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United Mine Workers of America
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The United Mine Workers of America (UMW or UMWA) is a North American labor union best known for representing coal miners. Today, the Union also represents health care workers, truck drivers, manufacturing workers and public employees in the United States and Canada.[1] Although its main focus has always been on workers and their rights, the UMW of today also advocates for better roads, schools, and universal health care.[2] By 2014, coal mining had largely shifted to open pit mines in Wyoming, and there were only 60,000 active coal miners. The UMW was left with 35,000 members, of whom 20,000 were coal miners, chiefly in underground mines in Kentucky and West Virginia. However it was responsible for pensions and medical benefits for 40,000 retired miners, and for 50,000 spouses and dependents.[3]
Key Information
The UMW was founded in Columbus, Ohio, on January 25, 1890, with the merger of two old labor groups, the Knights of Labor Trade Assembly No. 135 and the National Progressive Miners Union.[4] Adopting the model of the union was initially established as a three-pronged labor tool: to develop mine safety; to improve mine workers' independence from the mine owners and the company store; and to provide miners with collective bargaining power.
After passage of the National Recovery Act in 1933 during the Great Depression, organizers spread throughout the United States to organize all coal miners into labor unions. Under the powerful leadership of John L. Lewis, the UMW broke with the American Federation of Labor and set up its own federation, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). Its organizers fanned out to organize major industries, including automobiles, steel, electrical equipment, rubber, paint and chemical, and fought a series of battles with the AFL. The UMW grew to 800,000 members and was an element in the New Deal Coalition supporting Democratic president Franklin D. Roosevelt. Lewis broke with Roosevelt in 1940 and left the CIO, leaving the UMW increasingly isolated in the labor movement. During World War II the UMW was involved in a series of major strikes and threatened walkouts that angered public opinion and energized pro-business opponents. After the war, the UMW concentrated on gaining large increases in wages, medical services and retirement benefits for its shrinking membership, which was contending with changes in technology and declining mines in the East.
Coal mining
[edit]Development of the Union
[edit]The UMW was founded at Columbus City Hall in Columbus, Ohio, on January 25, 1890, by the merger of two earlier groups, the Knights of Labor Trade Assembly No. 135 and the National Progressive Miners Union.[5] It was modeled after the American Federation of Labor (AFL). The Union's emergence in the 1890s was the culmination of decades of effort to organize mine workers and people in adjacent occupations into a single, effective negotiating unit. At the time coal was one of the most highly sought natural resources, as it was widely used to heat homes and to power machines in industries. The coal mines were a competitive and dangerous place to work. With the owners imposing reduced wages on a regular basis,[2] in response to fluctuations in pricing, miners sought a group to stand up for their rights.
Early efforts
[edit]American Miners' Association
The first step in starting the union was the creation of the American Miners' Association. Scholars credit this organization with the beginning of the labor movement in the United States.[2] The membership of the group grew rapidly. "Of an estimated 56,000 miners in 1865, John Hinchcliffe claimed 22,000 as members of the AMA.[2] In response, the mine owners sought to stop the AMA from becoming more powerful. Members of the AMA were fired and blacklisted from employment at other mines. After a short time the AMA began to decline, and eventually ceased operations.
Workingman's Benevolent Association
Another early labor union that arose in 1868 was the Workingmen's Benevolent Association. This union was distinguished as a labor union for workers mining anthracite coal. The laborers formed the WBA to help improve pay and working conditions. The main reason for the success of this group was the president, John Siney, who sought a way both to increase miners benefits while also helping the operators earn a profit. They chose to limit the production of anthracite to keep its price profitable. Because the efforts of the WBA benefited the operators, they did not object when the union wanted to take action in the mines; they welcomed the actions that would secure their profit. Because the operators trusted the WBA, they agreed to the first written contract between miners and operators.[2] As the union became more responsible in the operators' eyes, the union was given more freedoms. As a result, the health and spirits of the miners significantly improved.[2]
The WBA could have been a very successful union had it not been for Franklin B. Gowen. In the 1870s Gowen lead the Reading Railroad, and bought several coal mines in the area. Because he owned the coal mines and controlled the means of transporting the coal, he was able to slowly destroy the labor union. He did everything in his power to produce the cheapest product and to ensure that non-union workers would benefit. As conditions for the miners of the WBA worsened, the union broke up and disappeared.[2]
After the fall of the WBA, miners created many other small unions, including the Workingman's Protective Association (WPA) and the Miner's National Association (MNA). Although both groups had strong ideas and goals, they were unable to gain enough support and organization to succeed. The two unions did not last long, but provided greater support by the miners for a union which could withstand and help protect the workers' rights.[2]
1870s
[edit]Although many labor unions were failing, two predominant unions arose that held promise to become strong and permanent advocates for the miners. The main problem during this time was the rivalry between the two groups. Because the National Trade Assembly #135, better known as the Knights of Labor, and the National Federation of Miners and Mine Laborers were so opposed to one another, they created problems for miners rather than solving key issues.
National Trade Assembly #135
[edit]
This union was more commonly known as the Knights of Labor and began around 1870 in the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania area. The main problem with the Knights of Labor was its secrecy.[2] The members kept very private their affiliation and goals of the Knights of Labor. Because both miners and operators could become members, there was no commonality to unite the members. Also, the union did not see strikes as a means to attain rights. To many people of the time, a strike was the only way that they believed they would be heard.
The Knights of Labor tried to establish a strong and organized union, so they set up a system of local assemblies, or LAs. There were two main types of LAs, trade and mixed, with the trade LA being the most common. Although this system was put into place to create order, it did the opposite. Even though there were only two categories of LAs, there were many sub-divisions. For the most part it was impossible to tell how many trade and mixed LAs there were at a given time. Local assemblies began to arise and fall all around, and many members began to question whether or not the Knights of Labor was strong enough to fight for the most important issue of the time, achieving an eight-hour work day.[2]
National Federation of Miners and Mine Laborers
[edit]This Union was formed by members of the Knights of Labor who realized that a secret and unified group would not turn into a successful union. The founders, John McBride, Chris Evans and Daniel McLaughlin, believed that creating an eight-hour work day would not only be beneficial for workers, but also as a means to stop overproduction, which would in turn help operators. The union was able to get cooperation from operators because they explained that the miners wanted better conditions because they felt as if they were part of the mining industry and also wanted the company to grow. But in order for the company to grow, the workers must have better conditions so that their labor could improve and benefit the operators.
The union's first priority was to get a fair weighing system within the mines. At a conference between the operators and the union, the idea of a new system of scaling was agreed upon, but the system was never implemented. Because the union did not deliver what it had promised, it lost support and members.[2]
1880s
[edit]During this time, the rivalry between the two unions increased and eventually led to the formation of the UMW. The first of many arguments arose after the 1886 joint conference. The Knights of Labor did not want the NTA #135 to be in control, so they went against a lot of their decisions. Also, because the Knights of Labor were not in attendance at the conference, they were not able to vote against actions which they thought detrimental to gain rights for workers. The conference passed resolutions requiring the Knights of Labor to give up their secrecy and publicize material about its members and locations. The National Federation held another conference in 1887 attended by both groups. But it was unsuccessful in gaining agreement by the groups as to the next actions to take. In 1888, Samuel Gompers was elected as President of the National Federation of Miners, and George Harris first vice president.[6]
Throughout 1887–1888 many joint conferences were held to help iron out the problems that the two groups were having. Many leaders of each groups began questioning the morals of the other union. One leader, William T. Lewis, thought there needed to be more unity within the union, and that competition for members between the two groups was not accomplishing anything. As a result of taking this position, he was replaced by John B. Rae as president of the NTA #135. This removal did not stop Lewis however; he got many people together who had been also thrown out of the Knights of Labor for trying to belong to both parties at once, along with the National Federation, and created the National Progressive Union of Miners and Mine Laborers (NPU).
Although the goal of the NPU in 1888 was ostensibly to create unity between the miners, it instead drew a stronger line distinguishing members of the NPU against those of the NTA #135. Because of the rivalry, miners of one labor union would not support the strikes of another, and many strikes failed. In December 1889, the president of the NPU set up a joint conference for all miners. John McBride, the president of NPU, suggested that the Knights of Labor should join the NPU to form a stronger union. John B. Rae reluctantly agreed and decided that the merged groups would meet on January 22, 1890.[2]
Constitution of the Union: The Eleven Points
[edit]When the union was founded, the values of the UMWA were stated in the preamble:
We have founded the United Mine Workers of America for the purpose of ... educating all mine workers in America to realize the necessity of unity of action and purpose, in demanding and securing by lawful means the just fruits of our toil.[2]
The UMWA constitution listed eleven points as the union's goals:
- Payment of a salary commensurate with the dangerous work conditions. This was one of the most important points of the constitution.
- Payment to be made fairly in legal tender, not with company scrip.
- Provide safe working conditions, with operators to use the latest technologies in order to preserve the lives and health of workers.
- Provide better ventilation systems to decrease black lung disease, and better drainage systems.
- Enforce safety laws and make it illegal for mines to have inadequate roof supports, or contaminated air and water in the mines.
- Limit regular hours to an eight-hour work day.
- End child labor, and strictly enforce the child labor law.
- Have accurate scales to weigh the coal products, so workers could be paid fairly. Many operators had altered scales that showed a lighter weight of coal than actually produced, resulting in underpayment to workers. Miners were paid per pound of coal that they produced.
- Payment should be made in legal tender.
- Establish unbiased public police forces in the mine areas that were not controlled by the operators. Many operators hired private police, who were used to harass the mine workers and impose company power. In company towns, the operators owned all the houses and controlled the police force; they could arbitrarily evict workers and arrest them unjustly.
- The workers reserved the right to strike, but would work with operators to reach reasonable conclusions to negotiations.[2]
John L. Lewis
[edit]John L. Lewis (1880–1969) was the highly combative UMW president who thoroughly controlled the union from 1920 to 1960. A major player in the labor movement and national politics, in the 1930s he used UMW activists to organize new unions in autos, steel and rubber. He was the driving force behind the founding of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). It established the United Steel Workers of America and helped organize millions of other industrial workers in the 1930s.[7]
After resigning as head of the CIO in 1941, he took the Mine Workers out of the CIO in 1942 and in 1944 took the union into the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Lewis was a Republican, but he played a major role in helping Franklin D. Roosevelt win re-election with a landslide in 1936, but as an isolationist supported by Communist elements in the CIO, Lewis broke with Roosevelt in 1940 on anti-Nazi foreign policy. (Following the 1939 German-Soviet pact of nonaggression, the Comintern had instructed communist parties in the West to oppose any support for nations at war with Nazi Germany.[8])
Lewis was an effective strike leader who gained high wages for his membership while suppressing his opponents, including the United States government. He was one of the most controversial and innovative leaders in the history of labor, gaining credit for building the industrial unions of the CIO into a political and economic powerhouse to rival the AFL, yet was widely criticized as he called nationwide coal strikes damaging the American economy in the middle of World War II. Coal miners for 40 years hailed him as the benevolent dictator who brought high wages, pensions and medical benefits.[9]
Achievements
[edit]- An eight-hour work day was gained in 1898.[10] The first ideas of this demand were outlined in point six of the constitution.
