared information and common interests, teams must make an active effort to foster and incorporate unique viewpoints from experts from different fields. Research by Daniel Thiemann, which largely focused on computer-supported collaborative tasks, found that the Preference Awareness method is an effective tool for fostering knowledge about joint priorities and further helps the team judge which negotiation issues were of the highest importance.[97]
Women
[edit]Women often excel in collaborative and integrative negotiations, where they can leverage their strong communication skills and empathy to find mutually beneficial solutions. However, they may face challenges in competitive or distributive negotiations, where a more assertive and confrontational approach is typically required. Many of the implications of these findings have strong financial impacts in addition to the social backlash faced by self-advocating women in negotiations, as compared to other advocating women, self-advocating men, and other advocating men. Research in this area has been studied across platforms, in addition to more specific areas like women as physician assistants.[98] The backlash associated with this type of behavior is attributed to the fact that to be self-advocated is considered masculine, whereas the alternative, being accommodating, is considered more feminine.[99] Males, however, do not appear to face any type of backlash for not being self-advocating.[100]
This research has been supported by multiple studies, including one which evaluated candidates participating in a negotiation regarding compensation. This study showed that women who initiated negotiations were evaluated more poorly than men who initiated negotiations. In another variation of this particular setup, men and women evaluated videos of men and women either accepting a compensation package or initiating negotiations. Men evaluated women more poorly for initiating negotiations, while women evaluated both men and women more poorly for initiating negotiations. In this particular experiment, women were less likely to initiate a negotiation with a male, citing nervousness, but there was no variation with the negotiation initiated with another female.[101]
Research also supports the notion that the way individuals respond in a negotiation varies depending on the gender of the opposite party. In all-male groups, the use of deception showed no variation in the level of trust between negotiating parties, however in mixed-sex groups, there was an increase in deceptive tactics when it was perceived that the opposite party was using an accommodating strategy. In all-female groups, there were many shifts in when individuals did and did not employ deception in their negotiation tactics.[99]
Academic negotiation
[edit]The academic world contains a unique management system, wherein faculty members, some of whom have tenure, reside in academic units (e.g. departments), and are overseen by chairs, or heads. These chairs/heads are in turn supervised by deans of the college where their academic unit resides. Negotiation is an area where faculties, chairs/heads, and their deans have little preparation; their doctoral degrees are typically in a highly specialized area according to their academic expertise. However, the academic environment frequently presents situations where negotiation takes place. For example, many faculties are hired with the expectation that they will conduct research and publish scholarly works. For these faculties, where their research requires equipment, space, and/or funding, negotiation of a "start-up" package is critical for their success and future promotion.[102][103] Also, department chairs often find themselves in situations, typically involving resource redistribution where they must negotiate with their dean, on behalf of their unit. And deans oversee colleges where they must optimize limited resources, such as research space or operating funds while at the same time creating an environment that fosters student success, research accomplishments, and more.[102][103][104]
Integrative negotiation is the type predominately found in academic negotiation – where trust and long-term relationships between personnel are valued. Techniques found to be particularly useful in academic settings include:[102][103]
- doing your homework – grounding your request in facts
- knowing your value
- listening actively and acknowledging what is being said
- putting yourself in their shoes
- asking – negotiation begins with an ask
- not committing immediately
- managing emotion
- keeping in mind the principle of a "wise agreement",[105] with its associated emphasis on meeting the interests of both parties to the extent possible as a key working point.
Etymology
[edit]The word "negotiation" originated in the early 15th century from the Old French negociacion from Latin negotiatio from neg- "no" and otium "leisure".[106] These terms mean "business, trade, traffic". By the late 1570s negotiation had the definition, "to communicate in search of mutual agreement". With this new introduction and this meaning, it showed a shift from "doing business" to "bargaining about" business.[106]
See also
[edit]- Alternating offers protocol
- Appeasement
- Collaborative software
- Collective action
- Conciliation
- Consistency (negotiation)
- Contract
- Cross-cultural
- Cross-cultural differences in decision-making
- Delaying tactic
- Deterrence
- Diplomacy
- Dispute resolution
- Expert determination
- Flipism
- Game theory
- Impasse
- International relations
- Leadership
- Multilateralism
- Nash equilibrium
- Principled negotiation
- Prisoner's dilemma
- Program on Negotiation
- Trust metric
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- ^ Van Kleef, G. A.; De Dreu, C. K. W.; Manstead, A. S. R. (2004). "The interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiations" (PDF). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 86 (1): 57–76. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.86.1.57. PMID 14717628. Archived from the original (PDF) on 26 September 2007. Retrieved 2 September 2007.
- ^ Bazerman, M. H.; Curhan, J. R.; Moore, D. A.; Valley, K. L. (2000). "Negotiation". Annual Review of Psychology. 51: 279–314. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.51.1.279. PMID 10751973.
- ^ Sagi, Eyal; Diermeier, Daniel (1 December 2015). "Language Use and Coalition Formation in Multiparty Negotiations". Cognitive Science. 41 (1): 259–271. doi:10.1111/cogs.12325. ISSN 1551-6709. PMID 26671166.
- ^ Sparks, D. B. (1993). The Dynamics of Effective Negotiation (second edition). Houston: Gulf Publishing Co.
- ^ Wang, Jian; Gong, Jingqiu (2016). Team negotiation based on solidarity behavior: A concession strategy in the team. 17th IEEE/ACIS International Conference on Software Engineering, Artificial Intelligence, Networking and Parallel/Distributed Computing. IEEE. doi:10.1109/snpd.2016.7515883. S2CID 14385529.
- ^ Thiemann, D., & Hesse, F. W. (2015). Learning about Team Members' Preferences: Computer-Supported Preference Awareness in the Negotiation Preparation of Teams.
- ^ Brianne, Hall; Tracy, Hoelting (24 April 2015). Influence of negotiation and practice setting on salary disparities between male and female physician assistants.
- ^ a b Gladstone, Eric; O'Connor, Kathleen M. (1 September 2014). "A counterpart's feminine face signals cooperativeness and encourages negotiators to compete". Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 125 (1): 18–25. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.05.001.
- ^ Amanatullah, Emily T.; Tinsley, Catherine H. (1 January 2013). "Punishing female negotiators for asserting too much…or not enough: Exploring why advocacy moderates backlash against assertive female negotiators". Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 120 (1): 110–122. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.03.006. S2CID 14837583.
- ^ Bowles, Hannah; Babcock, Linda; Lai, Lei (2006). "Social incentives for gender diVerences in the propensity to initiate negotiations: Sometimes it does hurt to ask" (PDF). Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 103: 84–103. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2006.09.001. S2CID 18202551.
- ^ a b c Callahan, J; Besterfield-Sacre, M.E.; Carpenter, J.P.; Needy, K.L.; Schrader, C.B. (2016). "Listening and Negotiation". 2016 ASEE Annual Conference & Exposition, New Orleans, Louisiana. doi:10.18260/p.25571. ISBN 978-0-692-68565-5.
