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Task Force 11
Task Force 11
Task Force 11
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Task Force 11
TF 11's Saratoga (foreground) conducts aircraft operations with Task Force 16's Enterprise in the South Pacific in August 1942.
ActiveAt least 1941–45, 2001–?
CountryUnited States
AllegianceAllies of World War II
BranchUnited States Navy
EngagementsAction off Bougainville
Battle of the Coral Sea
Battle of the Eastern Solomons
Marshall Islands Campaign
Commanders
Notable
commanders		Aubrey Fitch
Frank Jack Fletcher

Task Force 11 (TF 11 or alternately Commander Task Force 11, CTF 11) is a designation that has been used by the United States armed forces for two separate units.

World War II

[edit]

During World War II, Task Force 11 was a United States Navy aircraft carrier task force in the Pacific theater. After the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Destroyer Squadron 1 was attached to the task force, which was under the command of Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, made up of the aircraft carrier USS Lexington (CV-2) and the heavy cruisers USS Indianapolis (CA-35), USS Chicago (CA-29), and USS Portland (CA-33).[1] On 14 December 1941, after delays due to bad weather, the task force cleared Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, as a diversion for an expedition under Rear Admiral Frank J. Fletcher in the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga (CV-3) to relieve Wake Island.

Originally formed around Lexington, TF 11 then was formed around her sister ship Saratoga until Saratoga was torpedoed and disabled by the Imperial Japanese Navy submarine I-6 on 11 January 1942. It then was formed around Lexington again for the Battle of the Coral Sea in which Lexington was sunk in early May 1942, then again around Saratoga after her repairs were completed.

TF 11 – as part of Task Force 61 along with Task Force 16 – was involved in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons in late August 1942, but Saratoga was again crippled by a submarine, and the task force shrank to just the carrier and some destroyers.

In September 1943, TF 11 was reorganized around the light aircraft carriers USS Princeton (CVL-23) and USS Belleau Wood (CVL-24) under Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee and supported landings on Baker Island and Howland Island. In early 1944, its task groups TG 11.1 and 11.2, now consisting of escort carriers, supported operations in the Marshall Islands.

War on Terrorism

[edit]

Task Force 11 was also the first designation given to the United States special operations forces composite grouping which has pursued terrorist high-value targets in Afghanistan and Iraq since October 2001. The grouping has been redesignated multiple times to avoid information leakages. Task Force 11 (seemingly in reference to 11 September[according to whom?]) was only the first title used. It also used the title 'Task Force Sword' at the same time.

Initially it operated under the United States Joint Special Operations Command in Afghanistan searching for senior Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders. The unit included elements from Canada's JTF2 as well. JSOC frequently changed the name of the task force, and it has been designated Task Force 6-26, Task Force 121, and Task Force 145 with one of its most recently recorded names being Task Force 88.

References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Task Force 11

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia

Task Force 11 was a United States Navy aircraft carrier task force active in the Pacific theater during World War II, initially formed to conduct offensive operations against Japanese forces following the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Under Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher's command, Task Force 11, centered on the carrier USS Saratoga (CV-3), departed Pearl Harbor on December 16, 1941, as part of efforts to reinforce Wake Island but was recalled on December 22 due to risks from potential Japanese carrier presence, arriving too late after the island's fall on December 23.
Reorganized subsequently around USS Lexington (CV-2) under Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, the task force executed air raids on Japanese bases in the Marshall and Gilbert Islands in early February 1942 and on Rabaul later that month, disrupting enemy expansion while developing fast carrier strike tactics.
USS Saratoga rejoined as the core carrier after repairs from a January 11, 1942, submarine torpedo hit, enabling Task Force 11's participation in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons in August 1942, where it provided crucial air support during the Guadalcanal campaign despite Saratoga's subsequent torpedoing by Japanese aircraft.
These operations highlighted Task Force 11's role in early carrier warfare innovations, though the Wake recall drew postwar criticism for prioritizing fleet preservation over aggressive relief, reflecting cautious command decisions amid incomplete intelligence on Japanese dispositions.

