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Rejected takeoff
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In aviation, a rejected takeoff (RTO) or aborted takeoff is the situation in which the pilot decides to abort the takeoff of an airplane after initiating the takeoff roll but before the airplane leaves the ground.
Reasons to perform a rejected takeoff vary but are usually related to a suspected or actual problem with the aircraft, such as an engine failure; fire; incorrect configuration; aircraft control issue; unusually slow acceleration; automated warning signal(s) indicating a critical system failure; environmental conditions such as predictive windshear; or an instruction from air traffic control.
There are three phases of a takeoff. In the low-speed regime, usually below 80 kts or so, the takeoff will be rejected even for minor failures. In the high-speed regime, above usually 80 kts but below V1, minor problems are ignored, but the takeoff will still be rejected for serious problems, in particular for engine failures. The takeoff decision speed, known as V1, is calculated before each flight for larger multi-engine airplanes. Below the decision speed, the airplane should be able to stop safely before the end of the runway. Above the decision speed, the airplane may overshoot the runway if the takeoff is aborted, and, therefore, a rejected takeoff is normally not performed above this speed, unless there is reason to doubt the airplane's ability to fly. If a serious failure occurs or is suspected above V1, but the airplane's ability to fly is not in doubt, the takeoff is continued despite the (suspected) failure, and the airplane will attempt to land again as soon as possible. If the airplane's ability to fly is in doubt (for instance, in the event of a major flight-control failure which leaves the airplane unable to rotate for liftoff), the best option may well be to reject the takeoff even if after V1, accepting the likelihood of a runway overrun.
Single-engine aircraft will reject any takeoff after an engine failure, regardless of speed, as there is no power available to continue the takeoff. Even if the airplane is already airborne, if sufficient runway remains, an attempt to land straight ahead on the runway may be made. This may also apply to some light twin-engine airplanes.
Before the takeoff roll is started, the autobrake system of the aircraft, if available, is armed. The autobrake system will automatically apply maximum brakes if throttle is reduced to idle or reverse thrust during the takeoff roll once a preset speed has been reached.
Testing
[edit]A RTO is usually seen as one of the most challenging tests an airplane has to undergo for its certification trials. The RTO test is performed under the worst possible conditions; i.e. with fully worn out brakes, the plane loaded to maximum takeoff weight and no use of thrust reversers. During a RTO test most of the kinetic energy of the airplane is converted to heat by the brakes, which may cause the fusible plugs of the tires to melt, causing them to deflate. Small brake fires are acceptable, providing that in the first five minutes, they do not prejudice the safe and complete evacuation of the aircraft.[1]
Related accidents
[edit]- 2008 South Carolina Learjet 60 crash – an RTO above V1, four fatalities
- 1990 Wayne County Airport runway collision – RTO after collision following runway incursion; aircraft struck destroyed with eight fatalities, aircraft that performed RTO damaged with no fatalities, later repaired and returned to service
- Air France Flight 007 – RTO above V1 after flight-control failure, 130 fatalities
- American Airlines Flight 383 – uncontained engine failure and fire
- Ameristar Charters Flight 9363 – RTO above V1 after flight-control failure, aircraft written off but no fatalities
- British Airtours Flight 28M – uncontained engine failure that damaged a fuel tank, resulting in a major fire and 55 fatalities
- British Airways Flight 2276 – uncontained engine failure
- Garuda Indonesia Flight 865 – RTO after engine failure, three fatalities
- Korean Air Flight 2708 – uncontained engine failure, no fatalities, aircraft later repaired and returned to service
- Overseas National Airways Flight 032 – uncontained engine failure attributed to bird ingestion, aircraft destroyed by fire but no fatalities
- Spantax Flight 995 – an RTO above V1, 50 fatalities
- TWA Flight 843 – RTO after instrument failure, aircraft destroyed by fire but no fatalities
See also
[edit]References
[edit]External links
[edit]- Airliners.net – Photos detailing a RTO performed by a Lockheed Tristar at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport Archived 2012-03-09 at the Wayback Machine
- History of RTO Operations at Evergreen with good explanatory notes
- Fred George (Jul 21, 2017). "The Go/No-Go Decision: High-Speed RTOs Are Fraught With Risk". Aviation Week Network.
