Hubbry Logo
Review petitionReview petitionMain
Open search
Review petition
Community hub
Review petition
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Review petition
Review petition
Review petition
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

In India, a binding decision of the Supreme Court/High Court can be reviewed in review petition. The parties aggrieved on any order of the Supreme Court on any apparent error can file a review petition. Taking into consideration the principle of stare decisis, courts generally do not unsettle a decision, without a strong case. This provision regarding review is an exception to the legal principle of stare decisis.[1][need quotation to verify]

Article 137 of the Constitution provides that subject to provisions of any law and rule made under Article 145 the Supreme Court of India has the power to review any judgement pronounced (or order made) by it. Under Supreme Court Rules, 1966 such a petition needs to be filed within 30 days from the date of judgement or order. It is also recommended that the petition should be circulated without oral arguments to the same bench of judges that delivered the judgement (or order) sought to be reviewed.[2][3]

It is not necessary for the court to accept every review petition.[4] Court may accept review petition only if it is filed on sufficient grounds which are:

  1. The discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made
  2. On account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record
  3. Any other sufficient reason

Furthermore, even after dismissal of a review petition, the SC may consider a curative petition in order to prevent abuse of its process and to cure gross miscarriage of justice.[2]

While a civil review petition can be moved in accordance with Order XLVII, Rule 1(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 a criminal review petition can be moved only on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record. (Source: CPC, 1908 and CRPC, 1973)

Prominent cases

[edit]

Dowry harassment case

[edit]

IPC 498a review-On 23 April 2018, the Supreme Court heard arguments and reserved its judgement on a review petition filed against an earlier order of the Court which had outlawed immediate arrests under this provision of IPC 498a.On 14 September 2018, it set aside the earlier judgement and left it to the parliament to enact suitable guidelines.

2G spectrum case

[edit]
Main article: 2G spectrum case

On 2 March 2012, Govt of India filed a review petition in Supreme Court seeking partial review of the court's 2 February 2012 order which had quashed 122 licenses.[5] The Govt questioned Supreme Court's authority over ruling against the first-come first-served policy but stayed away from challenging the cancellation of 122 licences issued during the tenure of A Raja as Telecom Minister.[6] On the same day Sistema, majority shareholder in MTS India, too filed a review petition in Supreme Court.[7] The Supreme Court on 4 April 2012 accepted to hear Government's review petition on limited grounds and dismissed all other 10 review petitions.[8] Later on the Government of India applied for the withdrawal of the review petition and same was accepted by the Supreme Court of India[9]

NEET Case

[edit]
Main article: National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (Undergraduate)

On 18 July 2013, a 3-judge division bench of the SC by a 2:1 majority verdict had quashed National Eligibility Cum Entrance Test for admission to undergraduate medical/dental courses and Postgraduate medical/dental courses. The government of India subsequently filed a review petition. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the review petition on 23 October 2013. It recalled the 18 July order on 11 April 2016 and allowed the government to conduct NEET for admission to Undergraduate and Postgraduate medical and dental courses in the meantime. It decided to hear afresh on the validity of NEET. Another 3-judge bench of the Supreme Court after a fresh hearing upheld NEET by its judgement dated 29 April 2020.

Vodafone-Hutchison Tax Case

[edit]
Further information: Vodafone Tax Case

On 17 February 2012, Govt of India moved the Supreme Court seeking a review of its verdict holding that the Indian Income Tax Department does not have jurisdiction to impose Rs.11,000 crore as tax on the overseas deal between Vodafone and Hutchison.[10][11][12] On 20 March 2012, SC dismissed the review petition during an in-chamber proceeding saying the petition has no merit.[13][14]

Mayawati disproportionate assets case

[edit]
Further information: Mayawati § Disproportionate assets case

On 4 October 2012, based on a review petition filed by a person named Kamlesh Verma, the Supreme Court decided to review its earlier verdict in open court in a disproportionate assets case against Mayawati.[15][16][17] The case dates back to 2003 when CBI filed a case against Mayawati for owning assets disproportionate to her known sources of income. Mayawati described the CBI investigation against her as illegal.[18] The assets case was finally quashed on 6 July 2012—nine years later—by the Supreme Court; the court found that the case was unwarranted.[19] The CBI decided not to file an appeal.[20]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Review petition

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
A review petition is a judicial remedy available under Article 137 of the Indian Constitution, enabling the or High Courts to reconsider and potentially modify their own judgments or orders upon application by an aggrieved party, strictly limited to correcting errors apparent on the face of the record without reopening the merits of the case. Governed by Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, it serves as an exceptional mechanism to rectify patent mistakes, such as arithmetical errors or misapplication of law evident from the judgment itself, rather than introducing new evidence or arguments. The procedure requires filing within 30 days of the impugned , with the petition initially treated confidentially and, where practicable, placed before the same bench that delivered the original decision; public hearings occur only if the deems warranted, though successful petitions remain rare due to the high threshold for demonstrating apparent error. If dismissed, parties may pursue a as a final resort, underscoring the 's role as a narrow corrective tool rather than a routine appellate avenue. This framework balances finality in judicial pronouncements with accountability for gross oversights, though empirical data indicate approval rates below 1% in reported cases, reflecting judicial caution against undermining settled decisions.

