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An Lushan (Chinese: 安祿山; pinyin: Ān Lùshān; 20th day of the 1st month[4] (19 February) 703[2] – 29 January 757[3]) was a Chinese military general and rebel leader during the Tang dynasty and is primarily known for leading the An Lushan rebellion which the Tang government stopped by killing millions of people.

Key Information

An Lushan was of Sogdian and Göktürk origin,[5][6][7][8][9][10] at least by adoption.[11] He rose to prominence as a general by defending the northeastern Tang frontier from the Khitans and other threats. Through his frequent visits to Chang'an, the Tang capital, An Lushan managed to gain favour with Emperor Xuanzong of Tang and Chancellor Li Linfu. By 751, he had been appointed military governor over three prefectures. After the death of Li Linfu in 753, An Lushan's rivalry with General Geshu Han and Chancellor Yang Guozhong created military tensions within the empire.

In late 755, An Lushan instigated open revolt and quickly captured Luoyang, the eastern capital, where in early 756 he proclaimed himself emperor of the new Yan dynasty. While his generals continued his campaigns, An Lushan remained in the Luoyang palace; his health failed and he became increasingly violent and paranoid. In early 757 he was murdered by a eunuch with the support of his son, An Qingxu.

Background and name

[edit]

An Lushan's mother was a Göktürk of the Ashide clan and served as a sorceress. According to historical sources, his original name might have been Aluoshan[12] or Yaluoshan,[13][14] the latter stated in the Old Book of Tang to mean "war" in Old Turkic.[13] His father died early, and his mother Lady Ashide married a Turkic general An Yanyan (安延偃), who was a brother of general An Bozhi (安波至). An Lushan, therefore, took the surname An. Early in Emperor Xuanzong of Tang's Kaiyuan era, 713–741, there was a disturbance among the Göktürk tribe that An Yanyan belonged to, and An Lushan fled to Tang with An Yanyan and An Yanyan's nephew, An Sishun. He later settled in Ying Prefecture (營州, roughly modern Chaoyang, Liaoning).[13][14]

Paternity

[edit]

Sources conflict about An Lushan's biological father's origin and surname; for example, whether An Lushan's father had the surname Kang or not:[15] he took the name of An from his Göktürk stepfather An Yanyan. The surnames Kang and An suggest that they were respectively from the Sogdian kingdoms of Samarkand (康國; cf. Kangju) and Bukhara (安國).[2][7][16][17][18][19] The An are not to be confused with Anxi, which had been established as a prefecture by the Chinese in 661.[17][20]

On his side, Matsui Hitoshi, noting that nothing in the historical records provides hard evidence of Sogdian origin and that An Lushan was living at Yingzhou, a settlement of Kumo Xi and Khitan people, suggests that "Perhaps [An Lushan's father] might have been of Khitan origin."[21][22] Edward H. Schafer, however, maintains that An Lushan is probably the Sinicized version of a name derived from Anxi (安息 "Parthia(n)") and the common Sogdian name ܪܘܚܫܐܢ Roxshan "the Bright"[23][24][25] related to the Sogdian female name Roxana,[26] also borne by Alexander's Sogdian wife, Roxana.[27] His name has also been transcribed as Āluòshān (阿犖山)[12] or Yàluòshān (軋犖山),[13][14][15] and he was posthumously named Prince La of Yan (燕剌王) by his deputy Shi Siming.[14]

Youth

[edit]

It was said that An Lushan knew six non-Chinese languages, and, after he grew older, served as an interpreter in one of the military markets, which were set up by the Chinese government largely to obtain horses in exchange for silk through foreign trade. Serving with him was Shi Sugan (later named Shi Siming), who was one day older than he was and who became a good friend of his. In 732, when the general Zhang Shougui (張守珪) was governing You Prefecture (幽州, roughly modern Beijing), it was discovered that An Lushan had stolen sheep. Zhang was set to execute An Lushan by caning, when An Lushan yelled out, "Is it that you, Lord, do not wish to destroy the two barbarian tribes?[28] Why do you want to cane An Lushan to death?" Zhang, seeing that he had a large body and impressed by his plea, released him and had him serve as a police officer, along with Shi, and both of them were said to be capable at catching criminals. Later, Zhang promoted him to be a military officer. As Zhang believed that he was obese, he did not dare to eat too much while in Zhang's presence, and this drew Zhang's favor. Zhang took him in and treated him like a son. At a time that was not recorded in history, he married a Lady Kang as his first wife; they had at least one son, An Qingxu, who, however, was not his oldest son.[13][14]

Service in Tang armies

[edit]

Rise through the ranks (736–742)

[edit]
The Tang dynasty territory and provinces in 742, together with the approximate locations of the Khitan and Xi areas.
Distribution of 10 major jiedushi before the An Lushan rebellion; Hedong, Fanyang and Pinglu jiedushi were controlled by An Lushan

By 736, An Lushan carried a general title and was serving under Zhang Shougui as an officer of the Pinglu Army (平盧軍, based in modern Chaoyang). In 736, after An disobeyed Zhang's orders and made an overly aggressive attack against the Khitan and the Xi, he was defeated. According to army regulations, he was supposed to be executed. Zhang then sent him to the capital, Chang'an; by not executing An himself, Zhang was hoping that Emperor Xuanzong would pardon An.[12][29] The chancellor Zhang Jiuling, arguing that An's death would be necessary to preserve military discipline and further believing that An had the appearance of a rebel, advocated An's death, but Emperor Xuanzong believed An to be able and did not want to execute him, and therefore spared him but stripped him of titles, returning him to serve under Zhang.[12]

In 740, An became the Bingmashi (兵馬使) of Pinglu Army. In 741, when the deputy chief imperial censor Zhang Lizhen (張利貞) was sent to survey the Hebei (河北, i.e., the region north of the Yellow River) and visited Pinglu Army, An ingratiated himself with Zhang, so much so that he even bribed Zhang's servants. When Zhang returned to Chang'an and praised An, Emperor Xuanzong promoted An to be the commandant at Ying Prefecture and the commander of Pinglu Army, to defend against the Khitan, the Xi, Balhae, and the Heishui Mohe.[12] In 742, Xuanzong further promoted Pinglu Army to be a military circuit, making An its military governor (jiedushi).[30]

At Chang'an (743)

[edit]

In 743, An visited Chang'an to pay homage to Emperor Xuanzong. Emperor Xuanzong treated him well and allowed him to visit the palace at all times. He began to inject himself into court politics—as the official Su Xiaoyun (蘇孝韞) complained to him that the imperial examinations that year was unfair and that Zhang Shi (張奭), the son of the deputy chief imperial censor Zhang Yi (張倚), had been given top grade despite having no abilities. An reported this to Emperor Xuanzong, who ordered a retesting before him personally. Zhang Shi was not able to even write one character in response to Emperor Xuanzong's reexamination. As a result, the deputy ministers of civil service, Song Yao (宋遙) and Miao Jinqing were demoted.[30]

An often pleased Emperor Xuanzong by offering Emperor Xuanzong tributes of rare items, such as rare animals or jewels. By this time, he was even more obese than before, and Emperor Xuanzong, on one occasion, jokingly asked him, "What does this barbaric belly contain?" He responded, "Other than a faithful heart, there is nothing else." On another occasion, when Emperor Xuanzong's son Li Heng the Crown Prince was in audience, he refused to bow to Li Heng, stating, "I am a barbarian, and I do not understand formal ceremony. What is a crown prince?" Emperor Xuanzong responded, "He is the reserve emperor. After my death, he will be your emperor." An apologized, stating, "I am foolish. I had only known about Your Imperial Majesty, and not that there is such a thing as a reserve emperor." He bowed, but Emperor Xuanzong, believing him to be honest, favored him even more. As he was allowed to enter the palace, he asked that he become an adoptive son of Emperor Xuanzong's favorite concubine Consort Yang Guifei, and Emperor Xuanzong agreed. Thereafter, on one occasion, he bowed to Consort Yang first before bowing to Emperor Xuanzong, stating, "Barbarians bow to mothers first before fathers." Xuanzong, now believing An was as submissive to him as a son to a father, showed him even greater favors.[30]

