Hubbry Logo
James Hardie IndustriesJames Hardie IndustriesMain
Open search
James Hardie Industries
Community hub
James Hardie Industries
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Contribute something
James Hardie Industries
James Hardie Industries
James Hardie Industries
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

James Hardie Industries plc is an American-Irish global building materials company and the largest global manufacturer of fibre cement products. Headquartered in Ireland, it is cross-listed on the Australian and New York Stock Exchanges. Its management team currently sits in Chicago, Illinois, United States.[5] James Hardie was plagued by several asbestos-related scandals in the 20th century.

Key Information

History

[edit]

James Hardie (27 July 1851 – 20 November 1920)[6] emigrated to Australia in 1888 from Linlithgow, Scotland, and established a business importing oils and animal hides. Andrew Reid, also from Linlithgow, came to join Hardie in Melbourne, and became a full partner in 1895.[7] When Hardie retired in 1911, he sold his half of the business to Reid.[8]

Listing on Sydney Stock Exchange and asbestos-containing products

[edit]

The company was listed on the Sydney Stock Exchange in 1951.[9] At the time, the company manufactured products out of asbestos cement sheet and other related building material.[10] By the middle of the twentieth century, James Hardie had become the largest manufacturer and distributor of building products, insulation, pipes and brake linings containing asbestos. In Australia, it operated asbestos plants in New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia. Working with the products containing asbestos – including asbestos cement – caused people to develop various pleural abnormalities such as asbestosis and malignant mesothelioma.[11] In 1961, it merged its brake lining division with Turner & Newall's Ferodo, taking a 60% shareholding in Hardie-Ferodo.[12] It purchased the remaining 40% in August 1980.[13]

Asbestos-free products

[edit]

By the mid 1980s, James Hardie invented the modern day asbestos-free fibre cement material and had transitioned production entirely to fibre cement, a product consisting largely of Portland cement, sand, and wood fibres.[14]

Relocations to the Netherlands, Ireland and the U.S.

[edit]

In December 2001, the company relocated its headquarters to the Netherlands.[15] While the move to the Netherlands resulted in tax savings of $86 million over seven years, in 2009 the Australian Taxation Office issued an amended assessment for $172 million plus interest and penalties.[16] James Hardie successfully appealed the assessment.[17] Also in 2009, the US Internal Revenue Service alleged that James Hardie had not been in compliance with the US-Dutch treaty since it had been implemented in 2006 and claimed $US37 million in unpaid taxes plus $US10 million in interest and penalties.[18]

In 2010 James Hardie moved its corporate domicile to Ireland.[19]

James Hardie currently[when?] operates a corporate office in Chicago, Illinois, United States and operates more than a dozen manufacturing plants around the world.[20]

Sponsorship and philanthropy

[edit]

James Hardie was the naming rights sponsor of the Bathurst 500/1000 from 1968 until 1987.[21] It was shirt sponsor for the Parramatta Eels from 1981 until 1995, and commenced sponsoring them again in 2025.

In 1988 James Hardie Industries made the largest donation ever made to an Australian public library when it gifted to the State Library of Queensland the meticulously developed and hugely significant Australian Library of Fine Art which was given as a bicentennial gift to the nation.[22] This collection became the James Hardie Library of Australian Fine Arts, and was part of the Arts and Rare Books Unit at the State Library.[citation needed]

Asbestos

[edit]

History

[edit]

In 1978 the effects of pleural abnormalities and other asbestos-related diseases were beginning to show up in the former mine workers. While other companies were involved in similar asbestos-related activities, most notably CSR, more than 50% of claims made to the Dust Diseases Tribunal of New South Wales in 2002 were brought against companies in the James Hardie group.[23]

There were protests against the companies' operations near the small Aboriginal Australian community of Baryulgil on the NSW North Coast, with Lyall Munro Snr[24] and the NSW Aboriginal Legal Service taking an active part in actions against the company.[25][26]

James Hardie and its subsidiaries had been providing compensation for victims of its operations since the 1980s. Though some earlier claims had arisen, the proliferation of cases from the 1980s onwards forced James Hardie to acknowledge that it had known asbestos to be dangerous. James Hardie nonetheless maintained that it had done everything possible to protect workers.[27][28] In 1978 the company began putting warning labels on its products explaining that inhalation of the dust could result in cancer.[29] In March 1987 James Hardie ceased all asbestos manufacturing activities.[30]

As concern grew about the serious adverse health effects of asbestos, in the mid-1980s James Hardie developed an asbestos-free fibre cement technology, without the dangers associated with asbestos.[31]

The MRCF and move to the Netherlands

[edit]

James Hardie had been structured as a parent company operating through subsidiaries since the 1930s. All asbestos operations, including the provision of compensation, were undertaken by James Hardie's subsidiaries, principally James Hardie and Coy and Hardie-Ferodo (later known as Jsekarb).[32]: 3  Between 1995 and 2000, James Hardie (the parent company) began to remove the assets of these subsidiaries (since renamed Amaca and Amaba respectively), while leaving them with most of the asbestos liabilities of the James Hardie group.[32]: 3 

In 2001 these two companies were separated from James Hardie and acquired by the Medical Research and Compensation Foundation (MRCF) which was essentially created in order to act as an administrator for Hardie's asbestos liabilities. Then CEO of James Hardie, Peter McDonald, made public announcements emphasising that the MRCF had sufficient funds to meet all future claims and that James Hardie would not give it any further substantial funds. Indeed, the net assets of the MRCF were $293 million, mostly in real estate and loans, and exceeded the 'best estimate' of $286 million in liabilities which had been estimated in an actuarial report commissioned by James Hardie.[33] The Jackson Report found that this 'best estimate' was 'wildly optimistic' and the estimates of future liabilities was 'far too low'.[34]

After this separation, James Hardie moved offshore to the Netherlands for what it claimed were significant tax advantages for the company and its shareholders. To make this move, the company had to assure Australian courts (as it was listed on the Australian Securities Exchange) that the MRCF would be able to meet future liabilities. The courts were assured of this and that more money would be made available to its Australian asbestos victims through the issue of partly paid shares to MRCF obliging the new Dutch parent company to meet a call for funds if it were needed. The value of the call at the time was $1.9 billion.[32]: 3 [35] The move to the Netherlands therefore proceeded. However, the tax benefits which James Hardie expected to receive as a result from its move did not eventuate following the revision of tax laws in the United States in 2001 and later with the United States signing a new trade agreement with the Netherlands in 2006.[citation needed]

Shortly after the move, an actuarial report found that James Hardie asbestos liabilities were likely to reach $574 million.[36] The MRCF sought extra funding from James Hardie and was offered $18 million in assets, an offer the MRCF rejected. The estimate of asbestos liabilities was promptly revised to $752 million in 2002 and then $1.58 billion in 2003.[37] The funding shortfall became of increasing concern in 2004 as it became clear that eligible victims would miss out on receiving compensation after it was revealed that in March 2003 James Hardie had cancelled the partly paid shares that were intended to be a safety net for the fund.[35][38] In discussing the shortfall with the MRCF, James Hardie refused to accept further responsibility for the liabilities on the basis that the MRCF and James Hardie were separate legal entities.[39]

Inquiry

[edit]