World War II

Formation and Initial Deployment

Task Force 11 was formed in the immediate aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on , 1941, as part of the U.S. Pacific Fleet's reorganization into carrier-centered task forces to conduct offensive operations against Japanese-held territories. Centered on the USS Lexington (CV-2) as flagship, the task force was placed under the command of Vice Admiral Wilson E. Brown Jr., who flew his flag aboard Lexington. This structure reflected the U.S. Navy's shift toward mobile, carrier-based strike groups to counter Japanese expansion in the Pacific, prioritizing rapid deployment over fixed defenses. The 's initial deployment commenced on December 14, 1941, after weather delays, as a diversionary element to support Frank Jack Fletcher's Task Force 14 relief expedition to . TF 11 sailed from toward the , specifically targeting a raid on to draw Japanese attention away from Wake. However, upon learning of 's fall to Japanese forces on January 23, 1942, Brown canceled the planned strike, and TF 11 returned to on January 22. During this transit, Lexington patrolled the Oahu-Johnston-Palmyra triangle to interdict potential Japanese raids. Following refit and preparation, TF 11 conducted its next operation in February 1942, steaming toward on for a carrier strike against Japanese airfields and shipping. Departing on February 14, the force approached the target on February 20 but aborted the raid after Lexington was detected by Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, which prompted a damaging air counterattack that inflicted minor casualties and aircraft losses but no ship sinkings. TF 11 then withdrew to the South Pacific, setting the stage for its role in subsequent engagements like the in May 1942.

Composition and Command Structure

Task Force 11 was commanded by Wilson Brown Jr., who exercised overall authority from his flagship, the USS Indianapolis (CA-35). The followed standard U.S. for carrier striking forces, with Brown directing subordinate commanders for the carrier division, cruiser division, and , enabling coordinated screening, air operations, and logistics. The core of TF 11 centered on a single fleet aircraft carrier, initially USS Lexington (CV-2) under Captain Frederick C. Sherman, carrying approximately 70-80 aircraft including Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers, Grumman F4F Wildcat fighters, and Douglas TBD Devastator torpedo bombers. This was screened by three heavy cruisers—USS Minneapolis (CA-36), USS San Francisco (CA-38), and USS Indianapolis (CA-35)—providing anti-aircraft defense and gunfire support, augmented in some operations by light cruisers such as USS St. Louis (CL-49) and USS Helena (CL-50). Nine destroyers from Destroyer Squadron 1 or attached units, including USS Dewey (DD-349), USS Farragut (DD-348), USS Aylwin (DD-355), USS Monaghan (DD-354), USS Dale (DD-353), USS Phelps (DD-360), USS Worden (DD-352), USS Hull (DD-350), and USS Lamson (DD-367), formed the inner anti-submarine and torpedo screen. Logistical sustainment was handled by the oiler USS Neosho (AO-23), which refueled the force at sea during extended operations in the South Pacific. Following the loss of Lexington on May 8, 1942, during the Battle of the Coral Sea, TF 11 was reorganized around USS Saratoga (CV-3) as the primary carrier, retaining a similar cruiser-destroyer screen while Brown transitioned command responsibilities amid fleet reallocations.

Pacific Theater Operations

Task Force 11, commanded by Vice Admiral Wilson Brown and centered on aircraft carrier USS Lexington (CV-2), executed the U.S. Navy's initial carrier-based offensive in the Pacific on 1 February 1942. Departing Pearl Harbor on 31 January, the task force launched 33 aircraft against Japanese targets in the Marshall and Gilbert Islands, striking airfields at Taroa (Jaluit Atoll), Makin, and nearby installations. The raid destroyed or damaged seaplane hangars, fuel dumps, anti-aircraft batteries, and several aircraft on the ground, with U.S. losses limited to two planes and their crews. Prior to this action, TF 11 had faced setbacks during efforts to relieve . USS Saratoga (CV-3), operating with the task force, was torpedoed by Japanese submarine I-16 on 11 January , approximately 500 miles west of Oahu, while transporting Marine fighter aircraft; the carrier sustained heavy damage but reached for repairs, delaying her return to operations until June. Lexington then assumed the role for the Marshalls operation, marking the first U.S. counterstrike following . On 20 February 1942, TF 11, comprising Lexington, heavy cruisers , , Pensacola, , and ten destroyers, approached , , for a planned carrier strike to disrupt Japanese advances. Detected by Japanese reconnaissance, the force repelled an attack by 27 land-based bombers in two waves; U.S. fighters, led by Lieutenant Edward H. O'Hare, downed 15 enemy aircraft, earning O'Hare the . No ships were damaged, but two fighters were lost; the raid was aborted due to compromised surprise and fuel constraints, with TF 11 withdrawing successfully. In early March 1942, TF 11 rendezvoused with Task Force 17 (Yorktown) south of the . On 10 March, 104 from both carriers conducted a coordinated strike on Japanese invasion forces at and Salamaua, , sinking four transports, one , and damaging other vessels, while destroying and shore facilities; one U.S. plane was lost. This operation demonstrated effective inter-task force carrier coordination but failed to prevent Japanese entrenchment in the region. TF 11's operations culminated in the (3–8 May 1942). Departing for the southwest Pacific in late April, the task force linked with TF 17 on 1 May under Rear Admiral Frank J. Fletcher's overall command. On 4 May, TF 11 aircraft bombed , sinking several Japanese ships. During subsequent engagements on 7–8 May, Lexington endured multiple bomb and torpedo hits from Japanese carrier aircraft, leading to uncontrollable fires and explosions; the carrier was scuttled that evening, with 216 crewmen killed and 2,735 rescued. The battle marked the first carrier-versus-carrier clash, halting Japanese advances on , though TF 11 suffered the loss of its primary carrier. Brown was relieved of command on 26 May due to health issues.

