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Tank plinking
Tank plinking
Tank plinking
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Tank plinking is the military practice of using precision-guided munitions to destroy artillery, armored personnel carriers, tanks, and other targets.[1] The term was coined by pilots during the Gulf War, but discouraged by the military.[2] As the war progressed, the term began to encompass all forms of destroying a target with an excessively capable weapon.[3]

General Norman Schwarzkopf was looking for a plan to incapacitate 50% of the Iraqi army before any ground invasion could begin. Planning was performed including high intensity air strikes with General Dynamics F-111, A-6 Intruder, F-15E Strike Eagle, F/A-18 Hornet, AV-8 Harrier, A-10 Thunderbolt II, and F-16 Fighting Falcon crews. This culminated in December 1990, with Operation Night Camel in which air crews of the F-111 evaluated the ability of aircraft to use guided munitions with the LANTIRN and Pave Tack target designation systems from medium altitude.

This is a deviation from standard military air engagement. Due to the prevalence of surface-to-air missiles, most aviators would prefer to engage a target from either a very high altitude, or a very low altitude, and certainly with low observability aircraft. However, the Iraqi defenses proved very inadequate. The winning combination[citation needed] for the eventual campaign was either a pair or quartet of F-111F aircraft loaded with four GBU-12 500 lb (230 kg), laser-guided bombs. Bombs were designated for entrenched, hard targets, and for softer targets (e.g. armoured personnel carriers).

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Tank plinking

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from Grokipedia
Tank plinking is a tactic involving the use of precision-guided munitions, particularly laser-guided bombs, to systematically destroy individual enemy tanks, armored personnel carriers, , and other ground targets from , often conducted at medium altitudes during nighttime operations. The term, coined by U.S. pilots, evokes the casual imagery of "" at targets with a but refers to highly effective, cost-efficient strikes that neutralized high-value assets like Iraqi tanks, each valued at approximately $1.5 million, using bombs costing around $10,000. This practice gained prominence during Operation Desert Storm in the 1991 , where it shifted air tactics from low-level bombing to safer medium-altitude missions enabled by advanced infrared targeting pods and navigation systems. Aircraft such as the F-111F Aardvark, F-15E Strike Eagle, and A-6 Intruder were key platforms, employing laser-guided bombs to achieve remarkable success rates; for instance, F-111Fs alone flew over 4,000 in the war's final weeks, earning credit for more than 1,500 verified kills on armored vehicles. In one notable mission, two F-15Es destroyed 16 Iraqi vehicles in a single , demonstrating the tactic's precision and impact on denying enemy mobility. Tank plinking exemplified the transformative role of precision airstrikes in , contributing to the rapid degradation of Iraq's forces and influencing subsequent doctrines on integrated air-ground operations. Despite its effectiveness, the informal name drew criticism from commanders like Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, who reportedly urged pilots to avoid it in official communications, preferring more formal terminology. The approach highlighted advancements in and munitions that minimized while maximizing strategic gains.

Overview

Definition

Tank plinking is a military aviation tactic involving the use of aircraft-delivered precision-guided munitions to systematically target and destroy individual armored vehicles, such as tanks, artillery pieces, and personnel carriers, particularly those positioned in revetted, dispersed, or camouflaged locations on the battlefield. This approach emphasizes high-accuracy strikes that exploit advanced targeting systems to neutralize high-value ground targets with minimal collateral damage and pilot exposure. The tactic is characterized by low-risk engagements conducted from medium altitudes, often under cover of darkness, allowing to loiter over designated areas and methodically eliminate threats without the vulnerabilities associated with missions at low levels. By focusing on precision-guided munitions, tank plinking prioritizes efficiency in disrupting enemy mobility and , denying adversaries the ability to maneuver armored forces effectively. This method represents a shift toward standoff precision strikes, reducing the need for direct visual acquisition and enhancing overall operational safety. Tank plinking described the use of precision-guided munitions to target individual tanks and other armored , often in dispersed or revetted positions. Typical targets include main battle tanks like the , infantry fighting such as the BMP series, and towed systems, all of which are systematically engaged to degrade armored capabilities.

