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Repellent-1
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Repellent-1 (Russian: Репеллент-1) is a Russian electronic warfare system[1] designed to suppress the operation of unmanned aerial vehicles[2] at a distance of up to 30 to 35 km (19 to 22 mi).[3][4] It weighs more than 20 tons.

Key Information

The system is able to detect miniature air targets from their control signals at a distance of more than 35 km (22 mi), but is able to suppress drones only at a distance of not more than 2.5 km (1.6 mi).Cabin is protected against small arms fire and NBC (Nuclear, Bacteriological and Chemical) agents[5]

History

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Repellent-1 was developed by the Russian Scientific and Technical Center for Electronic Combat (Russian: Научно-техническом центре радиоэлектронной борьбы). It is installed on the chassis of MAZ (MAZ-6317 [uk]) or KAMAZ depending on the wishes of the customer.[3]

The development of "Repellent-1" was completed in 2016 and the system shown at an exhibition.[6][4]

Operators

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Application

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Russian-Ukrainian war

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Main articles: List of equipment used by Russian separatist forces of the war in Donbas and War in Donbas (2014–2022)

On August 11, 2018, the OSCE SMM noted in a report that on July 28, near the village of Chornukhyne, the UAV mission recorded four EW systems at once, including Repellent-1.[4]

Armenian-Azerbaijani border conflict

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Main article: 2021–2022 Armenia–Azerbaijan border crisis

Armenia has lost two operating stations of the Repellent-1 complex.[7]

Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022)

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Main article: 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

On May 1, 2022, it was reported that a Russian "Repellent-1" had been destroyed.[3]

See also

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References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Repellent-1

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Repellent-1 (Russian: Репеллент-1) is a mobile electronic warfare system developed by Russia's JSC Scientific & Technical Center of Electronic Warfare for detecting, tracking, identifying, and neutralizing small unmanned aerial vehicles through jamming, with an effective range of up to 30-35 kilometers. Mounted on an wheeled , the system suppresses drone operations by disrupting control and links, and it entered service following development completion in 2016. Primarily operated by in conflicts including the war in , where units have been destroyed or captured by Ukrainian and Azerbaijani forces, Repellent-1 has also been exported to and delivered to despite on . Its performance has faced scrutiny, with reports indicating vulnerabilities to strikes and questions over the overall efficacy of Russian electronic warfare systems in modern combat environments.

Development and Technical Overview

Design and Components

The Repellent-1 is a vehicle-mounted electronic warfare (EW) system developed by Moscow-based JSC Scientific & Technical Center of Electronic Warfare for countering small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). It operates on an 8x8 wheeled chassis to enable high mobility across varied terrain, supporting rapid deployment for protecting fixed sites such as military bases, airfields, and infrastructure. The overall design prioritizes non-kinetic neutralization through signal detection and jamming, with a total system weight exceeding 20 tonnes. Core components include mast-mounted sensors for electronic support measures (ESM), which detect UAV control signals at ranges over 35 km by intercepting emissions from drone operators and onboard systems. These feed data into integrated processing units for trajectory tracking and target identification, distinguishing hostile UAVs from benign signals via automated algorithms. Electronic attack (EA) modules then activate directional jammers to disrupt UAV command links, (including GPS), and , suppressing operations at effective ranges of 30 to 35 km. The system's architecture integrates a centralized station within the vehicle cabin, allowing operators to monitor multiple threats via displays and direct jamming responses. Power generation and cooling systems support sustained operation of high-output transmitters, while the facilitates maintenance and potential upgrades to counter evolving drone frequencies. Initial development concluded in , with the platform emphasizing to minimize requirements during engagements.