Return to the north front

[edit]
A Tang Chinese ceramic statuette of a Sogdian merchant and a camel

In 744, with further praises from the powerful chancellor Li Linfu and Pei Kuan, An was, in addition to Pinglu, made the military governor of Fanyang Circuit (范陽, headquartered in modern Beijing). Wanting to show his military abilities, he often pillaged the Khitan and the Xi. His actions led to two princesses of the royal clan, who were married to Khitan and Xi leaders as part of the heqin policy, being executed in retaliation,[31] and both groups rebelled in 745, though An defeated them.[30]

According to the Song dynasty historian Sima Guang, it was said that An was attempting to increase his own strength and planning a rebellion, and in 747, he claimed to be building Fort Xiongwu (雄武城) and asked fellow military governor Wang Zhongsi to contribute troops, hoping to hold onto the troops that Wang would send and not return them. Wang, instead, led the troops himself to Xiongwu in advance of the rendezvous date and, after participating in the building project, returned with the soldiers, and submitted reports to Emperor Xuanzong that he believed An was planning treason. Li Linfu, who was at this point apprehensive of Wang as a potential rival, used this as one of the reasons to indict Wang, and Wang was, later in 747, removed from his post.[30] Also in 747, An Lushan was given the honorary title as chief deputy imperial censor (御史大夫, Yùshǐ Dàfū), and Lady Duan, now described as his wife, although Lady Kang was still alive, was created a lady.[14]

In 748, Emperor Xuanzong awarded An Lushan an iron certificate promising that he would not be executed, except for treason, and in 750, he created A Prince of Dongping, setting a precedent for generals not of the imperial Li clan to be created princes.

New period in Chang'an

[edit]

By this point, a friendship had developed between An Lushan and the Emperor. When An went to Chang'an later that year to pay homage to Emperor Xuanzong, he presented Emperor Xuanzong with 8,000 Xi captives. In 751, Xuanzong had a magnificent mansion built for An in Chang'an, sparing no expense, using jade, gold, and silver in many different places. On An's birthday, 20 February 751,[32] Emperor Xuanzong and Consort Yang awarded him with clothing, treasures, and food. On 23 February, when An was summoned to the palace, Consort Yang, in order to please Emperor Xuanzong, had an extra-large infant wrapping made, and wrapped An in it, causing much explosion of laughter among the ladies-in-waiting and eunuchs. When Emperor Xuanzong asked what was going on, Consort Yang's attendants joked that Consort Yang gave birth three days ago and was washing her baby Lushan. Emperor Xuanzong was pleased by the comical situation and rewarded both Consort Yang and An greatly. Thereafter, whenever An visited the capital, he was allowed free admittance to the palace, and there were rumors that he and Consort Yang had an affair, but Emperor Xuanzong discounted the rumors. At An's request, Emperor Xuanzong also gave him the governorship of Hedong Circuit (河東, headquartered in modern Taiyuan, Shanxi), in addition to Pinglu and Fanyang.[33] Two of his sons, An Qingzong and An Qingxu, were given ministerial level positions, and An Qingzong was given an imperial clan member's daughter, the Lady Rongyi, in marriage.[13]

An was arrogant toward other officials, including Consort Yang's second cousin Yang Guozhong. However, carrying the honorary title of deputy chief imperial censor (御史大夫) at this point, he was respectful of his colleague Wang Hong (王鉷), an associate of Li Linfu's, although initially not Li Linfu—and therefore, on one occasion, Li Linfu intentionally summoned Wang Hong in An's presence, and when Wang Hong arrived, he was paying Li Linfu great respect, causing An to be surprised and apprehensive, and thereafter An carefully cultivated his relationship with Li Linfu as well.[33]

Pondering Emperor Xuanzong's death & Northward campaign

[edit]
Sogdian merchants from a 9th-century Buddhist fresco in Bezeklik, Xinjiang

It was also said that, by this point, An began to be apprehensive of what would happen once Emperor Xuanzong died—as he remembered how he had refused to bow to Li Heng—and he began to plan an eventual rebellion, which was further encouraged by his observation that the heart of the empire was without defenses. He selected some 8,000 soldiers among the surrendered Khitan, Xi, and Tongluo (同羅) tribesmen, organizing them into an elite corps known as the Yeluohe (曵落河), which meant "the brave". He retained Gao Shang (高尚), Yan Zhuang (嚴莊), Zhang Tongru (張通儒), and Sun Xiaozhe (孫孝哲) as his strategists; and Shi Siming, An Shouzhong (安守忠), Li Guiren (李歸仁), Cai Xide (蔡希德), Niu Tingjie (牛廷玠), Xiang Runrong (向潤容), Li Tingwang (李庭望), Cui Qianyou (崔乾祐), Yin Ziqi (尹子奇), He Qiannian (何千年), Wu Lingxun (武令珣), Neng Yuanhao (能元皓), Tian Chengsi, Tian Qianzhen (田乾真), and Ashina Chengqing (阿史那承慶) as his generals.[33]

Late in 751, An launched a major attack against the Khitan, advancing quickly to the heart of Khitan territory, but, hampered by rains, was defeated by the Khitan, and the general He Side (何思德) was killed. An himself was almost killed, and, after retreating, blamed the defeat on Ge Jie (哥解) and Yu Chengxian (魚承仙), executing them. He subsequently had Shi defend against the Khitan counterattack, and Shi was able to repel the Khitan. In 752, he wanted to launch a major counterattack against the Khitan, requesting that the ethnically Tujue general Li Xianzhong (李獻忠) accompany him. Li Xianzhong was afraid of An; when An ordered Li to attack the Khitan, Li rebelled, thus putting a halt to An's campaign.[33]

Rivalry with Geshu Han

[edit]

Later that year, when Emperor Xuanzong, seeing that both An Lushan and An Sishun (who by this point was the military governor of Shuofang Circuit (朔方, headquartered in modern Yinchuan, Ningxia)) had poor relations with Geshu Han, the military governor of Hexi (河西, headquartered in modern Wuwei, Gansu) and Longxi (隴西, headquartered in modern Haidong prefecture, Qinghai) Circuits, and wanted to improve relations between these three key border troop commanders, he summoned all three to the capital and had the powerful eunuch Gao Lishi host a feast for the three of them, trying to get them to resolve their unpleasantries. At the conference, however, Geshu and An Lushan got into an argument, which only stopped after Gao gazed at Geshu, stopping him from responding to An Lushan's insults.[33]

Death of Li Linfu and rivalry with Yang Guozhong

[edit]

In 753, with Li Linfu's death and replacement by Yang Guozhong, Yang Guozhong, intending to posthumously dishonor Li Linfu, had An Lushan corroborate his accusations that Li Linfu was involved in Li Xianzhong's rebellion. An agreed, and subsequently, with further corroboration from Li Linfu's son-in-law Yang Qixuan (楊齊宣), Li Linfu was posthumously dishonored, and his family members were exiled. Also in 753, Li Xianzhong's troops were defeated by the Uyghur Khaganate, and they surrendered to An, further enhancing his strength.[33]

Despite their cooperation posthumously accusing Li Linfu, a rivalry soon developed between An and Yang Guozhong, as An did not fear Yang Guozhong the way he did Li Linfu. Yang Guozhong made repeated accusations against An to Emperor Xuanzong that he was plotting a rebellion, but Emperor Xuanzong dismissed the accusations. Yang Guozhong, instead, allied with Geshu against An.[33] In spring 754, Yang asserted to the Emperor that An was set on rebelling, an accusation Yang had made before. Yang predicted that if Emperor Xuanzong summoned An to Chang'an, he would surely not come. However, when Emperor Xuanzong tested Yang's hypothesis by summoning An, he immediately appeared in Chang'an and claimed Yang was making false accusations. After that, Emperor Xuanzong refused to believe any suggestions that An was plotting rebellion despite Li Heng agreeing with Yang's assessment on this issue. The Emperor even considered promoting An to be chancellor; however, Yang opposed this, and the promotion did not occur. An returned to Fanyang. At An's request, Emperor Xuanzong allowed him to award his soldiers high ranks without first receiving imperial approval. (Geshu, hearing this, made the same request, and Emperor Xuanzong granted this privilege to Geshu.) Later, in 754, An defeated Xi forces, capturing their chieftain Li Riyue (李日越). Meanwhile, Yang Guozhong viewed the official Wei Zhi (韋陟) as a threat and accused Wei of corruption. Yang Guozhong later accused Wei of bribing An's associate Ji Wen (吉溫), and Wei and Ji were both demoted. An submitted a petition on their behalf, claiming that the accusations from Yang Guozhong were false. Emperor Xuanzong took no actions against either An or Yang Guozhong.[34]

Rebellion

[edit]
Main article: An Lushan Rebellion

The An Lushan Rebellion spanned from 16 December 755 to 17 February 763. This rebellion appears to have involved the death of some 13 million people, which would make it one of the deadliest wars in history.[35] Many scholars attribute the loss of 36 million people in the Tang census after the rebellion to a breakdown in Tang taxation and census gathering.