Strategic Impact and Transition

The engagements involving Task Force 11, particularly its role in the Battle of the Coral Sea from May 1–8, 1942, marked a pivotal shift in Pacific Theater dynamics by halting the Japanese Imperial Navy's southward expansion toward Port Moresby, New Guinea, thereby protecting Allied supply lines to Australia. Although tactical outcomes included the loss of USS Lexington (CV-2) on May 8 and damage to USS Yorktown (CV-5), the operation sank the light carrier Shōhō and severely damaged heavy carrier Shōkaku, compelling Japan to abandon its invasion convoy and redirect resources to the Guadalcanal campaign. This demonstrated the efficacy of carrier-based air strikes in denying enemy amphibious objectives without direct fleet engagement, influencing subsequent U.S. Navy doctrine emphasizing dispersed, reconnaissance-led carrier operations over concentrated battleship formations. Task Force 11's contributions extended U.S. naval air power's reach, forcing Japanese planners to operate within contested airspace and expend carriers prematurely, which eroded their qualitative edge in aviation. Aubrey Fitch's command of TF 11 during , coordinating with Frank Jack Fletcher's overall force, preserved operational aircraft and fueled intelligence gains from decrypted Japanese signals, enabling proactive interdiction. Critics, including some postwar analyses, noted Fletcher's cautious fuel management and withdrawal decisions as overly conservative, potentially forgoing pursuit opportunities, yet these preserved Yorktown for rapid repairs at , completed in 72 hours by May 25, 1942. ![USS Saratoga (CV-3)][float-right] Following Coral Sea, TF 11 transitioned from independent raiding to integrated fleet support, reforming around USS Saratoga (CV-3) after her January 1942 torpedo repairs; by July 7, 1942, she departed Pearl Harbor with heavy cruisers Astoria, New Orleans, Minneapolis, and Vincennes, plus destroyers, to reinforce Southwest Pacific operations. This shift aligned TF 11 with Admiral Ernest King's emphasis on fast carrier task forces for multi-threat environments, merging temporarily into Task Force 61 alongside TF 16 for the Guadalcanal campaign, culminating in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons on August 23–25, 1942, where Saratoga's aircraft repelled a Japanese carrier strike, sinking cruiser Ryūjō despite her subsequent torpedoing. By late 1942, TF 11's nucleus supported amphibious landings and convoy protection, evolving into the flexible, multi-carrier groups that dominated later offensives, with Saratoga logging over 120,000 miles and 16,000 landings by war's end.

Global War on Terrorism

Establishment and Mandate

Task Force 11 was formed in the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks as the initial (JSOC) composite task force dedicated to operations in under . Commanded by U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Gregory Trebon, it integrated elite units from across U.S. forces, including elements from the Army's and the Navy's , to execute time-sensitive missions. The task force established its forward headquarters at , with a joint operations center at Masirah Island, , to facilitate rapid deployment and command and control. The mandate of Task Force 11 centered on the capture or elimination of high-value targets (HVTs) within and networks, emphasizing raids, , and sensitive to disrupt terrorist leadership and infrastructure. This included conducting unilateral operations independent of broader conventional forces, often in coordination with allied elements such as British SAS and SBS units integrated under JSOC oversight. Unlike conventional task forces, TF 11 reported directly to U.S. Central Command's General , bypassing intermediate conventional command structures to enable swift, intelligence-driven responses unencumbered by bureaucratic delays. In addition to kinetic operations, the was tasked with synchronizing interagency efforts, incorporating from the CIA's Special Activities Division and the to refine targeting and exploit captured materials for follow-on missions. This structure prioritized operational secrecy and agility, reflecting JSOC's evolution into a primary instrument for in the Global War on Terrorism, though it later transitioned into successor designations like for operations.