Constitutional and Statutory Basis

The power of the to review its own judgments or orders derives from Article 137 of the Constitution, which states: "Subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145, the shall have power to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it." This provision establishes a plenary review jurisdiction, enabling the Court to reconsider decisions to correct errors, though it is not an inherent common-law power but one explicitly conferred by the Constitution. Article 137 operates alongside Article 145, which empowers the to frame rules for regulating its practice and procedure, including review applications, ensuring procedural uniformity. In civil proceedings, this constitutional authority is statutorily delineated by Section 114 and Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), which apply to the via the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. Section 114 provides that "any person considering himself aggrieved... by a or order from which an appeal is allowed but from which no appeal has been preferred... may apply for a of to the which passed the or made the order." Order XLVII, Rule 1, further restricts to specific grounds: (i) discovery of new and important not known or obtainable earlier despite ; (ii) any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) any other sufficient reason analogous to the foregoing. These limitations prevent from serving as a substitute for appeal, confining it to patent errors rather than reappreciation of or arguments. The Rules, 2013, under Order XLVII, operationalize these provisions by mandating that review petitions be filed within 30 days of the judgment, circulated before the same bench (or a successor), and disposed of without oral arguments unless the Court directs otherwise. This framework ensures reviews are exceptional, with the Court entertaining them sparingly to uphold finality of judgments while addressing manifest injustices. In non-civil matters, such as writ petitions under Article 32, the Court's review power under Article 137 remains broad but is guided analogously by principles of error correction, without strict adherence to CPC grounds.

Scope and Grounds for Review

The scope of a review petition in the is narrowly circumscribed to prevent it from functioning as an in disguise, confining judicial scrutiny to the specific or order under challenge rather than a de novo examination of the entire case merits. Under Article 137 of the , the Court possesses the power to review any pronounced by it, subject to the provisions of any law made by or rules adopted by the Court, which limits review to exceptional circumstances where the original decision exhibits fundamental flaws. This scope excludes re-appreciation of or arguments already considered, emphasizing finality in judicial pronouncements while allowing correction of patent errors. The primary grounds for entertaining a review petition mirror those outlined in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which the applies mutatis mutandis through its inherent powers: first, the discovery of new and important matter or evidence that, despite the exercise of , was not within the knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced at the time of the original hearing; second, any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, which must be self-evident and not require elaborate argumentation to discern; and third, any other sufficient reason, interpreted restrictively to encompass analogous situations akin to the first two limbs, such as jurisdictional errors or procedural irregularities vitiating the decision. Errors apparent on the record typically include arithmetical mistakes, inadvertent omissions, or misapplications of law that are obvious upon mere perusal, excluding debatable interpretations or points requiring . Courts have consistently held that "any other sufficient reason" does not extend to mere dissatisfaction with the outcome or novel arguments overlooked in the original proceedings, as affirmed in precedents like Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of (1980), where the ground was deemed analogous only if it shares the essence of patent error or undiscoverable evidence. Review jurisdiction thus prioritizes over substantive re-litigation, with the petitioner bearing the onus to demonstrate grounds in the application itself, often evaluated by circulation among judges without oral hearings unless exceptional. This framework ensures reviews are rare, constituting less than 1% of successful petitions historically, underscoring their role as a safety valve rather than a routine recourse.

Historical Development

Origins in Indian Jurisprudence

The review jurisdiction in Indian civil courts was codified for the first time under Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, enacted by the British Parliament to consolidate and amend procedural laws for civil judicature in . This provision granted courts the authority to their own decrees or orders where no appeal lay or to address specific errors, marking a departure from prior fragmented local customs and regulations that lacked uniform remedial mechanisms. The grounds for review, as outlined, included discovery of new and important matter or evidence not known earlier despite , mistake or error apparent on the record, or any other sufficient reason analogous to the foregoing. This statutory framework evolved through amendments and reenactments, with the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, retaining and refining the review power before its comprehensive restatement in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, under Section 114 read with Order 47. Order 47, Rule 1 of the 1908 Code explicitly limits review to circumstances preventing a full rehearing, emphasizing its role as an exceptional remedy to avert rather than a substitute for appeal. Pre-independence High Courts, established via the , exercised this jurisdiction in civil matters, applying it sparingly to correct patent errors while upholding finality in judgments. The doctrine transitioned into independent India's constitutional framework with Article 137 of the Constitution, effective from January 26, 1950, which empowers the to review its judgments subject to parliamentary laws and rules under Article 145. Draft Article 112A, the precursor to Article 137, was debated in the on June 6, 1949, reflecting intent to embed corrective authority akin to CPC principles while adapting it for the apex court's appellate role. Supreme Court Rules, 2013 (Order XLVII), incorporate CPC grounds, ensuring review remains confined to errors apparent on the record, new evidence, or analogous reasons, without reappreciating facts or merits. This continuity underscores review's foundational purpose in Indian jurisprudence: preserving judicial integrity through limited self-correction, inherited from colonial codification and constitutionally affirmed.

Key Judicial Precedents Shaping Review

In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (1964), the held that under Article 137 is permissible only for errors apparent on the face of the record, defined as those self-evident defects requiring no elaborate argument or re-examination of evidence. The Court rejected the petitioner's attempt to revisit the merits, affirming that does not equate to an and must preserve the finality of judgments unless a patent mistake undermines justice. The principles were further refined in Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1980), where the dismissed review petitions challenging its interpretation of sales tax liability on restaurant services. It ruled that review lies solely for discovery of new evidence unavailable earlier through due diligence or correction of errors apparent on the record, not for re-agitating disputed facts or legal interpretations, thereby preventing review from serving as a surrogate . A Constitution Bench in Kamlesh Verma v. (2013) synthesized prior precedents, applying the grounds under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure analogously to reviews: (i) discovery of new and important evidence not obtainable earlier; (ii) mistake or apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) any other sufficient reason akin to the first two, interpreted restrictively to avoid undermining finality. The Court dismissed the petition against quashing an FIR, holding that mere potential for alternative arguments or deeper analysis does not qualify as an apparent . These rulings collectively circumscribe as an exceptional remedy, confined to manifest judicial oversights, and have consistently guided the in rejecting petitions that seek substantive re-litigation.