- The union achieved collective bargaining rights in 1933.[10]
- Health and retirement benefits for the miners and their families were earned in 1946.[10]
- In 1969, the UMWA convinced the United States Congress to enact the landmark Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, which provided compensation for miners suffering from Black Lung Disease.
- Relatively high wages for unionized miners by the early 1960s.[11]
List of strikes
[edit]The union's history has numerous examples of strikes in which members and their supporters clashed with company-hired strikebreakers and government forces. The most notable include:
1890s
[edit]- Morewood massacre – April 3, 1891, in Morewood, Pennsylvania. A crowd of mostly immigrant strikers were fired on by deputized members of the 10th Regiment of the National Guard. At least ten strikers were killed and dozens injured.
- Bituminous Coal Miners' Strike of 1894 – April 21, 1894. This nationwide strike was called when the union was hardly four years old. Many of the workers salaries had been cut by 30%[2] and with the demand for coal down during the recession, workers were desperate for work. The national guard was mobilized in several states to prevent or control violent clashes between strikers and strike breakers. The workers intended to strike for three weeks, hoping that this would produce a demand for coal and their wages would increase with its rising price. But, many union miners did not wish to cooperate with this plan and did not return to work at all. The union appeared weak. Other workers did not go out on strike, and with the demand low, they were able to produce sufficient coal. By being efficient in the mines, the operators saw no need to increase the wages of all the workers, and did not seem to care if the strike would end.
By June the demand for coal began to increase, and some operators decided to pay the workers their original salaries before the wage cut. However, not all demands across the country were met, and some workers continued to strike. The young union suffered damage in this uneven effort. The most important goal of the 1894 strike was not the restoration of wages, but rather the establishment of the UMWA as a cooperation at a national level.
- Lattimer Massacre – September 10, 1897. 19 miners were killed by police in Lattimer, Pennsylvania, during a march in support of unions.
- Battle of Virden – October 1898. This was part of the larger mine wars that established Illinois as the leading union state in the country, and a reason that Mary Harris "Mother" Jones is buried at Mount Olive, Illinois.
Early 1900s
[edit]
- The five-month Coal Strike of 1902, led by the United Mine Workers and centered in eastern Pennsylvania, ended after direct intervention of President Theodore Roosevelt as a neutral arbitrator.
- 1903 Colorado coal strike – October 1903. The United Mine Workers conducted a strike in Colorado, called in October 1903 by President Mitchell, and lasting into 1904. The strike, while overshadowed by a simultaneous strike conducted by the Western Federation of Miners among hard rock miners in the Cripple Creek District, contributed to the labor struggles in Colorado. These came to be known as the Colorado Labor Wars.[citation needed] During the United Mine Workers effort, operators directed their private forces to attack and beat traveling union officers and organizers, which ultimately helped to break the strike. These beatings were a mystery until publication of The Pinkerton Labor Spy (1907) by Morris Friedman, which revealed that the UMWA had been infiltrated by labor spies from the Pinkerton agency.[12]
- 1908 Alabama coal strike – June–August 1908. Notable because the 18,000 UMWA-organized strikers, more than half of those working in the Birmingham District, were racially integrated. That fact helped galvanize political opposition to the strikers in the segregated state. The governor used the Alabama State Militia to end the work stoppage. The union adopted racial segregation of workers in Alabama in order to reduce the political threat to the organization.[13][14][15]
- Westmoreland County Coal Strike – 1910–1911, a 16-month coal strike in Pennsylvania led largely by Slovak immigrant miners, this strike involved 15,000 coal miners. Sixteen people were killed during the strike, nearly all of them striking miners or members of their families.
- Colorado Coalfield War – September 1913–December 1914. A frequently violent strike against the John D. Rockefeller Jr.-Colorado Fuel and Iron company. Many strikers and opposition were killed before the violent reached a peak following the April 20, 1914 Ludlow Massacre. An estimated 20 people, including women and children, were killed by armed police, hired guns, and Colorado National Guardsmen who broke up a tent colony formed by families of miners who had been evicted from company-owned housing. The strike was partially led by John R. Lawson, a UMWA organizer and saw the participation of famed activist Mother Jones. The UMWA purchased part of Ludlow site and constructed the Ludlow Monument in commemoration of those who died.
- Hartford coal mine riot – July 1914. The surface plant of the Prairie Creek coal mine was destroyed, and two non-union miners murdered by union miners and sympathizers. The mine owners sued the local and national organizations of the United Mine Workers Union. The national UMWA was found not complicit, but the local was judged culpable of encouraging the rioters, and made to pay US$2.1 million.[16]

Los Angeles Times
November 22, 1919
- United Mine Workers coal strike of 1919 – November 1, 1919. Some 400,000 members of the United Mine Workers went on strike on November 1, 1919, although Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer had invoked the Lever Act, a wartime measure criminalizing interference with the production or transportation of necessities, and obtained an injunction against the strike on October 31.[17][18] The coal operators smeared the strikers with charges that Russian communist leaders Lenin and Trotsky had ordered the strike and were financing it, and some of the press repeated those claims.[19]
- Matewan, West Virginia – May 19, 1920. 12 men were killed in a gunfight between town residents and the Baldwin–Felts Detective Agency, hired by mine owners. Director John Sayles directed a feature film, Matewan, based on these events.
- The 'Redneck War' – 1920–21. Generally viewed as beginning with the Matewan Massacre, this conflict involved the struggle to unionize the southwestern area of West Virginia. It led to the march of 10,000 armed miners on the county seat at Logan. In the Battle of Blair Mountain, miners fought state militia, local police, and mine guards. These events are depicted in the novels Storming Heaven (1987) by Denise Giardina and Blair Mountain (2005) by Jonathan Lynn.
- 1920 Alabama coal strike, a lengthy, violent, expensive and fruitless attempt to achieve union recognition in the coal mines around Birmingham left 16 men dead; one black man was lynched.
- 1922 UMW General coal strike, On April 1, 1922, 610,000 mine workers struck nationwide, shutting down the majority of operations within the country.
- Herrin massacre occurred in June 1922 in Herrin, Illinois. 19 strikebreakers and 3 union miners were killed in mob action between June 21–22, 1922.
1922–1925 Nova Scotia strikes
[edit]
In the 1920s, about 12,000 Nova Scotia miners were represented by the UMWA.[20] These workers lived in very difficult economic circumstances in company towns. The Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation, also known as the British Empire Steel Corporation, or BESCO, controlled most coal mines and every steel mill in the province.[20] BESCO was in financial difficulties and repeatedly attempted to reduce wages and bust the union.
Led by J. B. McLachlan, miners struck in 1923, and were met by locally and provincially-deployed troops. This would eventually lead to the federal government introducing legislation limiting the civil use of troops.[20]
In 1925 BESCO announced that it would not longer give credit at their company stores and that wages would be cut by 20%. The miners responded with a strike. This led to violence with company police firing on strikers, killing miner William Davis, as well as the looting and arson of company property.[20]
This crisis led to the Nova Scotia government acting in 1937 to improve the rights of all wage earners, and these reforms served as a model across Canada, at both provincial and federal levels.[20]
The Brookside Strike
[edit]In the summer of 1973, workers at the Duke Power-owned Eastover Mining Company's Brookside Mine and Prep Plant in Harlan County, Kentucky, voted to join the union. Eastover management refused to sign the contract and the miners went on strike. Duke Power attempted to bring in replacement non-union workers or "scabs" but many were blocked from entering the mine by striking workers and their families on the picket line. Local judge F. Byrd Hogg was a coal operator himself and consistently ruled for Eastover. During much of the strike the mine workers' wives and children joined the picket lines. Many were arrested, some hit by baseball bats, shot at, and struck by cars. One striking miner, Lawrence Jones, was shot and killed by a Strikebreaker.
Three months after returning to work, the national UMWA contract expired. On November 12, 1974, 120,000 miners nationwide walked off the job. The nationwide strike was bloodless and a tentative contract was achieved three weeks later. This opened the mines and reactivated the railroad haulers in time for Christmas. These events are depicted in the documentary film Harlan County, USA.
The Pittston strike
[edit]The Pittston Coal strike of 1989-1990 began as a result of a withdrawal of the Pittston Coal Group also known as the Pittston Company from the Bituminous Coal Operators Association (BCOA) and a refusal of the Pittston Coal group to pay the health insurance payments for miners who were already retired. The owner of the Pittston company at the time, Paul Douglas, left the BCOA because he wanted to be able to produce coal seven days a week and did not want his company to pay the fee for the insurance.
The Pittson company was seen as having inadequate safety standards after the Buffalo Creek flood of 1972 in which 125 people were killed.[4] The company also was very financially unstable and in debt. The mines associated with the company were located mostly in Virginia, with mines also in West Virginia and Kentucky.
On 31 January 1988 Douglas cut off retirement and health care funds to about 1500 retired miners, widows of miners, and disabled miners.[4] To avoid a strike, Douglas threatened that if a strike were to take place, that the miners would be replaced by other workers. The UMW called this action unjust and took the Pittston company to court.
Miners worked from January 1988 to April 1989 without a contract. Tension in the company grew and on April 5, 1989, the workers declared a strike.[4] Many months of both violent and nonviolent strike actions took place. On 20 February 1990 a settlement was finally reached between the UMWA and the Pittston Coal Company.
Internal conflict
[edit]The union's history has sometimes been marked by internal strife and corruption, including the 1969 murder of Joseph Yablonski, a reform candidate who lost a race for union president against incumbent W. A. Boyle, along with his wife and 25-year-old daughter. Boyle was later convicted of ordering these murders.
The killing of Yablonski resulted in the birth of a pro-democracy movement called the "Miners for Democracy" (MFD) which swept Boyle and his regime out of office, and replaced them with a group of leaders who had been most recently rank and file miners.
Led by new president Arnold Miller, the new leadership enacted a series of reforms which gave UMWA members the right to elect their leaders at all levels of the union and to ratify the contracts under which they worked.
