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Auction
from Wikipedia
An American auctioneer using auction chant at a livestock auction, November 2010

An auction is usually a process of buying and selling goods or services by offering them up for bids, taking bids, and then selling the item to the highest bidder or buying the item from the lowest bidder. Some exceptions to this definition exist and are described in the section about different types. The branch of economic theory dealing with auction types and participants' behavior in auctions is called auction theory.

The open ascending price auction is arguably the most common form of auction and has been used throughout history.[1] Participants bid openly against one another, with each subsequent bid being higher than the previous bid.[2] An auctioneer may announce prices, while bidders submit bids vocally or electronically.[2]

Auctions are applied for trade in diverse contexts. These contexts include antiques, paintings, rare collectibles, expensive wines, commodities, livestock, radio spectrum, used cars, real estate, online advertising, vacation packages, emission trading, and many more.

Etymology

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The word "auction" is derived from auctus, the past participle of the Latin verb augeō, ("I increase").[1]

History

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Classical antiquity

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The Babylonian Marriage Market, Edwin Long, 1875

Auctions have been recorded as early as 500 BC.[3] According to Herodotus, in Babylon, auctions of women for marriage were held annually. The auctions began with the woman the auctioneer considered to be the most beautiful and progressed to the least beautiful. It was considered illegal to allow a daughter to be sold outside of the auction method.[4] Attractive maidens were offered in a forward auction to determine the price to be paid by a swain, while unattractive maidens required a reverse auction to determine the price to be paid to a swain.[5]

Auctions took place in Ancient Greece, other Hellenistic societies, and also in Rome.[6] During the Roman Empire, after a military victory, Roman soldiers would often drive a spear into the ground around which the spoils of war were left, to be auctioned off. Slaves, often captured as the "spoils of war", were auctioned in the Forum under the sign of the spear, with the proceeds of sale going toward the war effort.[4]

The Romans also used auctions to liquidate the assets of debtors whose property had been confiscated.[7] For example, Marcus Aurelius sold household furniture to pay off debts, the sales lasting for months.[8] One of the most significant historical auctions was in 193 AD, when the entire Roman Empire was put on the auction block by the Praetorian Guard. On 28 March 193, the Praetorian Guard first killed emperor Pertinax, then offered the empire to the highest bidder. Didius Julianus won the auction at the price of 6,250 drachmas per guard,[clarification needed][9][10][11] an act that initiated a brief civil war. Didius was beheaded two months later when Septimius Severus conquered Rome.[7]

From the end of the Roman Empire to the 18th century, auctions lost favor in Europe,[7] while they had never been widespread in Asia.[4] In China, the personal belongings of deceased Buddhist monks were sold at auction as early as the seventh century AD.[5]

Modern revival

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A Peep at Christies (1796) – caricature of actress Elizabeth Farren and huntsman Lord Derby examining paintings at Christie's, by James Gillray
A late 19th Century auction at the Hôtel Drouot, Paris (painting by Albert Bettannier)

The first mention of "auction", according to the Oxford English Dictionary, appeared in 1595.[5] In some parts of England during the 17th and 18th centuries, auctions by candle began to be used for the sale of goods and leaseholds.[12] In a candle auction, the end of the auction was signaled by the expiration of a candle flame, which was intended to ensure that no one could know exactly when the auction would end and make a last-second bid. Sometimes, other unpredictable events, such as a footrace, were used instead of the expiration of a candle. This type of auction was first mentioned in 1641 in the records of the House of Lords.[13] The practice rapidly became popular, and in 1660 Samuel Pepys' diary recorded two occasions when the Admiralty sold surplus ships "by an inch of candle". Pepys also relates a hint from a highly successful bidder who had observed that, just before expiring, a candle-wick always flares up slightly: on seeing this, he would shout his final – and winning – bid.

The London Gazette began reporting on the auctioning of artwork in the coffeehouses and taverns of London in the late 17th century. The first known auction house in the world was the Stockholm Auction House, Sweden (Stockholms Auktionsverk), founded by Baron Claes Rålamb in 1674.[14][15] Sotheby's, currently the world's second-largest auction house,[14] was founded in London on 11 March 1744, when Samuel Baker presided over the disposal of "several hundred scarce and valuable" books from the library of an acquaintance. Christie's, now the world's largest auction house,[14] was founded by James Christie in 1766 in London[16] and published its first auction catalog that year, although newspaper advertisements of Christie's sales dating from 1759 have been found.[17]

Other early auction houses that are still in operation include Göteborgs Auktionsverk (1681), Dorotheum (1707), Uppsala auktionskammare (1731), Mallams (1788), Bonhams (1793), Phillips de Pury & Company (1796), Freeman's (1805) and Lyon & Turnbull (1826).[18]

By the end of the 18th century, auctions of art works were commonly held in taverns and coffeehouses. These auctions were held daily, and auction catalogs were printed to announce available items. In some cases, these catalogs were elaborate works of art themselves, containing considerable detail about the items being auctioned. At the time, Christie's established a reputation as a leading auction house, taking advantage of London's status as the major centre of the international art trade after the French Revolution. The Great Slave Auction took place in 1859 and is recorded as the second largest single sale of enslaved people in U.S. history — with 436 men, women and children being sold.[19] During the American Civil War, goods seized by armies were sold at auction by the Colonel of the division. Thus, some of today's auctioneers in the U.S. carry the unofficial title of "colonel".[8] Tobacco auctioneers in the southern United States in the late 19th century had a style that mixed traditions of 17th century England with chants of slaves from Africa.[20]

Rise of the internet

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The development of the internet has led to a significant rise in the use of auctions, as auctioneers can solicit bids via the internet from a wide range of buyers in a much larger variety of commodities than was previously practical.[21] In the 1990s, the multi-attribute auction was invented to negotiate extensive conditions of construction and electricity contracts via auction.[22][23] Also during this time, OnSale.com developed the Yankee auction as its trademark.[24] In the early 2000s, the Brazilian auction was invented as a new type of auction to trade gas through electronic auctions for Linde plc in Brazil.[25][26] With the emergence of the internet, online auctions have developed, with eBay being the most typical example. For example, if someone owns a rare item, they can display the item through an online auction platform. Interested parties may place bids, with the highest bidder winning the opportunity to purchase the item. Online auctions allow more people to participate and also make traditional auction theory more complex.[27]

Economic significance

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Artemis, Ancient Greek marble sculpture. In 2007, a Roman-era bronze sculpture of "Artemis and the Stag" was sold at Sotheby's in New York for US$28.6 million, by far exceeding its estimates and at the time setting the new record as the most expensive sculpture as well as work from antiquity ever sold at auction.[28][29]

By increasing visibility of an item and therefore demand, auctions can make an extremely rare item more likely to sell for a higher price.[30]

In 2008, the US National Auctioneers Association reported that the gross revenue of the auction industry for that year was approximately $268.4 billion, with the fastest growing sectors being agricultural, machinery, equipment, and residential real estate auctions.[31]

The auctions with the largest revenue for the government are often spectrum auctions (typical revenue is estimated in billions of euros) and quota auctions. In 2019, Russia's crab quota was auctioned for €2 billion.[32] Between 1999 and 2002, the British government auctioned off their gold reserves, raising approximately $3.5 billion.[33]

The most expensive item to ever be sold in an auction is Leonardo da Vinci's Salvator Mundi in 2017 ($450.3 million).[34]

In 2018, the yearly revenues of the two biggest auction houses were $5 billion (Christie's) and $4 billion (Sotheby's).[35]

Types

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Auctions come in a variety of types and categories, which are sometimes not mutually exclusive. Typification of auctions is considered to be a part of Auction theory.[36] The economists Paul Milgrom and Robert B. Wilson were awarded the 2020 Nobel Prize for the introduction of new auction types (or formats).[37] Auction types share features, which can be summarized into the following list.

Participants

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Forward auction Reverse auction Double auction
stand for sellers and for buyers

Auctions can differ in the number and type of participants. There are two types of participants: a buyer and a seller. A buyer pays to acquire a certain good or service, while a seller offers goods or services for money or barter exchange. There can be single or multiple buyers and single or multiple sellers in an auction. If just one seller and one buyer are participating, the process is not considered to be an auction.[38][39][40]

Single Seller Multiple Sellers
Single Buyer Trade Reverse auction
Multiple Buyers Forward auction Double auction

The forward auction is the most common type of auction — a seller offers item(s) for sale and expects the highest price. A reverse auction is a type of auction in which the roles of the buyer and the seller are reversed, with the primary objective to drive purchase prices downward.[41] While ordinary auctions provide suppliers the opportunity to find the best price among interested buyers, reverse auctions and buyer-determined auctions give buyers a chance to find the lowest-price supplier. During a reverse auction, suppliers may submit multiple offers, usually as a response to competing suppliers' offers, bidding down the price of a good or service to the lowest price they are willing to receive. A reverse price auction is not necessarily 'descending-price' — the reverse Dutch auction is an ascending-price auction because forward Dutch auctions are descending.[42] By revealing the competing bids in real-time to every participating supplier, reverse auctions promote "information transparency". This, coupled with the dynamic bidding process, improves the chances of reaching the fair market value of the item.[43]

A double auction is a combination of both forward and reverse auctions. A Walrasian auction or Walrasian tâtonnement is a double auction in which the auctioneer takes bids from both buyers and sellers in a market of multiple goods.[44] The auctioneer progressively either raises or drops the current proposed price depending on the bids of both buyers and sellers, the auction concluding when supply and demand exactly balance.[45] As a high price tends to dampen demand while a low price tends to increase demand, in theory there is a particular price somewhere in the middle where supply and demand will match.[44] A Barter double auction is an auction where every participant has a demand and an offer consisting of multiple attributes and no money is involved.[46] For the mathematical modelling of satisfaction level, Euclidean distance is used, where the offer and demand are treated as vectors.

Price development

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Auctions can be categorized into three types of procedures for auctions depending on the occurrence of a price development[40] during an auction run and its causes.

Driven by bidders only

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An auctioneer and assistants scan the crowd for bidders.
  • English auction, also known as an open ascending price auction. This type of auction is arguably the most common form of auction in use today.[1] Participants bid openly against one another, with each subsequent bid required to be higher than the previous bid.[2] An auctioneer may announce prices, bidders may call out their bids themselves (or have a proxy call out a bid on their behalf), or bids may be submitted electronically with the highest current bid publicly displayed.[2] In some cases a maximum bid might be left with the auctioneer, who may bid on behalf of the bidder according to the bidder's instructions.[2] The auction ends when no participant is willing to bid further, at which point the highest bidder pays their bid.[2] Alternatively, if the seller has set a minimum sale price in advance (the 'reserve' price) and the final bid does not reach that price the item will remain unsold.[2] Sometimes the auctioneer sets a minimum amount, sometimes known as a bidding increment, by which the next bid must exceed the current highest bid.[2] The most significant distinguishing factor of this auction type is that the current highest bid is always available to potential bidders,[2] although at that time there may be higher absentee bids held by the auctioneer which are not known to potential bidders. The English auction is commonly used for selling goods, most prominently antiques and artwork,[2] but also secondhand goods and real estate.
  • Auction by the candle. A type of auction, used in England for selling ships, in which the highest bid laid on the table wins after a burning candle goes out.
  • Scottish auction is an auction where all bidding should be completed within a certain time interval, which allows bidders an appropriate amount of time for consideration and avoids precipitate actions.[47]

Partially driven by time

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A 1957 Dutch auction in Germany to sell fruit
  • Dutch auction also known as an open descending price auction.[1] In the traditional Dutch auction the auctioneer begins with a high asking price for some quantity of like items; the price is lowered until a participant is willing to accept the auctioneer's price for some quantity of the goods in the lot or until the seller's reserve price is met.[2] If the first bidder does not purchase the entire lot, the auctioneer continues lowering the price until all of the items have been bid for or the reserve price is reached. Items are allocated based on bid order; the highest bidder selects their item(s) first followed by the second highest bidder, etc. In a modification, all of the winning participants pay only the last announced price for the items that they bid on.[1] The Dutch auction is named for its best known example, the Dutch tulip auctions. ("Dutch auction" is also sometimes used to describe online auctions where several identical goods are sold simultaneously to an equal number of high bidders).[48] In addition to cut flower sales in the Netherlands, Dutch auctions have also been used for perishable commodities such as fish and tobacco.[2] The Dutch auction is not widely used, except in market orders in stock or currency exchanges, which are functionally identical.[1]
  • Japanese auction is a variation of the Dutch auction with a low initial price that increases over time. As the price rises, participants must either signal intent to continue bidding or drop out of the auction, and no participant may enter or re-enter the auction once it has begun. Once only one participant remains in the auction, the auction ends and that participant wins the item at the current price. It has similarities to the ante in Poker.[49]

Single shot

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  • First-price sealed-bid auction,[50] or a sealed-bid first-price auction/blind auction, is a type of auction where all bidders simultaneously submit sealed bids so that no bidder knows the bid of any other participant. The highest bidder pays the price they submitted.[1][2] This type of auction is distinct from the English auction, in that bidders can only submit one bid each. Furthermore, as bidders cannot see the bids of other participants they cannot adjust their own bids accordingly.[2] From the theoretical perspective, this kind of bid process has been argued to be strategically equivalent to the Dutch auction.[51] However, empirical evidence from laboratory experiments has shown that Dutch auctions with high clock speeds yield lower prices than FPSB auctions.[52][53] What are effectively sealed first-price auctions are commonly called tendering for procurement by companies and organisations, particularly for government contracts and auctions for mining leases.[2]
  • Vickrey auction, also known as a sealed-bid second-price auction.[54] This is identical to the sealed first-price auction except that the winning bidder pays the second-highest bid rather than their own.[55] Vickrey auctions are extremely important in auction theory, and commonly used in automated contexts such as real-time bidding for online advertising, but rarely in non-automated contexts.[2]

Properties of auctioned goods

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The auction in Oulu, Finland, in September 1962. Auctioneer shows a table lamp with a final price of FIM 6,100.