Procedural Aspects

Filing and Timeline Requirements

A petition in the is filed as a formal application under Article 137 of the Constitution, invoking the 's inherent power to its judgments or orders, and is governed procedurally by Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. The petition must be presented by the aggrieved party or their duly authorized advocate-on-record, specifying the precise grounds for review, such as discovery of new and important evidence not previously available despite , mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason akin to the aforementioned. It requires accompaniment by a of the impugned judgment or order, an verifying the petition's facts and grounds, and, if applicable, copies of documents supporting new evidence or the error claimed. Petitions filed by non-parties to the original proceedings must additionally include of prior orders denying their impleadment. The timeline for filing mandates submission within 30 days from the date of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed, as stipulated in Rule 2 of Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, and aligned with Article 124 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a 30-day period for review applications in both civil and criminal matters. This limitation applies uniformly, though courts may condone delays upon demonstration of sufficient cause, such as unavoidable circumstances preventing timely filing, evaluated on a case-by-case basis without extending the period arbitrarily. For e-filing, which is now standard via the Supreme Court's portal, the petition must comply with digital formatting requirements, including PDF uploads not exceeding specified file sizes, and registration with the Registry for defects scrutiny before listing. Upon filing, the petition undergoes preliminary scrutiny by the Registry for compliance with formalities, including verification of limitation and jurisdictional grounds; defective petitions may be returned for rectification within a stipulated time, failing which they are deemed abandoned. If admitted, it is circulated to the judges who delivered the original judgment for disposal, typically without oral hearings unless ordered otherwise, emphasizing the exceptional nature of review as a corrective mechanism rather than a routine rehearing. Non-compliance with filing protocols, such as vague grounds or untimely submission without condonation, results in dismissal at the threshold, underscoring the strict procedural rigor to prevent abuse of the process.

Hearing and Decision-Making Process

The review petition, once filed and registered under Article 137 of the read with Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, is assigned to the same bench that delivered the original , insofar as practicable, to ensure continuity in . If the original judges are unavailable due to retirement, transfer, or other reasons, the may constitute a fresh bench, but the process prioritizes institutional familiarity with the case record. This assignment occurs automatically upon registration, without requiring a separate miscellaneous application for listing. Hearings for review petitions are predominantly conducted in chambers through circulation of the petition and supporting documents to the assigned judges, obviating the need for oral arguments in the vast majority of cases. This closed-door procedure, akin to an internal scrutiny, aims to filter frivolous claims efficiently while conserving judicial resources; open-court hearings are exceptional and granted only if the bench identifies a error warranting elaboration or if substantial injustice is evident from the papers. Parties are not routinely notified of chamber deliberations, and decisions are pronounced via orders uploaded on the Supreme Court's website, often without detailed reasoning unless the petition advances to oral hearing. The decision-making hinges on a narrow assessment under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (as adapted by Rules), permitting review solely for discovery of new and important unavailable earlier despite , apparent errors on the face of the record, or analogous grounds evincing . Unlike appeals, it does not permit reappreciation of or relitigation of merits; the bench must affirmatively discern a patent mistake or oversight, such as misapplication of law or overlooked binding precedent, without deference to alternative interpretations. Decisions are rendered by majority vote among the bench members, with dissenting opinions occasionally recorded if the matter proceeds to open court. If dismissed, the original judgment stands unaltered, precluding further on the same grounds; allowance, though rare (with dismissal rates exceeding 95% in reported cases), results in , modification, or of the impugned portions, potentially leading to fresh on delimited issues. In criminal matters, may extend to rectifying errors causing grave injustice, but procedural safeguards ensure finality, as affirmed in precedents emphasizing review's extraordinary nature.

Distinctions from Other Remedies

Review vs. Appeals and Revisions

In the context of Indian judicial remedies, a under Article 137 of the enables the to reconsider its own judgments or orders solely on grounds of errors apparent on the face of the record, discovery of new and important evidence unavailable earlier despite , or any other sufficient reason analogous to these. This intra-court mechanism, governed by Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, does not permit a reappraisal of the case's merits or a fresh hearing on disputed facts, emphasizing correction of mistakes rather than substantive reevaluation. Appeals, by contrast, constitute a statutory right to challenge the correctness of a decision on both facts and law before a higher or appellate forum, allowing for a de novo examination of evidence and arguments. In the Supreme Court, appellate jurisdiction arises under Articles 132 to 136, such as appeals from High Court judgments involving substantial questions of law (Article 132) or civil matters exceeding specified values (Article 133), often requiring a certificate of fitness or special leave under Article 136. Unlike reviews, appeals involve inter-court transfer and comprehensive scrutiny, potentially altering the outcome based on perceived errors in reasoning or application, as seen in provisions like Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for first appeals from decrees. Revisions under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, , differ as a supervisory power vested in High Courts to intervene in subordinate proceedings where there is jurisdictional excess, failure to exercise , or material irregularity in procedure, without probing the merits or reweighing . This inter- remedy, discretionary and aimed at ensuring procedural fairness rather than substantive , cannot be invoked against appellate orders or where an lies, and it excludes revisional over the Supreme 's decisions. In essence, reviews correct self-evident flaws within the originating , appeals enable merits-based challenges across courts, and revisions maintain hierarchical oversight on jurisdictional propriety. The following table summarizes key distinctions:
AspectReview PetitionAppealRevision
Governing ProvisionArticle 137, Constitution; Order XLVII, Supreme Court RulesArticles 132-136, Constitution; Sections 96-100, CPCSection 115, CPC
Court InvolvedSame court (intra-court)Higher or (inter-court)Higher court over subordinate (inter-court)
Scope and GroundsErrors apparent on record; new ; analogous reasonsMerits, facts, law, and Jurisdictional errors; material irregularity; procedural lapses
NatureLimited, discretionary; no merits re-hearingComprehensive, statutory right; full re-examinationSupervisory, discretionary; no merits interference
PurposeRectify patent mistakesChallenge decision's validityEnsure jurisdictional and procedural correctness