Etymology

The term "tank plinking" was coined by U.S. Air Force aircrews during the 1991 Persian Gulf War to describe the tactic of using precision-guided munitions, such as laser-guided bombs, to systematically destroy Iraqi armored vehicles from medium altitudes at night. This slang emerged in post-mission debriefs as pilots observed the relative ease of targeting stationary tanks illuminated by infrared sensors, drawing a direct parallel to casual recreational shooting. The word "plinking" itself originates from civilian , where it denotes informal target practice with or air guns at improvised objects like tin cans or bottles, mimicking the sharp, metallic "plink" sound of impacts. In the context, "tank plinking" adapted this concept to convey the precision and repetition of downing high-value targets with advanced technology, evoking an image of effortless marksmanship akin to " in a barrel" against a technologically outmatched foe. Although F-111 crews initially expressed reservations about the term, viewing it as downplaying the operational risks involved, it gained traction despite discouragement from senior leaders like General Norman Schwarzkopf, who saw it as trivializing serious combat efforts; ultimately, as predicted by Lt. Gen. Charles Horner, the phrase endured in official documentation and media accounts. This adoption reflects a broader in post-Vietnam toward informal, assured phrasing that underscores confidence in superior capabilities.

Historical Context

Pre-Gulf War Planning

In the lead-up to Operation Desert Storm, General Norman Schwarzkopf, as Commander in Chief of U.S. Central Command, established a key strategic objective to use air power to disable approximately 50% of the Iraqi Republican Guard's armored forces prior to any ground invasion, aiming to render the elite units combat-ineffective and facilitate a swift coalition advance. This goal was integrated into the broader buildup phase starting in August 1990, following Iraq's invasion of , with air campaigns prioritized to attrit Iraqi ground capabilities through targeted strikes on armor, , and logistics. Tank plinking tactics emerged from the U.S. military's doctrine, which emphasized integrated air-ground operations for deep strikes against enemy second-echelon forces, but the approach was largely improvised due to the doctrine's lack of specific provisions for nighttime precision strikes on dispersed, revetted armor formations in desert environments. Pre-war planning had not fully anticipated the need for such low-observable, medium-altitude operations using targeting, leading planners to adapt existing concepts to exploit air superiority and precision-guided munitions for individual vehicle destruction. This doctrinal evolution was shaped by exercises like Internal Look 90 in July-August 1990, which simulated air campaigns against Iraqi-like forces and highlighted gaps in targeting mobile armor. Early preparations included Operation Night Camel in December 1990, a series of training missions designed to evaluate the feasibility of nighttime interdiction against simulated Iraqi armor, focusing initially on suppressing (SAM) threats to allow safe medium-altitude bombing runs. These operations tested infrared-equipped in locating and engaging revetted positions, establishing procedures for precision strikes that would underpin tank plinking while addressing SAM vulnerabilities through dedicated suppression efforts in the initial air campaign phases. Intelligence played a pivotal role in setting the stage for targeted strikes, with reconnaissance assets deployed to identify revetted tank positions across the Iraqi desert, drawing on archival imagery, , and emerging real-time platforms to build a target list of over 200 sites including armor by late 1990. Pre-war efforts, constrained by sanctions and limited access, relied on U-2 and RF-4 sorties to map dispersed formations, providing planners with initial coordinates for air tasking orders and emphasizing the need for to track attrition progress.

