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Covenant (law)
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A covenant, in its most general and historical sense, is a solemn promise to engage in or refrain from a specified action. Under historical English common law, a covenant was distinguished from an ordinary contract by the presence of a seal.[1] Because the presence of a seal indicated an unusual solemnity in the promises made in a covenant, the common law would enforce a covenant even in the absence of consideration.[2] In United States contract law, an implied covenant of good faith is presumed.
A covenant is an agreement like a contract. A covenantor makes a promise to a covenantee to perform an action (affirmative covenant in the United States or positive covenant in England and Wales) or to refrain from an action (negative covenant). In real property law, the term real covenants means that conditions are tied to the ownership or use of land. A "covenant running with the land", meeting tests of wording and circumstances laid down in precedent, imposes duties or restrictions upon the use of that land regardless of the owner.
A covenant for title that comes with a deed or title to the property assures the purchaser that the grantor has the ownership rights that the deed purports to convey.[3] Non-compete clauses in relation to contract law are also called restrictive covenants.
Landlords may seek and courts may grant forfeiture of leases such as in leasehold estates for breach of covenant, which in most jurisdictions must be relatively severe breaches; however, the covenant to pay rent is one of the more fundamental covenants. The forfeiture of a private home involves interference with social and economic human rights. In the case of leases commuted to a large sum payable at the outset (a premium), that has prompted lobbying for and government measures of leasehold reform particularly in the law of ground rents and service charges.
Restrictive covenants are somewhat similar to easements and equitable servitude.[4] In the US, the Restatement (Third) of Property takes steps to merge the concepts as servitudes.[5] Real covenant law in the US has been referred to as an "unspeakable quagmire" by one court.[6]
Related to land
[edit]In property law, land-related covenants are called "real covenants", " covenants, conditions and restrictions " (CCRs) or "deed restrictions" and are a major form of covenant, typically imposing restrictions on how the land may be used (a negative covenant) or requiring a certain continuing action (an affirmative covenant). These may also "run with the land" (called a covenant appurtenant), meaning that any future owners of the land must abide by the terms, or may apply to a particular person (called a covenant in gross or of a purely personal nature).[7] Under English law, affirmative covenants typically do not run with the land; in the United States such covenants are examined more closely, but with exceptions affirmative covenants have been permitted to run with the land.[8]
The covenant may be shown in the deed and should be disclosed to prospective purchasers; it may also be recorded, or in the case of Commonwealth countries shown in Torrens title. Real covenants and easements or equitable servitudes are similar[9] and in 1986, a symposium discussed whether the law of easements, equitable servitudes, and real covenants should be unified.[4] As time passes and the original promisee of the covenant is no longer involved in the land, enforcement may become lax.[10]
Covenants may be imposed through homeowner associations, and controversy has arisen over selective enforcement.[11] Historically, particularly in the United States, exclusionary covenants were used to exclude racial minorities. Some covenants exist for safety purposes, such as a covenant forbidding the construction of tall buildings in the vicinity of an airport or one restricting the height of fences/shrubs at street corners (so as not to interfere with drivers' sight lines). Covenants may restrict everything from the height and size of buildings to the materials used in construction to superficial matters such as paint color and holiday decorations. In residential areas, covenants may forbid "dirty" businesses (such as feedlots or chemical production facilities) or business use entirely, or modifications such as amateur radio antenna. Amateur radio restrictions have been particularly controversial; in 1985 the U.S. Federal Communications Commission issued PRB-1 preempting state and local restrictions, but not private restrictions; in 2012 after Congress passed a law requiring study of this issue (at the urging of amateur radio group ARRL[12]), the FCC declined to extend this preemption.[13] Some US states have enacted legislation requiring homeowners' associations to provide reasonable accommodations for amateur radio antennas under the rationale that amateur radio provides public service communications in the event of an emergency, major disaster, or special event.
Application by jurisdiction
[edit]Canada
[edit]In Canada, governmental authorities may use restrictive covenants as well as zoning. For instance, the City of Calgary's requirement that buildings in the general vicinity of Calgary International Airport be under a certain height is registered against virtually every title in the northeast quadrant of the city as a restrictive covenant, not as a zoning by-law.
England and Wales
[edit]At common law, the benefit of a restrictive covenant runs with the land if three conditions are met:[14]
- The covenant must not be personal in nature – it must benefit the land rather than an individual
- The covenant must 'touch and concern' the land – it must affect how the land is used or the value of the land
- The benefited land must be identifiable.
At common law, the burden of a restrictive covenant does not run[15] except where strict privity of estate (a landlord/tenant relationship) exists.
The burden can be enforced at law in limited circumstances under the benefit/burden test - that is, whoever takes the benefit must also shoulder the burden. In Halsall v Brizell [1957] Ch 169, a covenant requiring the upkeep of roads was found to bind the successor in title to the original covenantor because he had elected to take the benefit. The rule in Halsall v Brizell is limited to cases where the benefit can be linked to a specific burden and where the covenantor's successors in title can physically elect to take the benefit. For example, a restrictive covenant to contribute to the maintenance costs of a common area will not be binding if the covenantor's successors in title have no legal right to use them.[16] Rules for ascertaining whether the benefit of a covenant has been passed to another person who wishes to enforce the covenant were summarised in Small (Hugh) v Oliver & Saunders (Developments) Ltd. in 2006, namely by an express assignment of the benefit, through a building scheme arrangement, usually for a new development of multiple properties, or through the application of section 78 of the Law of Property Act 1925,[17] which only applies for covenants made since 1 January 1926.[18]
A positive burden can run in law, but not in equity, as it is deemed to be analogous to a contract, to which equitable principles do not apply (Rhone v Stephens (1994)).
The burden of a restrictive covenant will run in equity if these prerequisites are met:[19]
- The burden cannot be a positive burden (that is, it requires expenditure to meet it);
- The purchaser must have notice of the covenant
- The covenant must benefit the covenantee's land
- The covenant must be intended to run with the covenantor's land.
The leading case on restrictive covenants in equity is generally regarded as that of Tulk v Moxhay, in which it was determined that the burden could run in equity subject to the qualifications listed above.
The risk of an undisclosed restrictive covenant coming to the notice of a buyer or developer after they have acquired a site has been seen as especially high in regard to infill residential development. Restrictive covenant indemnity insurance is often available to mitigate this risk.[17]
Requirements in US law
[edit]The covenant will typically be written in the deed, and must be in writing due to the statute of frauds. Although scholars have argued that some of the following should be significantly relaxed, in order for the burden to run with the land the following must apply:[20]
- The covenant must be in writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
- The original parties to the agreement must have intended that successors be bound by the agreement.
- A subsequent owner must have had actual notice, inquiry notice, or constructive notice (record) of the covenant at the time of purchase.
- The covenant must touch or concern the land. The covenant must relate to the use or enjoyment of the land.
- There must be horizontal privity between the original parties.
- Horizontal privity is found if, at the time the original parties enter into the agreement, those parties share some interest in the subject land independent of the covenant (e.g., landlord and tenant, mortgagee and mortgagor, or holders of mutual easements). Individual state statutes can alter the requirements of horizontal privity of estate. Privity may be instantaneous and mutual; instantaneous privity is present when the restrictive covenant is within the deed initially conveyed from the grantor to the grantee.
- There must be strict vertical privity of estate.
- Vertical privity characterizes the relationship between the original party to the covenant and the subsequent owner. To be bound by the covenant, the successor must hold the entire estate in land held by the original party (strict vertical privity of estate). Note that because strict vertical privity is required for a burden to run, a lessee could not have a burden enforced against them. However, a benefited party could sue the owner of the reversion of the estate, and the owner could possibly sue the lessee for waste.