Initial stage

[edit]

In the spring of 755, matters were coming to a head. An Lushan submitted a petition to Emperor Xuanzong to replace 32 Han generals under his command with non-Han generals. Xuanzong accepted An's request despite opposition from chancellors Yang Guozhong and Wei Jiansu, who took An's request as a sign of impending rebellion. Yang and Wei then suggested that An be promoted chancellor, and that his three commands be divided between his three deputies.[citation needed]

Map of An Lushan Rebellion

Emperor Xuanzong initially agreed, but after the edict was drafted, Xuanzong delayed and instead sent the eunuch Fu Qiulin (輔璆琳) to send fresh fruits to An and to observe him—upon which An was alleged to bribe Fu into submitting a favorable report. Yang, however, persisted in his reports against An. Yang then attacked some of An's staff and associates, including having the mayor of Jingzhao arrest An's friend Li Chao (李超) and others, and executing them secretly. An Qingzong, who was then at Chang'an, reported Yang's attack to An Lushan, causing considerable concern to An Lushan, who, thereafter, refused to attend the funeral of an imperial prince in summer 755, and did not offer to send a large number of horses to Chang'an that autumn, which aroused the suspicions of Emperor Xuanzong. Allegations of An's bribes to Fu also reached the Emperor, who then had Fu executed, and sent another eunuch, Feng Shenwei (馮神威) to Fanyang to again summon An Lushan, who ignored the summons.[34]

In winter 755, An launched his rebellion on 16 December,[36] claiming he had received a secret edict from Emperor Xuanzong to advance on Chang'an to remove Yang. The imperial officials were all apprehensive, because An had the strongest troops of the realm at the time, except for Yang, who believed that An could be suppressed easily. Emperor Xuanzong commissioned the general Feng Changqing as military governor of Fanyang and Pinglu, intending to have him replace An after An's rebellion was defeated. The Emperor also sent Feng to the eastern capital, Luoyang, to build up the defense there; another general, Gao Xianzhi, was ordered to command a secondary defense at Shan Commandery (陝郡, roughly modern Sanmenxia, Henan). He executed An Qingzong and An's first wife Lady Kang, and forced An Qingzong's present wife, Lady Rongyi, to take her own life.[34]

On 8 January 756,[37] An Lushan crossed the Yellow River, quickly capturing Chenliu (陳留, roughly modern Kaifeng, Henan) and Yingyang (滎陽, roughly modern Zhengzhou, Henan) Commanderies. He approached Luoyang, where he encountered an ill-prepared army commanded by Feng, defeating Feng quickly and forcing Feng to flee and concede Luoyang to him. Feng joined forces with Gao and urged a retreat to Tong Pass; Gao agreed, and they took up defensive positions there, and An did not proceed quickly, but remained at Luoyang, planning to declare himself emperor there. (Soon, due to accusations of the eunuch Bian Lingcheng (邊令誠), Emperor Xuanzong executed Feng and Gao, and replaced Gao with Geshu Han.) Some Tang officials north of the Yellow River resisted An Lushan under the leadership of Yan Zhenqing, the governor of Pingyuan Commandery (平原, roughly modern Dezhou, Shandong).[34]

As emperor of Yan

[edit]

On Lunar New Year's day, 756 (5 February[1]), An Lushan declared himself Emperor at Luoyang, establishing a new state of Yan, making Zhang Tongru and the surrendered Tang official Daxi Xun (達奚珣) his chancellors. He created An Qingxu the Prince of Jin and another son, An Qinghe (安慶和), the Prince of Zheng.[14] Meanwhile, Yan Zhenqing's cousin Yan Gaoqing (顏杲卿), who initially submitted to An, rose against An at Changshan Commandery (常山, roughly modern Baoding, Hebei) but was quickly defeated and delivered to An in Luoyang; An executed him and sent An Qingxu to make an initial attack against Tong Pass, and Geshu Han repelled the attack.[38]

By this time, the Tang generals Guo Ziyi and Li Guangbi had fought their way into Emperor An's territory north of the Yellow River, cutting off the communication between Luoyang and Fanyang, causing much fear in An's troops. An considered withdrawing north of the Yellow River to secure the territory, but meanwhile, suspicions had begun to rise between Yang Guozhong and Geshu, each believing that the other had designs on himself. Yang therefore persuaded Emperor Xuanzong to order Geshu to attack the Yan general Cui Qianyou, who was then stationed at Shan Commandery. (This order was against the advice of Geshu, Guo, and Li Guangbi that the proper strategy was to secure Tong Pass and let Guo and Li Guangbi capture the Yan territory to the north.) Geshu, with Emperor Xuanzong repeatedly ordering him to attack, was forced to do so, and was defeated by Cui. Geshu's subordinate Huoba Guiren (火拔歸仁) seized him and surrendered to Yan forces. Subsequently, An induced Geshu to write letters to several Tang generals, urging them to surrender, but they all refused.[38]

When Yan forces captured Tong Pass, Emperor Xuanzong and Yang, in panic, abandoned Chang'an and fled toward Shu Commandery (蜀郡, roughly modern Chengdu, Sichuan). On the way, at a small village, Mawei Station, prompted by general Chen Xuanli who believed that Yang Guozhong had provoked this rebellion, the imperial guards assassinated Yang Guozhong, and demanded the death of Yang Guifei, to which the Emperor reluctantly consented. An, caught by surprise of the Emperor's retreat, had Cui advance slowly into Chang'an, even though the Tang mayor of Chang'an, Cui Guangyuan (崔光遠), offered to surrender. Also surrendering to Yan forces were the former chancellor Chen Xilie and the key officials Zhang Jun (張均) and Zhang Ji (張垍), and An made Chen and Zhang Ji chancellors as well.[39]

Meanwhile, An had Emperor Xuanzong's sister, Princess of Huo, as well as a number of other imperial relatives, executed, and sacrificed their organs to An Qingzong. At this point, there was a new Tang Emperor: Li Heng, or Emperor Suzong. Due to the slowness of the Yan advance, the Yan forces were unable to capture either Emperor Xuanzong, who eventually reached Shu Commandery, or Li Heng, who fled to Lingwu and took the Tang imperial title there (as Emperor Suzong). (Xuanzong recognized Li Heng's actions and subsequently took the title Taishang Huang (retired emperor).) Hearing news of Chang'an's fall, Guo and Li Guangbi withdrew to Lingwu, allowing Shi to again pacify the region north of the Yellow River and east of the Taihang Mountains with exception of pockets held by Yan Zhenqing and other Tang officials under his command.[38]

Death

[edit]

Once he had assumed the imperial title, An Lushan spent most of his time inside the Luoyang palace. His generals rarely saw him, and most important matters were handled through Yan Zhuang (嚴莊).[40]

An Lushan suffered from chronic eye problems that eventually led to blindness; he had ulcers; and he was extremely obese. His sheer weight once crushed to death a horse[41] and he needed three servants to help him to put on and take off his clothes when he visited Huaqing Pool.

An Lushan had a highly-trusted Khitan eunuch named Li Zhu'er (李豬兒). But in his sickness and blindness An became ill-tempered and paranoid, and would flog or even murder his servants if they had caused him any displeasure. Even Yan Zhuang and Li Zhu'er were said to be hit frequently.