Multiunit auctions sell more than one identical item at a time, rather than having separate auctions for each. This type can be further classified as either a uniform price auction or a discriminatory price auction. An example for them is spectrum auctions.

A combinatorial auction is any auction for the simultaneous sale of more than one item where bidders can place bids on an "all-or-nothing" basis on "packages" rather than just individual items. That is, a bidder can specify that they will pay for items A and B, but only if they get both.[56] In combinatorial auctions, determining the winning bidder(s) can be a complex process where even the bidder with the highest individual bid is not guaranteed to win.[56] For example, in an auction with four items (W, X, Y and Z), if Bidder A offers $50 for items W & Y, Bidder B offers $30 for items W & X, Bidder C offers $5 for items X & Z and Bidder D offers $30 for items Y & Z, the winners will be Bidders B & D while Bidder A misses out because the combined bids of Bidders B & D is higher ($60) than for Bidders A and C ($55). Deferred-acceptance auction is a special case of a combinatorial auction.[57]

Another special case of a combinatorial auction is the combinatorial clock auction (CCA), which combines a clock auction, during which bidders may provide their confirmations in response to the rising prices, with a subsequantial sealed bid auction, in which bidders submit sealed package bids. The auctioneer uses the final bids to compute the best value allocation and the Vickrey payments.[58][59]

Generalized first-price auctions and Generalized second-price auctions offer slots for multiple bidders instead of making a single deal. The bidders get the slots according to the ranking of their bids. The second-price ruling is derived from the Vickrey auction and means the final deal sealing for the number one bidder is based on the second bidder's price.

Reserve price

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A No-reserve auction (NR), also known as an absolute auction, is an auction in which the item for sale will be sold regardless of price.[60][61] From the seller's perspective, advertising an auction as having no reserve price can be desirable because it potentially attracts a greater number of bidders due to the possibility of a bargain.[60] If more bidders attend the auction, a higher price might ultimately be achieved because of heightened competition from bidders.[61] This contrasts with a reserve auction, where the item for sale may not be sold if the final bid is not high enough to satisfy the seller. In practice, an auction advertised as "absolute" or "no-reserve" may nonetheless still not sell to the highest bidder on the day, for example, if the seller withdraws the item from the auction or extends the auction period indefinitely,[62] although these practices may be restricted by law in some jurisdictions or under the terms of sale available from the auctioneer.

A reserve auction is an auction where the item for sale may not be sold if the final bid is not high enough to satisfy the seller; that is, the seller reserves the right to accept or reject the highest bid.[61] In these cases, a set 'reserve' price known to the auctioneer, but not necessarily to the bidders, may have been set, below which the item may not be sold.[60] If the seller announces to the bidders the reserve price, it is a public reserve price auction.[63] In contrast, if the seller does not announce the reserve price before the sale, it is a secret reserve price auction.[64] However, potential bidders may be able to deduce an approximate reserve price, if one exists at all, from any estimate given in advance by the auction house. The reserve price may be fixed or discretionary. In the latter case, the decision to accept a bid is deferred to the auctioneer, who may accept a bid that is marginally below it. A reserve auction is safer for the seller than a no-reserve auction as they are not required to accept a low bid, but this could result in a lower final price if less interest is generated in the sale.[61]

Price of bidding

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An all-pay auction is an auction in which all bidders must pay their bids regardless of whether they win. The highest bidder wins the item. All-pay auctions are primarily of academic interest, and may be used to model lobbying or bribery (bids are political contributions) or competitions such as a running race.[65] Bidding fee auction, a variation of all-pay auction, also known as a penny auction, often requires that each participant must pay a fixed price to place each bid, typically one penny (hence the name) higher than the current bid. When an auction's time period expires, the highest bidder wins the item and must pay a final bid price.[66] Unlike in a conventional auction, the final price is typically much lower than the value of the item, but all bidders (not just the winner) will have paid for each bid placed; the winner will buy the item at a very low price (plus price of rights-to-bid used), all the losers will have paid, and the seller will typically receive significantly more than the value of the item.[67] A senior auction is a variation on the all-pay auction, and has a defined loser in addition to the winner. The top two bidders must pay their full final bid amounts, and only the highest wins the auction. The intent is to make the high bidders bid above their upper limits. In the final rounds of bidding, when the current losing party has hit their maximum bid, they are encouraged to bid over their maximum (seen as a small loss) to avoid losing their maximum bid with no return (a very large loss). Another variation of all-pay auction, the top-up auction is primarily used for charity events. Losing bidders must pay the difference between their bid and the next lowest bid. The winning bidder pays the amount bid for the item, without top-up. In a Chinese auction, bidders make sealed bids in advance and their probability of winning grows with the relative size of their bids.[68]

Structure of a bid

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In usual auctions like the English one, bids are prices. In Dutch and Japanese auctions, the bids are confirmations. In a version of the Brazilian auction, bids are numbers of units being traded. Structure elements of a bid are called attributes. If a bid is one number like price, it is a single-attribute auction. If bids consists of multiple-attributes, it is a multi-attribute auction.[69][70]

A Yankee auction is a single-attribute multiunit auction running like a Dutch auction, where the bids are the portions of a total amount of identical units.[71][72][73] The amount of auctioned items is firm in a Yankee auction unlike a Brazilian auction. The portions of the total amount, bidders can bid, are limited to lower numbers than the total amount. Therefore, only a portion of the total amount will be traded for the best price and the rest to the suboptimal prices.

Visibility of bids

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In an English auction, all current bids are visible to all bidders and in a sealed-bid auction, bidders only get to know if their bid was the best. Best/not best auctions are sealed-bid auctions with multiple bids, where the bidders submit their prices like in English auction and get responses about the leadership of their bid.[74] Rank auction is an extension of best/not best auction, where the bidders also see the rank of their bids.[75] Traffic-light auction shows traffic lights to bidders as a response to their bids.[76] These traffic lights depend on the position of the last bid in the distribution of all bids.

Buyout option

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A buyout auction is an auction with an additional set price (the 'buyout' price) that any bidder can accept at any time during the auction, thereby immediately ending the auction and winning the item. This means that if an item offers its buyout price at the beginning, one participant can stop all other potential participants from bidding at all, or stop the bidding process before the bid price has reached the buyout price.[77] If no bidder chooses to utilize the buyout option before the end of bidding, the highest bidder wins and pays their bid.[77] Buyout options can be either temporary or permanent.[77] In a temporary-buyout auction the option to buy out the auction is not available after the first bid is placed.[77] In a permanent-buyout auction the buyout option remains available throughout the entire auction until the close of bidding.[77] The buyout price can either remain the same throughout the entire auction, or vary throughout according to rules or simply as decided by the seller.[77]

Winner selection

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The winner selection in most auctions selects the best bid. Unique bid auctions offer a special winner selection:[78] the winner is the bidder with the lowest unique bid. The Chinese auction selects a winner partially based on randomness.[68]

The final price for the selected winner is not always conducted according to their final bid. In the case of the second-price ruling as in a Vickrey auction, the final price for the winner is based on the second bidder's price. A Proxy bid is a special case of second-price ruling used by eBay, where a predefined increment is added to the second highest bid in response to a yet higher bid.

Auctions with more than one winner are called multi-winner auctions.[79] Multiunit auction, Combinatorial auction, Generalized first-price auction and Generalized second-price auction are multi-winner auctions.

Cascading

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Auctions can be cascaded, one after the other. For instance, an Amsterdam auction is a type of premium auction which begins as an English auction. Once only two bidders remain, each submits a sealed bid. The higher bidder wins, paying either the first or second price. Both finalists receive a premium: a proportion of the excess of the second price over the third price (at which English auction ended).[80] An Anglo-Dutch auction starts as an English or Japanese auction and then continues as a Dutch auction with a reduced number of bidders.[81][82] A French auction is a preliminary sealed-bid auction before the actual auction, whose reserve price it determines. A sequential auction is an auction where the bidders can participate in a sequence of auctions. A Calcutta auction is a subtype of sequential auction, where the ordering in the sequence is determined by random.[83] A simultaneous ascending auction is an opposite of a sequential auction, where the auctions are run in parallel.[84]

Other features

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The silent auction is a variant of the English auction in which bids are written on a sheet of paper. At the predetermined end of the auction, the highest listed bidder wins the item.[85] This auction is often used in charity events, with many items auctioned simultaneously and "closed" at a common finish time.[85][86] The auction is "silent" in that there is no auctioneer selling individual items;[85] the bidders write their bids on a bidding sheet often left on a table near the item.[87] At charity auctions, bid sheets usually have a fixed starting amount, predetermined bid increments, and a "guaranteed bid" amount which works the same as a "buy now" amount. Other variations of this type of auction may include sealed bids.[85] The highest bidder pays the price they submitted.[85]

In private value auctions, every bidder has their own valuation of the auctioned good.[88] A common value auction is opposite, where the valuation of the auctioned good is identical among the bidders.

Contexts

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The range of auctions' contexts is extremely wide and one can buy almost anything, from a house to an endowment policy and everything in between. Some of the recent developments have been the use of the Internet both as a means of disseminating information about various auctions and as a vehicle for hosting auctions themselves.

Human commodity auctions

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A slave auction

As already mentioned in the history section, auctions have been used to trade commodified people from the very first. Auctions have been used in slave markets throughout history until modern times in the post-Gaddafi era Libya.[89][90][91] The word for slave auction in the Atlantic slave trade was scramble. A child auction is a Swedish and Finnish historical practice of selling children into slavery-like conditions by authorities using a descending English auction.[92] Fattigauktion is a similar Swedish practice involving poor people being auctioned to church organizations.[93] Trade of wives by auctions was also a common practice throughout history. For instance, in the old English custom of wife selling, a wife was divorced by selling her in a public auction for the highest bid.[94] ISIS conducted slave auctions to sell up to 7,000 Yazidi women as reported in 2020.[95][96]

A virginity auction is the voluntary practice of individuals seeking to sell their own virginity to the highest bid.[97] Cricket players are routinely put up for auction, whereby cricket teams can bid for their services.[98][99] Indian Premier League (IPL) started annual public auctioning of cricket players in 2008 as an entertainment for mass consumption.[100] Also, Bangladesh Premier League conducts cricket player auctions, starting in 2012.[101]

Real estate auctions

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An estate agent conducting an auction of real estate in Melbourne, Victoria, Australia

In some countries, such as Australia, auctioning is a common method for the sale of real estate. Auctions were traditionally used as an alternative to the private sale/treaty method to sell property that, due to their unique characteristics, were difficult to determine a price for. The law does not require a vendor to disclose their reserve price prior to the auction. During the 1990s and 2000s, auctions became the primary method for the sale of real estate in the two largest cities, Melbourne and Sydney. This was largely due to the fact that in a private sale the vendor has disclosed the price that they want, and potential purchasers would attempt to low-ball the price, whereas in an auction purchasers do not know what the vendor wants, and thus need to keep lifting the price until the reserve price is reached.