Enforcement and modification
[edit]US courts interpret covenants relatively strictly and give the words of the agreement their ordinary meaning. Generally if there is any unclear or ambiguous language regarding the existence of a covenant courts will favor free alienation of the property. Courts will not read any restrictions on the land by implication (as is done with easements for example). A covenant can be terminated if the original purpose of the covenant is lost. In some cases property owners can petition a court to remove or modify the covenants, and homeowner associations may include procedures for removing the covenants.
The covenant may be negative or affirmative. A negative covenant is one in which property owners are unable to perform a specific activity, such as block a scenic view. An affirmative covenant is one in which property owners must actively perform a specific activity, such as keeping the lawn tidy or paying homeowner's association dues for the upkeep of the surrounding area.
An agreement not to open a competing business on adjacent property is generally enforceable as a covenant running with the land. However, under the federal Supreme Court's holding in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), a covenant that restricts sale to a minority person (commonly used during the Jim Crow era) is unenforceable, as enforcement would require the court to act in a racially discriminatory manner, contrary to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In planned communities
[edit]In contemporary practice in the United States, a covenant typically refers to restrictions set on contracts like deeds of sale. "Covenants, conditions, and restrictions," commonly abbreviated "CC&Rs" or "CCRs", are a complicated system of covenants, known generically as "deed restrictions", built into the deeds of all the lots[21] in a common interest development, particularly in the tens of millions of American homes governed by a homeowner association (HOA) or condominium association. There are some office or industrial parks subject to CCRs as well.
These CCRs might, for example, dictate the types of structures that can be built (e.g., a CCR may prohibit any type of modular, prefabricated, or mobile home or may require the structure to be a minimum size), appearance (e.g., no junk cars), or other uses (e.g., no operation of home-based business, no pets except traditional household animals). The purpose of this is to maintain a neighborhood character or prevent improper use of the land. Many covenants of this nature were imposed in the United States in the 1920s through the 1940s, before zoning became widespread. However, many modern developments are also restricted by covenants on property titles; this is often justified as a means of preserving the values of the houses in the area. Covenant restrictions can be removed through court action, although this process is lengthy and often very expensive. In some cases[which?] it even involves a plebiscite of nearby property owners. Although control of such planning issues is often[when?] governed by local planning schemes or other regulatory frameworks rather than through the use of covenants, there are still[when?] many[quantify] covenants imposed, particularly in states[example needed] that limit the level of control over real property use that may be exercised by local governments. In Houston, Texas, the lack of a local zoning ordinance means that property owners make heavy use of deed restrictions to prevent unwanted development.[22]
Exclusionary covenants
[edit]Covenants have been used to exclude certain classes from owning real estate based on race, religion or ethnicity. These groups are generally marginalized groups.
United States
[edit]
In the United States, in the early 20th century zoning laws were used to prevent integrating neighborhoods but were struck down in Buchanan v. Warley. Thus, deed restrictions and restrictive covenants became an important instrument for enforcing racial segregation in most towns and cities, becoming widespread in the 1920s and proliferating until they were declared unenforceable in 1948[23] in the Supreme Court case Shelley v. Kraemer. They prohibited a buyer of real property from allowing use or occupancy by members of a given race, ethnicity, or religion as specified in the title deed. Such covenants were employed by many real estate developers to "protect" entire subdivisions, with the primary intent to keep "white" neighborhoods "white". Ninety percent of the housing projects built in the years following World War II were racially restricted by such covenants.[24] Cities known for their widespread use of racial covenants include Chicago, Baltimore, Detroit, Milwaukee,[25] Los Angeles, Seattle, and St. Louis.[26]
Said premises shall not be rented, leased, or conveyed to, or occupied by, any person other than of the white or Caucasian race.
— Racial covenant for a home in Beverly Hills, California.[23]
Often the restrictions applied only to African Americans wishing to buy property or rent a house or apartment, but other populations might also be banned, such as Asians, Jews, Indians, and some Latinos. For example, a restrictive covenant covering a large neighborhood in Seattle declared that "no part of said property hereby conveyed shall ever be used or occupied by any Hebrew or by any person of the Ethiopian, Malay or any Asiatic Race", thus banning Jews and anyone of African, Filipino, or Asian ancestry. The exclusionary language varied widely. Some neighborhoods were reserved for the "White or Caucasian race". Others enumerated banned populations. One subdivision near Seattle specified that "This property shall not be resold, leased, rented or occupied except to or by persons of the Aryan race."[27] The Lake Shore Club District in Pennsylvania sought to exclude various minorities, including "Negroes", "Mongolians", Hungarians, Mexicans, Greeks, and various other European ethnicities.[28]
In Montgomery County, Maryland, covenants excluded Black Americans and sometimes included language excluding Jews, Armenians, Iranians, Syrians, Turks, Greeks, Indians, Chinese, Japanese, Mongolians, Asians in general, or "non-Caucasians" in general.[29]
Covenants in Massachusetts localities excluded Black Americans and sometimes Irish, Italian and Polish people as well. One 1881 deed from Lowell, Massachusetts stated that "land shall never be deeded or conveyed to any person born in Ireland". A 1916 covenant in Springfield, Massachusetts, stated that "said lot shall not be resold to a colored person, a Polander or an Italian."[30]
Some covenants, such as those tied to properties in Forest Hills Gardens, New York, also sought to exclude working class people; however, this type of social segregation was more commonly achieved through the use of high property prices, minimum cost requirements, and application reference checks.[28]: 131–137
Covenants in Seattle, Washington, typically banned Black and Asian people and sometimes Jews.[31]
Covenants in Hennepin County and Ramsey County, Minnesota excluded African Americans and sometimes Asians and Middle Easterners. Prior to 1919, covenants sometimes excluded Jews. One Minneapolis covenant excluded "any person or persons of Chinese, Japanese, Moorish, Turkish, Negro, Mongolian or African blood or descent."[32] In 1953, the Michigan Legislature banned new covenants and in 1962 the legislature banned housing discrimination on the basis of race, religion or national origin.[33]
History
[edit]
Racial covenants emerged during the mid-19th century and started to gain prominence from the 1890s onwards. It was not until the 1920s that they gained widespread national significance, and continued to spread through the 1940s. Racial covenants were an alternative to racially restrictive zoning ordinances (residential segregation based on race), which the 1917 US Supreme Court ruling of Buchanan v. Warley invalidated on constitutional grounds.[34][35]: 26
During the 1920s, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) sponsored several unsuccessful legal challenges against racial covenants. In a blow to campaigners against racial segregation, the legality of racially restrictive covenants was affirmed by the landmark Corrigan v. Buckley 271 U.S. 323 (1926) judgment ruling that such clauses constituted "private action" not subject to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[35]: 31 [36] This cleared the way for racial restrictive covenants to proliferate across the US during the 1920s and 1930s.