Review vs. Curative Petitions

In the , review petitions and curative petitions represent sequential yet distinct remedies for challenging final judgments, with reviews serving as the primary statutory mechanism and curatives as an exceptional judicial innovation to avert irremediable injustice. Review petitions, enabled under Article 137 of the Constitution read with Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, permit the court to re-examine its own decisions upon a demonstration of an error apparent on the face of the record, discovery of new and important evidence unavailable earlier despite , or any other sufficient reason akin to those under Section 114 of the Code. These grounds are narrowly construed to prevent routine relitigation, emphasizing manifest errors rather than mere disagreement with the reasoning or reappreciation of evidence. Curative petitions, by contrast, emerged from the Supreme Court's equitable jurisdiction in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra (2002) 4 SCC 388, where a seven-judge bench recognized the need for a "final safeguard" against miscarriages of justice after review dismissal, drawing on principles of to uphold the without undermining finality. Invocable only post-review rejection, they address limited grounds including actual bias by a , denial of opportunity to be heard, or apprehension of creating a gross , but exclude rehashing merits or new absent exceptional circumstances. Unlike reviews, curatives impose rigorous pre-admission scrutiny by the three senior-most judges (plus the original bench where feasible), with oral hearings granted sparingly and admission rates historically below 1% to curb abuse. The distinctions underscore a prioritizing judicial finality: reviews correct patent flaws via statutory process, while curatives target systemic fairness lapses, reflecting the Court's self-imposed restraint against endless litigation. Procedurally, reviews must be filed within 30 days of judgment, supported by an verifying grounds, and may involve circulation to the original bench for disposal in chambers or open court if merit exists. Curatives lack a statutory timeline but require prompt filing post-review, with mandatory certification by two senior advocates attesting non-frivolity, and decisions rendered without expanding the original record unless violations are evident.
AspectReview PetitionCurative Petition
Legal BasisConstitutional (Article 137) and statutory (Order XLVII, CPC).Judicially evolved (Rupa Ashok Hurra, 2002); no direct constitutional provision.
PreconditionFiled directly against the judgment.Only after dismissal of review petition.
Primary GroundsError apparent on record; new evidence; sufficient reason (e.g., factual oversight).Violation of (e.g., no hearing, judicial bias); gross miscarriage preventing fair trial.
Evidentiary ScopeLimited to record; no fresh arguments on merits.Confined to claims; no re-examination of evidence or law.
Admission ThresholdLower; circulated to bench, potential open hearing.Highest; screened by senior judges, admitted only for "exceptional" cases.
Finality ImpactMaintains balance between correction and closure.Last resort; rejection bars further challenge, emphasizing abuse prevention.
This framework, as affirmed in subsequent rulings like Zakaria Lakra v. Union of India (2005) 3 SCC 161, ensures curatives do not supplant reviews but supplement them, with empirical data indicating curatives filed outnumbering admitted ones by over 100:1 in recent years, highlighting their role as a deterrent to procedural overreach rather than a routine appellate tool.

Notable Cases

2G Spectrum Allocation Case

The spectrum allocation case arose from allegations of in the allocation of unified access service licenses and by the in 2008, during A. Raja's tenure as Minister. Petitions filed by the Centre for Public Interest Litigation and others contended that the first-come-first-served policy was manipulated to favor specific companies, leading to a loss of approximately ₹1.76 lakh crore to the public exchequer, as estimated by the Comptroller and Auditor General. On February 2, 2012, the , in Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, quashed 122 licenses issued post-2007, deeming the process arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, and mandated auctions as the preferred method for reallocating natural resources like to ensure transparency and equity. Following the judgment, multiple review petitions were filed under Article 137 of the Constitution, invoking the Supreme Court's inherent power to review its decisions for errors apparent on the record. The Union government, telecom operators such as Uninor and , and former Minister sought review, arguing that the blanket cancellation unfairly penalized licensees who had invested billions without direct involvement in the irregularities, that the court's presumption of notional loss lacked empirical basis, and that mandating auctions ignored practical constraints like and market conditions. They further contended that the judgment's strictures against Prime Minister's Office officials for failing to prevent the allocations warranted reconsideration, as no deliberate complicity was proven. On April 4, 2012, a bench comprising Justices G.S. Singhvi and A.K. Ganguly dismissed the review petitions of seven telecom companies and , finding no error apparent on the record and upholding the original rationale that the allocations were vitiated by from inception. The , however, admitted the government's for open- hearing, particularly regarding the quashing order and directive, acknowledging potential merits in claims of disproportionate impact on third-party licensees. Despite this, on May 10, 2012, the government withdrew its review application, citing strategic reassessment amid ongoing auctions and to avoid further litigation delays, as permitted by the . The episode underscored the stringent thresholds for petitions in high-stakes public resource cases, where the court prioritized systemic integrity over individual equities absent clear jurisdictional errors. Subsequent developments, including a 2012 Presidential Reference answered negatively on auctions as the sole allocation method, did not revive the reviews but influenced policy toward hybrid approaches. In , the Centre's attempt to seek clarification on non-auction allotments was rejected by the registry as a disguised review, reinforcing procedural barriers against revisiting settled precedents. The outcome affirmed that does not extend to policy reevaluation or evidentiary reappraisal, preserving finality in judgments exposing governmental malfeasance.

NEET Examination Case

The , held on May 5, 2024, by the (NTA) for over 23 lakh aspiring medical students, drew widespread scrutiny following allegations of paper leaks, impersonation, and procedural lapses, primarily in , , and . Multiple writ petitions were filed in the seeking cancellation of the exam and a re-test, citing compromised that allegedly benefited a small number of candidates through pre-exam access to question papers. On July 23, 2024, a Bench led by D.Y. Chandrachud ruled against ordering a re-examination, determining that available evidence indicated localized malpractices rather than a systemic breach affecting the entire exam's sanctity, and directed the NTA to withdraw awarded to 1,563 candidates for time loss while upholding results otherwise. In response, review petitions were filed under Article 137 of the and Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, arguing errors apparent on the record, including overlooked evidence of broader irregularities and the NTA's flawed processes. A prominent petition by Kajal Kumari challenged the August 2, 2024, order (stemming from the July verdict) for allegedly failing to address anomalies in result compilation and candidate scoring patterns indicative of malpractice. The admitted the review for hearing in 2024 but, on November 6, 2024, a bench comprising Justices and S.V.N. dismissed it, holding that no sufficient material existed on record to demonstrate warranting re-examination or to identify any patent error in the original findings. This case underscores the stringent threshold for review petitions in examination disputes, where courts prioritize evidence of widespread impact over isolated incidents, even amid public outcry and an ongoing CBI investigation into leaks affecting around 150-200 candidates. The decision reinforced the original ruling's reliance on showing no unusual score inflation across the board, while directing reforms via a high-level to overhaul NTA processes for future exams. Critics, including affected students, contended that the review's dismissal overlooked potential underreported breaches, but the court emphasized that re-conducting the exam would unfairly penalize millions unaffected by the issues.