On 12 February 2004, a judicial inquiry into the matter was commissioned by the Government of New South Wales. The findings were very critical of James Hardie and its management.[40] Amongst other findings, it found that the actuarial reports commissioned by James Hardie which estimated liabilities at $286 million were inadequate because they used a financial model which made unfounded predictions on the value of investments held by Amaca and Amaba, the figures were subject to numerous unspecified conditions and they did not account for the effect of separating Amaca and Amaba from James Hardie.[33] However, the inquiry found that James Hardie was under no legal obligation to provide compensation.[41] Despite this finding, there was immense political and social pressure on James Hardie to negotiate a compensation deal;[42] governments were boycotting James Hardie products[43] and unions were threatening to instigate a global union movement against the company based on refusing to handle James Hardie products.[44]

Following the results of the inquiry, James Hardie entered into negotiations with governments and trade unions in an effort to establish some sort of compensation system for eligible victims of James Hardie's products. In December 2004, James Hardie agreed to pay compensation to the victims of its products through a voluntary compensation fund. The details of the fund were to be legally determined by June 2005 but progress was stalled and the company refused to disclose the date the deal would be finalised.[45] Further conflicts between the company and the federal government over tax deductibility of donations to the voluntary fund saw finalisation of the deal further delayed. It was not until November 2006, after the federal government had created 'black hole' tax legislation,[46] which made the contributions of James Hardie into the voluntary fund tax deductible, and had granted the voluntary fund tax-exempt status, that James Hardie finalised the compensation deal. There was immense pressure on the Federal Government from state governments, union leaders and victims to remove the tax problem.[47] The final step in giving the voluntary fund a legal structure was approval of the scheme by James Hardie shareholders. In February 2007, 99.6% of shareholders voted in favour of the scheme and it began operating days later.[48]

[edit]

After the inquiry in 2004, prosecutors were considering bringing civil and criminal charges against the CEO and other senior executives for making fraudulent statements as to the liquidity of the MRCF.[49] In February 2007 every member of the 2001 board and some members of senior management were charged by the Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) with a range of breaches of the Corporations Act 2001 including breach of director's duties by failing to act with care and diligence.[50]

ASIC also undertook investigations into possible criminal charges against the company's executives but in September 2008 the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions decided there was insufficient evidence and charges were not pursued.[51]

In 2009, the Supreme Court of New South Wales found that directors had misled the stock exchange in relation to James Hardie's ability to fund claims. They were also banned from serving as board members for five years. Former chief executive Peter Macdonald was banned for 15 years and fined $350,000 for his role in forming the MRCF and publicising it.[52][53] The former directors, excepting Macdonald, appealed and the New South Wales Court of Appeal subsequently overturned the ruling against these directors in 2010.[54] ASIC appealed against the ruling in the High Court of Australia in October 2011. In May 2012 the High Court upheld the 2009 New South Wales court decision and found that seven former James Hardie non-executive directors did mislead the stock exchange over the asbestos victims compensation fund.[54]

In August 2019, Mathew Werfel, a DIY handyman from Adelaide, won $3 million in a compensation case against James Hardie. Werfel was exposed to asbestos while pulling down fences and renovating two homes between 1990 and 2000, and was diagnosed with testicular cancer in 2017. James Hardie's products no longer contain asbestos, but Werfel's lawyer claimed the company should have done more to alert the public to the existence of asbestos in its old products, which were used in older homes.[55]

In 2021, James Hardie a New Zealand court dismissed a lawsuit claiming Harditex cladding caused weathertightness problems in New Zealand homes. The judge found that bad building methods rather than James Hardie products caused the problems.[56]

Timeline

[edit]

Timeline of key events from the Devil's Dust TV program:[57]

  • 2004: James Hardie CEO Peter MacDonald resigns, with a resignation payment of $9 million.
  • February 2007: ASIC files court proceedings against the James Hardie board as it "failed to act with requisite care and diligence" when they assured investors that the Medical Research and Compensation Foundation (MRCF) was fully funded.
  • February 2007: James Hardie shareholders, overwhelmingly approve a "compensation deal for asbestos victims worth $4 billion over the next 40 years". Meredith Hellicar, Chairwoman, resigns.
  • August 2007: Oncologist Professor Stephen Clarke diagnoses Banton with peritoneal mesothelioma, which is usually fatal within six months. Bernie files a new suit of exemplary damages against a former James Hardie subsidiary now part of the new Asbestos Injuries Compensation Fund. Judge John O'Meally (President of the Dust Diseases Tribunal) rules in favour of Banton, but the fund contests the judgement.
  • November 2007: Gravely ill, Banton gives court evidence from his bed at Concord Repatriation General Hospital. James Hardie make an offer of settlement. Compensation for Banton's "terminal mesothelioma is from the Asbestos Injuries Compensation Fund, the trust he fought to set up in 2004". Banton dies at home (on 27 November) aged 61 surrounded by his family and close friends.
  • September 2009: Journalist Matt Peacock releases his book Killer Company.
  • May 2012: The High Court of Australia finds that seven directors of the James Hardie breached their duties by approving the company's release of a misleading statement to the stock exchange that the MRCF was fully funded.

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

James Hardie Industries

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
James Hardie Industries plc is a Dublin-headquartered global building materials company specializing in fiber siding, backerboard, and fiber gypsum products for exterior and interior applications. Founded in 1888 by Scottish immigrant James Hardie in , , as a trading firm dealing in oils and hides, it evolved into a manufacturer of -based products and pioneered fiber technology in the 1980s, phasing out use by the early 1990s. With manufacturing facilities in the United States, , , the , and , it generates annual revenue exceeding $3.9 billion and employs approximately 5,800 people as the world's leading producer of fiber building solutions. The company has been defined by its historical involvement in and product manufacturing from the mid-20th century, which exposed workers and users to health risks, culminating in protracted legal battles over compensation after it relocated offshore and established an underfunded and Compensation Foundation in 2005, prompting inquiries and a reformed trust to address liabilities estimated to affect thousands.

Overview

Corporate Profile and Global Operations

James Hardie Industries plc is an Irish-domiciled public limited company with its registered headquarters in , , and management operations based in , , . The company maintains primary stock listings on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX: JHX) and the (NYSE: JHX), with a significant portion of its revenue generated from North American exterior siding markets, underscoring its operational emphasis in the . As of 2025, James Hardie employs approximately 5,860 people across its global operations and operates 19 manufacturing facilities in regions including , , , , and the . The company specializes in building products, holding the position of the world's largest producer in this category, with a focus on both sales and consumer-branded offerings such as HardiePlank siding and HardieTrim boards. Its global footprint supports efficient distribution throughout , , and the , prioritizing scalable production of durable, low-maintenance materials for residential and commercial . The 2025 acquisition of AZEK Company enhanced James Hardie's portfolio in complementary building products like decking and trim, resulting in combined net sales of $5.9 billion for the 12-month period ended December 31, 2024. For 2026, the company projects low single-digit growth in adjusted operating earnings, driven by synergies in North American markets and expanded product shelf space, while maintaining robust cash generation and peer-leading profitability margins.