Specifications and Capabilities

The Repellent-1 is a vehicle-mounted electronic warfare complex developed for countering unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), primarily through radio-technical reconnaissance and suppression of their communication and navigation signals. It operates on an 8x8 wheeled chassis, enabling mobility across varied terrains, including Arctic conditions. The system weighs over 20 tonnes and supports continuous operation for at least 24 hours without interruption. Key capabilities include remote detection, trajectory tracking, signal identification, and neutralization of small-sized UAVs, with a focus on disrupting mass drone attacks by jamming control links and GPS navigation. Suppression range extends up to 30-35 kilometers against UAV radio means, depending on environmental factors and target signal strength. For close-range operations, it integrates a high-power optical subsystem capable of detecting miniature drones during day, night, or adverse weather, facilitating precise targeting. The complex employs a sensitive radio reconnaissance station to scan and classify UAV emissions across relevant frequency bands, followed by directed jamming to induce loss of control or forced landing.
ParameterSpecification
Platform8x8 wheeled vehicle
Weight>20 tonnes
Operational Range (Suppression)30-35 km
Continuous Operation≥24 hours
Frequency Coverage (Variant Example)0.4-6 GHz
Detection Range (Radio Monitoring, Variant)Up to 25 km
These parameters are derived from manufacturer disclosures and operational analyses, though real-world efficacy varies with drone autonomy levels and electronic countermeasures.

Operational History

Initial Deployment and Testing

The Repellent-1 electronic warfare system, developed by JSC Scientific & Technical Center of Electronic Warfare, completed its primary development phase in 2016, with state trials confirming its ability to detect and jam unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) radio frequency links at claimed ranges exceeding 30 kilometers. The system was publicly unveiled at a Russian defense exhibition in September 2016, where demonstrations highlighted its automated detection, tracking, and suppression of small UAVs, including swarm formations, by disrupting control, telemetry, and GPS signals without kinetic effects. Russian state media reported successful neutralization tests against spy drones under various weather conditions, though independent verification of these claims remains limited, with some analyses questioning the practicality of advertised ranges due to terrain and signal propagation challenges. Following trials, the initiated adoption of Repellent-1 in 2017, integrating it into ground-based electronic warfare units for mobile anti-UAV protection, typically mounted on an wheeled for rapid deployment. Early operational testing emphasized protection of static assets like airfields and bases, with the system scanning broad frequency bands (including 400 MHz to 6 GHz) to identify and suppress commercial and tactical drones. A portable variant was also developed for dismounted use, expanding testing scenarios to infantry-level applications. By late 2018, the first confirmed field observation occurred in near Chornukhyne, where OSCE monitors detected the system via UAV imagery, indicating initial troop-level deployment for real-world evaluation amid ongoing separatist conflicts. These early phases prioritized non-combat validation, with Russian reports asserting 100% suppression rates in controlled exercises against low-altitude targets, though subsequent critiques from analysts have highlighted potential overstatements, as real-world efficacy depends on drone autonomy levels and countermeasures like frequency hopping. Initial deployments extended to and the region in the late 2010s, serving as proving grounds for refinements in and integration with broader electronic warfare networks before larger-scale combat use.

Use in Major Conflicts

Repellent-1 systems were deployed by Russian forces during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine primarily to detect, track, and jam signals from small Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles targeting infrastructure and military positions. Ukrainian military reports documented the destruction of at least one Repellent-1 unit by artillery strikes near Kharkiv in late April 2022, highlighting vulnerabilities to counter-battery fire despite its intended role in suppressing drone operations at ranges up to 30 kilometers. Further incidents included Ukrainian drone strikes neutralizing a Repellent-1 in the Zaporizhzhia sector in July 2025, as claimed by Ukrainian intelligence sources, though independent verification remains limited and Russian reports do not confirm these losses. The system's use in Ukraine underscores its tactical application against reconnaissance and attack drones, but repeated reported destructions suggest challenges in survivability amid intense electronic warfare environments. In the , Russian expeditionary forces employed Repellent-1 at the tactical level to counter drone incursions by opposition groups, with assessments indicating effective suppression of small UAVs over operational areas. The system reportedly operated successfully in protecting forward bases and convoys from low-altitude threats, contributing to Russia's broader electronic warfare doctrine in asymmetric conflicts. Armenian forces utilized exported Repellent-1 units during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, aiming to disrupt Azerbaijani drone operations, but Azerbaijani advances led to the capture of multiple systems by October 2023, as evidenced by visual confirmation of intact equipment. This outcome reflected limitations in the system's deployment against sustained, high-volume drone swarms supported by superior Azerbaijani electronic countermeasures.

