Hubbry Logo
2nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade2nd Guards Spetsnaz BrigadeMain
Open search
2nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade
Community hub
2nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
2nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade
2nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade
2nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia
2nd Guards Separate Special Purpose Order of Zhukov Brigade
2-я отдельная бригада специального назначения
Shoulder sleeve patch
Active1962–present
Country Soviet Union (1962–1991)
 Russia (1991–present)
Branch Spetsnaz GRU
TypeSpecial forces
SizeBrigade
Garrison/HQPromezhitsy, Pskov Oblast
Engagements
DecorationsGuards unit Guards
Order of Zhukov Order of Zhukov
Commanders
Current
commander		Konstantin Bushuev

The 2nd Guards Separate Special Purpose Order of Zhukov Brigade[a] is a Spetsnaz GRU brigade of the Russian Armed Forces based in Promezhitsy, Pskov Oblast.[2]

History

[edit]

As part of increases to the GRU's Spetsnaz, on July 19, 1962, General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces Directive No. 140547 was issued, by which the 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade was to be formed in the Leningrad Military District. The creation of the brigade began on September 17, 1962 and ended on March 1, 1963.

Until 2008[3] or 2013, Dmitry Utkin served as lieutenant colonel and brigade commander of a unit of special forces of Russia's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), the 700th Independent Spetsnaz Detachment of the 2nd Independent Brigade.[4][5][6]

The Brigade participated in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[7] On July 11, 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin awarded the unit the honorific unit status Guards for its actions in Ukraine.[8]

Structure

[edit]

The brigade comprises:[9]

  • Headquarters
  • Signals Battalion (2x Company)
  • Support Company
  • 70th Special Purpose Detachment (roughly battalion equivalent)
  • 329th Special Purpose Detachment
  • 700th Special Purpose Detachment
  • Training Battalion (2x Company)

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

2nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The 2nd Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade, known as the 2nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, is an elite formation of the Main Intelligence Directorate () within the , tasked with conducting deep , , , and missions in enemy rear areas. Headquartered in Promezhitsy, , as part of the , the brigade maintains a structure including specialized detachments for signals, support, and independent operational groups optimized for autonomous operations. Formed in 1962 amid the Soviet Union's buildup of capabilities to counter threats, the unit inherited traditions from earlier formations and received Guards designation for exemplary combat performance in prior conflicts, signifying elite status and battle honors within the Russian military hierarchy. Throughout its history, the brigade has emphasized rigorous selection, advanced training in , and versatility across theaters, including potential operations in the Baltic and Scandinavian regions aligned with its geographic responsibility. The brigade gained prominence in post-Soviet conflicts, deploying elements during the 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent operations in , where it conducted covert reconnaissance and support roles. In the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, units from the brigade participated in initial advances toward and later counteroffensives, including efforts to reclaim territory in the region, though these engagements revealed vulnerabilities in Russian tactics against prepared defenses, resulting in significant casualties and tactical setbacks as documented in analyses. Despite its storied reputation for operational daring, the brigade's performance in high-intensity has been critiqued for overreliance on surprise and insufficient adaptation to modern battlefield realities, underscoring broader challenges in Russian military modernization.

History

Formation and Early Development

The 2nd Guards Separate Special Purpose Brigade (Russian: 2-я отдельная гвардейская бригада специального назначения), commonly known as the 2nd Guards Brigade, traces its origins to the Soviet Union's expansion of Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) special forces amid escalating tensions. Formation commenced on September 17, 1962, in the , following Ministry of Defense Order No. 140547, which directed the establishment of the unit as one of the initial brigade-level formations. The process concluded on March 1, 1963, integrating personnel from existing reconnaissance and elements to create a force optimized for strategic operations. This brigade emerged as part of a broader initiative, building on special-purpose battalions formed since 1957, to develop brigades capable of independent deep-penetration missions, including , intelligence gathering, and disruption of enemy rear areas in potential conflicts with . Early organization emphasized elite selection, with subunits structured around companies, detachments, and support elements, totaling approximately 1,500-2,000 personnel at full strength—higher than standard units to ensure readiness for high-risk deployments. The unit's "Guards" designation reflected Soviet honors for exemplary combat heritage, likely inherited from predecessor elements tied to guards formations repurposed for . In its initial years, the brigade focused on rigorous training regimens in the Leningrad region's forested and urban terrains, simulating airborne insertions, , and clandestine operations to prepare for wartime scenarios in . Development emphasized versatility, incorporating demolitions, , and foreign weapons familiarization, with exercises often conducted in to maintain operational surprise. By the late 1960s, the brigade had relocated elements toward for strategic positioning nearer potential fronts, solidifying its role within the GRU's network of 10-12 brigades by the 1970s. These foundations prioritized empirical effectiveness over doctrinal rigidity, fostering a rooted in surprise, minimal , and maximal initiative at the squad level.