Even the invalidation of such a covenant by the US Supreme Court in the 1940 case of Hansberry v. Lee did little to reverse the trend, because the ruling was based on a technicality and failed to set a legal precedent.[35]: 57 It was not until 1948 that the Shelley v. Kraemer judgment overturned the Corrigan v. Buckley decision, stating that exclusionary covenants were unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment and were therefore legally unenforceable.[35]: 94 [37][38] On December 2, 1949 US solicitor general Philip Perlman announced that the "FHA could no longer insure mortgages with restrictive covenants".[39]
Some commentators have attributed the popularity of exclusionary covenants at this time as a response to the urbanization of black Americans following World War I, and the fear of "black invasion" into white neighborhoods, which residents felt would result in depressed property prices, increased nuisance (crime), and social instability.[28]: 97–98 Many African Americans openly defied these covenants and attempted to "pioneer" restricted areas.[40] But even still the covenants played a role as "gentlemen agreements", it wasn't until 1962, that the Equal Opportunity in Housing executive order was signed by President John F. Kennedy, prohibiting using federal funds to support racial discrimination in housing. This caused the FHA to "cease financing subdivision developments whose builders openly refused to sell to black buyers."[41]
In 1968, Congress passed the Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968) which outlawed housing discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. In 1988, it was expanded to prohibit discrimination based on familial status (e.g. the presence of children) or disability.[42] It wasn't until 1972 that the Mayers v Ridley decision[43] ruled that the covenants themselves violated the Fair Housing Act and that county clerks should be prohibited from accepting deeds with such clauses.[44]
Persistence of exclusionary covenants
[edit]Although exclusionary covenants are not enforceable today, they still exist in many original property deeds as "underlying documents", and title insurance policies often contain exclusions preventing coverage of such restrictions. It is not always easy to remove them from the chain of title.[45] Since 2010, the Seattle Civil Rights & Labor History Project has located more than 500 restrictive covenants and deeds covering more than 20,000 properties in Seattle and its suburbs. In response, the Washington State legislature passed a law that since January 1, 2019 allows property owners to "modify" property records, disavowing the offensive restriction.[46] Mapping Inequality, a collaboration of three teams at four universities, has identified restrictive covenants in various parts of the United States.[47] The Mapping Prejudice project at the University of Minnesota has collected restrictive covenants in the Minneapolis area.[48]
Examples
[edit]- Forest Hills Gardens, Queens, New York – covenants forbade the sale of real property to Black, Jewish, and working-class people.[citation needed]
- Jackson Heights, Queens, New York – covenants employed to restrict occupancy to white, non-immigrant Protestants.[49]
- Washington Park Subdivision, Chicago, Illinois – restrictive covenants used to exclude African Americans.[citation needed]
- Palos Verdes Estates, Los Angeles, California – covenants forbade an owner to sell or rent a house to anyone not of the white or Caucasian race or to permit African Americans on their property with the exception of chauffeurs, gardeners, and domestic servants.[28]: 15 [50]
- Upper Arlington, Ohio – covenants forbade the sale of real property to Black people or Jews, but allowed for "colored" servants to reside in the homes in which they served.[citation needed]
- Guilford, Baltimore, Maryland – covenants provided for exclusion against "negros or persons of negro extraction".[28]: 65
- Williamstown, Massachusetts, in 1939 prohibited any non-white not in domestic service from living in the town.[51]
- Kansas City metropolitan area (examples include Country Club and Johnson County) – restrictive covenants used to exclude African American and "Semitic" persons.[52]
- West Orange, New Jersey - one 1892 covenant stated "We do not sell to Colored People, Italians, Polanders, or Bohemians..."[53]
Outside the US
[edit]Although most commonly associated with the United States, racially or ethnically restrictive covenants have been used in other countries:
- Canada – Subdivisions such as Westdale, Ontario employed racial covenants to bar a diverse array of ethnic groups, such as Armenians and foreign-born Italians and Jews.[28]: 103 Opposition to exclusionary covenants was significant in Canada, culminating in the 1945 Re Drummond Wren ruling by the Ontario High Court which invalidated their use. This judgment was influential in guiding similar decisions in the United States and elsewhere.[54]
- France – During World War II, under the Vichy regime in the Free Zone outside the Nazi occupied area, some condominiums inserted clauses forbidding selling to Jews.[55]
- South Africa – racial covenants emerged in Natal during the 1890s as an attempt to prevent Indians from acquiring properties in more expensive areas, and were commonplace across the country by the 1930s. They were later used as a tool to further the cause of apartheid against the black population.[56]
- Zimbabwe – Asians and coloured people were excluded from purchasing or occupying homes in European areas[when?] by restrictive racial covenants written into most title deeds.[57]
Title covenants
[edit]Title covenants serve as guarantees to the recipient of property, ensuring that the recipient receives what he or she bargained for.
In England and Wales
[edit]Since 1989, the main covenants implied in England and Wales on "limited" or "full title guarantee" (unless expressly overridden) are:[58]
- that the person making the disposition has the right (with the concurrence of any other person conveying the property) to dispose of the property as he purports to, and[59]
- that that person will at his own cost do all that he reasonably can to give the person to whom he disposes of the property the title he purports to give.[60]
- [In the case of a disposition of an existing legal interest] (a) where the title to the interest is registered, it shall be presumed that the disposition is of the whole of that interest; (b) [if unregistered and not leasehold, then the presumption it is of the fee simple][61]
- [If involving a lease] (a) that the lease is subsisting at the time of the disposition,[62] and
- (b) that there is no subsisting breach of a condition or tenant's obligation, and nothing which at that time would render the lease liable to forfeiture.[63]
Others as to charges, incumbrances, and third-party rights vary depending on whether full or limited title guarantee is agreed.[further explanation needed][64]
Outside of England and Wales
[edit]Outside of England and Wales, the English covenants of title, sometimes included in deeds to real property, are (1) that the grantor is lawfully seized (in fee simple) of the property, (2) that the grantor has the right to convey the property to the grantee, (3) that the property is conveyed without encumbrances (this covenant is frequently modified to allow for certain encumbrances), (4) that the grantor has done no act to encumber the property, (5) that the grantee shall have quiet possession of the property, and (6) that the grantor will execute such further assurances of the land as may be requisite (Nos. 3 and 4, which overlap significantly, are sometimes treated as one item).[65] The English covenants may be described individually, or they may be incorporated by reference, as in a deed granting property "with general warranty and English covenants of title...".
See also
[edit]Footnotes
[edit]- ^ Holmes, Eric M. (1993). "Stature and Status of Promise Under Seal as a Legal Formality". Willamette Law Review. 29: 617.
- ^ "Developments in the Law of Seal and Consideration in New York". Cornell Law Quarterly. 26: 692. 1941.
- ^ Swan, Edgar A. (1908). The Law of Quiet Enjoyment and Title in Respect of Landlord and Tenant. Boston: Sweet & Maxwell. p. 15.
- ^ a b "Integration of the Law of Easements, Real Covenants and Equitable Servitudes". Washington Law Review.
- ^ Hernandez MV. (2005). "Restating Implied, Prescriptive, and Statutory Easements". Real Property, Probate and Trust Journal.
- ^ Lucas D. (2004). "There is a Porn Store in Mr. Roger's Neighborhood: Will You Be Their Neighbor? How to Apply Residential Use Restrictive Covenants to Modern Home Businesses". Campbell Law Review.
- ^ Lehman, Jeffrey; Phelps, Shirelle (2005). West's Encyclopedia of American Law, Vol. 1. Detroit: Thomson/Gale. p. 200.
- ^ New York has been one such exception; see Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 7 NY 2d 240 - NY: Court of Appeals 1959.
- ^ Schnably. Easements, Covenants, and Equitable Servitudes. Archived July 17, 2007, at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Expanded outline on covenants Harvard Law School.
- ^ Neighbors At War!, by Ward Lucas; Hogback Publishing (2012).
- ^ "Payroll Tax Bill Includes Provision for Amateur Radio Study". ARRL News. Newington, Connecticut: American Radio Relay League. February 17, 2012. Retrieved February 24, 2012.
- ^ Chief, FCC Wireless Telecommunications Bureau; Chief, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (August 16, 2012). "DA 12-1342" (PDF). Washington, D.C.: Federal Communications Commission. Retrieved August 23, 2012.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ Gray et al., Property Law in New South Wales, second edition, p 547
- ^ Austerberry v Oldham Corporation (1885) 29 Ch D 750
- ^ Thamesmead Town Ltd v Allotey (2000) 79 P & CR 557
- ^ a b Edwards, L., Restrictive covenants - are they enforceable?, RICS, published on 15 November 2006, archived on 28 March 2007, accessed on 26 September 2024
- ^ UK Legislation, Law of Property Act 1925, section 78(2), accessed on 4 October 2024
- ^ Tulk v Moxhay (1848) 41 ER 1143)
- ^ Ch. 33 Real Covenants. LexisNexis Study Outline.