Decline of labor unionism in mining
[edit]Decreased faith in the UMW to support the rights of the miners caused many to leave the union. Coal demand was curbed by competition from other energy sources. The main cause of the decline in the union during the 1920s and 1930s was the introduction of more efficient and easily produced machines into the coal mines.[2] In previous years, less than 41% of coal was cut by the machines. However, by 1930, 81% was being cut by the machines and now there were machines that could also surface mine and load the coal into the trucks.[2] With more machines that could do the same labor, unemployment in the mines grew and wages were cut back. As the problems grew, many people did not believe that the UMW could ever become as powerful as it was before the start of the war.[2] The decline in the union began in the 1920s and continued through the 1930s.[2] Slowly the membership of the UMWA grew back up in numbers, with the majority in District 50, a catch-all district for workers in fields related to coal mining, such as the chemical and energy industries. This district gained organizational independence in 1961, and then fell into dispute with the remainder of the union, leading in 1968 to its expulsion.[21]
In the 1970s and after
[edit]Diana Baldwin and Anita Cherry, hired as miners in 1973, are believed to have been the first women to work in an underground coal mine in the United States. They were the first female members of UMWA to work inside a mine.[22][23][24] Cherry and Baldwin were hired by the Beth-Elkhorn Coal Company in Jenkins, Kentucky.[25][26] However, more pervasive were hiring practices discriminatory against women. The superstition that a woman even entering a mine was bad luck and resulted in disaster was pervasive among male miners.[27]
In 1978 a discrimination complaint was filed by the Coal Employment Project, a women's advocacy organization, against 153 coal companies. This action was based upon Executive Order 11246 signed in 1965 by U.S. President Lyndon Johnson, which bars sex discrimination by companies with federal contracts. The complaint called for the hiring of one woman for every three inexperienced men until women constituted 20 percent of the workforce. This legal strategy was successful. Almost 3,000 women were hired by the close of 1979 as underground miners.[28]
A general decline in union effectiveness characterized the 1970s and 1980s, leading to new kinds of activism, particularly in the late 1970s. Workers saw their unions back down in the face of aggressive management.[29]
Other factors contributed to the decline in unionism generally and UMW specifically. The coal industry was not prepared economically to deal with such a drop in demand for coal. Demand for coal was very high during World War II, but decreased dramatically after the war, in part due to competition from other energy sources. In efforts to improve air quality, municipal governments started to ban the use of coal as household fuel. The end of wartime price controls introduced competition to produce cheaper coal, putting pressure on wages.[2]
These problems—perceived weakness of the unions, loss of control over jobs, drop in demand, and competition—decreased the faith of miners in their union. By 1998 the UMW had about 240,000 members, half the number that it had in 1946.[2] As of the early 2000s, the union represents about 42 percent of all employed miners.[2]
Affiliation with other unions
[edit]At some point before 1930, the UMW became a member of the American Federation of Labor.[30] The UMW leadership was part of the driving force to change the way workers were organized, and the UMW was one of the charter members when the new Congress of Industrial Organizations was formed in 1935. However, the AFL leadership did not agree with the philosophy of industrial unionization, and the UMW and nine other unions that had formed the CIO were kicked out of the AFL in 1937.
In 1942, the UMW chose to leave the CIO,[31] and, for the next five years, were an independent union. In 1947, the UMW once again joined the AFL, but the remarriage was a short one, as the UMW was forced out of the AFL in 1948, and at that point, became the largest non-affiliated union in the United States.
In 1982, Richard Trumka was elected the leader of the UMW. Trumka spent the 1980s healing the rift between the UMW and the now-conjoined AFL–CIO (which was created in 1955 with the merger of the AFL and the CIO). In 1989, the UMW was again taken into the fold of the large union umbrella.[31]
Political involvement
[edit]
Throughout the years, the UMW has taken political stands and supported candidates to help achieve union goals.
The United Mine Workers ran candidate Frank Henry Sherman under the union banner in the 1905 Alberta general election. Sherman's candidacy was driven to appeal to the significant population of miners working in the camps of southern Alberta.[32] He finished second in the riding of Pincher Creek.
The biggest conflict between the UMW and the government was while Franklin Roosevelt was president of the United States and John L. Lewis was president of the UMW. Originally, the two worked together well, but, after the 1937 strike of United Automobile Workers against General Motors, Lewis stopped trusting Roosevelt, claiming that Roosevelt had gone back on his word. This conflict led Lewis to resign as CIO president. Roosevelt repeatedly won large majorities of the union votes, even in 1940 when Lewis took an isolationist position on Europe, as demanded by far-left union elements. Lewis denounced Roosevelt as a power-hungry war monger, and endorsed Republican Wendell Willkie.[33][34][35]
The tension between the two leaders escalated during World War II. Roosevelt in 1943 was outraged when Lewis threatened a major strike to end anthracite coal production needed by the war effort. He threatened government intervention and Lewis retreated.[36]
The UMW represents West Virginia coal miners and endorsed Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.) in the 2018 United States Senate election in West Virginia.[37] In 2021 the union urged him to revisit his opposition to President Biden's Build Back Better Plan, noting that the bill includes an extension of a fund that provides benefits to coal miners suffering from black lung disease, which expires at the end of the year. The UMWA also touted tax incentives that encourage manufacturers to build facilities in coalfields that would employ thousands of miners who lost their jobs.
"For those and other reasons, we are disappointed that the bill will not pass," Cecil Roberts, the union's president said. "We urge Senator Manchin to revisit his opposition to this legislation and work with his colleagues to pass something that will help keep coal miners working, and have a meaningful impact on our members, their families, and their communities."[38]
Recent elections
[edit]In 2008 the UMWA supported Barack Obama as the best candidate to help achieve more rights for the mine workers.[39]
In 2012, the UMWA National COMPAC Council did not make an endorsement in the election for President of the United States, citing "Neither candidate has yet demonstrated that he will be on the side of UMWA members and their families as president."[40]
In 2014, the UMWA endorsed Kentucky Democrat Alison Lundergan Grimes for U.S. Senate.[41]
In 2023, the UMWA endorsed Democrat Andy Beshear for the 2023 Kentucky gubernatorial election.[42]
Leadership
[edit]Presidents
[edit]- John B. Rae – 1890–1892
- John McBride – 1892–1895
- Phil Penna – 1895–1896
- Michael Ratchford – 1897–1898
- John Mitchell – 1898–1907
- Thomas Lewis – 1908–1910
- John White – 1911–1917
- Frank Hayes – 1917–1920
- John L. Lewis – 1920–1960
- Thomas Kennedy – 1960–1963
- W. A. "Tony" Boyle – 1963–1972
- Arnold Miller – 1972–1979
- Sam Church – 1979–1982
- Richard Trumka – 1982–1995
- Cecil Roberts – 1995–present
Vice Presidents
[edit]- 1890: William H. Turner
- 1891: Phil Penna
- 1895: Cameron Miller
- 1897: John Kane
- 1898: John Mitchell
- 1899: Thomas W. Davis
- 1900: Thomas Lewis
- 1908: John White
- 1910: Frank Hayes
- 1917: John L. Lewis
- 1920: Philip Murray
- 1942: John O'Leary
- 1947: Thomas Kennedy
- 1960: W. A. Boyle
- 1963: Raymond Lewis
- 1965: George J. Titler
- 1972: Mike Trbovich
- 1977: Sam Church
- 1980: Wilbert Killion
- 1982: Cecil Roberts
- 1995: Post divided
Secretary-Treasurers
[edit]- 1890: Robert Watchorn[43]
- 1891: Patrick McBryde[43]
- 1896: William Charles Pearce[43]
- 1900: William Bauchop Wilson[43]
- 1908: William D. Ryan[43]
- 1909: Edwin Perry[43]
- 1913: William Green[43]
- 1924: Thomas Kennedy[43]
- 1947: John Owens
- 1972: Harry Patrick
- 1977: Willard A. Esselstyn
- 1982: John Banovic
- 1991: Jerry D. Jones
- 1995: Carlo Tarley
- 2005: Daniel J. Kane
- 2017: Bob Scaramozzino
- 2017: Levi Allen
- 2021: Brian Sanson
Districts throughout history
[edit]1890
[edit]- 5 – Western Pennsylvania
- 6 – Ohio
- 11 – Indiana
- 12 – Illinois
- 17 – West Virginia
- 19 – Eastern Kentucky and Tennessee[2]
1910
[edit]- 1 – ANTHRACITE (North)
- 2 – Central Pennsylvania
- 5 – Western Pennsylvania
- 6 – Ohio
- 7 – ANTHRACITE (Central)
- 8 – Indian (Block)
- 9 – ANTHRACITE (South)
- 11 – Indiana (Bituminous)
- 12 – Illinois
- 13 – Iowa
- 14 – Kansas
- 16 – Maryland
- 17 – West Virginia
- 19 – Eastern Kentucky and Tennessee
- 20 – Alabama
- 21 – Arkansas and Indian Territory
- 23 – Central Kentucky
- 24 – Michigan
- 25 – Missouri[2]
1936
[edit]- 1 – ANTHRACITE (North)
- 2 – Central Pennsylvania
- 5 – Western Pennsylvania
- 6 – Ohio
- 7 – ANTHRACITE (Central)
- 8 – Indian (Block)
- 9 – ANTHRACITE (South)
- 10 – Washington
- 11 – Indiana (Bituminous)
- 12 – Illinois
- 13 – Iowa
- 14 – Kansas
- 15 – Colorado and Wyoming
- 17 – West Virginia
- 18 – Alberta and British Columbia
- 19 – Eastern Kentucky and Tennessee
- 20 – Alabama
- 21 – Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas
- 23 – Central Kentucky
- 24 – Michigan
- 25 – Missouri
- 26 – Nova Scotia
- 28 – Vancouver Island[2]
- 50 – An amalgamated 'miscellaneous' and 'catch-all' district, including workers associated with, but not in, mines and mining. Included paint and chemical workers. Eventually it was absorbed by the United Steelworkers of America
1990
[edit]- 2 – Central Pennsylvania
- 4 – Southwest Pennsylvania
- 5 – Western Pennsylvania
- 6 – Ohio
- 11 – Indiana (Bituminous)
- 12 – Illinois
- 14 – Kansas
- 15 – Colorado, New Mexico, Montana, and North Dakota
- 17 – Central West Virginia
- 18 – Alberta, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan
- 19 – Eastern Kentucky and Tennessee
- 20 – Alabama
- 21 – Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas
- 22 – Utah, Wyoming, and Arizona
- 23 – Central Kentucky
- 25 – Anthracite
- 26 – Nova Scotia and New Brunswick
- 28 – Virginia
- 29 – Southern West Virginia (eliminated in 1996)[44]
- 30 – Eastern Kentucky
- 31 – Northern West Virginia[2]
2013
[edit]- 2 – Pennsylvania, New York and Eastern Canada
- 12 – Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Western Kentucky, Missouri, Kansas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas and Oklahoma
- 17 – Southern West Virginia, Eastern Kentucky, Virginia and Tennessee
- 20 – Alabama, Florida, Georgia and Mississippi
- 22 – Western United States
- 31 – Northern West Virginia and Ohio[45]
References
[edit]- ^ "Who We Are, Where We Work | United Mine Workers of America". Umwa.org. Retrieved November 11, 2013.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z United We Stand, The United Mine Workers of America 1890–1990, by Maier B. Fox
- ^ Kris Maher, "Mine Workers Union Shrinks but Boss Fights On, Wall Street Journal, January 9, 2014 p. B1
- ^ a b c d The United Mine Workers of America: A Model of Industrial Solidarity? Edited by John M. Laslett 1994
- ^ Lentz, Ed (2003). Columbus: The Story of a City. The Making of America Series. Arcadia Publishing. p. 93. ISBN 9780738524290. OCLC 52740866.
- ^ "George Harris papers". Archival Collections. University of Maryland Libraries. Retrieved October 4, 2024.
- ^ Melvyn Dubofsky, and Warren Van Tine. John L. Lewis: A Biography (1977) is the standard scholarly biography online
- ^ Tucker, Robert C. (1990). Stalin in power: the revolution from above, 1928-1941. New York: Norton. pp. 603–604. ISBN 978-0-393-02881-2.