Soviet-Era Operations

The 2nd Separate Special Purpose Brigade, formed on December 1, 1962, as part of the GRU's forces, conducted operations primarily oriented toward deep , , and disruption of enemy rear areas during the Soviet era. Its deployments emphasized preparation for large-scale conventional conflict with , involving airborne insertions, simulations, and nuclear survival training, though specific exercise details remain classified due to the unit's intelligence role. The brigade's most documented Soviet-era combat involvement occurred during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), where detachments were rotated into theater for against mujahideen insurgents. These missions included long-range patrols to locate and supply convoys, gathering on insurgent strongholds, and targeted strikes on leadership figures to degrade guerrilla logistics and command structures. GRU units, including elements from the 2nd Brigade, operated in small, self-sufficient groups of 8–12 personnel, often disguising themselves as locals to conduct psychological operations such as destroying non-Soviet-aligned resources to sow discord among the population. By the mid-1980s, the expansion of in reached approximately two brigade equivalents totaling under 5,000 troops, reflecting the brigade's contribution to efforts amid escalating Soviet casualties from . The unit's operations highlighted the limitations of in prolonged guerrilla conflicts, with high attrition from ambushes and betrayals underscoring the challenges of operating in hostile terrain without reliable local intelligence. No detail specific battle honors or loss figures for the 2nd Brigade during this period, consistent with Soviet military secrecy protocols.

Post-Soviet Conflicts

The 2nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade participated in the (1994–1996), conducting reconnaissance and special operations amid Russian efforts to reassert control over the breakaway republic. Deployments involved combined detachments from the brigade's companies, focusing on intelligence gathering and disruption of separatist forces in urban and mountainous terrain. Specific rotations included operations from early 1995, with units returning by mid-year after sustaining casualties in ambushes and close-quarters combat. During the Second Chechen War (1999–2009), the brigade deployed extensively from 1999 to 2006, supporting counter-terrorism operations in and adjacent regions like following Islamist incursions in August 1999. Elements of the brigade conducted deep reconnaissance, targeted raids on militant strongholds, and sabotage missions, contributing to the stabilization of federal control by 2000. These efforts were part of broader roles in identifying high-value targets and securing flanks for conventional forces, though the unit faced asymmetric threats from guerrilla tactics. The brigade also saw action in the of August 2008, where GRU units, including from the 2nd Brigade, executed preemptive and across the border to disrupt Georgian command structures and infrastructure. Operations targeted key communication nodes and military installations in and beyond, facilitating rapid Russian advances despite limited initial intelligence on Georgian defenses. This marked one of the brigade's final major engagements before shifts in Russian special forces doctrine emphasized .

Involvement in the Russo-Ukrainian War

The 2nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade participated in the initial phase of Russia's full-scale invasion of , deploying to the northern axis in February 2022 with advances directed toward from the Russian border. Elements of the brigade crossed into Ukrainian territory expecting minimal opposition, but encountered determined Ukrainian defenses shortly after entry. On February 27, 2022, two companies penetrated into city itself, engaging in urban combat amid the broader Battle of Kharkiv. A significant clash occurred at School No. 134 in , where an from the brigade fortified positions on the second floor, only to face assault by Ukrainian special operations personnel from the unit. The engagement resulted in near-total casualties for the Russian squad by the end of the day, highlighting the brigade's exposure to high-intensity urban fighting atypical for roles. Ukrainian forces also captured brigade equipment, including a Tigr-M armored vehicle, during operations in the area on the same date. In July 2022, President issued decrees awarding the brigade the and conferring Guards status, citing mass heroism, valor, resilience, and courage displayed by its personnel in combat operations for the defense of Russia's interests. The recognition underscored the unit's contributions despite the stalled Kharkiv offensive, after which the brigade reportedly shifted to other sectors, including border security duties in the region prior to Ukraine's 2024 incursion.