- ^ McKenzie, Evan (1994). Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Residential Private Governments. Yale University Press. p. 20. ISBN 0-300-06638-4.
- ^ Hanna Holthaus; Elena Bruess (January 3, 2025). "'No zoning' in Houston provides flexibility, complications, experts say. Why does it matter?". Houston Landing.
- ^ a b Watt, Nick; Hannah, Jack (February 25, 2020). "Racist language is still woven into home deeds across America. Erasing it isn't easy, and some don't want to". CNN. Retrieved December 5, 2020.
- ^ Kennedy, Stetson (1959). "Who May Live Where". Jim Crow Guide: The Way it Was.
- ^ Michelle Maternowski; Joy Powers (March 3, 2017). "How Did Metro Milwaukee Become So Segregated?". WUWM.
- ^ "Racial Restrictive Covenants: Enforcing Neighborhood Segregation in Seattle - Seattle Civil Rights and Labor History Project". University of Washington. Retrieved December 5, 2020.
- ^ "Racial Restrictive Covenants: Neighborhood by neighborhood restrictions across King County". Seattle Civil Rights & Labor History Project. Retrieved January 17, 2019.
- ^ a b c d e f Fogelson, Robert M. (2005). Bourgeois Nightmares: Suburbia 1870–1930. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- ^ "Mapping Segregation Project". Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission. Retrieved September 20, 2025.
- ^ "Racist covenants still stain property records. Mass. may try to have them removed". WBUR-FM. Retrieved September 20, 2025.
- ^ "Racial Restrictive Covenants". The Seattle Civil Rights & Labor History Project. Retrieved September 23, 2025.
- ^ "What is a Covenant?". University of Minnesota. Retrieved September 24, 2025.
- ^ "Racial Housing Covenants in the Twin Cities". Minnesota Historical Society. Retrieved September 29, 2025.
- ^ Correa-Jones, M. (2000). The Origins and Diffusion of Racial Restrictive Covenants. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 115, No. 4, p. 543.
- ^ a b c d Meyer, Stephen G. (2000). As long as they don't move next door: segregation and racial conflict in American neighborhoods. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- ^ "1920s–1948: Racially Restrictive Covenants". The Fair Housing Center of Greater Boston.
- ^ "1948: Shelley v. Kraemer". The Fair Housing Center of Greater Boston.
- ^ Jeffrey D. Gonda (2015). Unjust Deeds: The Restrictive Covenant Cases and the Making of the Civil Rights Movement. University of North Carolina Press.
- ^ Rothstein, Richard (2017). The color of law: a forgotten history of how our government segregated America (First ed.). New York; London: Liveright Publishing Corporation, a division of W. W. Norton & Company. p. 87. ISBN 9781631492853.
- ^ Cooley, Will (July 2010). "Moving On Out: Black Pioneering in Chicago, 1915–1950". Journal of Urban History. 36 (4): 485–506. doi:10.1177/0096144210363071. S2CID 144603139.
- ^ Rothstein, Richard (2017). The color of law: a forgotten history of how our government segregated America (First ed.). New York; London: Liveright Publishing Corporation, a division of W. W. Norton & Company. p. 88. ISBN 9781631492853.
- ^ "Title VIII: Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity". U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Archived from the original on July 8, 2015. Retrieved February 11, 2015.
- ^ "Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630 | Casetext Search + Citator". casetext.com. Archived from the original on August 3, 2021.
- ^ "Injunction Against the Recording of Deeds Containing Racial Covenants: The Last of the Racial Covenant Cases? - Mayers v. Ridley". Maryland Law Review. 34 (3): 403. January 1, 1974. ISSN 0025-4282.
- ^ "Nancy H. Welsh, Racially Restrictive Covenants in the United States: A Call to Action" (PDF). Agora. Retrieved July 27, 2020.
- ^ "Racial Restrictive Covenants Neighborhood by neighborhood restrictions across King County". Seattle Civil Rights & Labor History Project. Retrieved January 17, 2019.
- ^ "Redlining in New Deal America". Mapping Inequality. Retrieved July 27, 2020.
- ^ "Visualizing the hidden histories of race and privilege in the urban landscape". Mapping Prejudice. Retrieved July 27, 2020.
- ^ Miyares, Ines M. (2004). From exclusionary covenant to ethnic diversity in Jackson Heights, Queens. The Geographical Review. Vol. 94, No. 4, p463.
- ^ Creason, Glen (August 27, 2019). "An Old Brochure Reveals How the Palos Verdes Peninsula Became a Massive Planned Community". Los Angeles Magazine. Retrieved August 28, 2019.
- ^ Dravis, Stephen (July 13, 2020). "On the Books, Unenforceable: Restrictive Covenant an Echo of Williamstown's Racist Legacy". iBerkshires.
- ^ Thomas, Judy (2005). "'Curse of covenant' persists — restrictive rules, while unenforceable, have lingering legacy". The Kansas City Star. Retrieved November 28, 2018.
- ^ "New York Herald Fri, Jul 01, 1892 Page 9". New York Herald. Retrieved September 27, 2025.
- ^ Walker, James W. St. G. (1997). Race, rights and the law in the Supreme Court of Canada: historical case studies. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. pp204-205.
- ^ "SWC: Reported Vichy-Era Statute Forbidding Côte d'Azur Property Sales to Jews Still In Force". Simon Wiesenthal Center. March 23, 2007. Archived from the original on July 31, 2017. Retrieved July 31, 2017.
- ^ Christopher, A. J. (2001). The Atlas of Changing South Africa. 2nd Edition. London: Routledge. p181.
- ^ Baker, Donald G. (1983). Race, ethnicity, and power. London: Routledge. p109.
- ^ Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994 section 8(1)
- ^ Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994 section 2(1)(a)
- ^ Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994 section 2(1)(b)
- ^ Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994 section 2(3)
- ^ Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994 section 4(1)(a)
- ^ Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994 section 4(1)(b)
- ^ Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994 section 3
- ^ E.g., Richmond v. Hall, 251 Va. 151, 160, 466 S.E.2d 103, 107 (1996).
Further reading
[edit]- Richard R.W. Brooks and Carol M. Rose, Saving the Neighborhood: Racially Restrictive Covenants, Law, and Social Norms. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013.
- Jeffrey D. Gonda, Unjust Deeds: The Restrictive Covenant Cases and the Making of the Civil Rights Movement. Chapel Hill, NC: North Carolina Press, 2015.
- Clement E. Vose, Caucasians Only: The Supreme Court, the NAACP, and the Restrictive Covenant Cases. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967.
- Renton, Alexander Wood (1911). . In Chisholm, Hugh (ed.). Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 7 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 339.