An Lushan favored his son An Qing'en (安慶恩) (the son of his second wife, Lady Duan) and was considering appointing An Qing'en to be crown prince (instead of An Qingxu, who otherwise was in line to receive that title). Knowing that he was out of favor, and fearing that An Lushan was planning to kill him, An Qingxu, along with He, Yan, and Li Zhu'er, decided to assassinate An Lushan.

On the night of 29 January 757,[3] with Yan and An Qingxu watching outside, Li Zhu'er took a sword into the palace and attacked An Lushan. An tried to fight back, but could not locate a sword that he had put under his bed. Li Zhu'er attacked his stomach and abdomen. As his intestines were coming out of his body, An screamed "this is a thief of my own household" and died.[42][43]

The next morning, Yan announced to the Yan officials that An Lushan was seriously ill, and that he had appointed An Qingxu crown prince. Then, after taking the throne, An Qingxu reported that An Lushan had died.[40]

Two years later, in 759, after Shi Siming killed An Qingxu and assumed the imperial title, Shi Siming buried An Lushan with the ceremony due an imperial prince, not an emperor, and gave him the rather unflattering posthumous name of La (剌, meaning "unthinking").[14]

An Lushan's military promotions
Date Office (pinyin + English) Mission
pre-740 officer of the Pinglu Army 平盧軍, translator
741, seventh month Governor-general of Yingzhou and
Pinglu Jun Bingma Shi (兵馬使, commander of the Pinglu army)		 taking charge of the affairs of the northeastern frontier and overseeing the Khitan, Xi, Balhae, etc.
742, first month Pinglu Jiedu Shi
(Regional commander of Pinglu)		 for pacifying the Shiwei and Mohe.
744, third month Fanyang Jiedu Shi
(Regional commander of Fanyang)		 for controlling the Khitan and Xi and surrounding area.
747 Yushi Daifu (御史大夫, chief deputy imperial censor)[14] honorary title
751, second month Hedong Jiedu Shi
(Regional commander of Hedong)		 for defending the Turks.
755 Yan Huangdi (Emperor Yan, death in 757) Try to overthrow the Tang dynasty and install his own.
Sources : Xu Elina-Qian, pp. 248–249[44]

Personal information

[edit]
  • Father
    • may be surnamed Kang (康) (personal name unknown)[15]
  • Mother
    • Lady Ashide
  • Stepfather
    • An Yanyan (安延偃)
  • Wives
  • Children
    • An Qingzong (安慶宗) (executed by Emperor Xuanzong of Tang 756)
    • An Qingxu (安慶緒), the Prince of Jin (created 756), later emperor
    • An Qingzhang (安慶長)
    • An Qinghe (安慶和), the Prince of Zheng (created 756, executed by Emperor Suzong of Tang 758)
    • An Qing'en (安慶恩)
    • Six other sons, names unrecorded in history
  • Other
[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

An Lushan

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An Lushan (c. 703–757) was a military general of mixed Sogdian and Turkic ancestry who commanded key northeastern frontier armies and instigated the in 755, a civil war that ravaged until 763 and precipitated the dynasty's terminal decline. Born in Liucheng, Yingzhou (modern Chaoyang, ), to a Sogdian father of uncertain origin (with sources conflicting on specifics such as Samarkand or Bukhara) and a Göktürk mother from the Ashide clan who was a shamaness, An Lushan rose from humble origins as a broker and low-ranking soldier to prominence under the patronage of general Zhang Shougui, eventually securing command of the elite Pinglu Circuit in 742, Fanyang in 744, and Hedong in 751. His ascent accelerated through flattery and strategic alliances at Emperor Xuanzong's court, where he earned the favor of the emperor and consort , who adopted him as a son, while amassing control over vast military, administrative, and economic resources in the northeast. Tensions with Yang Guozhong, Yang Guifei's distant cousin, fueled An's grievances, prompting him to launch his revolt in December 755 with 150,000 troops under the pretext of punishing court corruption; he swiftly captured on 18 January 756, proclaimed himself emperor of the Yan dynasty, and seized the capital later that year, forcing Xuanzong to flee westward. Though obese and reportedly indulgent, An assembled a formidable force including 8,000 elite "braves" proficient in regional ethnic warfare tactics. An's rule proved short-lived; in early 757, amid paranoia and illness, he was assassinated by his Li Zhu'er at the instigation of his son , who succeeded him but failed to consolidate gains as Tang loyalists, bolstered by Uighur allies, gradually reclaimed territory. The prolonged conflict, continuing under and his general , inflicted catastrophic losses—estimates of direct and indirect deaths are roughly 13 million, while the approximately 36 million decline in census figures reflects depopulation but is largely attributed to breakdowns in taxation, reporting, and census gathering rather than confirmed deaths—and eroded central authority, empowering semi-autonomous governors and inviting foreign incursions that ended the Tang's golden age.

Origins and Early Life

Ethnic Background and Paternity Disputes

An Lushan was born in 703 in Liucheng, within Yingzhou Prefecture (modern ), a northeastern region characterized by ethnic diversity under Tang administration. His origins reflected the empire's incorporation of Central Asian and peoples, with his mother from the Göktürk Ashide clan, noted in Tang records as a shamaness or sorceress who practiced rituals common among Turkic groups. Historical accounts diverge on his paternity, with the Jiu Tangshu and Xin Tangshu indicating that his biological father—likely of Sogdian descent, a mercantile from —died during An Lushan's early childhood, prompting his mother to remarry An Yanyan, a Turkic in Tang frontier forces. An Lushan subsequently adopted the surname "An" from this stepfather, aligning with Tang practices of assimilation for non-Han military families, while his derived from Sogdian roots ("Rokhan" or "roxšan," meaning "light"). These discrepancies in Tang-era , compiled post-rebellion, may stem from efforts to portray An Lushan as an archetypal "" outsider, amplifying foreign elements to rationalize dynastic upheaval; empirical patterns of Sogdian-Turkic intermarriage in Ordos and Yingzhou regions, however, underscore routine integration rather than inherent disloyalty. Some later interpretations speculate Khitan influences due to proximity to their settlements, but primary records consistently prioritize Göktürk maternal lineage without substantiated claims of conception during captivity. Yingzhou's role as a multi-ethnic facilitated An Lushan's early fluency in multiple languages and initial employment as a market broker and interpreter, fostering within Tang structures that rewarded service regardless of origin.

Youth and Initial Military Entry

An Lushan, raised amid the multi-ethnic border markets of northeastern Tang , initially sustained himself as a broker trading horses and goods, acquiring fluency in several non-Han languages essential for commerce. Around the 730s, involvement in local market altercations and theft compelled his enlistment into the Tang military to evade or execution, a common recourse for vagrants and petty offenders in the era's practices. This entry leveraged his innate physical robustness and adaptability, traits honed in the unforgiving environment, as chronicled in the , a Song-era compilation drawing from Tang that, while post-rebellion, preserves contemporaneous records of enlistments despite potential Han-centric embellishments portraying non-Han recruits as rough opportunists. Under General Zhang Shougui, military commissioner of Pinglu and Youzhou circuits, An Lushan began as a low-ranking scout in the Pinglu stationed near modern Chaoyang, , by circa 733. Despite profound illiteracy in Chinese script and a pronounced foreign accent marking his Sogdian-Turkic heritage, he advanced through demonstrated valor in reconnaissance and skirmishes against nomadic threats. The Tang system, emphasizing autonomous frontier commands with integrated non-Han troops, facilitated such meritocratic rises, prioritizing martial efficacy over scholarly credentials—a pragmatic adaptation to defend vast borders, unencumbered by the ideals that later dominated and sidelined barbarian contributions. In 736–737, An Lushan's exploits peaked with unauthorized raids into Khitan territory, initially resulting in defeat and flogging by Zhang Shougui for insubordination, yet culminating in the capture of prominent Khitan leaders, including kin of chieftain Li Huaihsün. These feats, verified in Tang military dispatches aggregated in later chronicles, secured his promotion to acting general, underscoring the system's tolerance for bold initiative amid chronic incursions, even as post-An Lushan narratives in histories amplified flaws to retroactively justify the rebel's downfall. Empirical tallies from the period indicate Pinglu forces, bolstered by such hybrid officers, repelled Khitan incursions numbering in the thousands, stabilizing the frontier before broader campaigns.