Organization and Structure

Headquarters and Basing

The headquarters of the 2nd Guards Separate Special Purpose Brigade is located in the settlement of Promezhitsy, , , with the unit designated as military unit 64044 (v/ch 64044). This basing places the brigade within the , facilitating rapid deployment along 's northwestern borders proximate to and . Subordinate elements include the 70th Separate Special Purpose Detachment stationed in , , near the Estonian border, which supports reconnaissance and sabotage operations. The 177th Separate Special Purpose Detachment is based in Taibol (or variants such as Pushnoy in some reports), also within , contributing to the brigade's dispersed yet regionally concentrated footprint for operational flexibility. These locations have remained consistent since the brigade's Soviet-era formation, reflecting strategic continuity in Russian special operations basing despite post-2010 reforms integrating under the (KSSO).

Subordinate Units and Personnel

The 2nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade comprises a headquarters in Promezhitsy, , along with specialized support elements and operational detachments. Key subordinate units include the 70th Separate Special Purpose Detachment, historically based in before relocation elements to ; the 329th Separate Special Purpose Detachment; and the 700th Separate Special Purpose Detachment, each equivalent to a battalion-sized formation focused on deep , , and operations. These detachments were integrated into the brigade's structure by the late , enhancing its capacity for independent task forces. Support subunits encompass a signals battalion with two companies for secure communications and electronic warfare support, primarily located in Pechory; an engineering detachment for obstacle breaching and fortification; a special equipment company handling non-standard weaponry and explosives; and a training battalion structured with two companies dedicated to junior specialist and warrant officer schools. A logistics and maintenance company provides sustainment, enabling prolonged autonomous operations typical of Spetsnaz doctrine. Personnel are predominantly contract-based professionals, including officers, warrant officers, and enlisted operators, with selection emphasizing , marksmanship, and adaptability for high-risk missions. Detachments are variably sized from 180 to 500 personnel in peacetime, contributing to an overall strength of roughly 1,000 to 1,500, though exact figures remain classified and subject to operational adjustments. draws from volunteers across Russian branches, with ongoing emphasis on maintaining readiness amid post-2014 reforms.

Equipment and Armament

The 2nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade employs a range of small arms consistent with standards, prioritizing mobility, reliability, and suppression capabilities for and missions. The primary is the AKS-74 in caliber, often fitted with suppressors or optics for close-quarters and stealth operations. Submachine guns such as the AKSU-74 (a compact variant of the AKS-74) and provide options for urban and vehicle-based engagements. Specialized suppressed weapons, including the VSS Vintorez integral-silenced and AS Val in , enable silent eliminations and penetration of at short ranges. Support weapons include the PK or PKM general-purpose machine gun for , with modernized PKP Pecheneg variants featuring improved barrels for sustained operation. Sniper rifles such as the SVD Dragunov and provide precision fire beyond 600 meters, supplemented by SVDS marksman rifles for squad-level designated marksmen. Grenade launchers like the underbarrel model integrate with AK-series rifles for indirect fire support. Anti-tank and anti-personnel capabilities are addressed through portable launchers, including the RPG-7V with tandem-warhead PG-7VR rounds for defeating armored vehicles, and disposable systems like the , , , or for one-shot engagements against tanks and fortifications. The Vampir offers enhanced penetration against reactive armor. Thermobaric weapons such as the deliver area-denial effects in enclosed spaces. Man-portable air-defense systems, including the 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24), protect against low-flying . The brigade's special weapons company maintains heavier assets, such as 82mm 2B25 silent mortars for covert , introduced to units in the 2010s to minimize acoustic signatures during raids. and breaching tools, including mines, explosives, and bladed weapons like the NRS-2 with integral shooting capability, support roles. Vehicle-based equipment includes light utility vehicles like the GAZ Tigr for rapid insertion, armed with machine guns or anti-tank guided missiles such as the for brigade-level mobility and fire support, though operations emphasize dismounted infiltration over mechanized warfare. Personal gear encompasses night-vision devices, encrypted communications, and drones for reconnaissance, adapted from broader inventories but customized for endurance.