Core Products and Market Position

James Hardie Industries produces a range of fiber cement building materials, including lap siding such as HardiePlank, panel siding like HardiePanel, trim boards, and backer boards for tile underlayment, along with associated accessories. These products consist of , sand, water, and fibers, yielding boards that resist fire, moisture, rot, and pests while requiring minimal maintenance. The cellulose reinforcement in current formulations enhances flexibility and impact resistance compared to rigid alternatives, supporting applications in exterior cladding for residential and light commercial structures. As the global leader in fiber cement manufacturing, James Hardie commands significant due to its scale, product durability, and adaptation to demand for low-maintenance exteriors that align with energy-efficient trends, such as improved thermal performance and reduced lifecycle costs. accounts for roughly 74% of the company's sales, driven by fiber cement's advantages over vinyl or in harsh climates and high-traffic areas. Annual production capacity in key facilities, such as the expanded plant, reaches 1 billion standard square feet of siding, enabling responsiveness to U.S. starts. Strategic partnerships bolster its position; for instance, a July 29, 2025, extension of an exclusive supply agreement with Beazer Homes through 2028 designates Hardie siding and trim as standard for all new Beazer communities nationwide, securing volume amid cyclical demand. This dominance stems from proprietary manufacturing processes that achieve consistent quality and cost efficiencies, outpacing competitors in volume and innovation for weather-resistant exteriors.

Historical Development

Founding and Early Growth in Australia

James Hardie established the company in Melbourne, Australia, in 1888 after emigrating from Scotland, initially operating as a trading business importing animal oils, tanning agents, and related materials. In 1892, Andrew Reid joined the venture, becoming a full partner by 1895, which facilitated growth through their complementary expertise in commerce and technical knowledge. The firm began importing fibre-cement products from France in 1903, reflecting early engagement with durable building materials combining cement and asbestos fibres for strength and fire resistance. World War I disruptions to imports in 1917 prompted a shift to domestic , with the company producing asbestos-cement pipes to meet demands. By 1926, Hardie had developed the Sutton process, enabling efficient production of pipes up to 3.6 meters in length as a cost-effective alternative to traditional materials. Expansion accelerated in the late 1930s with factories established in , Victoria, , Newstead (), and Riverdale (), scaling operations to supply pipes, sheets, and other fibre-cement products amid Australia's industrializing economy. Following James Hardie's retirement in 1911, leadership passed to Reid's family, sustaining innovation and market penetration. The post-World War II housing boom drove further growth, as demand surged for affordable, fire-resistant building materials in residential and commercial construction. In 1951, James Hardie Industries Ltd became a publicly listed company on the Australian Stock Exchange, accessing capital for expanded production and technological upgrades, including the introduction of autoclave processes by 1959.

Asbestos Era and Industry Context

During the 1920s to 1970s, James Hardie Industries focused on asbestos-cement products, including sheets and pipes, which constituted the majority of its output and revenue as the company refined its fiber cement formulations following initial manufacturing in 1916. integration into cement provided empirical advantages such as enhanced fire resistance, mechanical strength, and cost-effectiveness compared to alternatives like wood or metal, facilitating scalable production for roofing, cladding, and piping in residential and industrial applications. These properties aligned with causal demands of early 20th-century , where durability under and affordability drove material selection amid limited substitutes. In , James Hardie achieved market dominance in asbestos-cement, supporting national infrastructure and the post-World War II housing expansion through fibro-based building systems that enabled rapid, low-cost development. The company exported these products to regions including the and , paralleling Australia's role as a major asbestos consumer with per capita usage among the world's highest by the 1970s peak. Approximately 90% of Australia's asbestos consumption occurred in cement manufacturing, underscoring the sector's economic scale and employment contributions in processing and fabrication. Scientific scrutiny of asbestos health effects emerged in the 1960s and , with studies establishing causal links to respiratory diseases like and , though debates persisted on exposure thresholds and fiber types amid varying global data. These discussions reflected industry-wide norms, as firms in , the , and continued production under evolving exposure limits introduced from the , prioritizing established benefits until regulatory frameworks solidified.

Shift to Asbestos-Free Fibre Cement

In response to emerging health concerns and regulatory pressures on asbestos use, James Hardie Industries initiated research into alternative reinforcements for products in the early 1980s, focusing on fibers derived from wood pulp to replace asbestos. This effort culminated in the launch of the world's first commercial asbestos-free products in 1981, including Hardiflex boards and related sheeting materials, which utilized autoclaved processes to achieve structural integrity comparable to asbestos-reinforced predecessors. Empirical testing demonstrated that these -reinforced formulations maintained equivalent tensile strength, flexural performance, and fire resistance—key metrics for building applications—without the carcinogenic risks associated with asbestos fibers, as validated through internal development trials and subsequent industry standards adoption. By the mid-1980s, the company had scaled production of these innovations, collaborating with institutions like Australia's to refine curing techniques that enhanced product durability and water resistance. This proactive adaptation positioned James Hardie ahead of many global competitors, who continued use into the 1990s or later, as the firm completed its phase-out of all asbestos-containing products by 1987—over a decade before Australia's national import and use ban in 2003. The transition involved retooling manufacturing lines for pipes, sheets, and boards, ensuring seamless substitution without compromising load-bearing capacities documented in material specifications exceeding 10-15 MPa . These technological advancements preserved James Hardie's dominant position in the Australian market, where it held approximately 90% share prior to the shift, by delivering products with proven longevity in empirical field tests—such as resistance to warping and cracking over 50-year exposures—thus mitigating potential revenue losses from regulatory-driven demand drops. The asbestos-free portfolio facilitated subsequent expansion into , , and beyond, as international markets increasingly favored safer alternatives, enabling sustained revenue growth through quality-driven differentiation rather than health-compromised formulations.

Corporate Relocations and Restructuring

In 2001, James Hardie Industries undertook a major corporate reorganization, relocating its headquarters to the and establishing James Hardie Industries N.V. as the new parent entity, with the process completing on October 19. This restructuring was driven by the pursuit of fiscal advantages under Dutch law, including favorable tax treatment for holding companies and improved access to European capital markets, amid efforts to separate operational assets from mounting Australian liabilities. The move effectively deconsolidated certain Australian subsidiaries, such as Amaba Pty Ltd, into trusts prior to the shift, optimizing the group's balance sheet for global expansion. By 2010, seeking further enhancements in tax efficiency and listing flexibility, the company redomiciled from the to , transforming into James Hardie Industries plc on June 17. 's 12.5% rate and membership provided regulatory motivations, including easier compliance with international standards and reduced withholding taxes on dividends, aligning with the firm's shift toward a more international investor base. This relocation preserved by minimizing overall tax burdens, as evidenced by the company's effective average payment in dropping to near zero over the subsequent decade. In parallel during the , James Hardie reoriented its operational leadership toward , basing key executive functions in , , to capitalize on the region's dominance in , which exceeded 80% of group by the early . This partial headquarters supported gains tied to market proximity, as U.S. fiber cement demand drove structural shifts away from . Collectively, these changes facilitated avoidance of higher Australian tax exposures while bolstering stock liquidity on exchanges like the NYSE, contributing to sustained valuation growth post-restructuring.

