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Towhidi Janata (Bengali: তৌহিদী জনতা, romanized: Tôuhidī Jônôtā, lit. 'Monotheistic Mass') is a Islamist revolutionary Bangladeshi movement who have been involved in protests, demonstrations, and political violence, centred around religious issues at various times.[1][2][3] There have been instances where they have attempted to prevent the participation of entertainment industry figures and personalities, particularly female artists, in various social and cultural events.[2]

Origin and meaning

[edit]

The term Tawhidi Janata is formed by combining two separate words from Arabic and Bengali. The word Tawhid refers to the oneness of Allah. From Tawhid, the term Tawhidi is derived, meaning someone who believes in the oneness of Allah. The word Janata comes from Bengali, meaning the general public or a group of people. Together, these words form Tawhidi Janata, which translates to "people who follow Tawhid" or "supporters of monotheism".[4]

Affiliations

[edit]

In the context of Bangladesh, Tawhidi Janata or Touhidi Janata is used to express the general Muslim community of Bangladesh like in the context of 1975,[5] 1997,[6] 1998,[7] 2001[8] etc.

On April 8, 2013, Al Jazeera used the term Tawhidi Janata to refer to revolutionary people.[3] On November 11, 2016, New Age reported that Tawhidi Janata was part of a national group supported by Hefazat-e-Islam Bangladesh.[9] On February 21, 2025, during a pre-protest gathering under the banner of Tawhidi Chhatra-Janata at the Baitul Mukarram premises, Islamic speaker Enayetullah Abbasi called for the implementation of the 13-point demand originally raised by Hefazat-e-Islam in 2013.[10] In the same assembly, another scholar named Abu Toha Muhammad Adnan appeared.[11] Both Abbasi and Adnan were members of Hefazat who used the term "Towhidi Janata".[12][13][11][14]

History

[edit]

Bhola Clashes

[edit]

On October 20, 2019, activists of Towhidi Muslim Janata gathered in Borhanuddin, Bhola and alleged that a local Hindu youth had defamed Islam on social media.[15][16] The activists burned down the home of a Hindu family and damaged 12 others.[15] They engaged in violent clashes with the police which resulted in four deaths.[15][17] Hefazat-e-Islam threatened the government with seize of Shapla Chattwar if they did not take action against police personals who shot at Towhidi Janata activists in Bhola.[18] Locals in Bhola alleged the slogans of Towhidi Janata were raised by activists of Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami.[19]

Violence in Cumilla, Chandpur, and Bandarban

[edit]

In 2021, violence erupted following the alleged desecration of the Quran at a Durga Puja pavilion in Cumilla, which later spread to Hajiganj in Chandpur. Several temples were attacked, and clashes with the police occurred.[20] A protest march was organized under the banner of Tawhidi Muslim Janata in Chandpur, during which demonstrators threw stones at Hindu temples. Clashes with the police led to the deaths of four people and injuries to fifty others.[21]

In response to the same incident, on October 14, a protest gathering was held under the banner of Tawhidi Janata in the Lama Upazila Parishad area of Bandarban. Following the rally, attacks took place on the Lama Central Hari Temple and a Durga Puja pavilion. Additionally, Hindu-owned shops and businesses in the local market were vandalized and looted.[22] These scattered incidents then snowballed into nationwide anti-Hindu riots.

Role in Sculpture controversy

[edit]

In December 2016, a sculpture resembling the Greek goddess Themis, symbolizing justice, was installed on the premises of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh.[23] Hefazat-e-Islam and other religious groups, opposed the installation, stating that Tawhidi Janata would not accept sculptures or Murti. They demanded the removal of this statue as well as other sculptures across the country.[24] Subsequently in May 2017, the sculpture was removed.[25]

In 2020, several Islamist groups opposed the planned construction of a sculpture of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at the Dholairpar Square in Dhaka.[26][27] They argued that sculptures were inappropriate from an Islamic perspective and announced a Tawhidi Janata-led movement to halt the construction.[28]

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Sculpture vandalization

[edit]

In January 2025, a mural of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in front of the Sylhet Deputy Commissioner's office was vandalized. Prior to this incident, Tawhidi Janata and local Islamic scholars had organized protests and demonstrations demanding its removal.[29][30]

Tilakpur clashes

[edit]