- ^ a b c Amekudzi-Kennedy, A.A.; Hall, K.D.; Harding, T.S.; Moll, A.J.; Callahan, J. (2017). "Listening and Negotiation II". 2017 ASEE Annual Conference & Exposition, Columbus, Ohio. doi:10.18260/1-2--28631.
- ^ McKersie, R.B. (2012). "The Day-to-Day Life of a Dean: Engaging in Negotiations and negotiations". Negotiation Journal 475–488. 28 (4): 475–488. doi:10.1111/j.1571-9979.2012.00352.x.
- ^ Fisher, R.; Ury, W.; Patton, B. (2012). Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in. Penguin: New York.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: publisher location (link) - ^ a b "negotiation". Online Etymology Dictionary. Retrieved 19 August 2019.
Further reading
[edit]This "further reading" section may need cleanup. (September 2022) |
- Camp, Jim. (2007). No, The Only Negotiating System You Need For Work Or Home. Crown Business. New York.
- Movius, H. and Susskind, L. E. (2009) Built to Win: Creating a World Class Negotiating Organization. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press.
- Roger Dawson, Secrets of Power Negotiating – Inside Secrets from a Master Negotiator. Career Press, 1999.
- Davérède, Alberto L. "Negotiations, Secret", Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law
- Ronald M. Shapiro and Mark A. Jankowski, The Power of Nice: How to Negotiate So Everyone Wins – Especially You!, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1998, ISBN 0-471-08072-1
- Marshall Rosenberg (2015). Nonviolent Communication: A Language of Life, 3rd Edition: Life-Changing Tools for Healthy Relationships. PD Press. ISBN 978-1-892005-54-0.
- Roger Fisher and Daniel Shapiro, Beyond Reason: Using Emotions as You Negotiate, Viking/Penguin, 2005.
- Douglas Stone, Bruce Patton, and Sheila Heen, foreword by Roger Fisher, Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most, Penguin, 1999, ISBN 0-14-028852-X
- Catherine Morris, ed. Negotiation in Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding: A Selected Bibliography. Victoria, Canada: Peacemakers Trust.
- Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation, Belknap Press 1982, ISBN 0-674-04812-1
- David Churchman, "Negotiation Tactics" University Press of America, Inc. 1993 ISBN 0-8191-9164-7
- William Ury, Getting Past No: Negotiating Your Way from Confrontation to Cooperation, revised second edition, Bantam, 1993, trade paperback, ISBN 0-553-37131-2; 1st edition under the title, Getting Past No: Negotiating with Difficult People, Bantam, 1991, hardcover, 161 pages, ISBN 0-553-07274-9
- William Ury, Roger Fisher and Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving in, Revised 2nd edition, Penguin USA, 1991, trade paperback, ISBN 0-14-015735-2; Houghton Mifflin, 1992, hardcover, 200 pages, ISBN 0-395-63124-6. The first edition, unrevised, Houghton Mifflin, 1981, hardcover, ISBN 0-395-31757-6
- The political philosopher Charles Blattberg distinguished between negotiation and conversation, and criticized conflict-resolution methods that give too much weight to the former. See his From Pluralist to Patriotic Politics: Putting Practice First, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, ISBN 0-19-829688-6, a work of political philosophy; and his Shall We Dance? A Patriotic Politics for Canada, Montreal and Kingston: McGill Queen's University Press, 2003, ISBN 0-7735-2596-3, which applies that philosophy to the Canadian case.
- Leigh L. Thompson, The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator 3rd Ed., Prentice Hall Oct. 2005.
- Nicolas Iynedjian, Négociation – Guide pratique, CEDIDAC 62, Lausanne 2005, ISBN 2-88197-061-3
- Michele J. Gelfand and Jeanne M. Brett, ed. Handbook of negotiation and culture, 2004. ISBN 0-8047-4586-2
- "Emotion and conflict" from the Beyond Intractability Database
- Echavarria, Martin (2015). Enabling Collaboration – Achieving Success Through Strategic Alliances and Partnerships. LID Publishing Inc. ISBN 9780986079337.
- Nierenberg, Gerard I. (1995). The Art of Negotiating: Psychological Strategies for Gaining Advantageous Bargains. Barnes and Noble. ISBN 978-1-56619-816-5.
- Andrea Schneider & Christopher Honeyman, eds., The Negotiator's Fieldbook, American Bar Association (2006). ISBN 1-59031-545-6
- Richard H. Solomon and Nigel Quinney. American Negotiating Behavior: Wheeler-Dealers, Legal Eagles, Bullies, and Preachers (United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010); 357 pages; identifies four mindsets in the negotiation behavior of policy makers and diplomats; draws on interviews with more than 50 practitioners
- Charles Arthur Willard. Liberalism and the Problem of Knowledge: A New Rhetoric for Modern Democracy. University of Chicago Press. 1996.
- John McMillan "Games, Strategies, and Managers" Oxford University Press. 1992. ISBN 0-19-507403-3.
- Charles Arthur Willard. A Theory of Argumentation. University of Alabama Press. 1989.
- Charles Arthur Willard. Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge. University of Alabama Press. 1982.
- Hames, David S. (2011). Negotiation: Closing deals, settling disputes, and making team decisions. SAGE Publications. ISBN 9781483332727.