Vodafone-Hutchison Tax Dispute

The -Hutchison tax dispute arose from International Holdings BV's 2007 acquisition of a controlling stake in Hutchison Essar Limited, an Indian telecom operator, through an offshore transaction valued at approximately $11 billion. Indian tax authorities sought to impose liability on , arguing the transaction triggered withholding obligations under the Income Tax Act, 1961, despite occurring between non-resident entities outside . After initial demands and appeals, the matter reached the in Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India. On January 20, 2012, a Constitution Bench led by unanimously ruled in 's favor, holding that the transaction involved the sale of shares in a foreign (CGP Investments, based in ) rather than direct Indian assets, thus falling outside Indian tax jurisdiction for capital gains. The Court emphasized principles of commercial interpretation over "" in , rejecting the revenue's look-through approach and directing the refund of approximately 2,500 rupees deposited by Vodafone as security. This decision clarified limits on extraterritorial taxation, influencing subsequent rulings on indirect transfers. The Union of India filed a review petition on February 17, 2012, challenging alleged errors in the judgment, including the interpretation of Sections 195 and 9 of the Act and the Court's view on treaty benefits under the India-Netherlands Avoidance Agreement. The petition sought reconsideration of the ruling's implications for taxing offshore capital gains with substantial Indian value. On March 20, 2012, the same Bench— Kapadia and K.S. Radhakrishnan—dismissed the review in chambers without oral hearing, finding no apparent error on the record warranting re-examination under Article 137 of the and Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Rules. The swift dismissal underscored the stringent threshold for petitions, requiring errors "apparent on the face of the record" rather than mere disagreement with reasoning. Critics, including revenue officials, viewed it as reinforcing Vodafone's position but noted the government's subsequent legislative response via the , 2012, which introduced retrospective clarificatory amendments to indirect transfers, overriding the judgment prospectively from 1962. This led to renewed litigation, including Vodafone's constitutional challenge and under the India-Netherlands BIT, where a 2020 awarded Vodafone over $4 billion in damages for fair and equitable treatment violations stemming from the retroactive . The dismissal thus highlighted 's limited role in overturning settled precedents absent patent flaws.

Mayawati Disproportionate Assets Case

In 2003, the (CBI) registered FIR No. RC 0062003A0019 against , then Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, under the , alleging possession of disproportionate assets worth approximately ₹50 crore acquired between 2002 and 2007, far exceeding her declared income which rose from ₹1 crore in 2003 to ₹50 crore by 2007. challenged the FIR in the , arguing it was filed mala fide in violation of earlier court directives from the , which had permitted probes into specific corruption allegations but not a standalone disproportionate assets inquiry without fresh sanction. On July 6, 2012, a two-judge bench of the quashed the , holding that the CBI had misinterpreted prior orders and acted beyond the sanctioned scope of investigation, thereby criticizing the agency's overreach and upholding Mayawati's contention of procedural irregularity. In response, Kamlesh Verma, an intervener in the original proceedings and resident, filed a review petition on August 4, 2012, under Article 137 of the Constitution, contending that the quashing overlooked evidence of disproportionate wealth, including family assets, and failed to address the CBI's compliance with court-monitored probes; Verma argued for reconsideration to prevent , as the decision effectively shielded alleged without trial. The CBI, after consulting its Directorate of Prosecution, opted not to file its own review, citing insufficient grounds for revisiting the judgment. The admitted Verma's review petition in October 2012, issuing notices to and directing the CBI to explore refiling the case with proper sanction if warranted, while reserving judgment after hearings in May 2013. On August 7, 2013, in Kamlesh Verma v. & Others, the Court dismissed the petition, reaffirming that review under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of is limited to errors apparent on the record, not reappreciation of evidence or fresh arguments; it emphasized strict criteria, rejecting Verma's claims as attempts to relitigate merits rather than identify reviewable defects, and reiterated criticism of the CBI for investigative lapses. This outcome upheld the original quashing, barring reopening without new procedural compliance, and highlighted judicial reluctance to expand review petitions into de facto appeals in probes.

Recent Applications (2023-2025)

In January 2025, the Supreme Court dismissed review petitions challenging its October 2023 judgment in Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty v. Union of India, which declined to recognize same-sex marriages under existing law, deeming the issue a legislative domain. The petitions, heard by a five-judge bench comprising Justices B.R. Gavai, Surya Kant, B.V. Nagarathna, P.S. Narasimha, and Dipankar Datta, were rejected in chambers on January 9, 2025, on grounds of no apparent error on the record. Petitioners had contended that the court overlooked protections against discrimination for queer couples, but the bench found no basis for reconsideration under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On August 20, 2025, the dismissed the West Bengal government's review petitions against its April 2024 ruling that annulled 25,753 school teacher and staff appointments due to recruitment irregularities in the Service Commission process. The original decision, delivered by a bench led by Justice , identified systemic flaws including cash-for-jobs allegations and OBC quota manipulations, ordering fresh recruitment. The review applications, filed under Article 137 of the , sought to revisit findings on procedural lapses but were rejected for lacking demonstrable errors apparent on the face of the record. In June 2025, advocates Chandra Sen Yadav and Faguni Mittal filed a review petition against the Supreme Court's May 20, 2025, judgment in All India Judges Association v. Union of India, which mandated a minimum three-year advocacy practice for eligibility in lower judicial services. The petitioners argued apparent errors, including disregard of the Shetty Commission's recommendation to eliminate practice requirements, absence of empirical data on fresh law graduates' judicial performance, and disproportionate impact on marginalized candidates by excluding non-litigation experience, violating Articles 14 and 19(1)(g). They also requested deferral of implementation until 2027 to mitigate hardship for recent graduates; as of October 2025, the petition remains pending before the original bench. These applications illustrate the constrained scope of review jurisdiction, with dismissals reinforcing the high threshold for evident errors, while the pending judicial eligibility review highlights ongoing debates on entry barriers amid calls for empirical justification.