On January 28, 2025, in Akkelpur Upazila of Joypurhat, a tin fence surrounding the Tilakpur High School field was vandalized in protest against a women's friendly football match.[31][32]

Dinajpur Protests

[edit]

On the same day, protests took place during a women's football tournament in Hili, Dinajpur. Under the banner of Tawhidi Janata, a group organized a demonstration, claiming that sports were religiously prohibited. They attempted to halt the tournament, leading to clashes that resulted in at least ten people being injured.[1][33][34][35]

Obstruction of Events Featuring Female Celebrities

[edit]

On November 3, 2024, in Chattogram, local businessmen and Tawhidi Janata obstructed an event where actress Mehazabien Chowdhury was invited to inaugurate a showroom in the Riazuddin Bazar area of Station Road.[36][37]

On January 25, 2025, actress Pori Moni was invited to inaugurate a shopping mall in Elenga, Tangail. However, Hefazat-e-Islam and the Jatiyo Olama Mashayekh Aimma Parishad opposed her presence, leading to the event's cancellation.[2][38]

Similarly, on January 29, 2025, when actress Apu Biswas was invited to inaugurate a restaurant in Kamrangirchar, Dhaka, some Muslim groups expressed their opposition to her participation.[1][39]

2024 Shrine riots

[edit]
See also: Bangladesh post-resignation violence (2024–present)

In 2024, several shrines in Bangladesh were attacked and set on fire at different times. According to a report by the Manobadhikar Songskriti Foundation, nearly 12 such incidents occurred in September alone. This marked the first instance in Bangladesh where shrines were attacked following public declarations. The individuals involved in these attacks identified themselves under the banner of Tawhidi Janata.[40][41]

In Narayanganj, Tawhidi Janata opposed the century-old Urs and fair held in honor of Sufi saint Shah Solaiman Lengta.[42] Additionally, a shrine associated with Dewanbagh Pir in Mymensingh was attacked following online campaigns under the Tawhidi Janata banner.[43] Similar attacks and arson incidents were carried out at the shrines of Doja Pir in Sherpur and Arshed Pagla in Shariatpur.[44][45]

On 27 January 2025, Towhidi Janata attacked a shrine in Sylhet and looted the pet animals like goats and cows.[46]

On February 20, 2025, the shrine of Shah Sufi Ayub Ali Darvesh in Noakhali was vandalized in an attack allegedly carried out by a group under the Tawhidi Janata banner.[47][48][49]

Lalon Fair controversy

[edit]

In November 2024, a cultural event titled Mohoti Sadhusang and Lalon Mela was canceled in Narayanganj following objections from Hefazat-e-Islam and local Tawhidi Janata.[50][51][52] Hefazat-e-Islam claimed that the event promoted "distorted culture" under the guise of a Lalon festival. The district administration stated that the cancellation decision was made due to ongoing protests by mosque congregants and Hefazat-e-Islam, which raised concerns about law and order.[53]

On February 14, 2025, violence erupted in Bhuapur Upazila of Tangail over the celebration of Boshonto Boron (Spring Festival) and Valentine's Day. A group under the Tawhidi Janata banner vandalized flower shops and staged protests in front of restaurants.[54][55] As a result, Udichi Shilpigoshthi was forced to cancel their planned Spring Festival event.[56] Additionally, anti-festival leaflets were distributed in Gopalpur Upazila, particularly targeting the Kite Festival, causing fear among organizers and leading to its cancellation.[57]

The Dhaka Metropolitan Theatre Festival was also postponed due to threats from a group allegedly linked to Tawhidi Janata.[58][59][55] The festival was scheduled to open on February 15, 2025, at the Mohila Samity Auditorium on Natok Sarani, Dhaka. However, on the evening of February 14, several individuals visited the venue, objected to the festival, and issued threats of violence if it proceeded.[60]

Ekushey Book Fair clashes

[edit]

In the 2025 Ekushey Book Fair, a group named Touhidi Janata attacked a stall named Sabyasachi for displaying books by exiled writer Taslima Nasrin, leading to its temporary closure. The government strongly condemned the incident, calling it a violation of citizens' rights. The Chief Adviser ordered the perpetrators to be brought under the law and instructed the police and Bangla Academy to strengthen security at the fair.[61][62]