The method has been the subject of increased controversy during the twenty-first century as house prices sky-rocketed. The rapidly rising housing market saw many homes, especially in Victoria and New South Wales, selling for significantly more than both the vendors' reserve price and the advertised price range. Subsequently, the auction systems' lack of transparency about the value of the property was brought into question, with estate agents and their vendor clients being accused of "under-quoting". Significant attention was given to the matter by the Australian media, with the government in Victoria eventually bowing to pressure and implementing changes to legislation in an effort to increase transparency.[102]

In the UK, historically, auction houses were perceived to sell properties which may have been repossessed — where a home owner fails to make regular mortgage payments — or were probate sales ( i.e.,a family home being sold by the heirs). However, more recently, selling at auction has become an alternative to a normal property sale, due to the speedy nature of the entire process.[103]

In China, land auctions are under the sole control of local government officials. Because some developers may use bribes to please government officials to obtain the right to purchase the land, the central government requires that future land auctions be conducted using a spectrum auction in order to prevent the spread of corruption. Although this method cannot completely solve the problem of corruption, it is still a significant contribution to the auction.[104]

Auctions by authorities

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Pima County, Arizona delinquent property tax list for auction by the County Treasurer

A government auction is simply an auction held on behalf of a government body generally at a general sale. Items for sale are often surplus needed to be liquidated. Auctions ordered by estate executors enter the assets of individuals who have perhaps died intestate (those who have died without leaving a will), or in debt. In legal contexts where forced auctions occur, as when one's farm or house is sold at auction on the courthouse steps. Property seized for non-payment of property taxes, or under foreclosure, is sold in this manner. Police auctions are generally held at general auctions, although some forces use online sites including eBay, to dispose of lost and found and seized goods. Debt auctions, in which governments issue and sell debt obligations, such as bonds, to investors. The auction is usually sealed and the uniform price paid by the investors is typically the best non-winning bid. In most cases, investors can also place so-called non-competitive bids, which indicates interest to purchase the debt obligation at the resulting price, whatever it may be. Some states use courts to run such auctions. In spectrum auctions conducted by the government, companies purchase licenses to use portions of the electromagnetic spectrum for communications (e.g., mobile phone networks). In certain jurisdictions, if a storage facility's tenant fails to pay rent, the contents of their locker(s) may be sold at a public auction. Several television shows focus on such auctions, including Storage Wars and Auction Hunters.

Commodity auctions

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Wool buyers' room at a wool auction, Newcastle, NSW
Grass-fed cattle at auction, Walcha, NSW
Farm clearing sale, Woolbrook, NSW
Tuna auction at the Tsukiji fish market in Tokyo
Fish auction in Honolulu, Hawaii

Auctions are used to trade commodities; for example, fish wholesale auctions. In wool auctions, wool is traded in the international market.[105] The wine auction business offers serious collectors an opportunity to gain access to rare bottles and mature vintages, which are not typically available through retail channels. In livestock auctions, sheep, cattle, pigs and other livestock are sold. Sometimes very large numbers of stock are auctioned, such as the regular sales of 50,000 or more sheep during a day in New South Wales.[106] In timber auctions, companies purchase licenses to log on government land. In timber allocation auctions, companies purchase timber directly from the government.[107] In electricity auctions, large-scale generators and distributors of electricity bid on generating contracts. Produce auctions link growers to localized wholesale buyers (buyers who are interested in acquiring large quantities of locally grown produce).[108]

Online auctions

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Online auctions are a form of E-commerce that relies on the advantages of a digital platform's ability to overcome geographical constraints, provide real-time information and reduce transaction costs, bringing greater convenience to people and allowing more people to participate as bidders, as well as being able to view a greater selection of auctions.[109] Websites like eBay provide a potential market of millions of bidders to sellers. Established auction houses, as well as specialist internet auctions, sell many things online, from antiques and collectibles to holidays, air travel, brand new computers, and household equipment. Private electronic markets use combinatorial auction techniques to continuously sell commodities (coal, iron ore, grain, water, etc.) online to a pre-qualified group of buyers (based on price and non-price factors).[110] Furthermore, online auctions facilitate the process for prospective bidders to discover and evaluate items by enabling searches across numerous auctions and employing filters to refine their selections.[111]

On the other hand, an alternative perspective suggests that the format of online auctions could also give rise to collusive conduct and other types of market manipulation, potentially skewing the market and diminishing its efficiency.[109] Firstly, online auctions might enable bidders to obscure their identities, such as utilizing pseudonyms or multiple accounts to maintain anonymity. This concealment could simplify collusion without detection.[112] Secondly, online auctions might ease the implementation of collusive arrangements among bidders. The accessibility of bidding data in online auctions, for instance, allows colluding bidders to monitor each other's bids, guarantee adherence to their agreements, and penalize non-compliance. This enhanced oversight capacity strengthens the stability of collusive agreements.[113]

Unique item auctions

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  • Motor vehicle and car auctions – Here one can buy anything from an accident-damaged car to a brand new top-of-the-range model; from a run-of-the-mill family saloon to a rare collector's item.
  • Antiques and collectibles auctions give an opportunity for viewing a huge array of items. The sale of collectibles includes items such as stamps, coins, vintage toys & trains, classic cars, and fine art.[114]
  • On-site auctions – Sometimes when the stock or assets of a company are simply too vast or too bulky for an auction house to transport to their own premises and store, they will hold an auction within the confines of the bankrupt company itself. Bidders could find themselves bidding for items which are still plugged in, and the great advantage of these auctions taking place on the premises is that they have the opportunity to view the goods as they were being used, and may be able to try them out. Bidders can also avoid the possibility of goods being damaged whilst they are being removed as they can do it or at least supervise the activity.[115]
  • Second-hand goods – For the sale of consumer second-hand goods of all kinds, particularly farm (equipment) and house clearances and online auctions.
  • Sale of industrial machinery, both surplus or through insolvency.
  • Thoroughbred horses, where yearling horses and other bloodstock are auctioned.[116]
  • Travel tickets – One example is SJ AB in Sweden auctioning surplus at Tradera (Swedish eBay).
  • Holidays – A variety of holidays are available for sale online particularly via eBay. Vacation rentals appear to be the most common. Many holiday auction websites have launched but failed.[117]
  • Mystery auction – An auction where bidders bid for boxes or envelopes containing unspecified or underspecified items, usually on the hope that the items will be humorous, interesting, or valuable.[118][119] In the early days of eBay's popularity, sellers began promoting boxes or packages of random and usually low-value items not worth selling by themselves.[120]
  • Some rare CryptoKitties, which are tokens representing virtual cats, have been sold over automated blockchain auctions for more than $200,000.[121]

Other contexts

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  • Charity auctions – Used by nonprofits, higher education, and religious institutions as a method to raise funds for a specific mission or cause both through the act of bidding itself, and by encouraging participants to support the cause and make personal donations. Often, these auctions are linked with another charity event like a benefit concert.[122]
  • Insurance policies – Auctions are held for second-hand endowment policies. The attraction is that someone else has already paid substantially to set up the policy in the first place, and one will be able (with the help of a financial calculator) to calculate its real worth and decide whether it is worth taking on. Lloyd's, the world's reinsurance market, runs auctions of syndicate capacity for the underwriting.[123]
  • Private treaty sales – Occasionally, when looking at an auction catalog some of the items have been withdrawn. Usually, these goods have been sold by 'private treaty'. This means that the goods have already been sold off, usually to a trader or dealer on a private, behind-the-scenes basis before they have had a chance to be offered at the auction sale. These goods are rarely in single lots – photocopiers or fax machines would generally be sold in bulk lots.
  • Environmental auctions, in which companies bid for licenses to avoid being required to decrease their environmental impact. These include auctions in emissions trading schemes.

Bidding strategy

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By the bidders

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An 18th century Chinese meiping porcelain vase. Porcelain has long been a staple at art sales. In 2005, a 14th-century Chinese porcelain piece was sold by Christie's for £16 million, or US$28 million. It set a world auction record for any ceramic work of art.[124]

Katehakis and Puranam provided the first model[125] for the problem of optimal bidding for a firm that in each period procures items to meet a random demand by participating in a finite sequence of auctions. In this model an item valuation derives from the sale of the acquired items via their demand distribution, sale price, acquisition cost, salvage value and lost sales. They established monotonicity properties for the value function and the optimal dynamic bid policy. They also provided a model[126] for the case in which the buyer must acquire a fixed number of items either at a fixed buy-it-now price in the open market or by participating in a sequence of auctions. The objective of the buyer is to minimize their expected total cost for acquiring the fixed number of items.

During an auction, the seller might possess more comprehensive knowledge regarding the item on offer compared to the buyer, creating an information asymmetry.[127] This lack of information could lead the bidder to overvalue the item and consequently pay a higher price, resulting in the winner's curse.[128] Nevertheless, bidders may also choose to employ bid shading as a strategy to circumvent this predicament. Bid shading is placing a bid which is below the bidder's actual value for the item. Such a strategy risks losing the auction but has the possibility of winning at a low price. Bid shading can also be a strategy to avoid the winner's curse. In either case, the allocation of resources may be inefficient, as the product will not ultimately be acquired by the individual who values it the most. Instead, it will go to the person who either overvalues it the most or effectively employs bid shading.[129]

Auction cancellation hunters bid minimal amounts on multiple auctions and expect them to be cancelled. If an auction is cancelled by the seller, they will claim for damages in the amount of the difference between the maximum bid at the time of the auction cancellation and the price of a replacement purchase of the offered item in the auction, when the market is in equilibrium, even if the seller has not sold any of the items, the shadow of bidding still exists. This is the self-protection instinct of the auction market. In order to make this transaction fairer.[130] Auction sniping is the practice of placing a bid at the last moment of the auction. According to the analysis of auction data from eBay, in general, experienced bidders are more likely to snipe in auctions, and those who snipe in auctions are more likely to win.[131] Jump bidding is an aggressive tactic of increasing every bid by high amounts. Calor licitantis is also known as "auction fever" and describes the irrational behavior of bidders at auctions. Suicide bidding is practice in reverse auctions, whereby a bidder submits a bid, which ends up in a loss for this bidder.[132]

Collusion

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Whenever bidders at an auction are aware of the identity of the other bidders there is a risk that they will form a "ring" or "pool" and thus manipulate the auction result, a practice known as collusion or more specially bid-rigging.[133][134][135] By agreeing to bid only against outsiders, never against members of the "ring", competition becomes weaker, which may dramatically affect the final price level. After the end of the official auction, an unofficial auction may take place among the "ring" members. The difference in price between the two auctions could then be split among the members. This form of a ring was used as a central plot device in the opening episode of the 1979 British television series The House of Caradus, 'For Love or Money', uncovered by Helena Caradus on her return from Paris.

In the UK, this auction practice is illegal.[136] It jeopardizes competition on the auction and can demotivate other bidders from participating. It robs the seller of the true value of their good and reduces the auctioneer's commission.

Beyond explicit collusion, a tacit coordination of bidders to keep bids low is at least theoretically possible. In case of spectrum auctions, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) experimented with precautions restricting visibility of bids, limiting the number of bids, click-box bidding, and anonymous bidding in order to prevent bidders from signalling bidding information by embedding it into digits of the bids.[137] Actions within the auction mechanism serve as a communication channel for collusive behavior, once no other channels are legal.

By the auctioneer

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Chandelier or rafter bidding

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This is the practice, especially by high-end art auctioneers,[138] of raising false bids at crucial times in the bidding in order to create the appearance of greater demand or to extend bidding momentum for a work on offer. To call out these nonexistent bids auctioneers might fix their gaze at a point in the auction room that is difficult for the audience to pin down.[139] The practice is frowned upon in the industry.[139] In the United States, chandelier bidding is not illegal. In fact, an auctioneer may bid up the price of an item to the reserve price, which is a threshold below which the consignor may refuse to sell the item. However, the auction house is required to disclose this information.

In the United Kingdom this practice is legal on property auctions up to but not including the reserve price, and is also known as off-the-wall bidding.[140]

Collusion involving auctioneer

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A ring can also be used to increase the price of an auction lot, in which the owner of the object being auctioned may increase competition by taking part in the bidding themself, but drop out of the bidding just before the final bid. This form of a ring was used as a central plot device in an episode of the British television series Lovejoy (series 4, episode 3), in which the price of a watercolour by the (fictional) Jessie Webb is inflated so that others by the same artist could be sold for more than their purchase price. In an English auction, a dummy bid is a bid made by a dummy bidder acting in collusion with the auctioneer or vendor, designed to deceive genuine bidders into paying more. In a first-price auction, a dummy bid is an unfavourable bid designed so as not to become the winning bid. (The bidder does not want to win this auction, but they want to make sure to be invited to the next auction).