Training and Doctrine

Recruitment and Selection

Recruitment for the 2nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, as part of Russia's , primarily targets volunteers from active-duty , including contract soldiers and those with prior service in conventional units, rather than direct entry from civilians. Candidates must typically be male Russian citizens aged 18 to 27, with exceptions for exceptional cases up to 28, and possess prior experience to ensure baseline discipline and skills. Recommendations from commanding officers and demonstrated high are essential prerequisites for consideration, reflecting the unit's emphasis on proven reliability in operational environments. Selection begins with rigorous medical screening requiring category A health status, confirming no chronic conditions, excellent vision, and overall physiological robustness capable of withstanding extreme stress. Psychological evaluations assess mental resilience, , and adaptability under interrogation-like conditions, often including tests and stress interviews to filter for ideological alignment and resistance to . Background checks verify absence of criminal records or foreign ties, prioritizing recruits from athletic backgrounds such as airborne or units. Physical trials form the core of selection, demanding master-of-sports candidate level proficiency in standards like a 3-kilometer run completed in under 10 minutes 30 seconds, 100-meter sprint in 13 seconds, 10 pull-ups, and 90 push-ups without rest. Combat simulations and marksmanship tests evaluate tactical proficiency, with failure rates exceeding 90% in initial phases to ensure only the most capable advance to specialized brigade training. Officers undergo additional vetting through personnel directorates, focusing on potential and aptitude.

Training Methods

Spetsnaz training within the 2nd Guards Brigade prioritizes the development of superior physical endurance, combat skills, and operational versatility, drawing from established GRU special forces protocols that demand master-class athletic certification in at least two sports disciplines for qualification. Daily regimens typically commence with 9-kilometer runs, escalating to forced marches spanning 65 to 70 kilometers while encumbered by 40-kilogram combat loads, conducted in extreme conditions such as freezing temperatures with limited hydration to simulate wartime deprivations. These exercises aim to forge resilience against fatigue and environmental stressors, with overall attrition rates in Spetsnaz programs exceeding 90 percent due to the unrelenting physical and mental demands. Combat skills training integrates advanced marksmanship, requiring operators to strike stationary targets at 1,600 feet (approximately 488 meters) using rifles, 130 feet with submachine guns, and 80 to 165 feet in dynamic scenarios. Specialized instruction covers fast rappelling from heights, construction and neutralization, incorporating knives and blunt weapons, and close-quarters battle tactics emphasizing reflex shooting and room clearance. Additional modules include airborne insertions, , and , ensuring proficiency in deep-reconnaissance and roles typical of deployments. Psychological conditioning permeates all phases, with prolonged , simulated capture resistance, and high-stress decision-making exercises to cultivate unflinching resolve under duress, as evidenced by historical accounts of Spetsnaz endurance tests involving multi-day survival without support. Initial basic training spans about two months, followed by years of advanced specialization, during which operators refine unit-specific tactics for the brigade's Pskov-based operations. While precise brigade curricula remain classified, these methods align with documented practices that prioritize functional warfighting capacity over aesthetic fitness.

Operational Roles and Tactics

The 2nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, as a GRU-affiliated unit, specializes in strategic missions conducted deep in enemy territory to identify and assess key and economic targets, including command centers, logistics nodes, and nuclear facilities. These operations enable the disruption of adversary capabilities prior to or during major offensives, drawing from Soviet-era that emphasized preemptive gathering to facilitate follow-on conventional strikes. forms a core tactic, targeting enemy rear-area infrastructure to sow confusion, degrade sustainment, and weaken political- cohesion through precise, low-signature attacks on communications, supply lines, and leadership elements. Tactically, the brigade deploys in small, self-sufficient teams—typically squad- or platoon-sized from its subordinate OOSN (otriadov osobogo naznacheniya) detachments, such as the 177th and 186th—prioritizing stealthy infiltration via airborne, heliborne, maritime, or overland methods to evade detection. These groups operate with high autonomy, leveraging initiative-driven decision-making to adapt to dynamic environments, often employing , demolitions, and survival techniques for prolonged evasion in hostile areas. Direct action raids supplement , focusing on rapid strikes to neutralize high-value targets before exfiltration, while integrating with broader efforts like proxy training or regime support in allied states. Doctrinally, operations blend covert "" with battlefield roles, such as serving as the for advancing forces by clearing paths or providing real-time intelligence feeds, though units maintain configurations optimized for mobility over sustained firepower. This approach reflects a causal emphasis on asymmetric disruption to amplify conventional advantages, with tactics honed through rigorous selection of personnel capable of operating independently under extreme conditions.

Operations and Engagements

Notable Missions and Achievements

The 2nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade conducted and operations in the during the Second Chechen War, deploying a combined unit from September 5 to December 26, 2000, to support counter-insurgency efforts amid ongoing separatist activities. These missions involved gathering intelligence on militant positions and engaging enemy forces, contributing to Russian stabilization operations in the region following the 1999 invasion of . During the in August 2008, brigade elements participated in the subsequent peacekeeping deployment to , maintaining security in the contested territory after Russian forces secured the area from Georgian advances. In the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the brigade advanced from the Russian border toward in late February, tasked with rapid seizure of key infrastructure but encountering stiff Ukrainian resistance, including at School 134 where defenders inflicted casualties on the advancing force. Russian President commended the unit's "skilful and resolute actions" in the operation on July 12, 2022, highlighting their role in frontline engagements. For these contributions, the brigade received the Guards honorific designation on July 11, 2022, recognizing collective valor in special operations.