Business Expansion and Innovations

Key Acquisitions and Market Entries

James Hardie Industries expanded its European presence through the acquisition of Fermacell, a German manufacturer of and -bonded boards, announced on November 7, 2017, and completed on April 3, 2018, for an enterprise value of €473 million in an all-cash transaction. This move diversified the company's product offerings beyond into complementary board materials, enabling market consolidation in where Fermacell held leading positions in interior and exterior applications, and added approximately 800 employees across manufacturing facilities in , , and other countries. Post-acquisition integration facilitated synergies in efficiencies and opportunities within the building products sector, strengthening James Hardie's foothold in non-residential and residential construction markets. In the United States, where James Hardie had established a dominant position in fiber cement siding, the company pursued further consolidation via the acquisition of The AZEK Company, a of low-maintenance PVC trim, decking, and outdoor living products, announced on March 24, 2025, and closed on July 1, 2025, in a cash-and-stock deal valued at approximately $8.75 billion enterprise value. The transaction integrated AZEK's environmentally focused composite materials into James Hardie's portfolio, broadening offerings for exterior home solutions and targeting synergies in distribution channels for new residential builds, where combined product lines addressed demand for durable, weather-resistant alternatives to traditional wood. This acquisition enhanced in the growing outdoor living segment, leveraging AZEK's established U.S. presence to drive cross-market penetration without overlapping core fiber cement operations. Complementing these acquisitions, James Hardie secured market entry and volume commitments through strategic partnerships, such as the exclusive supply agreement with Beazer Homes USA, extended on July 29, 2025, for three years through 2028, designating Hardie siding and trim as the standard for all new Beazer communities nationwide. Building on a 14-year relationship, this deal consolidated James Hardie's position in the U.S. single-family home construction sector by guaranteeing product specification across Beazer's build pipeline, fostering revenue stability and enabling bundled sales of fiber cement and PVC trim post-AZEK integration. Such arrangements exemplified empirical consolidation tactics, prioritizing builder exclusivity to counter competitive pressures in fragmented siding markets.

Technological Advancements in Building Materials

James Hardie Industries has advanced technology through proprietary formulations emphasizing reinforcement and low-density additives, holding over 800 patents globally, with more than 300 granted, surpassing competitors in innovations. These include methods for sized fibers that enhance composite strength and reduce waste in production, as detailed in U.S. 6,676,745. Annual R&D investments exceeding $50 million support ongoing refinements in material composition for superior weather resistance and structural integrity. A key evolution is ColorPlus® Technology, a factory-applied, baked-on finish integrated into Hardie® fiber siding that resists UV degradation, maintaining color vibrancy longer than field-applied paints. This , backed by a 15-year prorated covering peeling, cracking, and chipping, minimizes repaint cycles and associated labor costs, with empirical data showing reduced maintenance frequency compared to traditional wood or vinyl alternatives. For high-exposure applications like porches, Hardie® products incorporate enhanced formulations resistant to , rot, and pests, achieving lifespans of 30 to 50 years under proper installation, as validated by non-prorated 30-year warranties and independent durability testing. These attributes stem from fiber cement's composition—Portland cement, sand, fibers, and water—yielding noncombustible boards that outperform wood in wet environments without warping. At the 2025 International Builders' Show (IBS), James Hardie unveiled expanded offerings including the reintroduction of Hardie® Artisan® Trim with 1.5-inch-thick profiles, designed for precise architectural detailing and dimensional stability in fiber cement. Available in the U.S. from April 1, 2025, these profiles enable reduced on-site trimming labor and lower long-term upkeep costs through inherent resistance to impact and weathering. While James Hardie complies with Building Code standards via ICC-ES evaluations like ESR-2290 for exterior cladding, the industry lacks a universal calcination standard for fiber cement; instead, proprietary testing metrics underpin performance claims, contributing to elevated benchmarks in durability without formal standardization bodies adopting them universally.

Sustainability Initiatives and Recent Developments

James Hardie Industries published its fiscal year 2025 Sustainability Report on September 3, 2025, detailing progress toward environmental goals including a 14 percent reduction in Scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions compared to the prior year, achieved through region-specific short-term natural gas usage targets. The report highlights process efficiencies, such as integrating recycled materials into production and diverting waste from landfills, with the Asia Pacific region achieving 98 percent elimination of manufacturing waste to landfills by recycling it back into operations or alternative uses. Long-term targets include a 42 percent absolute reduction in Scope 1 and 2 emissions by 2030 from a 2022 baseline and zero manufacturing waste to landfill by 2035. In manufacturing, the company reported advancements in water recycling and circular supply chain practices to minimize environmental impact, aligning with broader commitments to reduce operational waste and enhance across global facilities. These initiatives build on post-2020 ESG strategies emphasizing empirical metrics over aspirational claims, with fiscal year 2025 data showing verifiable improvements in emissions intensity and waste diversion rates. Recent developments include the integration of synergies from the 2024 acquisition of The AZEK Company, contributing to enhanced product innovation in durable, low-maintenance siding and trim materials that support through extended lifecycle performance. Preliminary second quarter 2026 results, announced on October 7, 2025, indicated an improved outlook for the North American Fiber Cement and Building Products segments, driven by resilient demand and operational efficiencies that indirectly bolster ESG objectives like resource optimization. Community strengthening efforts, including and local economic contributions totaling $1.65 billion in 2025, focus on building resilient supply chains and workforce development without diverting from core environmental metrics.

Asbestos Compensation Controversy

Origins of Liability and Historical Practices

James Hardie Industries incorporated fibres into its products starting in the early , with domestic manufacturing beginning in 1916 using imported . The company's primary production facilities, located in suburbs such as and Granville, processed raw from various sources, including crocidolite (blue asbestos) mined at , from 1937 to 1966 by , which supplied the material to Australian manufacturers including James Hardie. Workers faced direct inhalation and dermal exposure during fibre handling, mixing with cement, sheet forming, and cutting processes at these plants, spanning the 1930s to the 1980s, when use was phased out. End-users, including builders, renovators, and homeowners, encountered secondary exposures from installing, , or demolishing -containing products like corrugated roofing, wall sheeting, and , which were widely marketed for durability. Waste materials from plants were often repurposed in local communities for driveways, playgrounds, and paths, amplifying para-occupational and environmental exposures. The health risks materialized primarily as and , with the first documented Australian case in a worker diagnosed in 1933, though causal links to strengthened in the amid mounting epidemiological evidence from occupational cohorts. Globally and in , pre-1980s underestimated potency, particularly for crocidolite, due to latency periods of 20–50 years and initial focus on high-dose industrial exposures rather than lower-level or amphibole-specific risks; Australian regulations on products began only in the late , reflecting this delayed recognition. incidence in rose steadily from the early , driven by cumulative exposures peaking in mid-century construction booms, with empirical claim volumes surging in the – as latent diseases manifested in former workers, tradespeople, and bystanders. James Hardie implemented dust monitoring at its facilities as early as the 1930s, with Western Australian health inspectors noting respiratory disorders among its workers by 1939, prompting initial ventilation improvements, though exposure levels remained elevated by modern standards. These measures aligned with prevailing industry norms, which tolerated asbestos use absent stringent airborne limits until the 1970s; the company continued production under ratios like 1:9 asbestos-to-cement, enhancing product strength without mandatory substitution until regulatory pressures mounted. Handling of asbestos ceased by November 1983, with full manufacturing discontinuation by 1987, consistent with broader Australian industry transitions amid evolving evidence, though early practices did not anticipate the scale of long-tail liabilities from dispersed exposures.