External links
[edit]Negotiation
View on GrokipediaFundamentals
Definition and Scope
Negotiation constitutes a communicative process in which two or more interdependent parties attempt to influence one another to resolve differences, manage conflicts, or achieve mutually acceptable outcomes through the exchange of proposals, concessions, and information.[3] [11] This process presupposes that parties possess some degree of mutual interest or overlapping goals, enabling potential for agreement despite initial divergences, as outcomes for each depend on the decisions of the others.[12] Scholarly definitions emphasize its voluntary and strategic nature, distinguishing it from coercive mechanisms by relying on persuasion rather than authority or force.[13] The scope of negotiation extends across diverse domains, including interpersonal relations, commercial transactions, labor disputes, diplomatic relations, and legal settlements, where parties directly engage without mandatory procedural rules.[14] It encompasses both bilateral discussions between two entities and multilateral interactions involving multiple stakeholders, often unfolding in informal settings or structured formats like treaty negotiations.[15] In theoretical terms, negotiation operates within bounded rationality, where parties pursue self-interested objectives while anticipating responses, potentially yielding distributive (fixed-pie) or integrative (value-creating) results depending on information disclosure and trust levels.[16] However, its boundaries exclude scenarios dominated by complete non-cooperation or unilateral imposition, as efficacy requires at least minimal willingness to bargain.[17] Negotiation differs fundamentally from other dispute resolution methods by its direct, party-controlled character, absent third-party intervention.[18] Unlike mediation, which introduces a neutral facilitator to guide dialogue, or arbitration, which imposes a binding decision, negotiation empowers parties to craft bespoke solutions or impasse without external adjudication.[19] [20] This autonomy fosters flexibility but demands skills in preparation, valuation of alternatives (such as the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement), and ethical conduct to mitigate risks like deception or power imbalances.[21] Empirical studies underscore its prevalence as the initial, least formalized approach in conflicts, often preceding escalation to costlier alternatives like litigation.[22]Etymology and Conceptual Evolution
The term negotiation entered English in the early 15th century as negotiacioun, denoting "a dealing with people" or "trafficking," borrowed from Old French negociation meaning "business" or "trade."[23] It derives from Latin negotiatio (nominative negōtiātiō), signifying "business transaction" or "traffic," formed as a noun of action from the past participle stem of negōtiārī "to carry on business" or "to deal."[24] The root negotium literally translates to "lack of leisure," combining neg- ("not," from Proto-Indo-European *ne-) with otium ("ease" or "idleness"), thus framing negotiation as effortful engagement in affairs rather than repose.[25] By the 1570s, the English sense had broadened to include "mutual discussion and arrangement of terms," extending beyond mere commerce to bargaining and agreement-making.[23] Conceptually, negotiation originated in ancient practices of barter and diplomacy, evident in Mesopotamian treaty texts from circa 2500 BCE, where sovereigns exchanged concessions to avert conflict or facilitate trade, though formalized theory was absent. In classical antiquity, Roman and Greek traditions emphasized it as a pragmatic extension of negotium, involving rhetorical persuasion in legal disputes or alliances, as Cicero described in De Officiis (44 BCE) the virtues of equitable dealings to maintain social order.[26] Medieval and early modern Europe retained this business-oriented core, applying it to mercantile contracts and feudal pacts, but Enlightenment rationalism in the 17th-18th centuries shifted focus toward diplomatic protocols, as seen in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which institutionalized multilateral talks to resolve wars through balanced power concessions rather than conquest.[27] The modern conceptualization emerged in the 20th century, transitioning from intuitive, distributive bargaining—prevalent in labor disputes and viewed as zero-sum—to integrative approaches emphasizing joint value creation, formalized in Richard Walton and John McKersie's The Collective Bargaining Process (1965), which dissected negotiation into behavioral, distributive, integrative, and attitudinal subsystems based on empirical industrial relations data.[28] Game theory further refined it mathematically, with John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944) modeling strategic interactions, and John Nash's equilibrium concept (1950) highlighting non-cooperative outcomes in repeated dealings.[29] The Harvard Negotiation Project, established in 1979, advanced principled negotiation—focusing on interests over positions, objective criteria, and BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement)—as detailed in Roger Fisher and William Ury's Getting to Yes (1981), drawing on psychological and legal insights to promote mutual gains amid critiques of overly adversarial traditions.[30] This evolution reflects causal shifts from scarcity-driven trades in pre-modern eras to interdisciplinary analysis in complex, interdependent societies, prioritizing evidence-based strategies over ritualized customs.[31]Core Principles from First Principles
Negotiation, at its foundation, arises from interdependence among rational agents whose outcomes depend on coordinated actions rather than unilateral decisions, as isolated choices often yield suboptimal results due to incomplete control over shared resources or externalities.[32] This interdependence creates incentives for interaction, where parties trade concessions to align preferences, transforming potential conflict into potential surplus through voluntary exchange grounded in subjective valuations of goods or actions.[33] Empirical evidence from bargaining experiments confirms that such trades occur when parties perceive mutual gains, as measured by increases in joint utility beyond disagreement points.[34] A primary principle is the centrality of alternatives to agreement, often termed BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement), which establishes each party's reservation value and leverage, as the agreement must exceed this threshold to be rational.[6] From causal realism, leverage derives from opportunity costs: a stronger BATNA reduces willingness to concede, as evidenced in ultimatum games where proposers allocate less to responders when rejection costs are low for themselves.[35] Information asymmetry compounds this, as undisclosed BATNAs lead to inefficient breakdowns, underscoring the need for credible signaling or verification to approximate efficient outcomes.[36] Another foundational axiom is Pareto efficiency, where no agreement should leave a party better off without worsening another's position, derived from the logical impossibility of perpetual disagreement in finite-resource scenarios without external enforcement.[37] Symmetry in bargaining power, absent information differences, implies equal division of surplus in identical utility functions, as axiomatized in Nash bargaining solutions tested across experimental settings yielding outcomes close to 50-50 splits under fairness perceptions.[33][34] Commitment credibility enforces these, as promises without binding mechanisms invite defection, rooted in time-inconsistent preferences observed in repeated games.[32] These principles extend to the rejection of zero-sum fallacies: while distributive claims (e.g., price haggling) appear fixed-pie, integrative opportunities arise from differing marginal utilities, enabling logrolling where parties value concessions asymmetrically, as demonstrated in controlled studies showing expanded pies through interest-based exploration over positional bargaining.[6] Objective criteria, such as market standards or precedents, mitigate bias in evaluations, promoting stability by anchoring to verifiable externalities rather than subjective power assertions.[35] Behavioral deviations, like loss aversion, temper pure rationality but do not negate these cores, as negotiators adapt via calibrated concessions to exploit psychological realism.[36]Historical Development
Pre-Modern Practices and Examples