Military Career under Tang

Early Promotions and Northern Campaigns (736–742)

In 736, An Lushan served as a subordinate officer under General Zhang Shougui in the Pinglu Army, tasked with defending the northeastern frontier against nomadic threats from the Khitan and Xi tribes. Disregarding orders, he initiated an aggressive offensive, which ended in defeat due to insufficient coordination and overextension. This incident highlighted the volatile nature of frontier warfare, where local commanders often balanced imperial directives with immediate tactical imperatives, yet An was pardoned rather than severely punished, indicating the Tang court's pragmatic tolerance for bold actions amid ongoing tribal pressures. Following the setback, An Lushan participated in subsequent operations suppressing tribal incursions, leveraging his familiarity with the terrain and multi-ethnic troops to stabilize the border. The Tang's system, designed to delegate defense of remote frontiers, granted semi-autonomous authority over recruitment, logistics, and campaigns; commanders like An raised armies from local Han, Sogdian, Turkic, and other non-Han populations, funded by regional taxes and spoils, which cultivated soldier loyalties to the general over distant central authorities. This addressed the empire's vast scale and the fubing militia's decline but empowered provincial leaders through personal patronage networks rather than bureaucratic oversight. An's effectiveness in these roles—routing smaller raiding parties and securing supply lines—directly contributed to his rapid ascent, as Xuanzong prioritized results in quelling nomadic disruptions to maintain trade routes and agricultural productivity in and Liaodong. By 742, An Lushan's proven utility led to his appointment as of Pinglu, commanding an estimated force exceeding 60,000 troops in the region around modern Chaoyang, . This promotion included noble titles such as of Pinglu, emblematic of Xuanzong's merit-based elevation of capable frontier officers to counterbalance eunuch influence at court and ensure vigorous border enforcement. Such rewards underscored a causal dynamic: the emperor's incentives aligned with generals' incentives for aggressive defense, fostering short-term stability but sowing seeds of regional autonomy that undermined imperial control.

Expansion of Command and Frontier Defense

By 751, An Lushan had consolidated command over the strategically vital Fanyang, Hedong, and Pinglu circuits in the northeastern frontier, overseeing approximately 184,000 troops tasked with defending against nomadic incursions. These commands encompassed key regions in and beyond, enabling An to project Tang authority amid persistent threats from tribes such as the Khitan and Xi, whose raids destabilized the area. In 747, An Lushan orchestrated a campaign against the Khitan, driving deep into their territories and compelling temporary submission through aggressive offensives that exploited his forces' mobility in the harsh northeastern steppes. This success, achieved despite internal rivalries—such as the rebellion of subordinate Li Xianzhong against An's orders—demonstrated the effectiveness of An's multi-ethnic in countering nomadic tactics, though it halted short of full pacification. His logistical management sustained operations across rugged terrains, supported by Tang fortifications that archaeological evidence links to expanded garrisons in the region. An's expanded authority stabilized by deterring Uyghur and Xi pressures, as his integrated forces of Han and non-Han soldiers leveraged local knowledge to fortify supply lines and conduct preemptive strikes. However, the Tang court's reliance on ethnic generals like An—whose Sogdian-Turkic heritage facilitated frontier expertise but fostered autonomous power bases—exposed structural weaknesses, as control over taxation, recruitment, and justice eroded central oversight and incentivized personal loyalty over imperial . This system, while yielding short-term defensive gains, sowed vulnerabilities evident in the unchecked accumulation of military resources under single commanders.

Court Sojourns and Political Maneuvering (743–755)

In 743, An Lushan was summoned to the Tang capital at Chang'an, where his visits facilitated demonstrations of loyalty that reinforced his standing despite occasional bureaucratic scrutiny and temporary reversals in status, underscoring his proven military value on the frontiers. These court sojourns, recurring through the early 750s, allowed him to build tactical alliances, particularly with Chancellor Li Linfu, who backed An's expansion of authority as jiedushi (military commissioner) over Pinglu in 742, Fanyang in 744, and Hedong by 751, granting him dominion over northeastern China's key circuits and their resources by 752. An's political maneuvering involved leveraging frontier reports and petitions to counter rivals, such as General Geshu Han, amid emerging frictions over command and strategy that tested loyalties within the Tang military hierarchy. This period saw him cultivate an elite force of 8,000 "brave" troops (yiluohe) and systematically replace officers with non-Han subordinates, consolidating personal control under the guise of border defense imperatives. The Tang jiedushi system's design, delegating near-total autonomy in military, fiscal, judicial, and civil affairs to regional governors, empirically enabled such power concentrations, as commissioners like An retained circuit revenues—often withholding them from —and commanded independent armies, with border forces numbering 490,000 of the empire's total 574,000 by the 740s while central guards atrophied. This structure reflected deeper bureaucratic corruption, where local potentates prioritized personal aggrandizement over imperial oversight, fostering unchecked influence in peripheral commands.

Prelude to Rebellion

Favored Status under Xuanzong

In 751, An Lushan requested and received as the foster son of , Emperor Xuanzong's favored consort, which deepened his personal ties to the imperial court and elicited Xuanzong's approval through prostrations and displays of loyalty upon entering the emperor's presence. This adoption symbolized peak patronage, rewarding An's reported successes in frontier defense against Khitan and Xi incursions. Concurrently, Xuanzong granted An the military commission of Hedong Circuit, consolidating his authority over three major northeastern commands—Fanyang (appointed 744), Pinglu (742), and Hedong—encompassing vast border defenses, fiscal administration, and over 160,000 troops. Xuanzong's favoritism extended to military honors, culminating in 755 with An's elevation to of the right flanks of the imperial guards and permission to replace 32 subordinate generals with non-Han loyalists, ostensibly to enhance border security but effectively augmenting An's independent power base. Lavish imperial gifts and audiences underscored this trust, yet empirical evidence of Tang fiscal pressures—evident in the maintenance of 490,000 border troops out of a total army of 574,000 by 742—highlighted the strains from sustaining such expansive, semi-autonomous forces under favorites like An. This patronage reflected Xuanzong's strategic miscalculation in centralizing frontier authority through personal favorites, bypassing institutional checks despite early admonitions from Zhang Jiuling, who warned of the perils posed by empowering ambitious like An with unchecked regional commands. Zhang's counsel, rooted in observations of An's and ethnic outsider status, was dismissed amid court favoritism toward Li Linfu and later Yang influences, prioritizing perceived loyalty over systemic risks of rebellion in an era of decadent imperial detachment from military realities.

Escalating Rivalry with Yang Guozhong

Following the death of Chancellor Li Linfu in December 752, , a relative of the favored consort , rapidly ascended to the position of , consolidating power through alliances with eunuchs and by exploiting imperial favor. Yang perceived An Lushan, who by 752 commanded the vital northern circuits of Fanyang, Pinglu, and Hedong—encompassing over 150,000 elite troops—as a direct threat due to this unprecedented concentration of military authority on the frontiers, which undermined central oversight. Yang began systematically slandering An to Xuanzong, portraying him as disloyal and intent on , accusations rooted in An's non-Han ethnic background and autonomous frontier operations but amplified by Yang's own factional interests. In 754, Yang orchestrated investigations into An's loyalty, leveraging court spies and networks to probe for evidence of , including claims of unauthorized troop musters and hoarding of supplies; these efforts reflected Tang institutional decay, as Yang's of state funds—documented in contemporary as diverting millions of cash from treasuries—fueled his need to eliminate rivals. An countered by distributing bribes to influential like Li Fuguo and mobilizing loyal troops to deter enforcers, successfully evading formal summons and demotion attempts without direct confrontation. This episode underscored An's strategic , justified in part by Yang's verifiable corruption, yet also his own overreach in defying imperial orders, as frontier like An had grown accustomed to independence amid the court's -dominated intrigues. By early 755, the antagonism reached a breaking point when Yang secured an imperial edict for An's arrest on charges of , prompting An to ignore repeated court summons and fortify his positions under the guise of illness. Yang's alliances with corrupt officials exacerbated Tang internal rot, including the suppression of honest remonstrators and prioritization of personal enrichment over frontier stability, while An's responses revealed a mutual cycle of distrust where legitimate concerns over military autonomy clashed with factional self-preservation. Historical records, such as those in the , attribute Yang's verifiable fiscal malfeasance— including the misappropriation of silk and grain reserves—to broader systemic biases in late Tang historiography, which often critiqued chancellor overreach without fully absolving generals' ambitions. This rivalry, rather than isolated paranoia, causally intensified An's resolve against perceived encirclement, setting the stage for open defiance.