Covenant (law)
View on GrokipediaGeneral Principles
Definition and Scope
A covenant in law constitutes a binding promise or agreement, typically embedded in a deed, contract, or lease, whereby one party (the covenantor) commits to a specific act or forbearance in relation to real property.[1] In the domain of property law, covenants primarily govern the use, maintenance, or disposition of land, distinguishing them from mere personal contracts by their potential to affect the property's title or value.[8] They arise between landowners or grantors and grantees, often to preserve neighborhood character, ensure mutual benefits, or impose restrictions that enhance or protect adjoining parcels.[9] The scope of covenants extends to both obligations requiring positive action, known as affirmative covenants—such as maintaining structures or paying assessments—and those prohibiting conduct, termed restrictive covenants, like bans on commercial use or certain building types.[9][4] While personal covenants bind only the original parties and expire with their interests, real covenants "run with the land," automatically encumbering or benefiting successors in title provided they meet criteria including intent to bind future owners, relation to the land's use (touching and concerning), privity between parties, and notice to purchasers.[2][8] Enforcement of real covenants typically yields damages at law, in contrast to equitable servitudes, which invoke injunctions in equity courts.[4] Covenants apply predominantly in common law jurisdictions, influencing property transactions by integrating into title records and impacting marketability; for instance, undisclosed or unenforceable covenants can lead to title defects requiring quiet title actions.[3] Their breadth covers residential subdivisions, commercial developments, and historical land grants, but excludes zoning ordinances, which are public regulations rather than private agreements.[10] Validity hinges on compliance with state statutes and common law doctrines, with courts scrutinizing them for reasonableness to avoid undue restraints on alienation.[11]Enforceability Requirements
In common law jurisdictions, covenants are enforceable as contractual promises provided they satisfy fundamental contract formation elements, including offer, acceptance, consideration, and mutual intent to be bound. Parties must also possess legal capacity, and the covenant's purpose must not violate public policy or statutory prohibitions. For covenants involving interests in land, such as those restricting or obligating property use, the Statute of Frauds mandates execution in writing, signed by the party to be charged, to ensure enforceability against assertions of oral agreements. For real covenants intended to "run with the land"—binding successors in title rather than merely the original parties—additional stringent requirements apply to prevent indefinite burdens on property alienability. These include: (1) express or implied intent by the original covenanting parties that the obligation or benefit bind future owners, typically evidenced in the deed or contract language; (2) the covenant must "touch and concern" the land, meaning it directly affects the property's nature, value, or use, such as maintenance obligations or usage restrictions, rather than merely personal undertakings; (3) privity of estate, comprising horizontal privity (a shared interest in the land at covenant creation, like grantor-grantee) for burdens and vertical privity (successor deriving title from the original covenantee or covenantor) for both benefits and burdens; and (4) notice to subsequent purchasers of the burdened land, either actual, inquiry, or record, to uphold due diligence in conveyancing.[8][9][12] Failure in any requirement typically renders the covenant unenforceable against remote parties, though equity may intervene via equitable servitudes for injunctive relief if notice exists and the covenant touches and concerns without strict privity, as developed in cases like Tulk v. Moxhay (1848), prioritizing fairness over rigid formalism where reliance induces development. Courts assess these elements case-by-case, with burdens harder to enforce than benefits due to privity hurdles, reflecting common law's caution against perpetual encumbrances.[13] Modern statutes in some U.S. states, such as uniform acts, relax privity for recorded subdivisions, but common law baselines persist absent legislative override.[3]Distinction from Related Concepts
Covenants in property law differ from easements primarily in their nature and enforcement. An easement grants a non-possessory right to use or access another's land for a specific purpose, such as a right of way, without imposing an affirmative or negative obligation on the burdened property's owner beyond permitting the use.[8] In contrast, a covenant constitutes a contractual promise by the landowner to perform or refrain from certain actions on their own property, enforceable through damages at law for real covenants or injunctions in equity, rather than conferring a usage right on the benefited party.[4] This distinction ensures that easements focus on access privileges, while covenants regulate conduct touching and concerning the land, such as maintenance obligations or building restrictions.[9] Covenants also contrast with conditions precedent or subsequent in deeds, which attach automatic consequences like estate forfeiture or reverter upon breach, shifting title back to the grantor or heirs without requiring judicial intervention.[14] Breach of a covenant, however, typically yields remedies in damages or specific performance rather than title reversion, preserving the estate while compensating the promisee for non-performance.[14] For instance, a condition might void a fee simple estate if a structure is altered, whereas a parallel covenant would support a lawsuit for monetary relief or an order to restore, reflecting the covenant's role as an ongoing obligation rather than a title contingency.[14] Real covenants further diverge from equitable servitudes, though both bind successors to restrict land use. Real covenants demand strict privity—horizontal (between original parties) and vertical (between successor and original promisee)—and are enforced at law with damages as the primary remedy.[15] Equitable servitudes, by comparison, relax privity requirements, relying instead on notice and intent to bind, and are remedied via equitable injunctions to prevent irreparable harm, originating from courts' equitable jurisdiction to avoid unjust enrichment.[16] [17] This remedial and formal distinction arose historically from common law's rigidity in privity, prompting equity to enforce similar promises where legal enforcement failed, though both "run with the land" if they touch and concern it.[9] Unlike personal contracts, covenants must inherently relate to the land's use or value to bind successors, ensuring they transcend mere inter-party agreements.[8]Types of Covenants
Affirmative Covenants
Affirmative covenants, also termed positive covenants, obligate a property owner to undertake specific affirmative actions related to the land, such as performing maintenance, constructing improvements, or contributing to shared costs.[9][18] These differ from restrictive covenants, which prohibit certain uses or activities, by imposing duties to act rather than to refrain.[3] Common examples include requirements to repair fences, maintain insurance coverage on structures, pay assessments for common area upkeep in subdivisions, or uphold landscaping standards.[19][20] The enforceability of affirmative covenants against successors in title poses significant challenges under common law principles. Unlike the burdens of restrictive covenants, which can bind subsequent owners through equitable doctrines like that established in Tulk v. Moxhay (1848), the burdens of affirmative covenants do not automatically "run with the land."[21][22] This stems from the historical reluctance of courts to compel positive performance by decree of specific performance against remote parties, as it would require ongoing judicial oversight and potentially infringe on the successor's property rights without direct privity.[18][23] In England and Wales, this principle was reaffirmed in Rhone v. Stephens UKHL 3, where the House of Lords held that positive covenants cannot be imposed on freehold successors absent statutory intervention or leasehold structures.[24] To circumvent these limitations, parties often employ indirect mechanisms, such as chains of indemnity covenants where each successor agrees to indemnify the prior owner against breaches, or by structuring obligations within leases, common interest communities, or statutory schemes like the UK's Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 for business tenancies.[25][26] In the United States, while common law mirrors this non-binding rule for affirmative burdens, enforcement may occur through homeowners' associations via contractual privity or state statutes enabling covenant running in planned communities, as seen in uniform acts like the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act adopted in several states by 2023.[27][14] These approaches preserve the covenant's intent without altering the foundational common law barrier.[28]Restrictive Covenants
Restrictive covenants, also known as negative covenants, are contractual provisions embedded in property deeds or conveyances that prohibit or limit specific uses of the land by the owner or subsequent grantees.[5] Unlike affirmative covenants, which mandate positive actions such as maintenance or payment obligations, restrictive covenants impose burdens by forbidding activities, thereby preserving the character, value, or enjoyment of neighboring or benefited properties.[2][21] For a restrictive covenant to be enforceable, it must be reasonable in scope, clearly articulated, definite in terms, and not violative of public policy.[29] Courts typically require that the covenant be recorded in public records, enforced uniformly without discrimination, and supported by an ongoing benefited interest, such as adjacent land owned by the enforcing party.[30] Neighbors or homeowners' associations may seek injunctive relief or damages for violations, provided they demonstrate a legitimate interest tied to the covenant's purpose.[31] Some covenants include automatic expiration clauses, or "sunset provisions," terminating after a defined period, such as 20 or 30 years, to adapt to changing community needs.[32] Common examples in real estate include prohibitions on commercial activities in residential zones, restrictions on building heights or setbacks, bans on short-term rentals, limits on exterior modifications like paint colors or signage, and rules against parking recreational vehicles or keeping certain pets.[33][34] These measures aim to maintain uniformity and property values within developments, though overbroad restrictions may be invalidated if they unduly burden the servient estate without proportionate benefit to the dominant estate.[29] In practice, violations can lead to fines imposed by governing associations or court-ordered compliance, underscoring the covenants' role in self-regulating private land use agreements.[35]Real Covenants Running with the Land