Operators and Exports

Russian Military Adoption

The Repellent-1 electronic warfare system, developed by Moscow-based JSC Scientific & Technical Center of Electronic Warfare, was introduced in late 2016 and formally adopted by the in 2017 for countering small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The system's adoption focused on its ability to perform radio-electronic , detect mini-UAVs via their control signals, and suppress operations through jamming at ranges up to 30-35 kilometers. Early deployments included detection by OSCE monitors in in August 2018, where Repellent-1 units were observed alongside other Russian electronic warfare assets, indicating integration into forward-operating units for UAV denial in contested areas. Its use expanded during the 2022 , with a Repellent-1 complex reported destroyed by Ukrainian forces on , 2022, confirming active field employment for protecting military infrastructure and airfields from small drone threats. Russian military sources have claimed the system's effectiveness in jamming drone signals even against encrypted or hardened electronics, though independent assessments suggest its performance may be overstated in operational scenarios. By , Repellent-1 had become a standard component of ' anti-drone capabilities, often mounted on wheeled platforms for mobility, with sustained procurement reflecting its role in addressing the proliferation of low-cost UAVs in modern conflicts. The adoption emphasized autonomous operation for up to 24 hours, prioritizing suppression over kinetic intercepts to minimize collateral risks in rear-area defense.

International Operators

Algeria acquired the Repellent-1 system from Russia and publicly unveiled it during a military parade on November 1, 2024, commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Algerian Revolution, as part of efforts to enhance counter-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) defenses. The system is deployed to protect key infrastructure and military sites from small UAV threats, with reports confirming its active operation in Algerian territory by late 2024. Armenia purchased Repellent-1 units from in 2017 for an estimated $42 million, intending to counter UAV incursions along its borders. However, during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, the systems proved ineffective against Azerbaijani Bayraktar TB2 drones, which operated beyond the jammer's reliable suppression range and exploited its limitations in detecting low-observable UAVs. Armenia reportedly lost at least two operational Repellent-1 stations to Azerbaijani forces by 2023. Serbia received Repellent-1 systems from despite , with President presenting them publicly on February 15, 2024, during Statehood Day celebrations, emphasizing their role in suppressing drone swarms for and attack. The acquisition included integration plans for installations such as , aimed at bolstering national air defense against small UAV threats.

Performance and Evaluation

Documented Effectiveness

The Repellent-1 electronic warfare system is designed to detect small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) via emissions from their control links and suppress them through targeted jamming, with manufacturer claims specifying effective ranges of 30 to 35 kilometers against group-1 and group-2 class drones. The system integrates automated detection, trajectory tracking, and signal suppression on an wheeled for mobility, purportedly enabling neutralization by disrupting pilot-to-drone communications without kinetic means. In operational contexts, such as Russian deployments during the starting from 2018, Repellent-1 has been employed to protect and forward positions from small Ukrainian and munitions, but verifiable intercept data remains scarce and unquantified in open sources. Ukrainian forces have captured Repellent-1 control units, exposing system components to reverse-engineering and underscoring vulnerabilities to counter-EW tactics or direct strikes. Independent assessments note that while the system transmits high-power jamming (up to 1000 watts) across relevant frequencies, its efficacy diminishes against UAVs operating beyond line-of-sight or with frequency-hopping, as evidenced by persistent Ukrainian drone incursions despite layered Russian EW employment. During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenian operators of Russian-supplied Repellent-1 units failed to prevent Azerbaijani Bayraktar TB2 strikes on air defenses, including S-300 systems, with Armenian leadership citing the system's ineffectiveness in real-time suppression of beyond-visual-range, satellite-linked drones. Azerbaijani forces subsequently captured multiple Repellent-1 platforms intact in 2023, further indicating limited battlefield resilience. Broader evaluations of Russian EW, including Repellent-1, describe capabilities as overhyped relative to pre-war claims, with practical performance constrained by power requirements, detection gaps against low-emission or autonomous UAVs, and the rapid adaptation of adversaries. Russia's introduction of complementary systems like Multik in October 2025 for medium-range drone blocking reflects ongoing limitations in standalone Repellent-1 utility against evolving threats.