Criticisms and Abuses

Instances of Misuse and Delay Tactics

The review jurisdiction under Article 137 of the has been exploited in instances where petitioners file applications lacking grounds of patent error, instead aiming to re-agitate settled issues or buy time against enforcement of adverse rulings. Such tactics undermine the doctrine of finality in judgments, as hearings—even if summarily dismissed—consume judicial resources and postpone execution, sometimes for months. The has repeatedly condemned this practice, observing that reviews cannot substitute appeals or serve as mechanisms for dissatisfaction with outcomes. A prominent judicial response to curb misuse came in Kamlesh Verma v. (2013), where the Court outlined strict parameters: reviews are permissible only for errors apparent on the record, new evidence discovery, or analogous sufficient cause, but not for re-appreciation of evidence, fresh arguments, or correction of perceived erroneous views. This framework addressed recurring attempts to transform reviews into appeals, as evidenced by the petitioner's failed bid to revisit a quashed against a political figure on merits grounds. The ruling implicitly acknowledged prior abuses that eroded efficiency, mandating dismissal in limine for non-compliant petitions to deter dilatory filings. In criminal contexts, particularly death penalty executions, review petitions have facilitated delay by triggering sequential remedies like curatives and mercy pleas. Convicts' counsel often raise extraneous or repetitive grounds post-conviction confirmation, exploiting the 30-day filing window to halt warrants; dismissals follow, but only after procedural scrutiny, extending timelines. The has linked such serial invocations to broader pendency issues, noting in 2017 that frivolous or baseless petitions—encompassing improper reviews—constitute a "menace to " warranting exemplary costs to discourage tactical prolongation. While exact quantification varies, execution petitions' backlog, exceeding 8.82 lakh across courts as of 2025, partly stems from ancillary review-driven stays. Commercial and tax disputes provide further examples, where losing parties file reviews post-SLP dismissal to stall recoveries or compliance. In a 2025 clarification on review scope under the Code of , the stressed that such petitions cannot indefinitely extend litigation, directly targeting patterns where litigants invoke reviews absent qualifying errors, thereby impeding economic finality. Imposition of costs, though more documented in SLPs or PILs (e.g., Rs 1 fines for habitual misuse), extends to reviews when deemed vexatious, reinforcing deterrence against viewing the mechanism as a default postponement tool.

Empirical Impact on Judicial Efficiency

Review petitions impose a measurable burden on the of India's resources, with indicating thousands filed annually despite an exceptionally low rate of allowance. Between 2011 and 2020, the Court dismissed 19,710 civil review petitions and 6,087 criminal review petitions, underscoring the scale of such filings and the rarity of substantive reconsideration. This volume requires dedicated procedural handling, including scrutiny by the original bench under Article 137 of the and Supreme Court Rules, 2013, often entailing chamber hearings before dismissal. Empirical assessments reveal a success rate for review petitions below 0.1%, meaning the overwhelming majority fail to identify or rectify any error apparent on the record, yet each demands time allocation that could otherwise address the Court's broader caseload. In context, review petitions form part of the institution's total pendency, which exceeded 88,000 cases by September 2025, amid annual filings outpacing disposals in certain periods despite an average monthly disposal of approximately 4,800 matters. The cumulative effect manifests in delayed finality for judgments, as petitioners frequently invoke reviews to stall execution, amplifying inefficiency in high-stakes disputes. Quantitative analyses of the Court's highlight that such post-judgment mechanisms, while narrowly scoped, exacerbate congestion when filed routinely without merit, diverting benches from admission and regular hearings where over % of pending cases languish at preliminary stages as of February 2025. This pattern aligns with broader critiques of docket overload, where even marginal resource drains from low-yield procedures hinder systemic throughput, as evidenced by clearance rates occasionally dipping below 100% pre-2022.

Judicial Responses and Potential Reforms

Guidelines to Curb Abuse

The has implemented procedural safeguards under Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, to restrict review petitions to genuine cases of error apparent on the face of the record, thereby preventing their use as a substitute for or mechanisms for re-litigation. These rules explicitly prohibit the re-appreciation of evidence or introduction of new arguments, ensuring reviews address only patent mistakes rather than substantive disagreements with the judgment. In K. Rajamouli v. A.V.K.N. Swamy (), the Court emphasized that reviews cannot serve as a "disguised ," a principle reiterated in a September 10, 2025, ruling where it held that proceedings must adhere strictly to Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, dismissing petitions that attempt to reopen settled issues. To deter frivolous filings that contribute to delays, review petitions must be filed within a strict 30-day period from the date of the impugned , with no extensions permitted except in exceptional circumstances justified by sufficient cause. Petitions are required to be heard by the same bench that delivered the original decision, minimizing inconsistencies and discouraging tactical reapplications to different judges. The Court may impose exemplary costs on parties found to have filed vexatious or mala fide reviews, as affirmed in procedural guidelines that aim to preserve judicial efficiency and penalize . Judicial precedents further reinforce these curbs; in Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy (2010), the declared that filing a review after the dismissal of a special leave petition constitutes an abuse warranting rejection, underscoring that successive remedies cannot indefinitely stall execution of decrees. Similarly, the introduction of curative petitions in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra (2002) serves as a residual safeguard post-review dismissal, limited to gross miscarriages of and requiring certification by senior advocates to filter out meritless claims, though it does not expand review grounds. These measures collectively aim to uphold finality in judgments while allowing correction of egregious errors, with empirical data from Court filings indicating that over 90% of reviews are dismissed in limine due to non-compliance with these thresholds.