Operation Desert Storm

Tank plinking operations commenced on January 17, 1991, the opening night of Operation Desert Storm, with initial strikes targeting Iraqi Republican Guard divisions as part of the coalition's strategic air campaign to degrade Saddam Hussein's elite armored forces. These early missions marked a shift from broad strategic bombing to precision attacks on high-value ground targets, integrating seamlessly with the larger aerial effort that involved over 100,000 total coalition sorties to achieve air supremacy and interdict Iraqi supply lines. F-111F Aardvark aircraft from the U.S. Air Force's 20th Fighter Wing led these efforts, launching from bases in the United Arab Emirates to conduct nighttime medium-altitude precision strikes deep into Iraqi-held territory. Key events unfolded rapidly as the air campaign progressed, with F-111F crews focusing on armored columns, including those of the retreating units from in late February. A pivotal phase occurred during the on February 26-27, 1991, where F-111Fs struck convoys of Iraqi vehicles fleeing northward along Highway 80 toward southern , contributing to the disruption of the enemy's withdrawal. Operations peaked during the 100-hour ground war from February 24 to 28, 1991, as coalition ground forces advanced, allowing aircrews to support the rapid maneuver by targeting residual armored threats in real time. The scale of tank plinking efforts was substantial, with F-111Fs alone flying over 4,000 sorties during the 43-day air campaign, concentrating on positions in southern and key retreat routes like the to prevent Iraqi reinforcements and ensure coalition momentum. These missions represented a high operational tempo, with the 84 deployed F-111Fs achieving a mission-capable rate exceeding 85%, enabling sustained pressure on dispersed Iraqi armor. Mission execution faced significant challenges, including adverse weather that obscured targeting and complicated low-level navigation for F-111Fs. Iraqi electronic countermeasures, such as jamming and decoys, further complicated , while the dispersed nature of Iraqi tanks in revetments and bunkers demanded adaptive planning, with crews often adjusting routes mid-mission to evade defenses and locate elusive armored units. Despite these obstacles, the integration of precision-guided munitions like laser-guided bombs allowed crews to maintain effectiveness in contested environments.

Operational Tactics

Nighttime Strikes

Nighttime strikes formed a core component of tank plinking operations during Operation Desert Storm, leveraging darkness to enhance survivability and effectiveness against Iraqi armored forces. These missions typically involved medium-altitude bomb deliveries from 10,000 to 20,000 feet, which allowed aircraft to operate above the effective range of most anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) while minimizing pilot fatigue associated with prolonged low-level flights. This altitude profile was particularly suited for precision-guided munitions, enabling accurate targeting under cover of night to exploit Iraqi forces' limited nocturnal defenses. The mission flow emphasized efficiency through structured loitering in designated "kill boxes"—predefined 30 by 30 nautical mile zones over enemy concentrations—where would circle to identify and engage targets sequentially. Pilots would drop bombs one vehicle at a time, often using laser-guided bombs in rapid succession to maximize destruction per without overcommitting resources, as seen in operations where pairs of averaged multiple vehicle kills by striking convoys at intervals of about . This methodical approach, supported by brief integration of technologies like (FLIR) systems, ensured high hit rates while conserving munitions. Risk mitigation relied heavily on maintaining standoff distances beyond the reach of fire and coalition-wide suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) to shield attacking from surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and radar-guided threats. SEAD operations, involving dedicated assets like equipped with anti-radiation missiles, neutralized key Iraqi SAM sites early in the campaign, creating safer corridors for nighttime bombers. By operating at these elevated altitudes and ranges, typically 5 to 25 nautical miles from targets, missions reduced vulnerability to ground fire, with studies confirming medium-altitude tactics as the most survivable against dense AAA environments. Adaptations to nighttime operations accelerated after initial SEAD efforts effectively suppressed Iraq's SAM network by the third day of the air campaign, transitioning from daylight and limited night s to comprehensive 24/7 coverage. This shift, beginning around January 19, 1991, eliminated the need for risky low-altitude daylight runs and capitalized on night-vision advancements, allowing sustained pressure on Iraqi armor without respite. As a result, tank plinking evolved into a predominantly nocturnal activity, with full-night cycles enabling higher sortie rates and broader area denial.