In Britain and many other countries, rings and other forms of bidding on one's own object are illegal. In Australia, a dummy bid or also a shill is a criminal offence, but a vendor bid or a co-owner bid below the reserve price is permitted if clearly declared as such by the auctioneer. These are all official legal terms in Australia but may have other meanings elsewhere. A co-owner is one of two or several owners (who disagree among themselves). In Sweden and many other countries, there are no legal restrictions, but it will severely hurt the reputation of an auction house that knowingly permits any other bids except genuine bids. If the reserve is not reached this should be clearly declared. In South Africa, auctioneers can use their staff or any bidder to raise the price as long as it is disclosed before the auction sale. Rael Levitt's companies The Auction Alliance controversy focused on vendor bidding and led to its downfall in 2012.[141][142]

Suggested opening bid (SOB)

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There will usually be an estimate of what price the lot will fetch. In an ascending open auction, it is considered important to get at least a 50-percent increase in the bids from start to finish. To accomplish this, the auctioneer must start the auction by announcing a suggested opening bid (SOB) that is low enough to be immediately accepted by one of the bidders.[143] Once there is an opening bid, there will quickly be several other, higher bids submitted. Experienced auctioneers will often select an SOB that is about 45 percent of the (lowest) estimate. Thus there is a certain margin of safety to ensure that there will indeed be a lively auction with many bids submitted. Several observations indicate that the lower the SOB, the higher the final winning bid. This is due to the increase in the number of bidders attracted by the low SOB.

A chi-squared distribution shows many low bids but few high bids. Bids "show up together"; without several low bids there will not be any high bids.

Another approach to choosing a SOB: The auctioneer may achieve good success by asking the expected final sales price for the item, as this method suggests to the potential buyers the item's particular value. For instance, an auctioneer is about to sell a $1,000 car at a sale. Instead of asking $100, hoping to entice wide interest, the auctioneer may suggest an opening bid of $1,000; although the first bidder may begin bidding at a mere $100, the final bid may more likely approach $1,000.

Terminology

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Duo Yun Xuan auction house in Malacca, Malaysia
  • Absentee bids – this is when a prospective buyer places a bid on an item without attending the sale. This is sometimes referred to instead as a commission bid because the auctioneer is effectively commissioned to enter bids on the potential buyer's behalf. The bid is submitted prior to the auction by whatever means the auctioneer has stipulated.[144]
  • Appraisal – an estimate of an item's worth, usually performed by an expert in that particular field.[145]
  • Auction block – a raised platform on which the auctioneer shows the items to be auctioned; it can also be slang for the auction itself.
  • Auction chant – a rhythmic repetition of numbers and "filler words" spoken by an auctioneer in the process of conducting an auction.
  • Auction fever – an emotional state elicited in the course of one or more auctions that causes a bidder to deviate from an initially chosen bidding strategy.[146][147]
  • Auction house – the company operating the auction (i.e., establishing the date and time of the auction, the auction rules, determining which items are to be included in the auction, registering bidders, taking payments, and delivering the goods to the winning bidders).
  • Auctioneer – the person conducting the actual auction. They announce the rules of the auction and the items being auctioned, call and acknowledge bids made, and announce the winner.
    • The auctioneer can sometimes just be the owner of the business, in which case they may hire a bid caller/s to announce the rules and call bids.
    • The auctioneer may operate their own auction house (and thus perform the duties of both auctioneer and auction house), or work for another house.
    • Auctioneers are frequently regulated by governmental entities, and in those jurisdictions must meet certain criteria to be licensed (be of a certain age, have no disqualifying criminal record, attend auction school, pass an examination, and pay a licensing fee).
    • Auctioneers may or may not (depending on the laws of the jurisdiction and the policies of the auction house) bid for their own account, or if they do, must disclose this to bidders at the auction; similar rules may apply for employees of the auctioneer or the auction house.
  • Bidding – the act of participating in an auction by offering to purchase an item for sale.
  • Bid Construction Problem (BCP) – also known as the Bid Generation Problem (BGP), BCP is a NP-hard combinatorial problem addressed and solved by the bidder to determine the bid packages to bid on and their corresponding bidding prices.[148][149]
  • Buyer's premium – a fee paid by the buyer to the auction house; it is typically calculated as a percentage of the winning bid and added to it. Depending on the jurisdiction, the buyer's premium, in addition to the sales price, may be subject to VAT or sales tax.
  • Buyout price – a price that, if accepted by a bidder, immediately ends the auction and awards the item to them (an example is eBay's "Buy It Now" feature).
  • Choice – a form of bidding whereby a number of identical or similar items are bid at a single price for each item.
  • Clearance rate – the percentage of items that sell over the course of the auction.
  • Commission – a fee paid by a consignor/seller to the auction house; it is typically calculated as a percentage of the winning bid and deducted from the gross proceeds due to the consignor/seller.
  • Consignee and consignor – as pertaining to auctions, the consignor (also called the seller, and in some contexts the vendor) is the person owning the item to be auctioned or the owner's representative,[139] while the consignee is the auction house. The consignor maintains title until such time that an item is purchased by a bidder and the bidder pays the auction house.
  • Dummy bid (a/k/a "ghost bid") – a false bid, made by someone in collusion with the seller or auctioneer, designed to create a sense of increased interest in the item (and, thus, increased bids).
  • Dynamic closing – a mechanism used to prevent auction sniping, by which the closing time is extended for a small period to allow other bidders to increase their bids.
  • eBidding – electronic bidding, whereby a person may make a bid without being physically present at an auction (or where the entire auction is taking place on the Internet).
  • Earnest money deposit (a/k/a "caution money deposit" or "registration deposit") – a payment that must be made by prospective bidders ahead of time in order to participate in an auction.
    • The purpose of this deposit is to deter non-serious bidders from attending the auction; by requiring the deposit, only bidders with a genuine interest in the items being sold will participate.
    • This type of deposit is most often used in auctions involving high-value goods (such as real estate).
    • The winning bidder has their earnest money applied toward the final selling price; the non-winners have theirs refunded to them.
  • Escrow – an arrangement in which the winning bidder pays the amount of their bid to a third party, who in turn releases the funds to the seller under agreed-upon terms.
  • Estimate - auction houses typically give an estimate (or guide price), often a range, for lots. This is a rather conservative indication of the price they expect the lot to reach at auction, decided by the auction house, perhaps after consulting outside experts. If an auction is going well, most lots will achieve a price near the top of the estimate, or some 20 or 30% over it. But some lots may fetch double or more the estimate, for various reasons; others much less than the lower end of the estimate.
  • Hammer price – the nominal price at which a lot is sold; the buyer, and often the seller, may have to pay additional fees, "premiums", and taxes on top of this amount.
Hammer used in auctions
  • Increment – a minimum amount by which a new bid must exceed the previous bid. An auctioneer may decrease the increment when it appears that bidding on an item may stop, so as to get a higher hammer price. Alternatively, a participant may offer a bid at a smaller increment, which the auctioneer has the discretion to accept or reject.
  • Thumb Auction - Olden Auction type where bid were hidden and the bidders used to tell auctioneer their bibs by placing their fingers unger a cloth and touch the fingers with an dedicated amount.
  • Lot – either a single item being sold, or a group of items[139] (which may or may not be similar or identical, such as a "job lot" of manufactured goods) that are bid on as one unit.
    • If the lot is for a group of items, the price paid is for the entire lot and the winning bidder must take all the items sold.
    • Variants on a group lot bid include "choice" and "times the money" (see definitions for each).
      • Example: An auction has five bath fragrance gift baskets where bidding is "lot", and the hammer price is $5. The winner must pay $5 (as the price is for the whole lot) and must take all five baskets.
  • Maiden bid – a single bid which wins the lot being offered for sale, with no other bids made.
  • Minimum bid – the smallest opening bid that will be accepted.
    • A minimum bid can be as little as $0.01 (one cent) depending on the auction.
    • If no one bids at the initial minimum bid, the auctioneer may lower the minimum bid so as to create interest in the item.
    • The minimum bid differs from a reserve price (see definition), in that the auctioneer sets the minimum bid, while the seller sets the reserve price (if desired).
  • "New money" – a new bidder, joining bidding for an item after others have bid against each other.
  • No reserve auction (a/k/a "absolute auction") – an auction in which there is no minimum acceptable price; so long as the winning bid is at least the minimum bid, the seller must honor the sale.
  • Outbid – to bid higher than another bidder.
  • Opening bid – the first bid placed on a particular lot. The opening bid must be at least the minimum bid, but may be higher (e.g., a bidder may shout out a considerably larger bid than minimum, to discourage other bidders from bidding).
  • Paddle – a numbered instrument used to place a bid[139]
  • Protecting a market – when a dealer places a bid on behalf of an artist they represent or otherwise have a financial interest in ensuring a high price. Artists represented by major galleries typically expect this kind of protection from their dealers.[139]
  • Proxy bid (also called an absentee bid) – a bid placed by an authorized representative of a bidder who is not physically present at the auction.
    • Proxy bids are common in auctions of high-end items, such as art sales (where the proxy represents either a private bidder who does not want to be disclosed to the public, or a museum bidding on a particular item for its collection).
    • If the proxy is outbid on an item during the auction, the proxy (depending on the instructions of the bidder) may either increase the bid (up to a set amount established by the bidder) or be required to drop out of the bidding for that item.
    • A proxy may also be limited by the bidder in the total amount to spend on items in a multi-item auction.
  • Relisting – re-selling an item that has already been sold at auction, but where the buyer did not take possession of the item (for example, in a real estate auction, the buyer did not provide payment by the closing date).
  • Reserve (price) – a minimum acceptable price established by the seller prior to the auction, which may or may not be disclosed to the bidders.[139]
    • If the winning bid is below the reserve price, the seller has the right to reject the bid and withdraw the item or items being auctioned.
    • The reserve price differs from a minimum bid (see definition), in that the seller sets the reserve price (if desired), while the auctioneer sets the minimum bid.
  • Sealed bid – a submitted bid whose value is unknown to competitors.
  • Sniping – the act of placing a bid just before the end of a timed auction, thus giving other bidders no time to enter new bids.
  • Soft close – When a bidder places a bid in the last set amount of minutes and the auction is automatically extended for a set period of time. Soft closes prevent sniping.
  • Specialist – on-staff trained professionals, often specialising in specific objects (for example, porcelain) who put together the auction.[139]
  • The "three Ds" (death, divorce, or debt) – sometimes a reason for an item to be sold at an auction.[139]
  • Vendor bid – a bid by the person selling the item. The bid is sometimes a dummy bid (see definition) but not always.
  • White glove sale – an auction in which every single lot is sold.[139]

JEL classification

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See also

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Notes

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia

An auction is an economic mechanism in which prospective buyers compete by submitting bids to acquire goods, services, or rights, with the highest bidder typically prevailing and the process determining a market-clearing price. Auctions originated in ancient civilizations, with the earliest documented instances around 500 BC in Babylon for marriage markets and in Greece for property sales, later adopted by Romans for liquidating estates and war spoils. Key formats include the ascending-bid English auction, descending-bid Dutch auction, first-price sealed-bid auction, and second-price Vickrey auction, each designed to elicit valuations under varying information conditions and strategic incentives. Widely applied in art markets, livestock sales, government procurement of radio spectrum, and privatization of state assets, auctions promote efficient resource allocation by revealing private information about value, though they can suffer from issues like bidder collusion or the winner's curse where overestimation leads to losses. Theoretical advancements, including revenue equivalence across formats under ideal assumptions and optimal design for complex settings, earned Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson the 2020 Nobel Prize in Economics for improving auction outcomes in practical scenarios like telecommunications licensing.

Etymology and Terminology

Origins of the Term

The word "auction" derives from the Latin auctiō, denoting "a sale by increasing bids" or "an augmentation," reflecting the mechanism of progressively higher offers in a public sale. This term stems from auctus, the past participle of the verb augēre, meaning "to increase" or "to augment," which underscores the core dynamic of escalating bids to determine the final price. The Latin root captures the competitive essence distinguishing auctions from fixed-price or tenders, where bids rise incrementally until no further increases occur, rather than negotiating downward or accepting predetermined offers. Roman usage of auctiō dates to at least the BCE, associated with public sales of goods, estates, or spoils, though the term's linguistic formation predates specific documented practices and emphasizes the "increasing" process inherent to the format. While auctions appeared in contexts as early as 500 BCE—described by without the Latin —the English term does not derive directly from Greek auktion (a later ) but traces through Latin influences, bypassing Old French equivalents like enchères for the borrowed form. The term entered English in the late , with the earliest recorded noun use in 1595, initially referring to a public sale conducted by an amid rising bids. This adoption preserved the Latin emphasis on augmentation, differentiating "auction" from broader terms like "sale" (from Latin salēs, implying exchange without ) or "tender" (focused on submissions rather than open escalation). By formalizing the bidding-up mechanism in , auctiō and its English successor highlighted causal realism in : value emerges from revealed bidder valuations via iterative increases, not arbitrary assignment. Hammer price refers to the highest bid amount accepted by the auctioneer at the moment the hammer falls, excluding any or additional fees. Bid increment denotes the minimum required increase over the current bid for a new bid to be valid, set by the auctioneer to control bidding pace and often scaled by item value. Proxy bid, also known as an absentee or maximum bid, is an instruction given to the auction house to bid on behalf of an absent bidder up to a specified limit, with the auctioneer advancing bids in increments against competing bids until the limit or winning the lot. An absolute auction sells the item to the highest bidder without a , ensuring the property transfers regardless of the final amount. In contrast, a reserve auction includes a confidential minimum set by the seller; if bids fail to reach it, the item remains unsold. Walkthrough describes the pre-auction inspection period allowing potential bidders to examine lots in person, typically held at the venue prior to the sale. In digital auction contexts, involves real-time price adjustments driven by bidder competition, where the final price emerges from ongoing bids rather than a fixed starting point.