Debates on Narrowing Scope

The has repeatedly affirmed that the jurisdiction under Article 137 of the to review its judgments is inherently narrow, confined to grounds such as errors apparent on the face of the record, discovery of new and important unavailable earlier despite , or any other sufficient reason analogous to those specified in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This limitation stems from the principle that review is not an appeal or a rehearing on merits, but an exceptional remedy to correct patent mistakes that undermine judicial finality. In recent rulings, such as the September 2025 decision emphasizing that review proceedings must not masquerade as disguised appeals, the Court has underscored the need for rigorous adherence to these bounds to avoid re-litigation and preserve the sanctity of concluded matters. Debates on further narrowing this scope center on addressing empirical patterns of misuse, where petitioners invoke to ventilate fresh arguments or challenge findings of fact, thereby contributing to pendency and delays in the judicial system. Legal analysts and judicial observations highlight that lax enforcement has allowed review petitions to prolong litigation, with data from the Supreme Court's annual reports indicating thousands filed annually, many dismissed summarily for lacking merit. Proponents of constriction, including voices in bar council discussions and select precedents, argue for amendments to Article 137 or Rules to mandate stricter pre-admission filters, such as mandatory certification by a senior advocate attesting to an apparent error, or confining reviews to clerical or jurisdictional defects only, excluding interpretive disagreements. This view posits that the introduction of curative petitions in 2002—limited to egregious miscarriages post-review—already signals a tilt toward finality, and broadening review risks eroding in swift justice delivery. Opposing perspectives, though less dominant in recent discourse, contend that aggressive narrowing could entrench irreversible errors in high-stakes cases involving , potentially violating access to under Article 39A. Critics, drawing from constitutional interpretations during the 1949 debates on Draft Article 112A, warn that overly rigid limits might compel excessive reliance on curative petitions, which themselves face scrutiny for inconsistent application and add procedural layers. However, empirical reviews of dismissal rates—often exceeding 90% for review petitions—suggest enforcement of the existing narrow framework, rather than statutory overhaul, suffices, as reiterated in 2025 judgments cautioning against appellate overreach to uphold without legislative intervention. These debates underscore a tension between corrective equity and systemic finality, with the favoring doctrinal reinforcement over expansion.