- ^ Zieger, Robert H. (February 2000). "Lewis, John L. (12 February 1880–11 June 1969), labor leader". Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/anb/9780198606697.article.1500412. ISBN 978-0-19-860669-7. Retrieved October 4, 2024.
- ^ a b c "UMWA in Action | United Mine Workers of America". Umwa.org. November 6, 2013. Retrieved November 11, 2013.
- ^ Leavitt, Judith Walzer; Numbers, Ronald L. (1997). Sickness and Health in America: Readings in the History of Medicine and ... Univ of Wisconsin Press. ISBN 978-0299153243. Retrieved November 11, 2013 – via Google Books.
- ^ Friedman, Morris (1907). "XIX and XX". The Pinkerton's labor spy [microform]. New York : Wilshire book Co.
- ^ Letwin, Daniel (1998). The challenge of interracial unionism: Alabama coal miners, 1878 - 1921. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press. ISBN 978-0-8078-4678-0.Letwin, Daniel L.(1998) The Challenge of Interracial Unionism: Alabama Coal Miners, 1878–1921. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press
- ^ It is union and liberty : Alabama coal miners and the UMW. Tuscaloosa, Ala. : University of Alabama Press. 1999. ISBN 978-0-8173-0999-2.
- ^ Kelly, Brian (2001). Race, class, and power in the Alabama coalfields, 1908-21. Urbana : University of Illinois Press. ISBN 978-0-252-02622-5.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: publisher location (link) - ^ Coronado Coal v. United Mine Workers of America, 268 US 295, 25 May 1925.
- ^ New York Times: "Palmer to Enforce Law," November 1, 1919, accessed January 26, 2010
- ^ Coben, Stanley (1963). A. Mitchell Palmer: politician. Columbia University Press. pp. 176–179.
- ^ Murray, Robert K. (1955). Red scare; a study in national hysteria, 1919-1920. University of Minnesota Press. p. 155.
- ^ a b c d e "The Nova Scotia Coal Strikes of 1922 to 1925". www.canada.ca. Canada Parks. February 15, 2016. Retrieved August 6, 2021.
- ^ "United Steelworkers of America, District 50 Records, 1936-1975 (bulk 1968-1972)". Penn State University Libraries. Penn State University. Archived from the original on September 27, 2021. Retrieved June 22, 2022.
- ^ Armstrong, Holly (March 22, 2022). "A Brief History of Women in Mining". DOL Blog. U.S. Department of Labor.
- ^ Klemesrud, Judy (May 18, 1974). "In Coal Mine No. 29, Two Women Work Alongside the Men". The New York Times.
- ^ "Two Women Make History as Kentucky Miners". Toledo Blade. December 26, 1973. p. 21.
- ^ Baisden, Harry I. (September 6, 1974). "Two Women Break Sex Bar in Modern Coal Mine". The Evening News. p. 48.
- ^ Gearhart, Dona G. (1995). 'Surely, a wench can choose her own work!' Women coal miners in Paonia, Colorado, 1976-1987 (Thesis). University of Nevada, Las Vegas. doi:10.25669/83uw-c7cr.
- ^ Alexander, Lendra Cole (1985). "The Coal Employment Project—How Women Can Make Breakthroughs into Nontraditional Industries" (PDF). U.S. Department of Labor; Women's Bureau (1985): 1–5.
- ^ Moore, Marat (1996). Women in the mines : stories of life and work. New York: Twayne Publishers. pp. xl–xlii. ISBN 0-8057-7834-9. OCLC 33333565.
- ^ Moody, Kim (1988). An injury to all : the decline of American unionism. London; New York : Verso. pp. 221–223. ISBN 978-0-86091-216-3.
- ^ "A Brief History of the UMWA". United Mine Workers of America. Retrieved November 11, 2013.
- ^ a b "Private Tutor". Factmonster.com. Retrieved November 11, 2013.
- ^ Brown, George; David M. Hayne; Frances G. Halpenny; Ramsay Cook (1966). Dictionary of Canadian Biography. University of Toronto Press. p. 950. ISBN 0-8020-3998-7.
- ^ Bernstein, Irving (1970). Turbulent years; a history of the American worker, 1933-1941. Boston, Houghton Mifflin. pp. 719–720. OCLC 1151831683.
- ^ Bernstein, Irving (June 1941). "John L. Lewis and the Voting Behavior of the C.I.O.". Public Opinion Quarterly. 5 (2): 233–249. doi:10.1086/265489. JSTOR 2744938.
- ^ Ross, Hugh (March 1976). "John L. Lewis and the election of 1940". Labor History. 17 (2): 160–189. doi:10.1080/00236567608584379. ISSN 0023-656X.
- ^ Sperry, J. R. (1973). "Rebellion Within the Ranks: Pennsylvania Anthracite, John L. Lewis, and the Coal Strikes of 1943". Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies. 40 (3): 292–312. ISSN 0031-4528. JSTOR 27772134.
- ^ "UMWA COMPAC Announces Endorsements for West Virginia Primary Election".
- ^ "Coal miners' union urges Manchin to reconsider opposition to Biden plan". The Hill. December 20, 2021.
- ^ "McCain campaign's last minute distortion of Obama's coal record an act of desperation". United Mine Workers of America. November 3, 2008. Retrieved November 11, 2013.
- ^ "United Mine Workers of America". Umwa.org. Retrieved November 11, 2013.
- ^ "UMWA endorses Grimes for Senate in Kentucky". Umwa.org. August 2, 2014. Retrieved September 15, 2014.
- ^ Kentucky – COMPAC Endorsements Archived April 17, 2023, at the Wayback Machine
- ^ a b c d e f g h The Samuel Gompers Papers. University of Illinois Press. 1986. ISBN 9780252033896.
- ^ "e-WV | United Mine Workers of America". Wvencyclopedia.org. October 26, 2010. Retrieved November 11, 2013.
- ^ "UMWA Offices | United Mine Workers of America". Umwa.org. Retrieved November 11, 2013.
Further reading
[edit]- Aurand, Harold W. (November 12, 2018). From the Molly Maguires to the United Mine Workers: The Social Ecology of an Industrial Union, 1869-1897. Temple University Press. doi:10.2307/j.ctv941x1v. ISBN 978-1-4399-1752-7. JSTOR j.ctv941x1v.
- Baratz, Morton S. (1972). The union and the coal industry. Port Washington, N.Y., Kennikat Press. ISBN 978-0-8046-1721-5.
- Bernstein, Irving (1983). The lean years : a history of the American worker, 1920-1933. New York, N.Y. : Da Capo Press. ISBN 978-0-306-80202-7.
- Bernstein, Irving (1970). Turbulent years; a history of the American worker, 1933-1941. Boston, Houghton Mifflin.
- Clapp, Thomas C. "The Bituminous Coal Strike of 1943." PhD dissertation U. of Toledo 1974. 278 pp. DAI 1974 35(6): 3626–3627-A., not online
- Dublin, Thomas and Walter Licht. The Face of Decline: The Pennsylvania Anthracite Region in the Twentieth Century (2005) excerpt and text search
- Dubofsky, Melvyn, and Warren Van Tine. John L. Lewis: A Biography (1977), the standard scholarly biography online
- Dubofsky, Melvyn, and Warren Van Tine. "John L. Lewis " in Dubofsky and Van Tine, eds. Labor Leaders in America (1990)
- Fishback, Price V. Soft Coal, Hard Choices: The Economic Welfare of Bituminous Coal Miners, 1890–1930 (1992) online edition Archived 2011-11-03 at the Wayback Machine
- Fox, Mayor. United We Stand: The United Mine Workers of America 1890–1990 (UMW 1990), detailed semiofficial union history
- Fry, Richard, "Dissent in the Coalfields: Miners, Federal Politics, and Union Reform in the United States, 1968–1973," Labor History, 55 (May 2014), 173–188.
- Galenson; Walter. The CIO Challenge to the AFL: A History of the American Labor Movement, 1935–1941, (1960) online edition Archived June 3, 2010, at the Wayback Machine
- Hinrichs, A. F. The United Mine Workers of America, and the Non-Union Coal Fields (1923) online edition Archived 2011-01-15 at the Wayback Machine
- Jensen, Richard J. "United Mine Workers of America." in Eric Arnesen, ed., Encyclopedia of US labor and working-class history (2007), v. 3
- Jensen, Richard J., and Carol L. Jensen. "Labor's appeal to the past: The 1972 election in the United Mine Workers." Communication Studies 28#3 (1977): 173–184.
- Krajcinovic, Ivana. From Company Doctors to Managed Care: The United Mine Workers Noble Experiment (Cornell UP, 1997).
- Laslett, John H.M. ed. The United Mine Workers: A Model of Industrial Solidarity? 1996.
- Lewis, Ronald L. Welsh Americans: A history of assimilation in the coalfields (Univ of North Carolina Press, 2009).
- Lynch, Edward A., and David J. McDonald. Coal and Unionism: A History of the American Coal Miners' Unions (1939) online edition Archived 2011-11-03 at the Wayback Machine
- McIntosh, Robert. Boys in the pits: Child labour in coal mines (McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP, 2000), Canadian mines
- Phelan, Craig. Divided Loyalties: The Public and Private Life of Labor Leader John Mitchell (SUNY Press, 1994).
- Powell, Allan Kent (1994), "The United Mine Workers of America", in Powell, Allan Kent (ed.), Utah History Encyclopedia, Salt Lake City, Utah: University of Utah Press, ISBN 0874804256, OCLC 30473917, archived from the original on March 22, 2016
- Seltzer, Curtis. Fire in the Hole: Miners and Managers in the American Coal Industry University Press of Kentucky, 1985, conflict in the coal industry to the 1980s.
- Singer, Alan Jay. "`Which Side Are You On?': Ideological Conflict in the United Mine Workers of America, 1919–1928." PhD dissertation Rutgers U., New Brunswick 1982. 304 pp. DAI 1982 43(4): 1268-A. DA8221709 Fulltext: [ProQuest Dissertations & Theses]
- Zieger, Robert H. "Lewis, John L." American National Biography Online Feb. 2000.