In ancient Greece, negotiation often served as a prelude to or alternative to warfare, emphasizing rhetorical persuasion and power dynamics. A prominent example is the 416 BCE confrontation between Athens and the island of Melos during the Peloponnesian War, documented by the historian Thucydides. Athenian envoys demanded Melian subjugation, rejecting appeals to neutrality or justice by asserting that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must," highlighting a realist approach where outcomes hinged on relative military strength rather than moral equivalence.[38] This dialogue underscored negotiation's role in coercive diplomacy, where weaker parties sought concessions through argument but yielded to existential threats.[38] Roman negotiation practices frequently involved treaties (foedera) to integrate conquered or allied communities, balancing autonomy with Roman dominance. The foedus Cassianum, concluded in 493 BCE between Rome and the Latin League following the Battle of Lake Regillus, established mutual defense obligations and regulated inter-city relations, allowing Latin cities limited self-governance in exchange for military support against common foes like the Aequi.[39] Such agreements were codified in writing, sworn under auspices, and periodically renewed, reflecting a pragmatic institutionalization of negotiation to stabilize expansion.[39] Later republican examples, like negotiations during the Punic Wars, similarly prioritized strategic concessions, such as Hannibal's 218 BCE parley with Roman envoys before Cannae, where tactical deception influenced terms.[39] In early medieval Europe, negotiation manifested through peacemaking rituals and treaties that resolved feuds via compensation, oaths, and hostages, often mediated by clergy or lords. Between 700 and 1200 CE, such instruments functioned as proto-international law, addressing violations like raids or broken alliances with wergild payments—monetary equivalents for lives or property—and guarantees of safe passage.[40] For instance, the 802 CE treaty between Charlemagne and Offa of Mercia delineated trade boundaries and pilgrimage rights, enforced by mutual sanctions, demonstrating negotiation's causal link to sustained peace amid fragmented polities.[40] These practices prioritized relational restoration over abstract rights, with credibility derived from witnesses and sacred relics rather than centralized authority.[40] Ancient Chinese strategic thought integrated negotiation as a non-kinetic extension of warfare, prioritizing psychological leverage to avoid costly engagements. Sun Tzu's The Art of War, composed around the 5th century BCE during the Warring States period, advocated subduing adversaries through "stratagems" like feigned weakness or alliance inducements, stating that "supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting."[41] This approach influenced practices such as the 453 BCE negotiations among Jin state factions, where diplomacy fragmented coalitions via bribes and threats, averting open battle while redistributing power.[41] Empirical success in these contexts correlated with information asymmetry and adaptability, as unverified claims of strength compelled concessions.[41]Emergence of Modern Theory
The foundations of modern negotiation theory coalesced in the mid-20th century, driven by interdisciplinary advances in economics, psychology, and political science amid post-World War II geopolitical tensions and expanding industrial labor disputes. Game theory provided an analytical bedrock, with John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's 1944 publication Theory of Games and Economic Behavior introducing formal models of strategic interaction, including bargaining under uncertainty, which shifted analysis from intuitive diplomacy to mathematical prediction of outcomes based on rational actors' utilities. This framework highlighted negotiation as a non-zero-sum game, where parties' interdependent decisions could yield joint gains or losses, influencing subsequent models of credible commitments and threats.[42] A pivotal advancement occurred in 1960 with Thomas Schelling's The Strategy of Conflict, which applied game-theoretic insights to real-world bargaining, emphasizing mixed-motive scenarios where cooperation and competition coexist, such as in arms control talks during the Cold War. Schelling's concepts of focal points—salient solutions emerging without explicit communication—and the strategic use of precommitments to alter opponents' incentives formalized how negotiators manipulate perceptions to achieve leverage, marking a departure from purely distributive views toward recognizing informational asymmetries and signaling.[42] These ideas, grounded in empirical observations of limited wars and deterrence, underscored causal mechanisms like enforceable threats over mere positional demands.[43] The 1965 work A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations by Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie further crystallized modern theory by dissecting negotiation into four subprocesses: distributive bargaining (dividing fixed resources), integrative bargaining (expanding value through trade-offs), attitudinal structuring (building trust), and intraorganizational decision-making. Drawing from case studies of U.S. union-management talks, they empirically demonstrated how integrative tactics—such as logrolling priorities—could mitigate zero-sum conflicts, providing a testable framework that integrated behavioral psychology with economic incentives.[44] This labor-centric model, validated through observational data, influenced broader applications in business and diplomacy, revealing systemic biases in traditional adversarial approaches that overlooked mutual interests.[45] By the 1980s, Howard Raiffa's The Art and Science of Negotiation synthesized these strands with decision analysis, advocating utility elicitation and probabilistic modeling to quantify reservation prices and zone of possible agreements (ZOPA), thereby enabling prescriptive strategies for asymmetric information scenarios. Raiffa's approach, rooted in Harvard's Program on Negotiation founded in 1981, prioritized empirical utility functions over subjective intuitions, fostering tools like multi-attribute utility theory for complex, multi-party deals. These developments collectively elevated negotiation from anecdotal practice to a rigorous discipline, emphasizing verifiable causal links between preparation, information revelation, and outcomes, though early models faced critique for assuming hyper-rationality amid real-world cognitive biases.[46]Key Milestones and Influential Works
The mathematical foundations of modern negotiation theory emerged with the development of game theory in the mid-20th century. In 1944, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern published Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, which formalized strategic decision-making in interactive settings, providing tools to analyze bargaining as zero-sum or non-zero-sum games where parties anticipate opponents' moves.[47] This work shifted negotiation from ad hoc diplomacy to quantifiable models, influencing subsequent analyses of power dynamics and equilibria.[48] A pivotal advancement occurred in 1950 when John Nash introduced the Nash equilibrium in his dissertation on non-cooperative games, demonstrating that rational players converge on stable outcomes even without binding agreements, applicable to bilateral bargaining where concessions depend on credible threats.[49] Nash's solution extended von Neumann's zero-sum focus to general-sum scenarios, enabling predictions of negotiation breakdowns or compromises based on payoff structures rather than intuition alone.[50] In 1964, Fred Charles Iklé's How Nations Negotiate marked an early empirical turn, drawing on case studies of diplomatic talks to critique overly rationalistic models and emphasize psychological, bureaucratic, and domestic constraints on negotiators, such as commitment problems and audience costs.[51] Iklé argued that negotiations often fail due to mismatched objectives or tactical rigidities, advocating adaptive strategies over fixed game-theoretic prescriptions.[52] The late 1970s saw the rise of behavioral and prescriptive approaches. The Harvard Negotiation Project, established in 1979 by Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, sought to bridge theory and practice by developing methods for mutual-gains outcomes amid Cold War tensions.[30] Their 1981 book Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In popularized "principled negotiation," focusing on interests over positions, objective criteria, and inventing options for mutual benefit, while introducing BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) to counter power imbalances.[53] This framework critiqued distributive haggling as inefficient, promoting integrative tactics supported by empirical observations from labor and international disputes, though later analyses noted its optimism overlooks zero-sum realities.[54] Subsequent works built on these foundations; for instance, Richard Walton and John McKersie's 1965 A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations delineated distributive (claiming value) and integrative (creating value) dimensions, influencing organizational theory by integrating game theory with behavioral economics.[2] By the 1990s, interdisciplinary expansions incorporated cognitive biases and emotions, as in Max Bazerman's research, but the von Neumann-Nash-Iklé-Harvard lineage remains central to distinguishing negotiation as a rational yet human process.[55]Types of Negotiation