Strategic Buildup and Perceived Threats

By 755, An Lushan had concentrated a multi-ethnic force of approximately 150,000–200,000 troops, primarily elite cavalry drawn from Sogdian, Xi, Khitan, and other northern nomadic groups, under his command across the Fanyang, Pinglu, and Hedong circuits. These units were drilled in relative secrecy within Fanyang's garrisons, leveraging the region's proximity to recruitment pools to bolster numbers beyond standard Tang quotas. This buildup exploited the decentralized structure of Tang frontier defense, where like An maintained de facto control over logistics and reinforcements, amassing grain depots and weaponry sufficient for sustained campaigns without direct imperial oversight. The Tang's fubing system, originally a rotational designed for rapid mobilization, had eroded by the mid-8th century due to land concentration, tax burdens, and evasion of hereditary service obligations, rendering it incapable of supporting prolonged northern expeditions. Emperors from Taizong onward increasingly turned to professionalized, long-term garrisons under commanders, granting them fiscal autonomy and recruitment rights to secure borders against Tibetans and Uighurs. This shift enabled figures like An—initially a low-born officer risen through merit—to cultivate loyal, self-sustaining armies, with Fanyang's forces exceeding 160,000 by official tallies, though actual strength likely surpassed this through undeclared levies. An's preparations were precipitated by escalating threats from Chancellor Yang Guozhong, who, upon assuming power in 752, pursued policies to curb frontier autonomy amid fears of military overreach. Yang leveled unsubstantiated charges of corruption against An and dispatched investigators to Fanyang, actions interpreted by An's camp as harbingers of demotion or execution akin to prior removals of generals like Tian Chao and Wang Zhongsi. Empirical records indicate Yang's centralizing efforts included reallocating supply lines and summoning jiedushi to court under pretexts, fostering a causal dynamic where An's preemptive fortification of positions reflected rational anticipation of purge rather than unprovoked ambition. This rivalry, rooted in Yang's civilian dominance over military affairs, underscored the Tang court's vulnerability to internal factionalism, as frontier commanders perceived such moves as existential risks to their entrenched commands.

The An Lushan Rebellion

Launch and Rapid Conquests (755)

In late 755, An Lushan mobilized approximately 200,000 troops from his bases in Fanyang, Yingzhou, and Pinglu under the pretext of a punitive campaign against Chancellor Yang Guozhong, whom he accused of treasonous corruption and plotting against the emperor. On December 16, 755, he formally initiated the rebellion by advancing southward from Fanyang with a predominantly cavalry force, leveraging superior mobility and local knowledge of the terrain to outpace Tang responses. This rapid deployment exploited the Tang court's overreliance on frontier commanders like An himself, whose divided loyalties and stretched supply lines left central defenses vulnerable and uncoordinated. The rebel army's swift progress through province met minimal opposition, as Tang garrisons were undermanned and hesitant to engage without imperial orders, allowing An Lushan to secure key passes and towns en route to the eastern capital. By early January 756, following decisive victories over inadequately supplied Tang forces under generals such as Feng Changqing, the rebels captured after bypassing fortified positions via flanking maneuvers. This conquest highlighted Tang unpreparedness, with imperial armies suffering from logistical failures and internal distrust, enabling An's cohesive, battle-hardened troops—drawn from diverse ethnic groups loyal to his personal authority—to overwhelm defenders despite initial numerical parity. The fall of unleashed brutal reprisals, including mass executions and looting that alienated potential local support, yet the rebels' momentum persisted as they pressed westward toward , forcing Emperor Xuanzong's evacuation by June 756. Early clashes inflicted heavy casualties on Tang units, estimated in the tens of thousands, underscoring the rebels' tactical edge in exploiting extended supply chains and the dynasty's delayed mobilization of reliable levies. An Lushan's forces maintained high cohesion through strict discipline and promises of plunder, contrasting with the Tang's fragmented command structure that prioritized political intrigue over unified defense.

Proclamation of Yan Dynasty and Imperial Ambitions

In early 756, after seizing in December 755, An Lushan formally proclaimed the establishment of the Yan dynasty (大燕), declaring himself emperor on the first day of the , corresponding to 5 February by the . He adopted the regnal era name Shengwu (聖武, "Sacred Military") and later received the Xiaocang (孝倉). This self-elevation marked his shift from Tang general to claimant of the , with Yan positioned as a rival encompassing northern . An Lushan established his imperial court in , the former Tang eastern capital, installing a parallel bureaucracy modeled on Tang precedents to project legitimacy. He appointed officials, including former Tang scholars and administrators who defected or were coerced, to roles in civil governance, such as the six ministries and advisory positions, aiming to integrate Confucian administrative norms. Efforts included minting Yan-specific cash coins to standardize currency in controlled territories and conducting rituals like imperial sacrifices to ancestors and heaven, invoking classical precedents for dynastic founding. However, traditional Tang-era histories, such as the , compiled by scholars drawing on official annals, emphasize An's Sogdian-Turkic heritage as disqualifying him from true imperial virtue, reflecting a Sinocentric bias that marginalized non-Han rulers' institutional adaptations. Despite these trappings of , An's ambitions for a enduring dynasty were causally constrained by Yan's reliance on plunder, , and ad hoc levies from conquered regions, rather than institutionalized systems. Unlike the Tang's pre-rebellion equal-field allocations and labor, which had eroded under fiscal pressures from military expansions, Yan lacked verifiable large-scale tax reforms or agrarian policies to foster loyalty or ; instead, sustenance derived from wartime expropriation, alienating urban elites and limiting administrative depth. This plunder-based model, sustained by An's multiethnic forces, underscored the regime's fragility, as ethnic stigmas—rooted in An's non-Han identity and associations with frontier "barbarians"—eroded ideological claims among Han literati, who viewed Yan as a transient usurpation rather than a cosmologically ordained order.

Blindness, Betrayal, and Death (756–757)

In 756, An Lushan's health deteriorated severely amid the strains of his self-proclaimed emperorship, with chronic eye ailments progressing to near-total blindness, compounded by extreme that fostered ulcers and skin infections in the folds of his excess flesh. Historical records from Tang-era chronicles attribute this blindness to longstanding ocular issues exacerbated by possible or , rendering him increasingly dependent on aides and unable to oversee military operations personally. His , noted in contemporary accounts as reaching over 150 kilograms, had long hindered mobility—once reportedly crushing a beneath him—and now intensified bodily decay, including necrotic sores that isolated him further within Luoyang's palace confines. This physical decline intertwined with mounting paranoia, as An Lushan's irascibility turned tyrannical; he executed or alienated key subordinates on suspicions of disloyalty, fostering dread among his inner circle and eroding rebel cohesion despite initial conquests. Blind and , he relied on eunuchs and for governance, yet his volatile temper—manifest in outbursts against perceived betrayals—strained relations with son , whom he increasingly viewed as a rival amid whispers of court intrigue. Such personal frailties, rooted in unchecked physical excess and ambition, amplified internal fractures, though they stemmed from broader command overreach rather than originating the revolt itself. On January 29, 757, An Lushan's culminated in his by , who, fearing for his own position after paternal threats against his allies, orchestrated the plot with Li Zhu'er; the killer reportedly slashed An Lushan's abdomen while he lay incapacitated, leading to a swift death amid screams of betrayal. This patricide, corroborated in Tang annals, plunged the Yan regime into immediate disarray, as seized control but inherited a fractured command structure plagued by vengeance and defections. The event underscores how An Lushan's corporeal and psychological unraveling—evident in his isolation from verifiable intelligence due to blindness—hastened the rebel leadership's implosion, independent of Tang countermeasures.