Real covenants running with the land constitute promises embedded in deeds or other instruments that impose obligations or confer benefits tied directly to the property, enforceable against or by subsequent owners who acquire the land with notice of the covenant. Unlike personal covenants binding only the original parties, these covenants "run with the land," meaning they persist beyond the initial transaction and affect the estate's value or use irrespective of changes in ownership.[2] This doctrine originates in English common law and has been adapted in American jurisdictions to facilitate long-term land use planning, such as in subdivisions where uniform restrictions ensure consistent development.[9] For a covenant to qualify as real and run with the land, four core elements must generally be satisfied: it must be in writing to comply with the Statute of Frauds; the original parties must demonstrate intent for it to bind or benefit successors; the promise must "touch and concern" the land by directly affecting its nature, quality, or value rather than merely the owners' personal interests; and privity of estate must exist between the parties.[15] The "touch and concern" requirement, articulated in cases like Spencer's Case (1583), ensures the covenant relates intrinsically to the land's physical attributes or economic utility—for instance, a promise to maintain fences or pay maintenance assessments qualifies, whereas a personal guarantee of payment unrelated to property use does not.[12] Intent is typically inferred from explicit language in the deed stating the covenant "shall run with the land," as seen in the 1938 New York Court of Appeals decision in Neponsit Property Owners' Assn v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, where covenants for property association dues were upheld as binding successors due to such phrasing.[36] Privity distinguishes burdens from benefits in enforcement. Vertical privity requires the successor claiming benefit or bearing burden to hold the same estate (e.g., fee simple) as the original covenantee or covenantor, ensuring continuity of interest in the land. Horizontal privity, needed primarily for the burden to run, demands a direct relationship between the original covenanting parties, often arising from a common grantor conveying portions of land with reciprocal promises, as in subdivision plats.[12] Subsequent purchasers of the burdened land must also have notice—actual, inquiry, or record—to be bound, preventing inequitable surprises; without notice, the covenant fails against bona fide purchasers.[15] For the benefit to run, horizontal privity is typically unnecessary, allowing broader enforceability by benefited successors.[9] In practice, real covenants enable remedies at law, such as damages for breach, distinguishing them from equitable servitudes, which courts enforce via injunction in equity courts and relax privity requirements in favor of notice and intent.[8] American jurisdictions vary: strict common-law privity persists in some states like New York, while others, influenced by the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes (2000), adopt more flexible approaches prioritizing intent and notice over rigid privity to reflect modern real estate dynamics.[9] Examples include affirmative duties like shared road maintenance or restrictive limits on building heights, which, if meeting the elements, bind heirs and assigns indefinitely unless terminated by agreement, merger, or changed conditions rendering them obsolete.[15] Courts scrutinize these covenants for reasonableness to avoid undue restraints on alienation, invalidating those imposing excessive burdens without corresponding land-related benefits.[12]Historical Development
Origins in Common Law
The action of covenant originated in the English royal courts during the late 12th and early 13th centuries as a formal remedy for enforcing promises made under seal, distinguishing it from less solemn parol contracts.[37] The writ of covenant, which required a deed evidencing the sealed obligation, became available as a matter of course (de cursu) by the mid-13th century, allowing plaintiffs to seek damages for breaches of such instruments in contexts including real property transactions.[38] This formality underscored the common law's emphasis on evidentiary reliability, as unsealed promises were generally unenforceable absent consideration under emerging assumpsit doctrines.[39] In property law, the doctrine's development focused initially on leasehold covenants, where burdens could bind lessee assignees through privity of estate—a successor's inheritance of the lease term—provided the promise related directly to the demised premises.[40] Common law courts enforced such covenants against assignees as early as the 14th century in lease disputes, recognizing that obligations integral to the estate's enjoyment, like repairs or non-waste, inhered in the land itself rather than remaining purely personal. This privity-based mechanism contrasted with freehold conveyances, where covenants typically bound only original parties absent contractual privity, reflecting the common law's reluctance to impose perpetual burdens on successors without explicit feudal or tenure ties.[41] The foundational rules for covenants running with the land crystallized in Spencer's Case (1583), where the King's Bench held that a lessee's covenant to build on existing demised land bound assignees without express words like "his assigns," as it touched and concerned the estate in esse (in existence).[42] Conversely, covenants for future improvements required such specification to evince intent to bind successors, establishing the tripartite test—touching and concerning the land, intent to run, and privity—that governed common law enforceability thereafter.[43] These principles, rooted in leasehold pragmatics, influenced later applications but highlighted common law limits: burdens rarely ran to freehold grantees without privity, prompting equitable supplements for negative covenants by the 19th century.[40]Key Milestones in the 19th and 20th Centuries
In 1848, the English Court of Chancery in Tulk v. Moxhay established a foundational equitable doctrine permitting the enforcement of restrictive covenants against subsequent land purchasers who had actual or constructive notice of the restriction, thereby allowing the burden to "run with the land" despite the absence of privity of estate required at common law.[44] This decision addressed limitations in prior precedents like Spencer's Case (1583), enabling developers and landowners to impose enduring use restrictions on subdivided properties, which became instrumental in shaping urban development amid 19th-century industrialization.[45] The principle was widely adopted in U.S. jurisdictions, influencing cases that upheld similar equitable enforcement to preserve neighborhood character.[46] The Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1881 codified implied covenants for title in English conveyances made for value, including warranties of right to convey, quiet enjoyment, freedom from encumbrances, and further assurance, thereby standardizing seller obligations and reducing litigation over defective titles.[47] These statutory covenants applied to beneficial owners and trustees, ensuring they bound heirs and assigns unless disclaimed, which streamlined property transactions and promoted market efficiency during rapid land conveyance growth.[47] The 20th century saw further codification with England's Law of Property Act 1925, effective January 1, 1926, which reformed feudal vestiges and clarified that covenants touching and concerning land automatically pass benefits to successors under sections 78 and 79 if originally intended to run, while section 80 defined running covenants as those binding or benefiting successors at law or in equity.[48] In the United States, Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank (1938) extended equitable enforcement to affirmative covenants, upholding a deed requirement for annual maintenance assessments as touching and concerning the land, with intent to bind successors and requisite notice, thus facilitating modern planned communities and homeowners' associations.[49] These reforms reflected causal pressures from suburban expansion and collective land management needs, prioritizing functional enforceability over rigid common law privity.[50]Jurisdictional Applications
United States