Distributive Negotiation
Distributive negotiation, also termed distributive bargaining, constitutes a competitive process wherein parties divide a fixed quantum of resources or value, such that gains for one negotiator directly correspond to equivalent losses for the counterpart. This paradigm assumes a zero-sum outcome, where the total value available—often denominated in monetary terms, such as price or budget allocation—remains constant, prompting each side to maximize their share through adversarial tactics. Originating in foundational labor relations theory, the concept was formalized by Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie in their 1965 work A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, which delineated distributive bargaining as involving fixed-sum issues requiring allocation of benefits amid perceived incompatibilities.[56][57] Central to distributive negotiation are elements like the reservation point—the minimum or maximum acceptable outcome before abandoning talks—and the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA), the overlap between parties' reservation points that enables a deal. Negotiators prioritize short-term value claiming over relational longevity, employing power dynamics, rights-based arguments, and information asymmetry to shift the pie's division favorably. Empirical studies underscore its prevalence in single-issue scenarios, where resources like market share or one-time asset sales preclude expansion of the pie, as evidenced in analyses of bargaining under scarcity conditions. Characteristics include high-stakes posturing, limited trust, and a focus on leverage, contrasting with cooperative models by eschewing mutual gains in favor of unilateral advantage.[58][59][60] Tactics in distributive negotiation emphasize anchoring—initiating with extreme offers to frame perceptions—and gradual, minimal concessions to signal firmness while probing limits. Research from the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School highlights strategies such as bolstering one's best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) through external options, thereby strengthening bargaining position; for instance, pre-negotiation market research can elevate a buyer's BATNA, compelling sellers to concede. Experimental findings indicate that aggressive opening bids yield higher individual outcomes in fixed-pie simulations, though over-aggression risks impasse if ZOPA is absent. Deceptive tactics, like misrepresenting reservation points, occur but carry ethical risks, with studies showing relational fallout in repeated interactions.[57][59][61] Practical examples abound in transactional contexts: a procurement manager haggling over canned food pricing to secure units at $1.40 each against a supplier's higher target, or an employee negotiating salary within a fixed departmental budget, where concessions on base pay might trade for non-monetary perks but ultimately slice the available funds. Real estate purchases similarly embody distributive dynamics, with buyers anchoring low on home prices amid seller resistance, as documented in negotiation case studies. While effective for discrete, high-conflict exchanges—like labor strikes over wage pools—the approach falters in interdependent scenarios, potentially eroding future cooperation, per longitudinal bargaining research.[62][63][64]Integrative Negotiation
Integrative negotiation, also known as integrative bargaining, refers to a collaborative approach in which parties aim to expand the available resources or value through mutual gains rather than dividing a fixed amount. This method contrasts with distributive negotiation by emphasizing joint problem-solving, where negotiators identify underlying interests and trade across issues to achieve outcomes that satisfy both sides more effectively than zero-sum competition.[65][66] The approach assumes that parties' priorities differ across multiple issues, allowing for logrolling—concessions on low-priority items in exchange for gains on high-priority ones—thus creating a larger "pie" of value.[67] Central principles include focusing on interests rather than fixed positions, generating multiple options for mutual benefit, and using objective criteria to evaluate solutions. These elements, outlined in Roger Fisher and William Ury's 1981 book Getting to Yes, promote information sharing about priorities to uncover synergies, such as when one party values timing over quantity in a deal. Empirical studies support that integrative strategies yield higher joint outcomes when negotiators communicate preferences openly, as measured in controlled experiments where cooperative tactics increased total value extracted by 20-30% compared to competitive ones.[68][69] However, success depends on trust; without it, revealing interests can lead to exploitation, as distributive incentives may dominate if one side anticipates defection.[70] Key tactics involve preparing by mapping interests, brainstorming without premature judgment, and prioritizing issues through techniques like the "contingent contract," where agreements hinge on future performance. In practice, integrative negotiation thrives in multi-issue scenarios with interdependent parties, such as business partnerships or labor disputes, where ongoing relationships incentivize collaboration over one-off haggling. Research from cross-cultural comparisons, including U.S. and Italian negotiators, indicates that integrative behaviors correlate with higher satisfaction and perceived fairness, though cultural norms favoring hierarchy can hinder open exchange.[66][71] Evidence from negotiation simulations demonstrates that integrative outcomes enhance long-term satisfaction more than distributive ones, particularly when issues involve subjective values like relationships or processes rather than purely tangible resources. A 2014 study found that negotiators using integrative tactics reported 15% higher satisfaction due to addressed interests, even if absolute gains varied.[72] Limitations arise in high-stakes, low-trust environments, where distributive tactics may prevail; critics argue that integrative ideals overlook power asymmetries, potentially favoring stronger parties who control information flow.[73] Despite this, field applications in organizational settings, such as European firms adopting interest-based bargaining, show reduced conflict and sustained agreements when training emphasizes these methods.[70]Mixed-Motive and Other Variants
Mixed-motive negotiations characterize the majority of real-world bargaining scenarios, where parties pursue both cooperative and competitive objectives simultaneously.[74] In these situations, negotiators must collaborate to expand the pie of available resources through integrative tactics, such as trading differing priorities across multiple issues, while also contending distributively to secure a larger share of the joint value.[75] This dual dynamic arises from interdependent relationships where mutual gains are possible but individual maximization incentivizes rivalry, as seen in classic two-party bargaining models.[75] The structure of mixed-motive interactions often involves multiple issues with varying valuations among parties, enabling logrolling—exchanging concessions on low-priority items for gains on high-priority ones—to foster joint efficiency.[76] However, without trust or information sharing, parties may default to competitive heuristics, such as anchoring on initial offers or misrepresenting preferences, which can shrink the zone of possible agreement.[77] Empirical studies demonstrate that skilled negotiators in mixed-motive settings outperform others by balancing inquiry (to uncover interests) with advocacy (to claim value), achieving up to 46% variance in outcomes attributable to individual differences in strategy.[78] Examples abound in business mergers, where firms integrate complementary assets cooperatively but haggle over equity splits competitively, or in labor disputes, balancing wage hikes against productivity concessions.[76] International diplomacy, such as arms control talks, exemplifies mixed motives: states cooperate to avert escalation while safeguarding strategic advantages.[74] Other variants extend mixed-motive dynamics to complex contexts. Multiparty negotiations introduce coalition formation and side-deals, amplifying coordination challenges and fixed-pie biases, as parties must manage alliances amid diffuse competition.[79] Team-based bargaining, common in organizational settings, layers intra-team alignment with inter-team rivalry, requiring internal consensus to prevent leaks or defection.[2] Cross-cultural variants further complicate motives through differing norms on directness or relational priorities, potentially eroding value creation if unaddressed.[76] In all cases, success hinges on navigating the interplay of cooperation and competition without succumbing to zero-sum assumptions.[77]Negotiation Process