- Zieger, Robert H. John L. Lewis: Labor Leader (1988), 220pp short biography by scholar
- Zieger, Robert H. The CIO 1935–1955. 1995. online edition[permanent dead link]
External links
[edit]- Official website

- Remember Virden: documentary on the mine wars in Illinois
- West Virginia's Mine Wars
- Burning Up People to Make Electricity, The Atlantic, July 1974
- Mary Harris ‘Mother' Jones, “Speech at a Public Meeting on the Steps of the State Capitol, Charleston, West Virginia,” 15 August 1912 Archived March 29, 2016, at the Wayback Machine Voices of Democracy, West Virginia Mining and the Conflict of 1912
- The Pinkerton Labor Spy, Chapters XIX, XX, and XXI (Colorado Labor Wars, 1903–04)
United Mine Workers of America
View on GrokipediaThe United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) is a labor union founded in 1890 through the amalgamation of miners' organizations including the National Progressive Union of Miners and Mine Laborers and Knights of Labor Trade Assembly No. 135, initially aimed at organizing coal miners to secure fair wages, reasonable hours, and safer working conditions amid hazardous industry practices.[1] The union quickly engaged in contentious strikes, such as the 1897 Lattimer Massacre where state police killed 19 striking miners and the 1902 anthracite coal strike that prompted federal intervention and marked the first U.S. government acknowledgment of collective bargaining rights for a union.[1] Under presidents like John Mitchell, who negotiated the eight-hour workday, and John L. Lewis, who led from 1919 into the 1960s and expanded the union's influence through aggressive organizing and participation in the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the UMWA achieved landmark gains including the establishment of employer-funded health and retirement benefits in 1946 following government seizure of mines during a strike.[1] These efforts contributed to transforming mining from unregulated, deadly operations—plagued by frequent accidents and exploitative company towns—into an industry with codified safety standards, culminating in the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977.[1] Despite these advances, the UMWA's history includes violent clashes with operators, as in the 1914 Ludlow Massacre killing over a dozen women and children, and internal governance issues, notably corruption during W.A. "Tony" Boyle's presidency that led to the 1969 murder of reform candidate Joseph Yablonski after he contested a fraudulent election, prompting the Miners for Democracy movement to install Arnold Miller in 1972 and enforce democratic reforms via federal oversight.[1][2] In the modern era, confronting coal's contraction from mechanization, environmental regulations, and shifts to alternative energies, the UMWA has broadened to represent manufacturing workers, clean coal technicians, healthcare professionals, corrections officers, and public employees across the United States and Canada, maintaining focus on workplace protections and benefits amid a shrinking core membership.[3]
Origins and Formation
Antecedent Organizations and Early Organizing Attempts
The earliest attempts to organize coal miners in the United States occurred in the mid-19th century amid hazardous working conditions, long hours, and wage instability in both anthracite and bituminous fields, but these were largely local and ephemeral due to ethnic fragmentation among immigrant laborers—predominantly Irish, Welsh, English, and German—and aggressive resistance from mine operators who employed strikebreakers and blacklists.[4] Sporadic strikes, such as the 1842 anthracite general strike in Pennsylvania, highlighted grievances over safety and pay but failed to sustain organization, as miners lacked unified structures and faced legal barriers under common-law doctrines treating unions as criminal conspiracies.[5] The first national miners' union, the American Miners' Association (AMA), formed on January 28, 1861, in St. Louis, Missouri, initiated by English immigrant miners from the West Belleville, Illinois, area to coordinate across bituminous regions for better wages, hours, and safety.[6] The AMA briefly affiliated local assemblies in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Illinois, achieving minor wage gains during the Civil War coal boom, but internal disputes over jurisdiction—particularly exclusion of anthracite miners—and postwar economic downturns led to its dissolution by 1868, underscoring the challenges of national unity in a decentralized industry.[6][7] In Pennsylvania's Schuylkill County anthracite region, the Workingmen's Benevolent Association (WBA), founded in July 1868 under Irish-born leader John Siney, emerged as the first industry-wide union, enrolling 20,000 members across 22 districts by emphasizing mutual aid, education, and arbitration over violence.[5] The WBA secured Pennsylvania's first mine ventilation law in 1869 and won the 1870 strike for a 10 percent wage increase through disciplined organization, marking the earliest collective bargaining contract in U.S. coal mining.[5] Renamed the Miners' and Laborers' Benevolent Association in 1870, it advocated for an eight-hour day but collapsed after the protracted 1875 Long Strike, which idled 25,000 miners for six months amid operator intransigence and economic depression, resulting in evictions, violence, and the union's fragmentation.[5] During the 1880s depression, the Knights of Labor expanded among miners, establishing assemblies in coal districts of Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, and Utah to push for shorter hours and against child labor, with District Assembly 135 coordinating bituminous workers nationally.[8][4] These efforts faced setbacks from the 1886 Haymarket Riot's fallout and Knights' internal debates over strikes, yet provided infrastructure for later consolidation, as local Knights groups in Ohio and elsewhere merged with emerging craft-focused bodies.[9] Concurrently, the National Progressive Union of Miners and Mine Laborers, organized in 1888 in the bituminous Midwest, prioritized wage scales and grievance procedures, representing a more specialized antecedent to national unity.[1]Establishment in 1890 and Initial Constitution
The United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) was founded on January 25, 1890, in Columbus, Ohio, via the merger of the Knights of Labor Trade Assembly No. 135 and the National Progressive Union of Miners and Mine Laborers.[1][10] This consolidation addressed the fragmentation of earlier miners' groups, which had struggled with regional wage disparities, unsafe conditions, and employer resistance, enabling a national approach to collective bargaining in bituminous and anthracite coal fields across the United States and Canada.[10] The founding convention drew delegates representing about 17,000 members, reflecting the urgent need for unified action amid the coal industry's rapid expansion during the late 19th century.[10] The initial constitution, adopted at the convention, articulated eleven principal objectives to safeguard workers' interests. These included demanding wages proportional to the perils of underground labor, payment exclusively in legal currency to eliminate company scrip systems that trapped miners in debt, and the mandatory employment of checkweighmen to verify coal tonnage and prevent operator underpayment.[11][10] Further provisions targeted an eight-hour workday, the prohibition of child labor for those under 14 years or without basic education, and the installation of ventilation systems alongside other technologies to mitigate explosions, roof falls, and gas accumulations—hazards that claimed thousands of lives annually.[10] Notably, the constitution enshrined inclusivity by barring discrimination on grounds of race, creed, or nationality, a stance that distinguished the UMWA from many contemporaneous unions and incorporated African American, immigrant, and skilled laborers alike into its ranks.[12] It advocated arbitration over strikes to resolve disputes with operators, aiming for stable relations while prioritizing worker education and organization.[10] John B. Rae, a Knights of Labor veteran, was elected the first president, with the union's membership surging to over 53,000 within a year as organizing efforts intensified.[10]Growth and Early Challenges (1890s–1910s)
Expansion Amid Industrialization
The expansion of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) occurred against the backdrop of America's industrial boom, where coal mining scaled up to meet surging demands from railroads, steel mills, and urban energy needs. U.S. bituminous and anthracite coal output more than tripled between 1890 and 1910, drawing hundreds of thousands of workers into hazardous underground labor and creating fertile ground for union organizing despite fierce opposition from operators. Formed in 1890 through the merger of miners' groups and the Knights of Labor, the UMWA initially faltered, with membership contracting to under 10,000 by 1897 amid economic downturns and failed strikes.[8][1] A breakthrough came with the 1897 bituminous strike, where approximately 10,000 UMWA members from Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania walked out on July 4, demanding higher wages and better conditions; the action forced operators to concede a uniform wage scale effective until March 1898, enhancing the union's reputation and sparking a membership surge to over 115,000 by the early 1900s.[1] Under President John Mitchell, elected in 1898, the UMWA shifted toward disciplined, large-scale campaigns, including the 1900 anthracite strike that secured pay raises and hour reductions without full recognition. This strategy capitalized on industrial concentration, where growing mine outputs made prolonged shutdowns costly for owners, pressuring concessions that further propelled organizing drives.[13] The pivotal 1902 anthracite strike in Pennsylvania, involving 150,000 miners despite initial unionization of only about 8,000, lasted from May to October and drew federal intervention from President Theodore Roosevelt, culminating in arbitration that awarded a 10% wage increase, a nine-hour day, and indirect union acknowledgment in future talks. During the strike's early months, UMWA ranks swelled by over 200,000 as bituminous and anthracite workers enlisted, transforming the union into a dominant force in eastern coalfields.[14][15][13] By 1910, these victories had embedded the UMWA in core industrial districts, with membership exceeding 200,000 and enabling scaled contracts, though southern and western non-union areas remained contested amid ongoing mechanization and immigration-driven labor supplies.[1][16]Key Strikes and Their Outcomes
The 1897 bituminous coal strike, beginning on July 4, involved approximately 100,000 miners across Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia, demanding wage restoration to pre-1893 panic levels and an eight-hour workday.[17] Lasting 10 weeks until September 11, the walkout succeeded due to unified action and public sympathy amid economic recovery, yielding a 5-7% wage increase in most districts and the first interstate bituminous agreement establishing scale committees for grievance resolution.[18] [19] This victory under UMWA president John Mitchell tripled union membership to over 100,000 by year's end, solidifying organizational gains but exposing vulnerabilities to regional operator intransigence.[1] In contrast, the 1902 anthracite coal strike from May 12 to October 23 paralyzed Pennsylvania's hard coal fields, idling 147,000 miners who sought a 20% wage hike, nine-hour day, and union recognition amid exploitative company store systems and child labor.[14] [20] Operators, led by the anthracite trust, refused negotiations, prompting President Theodore Roosevelt's unprecedented federal intervention via the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission; the arbitration awarded a 10% wage increase, nine-hour day for surface workers, and a permanent conciliation board, but denied full UMWA recognition and weighing rights.[14] [21] While averting a national fuel crisis and establishing arbitration precedent, the partial concessions fueled operator resistance, delaying anthracite unionization until 1903 and highlighting the union's leverage limits against consolidated capital.[14] Subsequent actions, such as the 1912-1913 Paint Creek-Cabin Creek strike in West Virginia involving 4,000 miners striking for union recognition and better pay, underscored escalating violence with martial law declarations and over 50 deaths from clashes, guard gunfire, and bombings, yet yielded check-off dues and wage hikes without formal UMWA contracts.[1] These early strikes expanded UMWA influence in bituminous fields but revealed persistent challenges in anthracite regions, where non-union labor and legal injunctions constrained outcomes until centralized leadership later.[13]John L. Lewis Leadership (1920–1960)
Rise to Power and Centralized Control
John L. Lewis ascended to the presidency of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) in 1920, following his role as acting president starting in late 1919. His leadership during the 1919–1920 national coal strike, which involved approximately 400,000 miners and lasted five months, secured significant wage increases and recognition from operators, enhancing his influence within the union.[22] [23] Under his early tenure, UMWA membership expanded rapidly to around 500,000 by the mid-1920s, reflecting the union's leverage amid high coal demand.[22] To consolidate authority, Lewis pursued centralization by establishing a hierarchical structure that vested substantial power in the international presidency, diminishing the autonomy of district organizations. He appointed or influenced the selection of district leaders loyal to his administration and used union resources to enforce discipline.[24] This approach included suppressing internal opposition through the expulsion of rivals, such as progressive challengers John Brophy and Adolph Germer, who advocated for more democratic processes or alignment with leftist factions.[25] Such measures ensured unified decision-making but drew characterizations of his style as autocratic and dictatorial, prioritizing operational efficiency over broad internal debate.[24] [23] Despite economic downturns in the coal industry during the 1920s, which reduced membership to about 150,000 by 1932 due to mine closures and unemployment, Lewis maintained control by emphasizing mechanization to improve productivity—miners under UMWA contracts produced substantially more coal per worker than non-union counterparts—and by negotiating directly with operators to preserve core bargaining units.[23] This centralization enabled the union to weather adversity, positioning it for recovery under later New Deal policies, though it entrenched Lewis's unchallenged dominance for decades.[24]Wartime Policies and Post-War Negotiations