Immediate Aftermath and Family Succession

An Qingxu's Continuation and Failures

Following An Lushan's assassination on January 29, 757, his son proclaimed himself emperor of Yan at , seeking to maintain the rebellion's momentum amid Tang counteroffensives. However, Tang forces under Emperor Suzong, bolstered by Uighur cavalry allies, decisively retook in March 757 after defeating rebel armies at the Battle of Xiangji, forcing to abandon any immediate western offensives and retreat eastward. 's subsequent attempts to launch counterattacks toward in mid-757 faltered due to logistical strains and divided command, repelling a Tang probe at Tong Pass but failing to exploit the victory or coordinate with fragmented rebel units. By autumn 758, An Qingxu's position eroded further when Tang generals Guo Ziyi and Li Guangbi, commanding a coalition of nine jiedushi armies totaling around 200,000 troops, recaptured Luoyang after a swift campaign through Hedong, exploiting rebel disarray and local defections. This loss severed An Qingxu's primary base, compelling his flight to Yecheng (modern Handan, Hebei), where Tang forces besieged him into early 759. Unlike his father's charismatic hold over diverse ethnic troops and opportunistic tactics, An Qingxu struggled to inspire loyalty, as evidenced by desertions and the inability to mount effective relief without external aid. To secure his rule, An Qingxu initiated purges targeting his father's inner circle, including executing aides suspected of disloyalty, which fragmented rebel cohesion and alienated key commanders. Heavily reliant on Shi Siming's Pinglu forces—who had briefly defected to the Tang in 757 before rejoining due to imperial suspicions—An Qingxu deferred strategic decisions to Shi, underscoring his own tactical deficiencies. These internal fractures, compounded by the absence of An Lushan's personal authority, culminated in Shi Siming's intervention to lift the Yecheng siege in spring 759, only for Shi to depose and execute An Qingxu shortly thereafter.

Shi Siming's Role and Rebel Infighting

Following An Qingxu's mounting defeats, including the loss of key territories, , a longtime subordinate and ally of An Lushan who commanded significant forces in the northeast, briefly submitted to Tang authority in 758, surrendering his troops amid suspicions from Qingxu's regime. However, perceiving opportunities in the rebels' disarray and distrusting Tang overtures, Shi defected back to the Yan cause later that year, rallying defectors and recapturing in early autumn 758, thereby restoring rebel momentum in the eastern capital region. This reversal exploited Tang overextension but highlighted the fragility of rebel loyalty, as Shi's forces numbered around 80,000 yet relied on personal fealties rather than institutional cohesion. In spring 759, orchestrated the relief of the Tang siege on Yecheng, where was trapped, luring the out under pretense of alliance; upon meeting, Shi executed and four of his brothers, seizing control of the and proclaiming himself emperor of Yan on April 10. This coup eliminated a perceived incompetent but intensified factional rifts, as Shi purged Qingxu's partisans—executing over 400—and redistributed commands to loyalists, yet failed to consolidate beyond military necessities. Shi's briefly revitalized Yan offensives, including victories at Xiangzhou, but internal suspicions persisted, with Shi favoring younger sons over the heir Shi Chaoyi, sowing seeds for further betrayal. Rebel cohesion eroded through recurrent leadership assassinations, culminating in Shi Chaoyi's coup against his father in spring 761, motivated by Shi Siming's rage over battlefield setbacks and threats of execution against Chaoyi and subordinate generals. Chaoyi, leveraging elite guards, strangled Shi Siming during a campaign near , proclaiming himself emperor but inheriting a command fractured by prior purges and desertions. These cycles of and usurpation—mirroring An Lushan's death—diverted resources from frontline efforts, as factions vied for spoils, executed rivals, and lost defectors to Tang offers, reducing effective rebel strength by thousands through infighting attrition. Shi Siming's attempts to secure steppe alliances, including overtures to Uyghur forces amid Tang's own diplomacy, yielded limited empirical support for Yan, as Tang incentives—such as silk payments and marital ties—ultimately aligned Uyghur khagans against the rebels from 762 onward. This diplomatic isolation compounded infighting's toll, as rebel divisions prevented unified negotiations or reinforcements, enabling Tang to exploit fractures without equivalent internal betrayals. The resultant exhaustion of manpower and supplies from 759 to 761, driven by leadership vacuums rather than solely Tang campaigns, marked factional strife as a primary causal factor in Yan's operational collapse.

Long-Term Legacy

Devastation and Demographic Collapse

The (755–763) caused an unprecedented demographic catastrophe in Tang China, with official records showing a registered of approximately 52.9 million in 755 declining to 16.9 million by 764, a drop of over two-thirds. This collapse stemmed from direct battlefield casualties, mass during sieges and disrupted harvests, and outbreaks of in refugee-overcrowded areas, though administrative factors like and incomplete post-war registrations likely inflated the apparent . Excess death estimates, derived from extrapolating differentials and contemporary accounts of and slaughter, vary from 13 million to 36 million, potentially equating to 5–16% of the contemporaneous global population of around 200–250 million. Higher figures, such as those subtracting pre- and post-rebellion totals without adjusting for undercounting, have been critiqued for overstatement, as pre-war already missed unregistered rural and nomadic groups while post-war evasion surged amid punitive taxation. The region, Tang's political-economic core including the capitals and , endured the most severe destruction, with rebel and imperial forces razing cities, irrigations systems, and farmlands through prolonged fighting from 756 onward, resulting in abandoned fields and urban depopulation that persisted for generations. This heartland ruin eroded the central tax base, forcing reliance on southern provinces via doubled levies and corvée labor, which fueled further unrest and entrenched eunuch-led armies as the emperor's primary counterweight to regional commanders. Epigraphic evidence from tomb inscriptions reveals a precipitous decline in elite interments in northern during and immediately after the rebellion, corroborating textual reports of widespread societal breakdown and economic paralysis in affected zones.

Weakening of Tang Cosmopolitanism

The An Lushan Rebellion, spearheaded by a general of Sogdian-Turkic descent, exposed vulnerabilities in the Tang Dynasty's reliance on non-Han military elites for frontier defense, prompting a policy shift toward greater suspicion of ethnic minorities in high command positions after its suppression in 763. Prior to 755, Tang cosmopolitanism had facilitated the recruitment of diverse officers, including Khitans, Xi, and other "Hu" peoples, enabling effective control over vast border regions through fubing militia systems augmented by irregular cavalry forces loyal to figures like An Lushan himself. However, the rebellion's success—capturing both and within months—demonstrated the risks of entrusting semi-autonomous commands to non-Han leaders, whose personal ambitions and tribal networks could override imperial loyalty, as evidenced by An's mobilization of over 150,000 troops from garrisons dominated by his ethnic kin. Post-763, Tang authorities implemented curbs on jiedushi autonomy, including efforts to rotate commands and favor officers, effectively dismantling the multi-ethnic composition of the officer corps that had characterized earlier decades. Emperor Daizong (r. 762–779) and his successors prioritized sinicized elites in core provinces, reducing non-Han appointments in strategic circuits like Fanzhen, where rebel holdouts had persisted; by the 780s, edicts emphasized Han bureaucratic oversight over frontier militaries to prevent recurrence of An-style betrayals. While this inward turn stabilized central authority temporarily, it coincided with the erosion of pre-rebellion openness, where pros such as cultural —evident in Sogdian merchants and Central Asian influences at —were outweighed by cons like divided allegiances, as An's case causally linked ethnic heterogeneity in the to imperial fragility. The pivotal Uyghur intervention in 762–763, which enabled Tang forces to retake from Tibetan occupiers, underscored this shift: while alliances with 4,000–10,000 Uyghur cavalry proved militarily decisive, their demands for silk payments and brides fostered dependency and resentment, culminating in Uyghur raids on the capital for unpaid tribute. This bred long-term , as Tang policies post-rebellion promoted Han-centric assimilation over pluralism, diminishing the influx of foreign traders and artisans that had enriched urban centers like pre-755. By the mid-9th century, such dynamics manifested in Emperor Wuzong's 845 edicts suppressing "barbarian" faiths like and alongside , reflecting a causal retreat from cosmopolitan experimentation toward defensive insularity, unromanticized by the rebellion's empirical toll of 13–36 million deaths that prioritized survival over expansion.

