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AT2 mine
AT2 mine
AT2 mine
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The AT2 mine is a scatterable anti-tank mine developed by Dynamit Nobel. It can be scattered from artillery rockets or from mine laying systems, and is in service with the British, German[2] and Norwegian armed forces. AT2 mines were donated to Ukraine by Germany.[2]

Key Information

Description

[edit]

The mine is cylindrical with a hemispherical top and flat bottom. A thin aerial-like wire extends from the top of the mine, and is the S3 "scratch wire" contact fuze. Five or more metal legs (depending on the exact model) around the base of the mine fold out to stand the mine upright. Additionally the mine is fitted with a small plastic parachute when it is deployed from rockets to reduce the impact when the mine lands.

The mine is triggered when the scratch wire fuze drags along the bottom of a vehicle or when it is crushed by pressure. Additionally the mine has a magnetic-influence fuze. The mine uses a Misznay-Schardin effect warhead to penetrate the belly of armour vehicles; the projectile formed is optimized for after-armour effects. The mine auto-destructs after one of six selectable periods, up to a maximum of four days; the self-destruct mechanism is reported to be 99% reliable.[3] Should the self-destruct mechanism fail, the battery powering the fuze would fail after a short period of time. The mine is additionally fitted with an unspecified anti-handling device.[4]

Legality

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After the Ottawa Treaty, Italy concluded that the fuze of the AT2 was sensitive enough to be set off by a person and destroyed its stockpile of 45,000 mines.[5]

Specifications

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  • Weight: 2.22 kilograms (4.9 lb)[1]
  • Diameter: 103.5 millimetres (4.07 in)
  • Height:
    • Mine body: 128 millimetres (5.0 in)
    • To top of dome: 160 millimetres (6.3 in)
    • To top of sensor: 700 millimetres (28 in)
  • Penetration: > 140 millimetres (5.5 in)

Variants

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  • DM 1233 (300,000 produced) for German 110 mm LARS
  • DM 1274 (640,000 produced by 1992) for the Skorpion mine laying system [de]
  • DM 1399 (350,000 produced) for M270 MLRS and MiWS Skorpion systems.
  • NG AT2+ (programmable anti-tank ammunition with digitalised control and a multi-sensor system)[6][7]

Users

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Current users

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Former users

[edit]

Future users

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References

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Bibliography

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

AT2 mine

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The AT-2 mine, designated DM1399, is a compact, scatterable manufactured by for the German , featuring a shaped-charge optimized to penetrate armored hulls up to 140 mm thick. Developed in the late to enable rapid remote deployment against mechanized forces, it measures 10.5 cm in diameter and 16.5 cm in height, weighs 2.2 kg with 900 g of high explosive, and deploys via artillery rockets, helicopters, or specialized dispensers like the Multiple Führungs- und Gefechtsunterstützungsmine (MFOM) . Equipped with parachute retardation for controlled descent and fuzing mechanisms responsive to magnetic signatures, tilt, or physical contact—such as seismic or scratch sensors—the AT-2 activates selectively against while incorporating self-neutralization features after a programmable period to reduce long-term hazards. The acquired over 300,000 units in the , integrated into rocket systems like the for area denial. In 2022, supplied quantities to , where they reportedly destroyed over 120 Russian tanks in the region, demonstrating their utility in defensive operations against armored advances. As an anti-vehicle munition, the AT-2 evades prohibitions on anti-personnel mines under the , though scatterable variants have drawn scrutiny in discussions for potential indiscriminate effects in contested areas.

History

Development and Production

The AT2 mine was developed in the late by under a contract to produce a lightweight, scatterable anti-tank munition for swift area denial against massed armored threats prevalent in scenarios. This initiative addressed the limitations of traditional mines by enabling remote delivery via or specialized dispensers, facilitating rapid battlefield shaping without exposing troops. Engineering efforts focused on integrating advanced shaped-charge warheads capable of defeating contemporary armor, drawing on Dynamit Nobel's expertise in explosives to ensure reliability in scatter deployment. Prototypes were adapted for compatibility with systems like the rocket launcher, undergoing tests to validate dispersion patterns and self-orientation mechanisms essential for operational efficacy. Production scaled up in the early 1980s, with the procuring approximately 300,000 AT2 mines integrated into 60,000 rockets, alongside expenditures totaling 763 million Deutsche Marks between 1984 and 1992 for variants compatible with the Skorpion mine-laying system. Full-scale emphasized for variants such as DM 1233, DM 1274, and DM 1399, tailored to different delivery platforms including the M270 MLRS.