References

  1. https://www.sriramsias.com/upsc-daily-current-affairs/review-and-curative-petitions/
  2. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2169967
  3. https://www.scobserver.in/journal/review-petitions-in-the-supreme-court/
  4. https://www.lawsikho.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-review-petition-before-the-sc/
  5. https://www.scobserver.in/journal/number-of-reported-supreme-court-review-petitions/
  6. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/249731/
  7. https://www.constitutionofindia.net/articles/article-137-review-of-judgments-or-orders-by-the-supreme-court/
  8. https://www.scobserver.in/reports/beghar-foundation-justice-puttaswamy-aadhaar-review-review-petition-summary/
  9. https://www.drishtijudiciary.com/to-the-point/ttp-code-of-civil-procedure/review
  10. https://lawchakra.in/supreme-court/order-47-rule-1-cpc-review-jurisdiction/
  11. https://sarallegalsolutions.com/review-jurisdiction/
  12. https://www.aegislegalllp.com/supreme-court-practice/review-petition.html
  13. https://www.ijllr.com/post/reference-review-and-revision-under-the-civil-procedure-code
  14. https://advocatetanmoy.com/explain-courts-power-u-s-114-read-with-order-47-rule-1-cpc/
  15. https://www.centurylawfirm.in/blog/section-114-review-of-the-code-of-civil-procedure-1908-section-of-the-day/
  16. https://lawbhoomi.com/review-under-cpc/
  17. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1536859/
  18. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1277731/
  19. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/45279932/
  20. https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=limitation%2520for%2520filing%2520review
  21. https://efiling.sci.gov.in/e-resources/FAQs
  22. https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-12658-guidelines-for-filing-review-petition-in-supreme-court-of-india-.html
  23. https://www.barandbench.com/view-point/how-final-are-decisions-of-the-supreme-court
  24. https://legal.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/litigation/sc-to-consider-on-thursday-review-pleas-filed-against-same-sex-marriage-ruling/117064902
  25. https://legallightconsulting.com/review-petition-civil-criminal-in-supreme-court-of-india/
  26. https://lawfoyer.in/review-section-114-and-order-xlvii-cpc/
  27. https://legallypresent.in/supreme-court-clarifies-scope-of-review/
  28. https://www.scobserver.in/supreme-court-observer-law-reports-scolr/malleeshwari-vs-suguna-and-anr-review-jurisdiction-to-be-strictly-delineated-scolr-judgement/
  29. https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2022/36401/36401_2022_5_1501_50787_Judgement_26-Feb-2024.pdf
  30. https://www.ilms.academy/blog/understanding-the-difference-between-appeal-review-and-revision-in-indian-law
  31. https://compass.rauias.com/polity/jurisdiction-of-supreme-court/
  32. https://lawbhoomi.com/difference-between-review-and-revision/
  33. https://lawgratis.com/blog-detail/difference-between-review-and-revision
  34. https://byjus.com/free-ias-prep/review-petition-curative-petition-mercy-petition/
  35. https://www.clearias.com/review-petition-vs-curative-petition-vs-mercy-petition/
  36. https://www.scobserver.in/journal/court-in-review-curative-petitions/
  37. https://www.studyiq.com/articles/curative-and-review-petitions/
  38. https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2021/Aug/02/more-curative-petitions-in-sc-than-reviews-2338853.html
  39. https://unacademy.com/content/upsc/study-material/general-awareness/review-petition-vs-curative-petition-vs-mercy-petition/
  40. https://prospectlegal.co.in/curative-petition-supreme-court-india-act-now/
  41. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/70191862/
  42. https://m.economictimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/2g-spectrum-scam-supreme-court-dismisses-all-but-one-review-petition/articleshow/12535768.cms
  43. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/2g-case-supreme-court-dismisses-review-petitions-filed-by-govt-telecom-companies-474986
  44. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/no-reviewing-2g-verdicts-rules-court/article3281130.ece
  45. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/north/story/sc-dismisses-former-telecom-minister-a-rajas-review-petition-98096-2012-04-03
  46. https://indianexpress.com/article/political-pulse/2g-case-sc-dismisses-all-but-one-review-petition/
  47. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/sc-allows-government-to-withdraw-its-review-plea-on-2g-verdict/articleshow/13080018.cms
  48. https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/supreme-court-registry-rejects-centres-application-to-clarify-2g-case-verdict-administrative-allotment-spectrum-256687
  49. https://theprint.in/judiciary/sc-registry-declines-to-list-centres-plea-on-2g-verdict-seeking-review-in-guise-of-clarification/2065474/
  50. https://www.livemint.com/liveblog/neetug-2024-verdict-live-updates-supreme-court-bench-led-by-cji-to-resume-hearing-at-10-30-am-what-to-expect-11721613694043.html
  51. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/education/news/supreme-court-verdict-on-neet-ug-paper-leak-localised-breach-govt-committee-to-issue-exam-sops-and-other-key-takeaways-here/articleshow/112214662.cms
  52. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/education/news/review-petition-filed-in-supreme-court-challenging-neet-ug-verdict-a-look-back-at-the-august-2-decision-and-recent-developments/articleshow/113011830.cms
  53. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/supreme-court-dismisses-review-petition-on-neet-ug-2024-re-examination-6959196
  54. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/sc-dismisses-plea-review-verdict-refusing-direct-re-exam-neet-ug-9657057/
  55. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/sc-upholds-decision-declines-re-exam-of-neet-ug-2024/articleshow/115022824.cms
  56. https://www.reuters.com/article/business/media-telecom/indias-top-court-rejects-bid-to-review-vodafone-tax-case-idUSL3E8EK2DN/
  57. https://www.moneylife.in/article/sc-dismisses-govts-review-petition-on-vodafone-verdict/24393.html
  58. https://m.economictimes.com/industry/telecom/vodafone-tax-case-supreme-court-dismisses-govts-review-plea/articleshow/12342305.cms
  59. https://www.milbank.com/a/web/7554/Milbank_Vodafone%2520Tax%2520Client%2520Alert_Feb_23.pdf
  60. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/mayawati-corruption-case-review-petition-filed-in-supreme-court-495441
  61. https://m.economictimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/more-troubles-for-mayawati-cvc-asks-cbi-why-review-petition-was-not-filed-in-da-case/articleshow/30299662.cms
  62. https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2012/Aug/04/mayawati-assets-case-review-petition-filed-in-sc-393845.html
  63. http://rajdeepandjoyeeta.com/mayawati-vs-union-of-india-ors/
  64. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/Supreme-Court-to-hear-review-petition-in-Mayawati-assets-case/article12544947.ece
  65. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/north/story/mayawati-disproportionate-assets-supreme-court-verdict-review-petition-173177-2013-08-07
  66. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Relief-for-Mayawati-SC-rejects-plea-to-reopen-CBI-probe-in-disproportionate-assets-case/articleshow/21700539.cms
  67. https://m.economictimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/cbi-decides-not-to-file-review-petition-in-mayawati-disproportionate-assets-case/articleshow/15310301.cms
  68. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/cbi-free-to-probe-mayawati-assets-case-supreme-court/article4673801.ece
  69. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/disproportionate-assets-case-cbi-free-to-probe-mayawati-sc-says/articleshow/16738536.cms
  70. https://www.casemine.com/commentary/in/reaffirmation-of-strict-review-criteria-in-kamlesh-verma-v.-mayawati-and-others/view
  71. https://www.scobserver.in/journal/monthly-review-january-2025/
  72. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/west-bengal/supreme-court-dismisses-west-bengals-review-plea-against-cancellation-of-nearly-24000-school-appointments/article69954660.ece
  73. https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/review-petition-filed-against-supreme-courts-mandate-for-3-year-practice-to-enter-judicial-service-294999
  74. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/review-petition-cant-be-allowed-as-appeal-in-disguise-rules-supreme-court/articleshow/123798289.cms
  75. https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56e6687b607dba6b53433113
  76. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/frivolous-petitions-a-menace-to-administration-of-justice-must-be-punished-with-exemplary-cost-supreme-court/articleshow/57520337.cms
  77. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/sc-terms-pendency-of-over-882-lakh-execution-petitions-alarming/article70182590.ece
  78. https://lawchakra.in/supreme-court/sc-fine-on-litigant-for-misusing-judicial-process/
  79. https://sansad.in/getFile/loksabhaquestions/annex/175/AU315.pdf?source=pqals
  80. https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-6606-are-review-petitions-curative-petitions-before-the-supreme-court-illusory-namesake-a-mere-formality-.html
  81. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/peaking-over-88000-cases-pendency-continues-to-plague-supreme-court/article70048821.ece
  82. https://www.scobserver.in/journal/supreme-court-review-2024-a-steady-recovery-in-pendency-after-the-pandemic-years/
  83. https://www.scobserver.in/journal/more-than-65-percent-pending-supreme-court-cases-stuck-at-admission-stage/
  84. https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s3ec0490f1f4972d133619a60c30f3559e/uploads/2025/05/2025051431.pdf
  85. https://lawsikho.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-review-petition-before-the-sc/
  86. https://www.casemine.com/commentary/in/limits-on-review-petitions-and-prevention-of-abuse-of-judicial-process:-the-meghmala-v.-reddy-judgment/view
  87. https://www.taxtmi.com/article/detailed?id=2078
  88. https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2025/09/09/supreme-court-restates-principles-for-review-jurisdiction-grounds/
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.