Performance in Major Conflicts

The 2nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade participated in the from December 1994 to August 1996, as part of task forces conducting special reconnaissance and sabotage operations to support restoration of constitutional order in the region. In the Second Chechen War from 1999 to 2009, the unit engaged in counter-insurgency missions, including raids and intelligence gathering, which contributed to Russian efforts to dismantle rebel networks, though overall casualties in these conflicts were significant due to asymmetric urban and mountainous warfare. During the in August 2008, elements of the brigade executed deep reconnaissance and direct action operations behind enemy lines, facilitating rapid Russian advances into and by disrupting Georgian . These missions aligned with the unit's doctrinal emphasis on strategic disruption, contributing to the conflict's swift resolution in Russia's favor within five days. In the beginning February 24, 2022, the brigade spearheaded assaults in the northern theater, advancing toward and with expectations of minimal resistance based on intelligence assessments. On February 27, 2022, a squad from the brigade occupied School 134 in northern but was encircled by Ukrainian regular forces, police, and territorial defense volunteers; the ensuing battle, lasting from morning to evening, involved close-quarters combat, Ukrainian tank fire, and a gas line explosion that set the building ablaze, resulting in nearly all Russian personnel being killed through shootings, burns, or blasts. Ukrainian accounts described the as highly professional in movement and fire discipline, yet overwhelmed by determined defenders. Broader brigade operations reflected misuse of in conventional infantry roles, leading to heavy attrition; units overall suffered up to 75-95% casualties in some cases, depleting elite capabilities. Despite these losses, President awarded the brigade honorific status on July 11, 2022, recognizing its contributions.

Assessment and Controversies

Effectiveness and Casualties

The 2nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade demonstrated elements of professional discipline during initial phases of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, infiltrating Ukrainian territory on February 23 to seize key objectives in Kharkiv with expectations of limited resistance. However, the unit's effectiveness was undermined by unanticipated Ukrainian defenses and a shift toward prolonged urban engagements, where special forces tactics proved insufficient against combined arms counterattacks. In one documented operation, a squad from the brigade occupied School 134 in Kharkiv by February 27, refusing surrender and engaging in a last stand that highlighted tactical resilience but exposed vulnerabilities to artillery, armor, and improvised explosives. Casualties inflicted severe degradation on the brigade's operational capacity, with the Kharkiv squad suffering near-total losses by the end of February 27, 2022, primarily through direct fire, tank assaults, and a gas line that burned or buried survivors. Open-source investigations confirmed additional fatalities, including Andrei Shamko in March 2022 and Vasily Marzoyev in October 2025, both from the Pskov-based brigade, indicating sustained attrition across and roles. Broader patterns among Spetsnaz units, including the 2nd, reflect misuse as conventional in high-casualty assaults rather than specialized missions, contributing to reported brigade-level losses exceeding 70% in comparable formations per analysis of obituaries and media. These outcomes stem from doctrinal overreliance on without adequate support, amplifying vulnerabilities in peer-level conflicts.

Criticisms of Deployment and Reforms

The deployment of the 2nd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has been criticized for assigning elite personnel to conventional assault roles, exposing them to unsustainable attrition rather than leveraging their training in unconventional tasks such as deep or disruption. In the initial advance toward in late February 2022, brigade elements crossed the border anticipating negligible Ukrainian resistance, as assured by superiors, but encountered determined defenses that inflicted rapid, disproportionate losses. On February 27, 2022, during the Battle for School 134 in , an advance group was surrounded by Ukrainian forces, subjected to tank fire and a gas line explosion, resulting in most combatants killed rather than captured, highlighting flawed intelligence and tactical overconfidence. This pattern reflects broader condemnations of Russian command practices, where shortages of competent motorized rifle units compelled Spetsnaz brigades, including the Pskov-based 2nd Guards, to function as in frontal attacks ill-matched to their equipment and doctrine, yielding casualty rates of 30-40% or higher in elite formations by late 2022. Leaked U.S. assessments from 2023 reported units suffering up to 95% casualties in specific deployments, with only around 125 of 900 personnel remaining operational in one brigade-scale group, underscoring how such misuse eroded specialized capabilities without commensurate strategic gains. Criticisms of reforms extend to the failure of Russian military restructuring efforts to divorce Spetsnaz employment from Soviet legacies of massed shock operations, perpetuating a doctrinal rigidity that prioritized offensive momentum over preserved force quality. Post-2008 reforms under Defense Minister Serdyukov aimed to professionalize forces but neglected to embed clear distinctions between and conventional maneuvers, leaving units like the 2nd Guards vulnerable to attrition in peer-like conflicts. Analysts attribute this to systemic civilian oversight flaws and entrenched elite resistance to change, which prevented adaptive training for hybrid threats observed in prior operations like , instead recycling outdated culture into high-cost conventional substitutions during the campaign.