Target Acquisition

Target acquisition in tank plinking relied heavily on advanced sensor integration to detect and designate Iraqi armored vehicles concealed in revetments or dispersed across the Theater of Operations (KTO). (FLIR) systems, such as the pod on the F-111F and on the F-15E, enabled detection of engine-hot tanks by capturing their heat signatures against cooler desert backgrounds, allowing identification even after sunset when visual cues faded. designation pods, integrated with these FLIR systems, then illuminated specific vehicles for precision-guided munitions like the GBU-12 bomb, ensuring accurate energy reflection back to the weapon's seeker. The acquisition process typically began with scout or lead aircraft, such as F-16 Killer Scouts or F-111F crews, sweeping assigned es to locate targets using FLIR imagery and relaying coordinates via datalink or voice to wingmen. Once confirmed, the lead aircraft lased the target, prompting trailing aircraft to release munitions in a coordinated "buddy" lasing sequence that minimized exposure time. This chain involved multiple aircraft per —often four-ship formations—for sustained coverage, with forward air controllers (FACs) validating targets to deconflict from friendly forces and enable rapid handoffs. Key challenges included distinguishing real armor from Iraqi decoys, such as dummy tanks and bunkers designed to mimic threats, and operating amid sandstorms, haze, and smoke that obscured visual and sometimes degraded FLIR performance. Thermal FLIR mitigated these by highlighting heat differentials from operational engines in genuine vehicles, which decoys lacked, while multi-spectral aspects of integrated pods provided enhanced contrast in low-visibility conditions. Sandstorms, which reduced visibility to near zero during nighttime strikes, were overcome through FLIR's penetration of particulates and reliance on backups for initial positioning. Practiced team coordination drastically improved efficiency, reducing the average time from detection to destruction to minutes per target; for instance, F-15E pairs destroyed 16 armored vehicles in a single using just eight GBU-12s. Overall, this sensor-driven approach achieved high success rates, with A-10s often securing single-pass kills via Maverick missiles guided by onboard IR seekers acting as a supplementary FLIR.

Equipment

Aircraft Employed

The primary aircraft employed in tank plinking operations during Operation Desert Storm were the General Dynamics F-111F Aardvark and the . The F-111F, a supersonic , flew 2,423 sorties, leveraging its for low-level night ingress to evade defenses while delivering precision strikes against Iraqi armored vehicles. Equipped with the AN/AVQ-26 pod for infrared detection and laser designation, the F-111F enabled crews to identify and illuminate targets from standoff distances, facilitating the use of laser-guided bombs in medium-altitude attacks. A total of 66 F-111Fs were deployed, primarily from the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing based at , , with operations staged from , , and other forward locations. The F-15E Strike Eagle served as a multi-role complement, conducting over 2,200 sorties with its integrated (Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night) pods for terrain-following navigation and targeting. This all-weather capability allowed the F-15E to perform tank plinking missions in diverse conditions, including SCUD hunting and armored vehicle , while maintaining air-to-air proficiency. With 48 aircraft deployed from , , the F-15E's conformal fuel tanks and enhanced supported extended loiter times over the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations. Secondary platforms included the , which provided all-weather attack support with its (Target Recognition Attack Multi-sensor) system for night precision strikes. squadrons from the A-6E variant flew hundreds of sorties, contributing to tank plinking by employing laser-guided munitions against revetted armor. The focused on close air support variants for engaging softer targets and residual armor, utilizing its cannon and missiles in daylight operations, with 144 aircraft deployed for nearly 8,100 sorties overall. The General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon offered agility for follow-up strikes, with LANTIRN-equipped Block 30 variants enabling night tank plinking; 249 F-16s flew almost 13,500 sorties, including ground attack roles post-initial interdiction. Key modifications across platforms emphasized night operations, such as the integration of on the F-111F for self-designation and on the F-15E and F-16 for pod-based targeting. Crews underwent specialized training, including the USAF's Operation Night Camel exercise, which adapted F-111F pilots from low-altitude profiles to medium-altitude precision drops using goggles and systems. Deployment efforts drew from U.S. wings like the 20th and 48th Tactical Fighter Wings, alongside contributions from carrier-based A-6 squadrons and Marine Corps aviators supporting integrated strikes. These adaptations ensured compatibility with precision-guided munitions like the , as detailed in subsequent equipment analyses.