Stages of Negotiation
The negotiation process is commonly structured into sequential stages to facilitate systematic progress toward an agreement, though real-world applications may involve iteration or overlap depending on context and complexity.[80][81] A standard five-stage model, drawn from organizational and business negotiation frameworks, emphasizes preparation as foundational, followed by structured interaction, problem-solving, and execution.[81][82] This model contrasts with shorter variants, such as Harvard Business School's four-step approach focusing on preparation, bargaining, closing, and post-negotiation learning, which prioritizes adaptive business outcomes over rigid sequencing.[80] Preparation and Planning. Negotiators assess their objectives, alternatives (such as BATNA, or best alternative to a negotiated agreement), interests, and potential concessions prior to engagement.[80][83] This stage includes gathering data on counterparts' likely positions, market conditions, and power dynamics to establish reservation points—the minimum acceptable terms.[84] Effective preparation correlates with higher agreement rates, as evidenced by studies showing unprepared parties concede more value.[85] Ground rules, like agenda, location, and time limits, may also be informally predefined here to minimize procedural disputes.[81] Definition of Ground Rules. Parties convene to outline procedural norms, including communication protocols, decision-making methods (e.g., consensus or majority), and timelines, ensuring mutual understanding of the negotiation's framework.[81] This stage sets boundaries to prevent escalation from ambiguity, particularly in multi-party or cross-cultural settings where differing norms can hinder progress.[82] Failure to align on rules early often leads to inefficiencies, as procedural conflicts divert focus from substantive issues.[83] Clarification and Justification. Initial positions are exchanged, with each side articulating goals, rationales, and supporting evidence to build understanding and identify overlaps or gaps.[84][81] Questions probe underlying interests rather than fixed demands, fostering transparency; for instance, in business deals, this reveals non-monetary priorities like delivery timelines.[85] Empirical analyses indicate that thorough clarification reduces misperceptions, which account for up to 30% of negotiation impasses in controlled experiments.[82] Bargaining and Problem-Solving. Core concessions occur through offers, counteroffers, and creative options to bridge differences, often employing objective criteria or trade-offs to expand the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA).[80][81] Distributive tactics like anchoring initial demands influence outcomes, while integrative approaches generate mutual gains; research from Harvard's Program on Negotiation shows integrative bargaining yields 20-50% more value in multi-issue scenarios.[85] Deadlocks may necessitate breaks or mediators to reframe issues causally, prioritizing verifiable data over positional entrenchment.[84] Closure and Implementation. Final terms are committed to writing, addressing contingencies and enforcement mechanisms to solidify the deal.[83][81] Post-agreement review assesses performance against expectations, informing future iterations; HBS data links this reflective step to improved long-term negotiator efficacy by identifying causal factors in successes or deviations.[80] Without robust implementation plans, even optimal agreements fail, as seen in contract disputes where vague clauses lead to 15-25% litigation rates in commercial settings.[85]Key Concepts: BATNA, ZOPA, and Reservation Points
BATNA, or Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement, refers to the most advantageous course of action a party can pursue if negotiations fail and no agreement is reached.[86] This concept, introduced by Roger Fisher and William Ury in their 1981 book Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, serves as a benchmark for evaluating proposed deals; any agreement must surpass the BATNA to justify acceptance, thereby empowering negotiators to avoid suboptimal outcomes and fostering confidence in walking away from unfavorable terms.[87] A strong BATNA, derived from realistic alternatives like alternative suppliers or legal recourse, enhances bargaining power, while a weak one risks concessions below value.[88] The reservation point, also termed reservation price or resistance point, marks the threshold at which a negotiator is indifferent between accepting a deal and reverting to their BATNA; it represents the least favorable terms they will tolerate, such as the maximum price a buyer will pay or the minimum a seller will accept.[89] This point, often kept confidential to maintain leverage, directly influences negotiation dynamics: exceeding it prompts rejection, as the BATNA becomes preferable, and it may differ from the BATNA value if opportunity costs or time sensitivities alter perceived alternatives.[90] For instance, in a salary negotiation, an employee's reservation point might be $80,000 based on competing offers (BATNA), below which they pursue external opportunities.[91] ZOPA, or Zone of Possible Agreement, delineates the bargaining range where parties' reservation points overlap, enabling mutually acceptable deals; absent a ZOPA—when one party's minimum exceeds the other's maximum—no rational agreement exists without altering aspirations or alternatives.[92] ZOPA emerges from the interplay of BATNAs and reservation points: parties assess their limits privately, then probe for overlap through offers, with a wider ZOPA (spanning, say, $90,000–$110,000 in a price negotiation) allowing value distribution, while a narrow one heightens impasse risk.[93] Effective negotiators expand ZOPA by strengthening BATNAs or introducing trade-offs, ensuring settlements Pareto-dominate no-deal scenarios.[91] These concepts interconnect such that BATNA informs reservation points, and aligned reservation points define ZOPA, guiding rational decision-making amid information asymmetries.[94]Strategies and Tactics
Competitive and Distributive Tactics
Competitive tactics in distributive negotiation emphasize claiming the largest possible share of a fixed resource pool, treating the process as zero-sum where one party's gains directly reduce the other's. These approaches prioritize self-interest over mutual benefit, often involving manipulation of perceptions, information asymmetry, and pressure to influence the opponent's reservation point—the minimum acceptable outcome—while concealing one's own. Research identifies four core tactical tasks: assessing the opponent's targets and limits, concealing one's own position, influencing the opponent's expectations, and establishing ambitious yet credible targets.[95] Empirical studies confirm that such tactics yield higher individual economic outcomes in single-issue bargaining but at the cost of relational damage, with a meta-analysis of 28 experiments showing hardline strategies increasing negotiator profit by an average of 18% compared to softer approaches, though reducing willingness for future collaboration by up to 25%.[96] Key competitive tactics include anchoring with extreme initial offers to set a favorable reference point, as negotiators conceding from a highball (seller's inflated demand) or lowball (buyer's undervalued bid) end up closer to the anchor; experiments demonstrate anchors bias final agreements by 20-30% toward the initial proposal.[97] Small, deliberate concessions signal reluctance and extract larger reciprocation, with data from bargaining simulations indicating that negotiators using this pattern secure 15% more value than those making large early yields.[59] Commitment tactics, such as rigid ultimatums or "take-it-or-leave-it" positions, limit flexibility to force concessions, effective when backed by credible alternatives but risking impasse; field studies in labor disputes from 1980-2000 found such tactics succeeding in 62% of cases where power asymmetry favored the committer.[97] Other distributive maneuvers involve information control, such as probing for the opponent's bottom line through selective disclosure or feigned ignorance, while withholding one's BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement) to maintain leverage—research shows revealing a strong BATNA prematurely reduces settlement amounts by 12% on average.[98] Hardball variants like the "nibble" (late minor demands after apparent agreement) or "chicken" (escalating risks to bluff weakness) exploit psychological pressure, though overuse erodes trust; a 2011 analysis of over 200 negotiations linked frequent hardball use to 40% higher short-term gains but 30% lower long-term deal quality due to retaliation.[99] These tactics demand preparation, including resistance point calculation via cost-benefit analysis, to avoid overcommitment, as unanchored positions lead to suboptimal outcomes in 70% of uncontrolled distributive scenarios per simulation data.[100]Collaborative and Value-Creating Approaches