Historical Development

Ancient Origins and Classical Antiquity

The earliest documented auctions occurred in ancient Babylon around 500 BCE, as recorded by the Greek historian in his Histories (1.196), where communities annually assembled marriageable maidens for public sale. The most attractive women were auctioned first to wealthy bidders, with proceeds funding dowries for the less desirable ones, who were then given to suitors willing to accept compensation rather than pay. This process, described as a former custom by Herodotus (writing c. 440 BCE), enabled —pairing brides with husbands—through competitive , where prices reflected bidder valuations and ensured broader matching without direct beyond societal norms. In Greek city-states, particularly from the 5th century BCE, auctions served as mechanisms for assigning public resources and contracts, evidenced by poletai inscriptions detailing sales of confiscated properties, leases of sacred lands, and rights to collection or operations. These open bids allocated opportunities to the highest-valued users, as seen in surviving records of rental auctions for estates, where the process maximized revenue for the while facilitating voluntary participation by potential lessees. Such practices demonstrated early via ascending bids, predating rigid administrative pricing and allowing empirical adjustment to demand for public assets like temple lands or quarries. Roman auctions, termed auctio from the concept of bidding increments (auctus), emerged during the (c. 509–27 BCE) for disposing of war spoils, estate goods, and slaves captured in conquests, with sales often signaled by a (hasta) planted at the site. By the 3rd–2nd centuries BCE, following territorial expansions, these became routine for liquidating assets efficiently, as soldiers and officials sold plundered items or debtor properties to the highest bidder in forums, prioritizing rapid exchange over fixed valuations. This format highlighted auctions' role in voluntary transfer amid conquest-driven supply, with records indicating widespread use for slaves and commodities by the late .

Medieval and Early Modern Periods

Auctions saw limited application during the medieval period in , primarily for disposing of seized goods or ecclesiastical properties, though systematic records remain scarce due to the dominance of feudal land-based exchanges over liquid markets. auctions, where bidding ceased upon a candle's extinguishing to prevent last-second bids, emerged as a rudimentary format in by the , reflecting early efforts to ensure fairness in perishable or contested sales without fixed prices. This method persisted sporadically but did not drive widespread commercial adoption amid guild-regulated trade and manorial economies. The early modern period marked a revival, propelled by expanding Atlantic and Asian trade networks under mercantilist policies, which favored auctions for rapidly pricing commodities and estates amid rising merchant capital. In the Dutch Republic, the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) pioneered regular auctions for imported spices and, from 1662, coffee—the first European coffee auction held in Amsterdam following shipments via Mocha—facilitating efficient distribution without royal monopolies and enabling liquidity for reinvestment in voyages. Amsterdam's broker auctions extended to damaged silks and second-hand goods, supporting a secondary market that recycled trade surpluses and mitigated risks in volatile colonial imports. English auctions echoed this Dutch model, with estate sales gaining traction by the mid-17th century for dispersing noble inventories, paintings, and , as evidenced by notices from ' era onward, which formalized conditions to attract bidders in London's coffee houses. These mechanisms underpinned precursors to the , where commodity and share auctions in venues like provided for joint-stock ventures, fostering outside state control. In colonial contexts, auctions liquidated cargoes and prizes, channeling mercantile profits back into European markets and accelerating the shift from feudal stasis to price-driven liquidity. This causal diffusion via trade routes—Dutch innovations influencing English practices—demonstrated auctions' utility in scaling exchange volumes, with Amsterdam's bourse handling VOC shares by 1611 amid surging global commodity flows.

Industrial Era and 19th-Century Expansion

In Britain, established auction houses such as Sotheby's, founded in 1744, expanded their scope during the 19th century to include fine art, jewelry, and estate sales, capitalizing on the wealth generated by industrialization and the Victorian era's enthusiasm for collecting. This period marked a shift from primarily book auctions to broader commodities, with sales reflecting the era's economic growth and the accumulation of industrial fortunes. Christie's, established in 1766, similarly thrived, hosting prominent auctions that attracted bidders from an expanding mercantile class. Across the Atlantic, the witnessed a surge in specialized auctions for agricultural commodities, particularly livestock and tobacco, as the young republic industrialized. Tobacco auctions emerged in around the early 1800s, driven by the need for standardized quality inspections amid growing export demands; these centralized markets enabled farmers to achieve higher, more consistent prices through competitive bidding and objective grading. By mid-century, auctions supplanted earlier and private treaty methods, becoming the dominant sales mechanism in emerging stockyards, which facilitated efficient matching of regional suppliers with urban buyers. Advancements in transportation, including railroads operational by the 1830s and expanded steam shipping, played a causal role in scaling auction markets by drastically reducing freight costs—by 60-70% compared to wagons—and connecting distant regions, thereby enlarging bidder pools and intensifying competition over fixed-price negotiations. This infrastructure boom allowed auctions to handle larger volumes of industrial-era goods, such as bulk agricultural outputs, promoting free-market dynamics where prices dynamically reflected supply and demand rather than localized monopolies. In tobacco markets, for instance, auction warehouses in hubs like Durham, North Carolina, by the 1870s centralized trade, mitigating price discrepancies through broader participation. Overall, these developments underscored auctions' adaptability to industrial expansion, enhancing scalability by enabling rapid, transparent price discovery across expanded geographies.

20th-Century Institutionalization and Theory

In the aftermath of , governments increasingly institutionalized auctions for disposing of military surplus, enabling efficient reallocation of assets from wartime to civilian production without relying on protracted administrative processes. , for instance, utilized public auctions to liquidate excess war materials, a practice that gained momentum as economies shifted toward peacetime recovery and highlighted auctions' role in and resource distribution. Theoretical advancements formalized these practices in the mid-20th century. In 1961, economist William Vickrey published "Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders," introducing a sealed-bid second-price auction model where the highest bidder wins but pays the second-highest bid, promoting truthful revelation of valuations and mitigating speculative behavior. Vickrey's work laid foundational insights into incentive-compatible mechanisms, earning him the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1996 for contributions to auction theory and information economics. Empirical applications underscored auctions' superiority over alternatives like lotteries or central planning. The U.S. (FCC) launched its first spectrum auctions in July 1994 under the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, replacing inefficient lotteries that often allocated frequencies to low-value users. By July 1996, these auctions had generated about $20 billion in revenue while assigning licenses to bidders demonstrating highest productive value, evidencing rapid and effective spectrum reallocation that boosted innovation and avoided the delays and waste of prior comparative hearings or random draws. This success validated theoretical predictions of efficiency, contrasting with central planning's tendency toward misallocation by demonstrating auctions' ability to aggregate dispersed information on asset values.

Digital Revolution and Post-2000 Innovations

The advent of platforms marked a pivotal shift, enabling global participation and scalability unattainable in physical settings. , launched in 1995, facilitated auctions that by 2024 achieved an annual of $74.6 billion, reflecting cumulative volumes exceeding trillions since inception through expanded user bases and algorithmic . This digital infrastructure reduced transaction costs by automating bid matching and verification, with quarterly GMV reaching $19.51 billion in Q2 2025, up 6% year-over-year. Amazon's early experiments, though discontinued by the mid-2010s, influenced subsequent models that adjust in real-time based on demand and inventory, optimizing revenue in high-volume . Blockchain technology introduced decentralized auctions post-2000, prominently via non-fungible tokens (NFTs), where sales volumes peaked at $24.9 billion in 2021 amid speculative fervor. By , NFT trading persisted at elevated levels, with Q1 sales surpassing $8.2 billion, sustained through decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) that enable trustless, programmable without intermediaries, enhancing transparency in volatile digital asset markets. These mechanisms demonstrated efficiency gains in tracking and , though market corrections post-2021 underscored risks of overvaluation in illiquid environments. Advancements in , particularly , refined auction design by 2024, with end-to-end differentiable frameworks solving multi-item optimal auctions from sampled data, outperforming traditional parametric methods in maximization. models simulated bidder strategies in complex scenarios, minimizing asymmetries. Virtual and integrations further cut physical infrastructure costs; empirical analysis of auctions found VR previews boosted final prices by 5.2% ($16,306 equivalent), attributing gains to immersive inspections that substitute for on-site viewings and . In multi-unit auctions amid volatile conditions, 2023-2025 studies revealed prior-free strategies under limited yielded robust , with maxmin preferences mitigating losses in uncertain macroeconomic settings. These innovations collectively amplified auction throughput, with AR/VR headset shipments projected to surge 41.4% in 2025 due to cost reductions and AI enhancements.

Theoretical Foundations

Core Economic Principles

Auctions function as voluntary exchange institutions where sellers offer goods or services to multiple potential buyers who compete through bids, thereby revealing underlying valuations and determining an allocative price without requiring direct seller-buyer negotiation over terms. This competitive process allocates the item to the bidder with the highest demonstrated willingness to pay, promoting efficiency by matching resources to their most valued uses based on private information held by participants. The mechanism's core advantage lies in its ability to generate prices endogenously from bidder interactions, rather than exogenously imposed figures, fostering transparency in value revelation. Central to auctions is price discovery achieved through the marginal bidder, whose bid establishes the clearing price reflective of the item's as signaled by competing demands. In efficient formats, such as second-price sealed-bid auctions, the winner pays the second-highest bid amount, incentivizing truthful revelation of private valuations as the dominant strategy, which decouples the transaction price from the seller's own reservation value or cost information. This independence ensures that revenue derives primarily from the distribution of bidder valuations, not seller-imposed floors beyond a minimal reserve, enabling sellers to extract surplus without needing to disclose or haggle over their private assessments. Compared to bilateral negotiations, auctions empirically mitigate holdout incentives, where a single buyer might strategically withhold agreement to extract concessions, often resulting in or suboptimal terms due to asymmetric and bargaining power imbalances. Studies of contracts demonstrate that auctions yield systematically lower costs for buyers when projects involve standardized goods and verifiable performance, as compels bidders to internalize risks and bid aggressively, reducing the delays and premiums associated with protracted haggling. While negotiations may suit highly customized or complex scenarios requiring adjustments, auctions' structured rivalry empirically outperforms in scenarios prone to strategic delay, as multiple bidders erode any one's leverage to . Auctions excel at causally aggregating dispersed, across participants, where individual bidders incorporate localized —such as unique assessments of an item's utility or future yield—into their bids, yielding a superior to centralized estimates or pairwise deals that capture only partial data. This process mirrors broader market dynamics, wherein competitive formation harnesses fragmented private that no planner or negotiator could fully compile, leading to more accurate than alternatives reliant on incomplete . Empirical outcomes in diverse auction settings, from commodities to allocations, validate this aggregation, as bid dispersions narrow toward equilibrium prices that reflect synthesized insights rather than isolated valuations.

Game Theory and Bidder Behavior

In common-value auctions, where the item's true value is the same for all bidders but known imperfectly through private signals, game-theoretic models predict that rational bidders will shade their bids below their unconditional value estimates to avoid the winner's curse—the tendency for the highest bidder to overpay due to selection bias in winning. The Nash equilibrium in such settings requires each bidder to submit a bid equal to the expected value conditional on having the highest signal and winning, ensuring zero expected profits in symmetric equilibria while accounting for rivals' strategies. Empirical laboratory experiments confirm that inexperienced bidders often fail to fully adjust for this curse, leading to systematic overbidding, whereas experienced participants converge toward equilibrium shading. The Milgrom-Weber (1982) framework extends this analysis to environments with asymmetric and affiliated values, where signals are positively correlated, amplifying the but also enabling strategic inference from rivals' actions. In first-price sealed-bid formats, equilibrium bids incorporate rivals' expected signals, with bidders aggressively shading to mitigate information disadvantages; English auctions, by contrast, reveal dropping-out prices, reducing the curse through aggregated . Field data from U.S. oil and gas lease auctions in the 1950s–1970s provide empirical support, showing early overbidding and negative post-auction returns for winners, which diminished as bidders learned to condition on winning probabilities and geological signal precision. Recent theoretical advancements address multi-unit common-value auctions under limited information, prevalent in volatile sectors like or commodities, where bidders demand multiple units with interdependent values. In these models, heightened volatility increases shading incentives, as imprecise signals raise the risk of correlated estimation errors across units; equilibrium strategies thus balance marginal value contributions against the amplified from partial awards. A 2025 study formalizes bidding under such constraints, demonstrating that limited-information equilibria yield lower deviations compared to full-information benchmarks, with simulations validating robustness to ambiguity in signal distributions.