During another day of the Ekushey Book Fair in 2025, controversy arose over the sale of sanitary napkins at two stalls. Some Islamist groups labeled sanitary napkins as "private items" and demanded a ban on their public display and sale.[63][64][65] In response to the complaints, Bangla Academy shut down the two stalls, citing fair regulations that only permit the sale of books and food items.[66] The academy clarified that the decision was not targeted at sanitary napkins specifically but applied to all unauthorized products.[67] However, Bangla Academy later issued a statement confirming that the free distribution of sanitary napkins at the book fair would continue.[68]

Shahbag Police station blockade

[edit]

On March 5, 2025, Bangladesh police arrested a man for allegedly harassing a female student of Dhaka University on the street over her attire.[69] Later, a group of people identifying themselves as "Touhidi Janata" gathered in front of Shahbagh Thana, demanding the release of the arrested individual.[70] The accused was subsequently sent to court, where he was granted bail. Later, the victim decided to withdraw the case due to pressure from "Touhidi Janata"[71] and alleged threats of rape and death.[72]

Jiban Mahal park clashes

[edit]

In 29 August, group of protesters took out a protest over "anti-social" activities in shrines (like prostitution). The people in the shrine attacked protesters which resulted in violence between 2 sides that injured over 20. The situation was brought in control by military and police.[73]

Nural Pagla shrine demolition

[edit]

Mob under banner of Towhidi Janata rioted in a shrine of a cult leader "Nur al-Haque" known as Nural Pagla (Crazy Nur) who had claimed to be Imam Mahdi. The shrine was similar to Kaaba in structure it was given as main reason why it got demolished.[74][75]

Mob against Baul

[edit]

In November 2025, attacks were carried out on Baul artists and their supporters in Manikganj and Thakurgaon under the banner of “Tawhidi Jonota.”[76][77][78][79][80]

Prothom Alo Office attack

[edit]

Following death of Osman Hadi, Towhidi Janata engaged in revenge attacks against left wing politics. Mob self-identified as Towhidi Janata attacked Prothom Alo Office in Kushtia. A well known leader of Towhidi Janata, Ataur Rahman Bikrompuri proudly claimed responsibility forthese attacks and was arrested.[81][82]

Government stances

[edit]

Adviser Mahfuj Alam threatened Towhidi Janata of taking legal actions against them if they do more violent activities. But he was criticized by many islamists for defaming the word "Tawhid". He later replied it and said "I warned Towhidi Janata, I didn't threatened them, I am also a Monotheist as a Believer Muslim. But I will not accept if anyone tries to spread extremism in name of Monotheism."[83][84]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Towhidi Janata

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Towhidi Janata, translating to "Monotheistic Mass" or "People of Tawhid," is a loosely organized Islamist movement in Bangladesh that surged in prominence after the August 2024 ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, mobilizing decentralized crowds to impose strict Islamic norms amid the ensuing political vacuum under interim leader Muhammad Yunus. The group operates through spontaneous mob actions rather than hierarchical structures, framing against perceived moral lapses—such as shrine veneration, folk music festivals, and minority religious sites—as a collective religious obligation, thereby evading formal accountability while filling governance gaps. Notable incidents include assaults on Baul music gatherings, sieges of educational institutions accused of proselytization, and violence against Hindu communities, often met with limited state intervention. This populist approach distinguishes Towhidi Janata from established jihadist outfits by leveraging public outrage over "un-Islamic" elements in cultural and social spheres, contributing to broader concerns about rising influence and minority insecurity in post- Bangladesh.

History

Origins and Emergence

Towhidi Janata's ideological foundations lie in the advocacy of , the Islamic doctrine of God's absolute oneness, which its adherents interpret as a mandate to purge perceived deviations from religious purity, including secular influences and practices deemed un-Islamic. This stance positioned the movement in opposition to the 's secular-oriented policies under , which emphasized and moderated religious expression in public life, viewing them as threats to orthodox Islam. Prior to 2024, Towhidi Janata manifested through sporadic, localized actions by clerics, students, and individuals with ties to banned militant outfits, who positioned themselves as vigilantes defending Islamic tenets against blasphemy accusations, interfaith tensions, and cultural events like celebrations or mixed-gender sports. These activities, often reactive and mob-driven, lacked coordination and formal hierarchy, setting Towhidi Janata apart from structured jihadist entities like or , which operated with centralized commands and explicit terrorist agendas. The movement's decentralized character relied on opportunistic gatherings rather than institutional frameworks, enabling it to exploit grievances over religious orthodoxy amid ongoing political suppression of Islamists.