Precision-Guided Munitions

The primary employed in tank plinking operations during the was the , a 500-pound derived from the Mk 82 fitted with a Paveway II guidance kit. This weapon was delivered by aircraft such as the F-111F and F-15E, enabling nighttime strikes against Iraqi armored vehicles with high effectiveness; a total of 4,493 GBU-12s were expended, accounting for a significant portion of anti-armor missions. Its precision allowed for near single-bomb destruction of tanks and other point targets, demonstrating superior performance over unguided alternatives in medium-altitude deliveries. The GBU-12 utilized semi-active laser homing (SALH) guidance technology, where the bomb's seeker head homed in on laser energy reflected from the target, designated by (FLIR) pods such as the on the F-111F or on the F-15E. This line-of-sight system required direct illumination of the target and did not rely on GPS, making it suitable for dynamic, low-light environments typical of tank plinking. Accuracy was enhanced by real-time , achieving a (CEP) of approximately 3 to 6 meters under optimal conditions, which contributed to its role in over 2,700 anti-armor strikes. Alternatives to the GBU-12 included the larger , a 2,000-pound variant using the same SALH guidance but paired with the Mk 84 bomb body for engaging hardened or more resilient targets, with 2,637 units expended during the conflict. Cluster munitions, such as the Mk-20 Rockeye, were occasionally used in anti-armor roles to provide area coverage following initial precision strikes, though they were less central to tactics. Key technical advantages of these munitions encompassed reduced through pinpoint delivery compared to unguided bombs, as well as the capacity to defeat earth-revetted tanks by directing explosive force effectively against armored hulls.

Results and Analysis

Verified Kills

During Operation Desert Storm, F-111 aircraft conducting tank plinking missions were credited with over 1,500 verified armor kills against Iraqi forces, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces. These attributions stemmed from nighttime precision strikes using laser-guided bombs, primarily targeting units in kill boxes within and southern . Across the , air and ground forces, including tank plinking tactics, contributed to the estimated destruction of over 4,000 Iraqi armored vehicles, with confirmations derived from battle assessment (BDA) photographs, footage, and post-strike . This figure encompasses efforts by multiple platforms, including F-111s, F-15Es, and A-10s, focusing on isolated armored targets to minimize and maximize efficiency. However, post-war analyses, including GAO reports, highlighted challenges in BDA, such as potential overcounting from multiple attacks on damaged targets. Verification of these kills relied on a rigorous post-mission process, incorporating video recordings from targeting pods, detailed pilot debrief reports, and cross-checks against ground forces' visual sightings and imagery. This methodology addressed initial challenges in BDA, such as overloaded channels, by prioritizing cockpit videotape evidence validated by ground liaison officers. Notable among F-111 achievements was a 95% mission success rate in tank plinking operations, enabling single sorties to destroy multiple targets through sequential designations and releases. Over 4,000 such sorties were flown by the deployed F-111 fleet, demonstrating the tactic's reliability in low-visibility conditions.

Military Impact

Tank plinking severely degraded the mobility of the Iraqi , preventing effective counterattacks during the coalition's ground offensive by destroying key armored assets and disrupting logistics networks. Precision strikes using -guided targeted dug-in tanks and command nodes, immobilizing elite units such as the Tawakalna and divisions, which reduced their operational effectiveness and contributed to the rapid collapse of Iraqi defenses. This tactical disruption aligned with General Norman Schwarzkopf's strategy to prioritize the as the enemy's center of gravity, enabling the ground phase to advance with minimal resistance. The psychological impact of tank plinking was profound, demoralizing Iraqi forces through relentless nighttime attacks that instilled fear of coalition air superiority and led to widespread surrenders. Prisoner interrogations revealed that the constant threat of precision strikes eroded morale, with many troops citing the terror of aircraft like the A-10 and F-15E as a primary factor in their decision to capitulate en masse during the ground campaign. This exemplified the restoration of U.S. air dominance following the , as the ability to deliver surgical blows from standoff distances shattered Iraqi confidence in their armored forces. Tank plinking achieved significant resource denial, with air campaigns causing an estimated 23-30% attrition to tanks in divisions like Tawakalna and prior to the ground invasion, leaving them at approximately 55% and 54% remaining strength, respectively, by the start of the ground war on 24 February 1991. This preemptive degradation fulfilled Schwarzkopf's objective of attriting high-value targets through , directly shortening the ground war to just 100 hours by crippling Iraq's ability to mount a coherent defense. Such outcomes were confirmed through battle damage assessments, including cockpit videotapes that verified strikes on thousands of vehicles. The practice of tank plinking marked a doctrinal shift from mass bombing campaigns to surgical precision strikes, emphasizing the efficiency of laser-guided munitions in neutralizing armor concentrations while minimizing . This approach influenced subsequent military strategies, particularly in , by promoting the avoidance of large-scale armored deployments in favor of dispersed, protected assets vulnerable to targeted . The success of these tactics, as analyzed in post-war surveys, underscored the value of integrating advanced sensors and guided weapons for high-impact, low-risk operations.