Primary Operations and Tactics

Task Force 11, operating under the (JSOC), focused its primary efforts on intelligence-gathering and missions to neutralize high-value targets (HVTs) within and networks during the initial phases of in . Established shortly after the , 2001, attacks, the task force prioritized the elimination of terrorist leadership through targeted raids, , and disruption of command structures, drawing on elite units such as special mission units for rapid-response operations. These activities emphasized integration of (HUMINT), (SIGINT), and real-time aerial surveillance to identify and strike individual threats, often in austere mountainous terrain. A core tactic involved "quick strike" retaliatory operations, characterized by insertions under cover of darkness, minimal ground footprints to maintain operational secrecy, and coordination with for precision-guided munitions to suppress enemy defenses. TF-11 teams typically conducted hit-and-run raids to capture or kill HVTs, minimizing prolonged engagements and relying on advanced force operations (AFO) for pre-mission to validate and assess risks. This approach allowed for high mobility and deniability but faced limitations in border regions, where porous enabled escapes, as evidenced by the need for interagency collaboration with CIA elements for enhanced targeting. In the Battle of Tora Bora from December 6–17, 2001, TF-11 supported encirclement efforts against Osama bin Laden and approximately 1,000 al-Qaeda fighters in cave complexes near the Pakistan border, employing small-team insertions, B-52 airstrikes delivering over 700,000 pounds of ordnance, and ground assaults to seal escape routes. Tactics included the use of local Afghan militias for blocking positions supplemented by U.S. special operators for direct assaults, though incomplete border sealing and militia unreliability contributed to bin Laden's evasion into Pakistan. (Note: Facebook post links to official Army History content) During in the from March 2–18, 2002, TF-11 elements executed advanced force reconnaissance and direct action to disrupt al-Qaeda concentrations estimated at 200–300 fighters, inserting teams via MH-47 Chinooks to occupy high ground and interdict exfiltration routes amid harsh weather and enemy anti-aircraft fire. The operation highlighted adaptive tactics such as dynamic targeting with AC-130 gunships and F-15E strikes—totaling over 6,700 joint fires sorties—but revealed vulnerabilities in initial underestimation of enemy strength and coordination challenges with conventional forces, resulting in eight U.S. fatalities, including seven from TF-11-related actions on .

Key Engagements and Outcomes

Task Force 11, operating as Task Force Sword, executed its initial major engagement on October 19, 2001, during with the assault on Objective Rhino, a remote airstrip in , . Launched from USS Kitty Hawk using MH-47 Chinook and MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, approximately 200 JSOC operators from and DEVGRU secured the site in a heliborne raid, marking the first U.S. ground combat operation in post-9/11. The operation succeeded in capturing the airfield without resistance, enabling its use as a for subsequent and disrupting control in southern . In December 2001, Task Force 11 supported operations at , providing forces alongside Afghan militias and conventional units to target remnants, including . TF 11 elements conducted , raids, and coordination, capturing or killing dozens of fighters and mid-level high-value targets (HVTs) while gathering intelligence on cave complexes. However, bin Laden's escape highlighted limitations in interagency coordination and reliance on local proxies, as U.S. commanders declined committing larger conventional forces, allowing key leadership to evade capture. During in March 2002, Task Force 11 focused on advanced force operations, including reconnaissance, HVT strikes, and seizure of key terrain in the , Shahikot Mountains. JSOC teams under TF 11 inserted via to target and holdouts, conducting raids that neutralized command nodes and facilitated the overall coalition effort to clear the area, resulting in hundreds of enemy casualties and the capture of significant intelligence materials. The task force's independent command structure from enabled rapid execution but exposed tensions in joint operations, contributing to tactical successes amid broader challenges like enemy reinforcements. Outcomes included the degradation of 's regrouping efforts, though incomplete enemy elimination prolonged instability in eastern . By mid-2003, elements of Task Force 11 transitioned to under evolving JSOC designations, integrating into networks for raids against regime remnants and insurgents. Operations focused on urban manhunts in and , yielding captures of former Ba'athist officials and early insurgent leaders, which provided actionable intelligence for subsequent task forces like TF 121. While specific TF 11-attributed captures remain classified, the shift enhanced JSOC's adaptation to , with outcomes including disrupted networks but persistent challenges from adaptive threats and limited strategic impact on overall violence levels.