Rise Post-2024 Political Shift

The ouster of on August 5, 2024, amid mass protests created a significant political vacuum in Bangladesh, catalyzing the surge of Towhidi Janata as it filled the void left by the weakened structures. Under the interim administration led by , which assumed power following 's departure, Towhidi Janata exploited ongoing institutional weaknesses and political instability to consolidate influence, operating in an environment where state enforcement mechanisms were strained. The movement employed initial coercive populism tactics, mobilizing decentralized street-level actions to assert dominance and appeal to sentiments of Islamic orthodoxy, thereby gaining rapid grassroots traction amid the transitional uncertainty.

Ideology

Core Principles of Tawhid

, the Islamic doctrine affirming the absolute oneness and uniqueness of God, serves as the central tenet of Towhidi Janata's ideology, with the group's name explicitly translating to "People of Tawhid." This principle is invoked to reject any perceived dilutions of monotheistic purity, positioning strict adherence to Tawhid as essential for authentic Islamic practice. The movement interprets as necessitating vigilance against influences deemed incompatible with divine unity, framing societal interventions as protective measures against and that could introduce or non-monotheistic elements. In this view, Tawhid demands opposition to practices seen as compromising orthodoxy, prioritizing unadulterated monotheism over blended traditions. This emphasis on contrasts with Bangladesh's historical heritage, where has often incorporated indigenous customs and folk elements into devotional life, a synthesis the group regards as deviations warranting correction.

Agenda for Islamic Orthodoxy

Towhidi Janata seeks to transform Bangladeshi society by imposing strict moral and religious codes derived from its interpretation of Islamic orthodoxy, emphasizing the elimination of practices deemed incompatible with tawhid-centered purity. This agenda prioritizes the reshaping of the public sphere to align with rigid Islamic principles, including curbs on cultural expressions and secular influences perceived as threats to religious integrity. Central to their vision is the enforcement of , such as restricting women's public participation and attire to conform to conservative standards, alongside broader demands for to eradicate "un-Islamic" elements like dissenting literature or festivals. form a key mechanism in their demands, serving as tools to target and purge perceived deviations from orthodoxy, thereby reinforcing communal adherence to their doctrinal standards. Over the long term, this coercive push risks eroding Bangladesh's pluralistic identity by systematically suppressing minority practices and cultural diversity in favor of a homogenized order.

Organization and Leadership

Decentralized Structure

Towhidi Janata functions as a loosely organized movement, manifesting through spontaneous assemblies of self-identified supporters who mobilize for public actions without evident formal command chains. Reports describe these groups operating under the banner of Towhidi Janata to conduct protests, sieges, and enforcements, such as the prolonged besieging of a police station in Dhaka or disruptions at cultural events, highlighting reliance on ad hoc gatherings rather than hierarchical directives. This mob-based model contrasts with structured Islamist organizations by emphasizing diffuse, opportunistic interventions amid institutional gaps.

Key Influential Figures

Prominent figures associated with Towhidi Janata include clerics and individuals with militant backgrounds who amplify the group's calls for Islamic orthodoxy through public rhetoric and presence at mob actions, without assuming formal titles to preserve operational ambiguity. Ataur Rahman Bikrompuri, a cleric often seen at demonstrations, has publicly endorsed vigilante responses against perceived insults to Islam, framing such acts as necessary defenses of faith during protests targeting media outlets like and the Daily Star. Sher Muhammad, also known as Abu Sayeed Sher Muhammad Khan, exemplifies former militants shifting to populist incitement; previously arrested in 2022 for funding the banned Jama'atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya, he has appeared at Towhidi Janata gatherings, portraying mob enforcements as communal safeguards against secular deviations. Mohammad Tamim similarly transitions from militant affiliations, coordinating informal networks that echo orthodox narratives while avoiding hierarchical roles to evade accountability. This pattern of influential actors—leveraging clerical authority or past militant ties—enables narrative shaping through decentralized appeals, maintaining deniability amid the movement's fluid structure.