During World War II, the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), under John L. Lewis's leadership, defied the no-strike pledge adopted by most American labor unions to support the war effort. In early 1943, contract disputes over wages and working conditions prompted Lewis to demand negotiations with coal operators, leading to a nationwide strike order effective May 1, 1943, that idled approximately 480,000 bituminous coal miners and halted production in key Appalachian fields.[26][27] President Franklin D. Roosevelt responded by seizing the mines via executive order on May 21, 1943, but miners returned to work only after the War Labor Board approved a wage increase of $1.50 per day, financed partly by retroactive adjustments and government subsidies.[26] A second strike in November 1943, lasting 40 days and again involving mine seizures, extracted further concessions, including union security clauses, though these actions drew widespread condemnation for disrupting coal supplies vital to steel production and munitions manufacturing.[28][29] The strikes contributed to the passage of the Smith-Connally Act in July 1943, which empowered the president to seize struck war-essential industries and imposed cooling-off periods, reflecting congressional frustration with Lewis's militancy.[30] Post-war, Lewis leveraged UMWA's strike power to secure unprecedented health and retirement benefits amid economic reconversion and inflation pressures. In April 1946, following the expiration of wartime contracts, approximately 400,000 miners struck against the Bituminous Coal Operators Association (BCOA), prompting another government seizure of the mines under the War Department.[31] Negotiations culminated in the Krug-Lewis Agreement on May 29, 1946, between Lewis and Interior Secretary Julius Krug, which ended the strike and established the UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund, initially financed by a federal royalty of 5 cents per ton of coal produced (later 10 cents), marking the first industry-wide, union-administered health plan in U.S. history.[31][32] This portal-to-portal pay dispute intertwined with the fund's creation, as the Supreme Court's 1947 ruling against retroactive pay claims shifted focus to royalty-based financing, but operators resisted until a 59-day strike in 1947-1948 yielded a permanent agreement with the BCOA for 20 cents per ton (escalating to 40 cents by 1950), funding comprehensive medical care, pensions, and disability benefits that covered over 300,000 beneficiaries by 1950.[33][34] These negotiations solidified Lewis's strategy of tying wage restraint to non-wage benefits, though critics argued the funds imposed burdensome costs on operators, contributing to mechanization drives and industry contraction.[24]Achievements in Worker Protections
Safety Legislation and Health Initiatives
The United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) has advocated for federal mine safety regulations since its founding in 1890, pressing Congress to address hazards such as explosions, roof falls, and respiratory diseases amid high fatality rates in coal mining.[35] Early efforts focused on state-level protections following disasters like the 1907 Monongah explosion, which killed 362 miners, but UMWA leaders emphasized the need for uniform national standards to counter industry resistance and inconsistent enforcement.[36] A pivotal achievement came with the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, enacted on December 30 in response to the November 20, 1968, Farmington, West Virginia, explosion that claimed 78 lives, including 19 rescuers.[37] UMWA's "Project 50" campaign mobilized miners and public support, resulting in the law's stringent provisions for regular inspections, mandatory safety equipment, and penalties for violations, marking the first federal mandate for comprehensive health protections against black lung disease (pneumoconiosis).[38] [39] The Act established a benefits program compensating totally disabled miners with up to $200 monthly payments, adjusted for dependents, and required operators to cover medical treatment.[39] Building on this, the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 expanded survivor benefits to families of miners deceased from pneumoconiosis, providing monthly payments and medical coverage administered through the Department of Labor.[40] UMWA testimony and lobbying ensured presumptive coverage for miners with 10+ years of service, countering operator claims that dust exposure levels were safe despite epidemiological evidence of widespread disease.[41] The union has since supported amendments, including the 2010 reforms restoring presumptions for complicated cases, amid ongoing disputes over claim denials exceeding 90% in some periods due to stringent proof requirements.[42] The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 further empowered UMWA initiatives by creating the independent Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) within the Department of Labor, mandating twice-annual inspections and miner representatives' involvement in enforcement.[43] [1] This legislation responded to persistent violations post-1969, incorporating UMWA demands for whistleblower protections and immediate mine closures for imminent dangers, which reduced fatalities from 27,000 cumulatively pre-1970 to under 20 annually by the 1980s.[44] UMWA's health programs, including advocacy for dust sampling and ventilation standards, have prioritized empirical monitoring over operator self-regulation, yielding measurable declines in compensable respiratory claims.[45]Wage Gains and Benefit Funds
Under John L. Lewis's presidency, the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) negotiated substantial wage increases through strategic strikes and collective bargaining, elevating miners' pay above many industrial averages. During World War I, UMWA cooperation with federal production controls secured significant wage hikes, which Lewis defended in subsequent strikes, including the 1921-1922 action that preserved wartime gains amid economic contraction.[46][47] In the 1930s, New Deal-era agreements under the National Recovery Administration doubled base daily wages from approximately $4 to $8 for many bituminous miners by 1934, with further adjustments tied to productivity and regional differentials.[48] Post-World War II strikes in 1946 and 1949-1950 yielded additional increases, such as a $1.50 daily boost approved under stabilization policies in the early 1950s, alongside portal-to-portal pay reforms that compensated travel time underground.[49] By the mid-20th century, UMWA contracts positioned coal miners among the highest-paid workers in major U.S. industries, with daily rates exceeding $10 in some agreements by the late 1940s.[50] The UMWA's establishment of dedicated benefit funds marked a pioneering shift from wage-only demands to comprehensive security, funded primarily by coal operator royalties rather than member dues. The Welfare and Retirement Fund originated in the May 1946 Krug-Lewis Agreement, signed in the White House to end a nationwide strike, mandating operator contributions of 5 cents per ton of coal mined for health and welfare benefits; initial payments reached beneficiaries in 1947.[51][52] The 1950 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement expanded this into the formal UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund of 1950, increasing royalties to 30-40 cents per ton and establishing trustee-managed pensions, survivor benefits, and medical care for retirees, independent of active wage scales.[53][54] In the 1950s, the fund financed construction of 10 hospitals in underserved mining regions to address black lung and injury-related needs, while periodic contract reopenings integrated wage hikes with benefit enhancements, such as expanded coverage under Lewis's oversight.[55] These mechanisms ensured retiree pensions averaged competitive levels, though reliant on coal production volumes for solvency.[56]Controversies and Criticisms
Internal Corruption and Power Struggles
Following the death of long-serving president John L. Lewis in 1969, W.A. "Tony" Boyle assumed the UMWA presidency amid growing accusations of autocratic control and financial irregularities inherited from the Lewis era. Boyle's administration faced scrutiny for misuse of union funds, including lavish personal expenditures and favoritism in district leadership appointments, which alienated rank-and-file members seeking greater transparency.[57] By 1969, internal dissent had coalesced around vice president Joseph "Jock" Yablonski, who launched a reform campaign against Boyle, alleging vote-rigging, ballot stuffing, and suppression of opposition in the union's December 1969 election, where Boyle secured 80% of the vote despite evidence of procedural flaws in multiple districts.[58] Yablonski filed a formal challenge with the U.S. Department of Labor on December 29, 1969, prompting a federal investigation into election fraud under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. The next day, on December 30, Yablonski, his wife Margaret, and 25-year-old daughter Charlotte were shot to death in their Clarksville, Pennsylvania home by hired assassins, an event that exposed the depths of intraparty violence within the union.[58] Investigations revealed the murders were commissioned by Boyle loyalists, with union treasurer George Titler and other officials implicated in funneling funds to the killers; Boyle himself was convicted in 1974 on charges of conspiracy to murder Yablonski, receiving a three-year sentence after serving time for related embezzlement.[57][59] The Yablonski killings galvanized opposition, leading to the formation of Miners for Democracy (MFD) in April 1970 as a rank-and-file reform caucus demanding democratic elections, term limits, and independent audits of union finances. Under federal oversight, a court-supervised rerun election in December 1972 ousted Boyle's machine, electing MFD-backed Arnold Miller as president with 56% of the vote, marking the first contested leadership change in UMWA history and instituting reforms like direct member voting for officers.[2] However, power struggles persisted into the 1970s, as Miller's tenure faced challenges from entrenched locals resisting decentralization, and subsequent leaders like Richard Trumka navigated lingering corruption probes, including a 1989 racketeering indictment against district officials for extortion.[2] These episodes underscored causal links between centralized authority and vulnerability to abuse, with empirical evidence from federal probes revealing over $1 million in misappropriated funds under Boyle alone.[57]Violent Tactics and Repression
The United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) employed violent tactics during several major strikes, particularly in the early 20th century, as a means to counter employer resistance and organize non-union fields. In the 1919-1921 West Virginia Mine Wars, UMWA organizers faced private detective agencies hired by coal operators, leading to mutual violence including assassinations and ambushes; however, miners responded with armed marches, culminating in the Battle of Blair Mountain in August-September 1921, where approximately 10,000 UMWA-affiliated miners, many armed with rifles, clashed with 3,000 sheriff's deputies and company guards over ten days, resulting in at least 16 confirmed deaths and estimates of up to 100 total casualties, predominantly among miners.[60] [61] UMWA leadership, including district officials, supported the mobilization despite federal intervention by President Warren G. Harding, who deployed Army air reconnaissance and troops to end the conflict, after which over 1,100 miners were indicted for treason, though most charges were later dropped.[60] Under John L. Lewis's presidency from 1920 to 1960, the UMWA centralized authority through repressive measures against internal dissenters, expelling rivals such as reformers John Brophy and Alexander Howat, as well as communists in districts like Kansas's District 26, to maintain unified control and prevent factionalism that could weaken bargaining power.[62] Lewis's administration imposed no-strike pledges during World War II but enforced compliance via district autonomy curtailed by loyalty oaths and purges, fostering a hierarchical structure that suppressed rank-and-file challenges, as evidenced by the 1920s decline in membership from 500,000 to 150,000 amid economic downturns and internal purges.[62] Later conflicts reiterated patterns of UMWA-sanctioned violence against perceived strikebreakers. During the 1989-1990 Pittston Coal strike in Virginia, UMWA picketers engaged in actions including blocking access roads and confronting non-union workers, leading to federal intervention by U.S. Marshals who arrested five picketers for assaulting deputies, damaging vehicles, and obstructing operations amid broader reports of gunfire and sabotage.[63] In the 2021 Warrior Met Coal strike in Alabama, company officials documented over 100 incidents of UMWA picket-line violence, including thrown objects and threats that injured security personnel, prompting calls for federal oversight to curb escalation.[64] These tactics, while rooted in historical employer aggression such as Baldwin-Felts agents' machine-gun attacks on tent colonies, often provoked legal repercussions and public backlash, contributing to the UMWA's image as prone to militancy over negotiation.[63]Economic Consequences of Union Actions