Criticisms and Limitations

The Repellent-1 system has demonstrated significant vulnerabilities in combat environments, particularly due to its large size and limited mobility. Weighing over 20 tonnes and mounted on an wheeled , it struggles with rapid redeployment in dynamic battlefields, making it susceptible to and precision strikes. For instance, Ukrainian forces destroyed a Repellent-1 unit near via in late April 2022, highlighting its exposure when static. Independent tracking by Oryx documented at least eight Russian electronic warfare systems, including Repellent-1 variants, lost in since February 2022, often to drones or . Manufacturer claims of a 35 km jamming range against UAVs have been questioned as exaggerated, with independent analysis estimating effective ranges of approximately 23 km at maximum 1000W power output and as low as 14 km at 200W, constrained by signal propagation and terrain. Detection and suppression reportedly require up to 25 seconds, potentially allowing agile drones to evade or strike before full engagement. In the 2020 , Armenian officials reported the system's ineffectiveness against Azerbaijani UAVs, despite its deployment by Armenian forces supplied via . Operational limitations in dense electromagnetic environments, such as urban areas in , further reduce efficacy, as civilian signals complicate target discrimination and jamming selectivity. Ukrainian adoption of NATO-compatible, frequency-hopping radios like has resisted Russian suppression attempts, undermining broader electronic warfare integration. Captures of intact units—by Ukrainian forces of a control module in 2024 and by in near-pristine condition during regional operations—suggest failures in self-protection or rapid response, enabling adversaries to analyze and potentially counter its signals. Despite deployments in and , persistent Ukrainian drone successes indicate incomplete suppression of low-altitude or swarming threats. Overall assessments portray Repellent-1's capabilities as overhyped for export purposes, with real-world performance falling short against adaptive countermeasures.

Countermeasures and Adaptations

The , reliant on high-power emissions for detection and jamming of UAV control links, exhibits vulnerabilities to passive electronic surveillance, allowing adversaries to geolocate its position through signal before launching kinetic strikes. Ukrainian forces exploited this in late April 2022 near , destroying a Repellent-1 unit via artillery targeting its emissions. Similar tactics succeeded on July 18, 2022, when a U.S.-supplied HIMARS neutralized another Repellent-1 in , highlighting the system's exposure as a high-value, mobile emitter in contested environments. FPV drones, operating at low altitudes and short ranges with manual piloting, have demonstrated resilience against Repellent-1 jamming; in during July 2025, a Ukrainian FPV drone evaded or overwhelmed a deployed unit, reaching and striking its target despite the system's activation. This incident underscores limitations in countering agile, low-signature threats, as the system's 1000W jamming—focused on standard UAV frequencies—proves insufficient against rapid, proximity-based operations. Russian adaptations have emphasized integration over standalone upgrades, pairing Repellent-1 with complementary systems like Silok-01 for medium-range signal blocking and emerging platforms such as Multik, unveiled in 2025, to address evolving drone tactics including and frequency agility. Deployments in layered defenses, as observed in since 2018, aim to mitigate single-point failures, though open-source analyses indicate persistent challenges against adaptive UAVs employing like spread-spectrum modulation. No verified hardware modifications to Repellent-1 itself have been reported post-2016 fielding.