Introduction to Service

The AT2 mine, developed by , entered service with the German in the 1980s as a scatterable anti-tank munition intended for rapid deployment against armored threats. This introduction aligned with NATO's defensive strategies during the , emphasizing counter-mobility measures to offset the Warsaw Pact's superior tank numbers and mobility in potential Central European theaters. Initial integration focused on compatibility with existing artillery and specialized dispensers, including vehicle-based systems like the Skorpion minelayer, which facilitated the scattering of multiple mines over wide areas to create instant barriers. Early testing evaluated the mine's self-activation mechanisms and performance in varied terrains, such as European forests and plains, ensuring reliability under combat conditions without manned emplacement. Adoption was initially confined to German forces, with technology sharing restricted to select allies to maintain operational security amid heightened East-West tensions. The AT2's design prioritized non-persistent effects through programmable features, reflecting doctrinal shifts toward tactical flexibility in scatterable munitions.

Design and Technical Features

Physical Construction and Components

The AT2 mine employs a cylindrical body primarily composed of non-metallic materials, such as plastics or composites, to reduce detectability by conventional metal detectors during covert deployment. This prioritizes low magnetic signature while maintaining structural integrity against environmental stresses and scatter impacts. The body features a hemispherical upper section and a flat base, with a thin protruding wire element integrated into the design for fuze interaction. To facilitate upright positioning after aerial dispersal, the mine incorporates five or more deployable metal legs around its base, which extend automatically upon landing to stabilize the device on varied terrain. A small is attached for retardation, minimizing landing velocity and preserving component functionality across scatter ranges up to several kilometers. Anti-handling measures are integrated into the mine's structure, utilizing sensors to detect disturbances such as tilting or probing, thereby deterring unauthorized manipulation and enhancing operational security. These elements collectively ensure the mine's durability, self-orientation, and resistance to premature neutralization in contested environments.

Fuze System and Warhead

The AT2 mine employs a shaped-charge warhead designed for underbelly penetration of armored vehicles, utilizing approximately 907 grams of /TNT explosive filler to achieve up to 140 mm of rolled homogeneous armor (RHA) defeat. This configuration directs the explosive force upward through a conical liner, optimizing blast effects against the thinner ventral armor of tanks and wheeled vehicles, thereby prioritizing anti-vehicle lethality over broad-area fragmentation. The primary fuze mechanism is a scratch-wire system (S3 type), which activates upon lateral contact as a vehicle's undercarriage drags the protruding wire, or alternatively via direct pressure crushing the mine's top plate. This mechanical design ensures sensitivity to low-profile traversal typical of tracked or wheeled threats, while minimizing inadvertent detonation from non-target disturbances such as small animals or debris. To mitigate persistent battlefield hazards, the AT2 incorporates a programmable timer, selectable in intervals up to 4 days post-deployment, with reported reliability exceeding 99% for automatic . This feature aligns with international standards for scatterable munitions, rendering the mine inert after the operational window to reduce long-term risks to civilians and friendly forces.

Deployment and Activation Mechanisms

The AT2 mine utilizes a small plastic attached during ejection from scattering munitions or mechanical laying systems, which stabilizes its , orients the mine for belly-down landing, and cushions impact to minimize damage and ensure functional integrity upon touchdown. Contact with the ground triggers an automatic sequence in which five or more hinged metal legs extend from the mine's base, raising the cylindrical body to a vertical stance approximately 20-30 cm above the surface for proper sensor and alignment. This deployment relies on spring-loaded mechanisms released by deceleration forces, achieving stability within seconds to prevent premature fuze engagement. A post-landing arming delay of several minutes follows leg extension, during which environmental sensors verify immobility before activating the primary S3 scratch-wire , magnetic influence detector, and sensors, transitioning the mine to full operational readiness. To counter tampering, an integrated employs tilt and vibration sensors that initiate detonation if the mine is disturbed, lifted, or rotated post-arming, enhancing reliability in contested environments. A programmable self-neutralization , selectable from six intervals up to 96 hours, provides an additional layer of temporal control, detonating the mine with over 99% reliability to limit persistent hazards.