Union actions by the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) have frequently resulted in short-term disruptions to coal production, leading to significant economic losses in output and revenue. The 1946 nationwide coal strike, initiated after contract expiration, halted bituminous coal mining for approximately 59 days in May and additional periods later that year, resulting in an estimated loss of 8 million tons of coal production.[65] This interruption, as coal supplied over half of U.S. energy needs at the time, contributed to broader economic strain amid postwar reconversion, prompting federal intervention under the Taft-Hartley Act and temporary mine seizures.[66] Similarly, recurrent strikes in the late 1940s and 1950s, often tied to pension and welfare fund disputes, reduced annual output; for instance, work stoppages in 1949-1950 limited operations to a three-day workweek in some districts, exacerbating production shortfalls amid declining exports from 43 million tons in 1947 to around 20 million tons by the early 1950s.[67] These events elevated energy prices and constrained industrial activity, with overall 1946 labor disputes, including coal actions, accounting for 116 million worker-days idle nationwide.[68] Longer-term, UMWA-negotiated contracts imposing above-market wages, comprehensive health and retirement benefits, and restrictive work rules elevated labor costs, diminishing the coal industry's competitiveness relative to alternative fuels like oil and natural gas. Post-1946 agreements established royalty-funded welfare and pension trusts, with operators paying up to 40 cents per ton by the 1950s, which strained smaller producers and encouraged consolidation among larger firms.[4] Empirical analysis of West Virginia coal mines from 1897-1925 indicates that UMWA organization correlated with 5-10% lower productivity after 1914, alongside reduced employment and operational days, as fixed wage premiums incentivized operators to minimize labor inputs.[69] By the 1960s and 1970s, these dynamics accelerated mechanization; continuous miners and longwall systems proliferated to offset high union-scale wages—averaging $3.30 per hour by 1950, far exceeding non-union sectors—allowing output to rise while employment plummeted from nearly 280,000 bituminous miners in 1950 to under 100,000 by 1970, despite production exceeding 500 million tons annually in the mid-1950s.[70][71] In Appalachia, the epicenter of UMWA influence, these effects manifested in structural economic decline, with mine closures and automation displacing tens of thousands of jobs, fostering dependency on federal aid and out-migration. The 1974 UMWA contract's stringent provisions, including guaranteed pensions and health coverage, further eroded productivity—underground output per worker-hour fell post-1969 due to adversarial labor relations and regulatory burdens amplified by union demands—contributing to non-union competition from Western surface mines and imports.[70] While securing gains for remaining members, such as sustained wage premiums, these actions arguably hastened the sector's contraction; coal employment in the region dropped over 50% from 1980 peaks amid rising mechanization, with ripple effects including depressed local GDP and elevated poverty rates in former mining counties.[72] Over-reliance on pattern bargaining locked in rigid cost structures, limiting adaptability to market shifts and exacerbating bankruptcies, as seen in the insolvency of UMWA pension funds by the 2010s despite industry output stability.[73]Major Labor Disputes
Interwar and Mid-Century Strikes
Following World War I, the UMWA launched a national bituminous coal strike on November 1, 1919, involving approximately 400,000 miners seeking wage increases and recognition of union agreements undermined by postwar adjustments. The action lasted until December 10, 1919, ending after federal intervention by President Woodrow Wilson, who invoked wartime powers and threatened conscription of strikers into the military to resume production.[74] In 1921, amid organizing drives in non-union southern West Virginia coalfields, 7,000 UMWA-affiliated miners marched on Logan County under leader Bill Blizzard, culminating in the Battle of Blair Mountain, a five-day armed confrontation with company guards and state forces that highlighted violent resistance to unionization. The following year, the UMWA called a national strike on April 1, 1922, encompassing up to 600,000 bituminous miners protesting operator demands for wage cuts of up to 20% and longer hours; the dispute endured 163-170 days until September, averting most reductions through arbitration but sparking local violence, including the Herrin Massacre in Illinois where strikers killed 19 strikebreakers and 2 union members.[1] [75] During the 1930s, under John L. Lewis's leadership, the UMWA shifted toward aggressive organizing in the Depression-era South, resulting in the Harlan County War from 1931 to 1939, a decade-long clash in Kentucky involving evictions, hunger marches, and skirmishes between miners and coal operator-hired guards, which drew national attention to labor conditions but yielded limited immediate union gains until New Deal protections aided recruitment.[1] Post-World War II, wartime no-strike pledges expired, prompting major actions; in 1943, UMWA strikes defied government orders, leading to mine seizures and fines against the union for disrupting war production. The 1946 strike, commencing April 1 with 400,000 miners demanding health benefits and safety improvements, triggered another federal seizure by President Truman; resolved via the Krug-Lewis Agreement on May 29, it established the UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund financed by a 5-10 cent royalty per ton of coal, marking a precedent for industry-funded benefits.[46] [76] The union's tactics continued into the 1950s, with the 1949-1950 dispute featuring intermittent stoppages and a full national strike from February 6, 1950, over contract terms; it concluded in March with wage hikes averaging $1.40 daily and a 28-month agreement, though federal intervention via the Taft-Hartley Act and court orders pressured resumption. A 1952 strike similarly prompted Truman's seizure of mines, underscoring persistent conflicts over automation's impact on jobs and royalties funding retiree benefits.[77] [78]Late 20th-Century Conflicts
The 1977-1978 national coal strike, initiated on December 6, 1977, involved approximately 160,000 United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) members across bituminous coal operations, marking one of the longest work stoppages in U.S. labor history at 111 days.[79] The dispute arose during negotiations with the Bituminous Coal Operators' Association (BCOA) over demands for higher wages, portal-to-portal pay for underground travel time, improved health benefits, and resistance to a contract clause restricting wildcat strikes, amid rising coal demand but operator efforts to curb labor costs.[80] President Jimmy Carter invoked the Taft-Hartley Act on March 6, 1978, ordering miners back to work under threat of fines and imprisonment, but widespread defiance by rank-and-file members—supported by local UMWA leaders—prolonged the action, highlighting tensions between national union leadership and grassroots militancy.[81] The strike ended on March 24, 1978, with a settlement providing a 37% wage increase over three years, establishment of the 1974 pension fund's solvency through operator contributions, and partial concessions on wildcat protections, though it exacerbated energy shortages and contributed to short-term inflation pressures.[82] In the late 1980s, the UMWA faced escalating conflicts with non-union and withdrawing operators amid industry deregulation and competition from surface mining. Pittston Coal Group, a major producer, exited the BCOA agreement in 1988 and unilaterally terminated health benefits for about 1,500 retirees and dependents effective February 1, 1989, prompting UMWA International President Richard Trumka to launch a selective strike on April 5, 1989, involving roughly 1,700-2,000 miners in Virginia, Kentucky, and West Virginia.[83] Tactics included picket lines, mass demonstrations, civil disobedience such as blockades of mine entrances, and innovative support from the Daughters of Mother Jones auxiliary, which organized logistics, rallies, and confronted strikebreakers; the action drew national solidarity from other unions and civil rights groups, sustaining strikers through 10 months of hardship.[84] Violence erupted, including shootings, equipment sabotage, and clashes requiring U.S. Marshals intervention to protect non-union workers and company property in southwest Virginia coalfields.[63] Federal mediation under the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, combined with economic pressure from lost production (Pittston's output fell over 90%), led to a settlement on February 20, 1990, restoring retiree benefits, capping premiums, and securing job security provisions, widely viewed as a UMWA victory that preserved multi-employer bargaining structures.[85] These conflicts underscored the UMWA's shift toward coordinated "corporate campaigns" combining strikes with public pressure and legal actions, contrasting earlier decentralized wildcats, while exposing underlying causal pressures: operators' responses to stagnant coal prices, federal black lung liabilities, and non-union competition, which eroded union leverage despite tactical successes.[86] The strikes imposed financial strains on locals, with UMWA strike funds depleting rapidly and reliance on member contributions and external aid, yet they delayed broader concessions on retiree health costs that later burdened the union amid membership declines.[87]21st-Century Disputes
In the early 2010s, a wave of coal company bankruptcies forced the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) into contentious renegotiations over collective bargaining agreements, as federal courts permitted operators to void existing contracts to shed labor liabilities. Over 60 coal firms, including Patriot Coal (filing in July 2012), Alpha Natural Resources (August 2015), Peabody Energy (April 2016), and Arch Coal (January 2016), entered Chapter 11 proceedings, citing competitive pressures from low natural gas prices and regulatory costs; these actions threatened retiree health benefits for tens of thousands and active miners' wages and pensions.[88][89] UMWA leadership accepted significant concessions, such as wage freezes, reduced overtime premiums, and higher health care contributions, to preserve union recognition and operational jobs, though pre-bankruptcy benefit levels were not restored; for instance, in August 2013, Patriot Coal workers ratified a deal relinquishing retiree funding guarantees in exchange for a 35% equity stake in the reorganized company, which the union later sold to bolster funds.[90][91] These outcomes reflected the union's strategic prioritization of survival amid industry contraction, with UMWA successfully advocating for legislative protections like the 2017 Bipartisan Miners Act to safeguard retiree health care and the 2019 stabilization of the 1974 Pension Plan.[88] The most protracted 21st-century labor action involving UMWA erupted at Warrior Met Coal in Alabama, where approximately 1,100 members struck starting April 1, 2021, demanding wage increases, improved benefits, and shorter shifts after the company—spun off from bankrupt Walter Energy in 2016—posted record profits without commensurate worker gains, despite prior concessions granted during that restructuring.[92][93] The 23-month walkout, one of the longest in modern U.S. history, saw Warrior Met hire over 1,000 replacement workers and report both sides' involvement in picket-line violence, including vehicle blockades and assaults documented by company statements and union reports; coal prices surged amid global demand, bolstering the operator's leverage.[64][94] In March 2023, UMWA leadership ended the strike without a new agreement, allowing unconditional return to work, though only about 250 union members had rejoined by mid-2023 amid ongoing tensions and a subsequent decertification petition from some employees.[95][96] This dispute underscored persistent challenges in non-union strongholds like the South, where operators exploited market rebounds to resist concessions reversal.Decline and Structural Changes
Impact of Mechanization and Market Shifts