Establishment of MRCF and Funding Shortfalls

In February 2001, James Hardie Industries undertook a corporate reorganization that involved demerging its Australian asbestos-mining and manufacturing subsidiaries, Amaca Pty Ltd and Amaba Pty Ltd, from the parent company, which was relocating its domicile to the . As part of this structure, the Medical Research Compensation Foundation (MRCF) was established to assume responsibility for all present and future asbestos-related claims against these subsidiaries. The MRCF received an initial capitalization of A$293 million, derived primarily from asset transfers and contributions by the subsidiaries, with the explicit intention that this fixed sum would render the foundation self-sufficient to meet "all legitimate compensation claims" indefinitely, without further recourse to the restructured parent company. This arrangement was predicated on actuarial assessments projecting total liabilities at approximately A$239–293 million, factoring in expected claim volumes, disease progression timelines, and settlement costs based on historical data up to 2000. The rationale emphasized shielding the ongoing fiber-cement business and its shareholders from the unpredictable, potentially open-ended exposures inherent in common-law systems, where liability for long-tail diseases like and could escalate due to evolving medical evidence, litigation trends, and judicial interpretations of . By ring-fencing liabilities in a standalone , the reorganization sought to enhance corporate viability post-relocation, prioritizing finite funding over perpetual corporate obligation. Notwithstanding these projections, funding shortfalls materialized rapidly due to causal misalignments between modeled assumptions and empirical realities. Actual claim inflows exceeded forecasts, with the MRCF disbursing over A$100 million in its first two years alone, driven by higher-than-anticipated incidence of late-onset diseases and associated legal expenses. By mid-2004, updated actuarial reviews, including those referencing prior KPMG-influenced valuations, indicated liabilities surpassing A$1 billion when incorporating revised mortality curves, increased claimant survival rates, and broader eligibility under Australian negligence doctrines—revealing underestimations rooted in overly conservative incidence rates and inadequate provisioning for defense costs. These disconnects stemmed from the inherent uncertainties in extrapolating from incomplete historical datasets to future common-law outcomes, where causal chains of exposure-to-disease liability proved more expansive than initially parameterized. The foundation's assets dwindled to critical levels by 2004, underscoring the limitations of fixed-fund models in jurisdictions without statutory caps on recoveries. The Special Commission of Inquiry, chaired by David Jackson QC and established by the government in 2003, released its report on September 21, 2004, examining the establishment of the Medical Research and Compensation Foundation (MRCF) in 2001 and James Hardie Industries' liabilities. The inquiry determined that the company and its senior executives, including then-CEO Peter Macdonald and CFO Peter Shafron, engaged in deceptive conduct by publicly representing the MRCF as fully funded for future claims, despite internal projections indicating liabilities exceeding A$1.5 billion while initial funding totaled only A$293 million plus shares projected to yield A$1.1 billion. Jackson criticized the 2001 corporate restructuring, which separated the MRCF from James Hardie ahead of its relocation to the , as designed to limit exposure to liabilities without adequate provision, constituting a breach of continuous disclosure obligations and misleading the public and regulators. The report recommended criminal investigations into potential breaches of the Corporations Act and Trade Practices Act, highlighting governance failures where the board prioritized over claimant security. Following the Jackson findings, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) initiated proceedings in 2006 against former James Hardie directors and executives for alleged contraventions of directors' duties and misleading disclosures regarding funding. In October 2009, the Supreme Court ruled that executives, including Macdonald and Shafron, breached section 180(1) of the Corporations Act by failing to exercise due care and diligence, and that announcements to the Australian Stock Exchange in February 2001 overstated the MRCF's capacity, leading to penalties including fines up to A$30,000 and disqualifications from directorships for up to five years. However, the New South Wales Court of Appeal in December 2010 overturned convictions for most non-executive directors, reducing some fines to A$25,000 and shortening disqualifications to three years, citing insufficient evidence of personal fault in the decisions. ASIC appealed to the High Court of Australia, which in May 2012 unanimously held that seven former non-executive directors breached their duty of care and diligence under section 180(1) by approving public statements without verifying the MRCF's funding adequacy against internal actuarial estimates, emphasizing that reliance on management advice did not absolve them of independent inquiry obligations. Separate High Court rulings in later cases, such as in 2019, rejected appeals by James Hardie-related entities seeking to apportion liability for indivisible asbestos diseases based on exposure location, affirming full responsibility for Australian-sourced products even amid international exposure, thereby upholding the indivisibility principle in tort law. These proceedings imposed direct taxpayer costs through state-funded inquiries and regulatory enforcement, with the Jackson Inquiry alone costing over A$20 million in public expenditure. Internationally, James Hardie faced class actions in the United States, including lawsuits in courts alleging liability for deaths linked to exported products used by American workers in the 1960s and 1970s, with claims that the company evaded through restructuring but was compelled to defend on substantive grounds of in product warnings. These actions paralleled Australian challenges by asserting extraterritorial reach of doctrines, though outcomes emphasized jurisdictional hurdles over liability merits in early stages.

Resolutions, Ongoing Obligations, and Empirical Outcomes

In December 2004, James Hardie entered into a Heads of Agreement with Australian unions and asbestos victim groups, establishing the framework for ongoing compensation via the Medical Research and Compensation Foundation (MRCF), later restructured as the Injuries Compensation Fund (AICF), with commitments including annual payments, a 40-year minimum term, and no cap on victim payouts beyond initial buffers. This was formalized through the Amended and Restated Final Funding Agreement (AFFA) effective February 29, 2012, under which James Hardie pledged long-term contributions projected to exceed A$4 billion in total funding to the AICF by approximately 2045, including potential final payments to cover residual liabilities. As of March 31, 2025, the AICF remains solvent per annual actuarial valuations by , which assess liabilities against projected claims and confirm funding adequacy through James Hardie's contributions, primarily sourced from its Australian subsidiary's operating profits; the latest report estimates liabilities met by the trust without immediate shortfalls, though elevated claim volumes necessitate ongoing adjustments. Amid James Hardie's 2025 merger with The AZEK Company, anti-asbestos organizations, including victim advocacy groups, demanded explicit assurances that the company would not divest or undermine AICF obligations, citing risks to long-term viability from corporate restructuring. Empirical data on claims processing reveal sustained payouts, with average mesothelioma compensations around A$295,000 per case as of –16, scaling with and incidence; however, mesothelioma claims rose 5% in the 2017–18 financial year compared to the prior year, driving a A$196 million increase in projected liabilities to A$1.853 billion at that time and underscoring latency effects in asbestos diseases. metrics from actuarial reviews indicate the AICF has disbursed over A$1 billion in contributions from James Hardie by , with cumulative payments enabling compensation for thousands of claims while litigation persists, incurring administrative and legal costs estimated to divert resources from direct victim support. These outcomes reflect effective containment post-2012 but highlight ongoing fiscal pressures from unpredictable claim surges, with no evidence of default yet observed.

Financial Performance and Shareholder Dynamics

Revenue Growth and Profitability Metrics

James Hardie Industries' revenue grew substantially from the early 2000s, when annual figures approximated AUD 1 billion amid operational disruptions from historical asbestos liabilities, to over USD 3 billion by fiscal year 2025, propelled by expanding demand for durable fiber cement products in residential construction. This trajectory reflected a compound annual growth rate exceeding 10% in key periods, with North American sales comprising the majority, fueled by fiber cement siding's rising share in US single-family home exteriors, where it accounted for 22% of materials by 2024. In FY2025, ending March 31, 2025, the company reported trailing twelve-month of USD 3.79 billion, a 4.74% decline from the prior year due to softer housing volumes and customer inventory adjustments, yet profitability metrics remained robust with adjusted EBITDA of USD 1.02 billion, yielding margins around 27%. reached USD 803 million, supported by adjusted of USD 955 million and efficient management, underscoring resilience amid cyclical demand. The siding segment, where James Hardie commands approximately 90% of the fiber market, continued as the primary growth driver, benefiting from long-term trends like preference for low-maintenance, fire-resistant exteriors over vinyl alternatives.
Fiscal Year (USD Billion)Adjusted EBITDA Margin (%) (USD Million)
Early 2000s (approx.)~1.0 (AUD equiv.)N/AN/A
FY20243.90~28N/A
FY20253.7927803
Export markets in and contributed ancillary growth, with fiber cement demand tied to and , though these regions represented under 20% of total revenue. Overall, profitability hinged on volume leverage in high-margin operations, where pricing discipline offset input cost volatility, positioning the company for recovery as housing starts stabilize.