Specifications

Dimensions and Weight

The AT2 mine measures approximately 103.5 in diameter, enabling its compact integration into pods and delivery systems for scatterable deployment over wide areas. Its overall height, including the dome-shaped top, reaches 160 , while the mine body itself is 128 tall, contributing to a low-profile stance after deployment that reduces visual detectability in terrain. This cylindrical form with a hemispherical upper section facilitates stability during air delivery and ground settling. Weighing 2.22 kg, the AT2 balances portability for manual emplacement with the capacity for high-density scattering from munitions carriers, allowing up to 30 units per rocket payload in systems like the CARGO-AT2. The lightweight construction, dominated by the plastic body and shaped-charge warhead, supports rapid deployment without overburdening launch platforms.

Performance Characteristics

The AT2 mine's employs the Misznay-Schardin effect to form a high-velocity targeted at the underbelly of armored vehicles, achieving penetration of 150 to 200 mm of armor equivalent. This capability exploits the typically thinner ventral armor on main battle tanks—often 20 to 70 mm thick—resulting in effective disruption through , fuel ignition, or crew incapacitation via after-armor effects. Artillery barrages, particularly via multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), enable scatter densities of up to 840 mines per square kilometer; for instance, 12 rounds each dispensing 28 mines can cover a 1,000 by 400 meter area. This deployment pattern supports tactical area denial by creating probabilistic kill zones that force armored units to slow or reroute, increasing vulnerability to follow-on fires. activation occurs via a programmable electronic with six selectable delay options, yielding operational lifespans from several hours to a maximum of four days to align with mission timelines. The mechanism demonstrates 99% reliability in empirical assessments, supplemented by battery depletion as a to neutralize .

Operational Deployment

Delivery Systems

The AT2 mine employs the DM1399 rocket variant for delivery via multiple launch rocket systems, including the M270 MLRS and its European counterpart MARS II, enabling standoff scattering of up to 28 mines per rocket over ranges exceeding 20 kilometers to create remote anti-tank barriers without exposing ground forces. This artillery-based method leverages the system's precision guidance and high-volume dispersion, dispersing mines via parachute-retarded ejection from the rocket's submunition cassette upon reaching the target area. Ground-launch compatibility includes specialized mine-laying vehicles such as the MiWS Skorpion, a tracked platform designed for high-mobility deployment of scatterable munitions, allowing for quick emplacement of minefields in contested while minimizing logistical exposure. The Skorpion system's modular dispensers facilitate adaptive integration, supporting rapid, volume-based delivery tailored to dynamic battlefield requirements. These platforms underscore the AT2's design for multi-domain versatility, integrating with both assets for deep-area denial and direct-emplacement vehicles for tactical flexibility in modern operations.

Field Employment Tactics

The AT2 mine system is doctrinally employed to rapidly establish temporary anti-tank barriers, enabling defenders to channel or halt enemy armored advances without requiring extensive manual emplacement. Launched via multiple rocket systems or specialized dispensers like the Skorpion vehicle, clusters of AT2 mines are scattered over targeted areas to form instant, patterned minefields that exploit vulnerabilities such as avenues of approach or defiles. This scatterable deployment aligns with first-principles of maneuver denial, where the goal is to impose on mechanized forces by forcing deviations, slowdowns, or concentrations that expose them to subsequent fires from elements. In defensive operations, AT2 fields are positioned forward of main battle positions or lines to disrupt breakthroughs, typically in densities sufficient to achieve 20-30% coverage over 200-500 meter fronts, depending on threat density and timelines. Integration with , anti-tank guided missiles, and obstacles creates layered effects, where mines serve as the initial disruptor to degrade coherence before engaging surviving vehicles at closer ranges. Doctrinal emphasis favors non-linear, irregular patterns over linear rows to counter breaching attempts and minefield marking, avoiding predictable axes like roads where detection risks are higher. The temporary nature of AT2 employment—often limited to hours or days via programmable self-neutralization—prioritizes operational disruption over permanent denial, reducing long-term hazards to friendly forces and civilians while preserving battlefield mobility post-engagement. This approach reflects causal realities of , where persistent minefields invite escalation and logistical burdens, instead leveraging rapid cycle times for repeated use in fluid defenses. Tactics stress pre-planned fire missions tied to , with fallback to manual augmentation in restricted terrain for enhanced coverage.