Legacy

Doctrinal Influence

Following the , tank plinking tactics were integrated into U.S. as an exemplar of precision engagement, emphasizing the role of in systematically attriting enemy ground forces through targeted strikes. This approach aligned with principles of integrated joint operations for achieving decisive effects on the battlefield. Furthermore, these tactics influenced the evolution of doctrine (developed in the 1980s) toward effects-based operations in the post-Cold War era, where air superiority and precision strikes were prioritized to disrupt enemy cohesion rather than relying solely on massed forces, as evidenced by post-war analyses of the campaign's operational outcomes from the 1990s. Training adaptations in the U.S. incorporated elements of tank plinking into exercises like Red Flag, which post-Gulf War added scenarios simulating medium-altitude nighttime interdiction using infrared pods and laser-guided munitions to replicate the kill chains observed in training exercises such as Night Camel. These updates emphasized multi-aircraft coordination, including buddy-lasing techniques and joint suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), to enhance and deconfliction in low-visibility environments, building on lessons from Desert Storm's missions. The U.S. military officially discouraged the colloquial term "tank plinking" in favor of "precision strikes" to uphold professional standards and avoid trivializing combat operations, a stance notably articulated by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf during the war; however, the phrase persisted informally in after-action reviews and pilot debriefs as a for the tactic's precision and repetition. Tank plinking's success informed broader emulation of precision strike tactics, particularly among allies, who incorporated related precision engagement concepts into joint exercises during the 1990s as part of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), contributing to defense reforms shifting priorities from quantity of conventional munitions to investment in smart weapons systems, as validated by the Gulf War's demonstration of technological superiority in achieving battlefield effects with fewer sorties.

Modern Usage

In the 2003 Iraq War, tank plinking tactics were adapted for urban environments, with U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles employing Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) to hunt and destroy Iraqi armored vehicles spotted via unmanned aerial vehicles and joint surveillance systems. This approach allowed precise strikes on armor amid populated areas, contrasting with the open-desert operations of earlier conflicts. However, in the campaign, the strategy faced significant limitations due to rugged mountainous and dispersed enemy forces, which reduced opportunities for effective aerial tank plinking and shifted emphasis to against lighter targets. Modern training incorporates tank plinking concepts into simulations and exercises to prepare pilots for precision strikes. The (DCS) World platform features dedicated modules and missions simulating tank plinking, such as those using the A-10C II Tank Killer for against armored targets. The U.S. Air Force has integrated these tactics into drone-era adaptations through VR-based drills, where pilots practice coordinating with unmanned systems for and engagement, enhancing readiness for contested environments. Technological advancements have evolved tank plinking toward unmanned systems, with the MQ-9 Reaper drone conducting precision strikes using missiles against ground armor, mirroring the one-by-one destruction ethos in real-world operations. Integration of for target identification further refines this, enabling automated recognition of tanks and vehicles in drone feeds to accelerate decision-making and reduce human error in dynamic battlespaces. As of 2025, analyses of the conflict highlight tank plinking's enduring relevance, particularly in drone-versus-tank tactics where Ukrainian forces use precision-guided munitions from unmanned aerial vehicles to systematically neutralize Russian armor, echoing the tactic's emphasis on accurate, incremental attrition.

References

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  36. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2024.2343717
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