Major Transactions and Investor Relations

In March 2025, James Hardie Industries plc announced a merger agreement to acquire The AZEK Company Inc., a U.S.-based manufacturer of outdoor living products, in a cash-and-stock transaction valued at approximately $14 billion. The deal offered AZEK s $26.45 in cash plus 1.034 shares of James Hardie per AZEK share, aiming to combine James Hardie's fiber expertise with AZEK's decking and railing portfolio to form a diversified exterior building products platform with projected accelerated growth and enhanced profitability. The acquisition closed on July 1, 2025, without requiring a shareholder vote from James Hardie investors, leading to immediate stock volatility attributed to the deal's dilutive effects and high acquisition premium amid market uncertainty in building materials demand. To finance the transaction, James Hardie successfully syndicated $700 million in senior secured notes due 2031 and $1 billion due 2032 through private offerings, demonstrating strong appetite despite the deal's scale and the company's ongoing asbestos-related liabilities. CEO Erter acknowledged dilution concerns, expressing regret over the surprise element but emphasizing the strategic necessity for diversification to mitigate cyclical risks in core siding markets, with post-deal vows to rebuild trust through transparent communication and value-accretive integration. James Hardie maintains dual listings on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX: JHX) and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE: JHX), with the AZEK merger preserving this structure while delisting AZEK from the NYSE, which contributed to short-term share price pressure on both exchanges due to perceived overpayment risks but positioned the combined entity for broader U.S. market access. The company has sustained a progressive dividend policy, distributing ordinary and special dividends in U.S. cents per share, such as the FY21 special dividend of US$0.70, reflecting cash flow generation capabilities that supported investor returns even amid transaction-related capital allocation shifts. Investor relations efforts post-merger have focused on empirical demonstrations of synergies, including cost efficiencies and revenue uplift from cross-selling, to counter volatility drivers like premium pricing in a high-interest-rate environment.

Criticisms and Balanced Perspectives

Stakeholder Critiques on Corporate Governance

Stakeholder groups, particularly asbestos victim advocacy organizations, have criticized James Hardie's 2001-2003 corporate restructuring and relocation to the as a form of designed to shield the majority of company assets from Australian asbestos liabilities. These critiques portray the move as prioritizing over moral obligations to victims, with claims that it evaded responsibilities inherent to the company's historical practices. In 2009, initial court findings held that former James Hardie directors and executives had approved misleading announcements to the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) regarding the adequacy of the $293 million Medical Research and Compensation Foundation (MRCF) established in 2001 to cover claims, implying the liability was fully resolved when it was not. These determinations were partially overturned on appeal, with the Court of Appeal in 2010 ruling that non-executive directors did not approve the specific misleading release, though the ASX statement itself was deemed deceptive. Victim groups continue to cite such episodes as evidence of failures that undermined trust. As of April 2025, anti-asbestos organizations expressed fears that James Hardie might abandon ongoing support for the successor Injuries Compensation Fund (AICF), seeking formal assurances amid the company's international operations and past restructurings. Media coverage has often framed these governance issues as a profound moral failing, emphasizing deception over contextual industry norms where firms restructured to manage legacy liabilities amid uncertain actuarial projections. Counterarguments from perspectives highlight empirical outcomes: several director prosecutions resulted in acquittals or reduced penalties on appeal, with non-executive directors securing reversals of bans and fines in 2010 and 2012, indicating insufficient of deliberate . Moreover, James Hardie has fulfilled funding commitments, contributing over $2.2 billion to asbestos-related compensation, , and by May 2024, including up to 35% of annual to the AICF under a agreement. These payments rebut claims of total evasion, aligning with legal ring-fencing strategies common in multinational firms facing indeterminate long-tail liabilities.

Achievements in Risk Management and Industry Transition

James Hardie Industries demonstrated foresight in risk mitigation by phasing out from its product lines in the early 1980s, prior to widespread regulatory bans in . Production of asbestos-containing materials, such as Hardiflex sheets, ended by 1981, reducing ongoing health exposures and potential liabilities for the company. This transition was driven by internal recognition of asbestos hazards, allowing the firm to pivot toward safer alternatives without abrupt operational shutdowns. Complementing this shift, James Hardie invested in of asbestos-free fiber cement technologies, which preserved manufacturing jobs and production capacity in . By innovating proprietary formulations using fibers and composites, the company maintained its market position in building products while eliminating reliance on the hazardous mineral. This proactive adaptation not only mitigated regulatory and reputational risks but also positioned the firm for export growth, leveraging Australian expertise in fiber cement processes. In managing legacy asbestos liabilities, James Hardie established the Medical Research and Compensation Foundation (MRCF) in 2001 as an innovative self-funding entity to handle claims, avoiding insolvency that could have halted operations entirely. As of May 2024, contributions from the company have exceeded $2.2 billion toward victim compensation, medical research, and awareness programs, supported by ongoing commitments including up to 35% of annual free cash flow. Guarantees totaling at least $4 billion and a minimum 40-year funding horizon further underscore this mechanism's role in stabilizing long-term obligations over potential corporate collapse. The industry's transition facilitated by James Hardie extended to global , sustaining Australian employment through diversified operations while exporting fiber cement innovations to high-demand markets like the . This expansion utilized domestically honed techniques, supporting ongoing jobs in , production, and without dependence on asbestos-era assets. Overall, these efforts exemplified diversification, transforming a liability-laden legacy into a foundation for sustained economic contributions.

Broader Implications for Corporate Liability

The James Hardie asbestos litigation highlighted tensions in frameworks, where aggressive enforcement of parent company responsibility for subsidiary debts can undermine the limited liability principle central to modern . This approach, by to access ongoing operations, risks destabilizing solvent entities capable of long-term claim payments, as evidenced by heightened director accountability standards in post-inquiry. Such precedents may deter multinational restructurings aimed at isolating historical risks, fostering a on cross-border investments in mature industries. Unlimited liability for latent risks like discourages capital allocation to legacy sectors, as firms anticipate retrospective claims eroding future value; in the U.S., asbestos-related insurer losses reached $92 billion by 2019, contributing to widespread corporate bankruptcies and of . Comparatively, Australian cases involving James Hardie and CSR demonstrated that sustained operations enabled cumulative payouts exceeding initial estimates without total , underscoring how preservation facilitates ongoing victim funding over windfalls. Capped funding mechanisms, such as isolated trusts, mitigate these distortions by ring-fencing liabilities while preserving enterprise viability, a strategy increasingly adopted globally for long-tail exposures. Hindsight-driven regulation amplifies these issues by imposing costs unforeseeable at the time of , creating perverse incentives against R&D in materials and chemicals where latency periods span decades. Empirical patterns show regulated firms reduce when compliance burdens escalate with scale, as uncertainty elevates the effective cost of experimentation. Policy analyses emphasize that ex post liability systems, prone to , often exceed prospective regulatory efficiency, inflating societal costs through prolonged litigation rather than predefined caps. Inquiries into such liabilities, while yielding accountability, impose substantial opportunity costs on communities via diverted resources and delayed resolutions, with Australian probes into asbestos funds exemplifying billions in legal expenditures that could alternatively support compensation. Prioritizing corporate aligns with causal incentives for enduring victim protection, as viable firms generate taxable revenues and employment sustaining national compensation schemes, contrasting adversarial models that prioritize immediate extraction over systemic resilience. Balanced reforms favoring negotiated, capped settlements thus emerge as empirically superior for allocating scarce resources in high-risk industries.