Activities and Tactics

Mob Violence and Intimidation

Towhidi Janata utilizes decentralized mob gatherings to exert physical pressure on institutions, often besieging locations like police stations to demand compliance with its demands. In one instance, a crowd of several hundred identifying as Towhidi Janata blockaded the Shahbagh police station entrance through a , pressuring authorities for the release of a detainee accused in a case they deemed unjust. These actions rely on crowd-driven escalation, where spontaneous participation amplifies intimidation without evident centralized command structures. The group's tactics differentiate from organized militancy by leveraging opportunistic mob dynamics for enforcement, as seen in coordinated yet fluid protests across regions like Dhaka and . Such efforts systematically target perceived violations of orthodox norms, using threats of sustained presence and disruption to coerce releases or policy shifts from law enforcement. This approach exploits institutional weaknesses, turning public gatherings into tools of immediate coercion rather than prolonged insurgent campaigns.

Moral Policing and Vigilantism

Towhidi Janata enforces strict moral codes through public accusations of immorality, targeting behaviors perceived as deviating from in everyday settings such as markets and gatherings. Groups under this banner monitor public interactions, issuing warnings and shaming individuals for actions deemed unchaste or un-Islamic, thereby imposing de facto segregation between genders in shared spaces. This relies on collective outrage rather than formal authority, amplifying social stigma to deter nonconformity without immediate reliance on legal enforcement. Vigilantes associated with Towhidi Janata disrupt cultural expressions viewed as threats to orthodoxy, notably intervening in events featuring Baul singers, whose folk traditions blend mysticism and secular themes often labeled as heretical. By mobilizing crowds to protest and demand prohibitions on such performances, they frame these interventions as communal defense of faith, pressuring organizers and participants through public condemnation and threats of exclusion. This approach extends to broader daily life, where routine activities like mixed-gender socializing face scrutiny and coercive correction via mob surveillance. The movement's tactics emphasize social pressure mechanisms, exploiting decentralized networks to foster widespread self-censorship among communities wary of ostracism or reputational harm. Rather than structured policing, Towhidi Janata leverages populist appeals to —unity under strict monotheism—to normalize as a grassroots obligation, bypassing weakened state institutions amid post-2024 instability. This reliance on communal enforcement sustains ongoing regulation without centralized command.

Notable Incidents

Attacks on Religious Minorities

Towhidi Janata has been associated with violence targeting Hindus, including assaults on , which serve as temporary temple structures during the festival, and the vandalism of a Hindu home in Sakhipur, Tangail, on 29 March 2025 by a mob identifying as the group in response to an alleged offensive Facebook comment. Such actions reflect a pattern of mob-led attacks on religious minorities in the wake of the , where groups invoking have desecrated places of worship and pressured Hindu communities through intimidation and property destruction. These incidents often frame religious minorities, particularly Hindus, as undermining Islamic monotheism, justifying coercive measures to purge perceived impurities from society.

Opposition to Sculptures

Towhidi Janata has opposed sculptures and statues, viewing them as idolatrous violations of tawhid. In 2020, under the banner of Towhidi Janata Oikya Parishad, the group protested the construction of statues of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in Dhaka, deeming them un-Islamic. In January 2025, Towhidi Janata was associated with the vandalism of a sculpture of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in Sylhet following protests demanding its removal.

Nural Pagla Shrine Demolition

On September 5, 2025, a mob identifying as Tawhidi Janata stormed the shrine of Nurul Haque, known as Nural Pagla, in Rajbari district following Friday prayers. The group vandalized the shrine and Nural Pagla's house, set structures ablaze, exhumed his body from the grave, and burned it on the Dhaka-Khulna highway. Clashes with shrine devotees resulted in one death and over 100 injuries.