References

  1. https://greydynamics.com/gru-spetsnaz-the-batmen-of-russia/
  2. https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/russia/spetsnaz-orbat.htm
  3. https://cepa.org/article/the-battle-for-kharkivs-school-134/
  4. https://informnapalm.org/en/2nd-separate-spetsnaz-brigade-ukraine/
  5. https://x.com/nigroeneveld/status/1800556777127166155
  6. https://theins.ru/en/news/279561
  7. https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/2nd_Guards_Spetsnaz_Brigade
  8. https://informnapalm.org/en/about-the-russian-2nd-independent-spetsnaz-brigade-of-gru/
  9. https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/russia/spetsnaz-org.htm
  10. https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/spetsnaz-operational-intelligence-political-warfare-and-battlefield-role-0
  11. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1987/august/spetsnaz
  12. https://english.nv.ua/nation/hur-military-intelligence-reveals-how-specialized-unit-kraken-fought-russia-in-kharkiv-50367903.html
  13. https://greydynamics.com/kraken-unit-ukrainian-intelligence-special-activities/
  14. https://ukr.warspotting.net/view/2325/
  15. https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/15184471
  16. https://regnum.ru/news/3643913
  17. https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1822564985991569419
  18. https://www.marshallcenter.org/sites/default/files/files/2020-11/PDF_PUB_SI_46.pdf
  19. https://www.cna.org/archive/CNA_Files/pdf/russian-forces-in-the-western-military-district.pdf
  20. https://amalantra.ru/2-brigada-gru/
  21. https://spec-naz.org/dossier/GRU_special_forces/obrspn_gru_gsh_mo_v_ch_%2C_raneje_v_ch/
  22. https://voinskayachast.net/suhoputnie-voyska/specialnie/vch64044
  23. https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/russia/spetsnaz-equipment.htm
  24. https://www.militaryfactory.com/special-forces/spetsnaz-weapons.php
  25. https://www.businessinsider.com/weapons-russian-spetsnaz-2017-6
  26. https://kula-tactical.com/how-to-become-a-spetsnaz
  27. https://www.quora.com/How-can-I-join-the-Russian-Spetsnaz-GRU
  28. https://www.rbth.com/lifestyle/331203-how-to-become-elite-spetsnaz
  29. https://sofrep.com/news/russian-special-forces-what-are-spetsnaz/
  30. https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/russia/spetsnaz-training.htm
  31. https://www.russiadefence.net/t68-selection-and-raining-of-spetsnaz
  32. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B3KC1Oo7Cuo
  33. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA168375.pdf
  34. https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/russia/spetsnaz.htm
  35. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68862
  36. https://icds.ee/en/the-2008-russia-georgia-war-five-years-later/
  37. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russias-elite-spetsnaz-special-forces-devastated-ukraine-war-213488
  38. https://nypost.com/2023/04/14/russias-spetsnaz-decimated-in-ukraine-leaked-pentagon-docs/
  39. https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/te0dt3/list_of_killedcaptured_russian_officers_march_14/
  40. https://www.facebook.com/united24.media/posts/lieutenant-vasily-marzoyev-the-son-of-russian-general-lieutenant-arkady-marzoyev/790889720378998/
  41. https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-spetsnaz-special-forces-unit-heavy-losses-in-lyman-ukraine-2022-11
  42. https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/publications/insights/sof-should-not-be-used-as-assault-troops-lessons-from-the-russo-ukraine-war/
  43. https://www.newsweek.com/elite-russian-units-take-40-percent-casualties-ukraine-1764140
  44. https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-spetsnatz-units-suffer-95-casualty-rate-in-ukraine-leaks-2023-4
  45. https://taskandpurpose.com/news/russia-spetsnaz-annihilated-ukraine-leaks-claim/
  46. https://ecfr.eu/publication/brass-tacks-why-russias-military-fails-to-reform/
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.