Mechanization in the U.S. coal industry accelerated after World War II, particularly from the 1950s onward, with the adoption of cutting machines, continuous miners, and conveyor systems replacing manual labor-intensive methods like pick-and-shovel extraction.[88] This shift was driven by operators seeking higher efficiency to compete amid rising labor costs secured by UMWA contracts, leading to a direct causal reduction in workforce requirements as machines performed tasks previously done by multiple workers.[97] In response, UMWA leadership under John L. Lewis negotiated the 1950 Mechanization and Wage Fund Agreement, which imposed royalties on coal tonnage to create a benefit fund compensating for job displacements, accepting fewer but higher-paid positions in exchange for job security measures.[24] Productivity gains from mechanization were substantial in surface mining but mixed in underground operations, where UMWA's core membership concentrated; overall coal output per worker-hour rose dramatically from the 1920s (when manual cutting dominated) to the 1970s, enabling U.S. production to exceed 1 billion short tons annually by the 2000s with far fewer employees.[11] For instance, bituminous coal mining employment, heavily unionized under UMWA, fell from around 400,000 in the early 1950s to under 100,000 by the 1980s, despite stable or increasing production volumes until the late 2000s, as mechanized longwall and room-and-pillar systems output more coal per shift with smaller crews.[98] Underground productivity specifically declined 43% from 1969 to the early 1980s due to factors including UMWA work rules and strikes that limited further automation, but the long-term trend remained one of labor displacement, with GAO analysis linking poor labor-management relations under union contracts to stalled efficiency gains.[70] Concurrent market shifts compounded these effects, as the fracking-enabled natural gas boom from the mid-2000s reduced coal's share of U.S. electricity generation from over 50% in 2005 to about 20% by 2020, primarily due to gas's lower fuel costs and abundant supply displacing coal in power plants.[88] Renewables like wind and solar grew but accounted for a smaller portion of coal's displacement compared to gas, with coal production dropping to around 500 million short tons by 2023 amid plant retirements and export challenges.[99] These demand-side pressures accelerated job losses in UMWA-represented mines, particularly in Appalachia, where underground operations faced both mechanization and competition from cheaper Western surface coal and non-union labor. The combined forces eroded UMWA membership from a post-war peak of nearly 500,000 in 1946 to about 240,000 by 1998 and fewer than 10,000 active coal miners today, as fewer jobs sustained dues-paying members and forced diversification into health care and other sectors.[100][11] While UMWA contracts historically mitigated some impacts through benefit funds covering retirees—preserving pension liabilities even as active ranks shrank—the structural decline reflected irreversible technological substitution and fuel market economics, rendering traditional organizing models less viable without broader industry contraction.[101]Membership Erosion and Industry Contraction
The United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) saw its membership peak at approximately 500,000 in 1946, reflecting strong postwar coal demand and union influence in Appalachia. By the 1990s, this figure had fallen below 200,000, driven by shrinking employment opportunities in organized mines and the rise of non-union operations. Further erosion continued into the late 1990s, with membership at about 240,000 by 1998, roughly half the 1946 level, as coal companies increasingly turned to unorganized fields in the West, where surface mining expanded without union contracts.[102][11] This decline mirrored broader U.S. coal industry contraction, with mining employment dropping from a modern peak of around 200,000 jobs in 1980 to 45,476 employees on average in 2023. Coal production itself peaked at over 1.1 billion short tons in 2008 before halving to roughly 500 million short tons by 2022, as utilities shifted to cheaper natural gas enabled by hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling. Renewables like wind and solar also captured market share through falling costs and federal incentives, while improved power plant efficiency reduced overall fuel needs.[103][104][105] Environmental regulations, including the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990 requiring scrubbers for high-sulfur Eastern coal, imposed compliance costs that favored low-sulfur Western coal but accelerated mine closures in UMWA strongholds. Membership erosion compounded as the union's share of total coal workers fell; by the 2010s, UMWA represented only a fraction of the remaining ~40,000-50,000 miners, with diversification into manufacturing, healthcare, and other sectors failing to offset core losses. Bankruptcies in coal firms like Peabody Energy and Arch Coal in the 2010s further strained union contracts, pensions, and retiree benefits, eroding worker loyalty and recruitment.[105][102][73]Political Engagement
Historical Alliances and Endorsements
The United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) forged early political alliances with the Democratic Party during the Progressive Era, aligning with labor reformers who advocated for miners' rights amid industrial strife, though formal endorsements were limited until the 20th century. By the 1930s, under president John L. Lewis, the UMWA became a cornerstone of the labor-Democratic partnership, supporting Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal through the 1936 formation of Labor's Nonpartisan League, which funneled union resources to Democratic campaigns and helped secure pro-labor legislation like the National Industrial Recovery Act.[106][107] This alliance was rooted in reciprocal benefits: Democratic administrations provided federal recognition of unions via the Wagner Act of 1935, while UMWA mobilization bolstered urban and industrial voting blocs for the party.[46] Lewis's independence led to notable deviations, as he endorsed Republican Herbert Hoover for president in 1928, prioritizing anti-union crackdown critiques over party loyalty, and Wendell Willkie in 1940, opposing Roosevelt's third-term bid and interventionist foreign policy amid UMWA strikes against wartime production mandates.[108][109] These breaks highlighted causal tensions between union autonomy and partisan demands, with Lewis leveraging UMWA leverage to extract concessions regardless of administration. By 1952, however, the UMWA reaffirmed Democratic ties, as Lewis—after a 16-year rift—led the union's convention in Cincinnati to endorse Adlai Stevenson, signaling a return to alignment on domestic economic issues like coal industry stabilization.[110] Post-Lewis, from the 1960s onward, the UMWA's endorsements solidified within Democratic circles, supporting nominees like Lyndon B. Johnson and Hubert Humphrey amid the Great Society's expansion of federal welfare programs that indirectly aided mining communities through health and pension funding.[46] The union's role in co-founding the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in 1935 further entrenched this, as CIO political action committees directed millions in member contributions to Democratic congressional races, emphasizing empirical gains in union density and wage protections over ideological purity.[46] Exceptions persisted in coal-dependent districts, where pragmatic endorsements crossed party lines—such as backing Republicans in West Virginia Senate races when candidates championed deregulation—but the overarching historical pattern prioritized Democratic majorities for legislative access on occupational safety and royalties financing retiree benefits.[111] This strategic realism underscored the UMWA's focus on industry-specific causal factors like mechanization subsidies, rather than blanket partisanship.Positions on Energy Policy and Recent Elections
The United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) advocates for an "all-of-the-above" energy strategy that prioritizes the preservation of coal production through technologies like carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), while supporting limited investments in renewable energy manufacturing to create jobs in coal-dependent regions. In its 2021 "Preserving Coal Country" principles, the union called for enhanced federal funding for CCS research and development, aiming for utility-scale deployment by 2030, along with regulatory waivers from zero-carbon mandates for coal plants committing to CCS retrofits.[99] The UMWA has criticized policies perceived as a "war on fossil fuels," arguing that renewable energy mandates have contributed to grid instability during extreme weather, as evidenced by reliance on coal and natural gas during the 2021 Texas winter storm.[112] It supports subsidies such as a proposed "wires charge" on electric bills to fund transition programs, including wage replacement, healthcare, and training for displaced miners, but opposes outright elimination of fossil fuels without guaranteed job security measures.[99][113] In 2021, UMWA leadership endorsed elements of President Biden's energy policies, including the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, in exchange for robust funding for worker retraining and community support in coalfields, though the union emphasized CCS over rapid renewable expansion.[114] More recently, in June 2025, the UMWA urged senators from coal-producing states to oppose reconciliation legislation, warning it would undermine job creation in energy and manufacturing sectors while cutting essential benefits like black lung clinic funding, thereby exacerbating economic distress in mining communities.[115] The union has expressed concerns over international efforts to retire coal plants without retraining provisions, noting as of December 2023 that few displaced coal miners had transitioned to new energy roles.[116] Regarding recent elections, the UMWA's Coal Miners Political Action Committee (COMPAC) decided in June 2023 not to endorse a presidential candidate for the 2024 cycle, marking the first such abstention in 15 years, as neither major party's nominee aligned sufficiently with the union's priorities for coal job protection.[117] Instead, COMPAC focused on congressional and senatorial races, endorsing Democrats such as Virginia Senator Tim Kaine in August 2024 for his support of workers, Virginia Ninth District candidate Karen Baker in July 2024, and Ohio Senator Sherrod Brown in April 2024, both of whom have advocated for coal community investments.[118][119][120] This selective approach reflects the union's emphasis on candidates demonstrating tangible commitments to miners' health, pensions, and energy policy stability over partisan loyalty.[121]Organizational Framework
Leadership Succession
The leadership of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) has historically transitioned through quadrennial conventions and member elections, though early successions were often controlled by entrenched figures amid limited internal democracy. Founding presidents in the late 19th century, such as Philip Penna (1890) and John Fahy, gave way to John Mitchell, who led from 1898 to 1908 and secured key gains like the eight-hour day in anthracite mining. Mitchell's tenure emphasized negotiation over strikes, but membership volatility persisted until John L. Lewis consolidated power.[1] Lewis assumed acting presidency in November 1919 following Frank Hayes's resignation and was elected to the full role in 1920, holding it until December 1960—a 40-year span marked by aggressive organizing, strikes, and centralization that expanded UMWA influence but stifled rank-and-file input. Upon Lewis's retirement due to age and health, vice president Thomas F. Kennedy succeeded him as president from 1960 to 1963, maintaining continuity in policy but facing no major challenges. Kennedy's death in office led to W.A. "Tony" Boyle's elevation from secretary-treasurer to president in 1963.[1][122][122] Boyle's leadership eroded trust through alleged corruption, embezzlement, and autocratic tactics, culminating in the 1969 assassination of reform challenger Joseph "Jock" Yablonski and his family, which federal investigations linked to Boyle's directives; Boyle was convicted in 1974 on charges including conspiracy to commit murder and served prison time until 1977. A U.S. Department of Labor lawsuit exposed voting irregularities in Boyle's 1969 reelection, voiding it and mandating supervised democratic elections under the Landrum-Griffin Act. This paved the way for the Miners for Democracy slate, led by disabled miner Arnold Miller, to win the 1972 presidency with 56% of votes in a DOL-overseen ballot, instituting reforms like direct member election of officers and term limits. Miller served until 1979, navigating strikes but clashing with allies over health fund management and centralization reversals.[123][124][124] Sam Church Jr. succeeded Miller in 1979 on a conservative platform emphasizing contract enforcement, but internal divisions prompted his 1982 replacement by Richard Trumka, a 33-year-old Pennsylvania miner elected on a reform-continuity ticket amid the Pittston strike buildup. Trumka led from 1982 to 1995, modernizing the union through legal strategies and pivoting to broader labor alliances while confronting membership declines from mechanization. Cecil E. Roberts, Trumka's vice president and a sixth-generation miner, assumed the presidency on October 22, 1995, after winning election and securing six reelections through 2019, focusing on safety enforcement and diversification into health care organizing. Roberts announced his retirement effective October 2025, concluding a 30-year tenure second only to Lewis in duration, with succession to be determined by the upcoming convention.[125][126][127] Post-1972 reforms shifted succession from Lewis-era patronage to contested elections, reducing corruption risks but exposing the union to factionalism and external pressures like industry contraction; turnout remains variable, with reforms credited for greater accountability despite ongoing critiques of insider influence.[128]| President | Term | Key Succession Context |
|---|---|---|
| John L. Lewis | 1920–1960 | Elected after acting role; unchallenged dominance via convention control.[1] |
| Thomas F. Kennedy | 1960–1963 | Automatic succession as vice president upon Lewis's retirement.[122] |
| W.A. Boyle | 1963–1972 | Elevated post-Kennedy's death; ousted via federal intervention after scandals.[122] |
| Arnold Miller | 1972–1979 | Won reform election under DOL supervision; first direct member vote.[124] |
| Sam Church Jr. | 1979–1982 | Elected amid Miller faction splits. |
| Richard Trumka | 1982–1995 | Youthful reformer; bridged to national AFL-CIO role.[125] |
| Cecil E. Roberts | 1995–2025 | Internal promotion; multiple terms via member ballots.[126] |