In the United States, real covenants—promises respecting the use or enjoyment of land that bind successors in title—are primarily governed by state common law, with variations influenced by judicial adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes (2000). For a covenant to run with the land at law and support a damages remedy, courts traditionally require five elements: (1) a writing embodying the covenant, (2) intent by the original parties that it bind successors, (3) the covenant touches and concerns the land by affecting its use, value, or nature, (4) privity of estate (horizontal privity between the original covenanting parties, typically arising from a mutual conveyance, and vertical privity between the original covenantor and successor burdened owners), and (5) notice to subsequent purchasers, either actual, inquiry, or record. Horizontal privity poses a significant barrier to enforcing burdens against remote successors, as it limits enforceability to scenarios where the covenant arises in a land sale or lease. Benefits run more readily, often requiring only vertical privity and the other elements. Equitable servitudes, enforceable via injunction rather than damages, relax privity demands in many jurisdictions, substituting notice for horizontal privity while retaining requirements of writing, intent, and touch and concern. The Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, adopted or influential in over 30 states, further modernizes the doctrine by eliminating horizontal privity for servitude burdens created after 2000, redefining "touch and concern" functionally (a servitude affects land if it impacts its use or value, excluding purely personal obligations), and emphasizing enforceability based on reasonableness rather than formalistic privity. States like California and New York maintain stricter common law approaches, with New York courts upholding traditional privity for legal remedies but allowing equitable enforcement with notice. Statutory overlays, such as those governing common interest communities, modify these rules; for instance, the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (adopted in 20 states as of 2023) facilitates covenant enforcement through homeowners' associations (HOAs), which manage restrictive covenants in subdivisions affecting over 74 million Americans in 2023. The U.S. Supreme Court has intervened in covenant enforceability on constitutional grounds, notably in Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), where it held 6-3 that state courts' judicial enforcement of private racially restrictive covenants constitutes state action violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rendering such enforcement unconstitutional despite the covenants' private origin. This decision invalidated judicial backing for discriminatory restrictions prevalent in mid-20th-century suburbs but left private agreements intact absent court involvement; subsequent federal legislation, including the Fair Housing Act of 1968, prohibits discriminatory covenants in housing sales and rentals, with the Department of Housing and Urban Development reporting over 28,000 fair housing complaints in 2023, many involving covenant-like restrictions. State courts continue to assess covenant reasonableness, voiding those imposing unreasonable restraints on alienation or lacking legitimate purposes, as in Texas cases enforcing servitudes only if they promote community welfare without undue burden. In commercial contexts, covenants in leases or developments must balance parties' interests, with courts in states like Florida scrutinizing affirmative obligations (e.g., maintenance requirements) for specificity to avoid vagueness. Overall, U.S. law favors covenant stability in planned developments—where HOAs resolved over 1.2 million violations in 2022 per Community Associations Institute data—while guarding against overreach through implied covenants of good faith and evolving judicial tests for obsolescence or changed circumstances.England and Wales
In England and Wales, covenants relating to land are contractual promises made by a landowner (the covenantor) to another party (the covenantee), typically restricting or requiring certain uses of the burdened land to benefit neighboring or retained land. These obligations are governed primarily by common law principles, equity, and statutes such as the Law of Property Act 1925 (LPA 1925) and the Land Registration Act 2002 (LRA 2002).[51][10] For enforceability against successors in title, a key distinction exists between restrictive (negative) covenants, which prohibit actions such as building or commercial use, and positive (affirmative) covenants, which require actions like maintenance or payment of contributions.[52] Restrictive covenants bind successors in equity provided they "touch and concern" the benefited land, the benefited land is identified and retained by the covenantee or passes to successors, and the successor acquires the burdened land with actual, constructive, or imputed notice of the covenant. This doctrine originated in the landmark case Tulk v Moxhay (1848), where the Court of Chancery granted an injunction enforcing a covenant to maintain Leicester Square as a pleasure garden against a purchaser who had notice, establishing that equity could impose the burden without privity of estate at law.[53][54] The benefit of such covenants passes at common law under section 78 LPA 1925 if annexed to the land, but equitable enforcement requires the fourfold test from Cosmichome Holdings Ltd v Gloucester Quays Developments Ltd (2019), emphasizing proximity or a building scheme for mutual enforceability within developments.[55] Positive covenants, by contrast, do not run with the freehold land at common law or in equity, meaning the burden cannot be directly enforced against successors who did not personally agree to it; liability remains personal to the original covenantor unless enforced through leasehold structures or commonhold associations under the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002.[56][55] Indirect enforcement may occur via an unbroken chain of indemnity covenants in conveyances, where each purchaser covenants to indemnify predecessors against breaches, though this provides damages rather than specific performance and fails if the chain breaks.[57] Under the LRA 2002, which applies to the majority of registered land (over 88% of titles as of 2023), restrictive covenants created after 13 October 2003 must be noted or protected by entry in the charges register of the burdened title to bind successors as overriding interests only if the purchaser is bound by the Land Registry's register.[58][59] Unregistered land follows unregistered principles, but indemnity insurance is commonly used for title defects. Modification or discharge of obsolete covenants is possible via sections 84(1)(a)-(c) LPA 1925 through Upper Tribunal application if no injury to benefited land or compensation suffices, with over 1,200 applications annually reflecting practical limitations on perpetual restrictions.[60]Canada and Other Common Law Jurisdictions
In Canada, the enforceability of real covenants running with freehold land adheres to common law principles derived from English precedents, distinguishing between burdens and benefits, and between positive and negative obligations. The burden of a negative (restrictive) covenant may bind successors in equity if it is negative in substance, the parties intended it to run with the land, the successor had notice of it, and it benefits an identified dominant tenement.[61] This equitable enforcement stems from Tulk v. Moxhay (1848), which Canadian courts apply, requiring the covenant to touch and concern the land by affecting its use or value.[61] In contrast, the burden of a positive covenant—requiring affirmative action, such as maintenance—does not run at law or in equity against successors, following Austerberry v. Corporation of Oldham (1885), absent statutory intervention or mutual benefit schemes.[61] Canadian cases like Re Hunt and Bell affirm the necessity of a dominant tenement for enforcement, while Page v. Campbell holds that the covenantee must retain benefiting land for the benefit to pass.[61] Benefits of covenants run more readily: at law, only original parties enforce, but in equity, assignees may if the covenant touches and concerns the dominant land and is annexed via words of covenant or building scheme, as in Rogers v. Hosegood (1900), adopted in Canada.[61] Registration on title, mandatory in most provinces under land titles or registry systems, provides constructive notice and binds successors, though Torrens systems in provinces like British Columbia and Manitoba prioritize indefeasible title subject to registered interests.[62] Provincial statutes, such as Ontario's Planning Act (R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13), facilitate subdivision covenants enforceable against future owners, often via developer-imposed restrictions on use, density, or aesthetics.[62] Courts criticize the rigid positive-negative distinction for causing inequities, such as original owners remaining liable post-sale, prompting calls for reform like extending equity to positive burdens or adopting "land obligations" akin to English proposals.[61] In Australia, covenants follow similar common law rules but are adapted to the Torrens system prevalent nationwide, where registration on the land title under state legislation (e.g., Transfer of Land Act 1958 (Vic)) ensures restrictive covenants run as burdens against successors if they touch and concern the benefited land, show intent to bind, and provide notice via the folio.[63] Positive covenants generally do not run unless part of a statutory scheme, such as strata titles or positive covenants under Queensland's Land Title Act 1994 (s. 185), which allow affirmative obligations to attach upon registration until discharged.[64] Enforcement requires the covenant not to be personal and to benefit land, not individuals; breaches may yield injunctions or damages, though public policy limits overly broad restrictions.[65] New Zealand's approach mirrors Australia's Torrens influence under the Land Transfer Act 2017, permitting both positive and negative land covenants to run upon registration, imposing burdens or benefits on specified land parcels.[66] Negative covenants restrain uses like building height, while positives mandate actions such as fencing; both bind successors if they concern the land and are not void under the Property Law Act 2007 (s. 147) for purposes like restricting low-income housing.[67] Courts enforce via specific performance or damages, but amendments require consent or court order to reflect modern needs, avoiding perpetual "dead hand" control.[68] Other jurisdictions like India retain English-derived rules, with burdens of restrictive covenants enforceable in equity against purchasers with notice, though statutory overlays under state transfer acts prioritize registered deeds.[69]Exclusionary and Discriminatory Covenants
Historical Implementation and Purposes