- Boeing 747-8 rejected take-off test, 2011
Rejected takeoff
View on GrokipediaOverview
Definition
A rejected takeoff (RTO), also known as an aborted takeoff, is the emergency procedure in which the flight crew discontinues the aircraft's takeoff roll on the runway after takeoff thrust has been set and the acceleration has begun, but prior to the point of rotation and liftoff. This action halts the departure sequence while the aircraft remains on the ground, allowing for a safe stop using braking and other deceleration means. Unlike scenarios involving airborne aircraft, such as a go-around or diversion after liftoff, an RTO is confined strictly to the ground phase of takeoff and does not apply to interruptions once the aircraft has left the runway surface.[4] This distinction ensures that RTO procedures are tailored to runway-based stopping dynamics rather than in-flight maneuvers.[5] The terminology and standardized procedures for rejected takeoffs originated in post-World War II aviation regulations, evolving from early certification requirements for accelerate-stop performance in the 1930s and gaining formal structure in the 1950s through the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board's oversight and the establishment of the Federal Aviation Agency in 1958.[6] Internationally, the concept was codified in ICAO Annex 6 (Operation of Aircraft), first adopted in 1948 with initial editions published in the early 1950s, emphasizing safe stopping distances and crew decision-making during the takeoff roll.[7] These standards have since been refined to enhance safety by preventing potential accidents during the high-risk takeoff phase.[8]Role in Aviation Safety
Rejected takeoffs (RTOs) serve as a vital safety mechanism during the takeoff phase, one of the most hazardous segments of flight in commercial aviation. This phase, encompassing the takeoff roll and initial climb, accounts for approximately 14 percent of fatal accidents in commercial jet operations. By enabling pilots to abort the takeoff upon detecting anomalies such as engine malfunctions or configuration issues, RTOs mitigate the risk of runway excursions, overruns, or continued flight with compromised aircraft integrity, thereby preventing potentially catastrophic outcomes.[9] Statistically, RTOs occur infrequently, with historical data indicating roughly one RTO for every 3,000 takeoffs in commercial aviation, though underreporting may suggest a rate closer to one in 2,000. These events demonstrate a high success rate, as runway overruns following RTOs—a primary failure mode—happen only about once per 1,000,000 takeoffs, implying over 99 percent of RTOs successfully stop the aircraft without excursion. This effectiveness underscores RTOs' role in averting worse scenarios; analyses show that around 45 percent of RTOs address genuine threats that could have led to accidents if the takeoff had continued, while the remainder often involve precautionary decisions that prioritize safety.[10][11] The procedural evolution of RTOs since the 1970s has significantly enhanced their safety contributions, driven by incident analyses and targeted training initiatives. Early simulator studies in the 1970s highlighted delays in pilot recognition and response, contributing to higher overrun rates of 6.3 per 10 million takeoffs in the 1960s. Post-1970s refinements, including stricter decision criteria above 80 knots and improved braking systems, reduced the RTO overrun rate to 1.4 per 10 million takeoffs by the 1990s—a 78 percent decline—despite a doubling in global flight volumes. The 1992 Takeoff Safety Training Aid, developed jointly by the FAA, Flight Safety Foundation, and Boeing in response to late-1980s accidents, further amplified this progress by emphasizing go/no-go decision-making and simulator-based drills, resulting in 22 RTO overruns in the 1990s compared to 28 in the 1980s amid 50 percent more takeoffs.[10][12]Decision-Making
Critical Speeds
In aviation, critical speeds during takeoff—V1, Vr, and V2—serve as precise velocity thresholds that dictate the pilot's options for continuing or aborting the procedure, ensuring safety margins against runway overruns or insufficient climb performance. These speeds are aircraft-specific and computed prior to each flight using performance data from the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM).[13] V1, known as the takeoff decision speed or critical engine failure recognition speed, represents the maximum speed at which a pilot can safely initiate a rejected takeoff (RTO) in response to an emergency, such as an engine failure. Below V1, an RTO is typically mandatory for critical failures to allow deceleration within the available runway length, as the aircraft's kinetic energy remains manageable for stopping. Above V1, the pilot must commit to continuing the takeoff to avoid exceeding the runway limits, since the remaining distance would be insufficient for a safe stop. V1 is also the minimum speed at which, following an engine failure at or above this point, the aircraft can still achieve the required climb gradient with one engine inoperative.[14][13] Vr, or rotation speed, is the calibrated airspeed at which the pilot applies back pressure on the control column to raise the nose gear off the runway, initiating rotation to the takeoff attitude for liftoff. This speed marks the practical end of the RTO window, as rotation must occur at or after Vr to prevent a rejected takeoff from becoming unfeasible due to insufficient remaining runway. Vr cannot be less than V1, ensuring that if an RTO is not initiated by V1, the aircraft can still rotate safely without risking an overrun.[15][13] V2, the takeoff safety speed, is the minimum speed attained by 35 feet above the runway end during a continued takeoff, providing the best one-engine-inoperative climb performance. It serves as the post-V1 commitment point, where the aircraft must be climbing at or above V2 to clear obstacles and maintain a safe gradient even after an engine failure.[16][13] The interrelations among V1, Vr, and V2 are governed by aircraft weight, runway length, environmental conditions (such as temperature, pressure altitude, and wind), flap configuration, and thrust settings, with V1 ≤ Vr and V2 typically exceeding Vr to account for climb requirements. These speeds are derived from balanced field length calculations, where the accelerate-stop distance from V1 equals the accelerate-go distance to reach V2 at 35 feet. For conceptual understanding, V1 can be approximated using basic deceleration physics as the speed from which the aircraft can stop within the available distance:where is the maximum deceleration rate (from brakes, spoilers, and reverse thrust) and is the remaining runway length after reaching V1. This simplification highlights the kinetic energy constraint but is adjusted in practice via AFM charts for real-world factors like engine-out performance.[13][17]