Reviews, Controversies, and Effectiveness

Task Force 11 demonstrated tactical proficiency in raids and during early Global War on Terrorism operations in , contributing to the disruption of networks following the 2001 invasion, though strategic successes were limited by the escape of key leaders like into . In (March 2002), TF 11 elements, including and 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment units, conducted advanced force operations and supported blocking positions, resulting in the confirmed deaths of approximately 100-200 and fighters, but the operation failed to encircle and eliminate the main enemy force due to incomplete intelligence and escape routes to . Controversies surrounding TF 11 primarily stemmed from frictions during , where the reported directly to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) General rather than the tactical commander, Combined Mountain under Franklin Hagenbeck, creating a parallel structure that hindered coordination between and conventional forces. TF 11 commander Brigadier General Gregory Trebon and subordinates, such as commander Lieutenant Colonel Pete Blaber, advocated for ground insertions by special operators into the for reconnaissance, arguing that air-centric plans ignored terrain realities and SOF expertise; however, CENTCOM overruled these recommendations, leading to the ill-fated 03 insertion on peak on March 4, 2002, which resulted in the deaths of seven U.S. personnel, including SEAL Neil Roberts, and exposed vulnerabilities in real-time decision-making from remote . Critics within circles, including Blaber, attributed these outcomes to and a lack of to on-scene commanders, though CENTCOM defended the structure as necessary for synchronizing joint fires and intelligence. Assessments of TF 11's effectiveness highlight its role in pioneering JSOC's hunter-killer model, which evolved into subsequent task forces like TF 121 in , achieving high operational tempos—such as 300 raids per month by 2005—but early missions revealed limitations in integrating with broader joint forces and preventing enemy exfiltration. Military analysts note that while TF 11's yielded tactical kills and captures, the task force's secretive operations and command autonomy sometimes exacerbated inter-service tensions, prompting post-Anaconda reforms like unified chains under Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force- to improve unity of effort. Overall, TF 11's contributions laid groundwork for JSOC's later successes, with kill/capture rates exceeding 80% in evolved iterations, but its Anaconda performance underscored the challenges of adapting paradigms to conventional-heavy battlespaces.

References

  1. https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/world-war-ii/1941/philippines/defenders-of-wake.html
  2. https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Task_Force_11
  3. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/world_war_2-cv-ops.htm
  4. http://pacific.valka.cz/forces/tf11.htm
  5. https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/s/saratoga-v.html
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  7. https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/1990/august/market-street-commandos
  8. https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/ships/aircraft-carriers/uss-lexington.html
  9. https://warhistory.org/%40msw/article/the-relief-of-wake-island-1941
  10. https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2011/october/contact
  11. https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/uss-lexington-a-lady-to-the-end/
  12. https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/c/composition-of-us-forces.html
  13. https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/defending-the-uss-lexington-action-off-bougainville/
  14. https://history.stackexchange.com/questions/69074/what-other-ships-were-with-uss-saratoga-when-it-was-hit-by-a-torpedo-on-1942-jan
  15. https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/e/early-raids-pacific-ocean.html
  16. https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/world-war-ii/1942/early-raids.html
  17. https://www.history.navy.mil/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-005/h-005-3.html
  18. https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/world-war-ii/1942/battle-of-coral-sea.html
  19. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1945/november/carrier-task-force-world-war-ii
  20. https://www.historynet.com/how-the-navys-fast-carrier-task-force-swept-the-pacific/
  21. https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/05/03/trial-by-fire-in-the-coral-sea/
  22. https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2022/june/give-credit-where-its-due
  23. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/tf-11.htm
  24. https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/-operation-anaconda-overview_142533140895.pdf
  25. https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Portals/7/documents/transcripts/operation_anaconda_transcript.pdf
  26. https://greydynamics.com/uksf-the-united-kingdom-special-forces/
  27. https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Joint_Special_Operations_Command
  28. https://dtic.minsky.ai/ADA612157/pdf
  29. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-111SPRT53709/html/CPRT-111SPRT53709.htm
  30. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/DefenseTechnologyPapers/DTP-060.pdf
  31. https://www.navy.mil/DesktopModules/ArticleCS/Print.aspx?PortalId=1&ModuleId=685&Article=3763047
  32. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-D114-PURL-gpo194477/pdf/GOVPUB-D114-PURL-gpo194477.pdf
  33. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA463075.pdf
  34. https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/txt-pete-blaber-backgrounder_152421876470.docx
  35. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/top-secret-america-a-look-at-the-militarys-joint-special-operations-command/2011/08/30/gIQAvYuAxJ_story.html
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