References

  1. https://ir.jameshardie.com.au/about-jhx/company-profile
  2. https://pitchbook.com/profiles/company/42013-00
  3. https://www.jameshardie.com.au/company-history
  4. https://www.jameshardie.com/all-about-james-hardie/
  5. https://ir.jameshardie.com.au/
  6. https://www.jameshardie.ca/about-us/our-company
  7. https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/JHX/james-hardie-industries/revenue
  8. https://www.asbestossafety.gov.au/sites/asea/files/documents/2017-10/ASEA_Reports_Asbestos_International_Australian_contexts_ACC.pdf
  9. https://www.nsw.gov.au/the-cabinet-office/special-commissions-of-inquiry/medical-research-and-compensation-foundation
  10. https://www.asbestossafety.gov.au/sites/asea/files/documents/2017-12/ASEA_National_Asbestos_Profile_interactive_Nov17.pdf
  11. https://www.jameshardie.com/all-about-james-hardie/press-releases/performance/james-hardie-industries-celebrates-grand-opening-of-new-us-headquarters/
  12. https://ir.jameshardie.com.au/stock-info/asx-jhx
  13. https://www.jameshardie.com/all-about-james-hardie/press-releases/performance/james-hardie-and-azek-to-combine-leading-building-products-growth/
  14. https://www.jameshardie.com/all-about-james-hardie/press-releases/performance/james-hardie-releases-annual-sustainability-report-2025/
  15. https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/fibre-cement-maker-james-hardies-full-year-profit-falls-9-2025-05-20/
  16. https://www.jameshardie.com/all-about-james-hardie/press-releases/performance/james-hardie-completes-acquisition-of-azek/
  17. https://www.jameshardie.com/blog/siding-types/what-is-fiber-cement-siding/
  18. https://www.jameshardie.com/product-catalog/exterior-siding-products/hardie-architectural-panel-siding/
  19. https://www.jameshardie.co.nz/about-us/why-fibre-cement
  20. https://ir.jameshardie.com.au/news/press-releases/detail/95/james-hardie-industries-announces-appointment-of-samara
  21. https://csimarket.com/stocks/segments.php?code=JHX
  22. https://www.jameshardie.com/all-about-james-hardie/press-releases/performance/james-hardie-announces-the-expansion-of-its-u-s-manufacturing-facility-in-prattville-alabama/
  23. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/james-hardie-building-products-inc-and-beazer-homes-extend-relationship-with-new-exclusive-agreement-302515472.html
  24. https://ir.jameshardie.com.au/news/press-releases/detail/96/james-hardie-announces-preliminary-second-quarter-results
  25. https://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/james-hardie-industries-n-v-history/
  26. https://asbestosawarenessaustralia.com.au/asbestos-history-australia/
  27. https://www.australianasbestosnetwork.org.au/asbestos-history/asbestos-home-3/building-materials/
  28. https://ir.jameshardie.com.au/financial-information/sec-filings/content/0001159152-24-000018/0001159152-24-000018.pdf
  29. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5858453/
  30. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5137554/
  31. https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/15/11/8492
  32. https://www.cascade.app/studies/jameshardie-strategy-study
  33. https://www.jameshardie.com.au/fibre-cement
  34. https://www.iibcc.biz/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IIBCC2014-Proceedings-Fiber-cement-industry-critical-review-conversion-asbestos-cement-new-technology-including-marketing-trends.pdf
  35. https://www.asbestos.co.nz/differences-between-asbestos-and-fibre-cement/
  36. https://paintthetriangle.com/when-did-james-hardie-stop-using-asbestos/
  37. https://www.airsafe.net.au/news/james-hardie-and-asbestos-compensation/
  38. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0363811106000658
  39. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0958946504001428
  40. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1159152/000089256906000742/a20766exv99w1.htm
  41. https://www.afr.com/politics/james-hardies-move-to-the-netherlands-gets-the-nod-from-its-shareholders-20011017-k16sy
  42. https://www.smh.com.au/business/james-hardie-a-shell-of-its-former-self-inquiry-told-20040508-gdivum.html
  43. https://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/j/ASX_JHX_2010.pdf
  44. https://www.independent.ie/business/world/james-hardie-plans-to-move-corporate-base-to-ireland/26546027.html
  45. https://www.smh.com.au/business/james-hardie-paid-an-average-of-0-in-corporate-tax-over-past-decade-20140929-10nntx.html
  46. https://www.morningstar.com/stocks/xasx/jhx/quote
  47. https://ir.jameshardie.com.au/financial-information/sec-filings/content/0000950123-10-025615/a55301orfv4.htm
  48. https://www.internationaltaxreview.com/article/b1fbsjqvj23bgw/james-hardie-wins-australian-capital-gains-tax-battle
  49. https://ir.jameshardie.com.au/news/press-releases/detail/21/james-hardie-completes-acquisition-of-fermacell
  50. https://d1io3yog0oux5.cloudfront.net/_9af8e96d90976cc7a41876639c9dc977/jameshardie/news/2018-04-03_James_Hardie_Completes_Acquisition_of_21.pdf
  51. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/james-hardie-completes-acquisition-azek-130000160.html
  52. https://www.jameshardie.com/all-about-james-hardie/press-releases/performance/james-hardie-and-beazer-homes-extend-relationship/
  53. https://hbsdealer.com/james-hardie-partners-beazer-homes
  54. https://insights.greyb.com/james-hardie-patents/
  55. https://www.jameshardie.com/why-james-hardie/innovations-siding-products/
  56. https://www.jameshardie.com/blog/siding-types/colorplus-technology-finishes-by-james-hardie-the-facts-behind-the-finish/
  57. https://www.dunnlumber.com/james-hardie-colorplus-hardieplank-lap-siding-cedarmill-5-16x8-12-statement-collection-assorted-colors-hpkcpcd-00.html
  58. https://www.jameshardie.com/why-james-hardie/siding-performance-durability/
  59. https://firstamericanroofing.com/blog/how-long-does-hardie-board-last/
  60. https://www.jameshardie.com/blog/siding-durability/any-look-any-style/
  61. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/james-hardie-to-unveil-new-and-expanded-hardie-products-at-nahb-international-builders-show-in-las-vegas-302369467.html
  62. https://www.jameshardie.com/all-about-james-hardie/press-releases/products/james-hardie-expands-hardie-architectural-and-hardie-artisan-offerings/
  63. https://icc-es.org/wp-content/uploads/report-directory/ESR-2290.pdf
  64. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/james-hardie-releases-annual-sustainability-report-302545647.html
  65. https://www.jameshardie.com/all-about-james-hardie/sustainability-esg-initiatives/
  66. https://assets.ctfassets.net/dzi2asncd44t/5jWpMtnrYu30RiNoEVBDge/30b8ef93fac91e8cd6e6f7abd4dcc229/JHX_Sustainability_Report_FY2025_FINAL.pdf
  67. https://www.jameshardie.com/all-about-james-hardie/sustainability-esg-initiatives/environment-sustainability/
  68. https://www.stocktitan.net/news/JHX/james-hardie-releases-annual-sustainability-kj1wufoqb53e.html
  69. https://www.ibasecretariat.org/jm_book_rev_killer_company.php
  70. https://www.epa.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/120919jameshardiereport.pdf
  71. https://www.asbestos.com/mesothelioma/australia/