Exclusionary and discriminatory covenants emerged in the late 19th century but gained widespread implementation in the early 20th century as a private mechanism to enforce residential segregation following judicial invalidation of public racial zoning ordinances. The first recorded racial covenant appeared in a 1891 deed in Chicago, restricting occupancy to white persons of non-African descent, though sporadic use occurred in cities like San Francisco and Los Angeles prior to 1910.[70] The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Buchanan v. Warley (1917), which struck down Louisville's racial zoning law as violating the Fourteenth Amendment, prompted real estate developers and homeowners' associations to shift to private deed restrictions as an alternative tool for exclusion.[71] By the 1920s, these covenants proliferated in northern and western cities, with developers incorporating standardized clauses into subdivision plats to bind all future buyers, often promoted by the National Association of Real Estate Boards through model forms that barred sales or leases to "any person not of the Caucasian race" or specified groups like Jews and Asians.[72] Implementation involved embedding perpetual clauses in property deeds that "ran with the land," allowing enforcement through lawsuits by neighboring property owners to enjoin violations, such as attempted sales to prohibited parties. In practice, covenants covered entire neighborhoods; for instance, by the 1940s, historians estimate that up to 80% of residential properties in Chicago and similar proportions in Seattle and Minneapolis included such restrictions.[73] Real estate professionals drafted and marketed these as essential for "quality control," disseminating templates via trade publications and legal advisors to ensure uniformity and judicial enforceability, with courts upholding them as valid contracts until mid-century challenges.[74] Enforcement was proactive: vigilance committees monitored sales, and violations triggered injunctions, fines, or forfeiture clauses, creating a self-policing system among white homeowners.[75] The primary purposes were to preserve racial, ethnic, and religious homogeneity in neighborhoods, thereby safeguarding perceived property values and social stability against demographic shifts driven by urbanization and migration. Proponents, including developers and realtors, argued that influxes of African Americans, immigrants, or other minorities would depress market prices and degrade community standards, drawing on contemporaneous pseudoscientific racial hierarchies and economic fears amid the Great Migration (1910–1970), during which six million Black Southerners moved north.[76] Historical deed language explicitly linked exclusion to value protection, stating aims like preventing "un desirability" from non-white occupancy, with evidence from period real estate journals showing covenants as tools to signal exclusivity to white buyers and deter integration.[6] While some apologists framed them as neutral property rights exercises, causal analysis reveals their discriminatory intent rooted in maintaining white supremacy in housing markets, as public records and litigation transcripts confirm repeated targeting of specific groups to avert "invasion and succession" patterns observed in transitioning urban blocks.[77][78]Legal Challenges and Judicial Interventions
Early judicial challenges to exclusionary covenants in the United States tested their constitutionality under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and later the Fourteenth Amendment. In Corrigan v. Buckley (1926), the Supreme Court dismissed constitutional objections to racially restrictive covenants, holding that private agreements among property owners to exclude certain racial groups did not violate federal rights, as they involved no state action.[79] This ruling affirmed the enforceability of such covenants through private lawsuits and lower court judgments, enabling their proliferation in urban areas to maintain residential segregation.[80] Subsequent challenges in the 1930s and 1940s, often backed by the NAACP, sought to undermine covenant enforcement by highlighting violations of civil rights statutes and equal protection principles. A pivotal case, Lee v. Hansberry (1940), addressed procedural issues in covenant suits but did not directly invalidate the restrictions, though it exposed weaknesses in unanimous consent requirements for covenant bindingness.[81] These efforts culminated in Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), where the Supreme Court, in a 6-0 decision, ruled that state judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants constituted state action prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[82] The Court clarified that while the covenants themselves were private agreements and not inherently unconstitutional, courts' role in decreeing specific performance or damages to uphold them violated constitutional protections against racial discrimination.[83] This intervention effectively nullified the legal mechanism for enforcing discriminatory covenants nationwide, as consolidated with McGhee v. Sipes from Michigan.[6] Post-Shelley rulings reinforced the unenforceability doctrine, with federal and state courts consistently refusing to lend judicial power to discriminatory restrictions. For instance, lower courts dismissed suits seeking to enforce covenants against non-white buyers, citing the state action bar.[84] Although Shelley did not retroactively void existing covenants or require their removal from deeds, it shifted the burden to private negotiation or voluntary release, diminishing their practical impact.[85] Judicial interventions thus transitioned from validation to prohibition of enforcement, paving the way for legislative measures like the Fair Housing Act of 1968, which declared such covenants void and unenforceable as a matter of federal law, prohibiting discrimination in housing sales and rentals based on race. This combination of judicial restraint and statutory abolition addressed the causal role of covenants in perpetuating segregation, though remnants persisted in property records until modern title-clearing efforts.[6]Modern Validity and Perspectives
In the United States, racially restrictive covenants became judicially unenforceable following the Supreme Court's 1948 decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, which determined that court enforcement of such private agreements constitutes state action violating the Equal Protection Clause of the [Fourteenth Amendment](/page/Fourteenth Amendment).[86] The federal Fair Housing Act of 1968 further prohibited discrimination in housing, including references to racial restrictions in real estate transactions, rendering such covenants void as against public policy.[77] Although these provisions remain in approximately 80% of property deeds in some historically affected cities like Minneapolis as of 2021, they hold no legal weight and cannot restrict sales or occupancy.[75] State legislatures have increasingly addressed the persistence of these obsolete clauses in land records, which can perpetuate stigma despite their invalidity. For instance, Virginia enacted legislation in 2020 allowing owners to disclaim discriminatory language via affidavit, while Illinois followed in 2021 with a process to strike such covenants from public records without court approval.[87][75] By 2023, at least 10 states had similar statutes, motivated by concerns over historical records influencing modern perceptions of property values and community equity, though title insurers like the American Land Title Association emphasize that these clauses do not affect marketability or insurability.[88] Contemporary perspectives on discriminatory covenants underscore their role in entrenching racial segregation, with empirical studies linking their historical prevalence to persistent disparities in homeownership rates and neighborhood demographics as of 2023.[89] Research indicates that areas once bound by such covenants exhibit higher white homeownership and lower minority presence today, attributing this to reduced interracial mixing during the mid-20th century, though causal effects are debated due to confounding factors like redlining.[90] Proponents of expungement argue that retaining the language in deeds symbolically reinforces inequality, while critics of overemphasis on historical covenants highlight that private property rights, absent state enforcement, align with voluntary association principles upheld in earlier cases like Corrigan v. Buckley (1926). In jurisdictions outside the U.S., such as England and Wales, general restrictive covenants remain enforceable if reasonable and not contrary to anti-discrimination statutes like the Equality Act 2010, but explicitly exclusionary ones based on race are void for public policy reasons, with no widespread legacy equivalent to U.S. racial covenants.[91]Title Covenants
Nature and Warranties Provided
Title covenants, also referred to as covenants of title, constitute express or implied contractual assurances embedded within a deed by which the grantor warrants to the grantee the validity and quality of the property title being transferred. These covenants serve to allocate risk between parties in real property conveyances, providing the grantee with remedies—typically damages—for breaches arising from title defects, and they originated from English common law traditions adapted in jurisdictions like the United States.[92][93] In a general warranty deed, which offers the broadest protection, these covenants are divided into present covenants (relating to the state of title at conveyance) and future covenants (extending protection against subsequent claims), with breaches of the former actionable immediately and the latter running with the land to benefit successors.[94][95] The standard set of six covenants of title, as recognized in many U.S. states under common law principles, includes:- Covenant of seisin: The grantor affirms ownership and lawful possession of the estate conveyed, ensuring the grantor holds fee simple title free from superior claims at the time of transfer. A breach occurs if the grantor lacks such seisin, entitling the grantee to damages measured by the property's value.[92][94]
- Covenant of right to convey: The grantor guarantees legal authority to pass clear title, distinct from seisin by addressing any lack of power due to restrictions like spousal consent or fiduciary duties. This present covenant protects against immediate impediments to conveyance.[96][95]
- Covenant against encumbrances: The grantor promises the property is free from undisclosed liens, easements, or other burdens except those specified in the deed, with damages recoverable for the diminution in value caused by such encumbrances.[92][93]
- Covenant of quiet enjoyment: The grantor warrants the grantee's peaceful possession without lawful eviction by paramount title holders, with remedies available upon actual or constructive eviction.[97][98]
- Covenant of warranty: The grantor commits to defending the title against all reasonable claims of superior right, including indemnification for losses from successful adverse actions, and this obligation binds successors indefinitely until breached.[97][99]
- Covenant of further assurances: The grantor agrees to execute any additional documents or actions necessary to perfect or clarify the title at no cost to the grantee, reinforcing the deed's efficacy without creating new substantive warranties.[97][94]