Efficiency and Revenue Equivalence

Auctions promote allocative efficiency by directing goods or rights to the bidder with the highest private valuation, thereby minimizing deadweight loss relative to non-market mechanisms like administrative allocation or fixed pricing, which often fail to reveal true demand and result in suboptimal use. In theoretical models under independent private values, ascending-bid or second-price formats ensure the item goes to the highest valuer without requiring full bid shading, contrasting with fixed-price regimes where rationing or excess supply can occur if prices deviate from equilibrium. Empirical assessments confirm this superiority; for instance, U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions since 1994 have achieved allocation efficiencies exceeding 90% in many cases, rapidly assigning licenses to firms investing in expanded services, unlike pre-auction European comparative hearings that delayed rollout by years and invited rent-seeking. The equivalence theorem asserts that, under symmetry, independent private values, risk-neutral bidders, and affiliation assumptions, diverse auction formats—including English ascending, Dutch descending, first-price sealed-bid, and second-price sealed-bid—generate identical expected seller , equivalent to the expected second-highest valuation plus any reserve price adjustment. First articulated by Vickrey in 1961 for open and sealed high-bid equivalence and generalized by Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981) to broader mechanisms, the theorem highlights that differences arise primarily from violations of these conditions rather than format choice itself. This equivalence underscores auctions' robustness, as sellers can prioritize efficiency or simplicity without trade-offs in ideal settings. Critiques positing auctions' inferiority due to strategic behaviors like the or are tempered by data showing net gains over alternatives; procurement reverse auctions, for example, have yielded 10-15% cost reductions versus fixed-price contracts in pilots, as elicits lower bids while post-award performance remains comparable. In spectrum contexts, FCC auctions have generated over $233 billion in revenue by 2023 while fostering and , far surpassing fixed allocation's inefficiencies, such as underused bands in pre-1994 . Though real-world asymmetries can erode equivalence—evident in lower efficiencies during collusive bidding episodes—auctions consistently outperform fixed prices by dynamically matching resources to marginal uses, reducing through .

Auction Formats and Mechanisms

Open vs. Sealed-Bid Auctions

Open auctions, exemplified by the English format, involve publicly observable incremental bids that ascend until no higher offers are submitted, with the winner paying the final bid amount. This visibility enables bidders to gauge competitors' valuations through dropout signals, promoting convergence toward the item's true value by revealing the second-highest valuation as the effective clearing price. In private-value settings, where each bidder's valuation is independent and known only to themselves, this process theoretically equates to a second-price mechanism, encouraging bidders to remain active up to their true valuation without strategic shading. Empirical observations from laboratory experiments confirm rapid convergence, with bidders typically dropping out efficiently as prices approach their limits, often resolving within a small number of bid increments. Sealed-bid auctions, conversely, solicit simultaneous private submissions, concealing rivals' intentions until bids are revealed post-submission. First-price sealed-bid variants award the item to the highest bidder at their own bid, prompting strategic bid shading below true value to balance winning probability against overpayment risk, which can amplify the —overestimation leading to negative utility for the victor. The , a second-price sealed-bid counterpart, mitigates this by charging the second-highest bid, rendering truthful bidding a dominant and thus incentive-compatible, as deviations neither increase win chances nor reduce payment when victorious. However, absent interim feedback, sealed formats preclude dynamic adjustment, heightening estimation errors compared to open revelation. Visibility profoundly influences information dynamics and strategic risks. Open formats facilitate real-time learning from observed bids, reducing uncertainty and exposure even in near-private-value contexts with mild value , while sealed bids enforce isolation, potentially deterring aggressive overbidding but inviting conservative that depresses prices. On , open auctions' transparency risks tacit coordination via bidding restraint signals, as rivals monitor participation; empirical analyses of U.S. Forest Service timber sales indicate sealed shifts curbed perceived collusive underbidding by obscuring actions, though both formats remain vulnerable to explicit pre-auction rings. and field studies on private-value goods, such as consumer goods procurements, reveal open formats often yielding higher seller revenues—up to 5-10% premiums in controlled settings—due to intensified and less aggressive , diverging from theoretical under risk neutrality and symmetry assumptions.

Ascending, Descending, and Fixed-Price Variants

Ascending auctions, commonly termed English auctions, initiate at a low reserve price and incrementally rise through open bidding until no participant offers a higher amount, at which point the highest bidder prevails. This structure promotes sequential information disclosure, as dropping out signals upper valuation bounds to remaining bidders, causally boosting participation by enabling entrants to gauge competition intensity against their private values; under decreasing absolute , empirical models predict and observe higher entry rates in ascending relative to non-transparent formats, fostering efficient allocation via observed revelation. Descending auctions, known as Dutch auctions, commence at an elevated price that methodically declines until a bidder accepts the current offer, securing the item at that level in a first-price manner. Suited to time-sensitive perishables, such as at where over 20 million transactions occur daily with sales concluding in seconds to avert , this format prioritizes velocity over extended deliberation, though its opacity induces strategic delay—bidders withhold acceptance anticipating further drops—yielding empirically higher revenues than sealed first-price counterparts via phased exits at elevated thresholds, yet risking suboptimal participation absent competitive cues. Uniform-price auctions, frequently executed in descending clock variants for multi-unit sales, set a single clearing —often the lowest accepted bid—for all winning allocations, as in treasury bill offerings where bidders submit quantity-price schedules. Japan's applied this to Japanese Government Bonds until 2007, when 30-year JGB auctions shifted to discriminatory , prompting of impacts from uniform's encouragement of aggressive marginal bids without per-unit differentiation. Fixed-price mechanisms degenerate dynamic auctioning into a static offer, where the seller posts an invariant for immediate purchase without escalation, akin to "buy now" add-ons in hybrid platforms. This eliminates price discovery's competitive tension, curtailing participation to those valuing above the threshold but expediting transactions; theoretical robustness checks reveal inferior in non-degenerate value distributions, as it forgoes incentives inherent in ascending or descending paths, trading potential for certainty in low-variance contexts.

Multi-Item and Combinatorial Auctions

Multi-item auctions involve the sale of multiple distinct , where bidders' valuations may exhibit complementarities, meaning the value of a bundle exceeds the sum of individual item values. In unit-demand settings, bidders seek at most one item, with bundle value equaling the maximum single-item value, simplifying allocation but still requiring coordination to avoid inefficiencies. General combinatorial auctions extend this by permitting bids on arbitrary packages, enabling expression of superadditive synergies, though in winner determination grows exponentially with items. The exposure problem arises in separate single-item auctions, where bidders aggressively bid on complements to secure bundles but winning subsets at prices exceeding marginal values, leading to losses or inefficiencies up to 9% in simulated multi-unit scenarios. Combinatorial formats mitigate this via package bidding, allowing joint offers that directly capture synergies and reduce truncation , empirically outperforming single-item bidding in lab tests for spectrum-like goods. Iterative combinatorial auctions, developed prominently in the , use sequential rounds with dynamic price signals to elicit bids, facilitating bidder learning and convergence to efficient allocations without full valuation revelation. Formats like clock auctions update prices upward for demanded packages, enabling proxy agents to approximate optimal responses and handle . These were tested in FCC spectrum auctions, where package in bundled licenses from the early improved allocation over sequential single-license sales, as evidenced by reduced bidder shading and higher revenues in Swiss and U.S. implementations. By , AI enhancements have advanced optimization in these mechanisms, with machine learning-powered iterative auctions like MLHCA using value and demand queries to achieve superior and faster convergence than traditional heuristics, outperforming benchmarks in simulated high-dimensional settings. Diffusion-based models further enable differentiable for deep menus, approximating revenue-maximizing outcomes in complex combinatorial environments previously intractable. These developments leverage neural networks for bidder support and winner determination, addressing scalability limits in general valuations.

Operational Elements

Participants and Roles

In auctions, the primary participants include the seller, who consigns the item or asset for sale to maximize ; bidders, who compete to acquire it by submitting offers up to their private valuations; and , who facilitates the process as an typically compensated via commission on successful sales. The seller's aligns with extracting the highest possible , often by setting a reserve below which the item remains unsold, while bidders aim to secure the asset at a cost below their estimated value, assuming independent private valuations and risk neutrality as foundational to . This structure promotes through competitive tension, with the auctioneer's role centered on enforcing predefined rules impartially to reveal the item's true market value without distortion. Bidders are often modeled as rational agents in economic theory, shading bids strategically to balance winning probability against overpayment risk, though behavioral deviations such as anchoring to initial prices or overbidding due to competitive occur in experimental settings. Empirical field evidence from professional contexts, including repeated participation in or auctions, indicates that experienced bidders mitigate such biases through learning and high-stakes discipline, exhibiting near-rational behavior with reduced overbidding relative to novices—new entrants submit fewer bids and underperform initially before converging toward equilibrium strategies. The auctioneer serves as a neutral catalyst, calling bids, tracking increments, and declaring the winner to ensure transparency and adherence to format rules, with incentives tied to transaction success rather than outcome manipulation. Neutrality is critical for credible price formation, as deviations like shill bidding—where the auctioneer or affiliates artificially inflate prices—are illegal in regulated jurisdictions such as the under federal statutes prohibiting , occurring infrequently due to oversight, penalties including fines up to $250,000 and imprisonment, and reputational costs in monitored environments like or major sales. Spectators and third parties, while not direct bidders, contribute to auction dynamics by providing observational liquidity—potentially entering as late bidders—and influencing atmosphere in live settings, where crowd presence can amplify emotional bidding intensity through social proof or perceived scarcity, though rigorous empirical quantification remains sparse and context-dependent. In physical auctions, studies of audience effects suggest heightened arousal from observers alters participant risk perception, occasionally elevating final prices by 5-10% in high-attendance events compared to subdued gatherings, underscoring the value of controlled environments for unbiased revelation.

Bidding Processes and Price Formation

In iterative bidding processes, such as those in English auctions, participants submit successive that must exceed the current highest offer by a predefined minimum increment, typically set by the auctioneer to manage pace and prevent nominal increases. For example, a $5 increment requires the next bid to advance the price by at least that amount from the standing bid of, say, $100 to $105 or higher. This structure contrasts with single-shot bidding in sealed formats, where each bidder submits one confidential offer without observing rivals' actions or revising based on interim feedback. Proxy bidding, common in digital platforms, automates this by allowing participants to enter a confidential maximum limit; the system then places incremental bids on their behalf up to that ceiling only as needed to counter competing offers, ensuring the winner pays the lowest amount necessary to secure the item. Price formation emerges from the aggregation of these bids toward an equilibrium where the final clearing price reflects the marginal bidder's . In ascending English auctions, the price trajectory ascends linearly from a starting point, with the auctioneer calling increments until dropouts leave a single active bidder, at which point the price settles at the level of the last competing bid. This dynamic reveals relative valuations through observable exits, fostering convergence as bidders adjust based on rivals' persistence. Empirical observations across auction datasets confirm that higher bidder counts correlate with reduced variance in final prices, as intensified compresses deviations from the item's underlying ; for instance, analyses of and resource auctions show bid spreads narrowing with participant numbers exceeding five to ten. Open visibility in iterative processes aids by disseminating bid levels in real time, enabling participants to calibrate offers against live and aggregate dispersed into a unified market signal. Data from detected bidding rings and investigations indicate that such transparency discourages sustained , as public bid streams heighten the risk of immediate deviation detection—evidenced by lower coordination success in open-outcry formats compared to concealed submissions, where side agreements evade scrutiny more readily. In contrast, mechanisms obscure this feedback, potentially amplifying uncertainty but insulating against overt signaling attempts.

Reserve Prices, Buyouts, and Additional Features

A reserve price is the minimum amount a seller will accept for an item, below which the good remains unsold even if bids are placed. In theoretical models of optimal , such as those for symmetric independent private values, the reserve price is set to maximize expected by excluding bidders with valuations below a threshold where the virtual valuation equals the seller's , as formalized by Myerson in 1981. Empirical analyses of English auctions, including field experiments on listings, demonstrate that higher reserve prices increase per sold item by filtering low bids and intensifying competition among higher-value participants, though they decrease the overall sale probability and number of bids received. In advertising auctions, reserve prices have been shown to substantially elevate platform by countering bidder underbidding, with effects persisting across varying bidder numbers. Public reserves in used car auctions similarly boost conditional but reduce participation, highlighting a where gains outweigh sales losses for high-value . Buyout options, exemplified by eBay's Buy-It-Now (BIN) feature introduced in 2000, permit immediate purchase at a seller-set fixed alongside traditional , often reducing auction duration by enabling quick sales to impatient or risk-averse buyers. Empirical investigations of eBay data indicate that BIN auctions yield higher revenues and compared to pure auctions without this hybrid, as they capture surplus from buyers valuing over competitive outcomes. However, buyouts can undervalue high-demand items by truncating bidding wars, leading to faster but potentially lower final prices relative to prolonged auctions, with temporary buyouts (vanishing after initial bids) mitigating some duration risks compared to permanent ones. Additional features include sequential or cascading auctions, where multiple items are sold one after another to the same bidder pool, allowing outcomes from prior sales to inform subsequent bids and potentially smoothing price volatility across lots. In practice, this format reveals bidder valuations progressively, enhancing revenue in multi-object settings by enabling strategic adjustments without simultaneous bidding complexity. Emerging integrations, such as (VR) for remote participation as of 2025, enable bidders to inspect items via 360-degree immersive views, reducing physical attendance needs while preserving feature authenticity through high-resolution 3D simulations. These tools trade off traditional in-person dynamics for broader access, with empirical adoption in platforms showing improved bidder engagement without revenue dilution.