Disruptions of Cultural Events

Towhidi Janata has targeted Baul performers, accusing them of for promoting syncretic folk traditions that blend Islamic and Hindu elements, issuing threats of violence and demanding event cancellations. In , the group disrupted Baul Pala performances and music festivals, labeling them un-Islamic and contributing to the persecution of artists whose songs challenge strict orthodoxy. Similar threats emerged in , where Towhidi Janata opposed Baul song events ahead of local gatherings, heightening tensions over cultural expressions seen as impure. In November 2024, members of Towhidi Janata protested the planned "Mahati Sadhusangha O Lalon Mela" in Narayanganj, submitting a memorandum to the district commissioner demanding its cancellation and threatening disruption, which led authorities to deny permission and halt the event. The movement has enforced shutdowns of heritage-promoting events, intervening to halt festivals that celebrate Bangladesh's pluralistic traditions. For instance, Basanta Utsabh, a spring festival embodying syncretic joy, faced obstruction from groups identifying as Towhidi Janata, leading to cancellations amid fears of mob action. Pohela Falgun and celebrations were similarly disrupted by hardline elements under this banner, with police intervening to prevent clashes but effectively stifling the events. In February 2025, members of Towhidi Janata stormed a stall of Sabyasachi Prokashoni at the Amar Ekushey Book Fair in Dhaka, protesting the sale of books by exiled author Taslima Nasrin and chanting slogans demanding their removal, which led to commotion at the event. These disruptions underscore Towhidi Janata's role in eroding , prioritizing -enforced purity over Bangladesh's historically diverse cultural fabric, as mobs coerce compliance through intimidation rather than institutional channels. By framing such events as threats to Islamic values, the loosely organized activists amplify populist , diminishing spaces for secular or mixed-faith expressions in public life.

Obstruction of Events Featuring Female Celebrities

In November 2024, in Chattogram, members of Towhidi Janata along with local businessmen obstructed an event where actress Mehazabien was scheduled to inaugurate a lifestyle showroom, opposing the public participation of female celebrities in such gatherings. The group has also prevented female artists from taking part in cultural events, aligning with patterns of moral policing that restrict women's visibility in public cultural activities.

Blockade of Shahbagh Police Station

On the night of March 5–6, 2025, a crowd identifying as Towhidi Janata besieged Shahbagh Police Station in Dhaka, staging a sit-in that blocked the entrance and lasted over eight hours. The group demanded the release of Mostafa Asif Arnob, a 25-year-old contractual bookbinder at Dhaka University library arrested earlier that day for sexually harassing a female student. Protesters stormed the station around 1:30 a.m., live-streamed their actions, and dispersed around 9:30 a.m., after which the detainee was sent to court.

Attacks on Media Outlets

In December 2025, following the death of independent political leader Sharif Osman Hadi on December 18, mobs identifying with Towhidi Janata attacked the offices of Prothom Alo and The Daily Star in Dhaka. The coordinated assaults involved vandalism, arson, and setting fires to the buildings, trapping journalists inside for hours while security forces failed to intervene effectively.

Impact and Responses

Societal and Cultural Effects

Towhidi Janata's enforcement of strict Islamic orthodoxy has posed a threat to Bangladesh's , particularly by targeting and historical sites associated with . These actions, framed as defenses against un-Islamic influences, contribute to a broader shift toward , where supplants state authority in regulating public behavior and cultural expressions. Under the interim governance, this movement has accelerated the erosion of pluralism by legitimizing vigilante interventions that prioritize religious purity over diverse societal norms, fostering an environment where deviations from orthodoxy invite communal reprisals. Such dynamics undermine Bangladesh's historically syncretic social fabric, potentially normalizing violence as a tool for ideological conformity and diminishing space for secular or minority cultural practices.

Governmental and Regional Reactions

The interim government of has faced criticism for its limited actions against Towhidi Janata's vigilante activities, including instances where arrests of individuals enforcing strict Islamic norms were overturned amid protests by the group, indicating potential influence or hesitation in enforcement. Reports highlight the administration's failure to implement preventive measures following attacks by the movement on offices and cultural events, prompting debates over whether this reflects state incompetence, unwillingness to confront Islamist pressures, or tacit enabling during the post- transition. Despite repeated alerts about escalating extremism, the government's response has remained restrained, avoiding aggressive crackdowns on decentralized mobs. This approach has raised concerns about broader South Asian security, with the unchecked rise of groups like Towhidi Janata viewed as a vector for regional spillover, potentially destabilizing neighbors through cross-border radicalization and refugee flows akin to patterns observed in Afghanistan's . Analysts argue that prolonged governmental leniency could entrench coercive populism, mirroring that empowered similar movements elsewhere, though Dhaka has denied complicity and emphasized restoring order amid political flux.

References

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  35. https://globalcdg.org/demolition-of-historical-places-in-bangladesh-in-august-2024/
  36. https://rsis.edu.sg/ctta-newsarticle/bangladesh-3/
  37. https://www.ndtv.com/opinion/hijab-policing-diktats-against-work-how-new-bangladesh-is-failing-its-women-10197244
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