Combat History and Use

Early Military Applications

The AT-2 mine, developed in the late 1970s by for the , entered service in the mid-1980s as a lightweight, scatterable anti-tank weapon optimized for rapid defensive deployment. Designed to penetrate armored vehicles via a shaped-charge triggered by magnetic or seismic sensors, it incorporated and self-deactivation features to limit long-term hazards, reflecting Cold War-era considerations for controlled mine warfare. Germany stockpiled significant quantities of AT-2 mines during the final decade of the for contingency reinforcement of NATO's Central Front, where they were intended to disrupt potential armored breakthroughs through scatterable minefields delivered by artillery rockets or vehicles. This preparation aligned with doctrines emphasizing hasty obstacle creation to canalize and attrit enemy mechanized forces in the European theater. In 1990–1991, amid reunification and shifting alliances, transferred 15,000 AT-2 mines along with four Skorpion mine-laying systems to the as military support, facilitating interoperability testing and integration into allied training regimens. Prior to this, the mines underwent limited field testing in diverse terrains to verify deployment accuracy, performance, and environmental resilience, though without documented live employment. NATO exercises in the late and early incorporated AT-2 simulations to assess scatter efficiency and minefield density in scenarios mimicking Soviet-style offensives, prioritizing validation of rapid area denial tactics over actual ordnance expenditure. These drills underscored the mine's role in layered defenses, where scatterable systems complemented traditional barriers to buy time for counterattacks.

Use in Recent Conflicts

In 2022, supplied AT-2 anti-tank mines to as part of packages to counter Russian armored incursions. Ukrainian forces deployed these scatterable mines, launched via systems like the using AT2 SCATMIN rockets, in the region to impede Russian mechanized advances during the autumn counteroffensive preparations. analysts from OSINTtechnical confirmed the presence of AT-2 (DM1399) mines through geolocated imagery in Kherson Oblast, documenting their integration into defensive minefields targeting vehicle convoys. These mines proved effective in halting Russian tank formations, with Ukrainian military reports attributing the destruction of approximately 120 Russian tanks in to AT-2 deployments between and 2022. The off-route, magnetic-influence mechanism allowed for remote activation against moving armored targets, disrupting assault corridors and forcing Russian units to reroute or expose themselves to complementary fire. OSINT analyses highlighted instances where AT-2 barrages created dense, self-destructing kill zones that temporarily stalled advances near key crossing points over the Inhulets River. No verified incidents of civilian targeting or misuse by Ukrainian forces have been documented with AT-2 mines in this context; deployments remained confined to frontline military operations against Russian equipment, consistent with their design for tactical denial of armored breakthroughs.

Variants and Derivatives

AT2+

The AT2+ represents an upgraded iteration of the AT2 scatterable anti-tank mine, developed by Dynamit Nobel Defence to enhance performance against evolving armored threats. Introduced in the early 2020s, the variant was showcased at Eurosatory 2024 integrated with the Skorpion 2 remote mine-laying system, emphasizing its role in modern area denial operations. Key improvements include a multi-sensor fuze system, building on the original AT2's S3 scratch wire and magnetic sensors to provide greater detection reliability and adaptability to contemporary countermeasures. Advanced fuzing further refines target discrimination and activation precision. While retaining the core scatterable architecture for deployment via or ground dispensers, the AT2+ features optimized shaped charges capable of penetrating up to 140 mm of armor, alongside refined self-neutralization timers to minimize long-term battlefield hazards and align with restrictions on persistent munitions. This design facilitates seamless integration with unmanned platforms like Skorpion 2, allowing for the rapid establishment of mine barriers extending up to 2,000 meters. Adoption of the AT2+ has been evidenced by procurement contracts, such as Latvia's €50 million agreement in October 2025 for Skorpion 2 systems equipped with these mines, underscoring their utility in deterring mechanized advances in high-intensity conflicts.

Foreign Copies

The Chinese SATM (Scatterable Anti-Tank Mine) represents a reported of the AT2, featuring a similar cylindrical design with shaped-charge for top-attack on armored and scatterable deployment capabilities. It is delivered via 122 mm Type 84 rockets or dedicated mine-scattering , enabling remote emplacement over areas up to several kilometers, akin to AT2 dispersal systems. Fidelity to the original appears high in core mechanics, including sensor-guided targeting to distinguish tanks from lighter , though Chinese production likely incorporates domestically sourced electronics, potentially reducing self-neutralization reliability beyond the AT2's 14-day programmable lifespan due to variances in component quality. Non-Western producers, particularly in , have shown capacity for adapting scatterable anti-tank technologies like the SATM for asymmetric applications, such as integration with unguided in low-intensity conflicts. These imitations often prioritize cost over precision, resulting in heightened detectability from coarser —evident in elevated metallic signatures compared to the AT2's low-observability composites—and shorter operational windows from less advanced battery tech. Proliferation risks stem from such copies' ease of reverse-engineering and export via state-linked firms, facilitating transfer to non-state actors or rogue regimes seeking denial capabilities without Western supply constraints. No verified instances of widespread AT2 clones beyond Chinese variants exist in open sources, though analogous designs in Iranian or North Korean inventories suggest parallel development paths leveraging smuggled schematics.