Strategic Aspects

Bidder Strategies and the Winner's Curse

In common value auctions, where the item's worth is identical to all bidders but estimated imperfectly from private signals, rational bidders employ bid shading—submitting bids below their signal-based value estimate—to counteract the , the risk of overpayment arising from in winning. This strategy adjusts for the that the highest signal overstates the true value, as lower signals from competitors imply a downward revision upon ; failure to shade leads to negative expected profits for winners, even if bids are unbiased. Empirical models confirm that equilibrium bidding incorporates such shading, with the degree depending on signal precision and bidder count, ensuring zero expected profit in symmetric equilibria. Field evidence from U.S. (OCS) oil and gas lease auctions in the illustrates the winner's curse's real-world impact, where winners frequently incurred losses due to overestimated reserves; engineers Capen, Clapp, and Campbell analyzed showing post-auction returns averaging below zero for high bidders, attributing this to insufficient amid geological uncertainty. Subsequent econometric studies of these sealed-bid auctions validated common value assumptions, estimating that unadjusted would yield systematic overbids by 20-50% of true values, though experienced firms mitigated losses through iterative learning and reduced participation in high-uncertainty tracts. Behavioral deviations appear limited in aggregate , as outcomes aligned with models rather than persistent over-optimism, contrasting lab anomalies critiqued for lacking stakes or expertise. To further hedge against the curse, bidders in resource auctions often form consortia, pooling signals and risks to derive more accurate common value estimates and dilute individual overestimation; in OCS sales, joint bids by oil majors like Exxon and Shell correlated with higher post-win profitability, as shared seismic data enabled finer shading without full . This adjustment preserves efficiency by broadening participation while curbing aggressive solo bids, though antitrust scrutiny limits scale. In multi-item combinatorial auctions, where synergies complicate valuations, recent models assist by querying bidder demands iteratively and optimizing bundles to approximate equilibrium bids, reducing curse exposure in spaces; a framework integrates neural networks with clock auctions to elicit truthful queries, achieving near-optimal allocation in spectrum-like settings without exhaustive enumeration. Such AI tools, tested on synthetic and historical data, enable dynamic adjustments to signal correlations, outperforming bidders by 10-15% in benchmarks.

Auctioneer Tactics and Reserve Setting

Auctioneers, acting as agents for sellers, strategically set reserve prices to maximize expected by establishing a confidential floor that screens low-valuation bidders while incentivizing competitive among higher-valuation participants. In independent private value models, the optimal reserve price exceeds the seller's valuation, derived from the inverse hazard rate of the bidder value distribution, enabling surplus extraction akin to monopolistic . Empirical analyses of English auctions confirm that reserves enhance when calibrated appropriately, as they prevent sales below value and anchor bidder expectations upward without fully disclosing seller information. In art markets, undisclosed reserves correlate with higher realized prices for lots that sell, as evidenced by patterns where passed lots later fetch bids aligning with or exceeding initial reserves, indicating efficient thresholding rather than overpricing. Auction houses leverage their intermediary position to advise sellers on reserves based on market estimates, historical data, and current demand signals, often resulting in unsold rates of 10-30% but elevated averages for successful sales. This approach outperforms no-reserve auctions in volatile segments like , where bidder heterogeneity amplifies the value of floors. Beyond reserves, auctioneers deploy pacing and descriptive tactics to sustain momentum, such as low starting bids—typically 30-50% of —to broaden participation and foster incremental escalation. Chandelier bidding, involving announced phantom bids to simulate interest, is employed sparingly to bridge gaps toward the reserve, though it remains legally contentious; , such bids are permissible below reserve but constitute if used to misrepresent genuine competition above it. Recent in as of 2022 has eased prior restrictions on post-reserve chandelier bids, potentially increasing their tactical use without mandatory disclosure. These seller-side mechanisms promote revenue neutrality by amplifying revealed valuations through intensified rivalry, distinct from fixed-price listings where opaque seller guesses suppress dynamic and . Unlike bidder-centric distortions, auctioneer tactics focus on participation incentives, empirically yielding superior outcomes in competitive formats over static alternatives.

Collusion Risks and Detection

Collusion in auctions typically involves bidders forming rings to suppress , such as by submitting complementary bids where one bidder refrains from aggressive in exchange for reciprocal favors in other auctions, thereby keeping prices below competitive levels. This risk is more pronounced in sealed-bid formats, where private bid submission facilitates coordination without public observation, enabling rings to allocate wins through pre-arranged rotations or bid suppression. In contrast, indicates that collusion breakdowns are common in open ascending (English) auctions due to defection incentives: a colluding bidder can covertly outbid the designated "winner" to secure the item at the suppressed price, undermining the agreement and rendering sustained rings rare. Detection relies on post-auction econometric analysis of bid data for anomalies, such as identical losing bids, rotational winning patterns, or geographically clustered submissions inconsistent with independent competition. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has prosecuted numerous cases in sealed-bid auctions, including a 2024 among firms that rigged bids on over $100 million in Oklahoma highway projects through pre-arranged rotations. Similarly, in 2021, Contech Engineered Solutions pleaded guilty to in drainage pipe contracts, paying $8.5 million in penalties after evidence revealed coordinated submissions to allocate markets. Mitigation strategies emphasize structural design to exploit cartels' internal instabilities, such as inviting a larger number of potential bidders, which heightens coordination costs and free-rider incentives, making collusion less feasible as the participant pool expands beyond a manageable size. By 2025, blockchain implementations have emerged to enhance transparency in digital auctions, using immutable ledgers and cryptographic verification to enable real-time auditing of bids, thereby deterring collusion through verifiable non-repudiation and reduced opportunities for covert side-agreements.

Applications Across Contexts

Government and Spectrum Auctions

Government spectrum auctions represent a shift from administrative allocations, which historically resulted in inefficient use and forgone revenue, to market-based mechanisms that assign licenses to highest-value users while generating substantial fiscal returns. Prior to auctions, agencies like the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) relied on comparative hearings or lotteries, often leading to spectrum underutilization and zero direct revenue, as licenses were awarded without competitive pricing. The introduction of auctions via the U.S. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 enabled the FCC to conduct its first spectrum auction in July 1994 for narrowband personal communications services (PCS), raising $616 million initially, with subsequent auctions from 1994 to 1996 generating approximately $20 billion overall. These early sales demonstrated auctions' ability to reveal true market values, allocate spectrum to firms poised for rapid deployment, and fund public treasuries, contrasting sharply with pre-auction practices that sacrificed billions in potential revenue. European spectrum auctions in 2000 further evidenced this superiority, yielding nearly €110 billion across member states for 3G bands, with standout results including €50.8 billion in and £22.5 billion in the . These auctions outperformed administrative "beauty contests" used previously, which favored incumbents and stifled , by promoting broader market entry and spurring investments in mobile infrastructure that accelerated technological . Empirical analyses confirm auctions' edge in efficiency, as they minimize in allocation processes and ensure reaches users with the highest , fostering innovation booms in post-auction. For instance, U.K. auctions following 1980s telecom of British Telecom enhanced competitive dynamics, causally contributing to expanded network coverage and service innovation by incentivizing operators to deploy advanced technologies. In , reverse auctions—where suppliers bid downward to win contracts—have similarly proven effective for cost containment. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has implemented reverse auctions for low-value items, achieving measurable savings through heightened competition; broader federal use, including DoD, yielded up to $100 million in savings in 2016 alone via iterative bidding that drove prices below initial quotes. Studies estimate DoD could realize annual savings nearing $6.1 billion by scaling reverse auctions, as they counteract supplier pricing power and align with market efficiencies absent in traditional negotiations. Overall, these mechanisms underscore auctions' role in public by prioritizing empirical value revelation over subjective administrative judgments, yielding both fiscal and operational gains.

Commodity, Real Estate, and Art Markets

Auctions in markets, such as those for , , and , enable rapid by aggregating buyer and seller information in real time, contributing to market stability. For instance, physical auctions at venues like or cattle sales yards determine spot prices based on immediate signals, while futures contracts on the (CME) extend this process, providing deep liquidity and transparent pricing across global participants. This mechanism reduces information asymmetries and stabilizes prices by reflecting empirical factors like weather impacts on harvests or herd health, with CME's products facilitating hedging against volatility. In , auctions are prominently used for foreclosures and sales, offering efficiencies in provision during distressed conditions. Empirical observations indicate that auctioned properties typically close in under 30 days, contrasting with traditional listings that can linger for months or years due to protracted negotiations. This speed accelerates capital turnover and resolves ownership uncertainties faster, as evidenced in markets like delinquent auctions where competitive bidding uncovers buyer valuations without extended marketing periods. While prices may vary with demand strength, auctions enhance overall market fluidity by matching assets to highest-value users promptly. Art auctions at houses like and demonstrate sector-specific efficiencies through high-volume transactions that signal valuations and provide for illiquid assets. In 2023, achieved $3.8 billion in sales, followed by at $3.5 billion, with top lots including works by Picasso and Klimt fetching tens of millions, contributing to a combined top-10 total of $675.4 million. These sales reveal empirical willingness-to-pay, informed by and condition, fostering efficient price formation despite art's subjective elements; experienced auctioneers' pre-sale estimates further refine information quality, aiding buyer decisions. High bids often serve as signaling, yet the competitive format ensures allocations to those deriving highest , enhancing over private dealings.

Online Platforms and E-Commerce

Online auction platforms have dramatically expanded the scalability of auctions by digitizing bidding processes, allowing participants from diverse geographic locations to engage without physical presence requirements. Platforms like , which pioneered consumer-to-consumer and business-to-consumer auctions, facilitate global access through user-friendly interfaces and automated systems, reducing entry barriers such as travel costs and time constraints. In 2024, reported a (GMV) of $75 billion across its auctions and fixed-price listings, with auctions comprising a significant portion that underscores the format's role in enabling millions of daily transactions worldwide. This volume reflects how online mechanisms lower search and participation costs, empirically demonstrated to increase bidder involvement compared to traditional auctions, as lower informational frictions allow more casual participants to join without specialized knowledge or proximity to sale venues. Proxy bidding algorithms, a core feature on platforms like , automate incremental bids on behalf of users up to their predefined maximum, minimizing emotional overbidding while maintaining competitive dynamics. This system contrasts with manual by shielding participants from real-time pressure, yet it has spurred the development of sniping software—tools that submit bids in the auction's final seconds to exploit proxy limitations and potentially secure wins at lower prices. Empirical analyses of data indicate that sniping occurs in up to 10-20% of auctions and can reduce final prices by avoiding early bid escalation, though it may deter some participants wary of technological disadvantages; overall, such tools enhance for informed users but highlight persistent strategic adaptations in digital environments. The global market, valued at approximately $5.25 billion in 2023, is projected to reach $11.3 billion by 2032, driven by these algorithmic efficiencies that democratize access for small sellers and buyers in emerging markets. The from 2020 onward accelerated the adoption of hybrid live-streamed auctions, blending real-time video with remote bidding to replicate in-person excitement while sustaining physical elements for high-value sales. Auction houses like reported a digital audience of 3.3 million engaging with livestreams in 2021, a trend that persisted into 2025 with integrated platforms allowing synchronized global participation and reducing geographic barriers further. This shift has been empirically linked to broader , as remote bidding volumes surged without corresponding drops in average sale prices, enabling sustained scalability post-pandemic. Emerging (VR) integrations, tested in select 2024-2025 pilots by platforms and houses, allow immersive virtual inspections of items, further lowering evaluation costs and boosting participation among tech-savvy demographics, though adoption remains limited to niche applications as of 2025.