References

  1. https://www.deagel.com/Armies/Repellent-1/a003389
  2. https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/d75b2754359aa8f01d64c25e22623d82
  3. https://www.military.africa/2025/01/algeria-operating-russian-made-repellant-1-c-uas/
  4. https://medium.com/dfrlab/minskmonitor-new-russian-electronic-warfare-systems-in-eastern-ukraine-5b913afbb455
  5. https://www.armadainternational.com/2022/05/exaggerated-russian-electronic-warfare-capabilities/
  6. https://defence-blog.com/topics/repellent-1/
  7. https://www.unmannedairspace.info/counter-uas-systems-and-policies/serbia-receives-repellent-counter-uas-systems-and-other-combat-assets-from-russia-despite-international-sanctions/
  8. https://www.armadainternational.com/2024/04/russian-drone-protection-electronic-warfare/
  9. https://indiandefencereview.com/russian-electronic-warfare-in-ukraine-2022-2023/
  10. https://ts2.store/en/news/fortress-skies-inside-russias-all-out-anti-drone-arsenal-2025-update
  11. https://www.kyivpost.com/analysis/32435
  12. https://topwar.ru/106457-v-rf-razrabotan-kompleks-reb-dlya-borby-s-miniatyurnymi-bespilotnikami.html
  13. https://dfnc.ru/arhiv-zhurnalov/2021-3-68/rossijskie-sredstva-borby-s-bpla-radioelektronnoe-podavlenie/
  14. https://ru.bellingcat.com/novosti/russia/2018/09/10/new-russian-ew-donbas/
  15. https://masterok.livejournal.com/3322674.html
  16. https://www.bugshunt.ru/info/news/kompleks-radioelektronnoy-borby-s-malorazmernymi-bla/
  17. https://www.roe.ru/production/protivovozdushnaya-oborona/sredstva-radioelektronnoy-borby/kompleksy-borby-s-bpla/repellent-patrul-i-skaut-patrul-optsiya/
  18. https://sputnikglobe.com/20161229/repellent-anti-drone-complex-development-1049110110.html
  19. https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/4023355-prometheus-that-never-took-off-and-other-valuable-assets-the-russian-military-lost-to-ukrainian-attacks-over-july.html
  20. https://www.menadefense.net/drone-warfare-todays-war/
  21. https://aze.media/azerbaijan-captures-russian-made-electronic-warfare-systems-in-karabakh/
  22. https://uawire.org/osce-drone-spots-latest-russian-electronic-warfare-systems-in-donbas
  23. https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/algerian-military-buildup/
  24. https://x.com/kmldial70/status/1849877082542608800
  25. https://www.uawire.org/armenian-prime-minister-electronic-warfare-systems-bought-for-42-million-failed-to-protect-the-sky-over-nagorno-karabakh
  26. https://www.euractiv.com/news/serbias-vucic-presents-anti-drone-system-acquired-from-russia/
  27. https://thegeopost.com/en/news/what-the-russian-repelent-anti-drone-system-which-has-arrived-in-serbia-and-will-be-installed-in-nis-can-do/
  28. https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2021/12/a-monument-of-victory-bayraktar-tb2.html
  29. https://thedefensepost.com/2025/10/21/russia-multik-system/
  30. https://cenjows.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Maj-Gen-AK-Srivastava_-Article.pdf
  31. https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html
  32. https://www.defenseworld.net/2020/12/09/russias-42m-ew-system-did-not-work-in-nagorno-karabakh-armenian-pm-complains.html
  33. https://sprotyvg7.com.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/COGINT_Analytic_Insight_Report_Russian_EW_Systems__231119_114942.pdf
  34. https://kyivindependent.com/why-is-russia-so-vulnerable-to-himars-in-ukraine/
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