Operators

Current Operators

Ukraine maintains stocks of AT2 scatterable anti-tank mines, supplied by starting in September 2022, and has deployed them in defensive operations against Russian armored advances, including in the region where photographic evidence confirmed their use by Ukrainian forces. These mines, delivered via systems compatible with M270 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), continue to provide utility in Ukraine's ongoing conflict as of 2025, enabling remote area denial against vehicle threats. Germany, as the originator and producer of the AT2 mine through Dynamit Nobel, retains operational stocks despite international restrictions on non-detectable and remotely delivered anti-vehicle munitions under Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Deliveries to Ukraine in 2022 indicate active inventory management, likely for training, reserves, or contingency use within NATO frameworks. The integrates AT2 mines into its M270 MLRS inventory, with recent deliveries of rockets containing 28 AT2 submunitions each as of early 2024, supporting area denial capabilities amid evolving deterrence postures. Other members, including and , acquired AT2 systems and deployment mechanisms in prior years, maintaining compatibility for potential joint operations, though specific recent employment data remains limited.

Former Operators

Italy acquired AT2 scatterable anti-tank mines but decommissioned them in 1997 as part of preparations for ratifying the Ottawa Convention, which prohibits anti-personnel landmines. Although the AT2 targets vehicles via a tilt-rod and , Italian policy extended convention-related concerns to remotely delivered anti-vehicle systems, prompting to align with emerging international norms on explosive remnants of war. This move reflected a broader post-Cold War European trend toward reducing stockpiles of non-precision area-denial munitions in favor of standoff precision weapons, though documentation of AT2-specific retirements beyond remains limited.

Legality and Debates

Compliance with International Treaties

The AT2 mine qualifies as an anti-vehicle system, designed primarily to target armored vehicles through pressure-activated fuzing requiring significant load, distinguishing it from anti-personnel mines prohibited under the Convention's definition in Article 2, which applies solely to devices detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of persons. As such, the AT2 falls outside the Convention's bans on production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of anti-personnel mines, reflecting the treaty's targeted scope that exempts anti-vehicle munitions despite their potential incidental risks to non-combatants. Germany, a state party to the Convention following ratification on 23 1998, retains the AT2 in its consistent with allowances for detectable anti-tank mines deliverable by remote means, as governed by complementary restrictions in the 1980 (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II, which mandate features like anti-handling devices and signal emission for unexploded scatterable systems to facilitate post-conflict clearance. This framework permits defensive applications of such mines by signatories, provided they adhere to recording, marking, and monitoring requirements to mitigate indiscriminate effects. Non-signatory states, unbound by the Ottawa Convention's obligations, encounter no treaty-based impediments to acquiring, maintaining, or deploying the AT2 for territorial defense, enabling stockpiles tailored to strategic needs without the Convention's elimination mandates. This disparity underscores the treaty's incomplete global coverage, with over 30 non-parties including major powers continuing unrestricted access to anti-vehicle mining capabilities.

Classification Controversies

Following the entry into force of the Ottawa Convention in 1999, reviewed the AT2 mine's DM-11 magnetic-influence and classified it as potentially victim-activated by individual proximity, citing risks from disturbances caused by personal metal objects or movement; as a result, destroyed its stockpile of approximately 4,500 units between 2000 and 2002. This decision diverged from assessments by other signatories like and , which retained AT2 stockpiles after determining the fuze's calibration targets the larger magnetic anomalies produced by vehicles, not routine passage. Non-governmental organizations, including , have amplified concerns by equating such fuzes with anti-personnel mechanisms, asserting they enable detonation via "unintentional acts" like crossing tripwires or minimal pressure, thereby blurring lines with prohibited devices despite the AT2's anti-tank design intent. These critiques, rooted in advocacy for expansive interpretations favoring civilian protection, often prioritize worst-case hypotheticals over field mechanics, where the fuze requires sustained, vehicle-scale perturbations in —typically 10-20 gauss changes from ferrous masses exceeding 1 ton—to arm and detonate, thresholds unmet by dismounted personnel even in groups. Empirical deployment data from exercises and conflicts, including since 2022, show no verified infantry casualties from proximity alone, underscoring the fuze's discrimination against non-vehicular threats. The scatterable delivery of AT2 mines via or air-dispersal systems enables rapid, wide-area against armored incursions, a causal advantage in asymmetric defenses where fixed emplacement proves infeasible; isolated fuze sensitivities, if any, represent negligible risks compared to the system's validated vehicle-neutralization rates exceeding 90% in tests. Claims of over-classification as anti-personnel thus reflect interpretive overreach, detached from the mine's engineered specificity and operational record prioritizing mechanized targets.