Emerging Technological Integrations

technology has facilitated decentralized auctions through non-fungible tokens (NFTs), enabling direct transfers of digital assets without traditional intermediaries, thereby reducing associated rents and verification costs. The NFT market experienced a boom in 2021, with sales volumes peaking amid high-profile auctions, but by 2025, it has matured toward practical utilities like real-world asset tokenization and cross-chain standards, with the global market valued at approximately $34.1 billion and projected to reach $61.01 billion by year-end at an 18.5% CAGR from 2020. This integration enhances trust via immutable ledgers, as seen in platforms like , which handled millions of visits monthly in 2025 while supporting auction formats for unique digital items. Advances in have enabled data-driven auction design, approximating optimal mechanisms from sampled bidder rather than analytical solutions alone. A 2024 Journal of the ACM paper introduced differentiable frameworks using neural networks to solve multi-item optimal auction problems end-to-end, achieving strategy-proof outcomes that outperform prior heuristics in complex settings. Building on this, a 2025 ACM study on robust data-driven auction design employs to derive revenue-maximizing rules resilient to distributional shifts, demonstrating empirical improvements in simulated environments with heterogeneous bidder valuations. These methods leverage sample-based optimization, allowing auctioneers to tailor formats dynamically based on historical , though they require validation against real-world constraints. Virtual and augmented reality (VR/AR) technologies have introduced immersive remote bidding for unique assets like and , expanding participation while empirically boosting efficiency. In online house auctions, VR integration increased final sale prices by 5.2%—equivalent to about $16,306 USD—by enhancing bidder immersion and reducing information asymmetries through virtual walkthroughs. AR overlays enable real-time asset inspection via mobile devices, cutting travel costs for international bidders, as adopted by major auction houses for hybrid events since the early 2020s; studies indicate this lowers logistical expenses by up to 30% in remote scenarios without compromising perceived value. Such tools verify efficiency gains by correlating higher engagement metrics with faster in dispersed markets.

Economic Impacts and Significance

Resource Allocation Efficiency

Auctions facilitate efficient resource allocation by directing goods to bidders with the highest private valuations, thereby minimizing associated with suboptimal uses. In theoretical models with independent private values, formats such as the ensure incentive-compatible bidding that reveals true valuations, leading to allocations that maximize total surplus without requiring a central to possess complete information on individual preferences. Empirical analyses across , , and other settings confirm low losses, with driving outcomes close to full surplus extraction; for instance, studies of auctions report deadweight losses below levels implied by entry costs alone, as additional bidders enhance allocative precision. Compared to administrative allocations or lotteries, auctions yield Pareto improvements by avoiding random assignments or bureaucratic judgments that ignore dispersed bidder . Administrative methods, such as pre-1994 FCC comparative hearings for licenses, prolonged allocation processes—often spanning years—while failing to aggregate private on optimal uses, resulting in persistent mismatches until costly resales or reauctions occurred. Lotteries, used for early cellular licenses, exacerbated inefficiencies, requiring up to a for market-driven reallocation due to high transaction frictions. In contrast, auction mechanisms enable bidders to express package preferences, forming efficient aggregations with minimal post-auction trading, as evidenced by uniform pricing across similar licenses (differences under 1% in early FCC auctions) and high initial assignment stability. This informational aggregation mirrors broader market processes, where bidding incorporates fragmented private data—such as local demand forecasts or technological synergies—beyond any planner's grasp, directing resources to highest-value applications without centralized computation. In FCC spectrum auctions, this has manifested in tangible outcomes: exclusive licenses post-1994 spurred investments yielding U.S. in 4G coverage, with reduced interference enabling reliable nationwide service expansion that pre-auction rigidities hindered. Offshore oil lease auctions similarly demonstrate Pareto dominance over non-market alternatives, allocating tracts to firms best positioned for extraction while preserving surplus for non-winners through competitive . Empirical work on diverse goods, including timber and , reinforces that such mechanisms sustain near-efficient equilibria even under strategic behavior, with deadweight losses curtailed by revealed bid patterns.

Revenue Generation and Market Liquidity

Auctions serve as a critical mechanism for governments to generate substantial fiscal revenues, particularly through the allocation of licenses and of public assets. Globally, auctions have raised over $100 billion in proceeds since the , enabling efficient assignment of radio frequencies while funding public budgets. In the United States, the has collected more than $155 billion from auctions over the past decade, with additional billions from ongoing sales supporting deficit reduction and investments. Similarly, cumulative proceeds from global programs, frequently executed via competitive auctions, surpassed $1 trillion by the early 2000s, demonstrating auctions' capacity to unlock value from state-owned enterprises and natural resources. U.S. Treasury auctions exemplify revenue generation on a massive scale, with 2023 issuances of marketable securities—encompassing bills, notes, bonds, and inflation-protected securities—totaling trillions in gross proceeds to federal borrowing needs and rollover maturing . These uniform-price and competitive formats ensure broad participation from investors, minimizing borrowing costs while providing predictable to the debt market; for context, analogous auctions issued approximately $28.5 trillion across 440 events. Such mechanisms not only bolster government fiscal flexibility but also stabilize amid varying economic conditions. In private markets, auctions enhance by facilitating rapid asset disposition in distress scenarios, such as corporate bankruptcies or forced , where bilateral negotiations often prolong stagnation and erode value. By drawing diverse bidders and enforcing transparent pricing, auctions accelerate turnover, preempting further depreciation and injecting capital into recovering sectors—as observed in the 2023 rebound, where auction-driven in illiquid assets supported broader market stabilization. Empirical analyses of over-the-counter markets underscore this, showing auction formats maintain fluidity even under stress for assets with varying quality, outperforming opaque negotiations in transaction velocity. Real estate markets illustrate auctions' liquidity advantages, with studies revealing that auction sales yield swift and reduced momentum effects compared to negotiations, enabling higher transaction volumes and market fluidity. For instance, auctioned properties exhibit predictive with minimal serial , contrasting negotiated deals' prolonged adjustments, which can hinder overall turnover; this dynamic has proven vital in high-velocity segments like foreclosures, where auctions expedite conversions to productive use. Such evidence counters views undervaluing auctions, highlighting their role in sustaining economic circulation over protracted private dealings.

Empirical Evidence of Market Benefits

Empirical analyses of auctions reveal consistent cost reductions relative to negotiated alternatives. A study of enterprise-wide auctions reported an average 9.6% decrease in costs over three years, equating to $17.91 million in annual savings adjusted to dollars, attributed to intensified among bidders. Similarly, reviews of online reverse auctions highlight prices frequently lower than those from bilateral negotiations, with savings driven by dynamics that pressure suppliers to reveal efficiencies. These findings hold across datasets where bidder numbers exceed thresholds for effective rivalry, countering claims of inherent inefficiency in standardized goods markets. Auction formats also demonstrate revenue advantages over fixed-price or sequential mechanisms in empirical settings. Discriminatory multi-unit auctions, for example, outperform uniform-price variants by generating 0.01% to 1.5% higher revenues in treasury bill sales, as bidders shade less aggressively under quantity-discounted pricing. Field data from diverse auctions confirm holds approximately under independent private values, but strategic designs—such as those informed by Wilson and Milgrom's models—yield superior outcomes by mitigating and encouraging entry, with realized revenues aligning closely to theoretical benchmarks in high-stakes environments. Participation in auctions empirically supports net gains for voluntary agents, as bidders enter only when anticipated surplus exceeds costs, fostering without coerced exploitation. Datasets from and auctions show positive net welfare for entrants, with losses minimal (under 5% deviation from first-best) when designs neutralize common informational asymmetries, as per post-Nobel validations of neutral auction architectures. Post-auction analyses indicate sustained supplier , with cost curves shifting downward due to competitive spillovers, rather than entrenching biases toward incumbents. These patterns affirm auctions' role in realizing mutual gains, distinct from zero-sum negotiations prone to holdout frictions.

Controversies and Criticisms

Fraud, Manipulation, and Shill Bidding

Shill bidding occurs when sellers or their agents place fictitious bids to artificially inflate the perceived value of an item, driving up the final price paid by legitimate bidders. Empirical analyses of auctions, including those for , estimate shill activity in a minority of listings, with detection rates aided by algorithms that analyze bidding patterns such as rapid escalations from new accounts or bids just above competitors. Platform-enforced policies, including account suspensions, limit its prevalence, as evidenced by studies showing shill bids contributing to only modest price inflation in affected auctions, often under 10% above . Bid rigging, a form of collusion where competitors agree to suppress bids or allocate contracts, undermines auction competitiveness and has been targeted by U.S. Department of Justice antitrust enforcement. In the construction sector during the , prosecutions included cases against ready-mix concrete firms for fixing prices and rigging bids, resulting in multimillion-dollar fines and prison terms averaging 25 months by fiscal year 2012. Similar actions addressed real estate foreclosure auctions, with over 36 individuals charged by 2013 for schemes inflating default property prices through coordinated non-competitive bidding. These prosecutions demonstrate regulatory deterrence, as escalating penalties and leniency programs for cooperators have disrupted cartels, though indicates persistent challenges in sealed-bid formats where transparency is limited. Open auction formats inherently expose manipulation through public bid histories, enabling bidder scrutiny and self-correction via mechanisms. Platforms like correlate higher seller ratings with reduced disputes, as buyers avoid low- accounts exhibiting irregular bidding, thereby incentivizing honest behavior without formal intervention. Emerging blockchain implementations further mitigate risks by providing immutable, decentralized ledgers of bids, preventing retroactive alterations and enabling smart contracts that impose dynamic penalties for detected patterns, as proposed in frameworks tested post-2020. While not eliminating all malpractices, these combined deterrents—transparency, , and technology—empirically curb widespread , with DOJ data showing sustained enforcement in reducing convicted collusions over time.

Debates on Fairness and Inequality

Auctions are often critiqued for favoring wealthier participants, as bidding capacity correlates with financial resources, potentially reinforcing economic disparities in outcomes for high-value items like art or real estate. However, auction theory posits that standard formats, such as English or Vickrey auctions, ensure procedural fairness through anonymous, nondiscriminatory rules that allocate goods to the highest valuer, independent of bidder identity, thereby revealing objective market values rather than arbitrary preferences. This merit-based approach counters claims of inherent bias by prioritizing demonstrated willingness to pay, which proxies for perceived utility, over egalitarian redistribution. Empirical analyses of auction markets, including and sales, emphasize efficiency in over evidence of inequality amplification, with studies showing that auction designs promote competitive neutrality without systematically widening wealth gaps beyond pre-existing distributions. For instance, experimental data indicate that market auctions enhance perceived fairness as a procedure, even when outcomes vary by bidder strength, as participants view itself as equitable compared to non-market alternatives like . Critics' focus on "rich win" dynamics overlooks that fixed-price sales or similarly concentrate assets among the affluent without competitive of value, rendering auctions comparatively neutral. Data from diverse auction contexts reveal no causal link to rising inequality; instead, broader participation in formats has democratized access for non-elite bidders, diluting concentration in segments like collectibles and enabling value discovery across income levels. While art auctions exhibit ownership skewed toward high-net-worth individuals—reflecting item rarity and global bidder pools— this pattern persists across sales methods and does not empirically stem from auction alone, but from asset illiquidity and valuation heterogeneity. Academic sources, often institutionally inclined toward equity critiques, provide limited quantitative support for systemic unfairness claims, prioritizing metrics in empirical work.

Critiques of Government Interventions

Government-imposed reserve prices in auctions, intended to ensure minimum revenues or protect sellers, often reduce by deterring bidder participation and preventing assets from reaching their highest-valued users. Empirical studies of and resource auctions demonstrate that high reserve prices correlate with fewer bidders and lower overall efficiency, as they exclude marginal participants who might otherwise compete effectively. In contexts like online and timber auctions, reserves set too aggressively lead to suboptimal outcomes, with showing diminished revenues and trade realization when bidder entry is stifled. Pre-1990s administrative allocations of exemplified the inefficiencies of non-market government interventions, where licenses were assigned via lotteries, beauty contests, or first-come-first-served methods, resulting in underutilization and failure to reveal true economic values. These approaches wasted resources by prioritizing political or arbitrary criteria over competitive , contrasting sharply with post-1994 FCC auctions that enhanced efficiency through market mechanisms. Auctions mitigated these distortions by eliciting bidders' valuations directly, generating superior without extensive regulatory overlays. Political favoritism in auctions further distorts outcomes, as in tender processes enables , inflating costs and favoring connected firms over efficient ones. Studies of asymmetric reveal that favoritism toward incumbents or allies leads to higher prices and reduced , with from reforms showing bunching of bids around thresholds indicative of manipulated . In emerging economies, such interventions correlate with lower firm productivity growth, as politically favored contracts misallocate resources away from merit-based allocation. Mechanisms like Vickrey auctions, requiring minimal intervention beyond truthful bidding rules, have demonstrated success in by incentivizing accurate valuations without reserves or favoritism, though their rarity stems from implementation challenges rather than inherent flaws. Recent analyses of auctions, including those for conservation payments, indicate that excessive regulation—such as complex eligibility criteria—hampers participation and cost-effectiveness, with studies up to 2025 underscoring that streamlined formats yield better empirical results than heavily administered alternatives.

References

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