  72. https://www.australianasbestosnetwork.org.au/asbestos-history/health-disaster-2/beginning/
  73. https://www.asbestossafety.gov.au/history-asbestos
  74. https://www.mja.com.au/journal/2011/195/5/increasing-incidence-malignant-mesothelioma-after-exposure-asbestos-during-home
  75. https://adss.org.au/history-of-asbestos/
  76. https://aithor.com/essay-examples/james-hardie-asbestos-case-history
  77. https://cabinet.qld.gov.au/documents/2015/Oct/AsbestosReport/Attachments/Report.pdf
  78. https://www.australianasbestosnetwork.org.au/asbestos-history/battles-2/battling-james-hardie/
  79. https://ir.jameshardie.com.au/financial-information/sec-filings/content/0000950137-06-010539/a19156exv4w25.htm
  80. https://www.actu.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/media171195James-Hardie-Fact-Sheet-080207.doc
  81. https://www.smh.com.au/business/james-hardie-release-misleading-inquiry-20040810-gdjipm.html
  82. https://www.businessinsurance.com/ex-james-hardie-execs-face-charges-in-australia/
  83. https://www.cnn.com/2004/BUSINESS/07/14/australia.hardie/
  84. https://www.ibasecretariat.org/lka_james_hardie_cond.php
  85. https://www.afr.com/politics/hardies-asbestos-battle-20040407-jkk5w
  86. https://www.turnerfreeman.com.au/personal-injury/asbestos-disease-compensation/case-studies/james-hardie-commission-of-inquiry/
  87. https://ir.jameshardie.com.au/financial-information/sec-filings/content/0000950137-04-008064/0000950137-04-008064.pdf
  88. https://ir.jameshardie.com.au/financial-information/sec-filings/content/0000892569-04-000700/0000892569-04-000700.pdf
  89. https://www.asx.com.au/asxpdf/20040607/pdf/3lss6ftjtjwgy.pdf
  90. https://ir.jameshardie.com.au/financial-information/sec-filings/content/0000950137-04-011272/a04190exv99w1.htm
  91. https://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/06globalsociety/Jackson.pdf
  92. https://www.smh.com.au/business/hardie-misled-community-inquiry-finds-20040922-gdjs51.html
  93. https://www.actu.org.au/media-release/jackson-inquiry-says-james-hardie-must-pay/
  94. https://ir.jameshardie.com.au/financial-information/sec-filings/content/0000950137-04-008099/a02075exv99w1.htm
  95. https://www.actu.org.au/media-release/justice-for-james-hardies-asbestos-victims-as-the-high-court-finds-ex-directors-breached-their-duties/
  96. https://www.swaab.com.au/publication/james-hardie-directors-free-to-re-enter-boardrooms
  97. https://www.financierworldwide.com/implications-of-the-james-hardie-judgment-for-directors-in-australia
  98. https://www.moray.com.au/insights-media-events/publications/insurance-directions/march-2019/james-hardie-fully-liable-where-international-exposure-to-asbestos
  99. https://www.westernsydney.edu.au/newscentre/news_centre/expert_opinion_stories/james_hardie_litigation_a_staggering_cost_to_the_community
  100. https://www.mesothelioma-lung-cancer.org/news/mesothelioma-news-0028.htm
  101. https://www.actu.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/media275620HOA1.pdf
  102. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1159152/000119312512292232/d355937dex428.htm
  103. https://www.listcorp.com/asx/jhx/james-hardie-industries-plc/news/kpmg-actuarial-report-31-march-2025-3191965.html
  104. https://www.afr.com/companies/manufacturing/asbestos-victims-want-compensation-assurances-from-james-hardie-20250408-p5lq5m
  105. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-22/james-hardie-profit-tumbles-on-mounting-asbestos-claims/9786850
  106. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1159152/000119312515252093/d62874dex998.htm
  107. https://ir.jameshardie.com.au/financial-information/sec-filings/content/0001159152-19-000048/ex996kpmgactuarial.htm
  108. https://companiesmarketcap.com/james-hardie-industries/revenue/
  109. https://www.fitchratings.com/research/corporate-finance/fitch-upgrades-james-hardie-to-bbb-outlook-stable-11-09-2024
  110. https://ir.jameshardie.com.au/news/press-releases/detail/87/james-hardie-achieves-fy25-guidance-issues-fy26-guidance
  111. https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/JHX/key-statistics/
  112. https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20250520079197/en/James-Hardie-Achieves-FY25-Guidance-Issues-FY26-Guidance-for-Organic-Sales-and-Adjusted-EBITDA-Growth
  113. https://www.marketresearchfuture.com/reports/us-siding-market-17834
  114. https://hbsdealer.com/sales-income-drop-james-hardie
  115. https://www.afr.com/companies/manufacturing/the-deal-is-done-james-hardie-ceo-vows-to-rebuild-trust-20251023-p5n4nj
  116. https://ir.jameshardie.com.au/news/press-releases/detail/83/james-hardie-and-azek-to-combine-creating-a-leading
  117. https://www.solactive.com/acquisition-azek-company-inc-1st-july-2025/
  118. https://www.hsfkramer.com/insights/2025-05/the-james-hardie-azek-merger-investor-backlash-and-asxs-response
  119. https://ir.jameshardie.com.au/news/press-releases/detail/91/james-hardie-industries-plc-announces-successful-closing-of
  120. https://research.ftserussell.com/products/index-notices/home/getnotice/?id=2616323
  121. https://ir.jameshardie.com.au/stock-info/dividends
  122. https://www.afr.com/companies/hardie-moved-to-protect-assets-court-told-20080930-j8zvb
  123. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/223885098_Pursuing_shareholder_value_The_rhetoric_of_James_Hardie
  124. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-04-23/judgement-day-for-james-hardie-execs/1659848
  125. https://download.asic.gov.au/media/1310881/Article-James-Hardie-20101221.pdf
  126. https://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/central-queensland/james-hardie-directors-mislead-asx/news-story/89683637012bd6c782da237c93e0db47
  127. https://www.afr.com/politics/hardie-executives-lashed-over-asbestos-deception-20040701-jlwu7
  128. https://studycorgi.com/james-hardie-industries-managing-under-uncertainty/
  129. https://www.brightlaw.com.au/james-hardie-directors-win-appeal/
  130. https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/former-james-hardie-directors-win-appeal/pqmnokit0
  131. https://www.jameshardie.com.au/ContentfulCMS/General/Asbestos_Fact_Sheet_James_Hardie.pdf
  132. https://assets.ctfassets.net/rg5y8r6t6cjr/6uQy0WwiP8TuhKQt1X7hgY/fc84a241fa6c1583e9cb320d6af34e3b/Asbestos_Factsheet_and_FAQ_as_at_Q1_2019.pdf
  133. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB110361658030805796
  134. https://www.nzlii.org/nz/journals/CanterLawRw/2021/4.pdf
  135. https://www.asbestos.com/mesothelioma-lawyer/asbestos-litigation/
  136. https://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/PDF-technical/integrated-reporting/rr-130-001.pdf
  137. https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2023/04/quarterly-insights/new-market-emerges-for-legacy-liability-dispositions
  138. https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/809/
  139. https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/does-regulation-hurt-innovation-study-says-yes
  140. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7233130/
  141. https://www.bca.com.au/bca-response-to-release-of-james-hardie-report
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
Contribute something
User Avatar
No comments yet.