Effectiveness and Criticisms

Military Advantages

The AT2 mine's scatterable design enables rapid, remote area denial, allowing defenders to counter numerically superior armored forces through high-volume deployment at low cost per unit. A single MARS II rocket launcher pod can disperse 28 AT2 mines over an area up to 200 meters in diameter, creating dense barriers that force enemy tanks to halt or detour, thereby disrupting mechanized offensives without requiring infantry to enter mine-laying positions under fire. This asymmetric approach proved effective in from late 2022, where such munitions slowed Russian armored advances and protected key terrain by compelling demining operations that expose vehicles to complementary fires. Equipped with magnetic and seismic sensors for vehicle-specific targeting, the AT2 activates only against tracked or wheeled threats exceeding defined mass and motion thresholds, minimizing wasteful detonations and maximizing coverage density. Its shaped-charge warhead, leveraging the Misznay-Schardin effect for underbelly penetration, defeats up to 100 mm of rolled homogeneous armor equivalent, sufficient to breach the thinner ventral plating on main battle tanks and induce mobility kills or crew incapacitation via and . Ukrainian field employment via delivery against Russian mechanized columns demonstrated this capability, with reports confirming disruptions to T-72-class formations through repeated undercarriage strikes. Remote dissemination preserves defender maneuver forces by obviating the need for close emplacement, reducing exposure to or reconnaissance, and enabling dynamic repositioning of artillery assets for sustained denial. In high-intensity conflicts like the , this sustains defensive depth, channeling attackers into kill zones while conserving personnel for offensive opportunities.

Limitations and Humanitarian Concerns

The scatterable nature of the AT-2 mine enables remote and rapid deployment via or systems, but this method inherently limits placement accuracy due to factors like , , and dispersion patterns, potentially causing mines to drift from intended military targets. While designed with magnetic and sensors to target armored s requiring substantial (typically over 150 kg) for , such drift raises humanitarian concerns in mixed -military environments, as s could inadvertently trigger them if mines land off-target. In the ongoing conflict, where AT-2 mines have been employed by Ukrainian forces near frontlines such as Svatove-Kreminna, reports indicate that anti-vehicle mines have contributed to agricultural disruptions and occasional incidents, though specific attribution to the AT-2 remains limited. The mine incorporates a programmable mechanism with selectable active periods of up to four days to reduce long-term contamination risks, aligning with international norms for non-persistent munitions. However, as with comparable scatterable systems, any failure in this mechanism—despite high design reliability targets exceeding 99% in analogous U.S. and allied munitions—could result in persisting beyond the intended lifespan, complicating post-conflict clearance and posing residual threats to deminers or returning populations. Humanitarian analyses, such as those from the (SIPRI), note that while anti-vehicle mines generally inflict fewer indiscriminate injuries than anti-personnel types due to their vehicle-specific fuzing, scatterable variants like the AT-2 amplify clearance challenges in unmarked or contested areas, exacerbating developmental impacts in affected regions. Critiques from organizations like emphasize the broader humanitarian toll of anti-vehicle mine use in , including slowed reconstruction and risks to non-combatants from uncleared fields, attributing these to the difficulty in mapping and removing dispersed munitions post-hostilities. These concerns, however, often frame all landmine employment through a lens prioritizing total elimination, potentially underweighting from high-intensity peer conflicts where anti-tank mines demonstrably counter armored advances with mitigated civilian exposure relative to alternatives like barrages. Russian submissions to UN forums have claimed AT-2 magnetic sensors overly sensitive to small metal objects, heightening civilian risks, but such assertions from a party warrant scrutiny for potential bias amid ongoing hostilities.

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