Collaborative negotiation approaches prioritize mutual gains by expanding the total value available to parties, rather than dividing a presumed fixed pie as in distributive tactics. These methods, often termed integrative or principled negotiation, involve identifying compatible interests, generating creative options, and using objective standards to resolve differences. Developed prominently in the 1981 book Getting to Yes by Roger Fisher and William Ury of the Harvard Negotiation Project, the approach rests on four core principles: separating interpersonal relationships from substantive issues, focusing on underlying interests rather than stated positions, inventing options for mutual benefit, and basing outcomes on independent criteria.[68][6] A primary tactic in value-creating negotiation is logrolling, where parties concede on issues of low personal value in exchange for gains on high-value issues, thereby increasing joint outcomes. Empirical studies, such as those reviewed in Thompson's 1990 analysis of negotiation behavior, demonstrate that integrative strategies yield higher joint profits in controlled experiments compared to distributive ones, with negotiators achieving up to 20-30% greater value through interest-based trade-offs.[101] Information sharing is another key element; research indicates that conditional openness—disclosing interests selectively to build trust—facilitates value creation by revealing synergies, as opposed to unconditional disclosure which risks exploitation.[102] Effective communication plays a key role in successful collaborative negotiation, involving clear and persuasive expression of ideas alongside open-ended questions (e.g., "How could we make this work for both sides?") to elicit underlying interests, reveal hidden information, and facilitate a shift from adversarial posturing to joint problem-solving dynamics. A related tactic involves embracing "No" responses, as "Yes" may often reflect avoidance rather than commitment, whereas "No" makes counterparts feel safe and in control, opening pathways to genuine dialogue. This is achieved through no-oriented questions, such as "Is now a bad time?" or "Would it be ridiculous if...?", which reduce pressure and encourage honesty.[103][104] Brainstorming sessions, decoupled from commitment, encourage divergent thinking to uncover novel solutions, such as contingent agreements that hedge against uncertain future events. For instance, in multi-issue negotiations, parties can capitalize on differing time preferences or risk tolerances to craft packages where one side receives immediate benefits while the other gains long-term advantages. Experimental evidence from abstract issue representation studies shows that negotiators framing problems at higher levels of construal reach more integrative agreements, with success rates increasing by facilitating focus on shared goals over immediate conflicts.[105] However, effectiveness depends on mutual motivation; when trust is low or power asymmetries high, integrative tactics may falter, reverting to claiming behaviors unless rapport-building precedes problem-solving.[71] In practice, these approaches have been applied in labor disputes and international diplomacy, where expanding issues beyond initial demands—such as incorporating training or environmental clauses—has led to sustainable pacts. Meta-analyses of bargaining outcomes confirm that collaborative tactics correlate with higher satisfaction and durability, though they require skill in avoiding premature concessions that could signal weakness.[101] Critics argue that pure integrative bargaining assumes goodwill absent in adversarial settings, potentially undermining leverage, yet data from economic models supports its superiority in repeated interactions where reputation matters.[73]Deception, Ethics, and Unethical Tactics
Deception in negotiation involves the intentional distortion or withholding of information to influence outcomes, including outright lies, omissions, bluffs about reservation prices, and paltering—misleading through truthful but selective statements. Such practices arise from inherent information asymmetries, providing both incentives and opportunities for misrepresentation in value-claiming scenarios. Empirical reviews confirm deception's pervasiveness, though laboratory experiments reveal lower incidence than game-theoretic models anticipate; for instance, in proposer-responder paradigms, deception occurred in approximately 14% of opportunities (60 out of 440 for proposers and 61 out of 440 for responders), attributed to anticipatory guilt, self-concept maintenance, and expected retaliation.[106][106] Ethically, deception challenges deontological principles of honesty while appealing to consequentialist rationales in zero-sum distributive bargaining, where full disclosure could erode bargaining power. Negotiators often distinguish "white lies" or puffery—exaggerated claims of enthusiasm or minor capabilities deemed socially acceptable—from "black lies" involving material falsehoods about facts or intentions, which risk severe relational damage if uncovered. Research indicates that while competitive bargainers rationalize deception as normative, its detection consistently undermines trust, escalates conflict, and reduces future cooperation, with retaliatory behaviors observed in experiments where deceived parties withheld value or exited deals. Cultural and individual factors modulate acceptability; for example, expectancies of opponents' ethics predict one's own deceptive tendencies, with "gamers" viewing low-level misrepresentation as standard.[107][106][108] Unethical tactics extend beyond deception to violations of implicit negotiation norms, such as aggressive pressure or illegitimate information acquisition. The Self-Reported Inappropriate Negotiation Strategies (SINS) scale, derived from factor analyses of negotiator perceptions, categorizes these into five dimensions, rated for acceptability by business professionals and students:- Traditional competitive bargaining: Includes bluffing one's bottom line or pretending to have better alternatives; viewed as moderately acceptable in adversarial contexts but unethical when involving false commitments to walk away.[109]
- Attacking the opponent's network: Tactics like threatening to contact the counterpart's superiors or allies to apply external pressure; widely rated as highly unethical due to escalation beyond direct parties.[109]
- False promises: Guaranteeing future actions (e.g., "We will deliver on time") without intent to fulfill; condemned for breaching good faith, with surveys showing near-universal rejection.[109]
- Misrepresentation of information: Fabricating data on costs, market conditions, or capabilities; perceived as severely unethical, correlating with lower self-reported use but higher incidence in high-stakes experiments.[109]
- Inappropriate information collection: Spying, hacking, or unauthorized surveillance to uncover private details; rated most unacceptable, as it violates privacy and procedural fairness.[109]
Psychological Dimensions
Role of Emotions and Affect
Emotions and affect exert profound influence on negotiation processes, shaping perceptions, decision-making, and interpersonal dynamics through both intrapersonal and interpersonal channels. Integral emotions arise directly from negotiation-related events, such as frustration over an unfair offer, while incidental emotions stem from unrelated sources, like prior stress, yet both can bias judgments toward risk aversion or overconfidence without conscious attribution.[112][113] Positive affect, including happiness or contentment, broadens cognitive scope, encourages collaborative problem-solving, and promotes information exchange, often yielding higher joint gains in integrative negotiations. In experiments by Carnevale and Isen (1986), negotiators induced into positive moods via small gifts secured 20-30% more value in multi-issue bargaining compared to those in neutral states, attributing this to reduced fixation on distributive claims and increased creativity in trade-offs.[114] Positive emotions also mitigate aggression and foster rapport, with negotiators reporting greater satisfaction and willingness for future dealings.[115] Negative emotions, particularly anger, function as social signals of resolve and high aspirations, prompting counterparts to concede more to avoid conflict. Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead (2004) demonstrated in three computer-mediated bargaining experiments involving 150+ dyads that angry expressers elicited 15-25% larger concessions than neutral or happy counterparts, an effect amplified when recipients were high in epistemic motivation to process cues carefully.[116] A 2020 meta-analysis of 29 studies (N=2,500+ participants) by Zhang, Van Kleef, and Fischer found a moderate effect (d=0.35) for negative expressions increasing counterpart concessions, enabling expressers to claim greater value, though this advantage diminishes in complex, multi-issue scenarios or when anger appears illegitimate.[117] Despite potential gains, negative affect risks escalation, trust erosion, and impasse by narrowing attention to threats and impairing perspective-taking. For example, high-arousal anger correlates with premature exits and 10-15% lower individual profits in simulated deals when counterparts reciprocate hostility.[118] Emotional contagion exacerbates this, as mirrored negative states reduce cooperative intent across dyads.[119] Effective regulation—such as labeling incidental emotions or reframing integral ones—preserves rationality, with trained negotiators achieving 12% better outcomes by decoupling affect from tactics.[113] Overall, while suppressing emotions proves counterproductive by heightening physiological stress, strategically harnessing affect aligns with causal drivers of value creation, balancing individual assertiveness against relational sustainability.[114]Cognitive Biases and Decision-Making Errors
Cognitive biases represent systematic patterns of deviation from normatively rational judgment, influencing negotiators' perceptions, evaluations, and decisions in ways that often lead to suboptimal agreements or impasses. In negotiation contexts, these biases arise from heuristics—mental shortcuts that prioritize cognitive efficiency over accuracy—and can distort assessments of value, alternatives, and counterparties' intentions. Empirical studies, including controlled experiments, demonstrate that biases such as anchoring and overconfidence persist even among experienced negotiators, reducing joint gains by as much as 20-30% in simulated bargaining scenarios. For instance, Tversky and Kahneman's foundational work on heuristics highlighted how negotiators' final decisions deviate from rationality due to biased information processing, a finding replicated in two-party negotiation experiments where participants systematically underperformed rational benchmarks.[120][121] Anchoring bias occurs when negotiators overly rely on the first numerical or positional offer as a reference point, insufficiently adjusting subsequent counteroffers despite new evidence. Research shows that high initial anchors yield higher final settlements, with even arbitrary anchors (e.g., random numbers presented before offers) shifting outcomes by 10-15% in favor of the anchor's direction. In one series of experiments, negotiators who made the first offer captured up to 65% more value than those responding, as the anchor constrained the perceived bargaining range. This effect holds across domains, from salary negotiations to asset sales, where countermeasures like pre-committing to independent valuations can mitigate but not eliminate the bias.[122][123] Overconfidence bias manifests as excessive faith in one's private information or predictive accuracy, prompting negotiators to reject viable deals within the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA). Experimental evidence indicates that overconfident bargainers demand more concessions, increasing impasse rates by 40% in multi-issue disputes, as they overestimate their BATNA's strength or the counterpart's willingness to concede. A 2021 study decomposed overplacement in joint production bargaining, finding it stems from egocentric assessments of contributions, leading to zero-sum framing even when integrative solutions exist. Overconfidence correlates with lower objective outcomes but higher subjective satisfaction, perpetuating the error across repeated interactions unless debiased through probabilistic forecasting tasks.[124][125] Confirmation bias drives negotiators to selectively seek, interpret, or recall information affirming their initial hypotheses about the deal or opponent, while discounting contradictory data. This leads to flawed proposal evaluations and persistent misjudgments of outcomes, as seen in simulations where biased questioning reinforced original positions, reducing concession rates by 25%. In conflict resolution settings, confirmation bias exacerbates ideological divides, with negotiators interpreting the same evidence differently based on priors, hindering mutual understanding. Peer-reviewed reviews note its interplay with other biases, amplifying errors in high-stakes talks where verifiable data (e.g., market benchmarks) is ignored in favor of self-serving narratives.[126][121] Framing effects alter bargaining through the presentation of equivalent options as gains or losses, invoking prospect theory's loss aversion where losses loom larger than gains. Negotiators framed in loss terms (e.g., "avoiding concession losses") make fewer compromises and achieve 15-20% worse distributive outcomes than those gain-framed, as loss aversion rigidifies positions. Experimental manipulations confirm that positive frames foster integrative search, while negative ones promote competitive tactics, with effects persisting in integrative bargaining where distributive splits interact with value creation. This bias underscores the causal role of wording in causal chains from perception to agreement, as negotiators' risk attitudes shift asymmetrically under different frames.[127][128]Personality Traits and Conflict Styles
Personality traits significantly influence negotiators' conflict styles, which in turn affect bargaining approaches and outcomes. Empirical research indicates that stable individual differences, such as those captured by the Big Five personality model—extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to experience—correlate with preferences for specific conflict-handling modes.[129] These traits shape whether individuals lean toward assertive, competitive tactics or cooperative, integrative strategies, with evidence from meta-analyses showing consistent patterns across studies.[130] The Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument (TKI), developed in 1974, provides a foundational framework for assessing conflict styles along two dimensions: assertiveness (pursuit of one's own concerns) and cooperativeness (pursuit of others' concerns).[131] It identifies five modes: competing (high assertiveness, low cooperativeness), collaborating (high on both), compromising (moderate on both), avoiding (low on both), and accommodating (low assertiveness, high cooperativeness).[132] The TKI, validated through decades of use in organizational settings, reveals that no single mode is universally superior; effectiveness depends on context, with collaborating often yielding higher joint gains in integrative negotiations but competing proving advantageous in distributive scenarios requiring firm positions.[133] Big Five traits predict TKI mode preferences. High agreeableness correlates positively with accommodating and compromising styles, as agreeable individuals prioritize harmony and concessions, but this can disadvantage them in zero-sum negotiations by leading to lower individual outcomes. [134] Extraversion links to competing and dominating behaviors, enabling extraverts to assert claims more forcefully and achieve better results in competitive bargaining, though excessive extraversion may hinder rapport-building in collaborative talks.[129] [135] Conscientiousness associates with compromising and integrating modes, reflecting disciplined, goal-oriented approaches that facilitate preparation and persistence.[136] Neuroticism, conversely, predicts avoidance, as emotionally unstable individuals may withdraw to evade stress, reducing negotiation effectiveness. Openness to experience supports collaborating by fostering creativity in value-creating solutions.[135]| Big Five Trait | Associated Conflict Styles | Negotiation Implications |
|---|---|---|
| Agreeableness | Accommodating, Compromising, Avoiding | Enhances cooperation but risks exploitation in distributive contexts; empirical simulations show lower payouts for high-agreeable bargainers.[134] |
| Extraversion | Competing, Collaborating | Boosts assertiveness and social influence, correlating with higher individual gains in empirical studies of bargaining performance.[129] [135] |
| Conscientiousness | Compromising, Integrating | Supports structured preparation and follow-through, linked to overall negotiation effectiveness in organizational samples.[136] [135] |
| Neuroticism | Avoiding | Increases withdrawal tendencies, impairing outcomes by limiting engagement. |
| Openness | Collaborating | Promotes innovative problem-solving, aiding integrative agreements per trait-outcome correlations.[135] |