Historiographical Biases and Modern Reassessments

The official Tang dynastic histories, such as the Jiu Tangshu (Old Book of Tang, compiled 945 CE), depict An Lushan as a duplicitous, corpulent barbarian of Sogdian-Turkic descent who feigned loyalty while harboring ambitions to usurp the throne from as early as the 740s. These accounts emphasize his physical grotesqueness—describing him as weighing over 150 kilograms—and attribute the rebellion to innate treachery, serving to justify the Tang court's survival and restoration under Emperor Suzong. Such portrayals embody victor historiography, wherein surviving Tang loyalists amplified An's villainy to moralize the dynasty's resilience, while embedding Han-centric ethnic biases against "Hu" (non-Chinese) generals who rose through frontier merit rather than aristocratic lineage. Modern scholarship has reassessed these narratives by identifying factual inventions and omissions in An's biography, such as exaggerated claims of premeditated , which 20th-century historians trace to propagandistic embellishments in post-rebellion chronicles. Debates persist on An's motives: traditional views stress unbridled personal ambition fueled by his rapid ascent from slave origins to command of 200,000 troops across three circuits (Fanyang, Pinglu, Hedong) by 755 CE, whereas alternative analyses frame the uprising as a defensive response to ethnic discrimination and political slander, particularly from , who accused An of disloyalty amid court factions favoring Han elites. Empirical evidence from Tang legal codes highlights systemic prejudice against non-assimilated aliens, including Sogdians like An, who faced barriers despite their utility in suppressing nomadic incursions. Recent studies incorporating archaeology and multi-ethnic military records question the "early plotting" trope, positing instead that An leveraged Sogdian merchant networks and non-Han cavalry (comprising Khitans, Xi, and Türks) opportunistically amid Tang overextension, rather than through a singular treasonous design. These reassessments underscore causal factors like the system's decentralization—essential for defending 10 million square kilometers against Tibetan and Uighur pressures—over individualized villainy. Critiques of "imperial decay" interpretations, often rooted in mid-20th-century ideological framings of feudal decline, argue they underemphasize pre-755 prosperity metrics, such as doubled tax revenues from 700 to 750 CE and cosmopolitan expansions, attributing the dynasty's post-rebellion fragility to wartime devastation (36 million reported deaths) rather than antecedent rot. This empirical pivot favors structural realism in frontier necessities over moralistic or decay-centric teleologies.

Personal Traits and Representations

Physical Appearance and Character Assessments

Historical records from the Old Book of Tang portray An Lushan as extraordinarily obese, weighing around 330 jin (approximately 150–200 kilograms by modern equivalents of Tang-era measurements), with his abdomen described as sagging to his knees. This extreme corpulence was proverbial in contemporary accounts, to the extent that it reportedly caused the death of a horse beneath his weight during an attempted mount. Despite such physical encumbrance, An Lushan exhibited notable strength and endurance suited to frontier warfare, enabling his command of diverse cavalry forces comprising Turkic and Sogdian elements. Later ailments, including chronic ulcers and progressive eye disease culminating in blindness by 757, compounded his bodily frailties, though these did not immediately impede his initial rebellious campaigns. An Lushan's character assessments in Tang dynastic histories blend verifiable traits with likely propagandistic embellishments, reflecting the victors' bias against a non-Han rebel leader of Sogdian-Turkic descent. Primary sources emphasize his illiteracy in script, yet highlight a cunning that allowed him to dictate effective strategies and feign a jovial, buffoonish demeanor—such as spilling food during imperial audiences—to cultivate trust with Xuanzong and consort . This facade masked ruthless ambition; once in power, he orchestrated purges of perceived rivals, demonstrating a capacity for that alienated even his inner circle. underpinned his troop loyalty, fostering personal bonds through shared hardships and spoils, which sustained his forces through early victories against Tang armies in 755–756. Causal analysis reveals how Tang cosmopolitan policies, favoring martial prowess in frontier generals over scholarly refinement, elevated An Lushan's flaws into systemic risks: his greed for titles and wealth, tolerated as eccentricity, eroded central oversight until mutual suspicions—exacerbated by court intrigues—precipitated . Balanced against criticisms of avarice and treachery in biased Tang compilations like the , his pre-755 loyalty in suppressing northeastern threats underscores tactical competence, suggesting provocation by impending demotion rather than innate disloyalty as a primary driver.

Family Dynamics and Descendants

An Lushan maintained a household with multiple wives and concubines, reflecting the polygamous practices common among Tang military elites of diverse origins. His principal wife, Lady Kang, bore him (c. 723–759), who rose to command units within his forces. A subsequent wife, Lady Duan, gave birth to An Qing'en, whom An Lushan particularly favored, reportedly considering him for elevation as over the elder An Qingxu. This preference extended to plans for designating An Qing'en as successor, highlighting internal tensions exacerbated by An Lushan's partiality toward Lady Duan's lineage. Such favoritism bred resentment among and his allies, culminating in the of An Lushan on January 29, 757, at , where the son orchestrated the killing amid fears of his own demotion or execution. An Lushan's other sons, including An Qingzong and at least four additional brothers to , also occupied military roles in the nascent Yan regime, drawing on familial networks intertwined with tribal loyalties from Sogdian and Turkic kin groups that facilitated early rebel cohesion and of non-Han . These kin ties provided initial operational advantages, as evidenced by the rapid mobilization of diverse steppe cavalry under 's command post-assassination. To navigate Tang hierarchies, An Lushan's family adopted Chinese administrative customs, including Sinicized surnames—An derived from Anxi commandery—and integration into the system, which masked their foreign roots while enabling ascent through meritocratic military service. Following the Yan state's collapse in 763, Tang forces executed surviving male descendants, such as An Qingzong and his brothers, as punitive measures against the rebel lineage, extinguishing direct familial threats without notable escapes or exiles recorded in contemporary .

Depictions in Literature and Culture

Du Fu's poetry provides some of the earliest and most poignant literary reflections on the , capturing the widespread devastation wrought by An's uprising in 755 CE without directly personifying the rebel leader. In "Spring View" (composed circa 757 CE), Du Fu laments the desolation of the capital , evoking images of ruined flowers and absent officials amid ongoing warfare, attributing the chaos to the rebellion's rupture of imperial order. Similarly, "Facing Snow" (circa 759 CE) describes spectral armies of the fallen haunting the landscape, underscoring the human toll of battles initiated under An Lushan's command, with rhythmic language emphasizing unrelenting grief over mythic embellishment. These works ground An's legacy in empirical suffering rather than personal caricature, distinguishing historical catastrophe from later villainous tropes. In traditional , An Lushan appears as a catalyst for dynastic tragedy, often framed through the lens of imperial favoritism toward . The opera The Palace of Eternal Life (dating to the Ming-Qing era but performed into modern times) depicts An's 755 rebellion as the precipitating event forcing Emperor Xuanzong's flight and Yang's execution by mutinous troops, portraying An as an opportunistic general exploiting court corruption rather than a singular embodiment of evil. This narrative kernel aligns with historical records of An's adoption as a foster son by Yang's family, amplifying tensions between loyalty and ambition without fabricating supernatural elements. Historical novels, such as Datang Youxia Zhuan, integrate An's revolt into frameworks, using the 755–763 conflict as a backdrop for heroic exploits amid rebellion, where An symbolizes disruptive frontier militarism grounded in Tang system's flaws. Such portrayals preserve causal realism by linking An's agency to verifiable institutional weaknesses, eschewing pure myth. Modern media adaptations tend to amplify An Lushan's brutality while occasionally mitigating his personal culpability in favor of systemic critiques. The 2023 animated film Chang'an chronicles Tang poets Li Bai and Gao Shi against the rebellion's onset, depicting An's uprising as an inadvertent historical mishap tied to court intrigue, thus diluting his hubristic drive in favor of broader Tang faults like eunuch influence and military decentralization. In television, Lady of the Dynasty (2015) frames An as the antagonist whose rebellion (755 CE) shatters the Xuanzong-Yang idyll, emphasizing his ethnic outsider status and resentment-fueled betrayal, drawn from Zizhi Tongjian accounts of his Sogdian-Turkic heritage and rapid rise. These representations, while sensationalizing violence for dramatic effect, retain historical cores like An's self-proclamation as emperor in 756 CE, serving as cautionary symbols of unchecked ambition in Chinese cultural memory without unsubstantiated legends.

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